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Interpretation
of
Plato's Socrates
University
of Chicago
shall
try
question
meaning in a
the
of a segment of
Platonic
The dialogues to
and
which
want
to draw
attention are
those
be
tween the
Theaetetus I
mean
the
Phaedo;
and
before
doing
by
"between."
That
explanation
meaning
of structure
logues
"between"
be, by
reckoning, the
the dialogues
a
ones
in that
order.
Of course, the
in
which
largely
conjectural,
and whatever
depends
on
of that order
another
order
which a number of
the
dialogues, especially
may be
aetetus and
the
Phaedo,"
can
be
certainty, namely,
dramatic
order.
If the
order of composition
which
dialogues,
called
the order
in
Of the
author's
order reveals
going to suppose not only that Plato's intention is more distinctly inferrable from the dramatic order in which he placed his inventions than any poietic order is
evidence
to
our comprehension of
as a thinker.
to the latter
intention may lie concealed within his development; after all, his development is the growth or decline of his intention; yet even if only to follow the course with to mean dra the less speculative premise, I shall throughout consider
"structure"
matic order.
The Theaetetus is
more
recounted
others,
the words
sented as
must go
having
been
spoken.
ends with
saying that he
to the
stoa of meet
the
king
in
order
to answer to Meletus's
indictment, but
that he expects to
sation.
the company
again
By
of
with
in the morning to continue the conver this brief passage, Plato indicates that the
at
trilogy Euthyphro,
cluding
Theaetetus, Sophist
Statesman is
least
a quartet
the dialogue that takes place at the porch of the king. The same con
that the quartet occurs within weeks or months of
Prepared for
delivery
at the
1979 Annual
Meeting of the
156
Interpretation
Socrates'
the end of
need to
as
a component of on
the
into
which
Plato
cast
it. This
that the
argument
the civil and theoretical implications of piety toward gods and fathers
articulated with the arguments presented
should
be
connection of
Socrates that that group of dialogues is linked in dramatic time with the famous trilogy of Apology of Socrates, Crito, and Phaedo. In crowding
a
in time, Plato signifies his conception of them unity that it is convenient to call the dramatic end of
"structure"
Of
ute
how the
supposition of and
this
of
could contrib
the disclosure
Plato's thought. An
end
easy
Socrates'
an account of
his indict
limits
of
the
an enhanced version of
the trial
of
Socrates. This
trilogy for in
terpretation, that the center of gravity of the seven dialogues is the judgment of Socrates in a sense that is dominated by his civic indictment even though it tran
scends
his
his
own
defense. I
shall
try
of what
follows,
that
useful
be, it
be
stated
seven
dialogues
are examined
concretely,
they
point to a
larger
structure of contain
cause
it does
Platonic dialogues, a larger structure that interests us be a judgment of Socrates, but on so broad a plan as to leave
by
Specifically,
trilogy
will
be
three dia
of of
logues are, in different ways, penetrated by the presence of two famous rivals Socrates, Protagoras and Parmenides. Protagoras is important to the argument
the
Theaetetus,
so
long
speech
in
which
views on
perception,
motion and
knowledge
ration.
his
enthusiastic admi
Theodorus,
if
sometimes reluctant
with reservations.
His
although
not
because Protagoreanism is
and
Simmias
we
turn to the
spirit
Kebes, the Pythagoreans, similar things will be said below when Phaedo.) As one might say, the Theaetetus is suffused with the of Protagoras; but it is not for that reason an un-Socratic dialogue, rather if
anything the reverse: Eucleides reports that he wrote this conversation down and that in the course of doing so, he would consult Socrates whenever he needed
help
the
place
in clearing up a doubtful point. This consultation would have to have taken in the short and presumably preoccupied period between the indictment and
of
execution
Socrates.
active
collaboration
of
Plato'
Socrates
the
157 Theaetetus
contains an
written
preservation,
autobiog
Socrates,
another
his
obstetric
autobiography,
with a view
in
order
Phaedo
superficially un-Socratic dialogue. has been made of the Protagoreanism of the Theaetetus; but there is a dialogue called Protagoras, in which the thought of Protagoras is obviously prominent. Do the Protagoreanisms of Theaetetus and Protagoras harmonize?
point
Why
and of
are
two
Protagorean dialogues
the Theaetetus
necessary?
Whatever the
gravitate
answers to these
questions
may be,
and
Protagoras
the Protagoras
becomes
attached a
by
line
same
way,
line
of attachment
and
the other,
for Parmenides
is
as
tagoras
a
actively present in the latter dialogues through the Eleatic Stranger as Pro is in the Theaetetus. The recurrence of themes in the Platonic dialogues is
would
lead to the
attachment of the
Meno to
our
growing
structure
Phaedo.
matic,
by the link of the doctrine of anamnesis, employed prominently in the Many other examples could be given. If carefully pursued, the dra
and personal
thematic,
ligatures
would
include
some
large part,
perhaps
all,
of
I have
rather
far in
order
Plato in the
construction of
it.
of
Raising
not
the
question
is
meant
to
set aside
by
but because it is
not what
Socratism
be
reckoned with.
The
presence of non-Socratic
in
which
Socrates
sur
privilege claimed
by introductions,
will
introduce it
would
non-
not
to
assume
that Plato
fashioned his
it
with
Socratics merely to
while
mirror
for Socrates to deflate every living and dead pretender to understanding beginning with Homer. It cannot be denied that Socrates is shown slaying his thousands; but his antagonists often have little
sketching that world, to set the scene
enough
to
say for
put
Plato does
cause
his
Socrates to
the armies of the fee-takers to the sword, but he also shows him at
without a proclamation
borrowed from
unidentified armories
that
belong
to other champions
Plato's
did
by
us.
I have in mind, to
give one
of
invisible
and
158
Interpretation
intelligibles
most real
by
which and
by
which alone
the
phenomenal world
is to
be
to
understood.
This
of
by
us as
when
Socratic idealism. It is
Parmenides
asks
Parmenides (130b),
own apart
likely time, recalling that, in the Socrates whether the ideas are his
Socrates'
by
though
worth
and whether
he
is likeness
rates says
directed to the
question, the
first
going
unanswered.
When Aristotle
of thought about
causes, he
sketches
out, in Metaphysics 1, to give the history a picture of Greek intellectual life that the Platonic dialogues. In
history, Plato looms large, as Socrates does in Plato's. Aristotle says that Plato was a Heracleitian both early and later in life, for he saw the world of
Aristotle's
phenomena as always could construct
in flux (Metaphysics
out
of
987a34).
Is it
not
Plato-Socrates
a view of
Pythagorean idealism
Plato
and
and
Socrates,
Socrates
and are
Aristotle is the
it, according
to
as
which
Plato
intimately
bound in
must
be discussed
belonging
recognition of
preeminence
does
not
does it
entail their
The Platonic
with
corpus seems at
first like
depiction
of
the
same pre-Socratic
landscape,
Socrates included in
it, but
whose as per
in a completely different perspective from Aristotle's. Those thinkers thought Aristotle diligently distills and criticizes appear, when they exist
sonae of
mere
of
Socrates. Plato's
Socrates
even as
among mediocrities and a lumines Did Plato not see Socrates on a human scale
called
divine in his
own
lifetime? I believe
and
that Plato's
show
this. But
if it
was
less detached than Aristotle's, thus clear-sighted, why was it given the
shall
try
to
appearance
by
its
author of no
being
no
the apotheosis of
Socrates,
debts,
peers,
errors, the
his ignorance
without
adding luster to the testimonials of his wisdom? What was the unprecedented achievement of Socrates that justified so extraordinary a portrayal? The closing
words of
follows here is
of a
an attempt
interpretation
few
el
ements of
My
general
intention is to
argue that
that one
the
of
the
instruments
those
of
the appraisal of Socrates; and simply is appraisal is the depiction of Socrates as a man in
whom
company
whom or
of all
with
it is
he learn.
useful
to compare
him,
from
whom whom
he
taught, learned
he
could not
teach,
whom
refused to
teach,
and
he
even refused to
said
to
have
gone af
ter the
Socrates). In the
recounted
159
an associate of
Theodorus,
who
is
geometer,
to the
Protagoras,
and a teacher of
whom
Theaetetus.
tradition, he is someone with According in Cyrene. Theaetetus is introduced into the dialogue
group of young men who are approaching. It be in the group is Young Socrates, the interloc have been
at
middle of a
least
in
order
for
middle,"
but
no other youth
is
named or other
as
Young Socrates
respects about
him
of course
Theaetetus
poses
by
Theaetetus to be studying
and arithmetic
mony,
("music"
cites
(145c, d), which the youth confirms. This list is the same being substituted for "harmony") as the list of arts that Protagoras re when, in the Protagoras, (3i8e) he derides the vulgar sophists who force
rather
than
teaching them,
as
he
himself
effective as possible
in domestic and civic affairs so that they may be as in the city both in action and in speech. Protagoras is said to look at Hippias while speaking; it may be understood that he would look as pointedly at Theodorus. In pursuing the interrogation of Theaetetus, Socrates
does,
good counsel
asks whether
whether
the increase
of
knowledge is the
same as
increase
of
wisdom,
and
knowledge
what
Now
the dialogue:
is knowledge? Theaetetus
the arts,
answers
by
referring to Theo
shoemak-
dorus 's
of saying wanted. adduces a where a one is This is the same itself it is; many thing objection with which Socrates confutes Meno's definition of virtue [Meno 72a, what
adding also the productive arts such as ing. Socrates turns this answer back because it gives examples instead
curriculum of
the
b). What
might
be
called
Socrates,
ligible is
resemblance to
sophists;
they
he
purveys wisdom
Theaetetus
encourages
meaning
of
knowledge
Socrates
forward,
about
powers at sion
Theaetetus's disposal
during the
Socrates
for
lengthy
statement
by
himself,
be
called his obstetric autobiography because he discloses in the course of it that he is a midwife of thoughts. His self-description is a curious mixture of depreciation
and
pretension,
able
for he
appears as a
of
generating
a thought
but
that
to deliver
a man of those
distinguishing
false
the pregnancies
spurious
dialectic pedagogy differs from the one set Socrates claims to be able to elicit all knowledge from
160
all men
Interpretation
everyone
knows everything by virtue of the only to be reminded. There is a tacit with drawal from that doctrine in the Theaetetus, where memory plays indeed an im
portant
question
is
of
than on
immortality
the
soul or on
the availability
ideas
as objects visible
in
a realm above.
This is the
more
in
need of consider
ation
place where
immortality of the
partly
the premise of
anamnesis.
question what
of
In any case, the Theaetetus ends inconclusively, aporetically, for the is knowledge is not answered. Socrates does not repeat the success
where
the
Meno,
he induces the
boy
to
discover, i.e.,
to discover
in himself, be
shown
gue
to possess all
knowledge,
for
knowledge
even about
knowledge itself
Theaetetus
what
better
able
believing
with
that
he knows
onstrated
he does
not
wisdom might
be is dem
in the
immediately
subsequent conversation of
Socrates
Euthy
phro, in the next dialogue. Whether the practical circumstances surrounding Socrates' end and the willfulness of the men who brought it about have anything to do
Plato's intention in closing the Theaetetus with aporia would require a separate investigation. For the present, it is necessary to inquire into the path by which Plato brings the Theaetetus to the conclusion it reaches.
with
Stimulated knowledge
by Socrates,
another,
Theaetetus
replaces
his first
suggested
definition
of
with
which
is that knowledge is
and as of all
perception.
Socrates im
of
mediately identifies this as Protagorean, Protagoras that runs "Man is the measure
things,
they
are and of
not."
they
are
mean
is the judge
and
of
the coldness,
hotness
the things
ance of
he perceives,
there is no way to go
beyond the
things to their
being
be
in truth. In
an unobtrusive
remark, Socrates
(152c)
be
difficult
points
with
throughout the
What is
and
error?
The issue
arises
dialogue, and which they will not because, if what every man per
be
wrong.
ceives
there
is
no
things appear, no
judgment
about a
thing
can
By
logue,
interlocutors have
in
defining
defining er
is
an ele
error"
knowledge is
sure")
it grows,
which
perception (or "man is the mea is surprising in the highest degree. Particular
161
argument survives unrefuted or
should
be
attached
to
whatever
in the
because, in
an argument
that ends
formally
in
apo
ria, one
has in fact
no affirmative conclusion or
argument
but has
not
been
eliminated
from it
by
The
Theaetetus especially calls for the consideration of some such hypothesis be cause the dialogue consists overwhelmingly of trial and error, of three major ten
tative
definitions
be
of
knowledge,
by
Socrates
survives
in
such a
effectually
a nega not
eliminate
Obviously,
and
is
itself
as a
be
counted as
Collecting
those negatives
affirmed
in the discourse
of the
di
to the present paper. I note, however, that in reflecting dialogue may be said to affirm formally, one might have to include the undisposed of issues raised by refuted positions, and the contradicting arguments
which refuted proposals are eliminated.
on what an
by
I doubt it
will
have
escaped notice of
that this
dialogue, in
above as
which
the
participants
by
proceeding throughout in act what obstetrician and his pa the seemingly teaching to bring forth. If the dialogue were thus to present its teaching
error,
was
work as a whole ends
described
in be
have to
ac
issues
would
in the
discourse
as a whole.
appearance of
being
it in
fails in its
to articulate
error or
to define
words.
of error and
mutually dependent, the dialogue inevitably has also the appearance of being an enactment of knowledge which fails in its efforts to articulate knowledge or to
define it in
"structure"
words.
were
designed to
present
its
own action or a se
(i.e., Form)
as the paradigm of
of
knowledge, it
would
be offering
ideas
as vorjrd
by
an
im
latency
through a method of
interrogation.
It
would
be presenting knowledge
and therewith
learning
as well as
as
teaching in
purely terrestrial medium, within the linked to perception and ratiocination. However far this is from
realm of experience
one might
say,
defining
can
knowl
edge, it does indicate that the definition is to be expected to lie in some realm of
being
that
is
der if this
speculation
only won is to any extent supported by Plato's causing Theaetetus to (or, "it seems so") when Socrates argues provisionally,
perception
One
is
and,
qua
knowledge,
us
cannot
be false (152c).
the
surmise
Let
hold in
abeyance
be
162
resolved
Interpretation
in the
retained elements of
dialogue
as a whole, and
let
us return to
the
progress of
perception
the
argument.
Theae
unno
tetus,
as was
said,
proposes
that knowledge
reverses
is
(i5ie). Socrates,
the
order of
is
knowledge"
as
Protagorean
and as tanta
measure."
to "man
is the
to
By
thing is
as, and
what,
it is
perceived
be
by
it,
and error or
prehension
now asserts
itself"
view that
"nothing is
thing
ever
from
movement and the mixing nothing that is, all the philosophers except Parmenides he (I52d). On says, this, ing concur, as well as the loftiest poets Protagoras, Heracleitus, and Empedocles
of
in comedy
and
Homer in tragedy. It is
offers
Pythagoras. Socrates
in
support of
he
motion
does
go
being
and
life,
fire,
nonbeing things, is
dissolution;
and
caused
by
motion.
However
sional this
played
advocacy
might prove to
Socrates'
be,
very important
part will
ultimately be
by
heat
or
fire in
unretracted
by
the end
of
the Phaedo.
Socrates
elaborates
in
considerable
detail
(156a-
"Protagorean"
157c) the
percipi
doctrine that
all perception
is born
of
the
motion of
Attached to this
motion,
"kineticism"
is the
notion
that
per
ception, the
vital concomitant of
cannot
be
"wrong."
One
can
only say
about perception
that
it
occurs.
Apparently in order to refute the kineticism of to attack the infallibility of perception by referring to
and
illusion, arguing
called
that we have
"perceptions"
surely be
them
false. Socrates
refutation of of
that
the
two
were
dreaming
their
actual
conversation.
sophism
Theaetetus
allows
that the
thing is
asleep
paltry
is fol
lowed in be
by
weight
because
we are
and awake
Socrates (i58d) that the previous point gains for equal periods of time. I take it
the use of
is
refuted
by
feeble
or
having
survived
frivolity
of
this
by
Socrates
a
when
he begins to indis
(166a) in
the name of
Protagoras, delivering
defense to
which we will
first,
that
in
some
impor
motion and
sons at
its force, and with it so much of the Protagorean doctrine of multiplicity in the all as must accompany it; and second, that for rea present at least equally unclear, the Protagorean view that man's percep
retains
heat
being
of
things is also
permitted
to remain alive in
163
degree. It
should
mean
been
a
said
is intended to
emphatically clear that nothing that has that Plato's Socrates is a crypto-kineticist. There is
be
made
very
energetic
denunciation
of
the Heracleitians or
"Ephesians"
(i79e-
180c),
re
which sisted
happens
by the
way to be delivered He
enlarges on
by Theodorus,
and which
is mildly
by Socrates,
in
who suggests
differently
in
private and
public.
dissimulation, distinguish
ing
the moderns,
kineticism from the many with poetry (ap who blurt out their wisdom so that the
belief that
some
things are
in
mo
tion and other things are at rest. He reminds himself that there are those who teach the opposite, namely, that all
is
one and at
rest,
doctrine that
can appar
ently be
harmful effects, for nothing is said about the wisdom own arguments of concealing it. Whether this has anything to do with and positions is exceedingly hard to judge. He goes on, however, to refute radi
published without
Socrates'
cal
kineticism
by
showing the
impossibility
of
of
saying anything
about
all
and
changing, that
the
is, becoming
of motion
rather than of
anything if being.
associated
He
theory
but
the
measure"
be
sensible
rejection or
(cbgoviuog) (i83b,c). To see how far this insight constitutes a refutation of Protagoras, we must return to an earlier point in the
at
dialogue.
Beginning
166a, Plato
causes
Socrates to deliver
a remarkable speech
in
which he impersonates Protagoras rebuking Socrates for the levity of his disputa tion to that point and then going on to present Protagoras's understanding with
"Protagoras"
unimpaired seriousness.
asseverates
"know"
ing
and
is
"idiotically", but
the
when
this
flatly
does
not mean
that there
is
no such
thing
as wisdom
wise man.
The
wise man
bad things
to us,
is precisely he who can so deal with us that he can cause good things instead to appear
man and
and
physician will
bring
in him to
in
which
food
will
The
sick man
is
not
ignorant
nor
is the
that
healthy
man wise
because
the
unwisdom or wisdom of
their opinions;
is,
is impossible,
says
The
a condition
drugs,
"Protagoras"
teachers of wisdom
argues
(oocpiorfjg)
a
that it
is
not a matter of
truly but
rather of
making a man who thinks (do^aom) falsely think bad condition (i^ig) of the soul so that the man remedying
{(bavrdouara)
that are
better, but
to
"true."
not more
The Socratic
"Protagoras"
body
with a view
improving
farmers
164
Interpretation
in them
with
perceptions
good,
healthy
and
true perceptions
{alodrjoeig)
in the
(167c).
cit
Wise
wicked seem
"good"
just to the
ies. It is to be
for
not
expression
denoting
XQr)OTog
better
condition
"useful"
is
dyaddg but
some
form
of
of
has
Socrates'
an overtone of
impersonation
Pro
interesting
assertions that
we can omit
from the
present on
emerged
wisdom
is this: in the first place, Protagoras insists and the absence of it. There is such a thing as
and
the
a wise
his
perceptions of
the
world might
be
it if his
wisdom qualifies
him
Socrates'
as the
cpgdvipiog of
wisdom
remark
(i83b,c)
referred
far
exceeds
the vulgar
"Protagoras"
sees
the good
under
the
beneficial,
needful,
useful as
readily
a paradigm of
them. to be
So
also
is
Protagoras
sees no reason of
apologetic about
man with
his
own
fee-taking. His
is that
the ordinary
his
average
be
called natural
if nat
primary
experience,
by belief in any force or criterion higher than gods or eternal ideas. Nothing further from his
depreciation
of
thought can
be imagined than
its
Socrates'
life
and
body
in favor
of
death
and
soul, as in the
Phaedo,
tagoras"
e^igor
habitual
condition
curious
to the
indicative
dency
with other or
toward materialism in
his belief in
Good, Truth,
Wisdom,
Socratic philosophy
strives to reconcile
in fact his philosophy reconciles them, though on the plane of the empirical, terrestrial, and natural. His thought reflects energetically on ex perience, but it remains on the level of its own objects: transcending and even de
to amalgamate; but
spising
mere
opinion,
it does
not
opinion
the
prephilosophic conclusions
from
experience
cannot encompass.
In
an earlier
passage,
(i62d) Socrates
have
presents a
for him
might
given to
Socrates'
reply that Protagoras or someone speaking injection of the gods into the discussion.
The reply is to the effect that the being or nonbeing of gods is excluded from Protagoras's speech and writing. One might say that he has no need of that hy
pothesis,
nor of
ideas
either.
No
standard
higher
or more
enduring than
may
prove to
man and
his
experience comes
soul
itself has
no pronounced primacy.
"Man is the
able
measure" perception"
"knowledge is
so
be
unten
propositions, but
they have
deep
reasserted
themselves
in
down to
numerous
as
implications
are uneven
in their gravity,
he
ad
impersonating
judgment
on
Protagoras. To determine precisely the details of his Protagoras would be a considerable task, but it seems as if one
Plato'
Socrates
165
clashes
the
seriously with Protagoreanism on the issue of with his Protagoras seems to replace
"truer" "better;"
of
bodily
or psychic conditions.
One thinks
of
teaching
the natural
impulse
of
practice,
beginning
including
business. The simplicity of this pattern is disturbed by demonstrations in various places that the true king, the true rhetor,
affairs
of
and
if
Xenophon is to be believed
of
generals) is the
philosopher.
a
I believe there is
might
another conflict
between Soc
might
Protagoras,
disagreement that
effectually
be
called
practical, that
to
keep
them
apart as
as most other
differences. Protagoras
as
long
the opinion
holds,
just
this
as each man
is the
measure
way of distinctions between the wise and the others, this doctrine must put it into the mind of every city and every man that he or it knows (176d, 177a). If all the world were Protagorean, the hope of persuading anyone of the impor
by
tance of
knowing
that
or what
he does
not
know
must
inevitably
decline. How
too obvi
Euthyphro,
the next
and on
dialogue, is
on
the
Apology
of Socrates
thing more obvious. While the empiricism, materialism, and apparent atheism of Protagoras, and their underlying premise of universal motion, might not make it
impossible
to name or
and obstruct
the rule
a sign
of
discuss anything, they do help to democratize the polis the wiser sort. Protagoras's wise man is capable of be
wisdom recommends of value.
coming rich,
those
course a
that his
who can
pay, as a
thing
The
wisdom of
which
Is the
ment?
and
Protagoras
one of unrelieved
disagree
Probably
not.
argument of
the Theaetetus
is
mucn
too complex to be
need
be
mentioned.
After heard
recalls
with
(201c, d) having
reason, and that
replies curi
together
to
knowable. Socrates
dream for another, something that he thought he heard some ously, offering people say, in exchange for what Theaetetus heard someone say. (A dream
one
seems to
anonymous source.
speech emanating from an have something in common with a rumor Cf. page 162 above, on dreams.) What Socrates heard is that
elements or components of ourselves and of all composites are not or
the primary
subject
to reason
addresses
to
being
explained or accounted
for
by
reason.
That is,
un
Socrates
first
by virtue
of
being
in
tractable to reason (whatever that might mean), then about such things there
could
be
at
opinion.
How
one could
opinion about
166
Interpretation
not
drifting
toward the
problems
of
piety
the gods
seems
the discussion to the question whether the primary elements of things are unintel
ligible
enter.
or are more or
into
which
they
He
of
letters
primary irreducible things {jtgcjra), of which the the musical notes are illustrations, are if anything more up
of
composites made
Socrates if re
203c,
the
conclusion
garded as
"some
one
indivisible
(205c)
and
(205d;
also
from unintelligibility by the intelligibility of the letters, those par ticles known to us in the only way in which they can be known, not by explana
204a) is
saved
tion but
by perception.
now
There
seems
to be some sense in
which
knowledge is
per
knowledge.
Socrates turns
for
son
us?"
(2o6d)
be
to the
of
Without the
formality
added
that which is to
intended to signify it down that rea he lays asking Theaetetus, to true opinion to form knowledge means one
question
"what is
reason
else.
Socrates
proceeds
not
by
reason
any
of
no matter which
opin
ion
be
by
possession of reason
is incompatible
with
the third
Theaetetus Theaetetus
will until
not enter
involves tautology (209c): the peculiar snubnosedness of into combination with my (true) opinion that that is it has already been distinguished in my mind from all other
that I have
ever seen
snubnosednesses on
and this
by
its
having
been impressed
place
with all
of
all
singularity has occurred, meeting with you again tomorrow, i.e., seeing you, will remind me and cause me to have right opinion of you. In brief, Socrates has
come round again to perception plus
tion.
He
seems to
have
rediscovered
collection.
We turn
next to of
the
Phaedo,
dialogue that
Socrates
demonstrating the
demonstra
immortality
the soul
during
and
in the
course of that
body
life (59b). In
order to accomplish
maintaining that death is preferable to his purpose, Socrates introduces his familiar
while
theory
vable
states.
of
ideas,
the
intelligible
to
and eternal
archetypes,
revi-
impressions
as we pass
through
our
disembodied toward
incarnated
Contributory
the effect
his showing the immortality of the soul is an argument to that things are brought into being by their contraries, as pleasure fol-
167
pain and life itself is consequent upon death. By the time the dialogue has its course, the reader has been made to wonder how far Socrates himself be lieved the soul to be immortal, to what extent he considered the soul to be inde
pendent of the
body,
and whether
he had
the orthodox
idealism is
his
name.
The
conversation who
is
by Phaedo,
death
Echecrates,
group
Phliasian
remembered as a
Pythagorean
in
of
of
Socrates
was a sizable
Athenians
and
others,
of a
variety
of philosophic persuasions.
sick"
It is
made explicit or
think,
(59b). Whether
there"
how this
Plato's
absence
is to be
connected with
Phaedo's remark,
after
Soc
account of
the ideas
as
who were
thought
Socrates
had
thing wonderfully clear, must remain more or less conjectural (102a). Eucleides and Terpsion, the Megarans of the recounting of the Theae tetus, were there. So also were Simmias and Kebes, two Thebans who are de
made
the
scribed
who
by
said
Socrates
as pupils of
is
tenets of Pythagorean-
Kebes
are
the
principal
interlocutors
of
the
Phaedo,
together with
Socrates,
doubts,
as well as
their unquestioning concurrences, are instruments that Plato uses in giving the
argument much of
its
shape.
As the thought
the
of
Protagoras
ways
moves
tetus,
so that of
Pythagoras
affects
Phaedo, in
that I can
here
I
ners
incompleteness.
like to begin
of
by
in discourse
Socrates
asking why Simmias and Kebes are made the part during most of the dialogue. I believe that an indi
cation of
the answer
is to be found in the
Simmias
following
places rather
early in the
conversation.
First,
at
64c, Socrates
a
death is anything but the separa from the body. Without hesitation Simmias replies that it is noth
asks
whether
ing
begging
of
change, for if it were known that death consists of such a separation, it would be known also that the soul is capable of and has an independent existence, a point
which
Socrates in fact
70a, Kebes
upon
Simmias has
given an
affirmative answer.
Simmias
Next,
that the
at
wishes to
separated
arguable
here.
common would
soul
disintegrates
being
like
some assurance
when
has any
power and
intelligence {(pgdvnoig)
that
we
the man
to the
remem
refers to
"some
ancient account
born
from the dead. And if this is so, he asks, if the living are born again from the dead, how might our souls not exist there? The support for the affirmative is to be
found in the doctrine is born
of pain and
from
opposites.
As
pleasure
168
turns
Interpretation
so also
dying follows living. Kebes accepts this astonishing mixture of an old story and a flimsy analogy with out a murmur, although he is not generally a passive interlocutor. Strengthening
into,
living
arises out of
being
dead just
as
this argument
reciprocation
with
between
states, the
into
ubiqui state
Socrates
unusually strong
ment,
declaring that
it
seems to
of
him that it is
altogether
exactly thus,
and that re
the
living
the
foregoing
re
by introducing
proof. ceived
favorite Socratic doctrine, Of course, if the soul carries forth into life before birth, it
must
impressions that it
would
have lived
on somewhere.
Simmias
like to be
reminded of omy.
it
Human beings
anything, which
they
would not
be
able to
do if the knowledge
force
from anamnesis, Socrates refers without explanation, as if it were self-evident, to a man's knowledge of things as gained through seeing, hearing, or other perception (73c). The aporia of the Theaetetus seems to dis
argument
Kebes'
solve
in the tacit
Protagorean
suggestion.
made
Returning
rators of
Socrates in this
them as pupils of
Socrates'
description
of
gives a clue
that gains
quiescence
in plausibility by their conduct in the exchanges just summarized. Their easy ac in the most problematic assertions apparently comports with their Py training,
which would
thagorean
have
put
culiarly
Socratic,
well within
one might
find
them
at
more agreeable
interlocutors
with
Socrates
on
questions of
immortality
by
and
indoctrination
would prepare
tion of opposites
cribes
opposites,
equally well to accept the theory of genera least if Aristotle is to be believed when he as is
to the Pythagoreans the belief that "contraries are the first principles of
things"
(Metaphysics
986b3).
All
of this
said without
intending
to minimize
Simmias
and
Kebes
will oppose
to the doctrine
the eternal vitality of the soul as distinguished from its capacity to survive the body for a limited time. Perhaps Simmias and Kebes are imperfect Pythagore ans, as Theodorus
was a
deviating
Protagorean. It is
on
to
try
to
clarify these
relations of
detachment
Kebes
they
It is
well worth
noticing,
of
Socrates'
and
doctrine
im
upon
statement of
party is disconcerted
an unassailable
by
thought to be
doubts
in his
itself
arise.
Beginning
at
account
169
relates
Phaedo
how Socrates
caressed
him,
and
drew
misplaced
between misanthropy and misology: both arise out of trust too readily given, followed by repeated disenchantment until
a parallel
eventually hatred of all men or of all reason ensues. The lesson is caution, not dogmatic skepticism. What this speech that Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates
betokens for Plato's
ily
matter
for be
understanding of philosophic sectarianism is necessar speculation. At any rate, here at 9od, Phaedo concludes his ex
own
and resumes
Echecrates
called
the
report of
the
argument
proper, ending
were
addressee of
the admonitions
just related, I think one might plausibly conclude importance to the chief point of the Phaedo section.
of a given passage
Those
who
in
text significant
as a whole
will wish
to
section
Let it be
of
supposed a
Socratism in
other.
By
congeniality of the one doctrine to the seem merely to be rediscovering the judg
although
ments of
Aristotle
Plato's provenience,
which
doing
so
by
concrete refer
ence
to the
dialogues,
of
on occasion.
another
feature
pay
Plato's
attention
in
weighty
issues, Socrates
last
almost
he himself
or per
the utmost
tentativeness, for
a proof
haps
low
soul
even seems at
to
In
order
to observe this,
we must
fol
develops
the
after
Kebes has
shown a need
that the
but is
altogether
imperishable (95b
a thorough
et seq.).
demand for
investigation
of
the
Socrates
count of
knowledge
He
relates
explorations
into
natural
philosophy, apparently on
confusion and
sense
whose
is the
arranger and
reasoned
it does
with a view
the
thing
in
tion
is really the study of good. Great was his disappointment when went on to introduce air, aether, water and many other foolish things as causes, i.e. to vitiate his doctrine with matter, as if any such could explain why (that is,
,
corrup Anaxagoras
with a view
to
what
good) anything
came
into
being
He
or
happened. Anaxagoras,
in mixing
conditions
matter
with mind, lost sight of the distinction between cause and the
operation of a cause.
and others
170
Interpretation
than any other power to
more powerful
keep
the
whole together.
Now Socrates
cause.
describes his
gins
in
search of
the
He be
by stating his method of inquiry. He adopts each time some explanation (Xoyog) as a hypothesis that he judges to be the strongest, and he posits as true whatever agrees with it and rejects as untrue whatever does not (iooa). Now he
will
hypothesize the
the
existence of
the beautiful in
itself,
and
others.
"If
you grant me
in the
you
being
of
these
things, I hope to be
immortal."
able
Astonishingly, Kebes
We
present
the
existence of
without a question.
might notice at
ideas,
at
least in the
stration of
context, is
of
subordinate to
theory
what
of cause and
the demon
the
immortality
thing is,
the soul.
Briefly,
in
which
each
or rather
is
made
to
be,
it
participates.
A beautiful thing is
made calls
it is
itself"
its
"participation"
can
give"
is the
cause?"
(It must be
immediately
that a few
pages
only safe but stupid. So we must not jump to conclusions about his naivete.) Socrates praises the clarity of the re sults of his method, and Echecrates breaks into Phaedo's report to join in the
later, Socrates
will call
praise.
as was said
above,
with
thought Socrates had clarified everything amazingly. Now Socrates shows how a
man can
one man
but
smaller
which can
simultaneously
him
or
be
present
in
him, but
in its
site,
thing itself,
being
opposite approaches
its
oppo
of
them
this
an unnamed
interlocutor
notices that
beauty's
being
the cause of
beauty
like is
caused
by like,
which contradicts
is
by
opposite of
opposite,
"things"
from "things in
as
themselves:"
the
former
through
destroyed by
heat
and
contrari cold or
next
important step
but hot
by distinguishing
they
are
fire,
Heat
and coldness
and cold.
themselves
have its
surrogates which
Thus,
if fire
can
approaches
snow, one
destroyed;
neither
tolerate
to
contrary.
Sometimes, Socrates
same name
(aim
which,
forever
called
while not
being
that
idea,
always whensoever
it
exists
always
be
three, but
although
The
Odd, it may
as
be
called odd.
as
Now three
would
will oppose
strenuously
eternally
Odd itself
do, because
171
beyond his
now
first
says you
argument that
something beautiful is
me,
by Beauty
itself. Socrates
(iosb.c),
what causes
something to be hot, I will not give Heat, but rather out of our present work a
if you
ask what causes
more sophisticated
reply, that it is
fire;
and
the
body to
be
sick, I
(in Greek, something like "fieriness"). say Sickness but All this comes to an immediate head in a brief passage in which Socrates
will not
fever"
shows
that the soul is to Life as fire is to Heat. Soul is not Life itself but Life's
and
surrogate,
stroyed.
it
and
death
that must
flee
one another or
be de
must
death descends is
proved.
upon
the
body,
the soul
flee,
and
the
body
The
reason
flee death
given when
stay to be destroyed by its opposite, as snow is by heat, is thus: if the deathless is also indestructible, the soul cannot be destroyed death approaches it (106b). One thought that the question was precisely
the deathless is necessarily also
whether seems
now
the same as or
is
the sign
this
its
insusceptibility
to
destruction."
live
must
formula mean, what must live must be alive as long as it exists, and it cannot exist once it no longer lives; or must the formula mean, life is of the thing's es
sence, it
and must
be in life
and
of
it
without
implying
its life is
formulation
will
certainly
a
remind of a particu
lar kind
of
being
such
that existence
way to discuss it without acknowledging the ne In either case, as the demonstration is left by Socrates, it
of
soul
in
That this
is
interesting
to gods as to men
is
made ex of
have been
asserted as well at
the
beginning
the argument as at its end, for nothing in the argument proper visibly addresses this issue.
is puzzling also in that, while the soul is characterized as the carrier or surrogate of Life, death acts for itself, capable of approaching and, presumably but only for a while, withdrawing. Is death the surrogate of a larger Idea, or is there a Death Itself, the Idea of Death? The demonstration
of the soul's
imperishability
death simply a negative, the privation of life? What is the ontic status of privations? Are they nothing? If death is ontically nothing, a nonentity, does it Is
not
for that
reason cease to
be discussable
that death is
or cease to
be
a source of anxiety?
or
The di
not
discussable
that it is
not a source of
anxiety to man and perhaps even, if rarely, to Socrates. The is not an explicit theme, but it is an active one, in ways that I
and of which
up here
the
will give
heatless
about
or unhot and
a single example.
At 106a, the
is
called
Socrates
says
how far
one can go
privation of
172
site.
Interpretation
and cold can
If heat
be
named
by
some process of
reciprocating
privation of
life be similarly named? After all, the absolutely living negatives, is called in Greek as in English the deathless, and Socrates says of "the very idea (106c). There is a special of (adrd rd rfjg ^cofjg eldog) that it is
can
death
and
life"
"deathless"
reason
of
heat
life
and
death,
as will appear.
foregoing that Plato presents Socratism as both affected with anism and as being developed by Socrates in ways that differ from the simple or thodoxies of Socratic idealism. A question opened up by this inference, but espe cially by the second branch of it, is how far the conjectured attributes of Socratism belong to thought and how much to Plato's. On this I shall have to difficulty nothing say now.
from the
Socrates'
In
ties
what
seem to withdraw
of
the ideas and even perhaps of the superiority of death to life? I can give
one
of
the
place of
Crito in the
which
world of
Socrates'
interlocutor in
famous dialogue in
Crito tries
dialogue, Crito
to prolong
death to the very last moment, urging him to use any small life and this after the colossal efforts of Socrates on behalf of
death. One inclines spontaneously to say in spite of, but I mean to suggest that one should perhaps say because of Crito's imperviousness to the radical depreci
ation of
body
and
and
life, Socrates
shows
him
a marked and
touching
sense,
affection.
wonder whether
common
healthy
hu
manity,
ence.
his
Nothing can make Crito see death as anything but fearful, bad, and to be long as possible, and he cannot feel anything but unashamed grief
Socrates does
from
not spurn
his
body
Socrates
selves
completely in
accord with
his
own orthodoxy.
Blinding
Socratic dialogues. I
find
some
imponderable
his feet
support
for this
speculation
by
the
Socrates'
when
bonds
were removed
by
a
jailers, he
die (6 id);
put
and when
his
husband
last
farewell,
she was
carrying
babe in
However this may be, the argument of the dialogue is not yet over. Having shown that the soul is imperishable as well as immortal, Socrates desires to de pict its fate after its emancipation from the body. This requires him to give a de
scription of the nether scription of
persuaded earth
regions,
the
whole world.
by
someone unnamed.
To begin with,
conditionally, if the
support
is
round and
is in the heaven
middle of and
heaven,
it
nothing to
it but
the
homogeneity
of
its
(looggosria).
173
does
not
fall because it is in
As for the
forces,
like
earth
itself, it is
of
dented
sages
and whose
interior is hollowed
The bulk
Socrates'
the earth
and aether
that lie
in
within
the
It is
brought on,
as
he says,
body of by the
bottomlessness
Greek term, reciprocating
no
"basis"
fluids. The cause, he says, is that the fluids have, in the or step, nothing on or with which to stand. There is a
side to side, and out of this melange of
rush of
fluids from
fiery,
muddy fluxions comes an equipoise. Socrates, who professed his dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras as a doctor of causes, appears to have lapsed into Anaxagorean-
ism
or some
form
of a
Heracleitianism
of
at the
last
moment.
The
subversion of
body
sim
hypothesis
and
body as cause.
What he
admits as cause
is
matter,
it
would
be straining credulity to maintain that the of fluids in motion is the good, namely, the just
rather
accommodation of
departed souls,
that must
hang
not
the
world order
is
certainly
man.
the
if the
good
or
implicated in the
I
good of
There is
to draw
one
last
conjunction of notions
in the Phaedo to
which
should
like
Early in the conversation, (63d) Socrates notices that Crito has been trying to say something, and he asks him what it is. Crito replies that the man in charge of the poison was trying to admonish Socrates to talk less because
attention.
speaking warms one up and the heat counteracts the poison. Later (105b, c), when Socrates is transcending the safe but stupid dictum that the cause of heat in something is The Hot, he gives as an illustration of the improved conception the
statement
that
what causes
the
body
,
to
be
sick or
is
not
the presence in
excess.
it
of
Sickness
in Itself but
of
rather of
fever,
i.e. fieriness,
of
heat to
In the last
sentences
the
dialogue,
the effect
is described
as a
growing
coldness
beginning in his feet and rising, like death itself, through his limbs until it reaches his heart, when not only his members but himself died. I wish to sug
that
gest
life itself is
any
his body,
indeed
of
animal or
its body, in
that
which
heat
in
a state of equilib
without
rium or such as
rest,
can
be
upset
by
things
some
introduced from
drugs,
be affected,
at
least in
be
men,
by
an
activity
of
the
(It is
Socrates in
double
understood
a mechanical
fluid
the
at
world,
is
One
would
like to know
what
significance, if any, to
an(l
for
soul
is ^XV
for cooling
\\>v%u>.
Can
one
be
certain
that
Socrates'
reminder
to Aesculapius,
gratitude
174
Interpretation
less death through cooling numbness rather than for release from life as if it were a disease? What the text does seem to make clear is that the intention of Plato cannot be discerned unless his Socrates is seen in his depth, free from the bonds
of an exoteric
dogmatism that
is,
after
all, incompatible
with
Plato portray a large variety of philosophic schools, human types, and professions. To understand Plato is to grasp the outcome of the for talk. How many dramatic meetings in which those actors are brought together should lead him to discussions those outcome of the reader perceives the many
The Socratic dialogues
of
we are
process and
from
some prejudgment of
work
Plato's
as
premises.
I have tried to
parts of
Plato's
and
Socrates;
ment of
was. open
little
of
as possible about
what
his judgment
understanding
Socrates
I
and
Socrates
an
I have tried to
mind,
and
keep
Plato kept
was
led to
that he had
done
so.
I do
not
blinded himself any more than Aristotle would do to the ligatures that bound Socrates to the thought of his predecessors, or that he believed that alone among men Socrates had no origins to speak of. Nor does it appear that the doctrines for
which
Socrates is
most
famous
were
held
by
him
as
dogma
or without regard to
What
that
entitles
Socrates to the
was
encomium of
Phaedo just
at
the end
of
the dialogue
whom
Socrates
the best
man of
that time of
those about
him had
experience?
Perhaps the
answer
achieved
He
seems
with
its
domesti
drastic reformulation, to
other
restraint, of
to
On the
have
elevated
Protagoreanism
which moved
only too
by frantically
reminding it
aware.
of soul and
hand, he ap heaven, of
have
Socrates
seems to
among the schools and professions of the Greeks like a judge in the midst
poets and
of
others.
straint of
After he had done his work, the stage was set for the seriousness and re Aristotle. That the achievement of Socrates was a historical achieve
to be some
part of
ment seems of
much
in fact Plato's is
hopes to
understand
Plato. in
all
Socratism
cautious
appears as a
turning
its
point
in Greek
and thus
thought,
as
the
deradicalization
of
extremes of
spiritualism, cultism,
and metaphys
ical dogmatism, accomplished through a careful sifting of the best resources available. There is reason to think that the history of philosophy in the modern age has been a record of the radicalization or intensification of the primary con
ceptions, a course opposite to that which came to a climactic point with the
175
were with
to prove correct,
it
would
in
must
be
cheered
by
this
discovery.
Philosophy, Education,
Charles L.
Howard
and
Griswold,
Jr.
University
A very
popular error:
of one's
convictions;
rather
it is
a matter of
having
I
When
arise
on one's convictions!
!!
Nietzsche1
we consider
the
relation
between philosophy
and
concerns the
philosophical attempt
interesting enough
dition to
to
focus
large
section
philosophy of courage, that is, the Plato, for one, thought this attempt of a dialogue on it (the Laches), in ad
second
passages of other
dialogues. The
issue
concerns
the question as
answer
philosophy
requires courage.
historical
circumstances.
Socrates
by
perhaps,
on
his
courage.
Indeed,
students of the
Apology
which
and
Phaedo
met
sometimes
in
Socrates
his
punish
A Bertrand Russell,
liberal
democracy,
under such
and
by contrast, has relatively little to fear from a modern courage does not seem to be a prerequisite of philoso
Yet
might not
phizing
tolerant conditions.
the
pursuit of
philosophy
might
nevertheless require another sort of courage regardless of the political conse quences? case
Having
convicti
an attack on one's
be
in
point.
So too, in fact,
be the We
viction
that it is
of
worth philosophizing.
to both
of
these as cases of
the courage
might
the philosopher. Thus a species of the philosopher's courage to say what courage
be
required
itself is,
as
Socrates
suggests at
Laches
194a.
knowledge if
Socrates'
The third issue, finally, is whether all courage requires philosophical courage is to be beneficial. However difficult it may be to defend,
position on
fairly
be
combined
with
3590-3606).
In this
shall
focus
on
Plato's
view of
issues just
ad-
Drafts of this paper were presented at Prince George's College, Maryland (Feb. I, 1982), Mary Washington College, Virginia (Feb. 29, 1984), and Malboro College, Vermont (April 4, 1984). I am grateful to Professors Edward Regis and David Roochnik for their helpful criticisms of an early draft
of this essay.
1.
Gesam. Werke, 23
see
vols.
vol.
16,
p. 318.
The
translation
is
W. Kaufmann's; have
used
emendations.
his Nietzsche,
(Princeton: Princeton
R. Sprague's translation
Unless
otherwise noted,
Stephanus
included
to
where
noted, when
refer
Nicias I
am ad
verting to
these characters as
Plato
portrays them.
178
Interpretation
about
issues
exists, it
would
presumably be
covered
by
as
such,
and
the definition of courage was the first of our issues. Since the Laches
is the only Platonic dialogue in which courage is a major theme, it is a logical place to begin an investigation into the nature of philosophical courage, and I
shall
Moreover,
our
first two
issues
in that,
as
sophically
as
among
yov)
of
other
things,
an effort
to give
Xdyog
of what courage
giving this
Xdyog requires
courage.
courage, and
the philosopher's courage, stand to each other as word to deed. the relationship between words and
mony"
As it turns out,
deeds (and in
particular
between the two levels) is itself a prominent and explicit theme in the Laches. These two strata of meaning throw a considerable amount of light on
each
other, as we shall
see.
Our third issue, namely the necessity for philosophical knowledge in every sort of real courage, is also connected to the effort to define courage (our first is
sue). often
Indeed,
Nicias'
one of
says
he has
heard from
Socrates) is
form
of
philoso
phy itself
requires a
connected.
ticularly
It is
of
issues (par
worth
initially less
losophize. Of
virtues,
courage seems
furthest
removed
connection with
have performed, it seems, very courageous acts. Not just the ability to act courageously, but also to recognize instances of courage, seem widespread and in little need of the phi
men and women
knowledge. Unphilosophical
losopher's help.
help. Thus
what
Only
he
is
out
is, Laches believes that he knows say it is (i94a-b), a claim Socrates does not dispute. However, Socrates points that if we cannot say what courage is even though we are ourselves coura
while cannot our
geous, then
deeds
but
"participate"
in
courage
"participate"
in
that event, the deeds (193c). The ability of human beings to if in an inarticulate way, would seem to be a
harmonized. For in
ability to
give a
Xdyog of courage.
some
of
indeed,
is
the
ability
of
the
"already
in
sense,
what
be
a prerequisite of
what virtue
is. This is
a point
to
shall
subsequently
return.
Philosophy, Education,
Before
and
179
of edu
delving
like to
consider
cation and
the philosopher's
courage are
worthy
of reflection.
They
the
are
inti
im
mately
word
utmost
portance.
In necessarily brief terms, this point may be stated as follows. As the is the love of one of the four Platonic virtues, implies,
"philosophy"
namely
compels
wisdom
wisdom.
If
we accept what
"philosopher"
loves
Symposium speech the teaching of he lacks, not the lack itself. Love or desire (egwg)
the
Socrates'
away from the lack by attaining what he wants, that is, (203b-204b). A prime question for the interpreter of Plato, if not for the
move
him to
philosopher as show
such,
concerns
wisdom
the
"justification"
of not
must
is
"good,"
just because
and
wisdom
is
good at
in itself least to
for its
that
wisdom
is possessable,
philosophy actually
conveyed
For example, the way in which philosophy is practiced in the dialogues makes it look simply negative and even skeptical, to the point that the refutation of ar guments is substituted for sound arguments which establish positive results. The
numerous myths and prise
effect
some
emorfjun
themselves
not
examples a
of
might
be taken
as
expressing the
de
fensible enterprise, but hope is not an argument. In the Symposium, moreover, Socrates also says that egwg is (203d5) as well as being a "philosopher through all of life, a clever enchanter
sophist"
"courageous"
and
sorcerer and
(203d7-8). Socrates
"egwg'
concludes
his
encomium
by
saying
that
now as
before he
of
courage"
praises virtues
power and
(2i2b7-8). Socrates
courageous egyov
does
not
link any
act)
to egwg.
"Egwg is
the
(work, deed,
of
philosopher.
If
line
of of
Plato,
then it
"virtue"
would seem
that the
strength
and perseverance
it supplies, the
But then philosophy would ultimately become a Sisyphean, or rather, Quixotic enterprise. It would be reduced to the decision of desire, that is, to the fulfill
a
of nonexistent
Philosophy
the
becomes
power
a meditation on
decision;
simply,
or
the
celebration of
to
desire;
or,
more
just the
subjective preference of
its
The
these conceptions, or
"Entschlossenheit"
recent
history
of
pivotal
role of
(resoluteness) in Heidegger's
Courage
plays a promi
Sisyphus.3
Sein
und
Zeit is
conception.2
nent role
in Nietzsche's writings,
e.g., Sein
a
und
as well as
in
Camus'
The Myth of
2. 3.
See,
For
pp. 297ff.
discussion
of the
issue in the
context of
Camus,
see
my "The Myth
of
Sisyphus:
Re
pp. 45-59.
180
Interpretation
Despite the important differences among the thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Camus, it is safe to say that in their writings courage occupies a very impor Laches' tant place and that its meaning is much closer to endurance (with which
first definition has to do; I92b9-ci) than to wisdom (with which definition has to do; I94d4~5). under these conditions becomes the
second
"Courage"
Nicias'
ability to create choices and to hold to them in the face of an unfriendly universe. This conception of courage and of its relationship to philosophy is tied to a larger
picture of man and world.
In
general
standpoint of the
"existentialist"
"wisdom"
in the Platonic
sense,
since no
soul,
no
The
"Whole"
Whole (or cosmos), and no natural harmony between is thought of as the multiplicity of parts, coming
together and
dissolving
through
history
in
for
unknowa
ble
ends.
counter
the connection between egwg and reason, soul and reality, and
"goodness" "intelligibility,"
finally
about of
the the
"harmony,"
"measure"
sense of
and
cosmos such as a
in itself
the
and
for
us.4
This is the
and
sort of
Phaedrus, Republic,
comprehensive
Philebus.1
comparably
discussion, it does in
shall
specify
us
to a connection
which are
between philosophy and courage, the defended in the just mentioned dialogues.
efforts to
presuppositions of
The
Laches'
define
in the
context of a
discussion
of education.
The issue
of courage
does
explicitly
and at
explicit.
The
nominal connection
between the
being
While there
to
for the
Laches
Nicias
know
what courage
is),
Laches
deeper,
albeit
in pedagogy
teach others,
with
but
more
(Phaedrus 26ia8, 271010), not just in that it is an effort to importantly in that the philosopher is above all concerned
self-knowledge.
himself with
The issue
of
the philosopher's
and
education,
the questions
possibility
of education the
in
Socrates'
peculiar sense.
position and an argument
For
an extended criticism of
"existentialist"
in favor Rosen
of
the "Pla
position see
Heideggerean/Nietzschean
restoring
wisdom as a
University Press,
1969).
argues that
leads to
"nihilism,"
partially
accessible object of
notion of education.
"classical"
Phaedrus'
formulation
1986).
of
this thesis in
University Press,
Philosophy, Education,
In the
and
-181
discuss the
problem of education as of
it is
and
section
courage,
section
I discuss the
connection
education and
the philoso
courage,
again
in terms
of
the Laches.
II
Plato
volves,
deftly sketches the topic of education, by means of the drama of the dialogue.
are
it in
Melesias,
trying
that
They
recognize
they
themselves
That they
cannot
be
educated
to do so becomes obvious
Lysimachus
unself-consciously confesses that he is not suited to philosophical discussion: for he often forgets the questions he intended to ask, and then forgets the answers
too, along
any other arguments that are brought up in the conversation (i89c-d). He and Melesias will listen to the conversation and then do whatever
with
Laches, Nicias,
their
and
Socrates
recommend.
Lysimachus
and
favor: they know that they are ignorant and incapable of either learning and teaching. Yet their knowledge of ignorance seems wholly unsuited to providing a
not
basis
ers
children
the teach
for their
Here
kinds
learn.
two
drama is
revealing.
Lysimachus
as advisors
Melesias
of
selected
prominent
propriate
generals, Laches
and
Nicias,
teachers.
They
take the
in the task
Stesilaus. The
parents'
quality to it:
rfyvn which
ors and out.
to possess a
is eminently
the
useful.6
selection of
the advis
the
selection of
Indeed,
generals show
(military science, in effect) are ill thought themselves to be incapable of defining the very
art
depends, namely
and
courage.
It is
of the ut as
importance to
Lysimachus
Melesias did
often
not select
Socrates
an educator or
advisor,
heard
about
Socrates be
from the
children and
had known
(180c).
dialogue,
father
well.7
Socrates
appears to
in the vicinity
by
chance
of the
somewhere
between 424
and
418,
would make
the utility of
reputations of
The Laches
(421 ); in
of
either
be far from
everyone's mind.
the dramatic
date,
see
R. G. Hoerber,
a remark
Laches,"
"Plato's
7.
which
Classical
says
Philology 63
he
never
(1968),
pp. 95-96.
Lysimachus
that
had
a single
difference
Socrates'
with
father (i8oe),
in any suggests that they did father was a distinguished man, but his
not engage
philosophical
discussions
Lysi
cf. as
virtue
did
not pass on
to Lysimachus
(I79d;
Meno
we
94a).
The
case
is the
reverse
for Socrates,
since
he
far
know,
by
his father.
182
Interpretation
Lysimachus'
Melesias'
Further
and
Stesilaus'
program
for
educat
ing fighting
him in
their sons.
They
have
all
just
watched
demonstration
of
his
fancy
techniques.
ances are
Stesilaus is allegedly an expert. But it turns out that appear deceiving, since the technique he is demonstrating made a fool out of
Simply
(and
because Laches
one
has the
out,
reputation
among nonexperts for being an expert Stesilaus does not demonstrate his art in Sparta where he
experts; 183b),
Stesilaus'
as
points
would
be
surrounded
by
to
real
one
is
not
necessarily
an expert.
To
make matters
worse, the
as
Nicias, disagree
a nonexpert
technique
is
or
is
not a good
thing for
They
to de
length their
reasons
for their
views.
How is
cide
between them?
answer seems obvious enough: consult a third expert.
Socrates has
accepted as an expert
by
both Laches
and
Nicias. For
one
thing, Socrates
his time conversing with youths ( 1 80c) and has already advised Nicias on a suitable music teacher for his son (Damon). Moreover, Laches points out that Socrates distinguished himself in battle at Delium (181b), and for Laches deeds
spends speak
louder than in
words.
The inclusion
of
Socrates
as an expert
in the
matter of
particular
by
Stesilaus'
means of
tech
has have
a certain
irony
to
will claim of
ignorance
perts
At this
deciding vote (i84d); when the experts disagree, let the disagreement be decided by majority vote. Socrates wastes no time in showing why this procedure is
unacceptable. given what
gymnastics
since
sult
the experts
(184c) seems question-begging it merely indicates that we should con He adds, however, that we must also in (xexvtxdg, i85ai) in
the matter at
is
an expert
hand,
the
and
if none is
an expert we should
find
someone who
the actual
educating of the children cannot go boys have exactly one line in the dialogue (which they pronounce in unison; i8ia3), and no attention is given to educating First we must discover
them.8
Socrates clearly has in mind here some procedure quite different from the in selecting Laches and Nicias. Yet any such procedure
for
discovering
.
impasse Socrates
or puzzle
(dnogCa)
8 At the
concerns
end of the
ability
of nonexperts
prevails upon
(among
Socrates
whom
classifies
Laches, Lysimachus
Aristides. Socrates
son
Evidently he
day
succeeded
Aristides;
so
at
Theae.
151a
says that
Lysimachus'
failed to bear
educate
good
fused to
(327C2).
Nicias'
in persuading Socrates to try to educate son Aristides left his company too soon and At Laches 20od we learn that Socrates has re
said to
be
present
in the Republic
Philosophy, Education,
himself)
qualified
and
183
precisely by being nonexperts they are not have the knowledge to distinguish charlatans up
with a version of
from
experts.
We thus
seem
to end
Meno's
paradox
(Meno
8od): if
you are a
nonexpert,
find the true expert, and even if you know that he possesses the knowledge have
no need of
looking for.
If
finding
true
experts or you
disagree
blind
comedy,
are
leading
the blind
who
do in
not
shall
"dutogia
education."
of
who are
Socrates'
underlying
that
they look
to the
ex
take a vote
is that there is
a xsxvn of education
comparable,
say, to the
the
However,
justified in
as
Laches,
is
doubt
on
it (below). The
sumption
nevertheless a commonsensical
one,
themselves
in desperate
(including
like
Melesias
and
who
Socrates
ever,
not send
with a man
an expert.
by starting ually showing that they are not. In the Laches, true an art but the artless practice of Socratic dialogue.
progress
education
to be not
The interlocutors
xtxvn of
of the
Laches begin
"education"
by by
assuming
not
fighting
have be
That
is, they
take
are
which
means of an example of
it,
a mis
focuses
on.
The
parents
not yet
thought
are
seeking
are supposed to
not suffer
experts
in. The
infects the
choice
as
to what
we want experts
may among experts of a given sort. Indeed, the decision to be experts in is not itself a decision which can be
the question. The decision
from
quite
the
same dico-
made
by
an expert without
were.
begging
is
a metatechnical
one,
as
it
It
requires
reflection, in
a general philosophical
sense,
on what
education
well as on
is for,
be
educated.
orient themselves
experts.
Socrates
proceeds
by
pointing out,
once again
for the
health,
for
and
in
gen
just
for the
his
sake of
the
r^vry's
ends, so
end
now we are
considering the
art of education
men
a certain end
(i85c-e). This
ment
is the
young
(185c).
is very
controversial.
Even though
no one present
184
Interpretation
it
or subject
it to
such varied
interpretations as to
empty it
that the
of
definite
significance.
effort to
and
defend the
view
purpose of education
is
cultivation of the
ing
of
"education
soul,"
of
the
of the
is
in the Platonic
The introduction
"soul"
85e2
means
for caring for the body, including be considered only as means to a further discussion. One
would expect
Stesilaus'
end.
Hence they
who
Socrates to
are to
go on
to say that it
define
what
is
meant
by
soul
if we
determine
is
qualified to care
He does
not
do
so and
over, there is
no
definition
are almost
inevitable
wine
given as
jar,
Socrates
means/ends argument
(187b;
cf.
190c).
an
upshot of
the
having
focus
to concern the
themselves
educator
"how"
with xtxvn.
Instead,
the argument
not
will
on what
a soul to make
it educated,
how he is to
educate
it. The
question will,
however,
issue
receive an answer
in terms
dialogue.
Socrates
strategies education: returns to the
of
finding
of
an
expert,
further
if not, knows
for
deciding
whether
any
first
has had
successful
teachers,
are,
or
(egya)
are
products
presum
For if
one
what a
student or
teacher
is,
one would
claims
already be expert in the field. that he has not had any teachers on the
We
dents
or whether
he has
he has had any outstanding stu better (cf. Apol. 3ib-c, 33a). Surely the
the present one
make
reader
is
Laches
not
and
also claims
in
no uncertain and
himself (18605)
dead
end:
tent to
which of
thus that he is not compe is speaking the truth (i86e). for how is Socrates to ascertain the
when
(Laches
and
Nicias)
he knows he is
not an
himself?
to
me
It
seems
that
Socrates'
is
response to
this dnogia.
says that
instead
of us
teachers
and students
there is another
looking
at our
point"
among those pres from the beginning. It had already nearly been established that education is undertaken "for the sake of the souls of young (185c). Socrates now argues, again by analogy with the art of medicine, that the specific way in which education cares for souls is by in putting them (i89e-i90b). How does this about virtue inquiry us to
ent)
and which
(that is,
bring
to the "same
which will
begins
somewhat more
men"
"virtue"
(a) bring
the same
Philosophy, Education,
point as the
and
185
"more nearly
the
projected
inquiry?
start
to
(a) lies in
Laches,
inquiry
Laches
are not
in fact
of
competent to educate
the results that Laches beg Nicias voluntarily disqualify themselves as educators. The deed of at words to tempting to define courage has spoken louder than words (e.g.
not
the question;
so clear are
Laches'
definition is
about the
not
difficult;
of
i9oe).
point"
competency
Nicias
Laches;
we
One
might
competency has
the
criterion
Socrates
the
"err/ov"
quality issue
of one's
now
interpreted
in the
"philosophizing"
rather
than
with
reference
closer
(b)
to the the
beginning
or
(dgxrj). The
"fundament"
of virtue
is
closer
to the
dgxrj
"ground"
sense of
which constitutes
the true
and
beginning
point.
This
dgxrj
of education
is the
soul
talking
about
is,
we
nearly
at the
are.
dgxrj
than we
be if
discussed
Nicias'
who
and expert
teachers
were
Paradoxically,
him to
agree to
Socrates
they
Socrates'
next
day
Immediately
at some
before the
about
abrupt shift
Laches
speak
their
willingness
Socrates'
by
had
words,
testify
converses with
will
be
his
present
Socrates'
experience with
when a man
deeds in
war
but
not
be in deed worthy of his words, else a Dorian harmony discusses virtue between deeds and words is lacking and the man is not truly musical. principle is not just that deeds and words should be harmonized, but that deeds
he
must
Laches'
speak and
louder than
words.
courage.9
Laches the priority of deeds, as is evident It is obvious that neither Laches nor Nicias
For further discussion
101 ; and
of the characters of the
9.
100-
Laches
pp.
185-225;
andS.
M. Blitz, "An Introduction to the Reading of Umphrey, "On the Theme of Plato's
Laches,"
R. Hoerber, "Plato's pp. Interpretation 5 (1975), Plato's Interpretation 6 (1977), pp. 1-6.
see
Laches,"
I add that Laches does most of the swearing in the dialogue gods once), while Nicias does none of it (Socrates swears
Hera). but
Laches'
(swearing by Zeus four times and by the by Zeus, and Lysimachus once by inarticulate, while Xdyog is relatively complex
once
Nicias'
not animated
by
the
Nicias'
attitude
towards Socratic
dialogue is it
as
revealing.
He
claims
to be acquainted
of one's
with
and regards
"not
bad thing to
unpleasant"
be
reminded"
for him to be
questioned
by
he is
his
comments at
the end of
typically Socratic turn of the discussion. This, by the dialogue, suggest that he does not take seriously enough the
surprised
the
186
Interpretation
words and
mony between
about
deeds in this
matter of courage.
can
Laches has
partially
remarks
identify
true
courage
(as his
Socrates show)
cannot
as well as
remarks about
but he
and
say
what
it is. Laches,
of
know,
served
died
a soldier's
at
than
to Syracuse of 415) he
relied on
seers and so
to disaster. As if to
who
drive
in
those
on
courage
(i95e).10
Nicias
words
"musical."
more
like Laches
like Nicias, for he distinguishes himself in battle but claims to know only his own ignorance. Indeed, in the Laches Socrates offers no definition of his
than
own.
This
seems
odd
at
first glance,
Nicias'
since
bent towards
Xdyog
and
knowledge
seems closer
Laches'
Socrates,
clearly).
deeds before he
speak
with
sound about
position and
something
un
sound about
position,
exhibits a out
help
us
in
which
Socrates
harmony
of words and
deeds.
clear
Socrates, it is
each
other.
that neither
stand
independently
mut
of
Correspondingly,
definition
Nicias'
and of courage.
definitions
be
Let
us
definitions.
Ill
The Laches
None
the these
contains
four
main
definitions
of
courage, two
before
definitions is
decisively
refuted;
the next.
not
to be
whole of
definition
of courage.
This leaves
open the
they may be
in the
parts
the
definition,
though this
possibility is
the wrong
(19004-6) is
of
in
a specific
situation,
not courage
logical form. Laches defines the itself. The definition would from Delium
which
for the
courage of
said
Socrates'
retreat
Laches
praised.
However, nothing is
to
disprove
Laches'
working of Socratic questioning and so is not truly in anogCa. Nicias fails to praises in word. Correspondingly, Laches twice accuses Nicias of
in deed
what
he
"adorning"
himself
with words
(196b,
cian
197c).
a
in
law
Aexonian"
Nicias is speaking like a d97d6-8; cf. the sarcasm at 200C2), like a rhetori (196b). Laches certainly does not want to run the risk of speaking like a "typical (197C8-9) himself.
court
an account of
"sophist"
10.
reminds
For
Thucydides, Books VI
and
VII. At Laches
199a
Laches
and
Socrates
and
187
to know why
in the way described could in fact be courageous. We learn instead that he is courageous a more philosophical grasp of courage as such is
second
definition
what
of courage
is "endurance
soul"
soul,"
of
the
which
is rap
to
idly
modified
into "wise
endurance of the
(i92c-d). Laches is
unable
specify satisfactorily
Laches
contradicts
he
means
by
"wisdom."
Having
a conception of wisdom as an
tmoxfjun
or xtxvn of
himself
by
successfully
nate all risk risk seem
master a situation
admitting enduring in knowing how to is not courageous. For such a man would elimi
that a man
facing
great
foolish, they lack the knowledge to minimize the risk. But fool ishness is something bad and courage something good. Even though knowledge was included in the definition of courage precisely to ensure that courage not be
seems
come
foolish endurance, that is, something bad, the very inclusion of knowledge to make courage risk free and so not courageous. The root of this dilemma
equation of
reject.
is the
knowledge
with xtxvn
(art,
skill),
therefore
gous
The
"knowledge"
a
"knowledge"
truly
point
is
not analo
to the technical
a physician
has,
a
in
1926-1930).
This
is
of capital
importance. I
other than
note
that the
or
"endurance"
"wisdom"
and
(in
sense
bnoxfjpir)
as well as risk
questioned."
It is in
at
this point that Socrates invokes philosophical courage; we must stand fast
our search
for
the
definition,
and endure
have harmonized
deeds.
proposed
by Nicias,
and
it
picks
It is first formulated
as
wise"
(i94d4~5;
the
ity, is defined,
war and
in
Laches'
of the
fearful
the hopeful in
on
situation"
(i94ei
i-i95ai).
The insistence
knowledge
as a
key
of
in
that,
children are
rash, not
fall
identifying
wisdom with
what
is
for
living
(I95c-d). That
is, if there is
coward.
to be courage, life
cannot
be the highest
out qualification.
person who
highest
value
is the
The knowledge
which
of when
when not
is,
of
Socrates
is the
most
impor
worst,
not
man
to possess.
Again,
of
the Laches
is,
at
narrow since
it does
not
include
Cf. G. Santas, "Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Metaphsics 22 (1969), p. 439: "Not everything in the answers [to the "what is
11.
Review of
courage'
question] is
188
Interpretation
merit.
other
things, knowledge
of the
by Socrates,
is
is fearful is bad,
directed to the
are
and what
is hopeful is good,
knowledge
present,
this as
cludes
fear
hope
are
future,
the
of what
bad is knowledge
must
of
things as
and
thus
be
corrected of
Nicias'
definition,
that
is,
the fourth
in
knowledge
of
"practically
This
(19905^3;
knowl
courage,
cf.
Charm.
I74a-c).
almost amounts
such.12
edge of what
is
If
knowledge is
part of
then even the most ordinary sorts of courage require philosophical knowledge.
its
Rather,
"part"
it is
shown
to
contradict a
separately
agreed
to premise
the courage
of the
is
a of vir re
of virtue.
For
we now seem to
contradiction
have is
supplied a
definition
"whole"
tue.
Indeed,
the
the
generated
"practically"
"all"
places
qualification
Nicias'
(19906)
the
unconditional
(i99d5-6)
ambiguous assent
having
holy.13
such
is
not
sufficient
condition
for
being
temperate, just
and of
Socrates does
himself
answer
falsity
is
not examined
further.
referred
On the
a
surface the
Laches
ends
indnogCa. It is therefore
the point
to at times as
dialogue
is
"negative,"
having
been to
refute various
definitions
not experts of
in the
matter.
correspondingly to show that Nicias and Laches are To take that position is, however, to overlook the role
supplies us with a splendid
example of
something
read on at
which
the
be
they
must
be
dialogue
which
alogue
fiction) taking place between the characters. The second is the di taking place between Plato and reader by means of the written text. Thus Plato, like Socrates, may well (for pedagogical reasons) intentionally withhold
dialogues,
so as to
is (in the
locutor (the reader) to find the answer for himself. To introduce considerations of this sort is to invite a discussion of irony, Platonic rhetoric, and a host of other
considerations.
ever, it
can
Without going into this controversial matter any further, how fairly easily be seen that the Laches does supply the key to theCOTOand
gia about
courage,
"Ideas"
in
a sense to
the
deeper cbiogia
about
education.14
12.
The
comes close
Nicias'
13.
Socrates"
actually mentioned in the Laches, but the passage under examination of evil (consider Rep. 4756-4763). especially if there is an assenting phrase is (literally translated): "You seem to me to be saying something, (19962).
are not
to
doing
"Idea"
so
assuming a number of important exegetical principles, the detailed justifica may be found in the introduction to my Self-knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus; in the In troduction to S. Rosen's Plato's Symposium (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); the Intro14.
am of course
tion
for
which
Philosophy, Education,
An
the
adequate
and
189
the reasons for
but
still rough
definition
courage, along
with
definition,
can
be
arrived at
tempted
definitions
offered
by
be something
xtxvrj) of
risk to oneself,
goods and evils
endurance accompanied
by
knowledge (which is
hoped for
and
feared,
that is to say,
evil
in the
sense of
knowledge
and
of when
life is
worth
by living
knowledge
of good and
not.'
and when
I do
not pretend
that such a
definition
But in
IS
general
it
is
fairly
good
definition,
is in fact
to Aristotle's.
IV
In the final
philosopher's
section of
of
the
courage,
as well as
have
seen
that the two are closely connected. The philosopher's courage, that
on
is,
the courage to
keep searching for (in this particular case) a definition of cour age, is mentioned once in the Laches explicitly (19431-5). But it is never de fined for us explicitly, anymore than the above mentioned definition of the whole
of courage was made explicit.
The very formulation of the point at 194a suggests the definitions of courage as elements in the definition of the it took to
Laches'
philosophical courage
generate
search
must
hold
in the
We
cannot one's
help
of of
of courage
(holding
ground
the enemy,
the nature
the
philosopher's courage
is
However,
ful
and evils put
Nicias'
two
definitions (courage is
courage part of
kind
of
knowledge
of the
fear
hopeful in
all
situations;
is
also
the knowledge of
of
together)
must also
be
the nature
For the
his
quest unless
order
he is
animated
by
the hope
un not
to for wisdom and the fear of ignorance. And in eagerly he must derstand that ignorance is evil and self-knowledge good, and so that life is
search
the highest
As Socrates
says
"unexamined life is
self,
not worth
"deed"
Laches it
considered as an effort
to say
what courage
formulating
this kind
of
Xdyog
knowledge in fact
in fact
get anywhere
in his
philosophizing?
If not,
said at
beginning
of
duction to J. Klein's A
Commentary
on
University
Platonic
as
and
of
North Carolina
Press,
1965);
and
Commentaires du
Socratic
For
an extended
discussion
of
irony see
in Literature my "Irony and Aesthetic Language in Plato's Murray Krieger, ed. Douglass Boiling (New York: Haven Press, 1987).
15.
Dialogues,"
III,
vi-vii.
190
Interpretation
his
"courage"
this essay,
comes
down to
mere endurance
in the face
of an unin
telligible
universe.
The
answer
withheld
from the
egyov.
Points
about
is the
par
tial
falsehood
are given
and of
We
eral
definitions. And for the reader, much more than this is gained. grounds for formulating our own definition of both courage in gen
of
deed
of
the
Laches
philoso
learning,
in
cation"
until we recall
Still
further,
solution
is that the
selves.
We
be done
one
engaging in the kind of dialogue the Laches thereby receives is not, however, education in an art
by
The
education
comparable to medicine
or carpentry.
pher.
Consequently,
and others.
the solution
is that
one should
become
a philoso with re
of course what
Socrates is bent
of the
on
bringing
as
about, both
spect to
The deed
Laches,
I said, is the
"proof"
that
education courage
in this
philosophical sense
is possible, Of course,
and so
is
not a matter of
foolish
endurance or of
defiant
of an absurd world.
ity
Laches does
seem
designed to
show us
easy to formulate in detail, and the many Platonic dialogues the Laches does that the deed of learning speaks louder than the skep
so
we know for example, by experiencing the search for it, realizing that some definitions will not do, that others are better, and so forth. At the end of this dialogic experience we know our way about the issue of courage,
learning
something
about
courage,
so
have done
cess,
know
our
way
about
something that could be proven to a skeptic prior to his undergoing it. Similarly, in the Meno Socrates says that although he is not sure that
should
be
called
"recollection,"
learning
deed" idle"
he is
be
prepared to
do battle "in
word and
for the
and
less
if we think it necessary to look for or search out that which we do not know (86b6-c2). Indeed, Socrates refutes Meno's pardox with a demonstration of the deed of somebody learning something, not with a theoretical attack on
the para
we
of not
just
deeds, but
to
harmony
between
ob-
of
foundational
thednogia
nature of
deeds. We have
Laches
points
a solution of
of education
Philosophy, Education,
servation rather
and
191
after
helps to
explain
Plato's decision to
dialogue
Laches
than
Nicias.16
for the
own educators.
someone who
for which we are seeking is We thereby become in large part our specifically, can the search be conducted by
end of the search?
That
is, let
us grant
that
philosophical conversation
not an own
art; how
are we to
and yet
tion?
ignorance
the word
show others
edge
they
too are
calls
This knowl
sense) his
is
what
art"
Socrates
(using
in
an equivocal
"erotic
the
or
"knowledge
matters"
of erotic
ability to ask questions which arouse and this, his words participate in the philosopher's
suggested,
participated
courage. His deeds too, as Laches (though only at Symp. 2i9d5 is Socrates ex "courageous"). Socrates thus exhibits a harmony between word
in
courage
effort
to explain
Socrates'
erotic
dialectic limit
metaphilosophical questions.
must
here to making
of
Laches.11
The
progress of
heavily
on a
variety
opinions,
particularly
constitutes
opinions about
"knowledge,"
as well as on an
immense
stock of
information
which
every human being possesses by virtue of being nity. For example, the modification of
pends on agreement with the opinion
Laches'
definition explicitly de
thing"
and
ignorance "harmful
connection arguments
injurious"
between in favor
knowledge
of
Similarly
the arts
repeatedly in the
second
half
of
foun
dations for
of
Socrates'
analogical reasoning.
It is
assumed
knowledge; but
there
is
no attempt
to prove that
Many
16.
more examples of
the
reliance on opinion
they do could be
no
knowledge.
mentioned.18
They
in-
Hoerber
explains
Plato's
choice of title as
follows: "Plato in
doubt
named
represents
need of
bet
showing than Nicias at the conclusion of the composition by attacking Nicias with some p. 209. p. 104. For still another explanation, see Blitz, "An "Plato's Metaphiloso17. The metaphilosophical questions are explored at greater length in my "Plato's
Introduction,"
phy,"
success."
in Platonic Investigations,
1985),
pp.
ed.
University
to
of
America
Press,
18.
1-33.
selection of courage as a theme
Stesilaus'
Even the
on what
be the
case
to
"every
one"
(I90d) in
the light of
demonstration. In
spite of
the
fact that
we
learn
right
from the
quality of courage itself, repeatedly adduced as a means of deciding whether or not a given definition is adequate. Also, Socrates refutes the first definition by citing counterexamples of behavior opined to second definition leads to a contradiction because Socrates cites six examples be courageous.
start
that
we are
to define not the courageous man or act but rather the single
instances
of courage are
Laches'
192
Interpretation
of
the Laches is
thoroughly
or
embedded
in dd^a,
and so
in
deeds.
"pre-judice."
of
"already
"mere"
It
seems clear
that with
not progress.
the basis of
"education"
cussing would not amount to much. The opinions truth if they are to be more than mere dogma. Plato's talk
"recollection"
must
be
grounded
in
some
about
(dvduvnoig) is
may
not
meant
in
question
consists
know"
least in
"reminding"
ourselves of
the truth
and speak
in
an opinionated way.
not refer
to
"already dvduvnoig
Laches'
How
ever, the
word/deed
distinction may
imply
that
the same
doctrine.
principle
louder than
words and
deeds
are
lowing
present
the corresponding words could be given, in this context, the fol interpretation. The nature of courage, among other things, is partially
to the soul
in
is the basis
of
ity
in
egyov of courage
is
visible
in
part
Xdyog
would
be
The
which
am
of
making is implicit
at
the
issue
he knows
what courage
is he does
not
know how to
ar
ticulate it adequately.
denies that Laches does know, in some what courage is. The way, superiority of Laches to Nicias lies in just that fact. (failed to "recollect") what he is talk Nicias, by contrast, may have ing about; this is why, in effect, his answers are too discursive, too verbal. Laches is not altogether wrong in suggesting that Nicias speaks like a sophist,
never
"forgotten"
Socrates
definition but
specify
Nicias is
compelled to
what
by
so
by getting agree
would expect
Laches to readily assent to some such proposition, but no proof for it is offered. The requisite knowledge is thus that of goods and evils to be feared and hoped for, that is, that death is not the summum malum and that loss of liberty is more fearful than death. Nicias is led to modify his definition by means of reflection on the examples of medicine, farming, and generalship (I98d-e). The knowledge of goods and evils lying in the future requires knowledge of practically all goods and evils as such. Having arrived at this result on the basis of (undemonstrated) opinions and analogies, Socrates makes his final point to the effect that having such wisdom entitles one to temper
fighting
men such as
Nicias
and
ance,
justice,
or
and
holiness.
no
19.
"sidoc"
Yet there is
"Idea"
far
as
(in the
or
"Idea")
of courage.
"anamnesis"
I know, in any of the other dialogues about an For an interesting attempt to connect
G. Vlastos, "The Socratic
Elenchus,"
see
pp. 27-70.
Oxford
Philosophy
(1983),
Philosophy, Education,
that
and
193
is, as someone whose talk is clever but not founded on sound insight. Even Nicias, though, has some sense of what courage really is; and so do most of us.
although
Thus
the search
for
definition
of courage not
is,
on
cessful,
no one concludes
in fact
exist.
Similarly,
while
in
dialogue
Socrates
state
observing that they are nevertheless friends. In the Laches his usual view that if we know something we must be able to it (19006). But, as I have been suggesting, it is not simply true that if we
repeats
by
cannot state
we are
some sense we must already know what for in order to search for it. discursively searching The whole Socratic search for wisdom, as well as the related notion of educa
we
it
do
not
tion,
makes sense
semantic
only on the assumption that what is being searched for is not a definition but the thing itself. The corresponding notion of recollection
in the cosmos,
a view
implies
fundamentally
I
am and
opposed
to the
now
"existentialist"
suggesting
ticular
by
the
Laches,
deeds
in
par
by
the
"priority"
to
Xdyog
Laches
associates
with
truth
a philosophical version of
analysis closer
to Laches than
"knowledge"
Nicias, in
It
the lat
which
intuitive.20
has is thus in
part nonpropositional or
requires
insight. One
put, our in
might ask
why, if this is true, speech is required at all. The partial failures of the
give us an
indication
of
the answer.
Simply
not
It may be that
at
we cannot
knowing
what we
to say, but
until we and
it is true that
do
know The
think we
know
have
gradual
process of
refining
tying down
wants
to say, recollec
"revelation"
furnish
a complete
of
in its clarity
recalling
to
able
The
experience of
sharpening
this
one's
no substitute.
Socratic dialectic is
his
bring
experience about
means of questioning.
Plato
He does
not tell
shows
readers
the
a
solution
to the problems of
education and
courage, he
it to them in
the
work
dergoing
deeds
un way that invites them to articulate of philosophizing they discourse about their insights into the
it for themselves. In
in
philosophical courage.
20. A very strong version of this view is argued by W. Wieland in his Platon Wissens (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982).
und
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Refutative Rhetoric
Thomas J. Lewis
McMaster
as
University
Plato
gias and
explores
the subject
of rhetoric
in
a number of
dialogues, but
a great
the Gor
the
Phaedrus
How
deal
of per
plexity
rhetoric
Plato's view of rhetoric. As Edwin Black observes, in the Gorgias is denounced in satirical, contentious, and refutative language, whereas, in the Phaedrus, Plato offers a constructive and affirmative judgment of rhet
about
oric.1
Black his
notes
changed
wrote
Phaedrus,
meant
or
".
by
"rhetoric"
in the Gorgias
he He
as
by
of
"rhetoric"
in the
Phaedrus."1
But Black
rejects
both
responses.
presents pects
different, but
complementary,
Plato's understanding of rhetoric. He argues that the Gorgias is refutative, because Socrates is mainly concerned to define and to condemn false
rhetoric;
and
is
engaged
in
defining
self
true
in
demonstrating
least
one
of
its
practical
applications
to
philosophy.3
agree
accounted
for
by
the
different dramatic
and
inquisitive young man, who is readily attracted by an alluring image of phi losophy. In contrast, in the Gorgias Socrates is confronted with three interlocu tors defending art, and two of these, Polus and Callicles, are willing to
Gorgias'
go on
the offensive
to impugn
Socrates'
character,
art. of
and
Gorgias'
challenges
Thus,
Socrates'
task
denounce itor to
and refute
the false
philosophy.
In both dialogues
to the
Socrates'
rhetoric, be
it
constructive or
refutative, is
appropriate
particular circumstances.
However,
the two
not
fit the
view of rhetoric
forms
In the Phaedrus
Socrates'
philosophy; whereas,
that
Gorgias, Polus,
of
or
by
Socrates.
361-74.
Rhetoric,"
of Speech, 44 (1958),
Ibid.,
Ibid.
,
p. 361.
p. 374.
Black's interpretation
work
Rhetoric,"
of
Gorgias has
by Rollen Quimby and David Kaufer. See Quimby's "The Growth of Plato's Perception of Philosophy and Rhetoric. 7 (1974), 71-79; and Kaufer's "The Influence of Plato's Developing Psychology on his Views of Quarterly Journal of Speech,
served as a
Rhetoric,"
64(1978), 63-78.
196 At best
Interpretation
each
has been
but
Socrates'
not persuaded.
conclusion
failure to
persuade
his interlocutors
appears to
lead to the
that Plato
and
is
depicting
Gorgias,
it is
difficult to
how
be the
complement of
constructive rhetoric.
assessment of
failure
that
Socrates'
of
rhetoric
appears
Socrates'
however,
this fact is not itself evidence of the failure of his refutative rhetoric.
not portray Socrates as them; rather, he portrays Socrates as manipulating Gor Callicles in order to persuade a very different audience the
Gorgias'
It is
not evidence of
attempting to
gias,
persuade
Polus,
of
and
group young men who have assembled for Phaedrus it is appropriate to judge the success
on
display
of words.
In the
Socrates'
of
by
its impact
the
interlocutor
If the primary audience for refutative rhetoric is this group of young men, then it may be sufficient for Socrates to only silence his interlocutors in order to persuade this audience.
matic structure of
Socrates'
is
more complex.
I
ric
in the
rheto silencing his interlocutors Socrates discredits of the primary audience, and that this discrediting is the initial step
by
Gorgias'
in attracting the
audience to philosophy.
Thus, his
of
refutative rhetoric
does
serve
as a complement of
dition, his
Socrates'
refutative rhetoric
illustrates his
prowess
in
a public
disclaimers, in
in
public
as more
hold his To
own
debate.
and
essary to
uses
refutative rhetoric it is nec his identify primary audience; to articulate the shaming tactics Socrates to discredit art in front of this audience; and to explicate the way
of
Gorgias'
appreciate the
intent
the force
Socrates'
Socrates
covers
up his
rhetoric
by presenting himself
The Gorgias
rates urges
a
in
which
Soc
also
Callicles to
up
philosophy.
There is
Chaerephon,
which provides a
transition be
tween the
opening pleasantries surrounding the arrival of Socrates and Chaere initial conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. The dialogue begins with the arrival of Socrates and Chaerephon in the interCharles Kauffman, "Enactment
114-29as
4.
Argument in
the
Gorgias"
(1979),
Philosophy
and
Rhetoric
12
Refutative Rhetoric
lude between
public
Gorgias'
as
197 his
formal demonstration
will
his
display
where
Gorgias'
ond part of
he
take
questions
not
from the
place.
But the
sec
take
It is
replaced
by
the con
before
the audi
it he injects him
Socrates has
allows of
into the
"
Callicles
come as
acknowledges
that
he has
arrived
they say you should take part in late, and Callicles informs him
late for
of
Gorgias' Gorgias'
warfare"
Socrates
that he has
missed a
feast
words
by being
not comment on
Calli
to
cles'
depiction
speech as a
feast, but he
arrival.
allows
this
evaluation
stand
by blaming
Chaerephon
a
accepts of
his
culpa
can
bility
cles
he is
friend
Gorgias he
arrange another
display
his
either now or
expresses
surprise:
best
suits
Socrates. Calli
anxious
to hear
we are
Gorgias"
(447b). Chaerephon
here"
(447b).
Clearly
Callicles
Socrates'
interest in
Gorgias'
feast
of words.
Callicles is
surprised
that Socrates
would
be
that
not com
himself
either way.
Chaerephon to
and where
come to
will
his home,
where a spe
Gorgias is staying
cial
on this visit to
Athens,
they
be treated to
display
of rhetoric
by
Gorgias, instead
be willing to
of
an art
just
what
suggests that
Socrates
ask
Gorgias himself, is
pleased
said
he is
Socrates
to have
his
forward in his
not
place:
"Splendid!
know
what
to say
and relies on
question
(447d).
When Chaerephon
finally
who
does
manage
by Socrates, Polus,
place of
in
Chaerephon,
states
unsatisfactory
5.
Gorgias
asks
for
an explanation
about
commentators
have For
conversations
take place at
home. There is
now gen
mistaken and
for the summary of this controversy and the basis Plato's Gorgias (Oxford, 1959). P- l88logues of Plato,
Dodds,
6. Citations from the Gorgias are from the translation by W. D. Woodhead in The Collected Dia eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1961).
198
sion.
Interpretation
clarifies art
Socrates
what
his
Polus'
criticism of
answers and
them
oric
his
is
and what
it
should
be
called.
Gorgias
and
says
it is the
art of rhet
(449a),
between Socrates
Gorgias is
appears
underway.
What is to be
meet
this
to have come to
own
come at
the
instiga
late
tion or
with
insistence
of
his
companion
come
by insisting
that
they stay in
either com con
impediment to Socrates
loitering.7
ing
alone or
insisting
We may
that
clude
late,
which
is entirely
consistent with
Callicles'
of
at
Chaerephon 's
Gorgias'
presumption
Socrates indicates
would
be
anxious
to hear
exhibition.
Choosing
art.
to come late
says
that
Socrates
Socrates
this explic
itly (447c),
but
he does
not
say is that he
wants
presence of
Gorgias'
Notice that
Chaerephon to
raises
at
home. Socrates
Callicles'
the
stead of an exhibition at
home,
and
that Callicles
invites Socrates to
ask
question
Socrates
has Chaerephon
Gorgias is
not whether
Callicles'
Gorgias
will
discuss his
in lieu his
art.
of a second exhibition at
home; instead, it is
discussion
at
a question about
The possibility
of an exhibition or a
Callicles'
home is
not
raised again.
Socrates
initially
manner
questions
Gorgias
in
a polite and
inoffensive have to
(4493-4553). He then
briefly
summarizes what
because he is
he
suggests a
thinking
and
the audience.
And so, imagine that my interest is on your behalf, for perhaps some of those present are anxious to become your disciples there are some, I know, quite a number in
fact
when you?
who would
be bashful
perhaps about
questioning
you.
inquire, they
just
What
shall we
gain,
Gorgias, if we
On
be
wrong alone,
or the subjects
mentioned
by Socrates? (455cd)
can, if Gorgias is willing to employ
Socrates
him,
facilitate
his
purpose.
Gorgias
to
wants to
be
questioned
in
order to
display by
ability.
He may simply
wish
bask in
public
suggests
disciples
or students.
impressive
to risk
being
self-defeat-
Commentators have generally not remarked on the problematic nature of Socrates' late arrival. noted by Arlene W. Saxonhouse in her recent article "An Unspoken Theme in Plato's Gorgias: Interpretation, 11 (1983), p. 140.
However, it is
'War,"
Refutative Rhetoric
ing.
as
199
According
to
embarrassed
to question
fully
appreciating the
that these young men are be denied the opportunity of may with him. Gorgias accepts this associating
method of self
Gorgias'
display
for direct
questions
from the
audience.8
audience
is
portrayed as
young
and ambitious.
These young
what
men are
interested in
prominent public
positions,
and
Gorgias
responds
by holding
they
out
can as
to
if they
master
his
art
(455c). To be
Socrates'
ness of
refutative
rhetoric,
we must
be
for seeking
the
"love
of
directs the city on the most important To "advise be able to prevail in a public forum, and Gorgias claims that Gorgias
produces agreement on a number of as
of
his
Socrates'
conversation with
pects of rhetoric:
(453);
sis of
there
are
two
forms
of
conviction on
knowledge,
practiced
numbers
knowledge;
latter is
in
courts of
law
and assemblies
because the
use of
combination of
large
the
former (454e, it is
not an art
455a).
Socrates
the truth
that to the
edge of
its
subject
it is inferior to
at all
(459bcd). He
pupils
how to
is just
base,
a student must
of
struction
matters.
or
Gorgias
begin
by instructing his
from Gorgias be
one who
learns
rhetoric
would appear
knowledge
not
he does not,
allows
he is
(459de). Gorgias
agrees with
students
in this
manner and
he
to
misuse
skill
his skill, the teacher of rhetoric was only for good use (457bc). Socrates
not
Gor
gias seems to be saying that by his very nature the rhetorician must be just and do just actions, but also to be saying that the rhetorician may misuse his skill. Since there seems to be an inconsistency here Socrates suggests it will require a long discussion to determine the truth of the matter (46iab). Polus sees the inconsis
tency
that arises
from
Gorgias'
admission
that knowledge
contends
is
necessary
condi
tion for
becoming
a student of rhetoric.
He
8.
Socrates'
role as an
interviewer
noted
of
Gorgias before
a composite audience of
9.
by Steven Rendall, "Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Ex of Plato's Philosophy and Rhetoric, io (1977), 105-79K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974),
the
reader
is
Gorgias,"
226-34.
200
Interpretation
say otherwise,
and
ashamed to
Gorgias'
of
sense of shame
(46icd). his
conversation with
Socrates displays
he
adopts a
tone of
There is
underlying mockery in
and
words, but
he
speaks
politely to
Gorgias,
Gorgias
maintains
dignified
pose
befitting
a man of
and
reputation,
has
impressive
performance.
reason on
for
Socrates'
Socrates'
politeness. sufferance.
Gorgias'
Both
by
prior ar
by
virtue of
his impressive
performance
the audience
belongs to
questions or
Thus, if Socrates is
not
to
lose
access
auspices. If Gorgias is treated too roughly he may simply call it a day, Polus has already provided an adequate excuse by explaining that Gorgias has had a long day and is tired (448a). After a fairly lengthy conversation with
and
Gorgias, but
to the
inquiry
in sight, Socrates is
bility
more;
of
Gorgias'
response
revealing.
He
says
he is
he is
concerned that a
wish
to hear
long demonstration
may have
other
things to to
for the
audience seems
exaggerated; he
appears
be
looking
of
for
a graceful
not succeed.
is
ing
Gorgias'
agreement to continue
"It
would
be disgraceful it
of me
to refuse,
when
volunteered to meet
any
question makes
that might be
possible
put"
(458d).
Gorgias'
for his
public reputation
for Socrates to
oblige
him to
continue.10
his way in front of audience and then by appealing to that dience he has made it difficult for Gorgias to dismiss him.
wheedled
Socrates'
Gorgias'
effort
to gain access to
Gorgias'
audience
has
a clear parallel
in the
of
10.
For
Gorgias'
character,
1-22.
Gorgias'
see
Gorgias,"
the
about
Philosophy
how he
appears of
and
Rhetoric, 8 (1975),
is
at
She
to others
the core of
character, and
Gorgias'
char offending his audience (7-9). Kauffman recognizes this aspect of acter but he contends that it does not encompass later comments at 497 and 506 where Gorgias urges that the conversation be pressed on to a conclusion. to Kauffman these pas result of
his fear
According
(458), even if Kauffman claims, and what he says appears to indicate a different aspect of his character. However, the truth-seeking Gorgias can be reconciled with Spitzer's position if, as I have argued, Gorgias is not only expert at knowing what pleases an audience, but also if he has a sufficient degree of self-control to put this knowledge to use
as earlier claimed
he had
Gorgias does
speak as
by
always
appearing
as
pleasing
as possible.
Unlike Polus
and
sire
they
want, especially if he
from
directly
Socrates'
himself,
as
he does,
suffering
cross-examination.
Refutative Rhetoric
first
part of
as
201
the Phaedrus
as the
speech,
play.
just
a
(227-2300). Phaedrus has been impressed audience in the Gorgias has been impressed by
by
Lysias'
Gorgias'
dis
Socrates Phaedrus would normally welcome his But because Phaedrus wishes to practice the speech and then use it to
of
As
friend
company.
own rhetorical
ability, he does
not
Socrates'
speech under
tion.
up his intended
speech,
and
decep
insure
Lysias'
to
an uninterrupted conversation
they leave
the
city
and walk
along the
river to
attaches to
influencing
Phaedrus is
by
Socrates'
the area
unfamiliarity with the terrain. He describes himself as a stranger to and refers to Phaedrus as his guide (23od). Phaedrus responds that
oddest of men
Socrates is the
and
because he
so seldom sets
Lysias'
foot
outside
the walls,
could
lead him
around of
Attica
or anywhere else
(230c).
Knowing
what
Socrates
really thinks
Lysias'
speech we
his friend,
Attica. Nonetheless,
Phaedrus'
given
may conclude that in order to counter the Socrates might be willing to be dragged around interest in rhetoric, his friendship for Soc
rates, and the absence of any complicating third party, it is relatively easy for Phaedrus' Socrates to capture attention; whereas in the Gorgias Socrates cannot
lead the
ence, he
audience must
Gorgias'
effect on participation
the
audi
of, the
de
fenders
of rhetoric.
To
counter
the effect
of
display
Socrates
tion to associate
Gorgias'
indecency. There
are
First, Socrates induces Polus and then Callicles rhetoric. Second, he provokes behalf of
Gorgias'
Callicles to say things, which appear to violate the city's sense of decency. As this process of manipulation unfolds a further complication about the audi
ence arises. signed to
suggest
each of
the
interlocutors is de
influence the
the primary
a
audience.
However,
Polus
throughout the
and
conversation with
secondary
are
audience of
Callicles,
and what
is
said
by
part calculated
the
conversation.
Similarly, Gorgias
than
Callicles
during
trated
to Callicles
by
what
it is clear that Socrates is playing mainly for it is Callicles who is so astonished and frus Gorgias, he hears that he thrusts himself into the conversation brushing
Polus
aside.
202
The
Interpretation
process of
drawing
Socrates'
effort to establish
himself in front
to enter
eagerness
his
a
responses moved
looking
for
sequence of events
is important. It is
at 457e
not
Gorgias
to be
blamed if
it is
misused
by
a student.
Socrates
suggests
somewhere;
what
at
will require a
Gorgias has
not
Instead, he
mary
and
suggests
want
audience as well as
Gorgias'
Chaerephon
and
Callicles to for it
for
continuation,
oth
erwise
on
eliciting (458e).
agreement
to go on
would
be disgraceful to do
afford to press
Only
after
he has
Socrates
hard
the
but
now without
Although Gorgias is
rates continues
by
Polus
Socrates'
as
main
interlocutor, Soc
he
can say.
to treat
Gorgias'
He
invites Polus to
give
question
him
of
about rhetoric
frank
answers
for fear
permission to proceed
offending Gorgias, and he waits to obtain (463). Only then does Socrates present his analysis
of
typology
of
form
of justice and
just
as medicine
is impersonated
by cooking,
gymnastic
by beau-
tification,
Polus'
legislation
by sophistry (463-466). Finally Socrates obtains that the knack or technique of rhetoric can be of no
oneself and one's
doing
friends
and relatives of
wrong
Also, if it
were right
being
punished
for their
wickedness
(48o-48ib).
ask
These
rious or
assertions provoke
Callicles to
Callicles'
Chaerephon
whether
Socrates is
se
simply hear
joking
(481b).
in his initial question about whether Socrates really demonstration (447b). As before, Chaerephon responds that Socrates is quite serious and he invites Callicles to confirm this by asking Socrates (481b). Socrates responds to question with a long speech
surprise and skepticism as wished to
Gorgias'
Callicles'
(4810-4820) affirming his radical assertions about rhetoric. This is too much for Callicles; he has run out of patience with Socrates, Gorgias, and Polus. Jokes
and spoofs are one
ther
Gorgias
the
nor
thing, but if Socrates persists in spouting nonsense and nei Polus can expose it for what it is, then he, Callicles, will. Here,
Socrates'
as at
Socrates
beginning of the dialogue, Chaerephon takes initially took advantage of Chaerephon's apparently
for arriving late, but
now
words
literally.
guileless nature to
and
make excuses
Chaerephon's trusting
literal
accep-
Refutative Rhetoric
tance
vokes
Socrates'
as
203
and pro
of
him to
things straight.
Callicles
because he
contends
Socrates'
agrees with
entangled
in inconsistencies
he really believed. However, Callicles that Polus has fallen into the same trap. He was obliged to agree with ludicrous assertions about rhetoric only because he agreed to the prem
was ashamed to assert what suffer
and
he
was
ashamed to
deny
it (348de).
by
goaded
to say what
without
into the conversation, and he has been induced concern for public decency. The stage is set for the
Socrates'
Callicles
or radical.
rightly understands
then
be
extreme upside
If true, ".
be turned
what we
down
and
apparently
we are everywhere
doing
the opposite of
should"
(481c).
suffer
Socrates'
it is better
to
wrong than to
obliged to match
Socrates'
radical as
sertion with an
equally
is to live
them,
Anyone
who
his
intelligence
should
be
competent to
satisfy every
it
craves
Any
opposition
to this way of
living
on
or shamefulness
is,
an attempt
by the
inferior to
inferiority
Socrates
having
to
invoke
a sense of shame
says that
or natural
Socrates is potentially a superior man who has been blinded to the right form of human life by his preoccupation with philosophy (484cd). If
would
Socrates
Socrates
spected
1 1
only
study
abandon
philosophy he
rhetoric
would see
the truth of
Callicles'
words, and he
his
superior nature to
develop
would
employ
he
could
become
member of
the
community.
The
views expressed
by
Callicles
and
lic
(336b- 354a).
Both Callicles
are closely related to those of Thrasymachus in the Repub Thrasymachus are frustrated and angered by what Socrates has
obliged
his
previous
interlocutors to
are
agree
to,
and
conversation to set
Both
provoked
serve
by
benefits
of radical
hedonism
in the Republic
speech serves
to draw out
who restates
position
praise of
insists
that
Socrates
reckless eloquence of
Thrasymachus,
in turn
provokes
Glaucon to
no
position examined
by
Glaucon
no scope
for
204
Interpretation
of rhetoric
knowledge At the
Socrates
can
be
of use
to no one.
court on
He
who would
drag
false
(486bc).
satisfac
Callicles'
assertion
is the
be drawn between
this premise
pleasures
that are
that are
evil.
Callicles
affirms
by
allowing that
he is thinking of appetites such as hunger and thirst and the pleasure that results from eating and drinking, and by analogy he extends this meaning to all other ap
petites
(494bc). Socrates
urges
to falter
have to throw
(494c).
Socrates then
suffering from an appetite such as an itch be scratched forever can be said to be happy. The
possibility of one such appetite as the basis of happiness is diminished as absurd by Callicles. However, having equated all appetites, Callicles is obliged to affirm
that
such a man would
be
happy
(494d). Socrates
presses
Callicles
still
further:
socrates
question
If it
was
wanted
to scratch
or can
push the
further? Think is
answer,
Callicles,
if
life
of a
shocking and shameful and miserable? Will you dare to say that happy, if they have what they desire in abundance?
Are
you not
callicles
ashamed,
Socrates,
to
drag
our
discussion into
such
topics?
socrates
Is it I
who
whatever
do this, my noble friend, or the man who says so unequivo its nature, is the key to happiness, and does not distin
between
But enlighten
or
me
further
as to whether you
say
identical,
that there
callicles
same.
To
avoid
inconsistency if I
say they
are
different,
assert
they
are the
socrates
Then
statement,
speak
Callicles,
longer
with me,
if you
contrary to
(494e,
Although Callicles is
pressed to affirm
his
by
his
sense of shame
like any decent person into indecency. Callicles knows that he has been trapped Gorgias and Polus managed to avoid the trap; they chose
public purposes the small price of
inconsistency. Callicles is from affirming the consequence of his assertion, he rebukes Socrates for dragging a polite conversation
Both
is for
logical inconsistency. Callicles, on the other distanced himself from Gorgias and Polus with the claim that he could not hand, be shamed into inconsistency. Further, he claimed that not to be bound shame
by
was
the
mark of
the
feelings
of shame was
simply
an
instrument
of
inferior
man.
Refutative Rhetoric
as
205
a protective
According
device
For home
to
Callicles,
the
all conventional
false morality,
used
by
a public
to chain the
whom
energy of the superior man. Socrates describes as "in love with the
the
demos"
because
his
need
to pander to
a
it,
description
of
of a
sheep morality is
anger and
very imprudent
statement.
The aspiring
air
these views.
Further,
al
though
self
initially by criticizing Socrates, he finds him polite and decent behav indirectly attacking Gorgias by associating iour with a sheep morality. However, having staked out this ground in order to
Gorgias
Gorgias'
Callicles
best
Socrates, Callicles
now
rior man
affirm
happiness
bly
ashamed:
prove
of such
First, like any decent and conventional Athenian for seeming to ap a way of life; second, because of his claim of being above
also ashamed of
conventional
morality, he is
being
ashamed.
He is humiliated.
To this
defenders is
of rhetoric shown
display
In
defense
of rhetoric
to require a
that is shameful or
and each
indecent,
chose
community,
is
offered a choice
between
rhetoric and
decency. Both
unaware
Gorgias
that
and
Polus
instinctively
decency
and seemed to
be
largely
they had
chagrin,
Callicles, determined
indecency.12
Gorgias'
choosing to dissuade
route
Forcing
audience
attempt
see rhetoric as a
from
following
in
Gorgias.
life
They
for
(455d). But
success
respectability; one
then
publicly
embrace
whatever
can a
If
rhetoric
must
honour him for his services. community entrust its decisions to is to be the route chosen by ambitious young men and their families it appear respectable, otherwise it will not serve their purposes. Both analyt
a man and and
ically
toric.13
dramatically
Socrates has
face
of rhe
Greece and Rome, xxxi, George Klosko, "The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's hedonism is far more extreme than is necessary to support his (1984), 126-39, argues that view of natural justice. Thus, he is more easily refuted than had he advanced the more moderate argu
12.
Callicles'
Gorgias,'
ments suggested
Callicles'
by
in
Klosko. I
concur with
into
Socrates to deal effectively with hedonism. However, Klosko stops with the logical defeat of Callicles. He does not explore how the shaming tactics used on Gorgias and Polus are preliminary to the more ruthless use of these tactics on Callicles, leading to the dramatic de
mouth order
to allow
feat
of
Callicles. The
need
13.
for
care
to
to the community
on
he
visits
is
explained
himself
of managing this problem for so many years. In the Euthydemus Plato lampoons the "wordy Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus in much the same manner as Aristophanes characterizes
warfar
206
Interpretation
offered
Socrates has
through
ric with
an
analysis
of rhetoric
and
as
indecent pandering,
and
Gorgias, Polus
he is
Callicles he has
associated rheto
decency, but in
so
doing
he has
provoked
the
allegations
that
(461c, 483c,
that
he
speaks
unfairly
or
deceptively,
and that
he harangues like
(482c, 4836, 489c, 489c, 494d, 5i9d). However, when he eventually admits that
claims
that he is
not at
fault; he is
obliged
to
speak
like this
haviour
of others
(494c, 494c,
and
5i9d).
The final
part of
Callicles (521-522)
these
charges
the concluding
exhortation
(523-527)
to
meet as
by
presenting Socrates
philosophy
The
conversation
has been
long
and
all
enthusiasm
for it,
and
he
gives no sign of
the
reasons
he
in urging Socrates to
Callicles'
abandon
evokes
earlier
role
in the city
he
will
have for
of care
a
rhetoric.
socrates
me what
kind
you recommend
to me, that of
possible,
or
doing
the
Athenians, like
doctor,
first,
them as
good as
And
so speak
up
to me at
say
now.
callicles
I say then, to serve and minister. Then you invite me, my noble friend, to play the flatterer? socrates callicles Yes, if you prefer the most offensive term, for if you do not
(521).
Having
licles'
pressed
Callicles to
reiterate
his initial position, Socrates labels Cal curtly interrupts Callicles, and
term,"
said
dramatically rejects rhetoric and claims that he is well aware that this leaves him helpless in defending himself in a court of law, and that if brought to court his trial would be like that of a doctor prosecuted by a pastry cook before a jury of children (52ie, 522a). He claims that all he could do
befall him. Then Socrates
in
court would
and as a result
anything might happen to him. his death than save his life through the
concludes with a tale about the afterlife
and
flattering
rhetoric
(522d). Socrates
claims to
and an exhortation.
He
he
contends that
it demon
strates
the correctness of his decision to reject rhetoric. The tale also provides a
with
piety
and
justice, for
philos-
disgust
of re
its
practitioners
fail
Refutative Rhetoric
ophy
provides
as
207
and
(527d),
for the
claim
that philosophy
527c)-
and
(526c,
In his
original recommendation
Socrates
in
order to show
how
misguided was
losophy. Socrates does nothing to close this gap between philosophy oric; instead, he uses it to advantage. Socrates portrays rhetoric as
Callicles'
indecent,
philos
allows
claim
that there is
virtually nothing in
common
between
ophy and rhetoric, and then embellishes the easy, although perhaps misleading, inference that philosophy as the antithesis of rhetoric must be respectable, de
cent, and at one with the community's sense of justice.
chooses
with
Therefore,
clear.
a man who
philosophy
and
his fellow
citizens and
he finds favor
the Gods.
Socrates'
Gorgias'
admirers
is
only Polus
art are
Callicles
wrapped
in
a veneer of respectability.
fundamentally disreputable;
you
follow him
at your peril.
SOCRATES'
When
that
accused
by
Callicles
he
of
he condemns, Socrates
respectable,
and
responds
employing the very techniques of mob oratory by depicting himself and philosophy as pi
his courageous devotion to philosophy it for pandering rhetoric even at the cost life.14 of his But the anomaly pointed out by Callicles is now compounded. Socrates has wrapped himself in the cloak of public morality by using to good
ous and
with
emphasizes
effect used
the truth
and es
If
refutative rhetoric
is to be
rhetoric,
further
analysis.
The initial
Socrates'
part of
conversa
tion with
Gorgias in the
provides a
Early
conversation
way to Gorgias
approach this
of rhetoric
(456b-c). First, he
recalled
by
their physi
In his
second example,
Gorgias
tending
in
with a
doctor before
an audience.
doctor,
or
indeed,
over
forum. The
remarks on
second example
is the
one of
any interest to
audi-
14.
Aristotle
the rhetorical
force
of
being
seen
to
choose
Achilles'
as a powerful example,
Rhetoric I, 3,
to
1359a.
his
Achilles,
whereas
in the
208
Interpretation
(455c-d), they
are
interested in
Gorgias'
characterizes
of rhetoric as
ignorance prevailing
Gorgias'
over
knowledge (459b),
and
throughout the
dialogue he
castigates
art as
ignorance prevailing over knowledge by audience. Socrates does not mention the fact
of rhetoric are
in the
service of
knowledge
knowledge
The
of
is
worth examining.
implant the
conviction
necessary to improve the body appears to be rhetoric found in the Phaedrus, where
In
Gorgias'
another example of
the constructive
conviction
Socrates'
rhetoric
implants the
first
cian cannot
be
used
for the
welfare of
his
patient unless
is
convinced
that he
should undergo
ment should
be
administered rests on
his knowledge
qua
pa
tient
does
of opin
"truth"
ion
or
belief
is
able to speak
of
the
within
the scope of
of
knowledge the
the need
physician
is
not capable of
implanting
is
thus,
for
the
rhetorician. and
The
rhetorician
assumed not
sician,
edge.
knowl
the
realm of opinion or
ig
his
implant
conviction on the
be,"
basis
not of
be"
knowledge
of
"what
but
of
"what
seems
to to say?
or
"appears to
even
though it "is
not."
rhetorician
Presumably he emphasizes
of
bleakness
untreated, minimizes the distasteful aspects of the treatment and the convales cence, and holds out the expectation
what of
the
best possible,
and
therefore some
the areas of
unlikely,
recovery. and
In
addition
beyond
diagnosis, treatment,
tites or
prognosis,
ing
the great
desires. For example, he may appeal to the patient's vanity by emphasiz improvement to be expected in his appearance, or to his desire for
and wealth secure
honour
successful
treatment
will enhance
his
ability to
rhetorician's persuasiveness
is based
on set
ting
the prescribed treatment within the context of what the patient would
like to
avoid and/or
obtain,
isfy
and
his desires.
addition
In
to the
knowledge
how to
of
the patient's
hopes,
aspirations,
and
desires,
the
knowledge
of
present the
treatment to make it
appear
to satisfy
these
desires,
how
be trusted to
helpful
advice that
be
relied upon.
The
being
be trusted,
through distortion
Refutative Rhetoric
tion.
edge
as
209
service of
Thus,
Gorgias'
example of
in the
knowl
indicates two
somewhat
rhetoric:
first,
is
at
the persuasion of
the patient, and second, the maintenance of the rhetorician's public reputation.
Because the
dent
on
effectiveness of
patient
least in
part
depen
in
to
having
he
niques of others
persuasion, the
to
implant the
that
to do what he in
must appear
be
other
than
he is in
order
In
of
order
to apply
one
Gorgias'
manner
speaking,
detail
must
be
modified without
changing
Gorgias'
by
different
in the
person.
Let
us suppose
by implanting
sumed
has
mastered
both the
of
realm of opinion.
both
a practitioner of an art
based
on
technique of
implanting
they
knowledge,
the time
taking
care to polish
his
reputation as an
honest
and
trustworthy
deceive.
in the Gorgias, Socrates does
The
characters, just
al
condemnation of rhetoric
object
the art of
uses
is the improvement
of their
(502e,
503a).
The true
art of
rhetoric
is the basis
and
ticed
(517a)
he
he
but according to Socrates it is seldom prac he may be the sole practitioner (52ide). Also, this true rhetoric is comparable to doing battle
"
possible
with
(521a). But
or at
he
also claims
to this true
rhetoric precludes
the the
knowledge of, the techniques of the flattering false rhetoric, thus, his fate hands of a jury of children prosecuted by a pastry cook.
If
the
Socrates'
commitment
to a true
rhetoric
is
analogous
to medicine, then
patients
like
citi
with
his
(fellow
zens) to
ness to
presence and
his
attractive
the
audience requisite
dergo the
which manipulates
difficulty of convincing these young men to un the need for refutative rhetoric: a rhetoric thus, treatment, his three interlocutors. However, silences then and
increases the
Socrates'
manipulation of
Callicles
goes
purpose of
au
dience away from Gorgias. Callicles sees technique and repeatedly accuses Socrates
cusation
deal
Socrates'
of
persuasive ac
of
engaging in
mob oratory.
reputation.
Accordingly, he
makes
undertakes
the the
task of
defending his
for
for honest
and
Socrates'
consequences.
astuteness
aggressiveness
this
defensive
rhetoric necessary,
otherwise
persuasive effort
may be
undermined
210
Interpretation
Socrates'
by
Callicles'
exposure of
techniques
of persuasion.
However, Callicles
Socrates
the
raw material
of
his
reputation.
to associate the
and
rhetoric of reject
with the
shameless statements of
Callicles
then to piously
this pandering
rhetoric. audience
Socrates
uses
refutative rhetoric
to dissuade the
from
his
following
reputation
Gorgias,
high
and
he
continues
to
manipulate rhetoric.
his interlocutors to
polish
as someone who
has
no use
for
ground of public
morality
noble
virtue; like
Achilles, he
will
do the
thing
CONCLUSION
Refutative
rhetoric.
The
rhetoric
of
Gorgias;
the
creates an
alluring image
philosophy.
heavy
false
rhetoric
in the Gorgias is necessary because of mounted by Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. demonstration
and
Socrates
to press
mined
arrives
in the
Gorgias'
middle of
and
finds
way to insert
presence
his
audience.
Socrates then
Gorgias'
uses
conclusion.
Callicles
mounts a
deter
reck
into
lessness,
discredits
Gorgias'
Callicles'
shame and
silenced, he
claims
Socrates is using the very techniques of persuasion that he eschew, and Socrates finally does move to meet the charge of being a
tor.
to
mob ora
To
polish
his
Socrates
portrays
embellishes
only the truth no matter what, distinction between rhetoric and philosophy, and
who would
rather
than stoop
to the
deceptive techniques
no
false
direct
honour has
to
Gorgias, from
of
ing
in
public
they hope to learn the art of prevail intervention they are treated to the
spectacle of the
defenders
by
what
they
are pressed
to say. Plato leaves us to draw our own conclusion about the tacle on the audience.
impact
of this spec
I. INTRODUCTORY
Boethius'
Consolation of Philosophy, for centuries one of the most widely books in the West, is now little more than a historical curiosity.
all, educated people have heard
reasons of
Most, but
seem to
not
it;
some
have
read
it;
very few
than
for the
our common
twentieth-century
"the tradi
tion".
place we are separated by a centuries-long tradition of philoso from the intellectual context which gave rise to synthesis of Plato phy and Aristotle. Minds such as Descartes and Kant have so altered the cast of west
Boethius'
In the first
ern
thinking
impossible,
at
least
at
seriously
eth
as a philosopher.
twenti the
America,
and
continental
agreement with
most
would
basic
popularly
text,1
ac
manifesto,
in
to the Boethian
and
make
the
character
Boethius
Dame
Philosophy
temerariis agi
fortuitisque
inesse
rationis?
Atqui, inquam,
hac
certa
deum
pr.
fuerit dies
depellat (Bk. I,
6,
3-4).
(Then
she said,
"Do
is driven
by
reckless and
it?"
haphazard
chance or
no
do
you
rational
direction to
rather a
way would I think that such regular phaenomena are moved I know that the creator god presides over his handiwork,
which might
by
haphazard;
be
day
drive
me
of this
opinion.")2
Because Ayer dismisses metaphysical questions and answers as not only wrong but nonsensical, he could continue reading only on the assumption that he was perusing a text indicative of the philosophical errors of the past.
Thomas F. College
1984,
1.
2
.
Curley
and was a
III (B.A. Amherst 1976, Ph.D. Princeton 1981) taught Classics at Hamilton at Johns Hopkins University. His exploration of the relationship be of which this paper is a part, was cut short by his death in October, philosophy,
Mellon Fellow
and
1946).
my
vance
which at
merely as trots for the Latin, thus I times lapses into clumsiness.
apologize
in
ad
212
Interpretation
what would
Likewise,
defines
of
Sartre,
in
who
in
an accessible manifesto of
his
own make
existentialism as
the
conviction
essence,3
the
following
si
argument
which existence
is treated
as a predicate
like any
other and
quolibet genere
imperfectum
in
eo perfectum quod
sit;
illud
imperfec
fingi
(Bk.
Ill,
pr.
io, 4).
example of a given
should
be
seen to
genus, it is necessary that there should also be a perfect example of that genus; for it is
impossible to imagine
whence
that
which
is
considered
might
come. to exist,
if the
perfect
is removed.)
In Sartre's
case as well
further reading
could
only
proceed on
he
was engaged
in the merely
academic exercise of
becoming
in the
history
of
of philosophy.
Thus there
Boethius'
exist significant
intellectual differences to
account
for
our neglect
however,
that other
equally important factors come into play. The Consolatio, in addition to being a work of philosophy, is also an intricately crafted work of literature: a dramatic
characters composed
in alternating
we
Boethius'
verse and
This
blending
of
poetry
and
philosophy,
our
categories
tend to
keep
as
obstacle
to
understanding
intentions
prose (that pay lip service to the clarity of certain of David Hume and A. J. Ayer, for example) and to the wit and style of (Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's, for instance); but in fact we believe that philo
others'
thing, poetic invention quite another. We simply do not philosophy as poetry, or poetry as philosophy, which is pre text. cisely the response demanded by This distance from the work, both intellectual and aesthetic, clarifies the na
sophic exposition one
is
know how to
read
Boethius'
ture and
limitations of Boethian scholarship in the last century. Modern research into the Consolatio may be dated from the publication in 1877 of Hermann Usener's Anecdoton Holderi.* In this monograph the author dismisses the Con
Usener
and the
grants as
Boethius'
own an
metra,
which
he
rates
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic sources. introduction (up through Bk. II, pr. 4, 38) very low; otherwise he sees the text as an amateur
better
expressed elsewhere.
ish
On the
one
hand, Usener's
3. 4.
obviously determined by
Sartre, J. P., V Existentialisme est un humanisme (Paris: Nagel, 1946). Usener, Hermann, Anecdoton Holderi. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostgothischer Zeit, Bonn, 1877. The fragment here analysed is claimed by the author to belong to a lost historical
work
by Cassiodorus.
his
sociated with
name which,
Consolatio.
The fragment itself explicitly ascribes to Boethius theological treatises long as however, many found impossible to ascribe to the author of the
of
Philosophy
-213
"Quellenforschung";
only be
on the
explained on
the basis of a
stance.
deep
lack
of
sympathy
with
One
might characterize
twentieth-century scholarship
of
on
the Consolatio as
and
defense
illustration
of
integrity
and
originality
the
work or
increasingly
sophisticated
investiga
by
Boethius in the
composition of
who
view.5
Reichenberger,
sources
towards demon
the methods
by
which
he
made
his
his
own.6
On the
other
hand
scholars such as
of
Courcelle,
on
was
Silk,
and most
recently,
the analysis
the
influences
Boethius to the
extraordinary.7
point where
If Boethius
was a mere
compiler, he
least
a compiler of
result of
is,
as often ori of
world of
Boethius'
ginality
was a
false
It has turned
out that
in
almost
every line
both
the prose and verse sections Boethius can be detected echoing, if not quoting, the
literature
that
and
he has
shaped
philosophy of the past; nonetheless it has become his material into a complex pattern of his
then
us
increasingly clear
own contrivance.
The
question
becomes,
dynamics
of this curious
work,
so re
moved small
from
group
of
both philosophically and aesthetically. And in recent years a scholars have begun to address this issue. L. Alfonsi has traced
personal and
the universal as
and
Dame
Philosophy.8
to
read
the work as an
sought the
key
St.
to the
work
in its
adversity
of such exemplars as
Ovid,
and
Augustine.9
Consolatio Rand, E. K. "On the Composition of Classical Philology, 15, 1904, pp. 1-28. 6. Klingner, F., De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae, Berlin,
tersuchungen
zur
Boethius'
Philosophiae,"
Harvard Studies in
Un-
192 1.
Reichenberger, K.,
literarischen
1954.
Stellung
N.S. 3, Cologne,
7.
Silk, E..
"Boethius'
Consolatio Philosophiae
as a
pp.
and So-
Courcelle, P., La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition litteraire: Antecedants et posterite de Boece, Paris, 1967. Gruber, J., Kommentar zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1978. Convivium, N.S. 8. Alfonsi, L. "Storia interiore et storia cosmica nella Consolatio
Harvard Theological Review, 32, 1939,
I9~39boeziana,"
,
liloquia,"
3, 1955,
9.
Menippean Satire,
as
University
of
1981,
Menippean
Satire,"
Crabbe, Anna,
214 The
Interpretation
problem with this trend of criticism
Boethius'
is that its
manifold
practitioners
have
either
limited themselves to
one aspect of
text or
dentious in championing an idiosyncratic approach to the been most lacking is a comprehensive approach which takes into
the philosophic and
work.10
account
both
literary
This
aspects of paper as
they inform
shall
each other.
is intended,
readers
many
eclecticism as
my starting
my argument
cal content.
treatise, it is necessary to clarify the structure and drift of its philosophi I shall not be concerned to label the provenance of this or that argu
ment, a task
largely completed by
Gruber. I will, however, endeavor to thius has molded his Platonic, Aristotelian,
since
Neoplatonic
Second,
Boethius
chose
dialogue,
the
implications
glance at
of this choice on
standing
be
achieved.
To do
so
shall
have both to
the
tradition of philosophic
Augustine,
Boethius
and
dialogue in antiquity, most importantly Plato and to uncover the dynamics of interaction between the character
and
Dame Philosophy. Finally, since the Consolatio is an example of Satire, it is incumbent on me at least to hazard a form
of
alternating
is
smitten with
The Consolation of Philosophy is essentially a dramatized therapy. Boethius despair over his fall from fortune and Dame endeav
Philosophy
on
ors
insight
and calm.
As first step
Boethius'
is the diagnosis
end of
which
Dame
Philosophy
performs
prose
6. At the
her
examination of the
patient,
she summarizes
his illness
Nam
esse
confunderis,
bonis
doluisti;
finis ignoras,
nequam
homines
atque
nefarios potentes
felicesque arbitraris;
"Literary Design
ed.
in the De Consolatione in Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influ Margeret Gibson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, pp. 237-74. ence, 10. Payne attempts to read the Consolatio as an example of Menippean Satire, which is a per fectly reasonable endeavor; but her characterization of what constitutes Menippean Satire, especially in a sixth century context, has little if anything to do with the Boethean text. For a more detailed cri tique of Payne's conclusions see pp. 242-43 of this paper.
Philosophiae"
of
Philosophy
-215
es, has fortunarum vices aestimas sine rectore fluitare: magnae non ad
I,
pr.
6,
19-19).
you
(For
since you
have been
confused
have
complained not
that you are in exile and dispossessed of your own goods; and since you do
know the
purpose of
happy;
judge
not
you think
by
is governed,
you
are
in flux
and without
any direction:
great causes
only
illness but
of
death
well.)
This
passage
is clearly
second
meant
to be programmatic
concerned with
for the
structure of
Boethius'
Books 1 1
Boethius'
through
V. The
book is
loosening
attachment
to the gifts of
fortune and, as Dame Philosophy repeatedly points out, to the rise and fall of fortune is occasioned by his lack of a vulnerability
self:
sense of
Quid igitur,
tibi te tu
intra
vos positam
felicitatem? Error
vos inscialiquid
tiaque confundit.
summae cardinem
si
felicitatis. Estne
ipso
pretiosius?
tui compos
fueris,
pr.
possit auferre
(Bk. II,
4, 22-23).
(Thus,
to you
within yourselves.
why do you seek outside yourselves the happiness which is placed Error and ignorance are confusing you. I shall briefly demonstrate the essence of the greatest happiness. Is there anything more precious to you
o mortals,
"Nothing,"
than yourself?
you will able to
you say.
Thus if
you should
be in
possession of
yourself,
be in
lose
nor
fortune be
remove.)
long
discussion
fortune is in fact
bonum"
an at
strong
a
identity."
to Boethius the
existence of
the "summum
which
is
the
of all things.
First
by
kind
negativa"
of
"via
demonstrates
that wealth,
then in a
fame,
power,
and
more positive
manner, Dame
Philosophy elucidates
and
Finally, Books IV
nature of
seek as
it
were
as
God to
man.
The
established
in Books II
tionship between these two entities is depicted in all its complexity, logue ranges over such topics as theodicy, free will, determinism,
dence. Thus the
most
the dia
readily
apparent structure of
the
Consolatio is the
the three as
pects of
illness
as
of
self,
of
the
"summum bonum",
and of the
But the
might
situation
is far
more complex
indicate. As many
See Book II,
pr.
scholars
have
pointed
11.
4,
8;
pr.
4, 24-29;
pr.
5, 24-29;
pr.
6,
16-20;
pr.
7, 21-23.
216
Interpretation
in the Consolatio
changes as ame
mentation
tion. F
The
give the
four
V,
m.i), and
sources
her (i.e. Philosophy's) argument Cynic (Bk. Aristotelian (Bk. pr. IV, 5), IV, Augustinian (Bk. V, prs. 2-6) are not intended to indicate
sections of m.9-Bk.
literal
to
which
the sections
for these sections, but rather techniques and points of view allude. The analogies between Lucian and the first section have
already been discussed. The Platonic section begins with a paraphrase of Plato's Timaeus, and two proses of the discussion on evil contain a paraphrase of the Gorgias. The Aristotelian debate
about section ends with an allusion to
relation of
Aristotle's definition
will
of chance.
The de
the
foreknowledge
and
free
in the final
section of
the Con
a
indirect
allusion to the
City
bate
Augustine.12
The
question
is that the Consolation may be seen as a succession of three in creasingly lofty and comprehensive disquisitions on the order of the universe. In Books I and 1 1, the ways of the world are viewed as they appear to the eyes of the
answer
One
unregenerate
is,
under
the aspect of
of
"fortuna"
In Book
III,
the
way is
opened
is,
under
its
aspect of
"fatum";
in Book IV, fate's determination of events is demon and detail. Finally, in Book V, the discussion seeks to
and rational point of view and to adumbrate
"providentia"
God's
universe, that
which
is the
viewpoint of the
"personal"
"nunc
of eternity.
Thus, in
term the
by
which the
dilemma
of
Boethius,
device,
the cosmological,
tuna", "fatum",
and
"for
Finally
to call the
and which
is the
most
V, in her attempt
to explain
Dame
Philosophy
Omne
.
makes
the
following
observation:
cogno-
facultatem (Bk. V,
not
pr. 4, 25).
(Everything which is known is understood ing to the capability of those knowing it.)
She then
Sensus
ria
according to its
own power
but
accord
four
"faculties"
principal
of
knowledge:
figuram in
imaginatio
iudicat figuram; ratio vero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam singularibus inest universali consideratione perpendit. Intellegentiae vero
12.
quae
celsior
ocu-
Payne,
69-70;
also see
Gruber,
op.
of
Philosophy
4, 28-30).
-217
ipsam illam
simplicem
formam
(Bk.
V,
pr.
(The
senses
judge
of
form
embodied
of
the mere
form
without
by
a univer
the idea itself which is present in individual things. But the eye
intellection
exists on an even
itself.)
end of
Although this
the
hierarchy of knowledge
it becomes
for the his
is
articulated
text,
upon reflection
clear that
provided
a structural scheme
work parallel
details
of
decay
laxa
are
to the two already described. Boethius writing an elegiac lament in dwelt upon:
which
Intempestivi funduntur
(Bk. I,
m. 1
1 1
12).
of
(Prematurely
shakes.)
white
hair
covers
my head
and
my
weakened
body
indicates that he is
mired
in the
material
universe
by Philosophy
terms
Boethius'
means of
his he
senses.
As token
of this
first
mainly Dame
adapts
herself to
Boethius'
his
condition
in
which
can
diagnoses
initial
him to
recognize
her for
what she
is,
all
by
touch:
Cumque
me non modo
taciturn
.
vidisset,
ammovit
pectori meo
leniter
(Bk.
manum et
oculosque meos
fletibus
undantes contracta
in
rugam
veste siccavit
I,
pr.
2,
5-7).
was not
(When
speech, she
lightly
a
touched
merely silent but mute and my breast with her hand and with a
eyes which were
quite
incapable her
of
portion of
garment
drawn into
fold
she
dried my
overflowing
with
tears.)
The
realistic
detail
of
is very
rare
in the
"sensus"
Consolatio
and
is
appropriate
In Book II Dame
mological
only at this preliminary stage of Philosophy begins to employ the next faculty in her
the imagination. Whereas
Boethius'
episte
hierarchy,
the
attention was
fo
cused on
particulars of
second
book
a
Philosophy
which can of
leads her
fortune in general,
most
step
this strategy
and
striking
example
prose 2 where
Philosophy
verbis
puts on
tuna"
interrogates Boethius
autem pauca
on
his
claim
Vellem
tecum Fortunae
pr.
ipsius
igitur
an
ius
postulet
animadverte
(Bk. II,
2, 1).
(I
would
like to discuss
few
in the
words of
fore
consider whether
her
claim
is
just.)
218
In fact
Interpretation
is here using one of the imagination's greatest achievements, the theater, to effect her own purposes. This recourse to the imagination is further underscored when, during her speech in the persona of Fortuna, she alludes to
Philosophy
imagination
regem
such as
legend, tragedy,
paulo ante
and epic:
Nesciebas Croesum
miserandum rogi
Lydorum Cyro
formidabilem
mox
diende
praeterit
Tragoedia-
flammis
deflet
Paulum Persi
nisi
regna vertentem?
Nonne
5vo Jtidovg,
de
exegov
idwv in Iovis
2, 1 1
of the
13)
Croesus, king
when
Lydians,
an object of
fear to Cyrus
and
handed
over to the
flames
of the
by
And it has
king,
whom
captured? perous
does the shouting of tragedy bewail but fortune overturning pros kindgoms with a sudden blow? As a student, didn't you learn that "two jars, the
What
goods"
stand
in Jove's threshold?)
urges
Philosophy
constantly
At the
signalled
beginning of Book III the transition from by the following statement by the character Boethius:
summum
to
is
O, inquam,
lassorum
solamen
iucunditate
refovisti, adeo ut
iam
me posthac
imparem
fortunae ictibus
modo non
Itaque
dicebas
pr.
non
II,
1,
2).
("O
I said, "how
you
have
by
the weight of
the
delight
of
of your
that
hereafter I
shall
be
blows
not
slightly
bitter,
strongly desirous
of
hearing
them.")
throughout Books III
and to elucidate
and
The harsher
to
IV
demonstrate
"summum
bonum"
its
rela
in
general and
Boethius'
are
particularly frequent
9
of
particularly
appropriate.
The
imagery
of metrum are
Book III
and
the arguments
Gorgias in Book IV
scheme of things.
incorporated into
not
a rational explanation of
Furthermore,
to be
only
are
the
instruments
way, in
II.14
of reason employed a
in
a critical and
fashion
parallel to
poetry
found in Books I
pr.
14.
See Book II, pr. 5, 3ff.; pr. 6, iff.; See Book III, pr. 12, 30-38.
7, 3ff.
of
Philosophy
-219
Finally, Book V
highest
faculty
of
human understanding (ratio) the nature and scope of divine understanding (intellegentia). We have been led through the various stages of human knowledge:
"sensus", "imaginatio",
cate
eternity.
and
now seeks
to
communi
The
reality
mys
beyond the
humanly
work:
is
being described,
final
the
Magna
vobis
necessitas pr.
indicta probitatis,
cum ante
oculos agitis
iudicis
cuncta cernentis
(Bk.
V,
6,
48).
(Unless
pronounced
to you, since you act under the gaze of a judge who discerns
things.)
Thus the
philosophical content of
the Consolatio is
categories.
First
of all
is
structured
to correspond to
points
Boethius'
first
restores
his
sense of
self, then
to the end or
of
things,
and
finally demonstrates
the relationship between the individual human reality the universe, God.
and
the Alpha-Omega of
Second,
and
fortuna", "fatum",
"providentia". That
of the
is,
is
portrayed un
"sensus"
human
being
as possessor of
and
"imaginatio",
and
immediate
all-encompassing knower
Finally,
a
in
relief
by
four-fold
ture:
"sensus", "imaginatio", "ratio", and "intellegentia". The human being, as a human, has access to the first three modes of knowledge; the fourth can only be
hinted The
at
by
the highest
means at
hand,
of
namely, the
rational.
Boethius,
to
effect a conversion, or
turning
about,
his
a
soul.
The
work
is
entitled a of
"Conso
of the
lation"; it is in fact
soul sis.
"therapy"
But it is
us
therapy
from that
most
familiar to
in the
is, psychoanaly
Whereas in the contemporary analyst's office the patient does all the talk prison cell Dame Philosophy is the principal interlocutor; and ing, in whereas modern analysis proceeds on the assumption that the higher faculties of
Boethius'
imagination fore
her
in terms
of unconscious
of
drives
and there
"epiphaenomena"
reducible
to the
"sensus", Dame
Philosophy
Boethius'
effects
cure of
by leading
points
him
upward
imagination,
The
the
next
to reason,
last
to the
ultimate reality,
problems and
dilemmas
than
set
of one
level
are resolved
by
a
level
rather
by descending
backwards to
dure is
most
forth in the
crucial
step from
"ratio"
to
seemingly contradictory
220
Interpretation
"providentia"
propositions of
and
Philosophy
responds
by
stat
ing
that a higher
before this
contradiction can
be
resolved:
Cuius
humanae
ratiocinationis motus ad
divinae
praescientiae
ammoveri;
(Bk.
V,
pr.
4,
2).
(The
cause of this
cannot reach
obscurity is the fact that the impulse of the human power to reason foreknowledge; if this latter could in any way be
would remain
unclear.)
Nonetheless, it is important
conflicts of one
level
by
the the
lower
and
intermediate levels
"providentia".
"intel
legentia"
or
Rather,
Philosophy
Boethius'
is
careful to
accommodate
her
mode of
discourse to the
on
soul.
What is
is based
it,
nonetheless
level is
fected
within
wider scope of
the higher:
Superior
inferiorem, inferior
vero ad superiorem
Neque
imaginatio
formam;
sed
intellegentia
(Bk. V,
quasi
desuper
quo
spectans concepta
forma
diiudicat,
sed eo modo
pr.
formam ipsam,
4,
31-32)
(The higher
rise nor
faculty
towards the
of understanding embraces the lower; but the lower can in no way higher. For sense perception is good for nothing apart from matter, contemplate universal as
categories, nor does reason grasp the if looking down from above, both perceives the form and also discerns everything which lies below, but in the same manner in which it comprehends the form itself, which was incapable of being known to any of the other
pure
form;
but "intellegentia",
faculties.)
It is precisely in this
harmony
of all aspects of
divine, of the temporal and the eternal, of becoming and being, of change and or der, that the central point of the Consolatio as a work of philosophy lies. This
harmony is
of a
not achieved
through the
blurring
of
distinctions, it
insists
consists, in
fact,
in
hierarchical
of this
The
particular
beauty
soned,
hierarchy
it is
is that,
although
Philosophy
on a strict protocol
higher,
a
nonetheless the
lower is
never
completely jetti
higher.
order
Thus
apparent vealed.
Philosophy
flux
of
has
double task: to
make manifest
the
divine
in the
by certain
verbal echoes
in the text.
in-
For
instance,
first book, in
of
Philosophy
221
Boethius'
Philosophy
her
"alumnus"
Tu
lumine
cernere verum,
tramite
recto
carpere callem:
gaudia pelle,
pelle
timorem
spemque nee
fugato
adsit
dolor
(Bk.
I,
m.
7, 20-28).
with clear vision and
to make
nor
your
joys,
cast out
fear,
put
hope to flight,
let
sorrow
way along be
present.)
This
sion,
stoical
appropriate to
warning against the power of the passions to cloud intellectual vi Boethius at this stage of dismay and self-pity, is turned on its
sentences of
Philosophy's disquisition
where she
on the on the
harmony
validity
of
divine human
and
striving
Quae
within
insists
of
order:
cum
ita sint,
intemerata
mortalibus arbitrii
libertas
nee
iniquae leges
. . .
Nee frustra
in deo
inefficaces
sublevate, humiles
in
excelsa porrigite
(Bk.
V,
pr.
6,
44-47).
will remains
inviolate
nor
for
wills
freed from
all necessity.
are
prayers,
placed
in God, in vain;
as
long
as
they
correct,
they
be ineffectual.
Therefore
lift up
your mind
towards proper
hopes,
ex
tend humble
high.)
one might well point out
By
way
of
summary,
work, the
reflected
essential
harmony
between the
microcosm
macrocosm, is
in the
relation
The first
is based
and of
Boethius'
on
three points of
igno is
"telos"
self, of the
and as such
of
things,
the means
by
which
the cosmos
"personal"
governed,
the
may be
termed the
The
and
world under
three
aspects:
"fortuna", "fatum",
The
"providentia",
and can
"cosmic"
"sensus",
may be For
the
"imaginatio", "ratio",
seen as the
and
"intellegentia", is clearly
epistemological and
harmony
of the
first two
structures,
the
personal and
the cosmic.
the
concerns of
in
harmony
with
laws
of
tions between
defined, distinguished,
222
Interpretation
But this
philosophical content
is
couched
in the form
of
of a
dialogue,
of never
and what
though
peculiar
kind
dialogue. First
scattered
hints
within
the text, is
clearly in
to
Philosophy
exsilii nostri
delapsa
venisti?
(Bk. I,
3, 3)
virtues, descended from on high to enter
of all
into
the
loneliness
of
my exile?);
because
question
at another point
he
gestures towards
his
surroundings with
the rhetorical
Haecine
in
(Bk. I,
est
bibliotheca,
quam certissimam
de humanarum divinarumque
rerum scientia
disserebas?
4, 3)
library
fixed
on
abode
hold, in
human
and
discourse
the
and
divine?);
at the end of states
because
his
"defense"
before Philosophy,
as
if before
a court
(Bk.
I,
pr.
4), he
Nunc
quingentis
fere
indefensi
ob studium
propensius
in
damnamur (Bk. I,
pr.
4, 36).
(Now
about
fifty
away,
defense, I
behalf
am condemned to
death
my too
great zeal on
of the
senate.);
infer that the setting is a prison cell, or some place where Boethius is being held under house arrest, at some distance from Ravenna, Theodoric's capital in
we
Italy. And
our ancient
within
that Boethius
he defended
fellow senator,
was soon ac
Albinus,
cused of
ad.15
who was
being
prosecuted
the same crime, tried and convicted in absentia, and executed in 524 Thus the reader is aware that Boethius is in prison, under sentence of alone,
and
death,
in exile; but
we are never
told
for how
long
or where
Boethius
nor when
he
expected to
die,
Boethius'
setting,
with
its
associations of
im
pending his
doom, is clearly
meant to make
identification
him
an
everyman, lost
15.
See Gruber,
8-13.
of
Philosophy
Boethius"
223
raises the question: where
Now,
"character
Consolatio is indeed the historical Anicius Manlius Severinus the Roman senatorial aristocracy, who was adopted by the Symmachi and grew up giving every evidence of extraordinary literary and intellectual ability. He married the daughter of his adoptive father and had two sons by her. While pursuing a political career as a high official under
Boethius,
an orphaned member of
Theodoric, he
vres of
translating
Plato
and
Aristotle, producing
a
commentaries on
textbook
on
translated introduction to
Organon,
which seems
to represent
as
far
as
he
progressed
in his life
the text.
long
project
death.16
Thus
"Boethius"
is the
author of
highly
on
wrought
object, combining
Menippean Satire,
say
based
he
exhibit a
an ac
Greek philosophy, not only with the Neoplatonism of late antiq Plato and Aristotle as well, a phenomenon rare in an age when
all
stands as
Europe
enters
rightly
or
to the question of
Boethius'
by birth, breeding,
literature.'7
tradition
philosophy and But Boethius the author is not the only Boethius present in the text. Boethius the narrator of his encounter with Dame Philosophy and Boethius the character
within
further
personae of
the
author.
aspect of
Boethius
within
the text, as
narrator and as
striking
person:
effects.
Thus the
Carmina
florente
inire
peregi,
flebilis, heu,
(I,
who
maestos cogor
modos
(Bk.
I,
m.
i, 1-2).
in my
verses, am
now
sad
lamentations.)
The
reader
naturally
assumes that
the
speaker
voice contrasts
the first
be
ing
quoted
by
the
voice of
1-8.
the
whole work:
16. 17.
See Gruber,
See Gruber,
24-40, for
an
indication
Boethius'
of
breadth
of
learning.
224
Interpretation
mecum
Haec dum
signarem
.
tacitus
pr.
ipse
i,
reputarem querimoniamque
lacrimabilem
stili officio
(Bk. I,
by
means of a stylus
.)
couplet of
first
clause of
the
point of
despair
expressed
in the opening
of
elegy.
Second,
which
hearing
beginning
we realize
has
future
ahead of
him,
development
narrator.
to the latter
throughout the
first
to
describes the
character's
elegy
as a
"querimoniam lac
and appeal
defense
God (Bk. I,
Haec
pr.
4 &
m.
5)
as mere
barking:
.
ubi continuato
dolore delatravi
all
(Bk. I,
pr.
5, 1)
. .
that
with uninterrupted
self-pity
.)
Clearly
the
distraught
has
long
way to
go
before
at
the text
upon
writing
of
and
On the
of
the interaction be
character and
the narrator
Boethius merely
copies
down:
m.
Ecce
mihi
lacerae dictant
scribenda
Camenae (Bk. I,
what
3).
am to
write.)
Quaeubi
tes
poeticas
Musas
1, 7)
toro
fletibusque
(Bk.
I,
pr.
(When
tears
. .
she saw
.)
standing
by
my bed
and
dictating
words to
my
This passivity, whereby the character Boethius merely transcribes the words of others is strongly contrasted with the more active response demanded of Boe
thius
cure partner pr.
by
Boethius'
Dame Philosophy. After routing the elegiac Muses, her first action is to blindness and dumbness, thus enabling him to become an active
which will constitute written
in the dialogue
pr.
2, 1-7, &
3,
1-3).
the
development
character of
cent of
the theme
and
Plato's
Phaedrus,
which
may
well
have been
motif
in the Consolatio.
of
Philosophy
dichotomy
225 between
written verse and
note
that in this
prose, the
former
element
The
fairly
,
frequent
,
mention of at
I,
pr. i
&
"bibliotheca"
is not simply negated in the face of the latter. at Bk. writing and its products (e.g. "stili Bk. I, pr. 4, 3) reminds the reader that what he has
Boethius'
officio"
before him is
a written
mention of a
li
li
brary
brary,
surely draws
an
"library"
attention
is
a veritable
anthology have
of all available
forms
of
discourse
ments, a
which
only
an
author,
who
had
spent much of
books,
could
composed.
Thus in
addition
to underscoring the
Boethius the
sus spoken of
character
motif of written
dialogue
which
also
hints
at
the poem
is the Consolatio.
complex presence of
To
sum
up the
one might
say that the author of the text assumes the persona of the narrator in order to por
tray
character
is
pictured at
the
a
beginning
of
the
text as
indulging
in poetry; the
author of
poetry are very different and much of the dynamics of the Consolatio has to do with the process whereby Boethius the character develops to the point where he is identical with Boethius itself
constitutes a poem.
the
narrator and
of
Boethius the
author. can
.
In
other
words,
Boethius
prose or
must undergo
therapy
of
philosophy before he
handle
narrative
imagistic poetry in other than self-destructive ways Thus the dialogue in the Consolatio must be viewed as taking
Dame Philosophy,
as reported
place
between
by
thius,
of
and as
fashioned
by
we
other participant
of
being,
eternity,
truth, in
contrast with
the character
Boethius,
and
piece of
of appearance. not
suffering humanity, subject to the vicissitudes of time That Dame Philosophy is the spokeswoman for eternity is clear the fact that she guides the character Boethius towards an aware from only
the deceptions
ness of
being
in the
midst of
becoming
but
also
of
her ap
pearance
in Book I:
mihi supra verticem visa est mulier reverendi admodum
Astitisse
vultus,
oculis
hominum
aevi plena
valentiam
inexhausti vigoris,
(Bk. I, (There
pr.
quamvis
ita
foret
1, 1).
dignified aspect, with my head a woman of a most with a glowing complexion eyes shining and piercing beyond the usual power of men, no way could it be and inexaustible strength, although she was of such an age that in
appeared
standing
above
credited of our
life span.)
That Dame
and old
where
"aeternitas"
both young ("colore vivido atque inexhausti vigoris") ("aevi plena") foreshadows her own disquisition on eternity in Book V, is defined as:
Philosophy is
226
Interpretation
vitae
interminabilis
tota
(Bk.
V,
pr.
6,
4).
(the completely
that
life
without
beginning or end.);
simultane
is,
is
contemporaneous.
Dame Philosophy's
But Dame
Philosophy
is
explicitly
of which
made
in antiquity,
when
last
example,
makes
it
evident
that,
is in
conversa
tion with
way talking to himself. At one Thaeatetus Socrates describes the process of thinking as follows:
Philosophy, he is in
some
point
in the
aurnv
f| tyvxi]
yap
6iE^EQxeTaL
um
^EQ1 wv av oxojttj.
(be,
ye
ur)
IvSaX^ETai
6iavooufievr]
oux aM.o ti
f\
biakeyBoftai, aurr)
(pa.oy.ovaa. otav
6e 6pioaaa,
(3pa6uxQov
6^tjteqov EJta'i^aoa,
wot'
to
EycoyE to cpfj xai \ir\ &iarar|, 66|av xavxr]v Ttf>E(Xv auTfjg. 6o^a^eiv XeyEiv xdkib xai ttjv 56|av Xoyov lor|UEvov, ou ^ievtoi jiqoc, ctXXov
arjxo
fj&r|
ou6e
epeovjj,
aKka
oiyf\ node,
the
aurov
ov
6e ti;
(189c- 190a).
(As
discussion
I'm
sure
which
itself concerning
to
me
whatever when
it is
consid
ering.
must seem a
fool, but it
seems
it is thinking,
is
engaged
making rushing to it quickly, and is in agreement its judgment. So that I define the process
statement pronounced, not to another nor
claims and
in nothing other than talking with itself, asking and answering questions, denials. And when it comes to a decision, whether slowly or
and no of
longer differs
with
itself,
we call
this
thought as
discourse
and
and
judgment
as a
what
to oneself.
But
do
you
think?)
accomplished
by introducing
is thought.
the persona of
Philosophy
is
which
far
as we
know,
the Aristotelian
dialogues
portrayed same
interpersonal dialogue
procedure.
and
by
and
large the
ancient tradition
followed the
But in late antiquity there appear certain intrapersonal dialogue, that is, with thought. The
as when
phenomenon exists
of
in Plato,
Socrates
stands
on how long he will remain lost in thought (Symposium 220cd), but it is always portrayed from the outside, as a withdrawal of the person from interaction with others, never from
I74d-i75b)
or when
outside the
house
Agathon (Symposium
standing,
the
as
inside
as a
kind
of
interaction
However, in later
where
works,
such
Marcus
Aurelius'
speaker and
audience, and
Enneads,
like
a man think
ing
full-blown
accomplishment
ventures into the dramatization of thought and its in Boethius is to be found in Augustine's Soliloquia,
of
Philosophy
227
his dialogue
is in
with a personified
"Ratio",
who
is
explic
itly
stated
be both
is
divine figure
and an aspect of
Augustine
himself.18
Now if Dame
what aspect
Philosophy
Since the
some
she?
author as
way an aspect of Boethius himself, just Boethius is the remarkably learned man he
to
was, when
he
portrays
himself
and
talking
whole
himself, he does
so
by
recording
the
he had learned
eternity
and aspect of
Boethius, is
course of
image,
icon, representing
end point.
the centuries-long
Boethius is the
losophy
our
in the
philosophic argument:
and
Augustinian; but
role as
also
first
encounter with
image
of
the
philosophic
tradition:
Vestes
erant tenuissimis
filis
subtili artificio
indissolubili
materia
perfectae, quas,
speciem, veluti
uti
ipsa texuerat;
"0"
quarum
Harum in
atque
extremo margine
Graecum, in
legebatur intextum
in
utrasque
litteras in
insigniti videbantur,
quibus ab
inferiore
Eandem tamen
vestem violentorum
quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas quisque potuit abstulerant. quidem eius
Et dextra
libellos,
(Bk. I,
pr.
3-6).
(Her
clothes were
made,
by
finest threads
of an
indissoluble
her
own
mate
lips,
she
had
woven
them
with
hands.
certain
duskiness
of
long
neglect
as
is
with
images
a
Greek "IT',
on the upper
border
"0"
to
be
read
inwoven;
to
be
seen
manner of a
ladder, by
which
there
was a means of as
the higher
of certain violent
individuals had
Finally,
she carried
they had taken away those portions that each was able to. books in her right hand, and in her left she held a scepter.)
explanation of
Furthermore, Dame
trays
a critical
Philosophy's
of
how her
be
understanding
the
ing quite
Cuius
in
Boethius'
accord with
own
and
foun-
and/or
Plato's) hereditatem
vulgus ac
Stoicum
renitentemque velut
in
partem praedae
traherent,
texueram manibus
disciderunt
pr18.
of
abreptisque ab ea panniculis
I,
3.
!)
"Augustinus"
For the
relation of
the two
interlocutors,
and
"Ratio",
dies
see the
opening
passage
the
work:
diu,
ac per multos
sedulo quaerenti
memetip-
sum ac
bonum meum,
ipse,
extrinsecus, sive
quia,
I,
1).
intrinsecus, nescio; nam hoc ipsum est quod magnopere scire molior See Silk, op. cit., for possible influence of this text on the Consolatio.
(Solilo-
228
Interpretation
and or and
Stoic crowd,
for his
part, to steal
as
his
(Socrates'
Plato's inheritance
they
were
dragging
gar
away
if I
were
booty
I had
woven with
my
own
hands
when
they away believing in fact they had only snatched tatters from
and went
that I had
it.)
Thus the figure
she of
Philosophy, like
eternity, an tradition. This
the
figure
of
Boethius, is
also multifaceted:
is the
voice of
aspect of
Boethius,
and a representation of
the
refraction of
for
a complex
dramatic
portrayal of
is
thought,
a phenomenon
distant
and
opaque as the
figure
as
of the abstracted
Socrates.
philosophy,
which
That Boethius,
heir to the
in the
perhaps
the Conso
latio. Comparison
condemned
with the
Phaedo
will make
by
his
family
has to
and write
friends
he
prepares
to drink the
hemlock.19
In contrast, Boethius
own swan
his
solitude
in
prison and
in
the
face
of
someone
a concrete
image
Boethius'
of
essential solitude as
tradition of
all
ancient
philosophy
poetry
at a
time
when
tradition and
plunging into the simplifications of popularized Christianity. Now how does this peculiar kind of dialogue play itself out and how does it
was
inform the
ter
Boethius falls
after
Philosophy
After the opening elegy the charac loosens his tongue by her touch; in Book
V,
maintaining both God's providence and hu free will, the character Boethius again falls all but completely silent, while Philosophy delivers her disquisition on eternity which constitutes the end of the But these two discourses and their subsequent silences are very different expressing the
paradox of
man
work.20
from
history
of
his
progress
in the therapy
of philos
From
19.
beginning
What is more, Socrates is consistently portrayed as insisting that talk with his fellow human of his philosophical life (Phaedrus 23ode); he even goes so far as to speculate that
happy
opportunity
Boethius the
silence
to spend
eternity in
likes
of
Homer
and
Hesiod
(Apology
4, 16;
40e-4ic).
answers character says
20.
Book V (Bk. V,
4,
8;
pr.
pr.
6,
19).
His
is drawn
attention to
order to
strategy of herself supplying her ing (Bk. V, pr. 6, 25, 37, 39).
uncooperative
interlocutor's lines in
of
Philosophy
229
suffering humanity. He bemoans his fall from fortune in the opening elegy and presents his case before Philosophy and God, as if in a court of law, in prose 4
and metrum
of
the
which
Philos
ophy applies, Boethius continues to insist on, to focus attention on, the plight of man in an apparently unjust universe. In response to Philosophy's prosopopoeia
of
"Fortuna", in
Boethius'
fortune,
the
character
Boethius
replies:
Turn
ego:
Speciosa haec
quidem
auribus
(Bk. II,
3,
indeed
they
are
are with
honey
they delight
an
long
as
they
being
and
heard; but in
when
lies deeper,
thus,
innate
sadness weighs
down their
mind.")
This
elicits
from
joyed, but he
Turn
ego:
responds with
Philosophy a list of the variety of good fortune Boethius has en the following reformulation of his sense of suffering:
commemoras, o virtutum omnium nutrix, nee
Vera, inquam,
nam
infitiari
pos
Sed hoc
vehemen-
tius coquit;
in
omni adversitate
fortunae infelicissimum
est genus
infortunii fuisse
pr.
4,
1-2).
you
prosperity.
say is true, O nurse of all the virtues, nor can I deny the But it is just this very fact which troubles me even more
of
fortune the
most
unhappy kind
of misfor
This in turn
moves
Philosophy
which
Boe
he
replies:
habeant,
4, 10).
Sed
decesserit
vides
(Bk.
II,
pr.
tinue to
(And I said, "I pray that they (the hold, for as long as they remain, But
you see
of
father-in-law,
whatever
the situation
is, I
shall
stay
afloat.
how
much
has disappeared
of
my honors.")
Although he has
aliquantum si
te
nondum
II,
4,
ii)she
(And
said, "We
have
made a
little
progress,
if
you are no
longer completely
dissatisfied
with your
lot.")
insists that
Boethius the
ously.
character still
Philosophy
230
Interpretation
after
Philosophy
objects
has
made clear
the vanity of
Boethius
for
per
glory but in
ego:
order
to
exercise virtue:
Turn
fuisse
know that
ambition
of
this
world
in the
governance of affairs
the
occasion
in silence.)
of noble
To
which
Philosophy
replies
with
minds,
thus acknowledging,
After
of
Philosophy
and stresses
fortune
has demonstrated the relationship between the false goods in Books II and III, the character the true "summum his
private
Boethius
tinues to
suffering less
attention on
and
less; but
all
focus Philosophy's
the
apparent contradictions of
hu
Thus at the opening of Book IV, after admitting the validity of Philosophy's arguments, he claims that the problem of theodicy remains un
man condition.
solved:
Sed
ea
ipsa
bonus
rector
existat,
impunita
dignum
At huic
imperante florenteque
torum
3-4)-
scelera-
in locum facinorum
supplicia
pr.
i,
(But that is precisely the greatest cause of my grief, that, although there exists a good lord over things, evils are able to exist at all or to go unpunished, which fact alone you
yourself judge to even greater,
be worthy
of great wonder.
But in
is something
for,
flourishes,
not
only does
virtue go without re
wards,
but it is
even cast at
the
feet
of
it
ishments due
to crimes.)
on
This insistence
human condition seriously elicits from derived from the Gorgias, by which good men are proven to be naturally happy, evil men naturally unhappy. And Boethius the character, while granting Philosophy's points, nonetheless maintains a hu man, down to earth, attitude towards the issue:
taking
a paradox of the
Philosophy
Turn
ego:
Fateor, inquam,
nee
injuria dici
humani
corporis
speciem servent,
in beluas tamen
bonorum
pernicie
pr
admit and
I do
it is
said
vicious, al
they keep
human body,
are nonetheless
transformed
of
Philosophy
intention
23 1
quality
of
fierce
and criminal
of the
good.")
Accedo, inquam,
deserti
sed uti
hoc infortunio
(Bk. IV,
pr.
vehementer exopto
4, 6).
of the
("I agree", I said, "but I strongly wish that, deprived plishing evil, they soon lack this misfortune.") Turn
possibility
of accom
ego: Cum tuas, inquam, rationes considero, nihil dici verius puto; at si ad hominum iudicia revertar, quis ille est cui non credenda modo sed saltern audienda videantur?
(Bk. I V,
pr.
4, 26)
reasoning, I think that nothing is
more
consider your
truly
said;
but if I
revert to the
judgment
of mankind, who
is there to
whom
these arguments
only worthy
of
belief but
even of
hearing?")
character asks
what
bad alike,
by
God
Minus
meum
fortuitis
casibus crederem.
Nunc
stuporem
deus
rector exaggerat.
Qui
cum saepe
bonis iucunda,
malis optata
deprehenditur,
fortuitis
("I
casibus
differre
videatur?
(Bk. IV,
pr.
5, 5-6)
would
domly. But
be less bewildered, if I believed that everything was mixed together ran now the idea of a controlling god increases my bewilderment. Since he
of
for the
good and
also
bestows is
appre
hardship
hended,
This
vine of
distinguishes this
from
pure
chance?")
question
leads
Philosophy
and
into
discussion
of
providence,
fate, fortune, di
pages
predestination,
human free
which represents
verse.
prose
(3)
the
and then
in
verse
(3),
the character
recon
human
aspect of
work's central
problem, how to
divine
providence and
human free
will:
Igitur
deprecandi
ulla ratio
est; quid
vel etiam
deprecetur
indeflexa
conectit?
(Bk. V,
pr.
3,
33)
("Therefore there is
anyone
no reason
to hope
for
or
to seek to
avoid
might
hope for
binds
all objects of
hope together?")
In the
verse
section
he
goes a
step further
epistemology:
232
An
Interpretation
discordia
veris
nulla est
cohaerent,
luminis igne
(Bk.
V,
m.
3,
6-10)
and are
(Or is there
other,
no contradiction
between truths
the
they firmly
of
the
while
the mind,
buried in
imperceptive limbs
the
body, is
unable to per
interweaving
3
of things
by
the
flame
of
Taken together,
prose
and verse
of
Book V
parallel prose
Book I. In both
passages
the
character
Boethius first
explains
in
(Anapestic
fact, the two verse sections are composed in the Dimeter Acatalectic), a particularly striking coincidence,
verse.
In
for
verse
since
3 in Book V is the first time Boethius the character has spoken in verse verse section 5 in Book I. The purpose of this parallelism is to demonstrate
that from
beginning
in
to end the
contrast
character
Boethius
continues
to
focus
on
the hu
to Philosophy's
tendency
to
view
from the
remaining the spokesman for humanity develop. Whereas his formulation of the problem in
But
while
which
naive, a performance
the narrator
Boethius
char
acterized as
"barking",
less
this
formulation in Book V is
than
intellectually
sophisticated
and motivated
by self-pity
in the
by
an
honest bewilderment
at man's episte
mological position
universe.
articulation of the
on
problem elicits
the best
Philosophy
eternity
and
its relationship to temporality, with which the work Let us now consider more closely by precisely what
thius
Boe
so
develops from
Book I to the
intellectually
phisticated and
phy
appears
emotionally balanced maturity of Book V When Dame Philoso and scatters the elegiac Muses, Boethius the character falls into a
Upon receiving the
such
state of speechlessness.
healing
ignoble
touch of
Philosophy
To
which
he im
Philos
mediately
recognizes
her
that
should condescend to
inhabit
lowly
and
environs.
ophy responds, by listing many examples of martyrs to philosophy, that her dev otees have always been subject to unjust suspicion and punishment. The first re
mark
by
the character
must resolve
Boethius neatly expresses his "problem", that which he before perceiving the cosmos correctly, namely, his inability to
reconcile the
and
reality of being, truth, and goodness with the reality of human ignorance. As Dame Philosophy will sum it up after performing her
character
Boethius
suffers
from ignorance
of
self,
of the end of
and of
the means
the poems
by
which
Likewise,
4
of
following
a response on
Philosophy's
part to
Boethius'
dilemma
and are
of
Philosophy
233
on
At this preliminary stage of his therapy Philosophy insists dies before proceeding to harsher medicines:
Sed
quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum
using
mild reme
maeror
distrahunt,
Itaque
lenioribus
paulisper
induruerunt
blandiore
mollescant
(Bk.
I,
pr.
5, 1
1-
12).
(But
has
anger,
and grief
pull you
in different
directions, in
your present state of mind stronger remedies are not us make use of milder ones
yet appropriate
for
you.
Therefore let
for
a while, so that of
those
faculties,
which
influence become
disturbing
to the
passions, might,
by
means of a gentle
touch,
receptive
power of stronger
medicine.)
The
effect of
poetry
and rhetoric
is to
encourage
Boethius
suf
to take his
first step
health
fering
11).
Fortune has in
by admitting that despite his immediate been kind to him. As Philosophy puts it:
II,
pr.
Promovimus, inquit,
4,
("We have
progress,"
made some
she
said, "if
you are no
isfied
with your
lot.")
judges that slightly
patient:
Shortly
plied
thereafter she
stronger remedies
may
now
be ap
to her recuperating
quoniam rationum
Sed
iam in te
pr.
mearum
fomenta descendunt,
paulo validioribus
utendum puto
(Bk.
II,
5, 1).
(But
my reasoning
are
ones.)
reviewed all
And
when
Philosophy has
opening of Book III, in which she will clarify the difference between the false goods of for tune and the true good, Boethius states:
they
can neither
really benefit
nor
Itaque
dicebas
perhorresco, sed
(Bk. Ill,
1, 2).
not
(Therefore those
of
little harsher,
only
am
not afraid
them, in fact I
am eager
beg
for them.)
to undergo the
his
readiness
harsher
his therapy. When Philosophy has definitively demonstrated the inadequacies of all for in tune's gifts and is about to delineate the form of the true good, the following
terchange takes
place
234
Interpretation
mendacis
Hactenus
formam felicitatis
intueris,
nee
ordo est
deinceps
nee opibus
dignitatibus
laetitiam
An
id ita
sit deprehen-
disti? Tenui
malim
intueri,
(Bk. Ill,
pr.
9,
1-3).
you
("Let the preceding suffice to show the form of false happiness; if seen into it, the next step is to demonstrate what true happiness
see,"
have clearly
is."
"And indeed I do
kingship,
nor
honor to office,
causes
glory to
fame,
pleasure."
joy to
"But have
as
the
"I think that I catch a glimpse why this is the but I prefer learn would to more clearly from you.") crack,
case?"
if through
Boethius
expresses a
of
the tutelage
sight.
when
Philosophy
has
states that
he
can anticipate
Philosophy's line
vehementer
of reasoning:
Turn
ego:
Platoni, inquam,
assentior; nam
me
horum iam
secundo
memoriam corporea
concessa respicias, ne
illud
quidem
longius
Quibus,
ilia,
Memini, inquam,
me
12, 1-3).
agreement with
am
in strong
Plato,
since
for
those
a
then
she
for
things, the memory of which I first lost through contact with the body, and second time, because I was overwhelmed with the weight of Then
you consider the points you
you remember what you
grief."
said, "If
long
said.
before
"The
recently
not
know."
"What,"
be very I
means,"
"by
"I
remember,"
said, "that I
nonetheless
my ignorance; but, although I already foresee the answer, I desire to hear it more clearly from your lips.")
Here, too,
he
can
importantly, he has
reached a
as
see
into the
nature of
self-awareness where
not
but the
re-education of a
lapsed
philosopher.
Boethius'
increasing
insight
and self-con
reasons
fidence
are expressed
in the
following passage,
where
for himself
Dame Philosophy:
dubitandum
putabas.
Ne
nunc
arbitror,
inquam,
nee umquam
rationibus accedam
breviter
exponam
quibusque
in hoc
of
Philosophy
now,"
235
she
said, "you
were of
this world
is
ruled
by
God."
"Nor do I think
it
can
be doubted,
and
shall
briefly lay
before
reasoning
by
which
came to
this opinion.)
makes the bold assertion that evil does not, prop Boethius the character is by now an active enough interlocu erly speaking, exist, tor to question her reasoning and to suggest that her argument might be circular: when
Finally,
Philosophy
Ludisne, inquam,
qua egrediaris
me
inextricabilem labyrinthum
nunc vero quo
rationibus
texens,
introeas,
introieris egrediare,
(Bk. Ill, weaving
pr.
an mirabilem quendam
divinae
("Are
12, 30)
you
playing
with
I said,
"by
an
inextricable labyrinth
with your
arguments, so that
exited, and
tered,
or are you
winding
divine
simplicity?")
Thus
he is
by the end of Book 1 1 1 the character Boethius has reached the point where beginning to see things for himself and to take a more active role in the dia
with
logue
Philosophy.
pointed
As I have already
states
out, the
character
Boethius in Books IV
more and more more
and
re
the central
question
of
the Consolatio in
sophisticated
from
Philosophy
pr.
progressively pr.3-m.3). He
longer
sophisticated re
remains a spokesman
point of
view, but he is no
plagued with
blindness
and
dumbness; he
taking
place
of the
discourse
between him
Philosophy. Thus
to
he is
ir
confident enought of
his
abilities
she
with
discuss the
question of chance
despite her
relevant
difficulty
and
is
somewhat
Dixerat Turn
ego:
exhortatio
dignissima,
esse
sed quod tu
experior.
implicitam
dixisti
re
Turn
Haec
sunt,
verendumque est ne
deviis fatigatus
vereare;
ad emetiendum rectum
iter
ea
Ne id, inquam,
agnoscere.
prorsus
loco fuerit
delector
Simul,
cum omne
nihil
de
sequentibus ambigatur
pr.
1, i-7).
her
towards
treating
and of
explaining
exhortation
is
worthy
tied
but
about
being
up
many
others,
now experience
in fact. For I
Then
think chance
thing it
up
she said,
"I
am
in
hurry
to
my
promise and
to
open
the way
by
to your
236
Interpretation
although useful
to
know,
from the
you not would
path of our
undertaking
and
by
I
side-tracks,
"Have
no
fears
all,"
at
which
I said, "for it
most
with
those things in
delight.
Likewise,
conviction,
has been
doubt
about what
follows.)
the function of
Thus
we see
that the
character
Boethius, by assuming
determin
ing the course of the dialogue, instead of merely reacting to the initiatives of Dame Philosophy, is approaching the status of Boethius the narrator. What is more, by his restatement of the problem in epistemological terms in verse 3 of
Book V, the only time he speaks in Boethius also approaches the status
all
of
Book I, the
character
kinds
of
discourse, both
is the text
of
prose and
poem which
the Consolatio. So
by
Boethius,
while
undergone a
remaining the voice of the human condition, has nonetheless transformation from a passive and prostrate victim of fortune to an
in the
quest
for the
human di
being
and
becoming.
sections of
character
silence
in the last
Book V
and
the
fact
that
of
has
not
framed his
vision of
Philosophy
with a
description
and
have led
of the
development
Boethius the
character
sible
satisfying
longer problematic; it is in fact the only pos to the work. Boethius the author has portrayed the
no
evolution of
hinted
at
the
further development
Boethius the
at
narrator
author of
the
Philosophy
voice of
the
human
Boethius the
by
Boethius the narrator, is now seen to be one of the voices of Boethius the author. And what the voice says represents the successful completion of the work's cen
tral project, to
harmonize just
being
as
and
the strict
God.
refracted
We have
seen that
Boethius'
presence
in the text is
into three
appear
and
Philosophy
the voice of
being,
an aspect of
of ancient philosophy.
Boethius
"Sybil"
transformation in the
course of
Philos
to
are
transformation from
"Icon"
Furthermore,
I
to
shall
demonstrate, Philosophy's
specific capabilities at
transformations
calculated to correspond
Boethius'
any
given stage of
his therapy.
22.
For
discussion
see
Gruber,
of
Philosophy
237
of
way
of
making
clear
the evolution
Philosophy's
charac
is
by
follows the
progress of
Boethius from
"sensus"
to
"imaginatio",
different
"ratio",
and
finally
towards
"intellegentia"
My
claim
is that Dame
Philosophy
adapts
herself
to
thereby
presents a
of
appearance
Boethius the
character at each of
the four
levels
knowledge.
portrayed as mired a
Thus in Book I,
realm of
Boethius is
in the
the senses,
order
reacting
to make
to the blows of
fortune in
merely
uses
personal way,
Philosophy, in
he is
an
prepared
herself
apparent to
Boethius,
icon,
the
imagery
forth her
nature as
it
will unfold
itself in the
the dialogue.
with a
faced
Furthermore, when she has put dumb and blind Boethius, she again
7).
case
(see Bk. I,
2,
In
addition
Philosophy
has
recourse
to the sense
of
hearing
as a means
Boethius in his
present condition:
paulisper utemur, ut quae
Itaque lenioribus
in tumorem
perturbationibus
influentibus
(Bk.
induruerunt
blandiore
mollescant
I,
pr.
5, 12).
us make use of milder remedies
(Therefore let
which
for
faculties,
influence
disturbing
passions, might,
by
means of a gentle
touch,
to
become
receptive
medicine.)
Here "tactu
stage of
blandiore"
Boethius'
refers
to the
gentle
touch of verse,
which at
this
In the
second
book,
of
Philosophy
she
an exclu
his
to instill
in him his
an understand
ing
of
the nature
fortune in general,
the human
begins to
exercise
faculty of imagi
from its
puts off
nation,
which allows
being
to
perceive
specific embodiment
in
matter
(see Bk.
V,
pr.
4,
Thus
Philosophy
her
persona of
icon
and puts on
is strikingly
at most power
signaled
in the
Book II,
where
Philosophy, in her
tempt to
reconcile
employs one of
imagination's
her
speech
herself.23 And in the playing the role of Fortuna alludes to various products of the Fortuna as Philosophy
by
imagination
such as
history, tragedy,
and epic
reason
pr.
2, 11
-13).
in
therapy
prosopopopoeia of
and the
analo-
Socrates'
Perhaps this
by
Fortune's
case the
powers personified
defend their
prerogatives
in
kind
"apologia". In the
Consolatio Philosophy's
assumption of
role
hints
at what
is
made explicit
in the
and of
last
prose section
(#8)
of
when
properly understood, is
not
in
itself
an evil
but
a great
teacher.
238
Interpretation
gous transformation of
"Magistra"
to
is clearly
also
marked at
the opening of Book III (see pr. i, 1-3). Boethius describes himself as en
chanted
by
discourse, but
response
"somewhat harsher
terizes the
apy:
of pure reason.
In her
Philosophy charac
nature of
poetry
and
habitum
ipsa
perfeci
1, 3).
condition of your mind
was
expecting this
or,
what
is truer, I
myself
brought it
That
is,
she emphasizes
the affective
power of
poetry to
dis
Thus throughout Books III, IV, phy will play the role of a delivers lectures in which
she sets pr.
and the
"magistra"
of
Book V Philoso
"alumnus"
Sometimes
she
forth doctrines in
a straightforward
format
so
pr.
6,
her pupil
3, 58"., & Bk. IV. pr. 7). At times, as we have already pointed out, Boethius himself comments on the argumentation, sets forth arguments of his own, and initiates new avenues
pr. of
discussion. The
IV,
where
Philosophy
in
of the wings
Pennas depulsa
altum
ut perturbatione
in
patriam meo
ductu,
mea
IV,
pr.
1,9).
shall attach wings
(And I
to your mind
by
means of which
it
will
be
able to
lift itself on
your
high,
so
that,
with all
disturbance
safely
turn
back towards
homeland
under
by
my conveyance.)
The image
of wings and
cifically human
realm of
mode of with
being
becoming,
But the
knowing
must move
one point
ultimate goal of
"homeland",
the realm of
not
being
work
the truth
itself. This
second
problem and
its
in the
half
of
of
Book V.
character changes the course of the
which
At the
dialogue
beginning by focusing
on
felt
contradiction
providence and
will.
By
by articulating
the paradox of
of
Philosophy
up the
of
239
propositions
the
faculty, bound
"wings"
faculty as it is by
have
of
limitations
of
that
the human
dimensions
"ratio"
of
conveyed
Boethius
to the
frontier
they
this
are
incapable
bearing
off
realm of eternal
realm of
Philosophy
undergoes
her final
metamorphosis: she
takes
"magistra"
Sybil,
the mouthpiece of
change of
divine
This
character
and thus
by implication
in the
of the role of
the
nature of the
a
dia very
Book V (through
once
3) Boethius takes
in the
discussion; but
ways of
Philosophy dazzling
and
begins to
says
speak as a prophet
more
little
than a per
functory
of
"yes"
or on
disquisition
and
on the
four
modes
knowledge,
of
difference between
"aeternitas"
analogous
distinction between
"providentia"
forms
necessity,
Philosophy
as she
speaks as an oracle
hu
man audience.
But
herself
says
knowledge,
of
transcends it
(see Bk. V,
pr. as
4,
24-39).
Philosophy
Icon, Muse,
able
not
the negation
she
culmination of progressed
her
former roles,
sition where
to a po
he is
eratic
Thus, although at first sight Dame Philosophy might seem an unchanging, hi figure, an appropriate appearance for the mouthpiece of eternity, nonethe
most
less her
important
role
in the dialogue is to
constitute
which makes
between the
whereby
character
Boethius
and
Philosophy
nor
adapts
herself to the
Boethius
and
interprets
being
is,
a power neither
merely human
realms.
fully
divine
which
acts
as
intermediary
The
Boethius the
character
addresses
his
interlocutor
that
Philosophy's function
refers to
as
her
as
"nutricem
is,
as
his
nurse.
Philosophy is that power which oversees his growth, intellectual infancy to adulthood. After Philosophy's prosopo
Thus
in Book II, Boethius
adresses
poeia of
trix"
her
but
as
"virtutum
omnium
nu-
(Bk. II,
pr.
4, 1), that
is,
Thus
Philosophy
is
now
Boethius'
characterized not as
as a
the
excellencies of the
human
of
soul.
This
address represents a
Boethius'
understanding
his interlocutor: he
his
no longer sees her merely from What is more, he aptly describes Philosophy, not
240
Interpretation
as excellence
itself, but
as
much as
in Plato,
phi
losophy
to
is
not wisdom
when
but the
Dame
Book III,
Boethius the
fortune, he
addresses
pr.
Philosophy
is,
is
a
as
"summum lassorum
solamen
ani-
morum"
(Bk. Ill,
i, 2), that
Philosophy
or
as a curative means
figure
whose
monic"
"hermeneutic",
addresses
that
is,
to be the guide
weary souls. Thus function is essentially "de of the soul from one state to an
the first prose section of Book
luminis"
other, in
other
words, a psychopomp.
Finally, in
"veri
IV, Boethius
that
Philosophy
as
praevia
(Bk. IV,
pr.
1, 2),
is,
as guide most
function
as guide or not
interme
the
diary
itself.
is
clearly
light
This
"hermeneutic"
aspect of
Philosophy
ning of the text, where the figures embroidered on her garments The pi (the practical) and the theta (the theoretic) connected by
described.
a series of steps
constituting a means of ascent from the former to the latter are clear images of Philosophy's role in the text. As mouthpiece of eternity and aspect of Boe
thius himself she embraces "ra
Oewgexixd"
ngaxxixd"
of the
human
condition
and
"rd
of
affording access itself which conveys Boethius from the depths vinity
divine wisdom; she further provides the means, the ladder, to the higher realm from the lower. This ladder is the dialogue
of
humanity
to the heights
of
di
by
means of
whole
tradition of
Greco-Roman
at
Boethius'
antiquity
all calculated
stage of
receptivity
of
any
given rung.
significance of the
dialogue form
the Conso
latio, dialogue,
one could
say that,
although
firmly
within
Boethius'
use of
the genre is
attained.
internalized
This
had
interiority
master of
when
danger
of
being forgotten;
dialogue
but it
tion available to
him, interaction
allow
this interior
trait of
him to dramatize the only interac himself. What is more, the dynamics of him to achieve a great deal more than a simple por
and complex
intellectual alienation; they constitute a subtle individual human being's epistemological condition.
First
of
image
of
the
as
author,
as narra
tor,
and as
character,
self-identity.
Every
human being,
problem of
tence, "I bought the paper this morning", the who bought the paper within the story of that
Both the
identity. For instance, in the sen first of all refers to the character
But the
with
"I"
sentence.
also
identifies
of
is,
the narrator
the
of
(Theaetetus
150b
ff.)
and the
Socrates
but
as
in
of
Philosophy
241
"I"
Finally
of
"I"
which
is beyond
"I"
the
the character and the narrator, which is always subject and never ob
ject,
of
which
determines
what stories
the narrator
"I"
will
accomplished
integrating
he,
as
composes a
which
he
how he, as character, developed to the becoming both narrator and author. But it is im simply he carefully
collapses the three aspects
articulates the
into
an
undifferentiated
whole;
rather
three aspects
interact.
with
of any Platonic in in the Theaetetus concerning thought as an in terior dialogue, the striking thing about introduction of Philosophy as the second interlocutor in the dialogue is its accuracy as a depiction of the pro
Likewise
fluence,
Socrates'
such as
cess of
all
had,
do
or
nearly
had,
ence of
being
caught unawares
talking
embarrassment at
being observed to
only
proceed
one
hand,
The
for
drama
and
activity of different
aloud or
On the
hand,
to be observed
doing
so,
either
silently
in the
examples of either
strange,
is
significant, for clearly our human ability to think has as its basis our characteristically human means of communicating with each other, lan
also
guage.
rather than to another, is in some way unusual or sign either of a great mind or of the failure to interact satis it is the "unnatural"; factorily with our fellow humans. Thus what Boethius has accomplished by in
cluding the necessary second voice in any interior dialogue, and which had never been done quite so systematically before him, is the dramatization of the process
of
thought.
"I"
is three-faceted, it is in
order
natural
which we contrive
to talk
with
be
three-
faceted, depending
And
so
on what aspect of
is felt to
correspond
to.
it is
Boethius'
with corresponds
voice of
phy obviously
position to comprehend the sequence of time and the expanse of space stantaneous and all-inclusive grasp.
in
In
a certain sense
both
stand outside
the text:
Boethius
as
fashioner
all
of
transcends
stories.
Philosophy as the image of eternity which Dame Second, Philosophy as the representative of the
the story
and
of
the
story.
Both have
can
be
associated with
Boethius
as narrator
narrator
has his
as character
in the story he
narra-
tells, Philosophy
phy, their rise
has hers
history
of
the
and
fall,
and
242
Interpretation
Philosophy
unfolds
Greco-Roman
Boethius the
speculation
in
a sequential order
character.
Boe
She
her
his
capacities at
whom
Thus
Sartre,
every stage of their conversation. in my introduction I portrayed as pursuing the Consolatio general education, should now be reading with greater at
certain
fascination. For,
apart
from
whatever
dogmatic bi
of
Boethius may hold, he has, by means taken great pains to depict the existential knowledge. On the her tendentious relativity Chaucer
of all other
of the
dialogue form
of
the work,
and
conditions
human thought
what
hand,
criticized
I felt to be in
characterization of
human discourse
of
and
By
now
am
better
position to
and
my disagreement. At one point in her study, Menippean Satire, she describes the final effect of the work as
follows:
There is
tune,
no
inevitable
sequence
in the
subjects she
(i.e.
happiness,
fate,
chance,
foresight
Boethius
ever reach
he keeps asking questions, partly because for lives in time, that the dialogue will continue, that there
swers
man will
be insights, but
final
an
(p.
59).
First
of
I have demonstrated in my
losophy
states
is
a special
which
is
a matter of
internal disposi
civitatis antiquissimam
legem
ius
exsulare
in
ea sedem
fundare
maluerit?
Nam
ne exsul esse
mereatur;
pr.
at quisquis
inhabitare
earn velle
desierit
(Are
pariter
desinit
etiam mereri
(Bk.
1,
5, 5).
you unaware of
home his
city,
according
to which
it is
declared illegal is
protected
For
whoever
by
its
moat and
walls, there is no
to
fear that he
deserve
to
be
an
exile.
But
whoever stops
wanting
ceases to
deserve to do so.)
the
understood the
dynamics
of the
dialogue, Boethius
by the end
of the work
has
entrance
into the
in his
city.
insistently
25.
asks questions
role as representative of
See footnote
10.
of
Philosophy
243
sophisticated nature of
his final
questions proves
him from entering the city, indeed, the him ready to enter.
Finally,
cation of
home for
As
man
is in time
and
stance.
a pupil of
the
paradox
that,
although man
and utter
Consolatio, is a great simplifi Plato, Boethius is accutely sensitive to lives in the "metaxy", that is, in the realm be
a part of
tween pure
another
platonic
being
nonbeing,
him is
for
the
home in the
realm of
with
delicate balance
of emphasis
between the
uncertainty
Boethius'
of our
human
completely realized, it would be false to deny as characteristically human. refusal to depict true being in a straightforward and simplistic Thus
never
manner
does
not
imply
the denial of
being
as
real, it merely
which
represents a pro
found
much
which
respect
for the
givens of
reality"
Although Plato
various
Boethius
might
are
portrayed
aspects of
lack
thereof, towards being, the great truth itself is always treated as a mystery, which, because it cannot be portrayed directly, must not be. Boethius, by his use
of
the dialogue
form,
for
no such
thing
as a
by
being,
from
human be
ings,
own
thought,
approach
being.
highly
wrought
elaborated
in
yet another
only is the
work couched
in the form
been
cast
of a
between two
artificial which ate
multifaceted
interlocutors;
the text
has
of
also
in the
highly
prose,
form
of
Menippean
Satire,
had
enjoyed a
long
and various
verse and
appropri
own purposes.
to have
originated with
Gadara,
Greek-speak
He
used
ing
of the third
century
bc.
the
form
alternating
to
Cynic's
serio
how the
verse sections
in his
works
compositions or
lowed
course
by
was
fol
body
of
Cynic dis
ioo.
The
genre was
taken over
into
Latin
by
who wrote no
books
of Menip-
244
pean
Interpretation
which some
satires, of
foibles.26
600 fragments
in
which
he
mocked
human
In the first century ad Varro's lead was taken up by Petronius in the Apocolocyntosis Likewise, in the second in the Satyricon and by
"Seneca"
.
century ad, Lucian of Samosate wrote a ippean influence is strong and in which as character. But, although Lucian shares
not choose
series of
dialogues in himself
which
the
Men
"Menippus"
sometimes appears
Menippus'
seriocomic
stance, he does
to which
verse
and
prose
Menippus had
his
name.
to have
attracted practitioners
for
almost
three centu
character
ries;
is
it
and
early
sixth centuries
ad, its
istically
it is
of
tone
to
undergone a radical
transformation. No
longer
fun
the pretensions
and vanities of
mankind; instead
during
and
this
period.
Thus Martianus
Capella (fl.
425)
casts
his
highly
elaborate
Philologiae, in
cal
form;
his
collection of
by
genre
it had
on
long
lost its
associations with
had taken
ies
lofty myster
The
and expressive of
literary
mastery
of
its
practitioners.27
question medium
then arises, why did Boethius choose this strangely artificial form as
The first
to be made about
of
Boethius'
use of
Menippean Satire is
text.
Fulgentius, employ the form only intermittently; furthermore, their use of verse appears merely decora tive and at times gratuitous. In contrast, Boethius alternates verse and prose from
rough and
Both his
beginning
to end of the
Consolatio
and
he
progress of
the
work.
in the
Book II);
sometimes
of
Book V);
sometimes prayer
the more vivid images of poetry (e.g. the it actually advances the argument (e.g. metrum 3 it is reserved for purposes less appropriately treated in
,
prose, namely,
sometimes
(e.g.
metrum
it
serves to refresh
5 of Book I & metrum IX of Book III); Boethius the character between strenuous dialec
of
tical workouts
26.
(e.g.,
metrum
Book IV).
Finally,
sec-
The
Varro's Menippean fragments is: Cebe, J. P., Varron, Satires Commentaire), Ecole Franchise de Rome, Palais Farnese, Rome,
tire
format
be
This is my central disagreement with Payne's approach: to take seriously the Menippean Sa of the Consolatio is an important task for contemporary Boethian scholarship, but one
careful
must
antiquity.
of
Philosophy
245
in the Consolatio is
works
analogous
iad. In both
encountered which
these respective
stark settings of
in many ways to that of the similes in the Il devices interject aspects of reality not to be
main action.
in the
the
entire plot of
is
restricted
to the
bleak
plane
citadel
to the sea,
the similes afford glimpses of the natural world of plants and animals, and of the
workaday
world of
humans
at
their
domestic
all of which
takes place
Boethius'
within
prison
cell, the
ally
present
images
of natural
celestial,
and
sometimes refer
to the characters of
history
and myth
(e.g.,
metrum
of
Book
II;
metrum 12 of
Book
III;
of
metra
3 & 7 of Book IV). Thus, on first reading, the the Consolatio appears more integrated than in other
stands,
what end could not
But the
question still
allow
Boethius to achieve,
existed
which otherwise
he
There
even
inveterate feud,
which
pute",29
in the fourth century bc Plato could refer to as a "certain ancient dis between philosophy and poetry. The most common expression of this
and
launched by philosophical critics against poetry false. As early as Xenophanes, most articulately in certain Pla tonic passages, and as late as Boethius, poetry is accused of beguiling the mind with dangerously deceptive fabrications. On the other hand, philosophy itself felt
tension was the repeated attack
as
fictitious
the strong
pull of
poetry; in
fact,
much of what we
composed as
poetry, if
not verse.
For
example
both Parmenides
Empedocles
chose to couch
Hesiod;
Plato
set
the example
by Empedocles;
which
present
Boethius
highly
artificial
form
of
Menippean
Satire in poetry is
throughout
of
the
in
Before proceeding I should forestall a possible confusion of terms. Menip pean Satire is often defined as a potpourri of verse and prose, which is as good a definition
as any.
But
when
speak of the
losophy
tions
are
in the Consolatio,
prose and
I do
relationship between poetry and phi that Boethius has cast his
philosophy in
his
poetic aspirations
in
verse.
The
equally poetic, or literary; the philosophy is not to be found in any one discourse but in the arrangement of the work as a whole. Thus,
following
functions
of
the metra,
much
the same
arguments could
be
applied
to the variety
of
as a
"pharmakon",
that
is,
as a potent
sub-
question
in
somewhat greater of
as a
Work
of
Philology, Fall
29.
rig dia<j>oga
<j>iXooo(t>ia re xai
246
stance of
Interpretation
mysterious, almost magical, properties, the pharmakon and how it is
which can either cure or
kill.30
Who
applies
factors
contribut
at
ing
is
be read,
least
on one
level,
as the
history
of
verse.
The Consolatio
tune in a
poem
opens with
within
Boethius the
character
bewailing
elegy.31
firmly
Dame
Philosophy
her
Muses, but
she
immediately
substitutes
Muses in their
stead:
scenicas meretriculas ad
hunc
foverent,
verum
dulcibus insuper
meisque eum
alerent venenis?
dulces,
Musis
curandum
sanandumque relinquite
("Who,"
(Bk.
I,
pr.
I, 8 & ii).
she
said, "has allowed these theatrical bawds to approach this patient? Not
not
only do they
tend him
with
sweet poisons.
But
off with
you,
any remedies, in fact, in addition, they feed him on you Sirens sweet even unto death, and leave him to
be
cared
for
and cured
by
my Muses.")
Thus
verse
is
not viewed as on
beneficial, depending
Boethius'
essentially pernicious; its effects can be harmful or how it is used and by whom. And the first book of the
Consolatio may be read as an account of how hands and appropriates it for her own
Philosophy
uses.
removes verse
from
ity
to perceive the hand of God in human affairs in the fifth metrum of Book I
character will not speak
Boethius the
in
Philosophy
in
variety
shall
of
Boethius'
progress of
therapy.
use made
by Philosophy
of verse
is
what
term "the
affec
fortune (Bk. I,
m.
4),
atque animo
things,"
illabuntur tuo
an
p.
4, 1).
or are
these
she said,
"and have
you as an ass
to the
lyre?")
"pharmakon"
I of course owe the concept of poetry as a in Plato's Phaedrus in "La Pharmacie de Platon," in La
30.
to J. Derrida's treatment
of
the theme
Dissemination, Editions
,
du
Seuil, Paris,
1972,
pp.
108-33.
are the meter and
31.
Not only
many of the topoi conventional to the genre Boethius also echoes Latin Elegy, especially from Ovid's Tristia. Thus the first four lines
Trista v, 1,
56:
Flebilis
ut noster status
est, ita
fiebile carmen,
allude to
Tristia iv,
19-20:
Me
sola
Musa levat loca iussa petentem, comes nostrae perstitit ilia fugae.
of
Philosophy
247
of
present condition
receiving
healing
truth of
philosophy
the instrument
necessary change of heart, namely, verse. Ac cordingly, later in Book I, Philosophy describes her use of verse as calculated to
which will
be
able
to effect the
Boethius'
respond
to
emotional state:
Sed
quoniam
firmioribus
constat esse
induantur,
ex quibus orta
ilium
intuitum, hanc
pr.
paulisper
lenibus
tenebris
fomentis
attenuare
temptabo,
dimotis fallacium
affectionum
splendorem verae
lucis
possis agnoscere
(Bk. I,
6,
21).
of minds
(But
since
it is
is
so consti
tuted that
they
false
they divest
while
the ca
for
little
to
disperse this
of
fog
with mild
strength, so that,
with
the shadows
false
affections
removed,
be
light.)
This
affective use of
poetry
will prevail
throughout Book
Boethius'
II, in
the
course of when
which
Philosophy
appeals
principally to
the
ultimate pr.
imagination. Even
Boethius himself
viate of
complains of
deeply
rooted sorrow
(Bk. II,
most
3, 2),
inability of verse and rhetoric to alle Philosophy insists that at this stage
tui remedia, sed adhuc contumacis
he
can expect:
doloris fomenta
sunt;
in
profundum sese
fuerit
ammovebo
(Bk. II,
3, 3-4).
(And
she
said, "So
it is, for
for
your
illness, they
For
are
preparatory to the
when
the
apply
deeply.")
into play, that
passage
which
In Book III,
choose to call
its
power
Already
most
in Book I, in the
recently
central
cited,
the
power of verse
ity. This ability of verse to illumine is prayer to God as ruler of the cosmos:
O
qui perpetua mundum ratione caelique
effectively
in the
gubernas,
terrarum
sator,
qui
tempus ab aevo
ire iubes
(O
stabilisque manens
das
cuncta moveri
(Bk. Ill,
m.
9, 1-3).
the
reason,
begetter
of earth and
heaven,
enable
who order
time to proceed
move
from eternity,
remaining stationary,
all things to
)
in the
entire
verse section
Consolatio to be
the
composed
hexameters;
indicates its
which
with
status as
career
in the
work.
Accordingly it
248
sents a which
Interpretation
cosmology, derived in large measure from Plato's
philosophical content of
Timaeus, in
of
terms of
the whole
the second
half
the text
will
be
ex
pressed.
of a philosophical
harmony
being
nature
and
pressing the
hexameter
poem ex
moving things:
tu namque serenum,
tu
requies
finis, I,
m.
principium, vector,
dux,
9,
26-28).
(For
you are
the cloudless sky, peaceful rest for the good, the goal is to perceive you,
beginning,
But
soon
conveyor,
leader,
path, end,
all
in the
same
being.)
of
thereafter the
status of verse as an
instrument
philosophy begins
the
describing
on
in
order
stated significance of
legend,
to be
the
poem
itself, is that
the
soul's voyage
towards celestial
respicit
in
superum
diem
victus
12, 52-58).
your mind
(This tale
lead
to the
who
is
overcome and
when
bends his
sight
he bore,
he
below.)
type of the poet in much Latin
literature,32
was a stock
of a poet's
failure to
regain
his
wife
is
meant
to sug
the ultimate
inability
poem
of verse
to grasp and
keep
whatever
truths it might
convey.
Therefore,
though not a
definitive dismissal
of verse
decreasing
less frequently;
nor
insignificant that,
closes with prose.
Book I began
in verse, Book V
opens and
verse's
dimin
on
ished
role at
long
lecture
"providentia"
these words
Quodi te
delectant, hanc
oportet paulisper
differas
voluptatem
dum
(Bk.
IV,
pr.
6, 6).
32.
For Orpheus
Virgil, Georgics.
iv.
ses, x, 1-77;
569-91.
of
Philosophy
you,
you must
249
defer this
pleasure
of musical
song
please
for
little,
weave
with
and concludes
the same
lecture
with
the
following
remarks
Sed
video
fatigatum firmior in
(But I
see
(Bk.
accipe
igitur haustum
quo refectus
by the
fatigued
by
the extent of our reasoning, you look forward to some poetic sweetness;
receive
therefore a
draught,
longer
restored
by
Verse is
no
characterized as affective or
no
illuminating,
longer
works
it had been in
with
Books I-III; it is
hand in hand
serves as a rest
stop
on the arduous
way towards truth. But this is not the last in Book I Boethius the just
about
word on verse
metrum
character
has
as
his last
words
in the text
at
3) be
fore
on
Philosophy
and
knowledge,
the
eternity
perpetuity,
on
and
"praevidentia",
complained:
with which
Omnia
certo
fine
gubernans
hominum
Nam
cur
tantas
.
lubrica
.
versat
Fortuna
vices?
Rapidos,
firma
(You
immensum
m.
fuse to
the deserved
fixed purpose, it is only human affairs which you re measure. For why does slippery fortune
rushing waves,
and with the same
Ruler,
quiet the
bond
by
which
the great
puts
heavens, fix
matter as
and stabilize
the earth.)
In Book V he
the
follows:
rerum
bella duobus
iugari?
veris
An
nulla est
discordia
cohaerent,
luminis igne
(Bk.
V,
m.
3, 1-10)
250
Interpretation
undone
the
bonds
of
things?
What
god
has
established such
by
one, are valid, should refuse to be joined together? Or in fact is there no discord
and
they
always
limbs, is
of
firmly cohere one with the other, but the mind, buried in unable by the fire of its buried vision to discern the subtle
final
Boethius the
interweaving
things.)
note
It is important to
couched
that these
words
of
character are
in the
same meter as
ter
Acatalectic)
and
being
less
verse section poses essentially the same ques is the relationship between the realm of unchanging but that it does so in the unpredictably various world of humanity and that this
what
latter
mological sophistication.
as the
last
throughout the
of
"pharmakon"
Philosophy
the
hands
take a
potentially dangerous
Boethius'
object
child.
Philosophy
of
"pharmakon"
as one means
therapy.
Thus, depending
Boethius the newly
beneficially.33
on
the stage
therapy involved,
in
verse one
fills
more or
less impor
his
and
tant functions. In the end, as token of his successful cure and new maturity,
character speaks
demonstrating
correctly
acquired
ability
to manipulate the
"pharmakon"
of verse
Throughout its it
career
as well as
of philosophy.
Adsit igitur
nostra
dulcedinis,
hac (Bk. II,
quae
cum
instituta
deserit
cumque
musica pr.
laris
leviores
I, 8).
power of
sweetness'
present rhetorical
persuasion,
which ad
along the straight path, only when it does not abandon our handmaid in our household, it sings measures now soft, now
in its music.)
In this
regard
its
ancient
feud
the canon of
Boethius may be seen as coming down on the side of philosophy in with poetry, for the value of the latter is strictly determined by the former. But the situation is considerably more complex than
at
least
as
book,
Philosophy
Boethius'
in Book V may be seen in the first metrum illustrates her definition of chance in elegiac couplets. Just as the lament in elegiac couplets, so, too, is the first metrum of the final
use of verse
Boethius'
book
composed
in that
same meter.
vehicle
But for
meter
losophy
stration.
Boethius'
is the only thing the two poems have in common; Phi self-pity into an instrument of philosophic demon
of
Philosophy
251
prose, it constitutes
forms
verse (Bk. I, m. i), visionary literature (Bk. I, pr. i literature (Bk. I, pr. I, 7 n), didactic verse (Bk. I, m. 2), Cynic-Stoic diatribe (Bk. I, pr. 3), prayer (Bk. I, m. 5), forensic oratory (Bk. I, pr. 4, 2ff.), philosophic dialogue (Bk. I, pr. 6), and expository prose (Bk. I, pr. of
discourse. Elegiac
1-6),
allegorical
5)
are
just
some of
work.34
the many genres included in this extraordinarily eclectic of the composition is one of great variety and one
almost proudly.
which
That
is, Boethius
the au
literary
genres and
he
One answer,
Boethius
does
not
manipulates various
really get to the heart of the matter, is that forms of discourse according to a canon of propri
ety of form to content. Thus Boethius the character bewails his fall from fortune in the tones traditional to Latin elegy; Philosophy's first appearance is described according to the Muses recalls the
conventions of ancient vision
literature
and
her
rout
of
the
allegorical methods of a
Prudentius;
when
for his
despondency
form
and
Boethius the
character speaks as
if before
jury, employ
on
ing
the
to message
is
or
according to the
character
same
hierarchical
structure which
informs the
philo
work opens
the
Boethius
indulging
in the lachrymose
on
strains of couched
"providentia"
oracular,
in
Plato.35
lution from
"sensus"
one mode of
"imaginatio"
follows the
same progress
from
to
to
and
which we
have traced in
other contexts. of
In this
philosophy
doing
philosophy.
as a
is,
Boethius the author presents to the reader as an obviously implications. At the very core of the work, in the further has object, exact middle of the central Book III (metrum 9), at the hexameter hymn to God
wrought
34.
For I
by
Boethius in the
composition of the
Con
solatio see
Reichenberger, thinking
of
35.
am
exemplified
by
the
following
"
passage
8'
in the Phaedrus
(245c5-246ai):
akkov
"tpvxfi
to
yag
rd
xivovuevov,
xivijoetug,
rravXav
uoi)g
2-5:
"Deum igitur
aeternitas
degentium
pariter
commune
igitur
consideremus;
est
haec
enim
nobis
naturam
divinam
Aeternitas igitur
ralium clarius
interminabilis
vitae
possessio.
Quod
liquet. Nam
quicquid vivit
in
tempore
id
praesens a praeteritis
in futura
in Plato, both
in exemplifying
highly
252
Dame
out
Interpretation
addresses a prayer
Philosophy
poem
universe.
Through
this
God is depicted
the
as
which
mos", that
is,
universe as an
structured whole:
ire iubes
stabilisque manens
das
fingere
insita
fluitantis
epus verum
summi
cuncta superno
ipse
(Bk. Ill,
in imagine formans
m.
iubens
9, 1-9).
(O
the
reason,
heaven,
temporality
motion,
to
from eternity,
highest
and while
things
with
stant matter
of the
good
You
a
high,
yourself most
beautiful wielding
beautiful
shaping it according to
to complete a per
is God's
creation
generation of
the uni
"poiesis", his
perspective on
his
is that
of an observer
viewing
a work of art:
vero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum
Intellegentiae
ipsam illam
(But the
verse
simplicem
formam
(Bk. V,
pr.
4, 30).
eye of
intellect
exists on a
it beholds the
eye
simple
form
To God's
not appear as a
history,
that
is,
as a sequence of
is,
being immediately
completely
perceived:
vitae plenitudinem
futuri
fluxerit, id
aeternum esse
iure
perhibetur mobilis
idque
infinitatem
temporis
habere
praesentem
(Bk.
V,
pr.
6, 8)
(Therefore that
which
beginning or end,
and
equally grasps and possesses the whole fullness of life without from which no future thing is absent nor has the past flowed by,
always
that is rightly held to be eternal, and it is necessary that, possessed of itself, it is present to itself and holds as present the whole infinity of moving time.)
Finally,
the
Consolatio
God
as
eternally
fashioning
and
creation:
cunctorum praescius
desuper
deus
futura
45).
qualitate concurrit
bonis
praemia
dispensans (Bk. V,
pr.
6,
of
Philosophy
God
who
253
foreknows
all things and the ac
from
above
constantly
tions,
dispensing
within
as
eternity it does
of
his
vision
is in for
punishments
Because
is
his
creation as a
poem,
the
work
has been
to the
purification of
philosophy, the
goal of
an
which
is the
cosmos. so
Thus
just
his
work of
art,
too
does
to
Boethius the
fashion
text, the
can view
purpose of which
is to
guide
the
reader
he
does,
that
is,
as a poem.
Therefore the
must
to philosophy
within
the text
casti-
be understood,
dangerous human capacity for not living up to its potential, for not constituting the human fiction which might adequately reflect God's supreme fiction. In the end, Menippean Satire allows Boethius to compose
gation of
kind
of
metapoem, that
is,
a poem
conventional constraints of
traditional
literary
genres,
able
to
We have
Sartre
seen
of
the
work allows
Boethius to portray
as
the development
might of
Boethius the
character
ditions
present of
have put it, dialogue allows Boethius to portray the existential con human knowledge. Likewise, Menippean Satire allows Boethius to himself as a poet as opposed to a dogmatic philosopher. The implication
unlike
that
A. J. Ayer for instance, Boethius does not believe is a succession of simple declarative sentences
voices and
but
highly
wrought
produce a pattern
of the cosmos.
V. CONCLUSION
On the
strength of
the preceding
analyses of
the
philosophical
content, of the
dialogue form,
and of the
format
of
Menippean Satire
we can at
last draw
some
firm
conclusions as
to how one
might
best
approach
Consolatio.
clear
On the
one
hand it is
or
that we
cannot
straightforward
philosophical
essay
elements of
definitions,
propo
sitions,
literally
when
and as
di
rectly
expressive of
the
author's
intention.
Boethius the
character concludes
with
254
Quid
Interpretation
me
felicem totiens
iactastis,
ille
amici? gradu
Qui cecidit,
(Bk. I,
of
m.
21-22).
so often
boast
my
prosperity?
He,
who
has
fallen,
least
proves
in
a secure
position.)
not as
these
when
words stand
in their immediate
metrum of
in the final
have already seen, Likewise, Book I Dame Philosophy advises Boethius to cast
context. as we
out all
phy's
hopes
and
fears,
be simply
accepted as
Philoso
last
words on
the subject,
the
opinion of
same character of
in the last
hand to be
sentences of the
text
will
pr.
5,
44-48).
subject
the text to a
at
structuralist analysis or
decon
struction would
inappropriate,
or
least
at
both these
the text
methods arrogate
and of
downplay
ignore the
craftsmanship,
and
thereby
the in
tention,
foregoing
pages will
have
text were
deliberately
inserted
by
Thus,
would
that
the intended
of
interaction
of ele
ments within
be
categories or
display
its
text
on several occasions
thing
m.
there
is
a season and a
time to
m. 1).
purpose under
on
(e.g. Bk. I,
as evi
dence
tivus"
betraying an anxiety
failure to
theme
stitute a
appreciate
being
one of the
elements which
literature36
Consolatio
shares
with
cance of
this motif
within
the larger
dialectic
of
chaos.
am not
claiming that
a structuralist or
deconstructionist
fascinating
us
material; I
that
we are
am
elaborate
intricacy of
indicate to
up
us a
healthy humility
with regard to
How, then,
the
Consolatio! I
that of a poet
would respond
that it
requires
by
giving
an account.
"ratio",
36.
and
The English word, "account", its Latin forerunner, all denote a rational explanation and
"logos"
See, for
Seneca, Cosolatio
ad
Helviam Matrem 1,
solacia
2:
recens nam
ilium ipsa
irritarent
accenderent;
in
immature
medicina."
of
Philosophy
255
Thus the properly philosophic mode of illumine reality by coming up, as it were, with a formula corresponding to the interaction of the elements of reality. On the other hand, the
connote mathematical proportion. attempts to
discourse
poet responds
to experience
by telling a story.
both
This
features
nance of certain
reality and the conso English words, such as "to and "to tally", "to and "to count", suggests that in some ways the poetic story is a kind of philosophic account. But always present and operative in the telling of a story is the mode, "it is as if"; in other words, the poet's story, although meant to reflect reality, is al
tell"
with
the philosophic:
attempt to represent
recoun
consciously fabricated fiction. Thus the "ancient between philosophy and poetry is feud. The philosopher and poet, like Cain and Abel, like Eteocles and
ways a
disagreement"
family
Polynei-
ces,
desire the
same
end, to
represent what
is, but
count and
they display
whole,37
a common concern
appear
to be
irreconcilable, for
story likeness
ceases
losopher's if
read as a
fiction
function
formula. As is true
of all
family feuds,
the very
of the com
batants
renders
are
bold
ones
constitute various at
recon
ciliation of
The
"stories"
i and
his defense
Bk. I,
4; Philosophy's
sopopoeia of
Bk. II,
3,
and
pr. 2 and
her retelling
7)
of ancient
legends
at
Bk.
to a
of
Ill,
m.
12, Bk.
IV,
m.
Bk.
IV,
and
m.
clearly in the
account
hierarchy
story
"intellegentia"
on
(Bk. V,
pr.
4, 24-39);
of
is
encounter with
Dame Philosophy: it is
in
context, it is led up
of a char
to
by dialogue,
and
it is
preferred not
in the
author's words
but in those
respond
seems to
be that to
to reality
merely
the end
as a philosopher or
as a poet
is insufficient, for
an account and a
story,
of
between these
modes must
fiction"
In
the depiction
the
universe as
God's "supreme
suggests a possi
ble
harmony
both to But
phy
purge
between philosophy and poetry. Philosophy's account is required human fictions and to lead man towards God's perspective; but
the
world constitutes a poem and must
from this
perspective
be
read as such.
what
in
practice
does it
mean
to
read a
text
with
the dual
focus
of philoso
and poetry?
The
clearest response
is to
Thus it is
the
very
likely
It is
very
and
certain
that the
reader of
37.
worth
common
feature
of
poetry
for the
co
herence
rather
in
order
to clarify the
real
modes.
Thus
beauty
conflict
vs. truth, for there is a kind of aesthetic is between two approaches to the truth.
in
all philosophic
accounts;
256
Interpretation
will
Consolatio itself,
the
question of
have
realized
by
now
central
is
the
universe.
The
is
not a
new
one,
even
means of
addressing the
question
is
novel. com
the
question
is the
Boethius'
character
distressed
in the
middle of
Omnia
certo
fine
gubemans
hominum
(Bk.
I,
m.
5,
(You
things
with
fuse to
His
of
claim
that order
seems
to
reign over
human fortune is
Dame
countered
every aspect of the universe except that in the very next verse section, in which universal order does obtain and that it is man's
duty
to conform to
Signat tempora
aptans ofliciis nee quas
propriis
deus
cohercuit
ipse
Sic
certum
deserit
ordinem exitus
laetos (God
non
habet
(Bk. I,
m.
6,
16-22).
cles which
assigning each to its proper duties; nor does he allow the cy he himself has bound to be confused. Therefore whatever in its headlong
fixed
order
has
no
happy
outcome.)
Here two opposing conceptions of man's taposed. As Boethius the character sees
order
does
to the realm of
exiled
simply jux it, mankind is in exile, because God's human affairs; while from Philosophy's
position
in the
universe are
point of
view,
has
himself by
failing
fact,
to
conform
to the
order
inherent
ques read
in the
tion
as a
nature of
things. What
is important to
note
is that
neither side of
the
is
guaranteed as
points of view
Book II
Philosophy's
are not
part to convince
Boethius the
of
character not
of
fortune
by
right
of
the possession
any
human
being
apparent
flux
fortune in reality
consti
Constat
aeterna positumque
lege est,
(Bk.
II,
m. 3,
17-18). stands
(It
stands
firm
and
fixed
by
eternal
firm.)
This law
suffer
of
change, according to
and
highs
of
of
Philosophy
257
usual persona
longer functions
as
the
in
philo
sophical
texts, but
plus
as an effective
Etenim
hominibus
fortunam; ilia
est,
enim
semper specie
felicitatis,
semper vera
cum se
instabilem
mutatione
8,
3).
it
seems propitious,
deceives
whereas
the
former is
always
true, for
by by its
happiness,
essential
it demonstrates its
instability.)
This
pedagogical power of
when
fortune
was
foreshadowed
and
dramatized early in
paradox of vision of
Book 1 1
address
Dame
Philosophy
put on
Boethius'
complaints
(Bk. II,
pr.
2,
iff.).
change as
"amor"
as
the
principle of order
in the
universe:
Hanc
rerum seriem
ligat
(Bk. II,
imperitans
amor
m.
8,
13-15).
and which controls
(Love,
in heaven,
both land
binds this
series of
things.)
response
Thus
we
dilemma: the very fortune which he to function according to a law proper to it, and the uni
to
Boethius'
of
fortune's law, is
author's
governed
by
tensile
harmony, best
of uni
described lated
on
"amor"
as
But again,
description
versal order
is
not
necessarily the
opinion; instead it
represents a calcu
attempt
by
Dame
Philosophy
to
communicate with
Boethius the
character
terms
which
he is
capable of understanding.
This
point
becomes
in Book III
pects of this
metrum of
first
into
The first
poems
Book III
reads
very
much
like
metrum
of
Book I, both
the
it is
man's
duty
to
imitate; but in
section,
certain
#2,
which seeks
to describe the
emerge.
nature of
this order
next verse
troubling
traits begin to
Dame
Philosophy
opens
by
governs the uni stating her intention to sing of the means by which nature's illustrative of examples verse. There follow three ability to reassert her self despite the artificial interventions of humanity: the tame lion, who once he
"Natura"
tastes
blood,
recovers
his
wild
bird,
to
who, though
well
fed
by
its
haunts; human captors, breaks into song tree, the top of which has been bent to the ground, snapping back straight up when released. In all three cases man appears as in some way not belonging to
it
escapes natural
its
and
the
the
nature of
course
things, for the emphasis is on nature's capacity to maintain its own despite human interference. In addition, all three examples bear associa-
258
Interpretation
which might well
instill in the
reader a certain un
the operations of
nature.38
and
final example,
1
no place process
for
of
described holds
.31
every morning
at
dawn (i
-33)
is
independent
control;
and
"eternal
of
return"
of nature
certainly
suggest man's
things, for he is just that creature who seems ginning and thus to enter into the eternal round of
Repetunt
proprios quaeque recursus
traditus ordo
ortum
nisi quod
fini iunxerit
stabilemque sui
fecerit
orbem
(Bk. II,
m. 2, 34-38).
seek out
in its
own
return,
nor
is
beginning
to
its
end and
itself.)
things celebrated in the second book is
Thus the
have
natural order of
here
shown to
precious
little to do
"amor"
with
the principle
of
no
verse section of
Book II,
world.
"amor"
where
it
constituted a
or bond uniting the disparate contraries of the Fortune's wheel and the cosmic principle of
for
more
(Bk. II,
m.
counterbalancing man's lawless appetites, his eternal desire 2); thus the book can end on a triumphant note of achieved desire:
harmony
between
order and
O felix hominum
genus
(Bk.
II,
m.
8,
28-30).
(O
happy
race of
by
which
heaven is
minds.)
is
suggested to
be
of
little
concern
to
man
kind final
man
and
metrum of
loses its status as a principle of order. When in the consequently Book III Orpheus attempts to rescue Eurydice from Hades, a hu
with
interference
cannot
bear to be
constrained
by
Hades'
coniugem;
What is more, the literary background to some of these images conjures up very unsettling Thus the image of the lion calls to mind the famous Aeschylean lion cub in the Aga memnon (717-36), while the bent tree echoes the Bacchae grisly demise of Pentheus in
38.
associations.
Euripides'
(1062-75).
of
Philosophy
259
fas
lumina
flectere.'
amantibus?
(Bk.
Ill,
m.
12, 42-47).
a song.
But let
one
law
hedge in this
it is
a
not allowed to on
look back
until
regions.'
law
own greater
law.)
to
Thus
all
that has
progress
from Book I
at
tainment of a more
with
disjunction
are
the
universe.
The up
realm of
fortune
"amor"
and
as
described in Book II
in Book III
does
shown
as
of course this
is
not the
in reality excluding all properly human aspiration. But whole picture; Boethius the author is not a Camus, he
in
"absurd"
an
relation with
the
world.
lacking
throughout Books II and III is a sense of man's proper place in the uni
answer
to this
lack,
which will
and
#9,
of
Book III.
There, in
of
the context of a prayer, all that will become explicit in the disquisitions
"homeland"
final two books, is succinctly summarized. Man does have a but he is in exile from it and his re-entry into it requires not only
the
within one
movement
passage
from
one
dimension to
as
another.
it is his
possible
the lack
of a
Likewise, home, as
is
on the
pilgrim status
way towards
some
with
man
In Book I V the
certain precision.
means of
The
significance of the
arguments of
imagery
in the first
verse section
is
elucidated not
only in the
sections
but,
ingly, in
metrum
the
measures of
metrum while
the obstacle
to man's return
is declared to be,
reminiscent of
in the
sixth
the
object of man's
actual
knowledge is de
"amor":
scribed
in terms
"amor"
differences. God is
Hie
portrayed as
harmonizing
the cosmos
by
means of
repetuntque
dedit
esse
(Bk. IV,
m.
6,
44-48).
seek
common
to
all
to be
contained within
the
boundary
of
the good;
for
they
love
turned back
to the
them
being.)
is
pro
But the
relation
between the
foundly
"amor"
metrum of
itself,
260
whereas
Interpretation
here the
principle of order as
is radically
transcendent.
The world,
m.
as
be
the agent of
(Bk. IV,
from
all movement:
Sedet interea
conditor altus
rerumque regens
flectit habenas
et origo,
rex et
dominus, fons
lex
6,
34-39)-
(Meanwhile the
lofty
creator sits
control
turning
and
the reins of
things, the
king
and
lord,
the
fount
and
wise arbiter of
justice,
and what
he has
put
into
motion,
by
halt,
he
wander.)
Thus
agree
by
the end of the fourth book Boethius the character and Dame
Philosophy
an activity:
that there
is
an order
is
even more
important,
to human beings
human
ducit
exempli via.
Cur inertes
terga nudatis?
sideradonat
Superata tellus
(Bk.
IV,
m.
7, 32-35).
the
(Now
go
forth, heroes,
where
lofty
of
path of
the
great exemplar
tive, do
stars.)
you
keep
this
your
backs free
burdens? The
What
renders
order
humanly
satisfying, in a way
some
which
just as man is way what makes this of transcendence is But in some way very quality this order so inaccessible to man, for if man is in one sense out of nature, he is
in Book II
was
out of nature,
out of nature.
to
obviously bound to nature. The expression it will constitute the content of Book V.
pointed out
of this
dilemma
and of the
in
more
of
Book V
echo metra
and
of
Book I. The
first
of each pair
Boethius the
somewhat
character expresses
his dilemma;
The
Dame Philosophy,
obliquely,
in Book I
repre verse
whereas
in
section
and
of
sophisticated
terms, terms
eventually
is
verse section
and
case
for the
existence of
mental
faculties. In Book I
to harmo
de-
Boethius
says one
thing, Dame
Philosophy
another; there
is
no attempt
view, because it
will require
the
whole process
of
Philosophy
261
as
the same
in Books II, III, and IV before Boethius and Philosophy can, language. The various philosophical doctrines and
it were,
the
arguments
important in
a
whereby
even more
important is
verge of
from
in fact,
of eternity.
For the
change of procedure
Boethius'
from thought to
thought and
completing
and
human free
will
(Bk. V,
m.
3, 1-5) but
immediately
merely
m.
limited
(Bk. V,
3,
6-10)
The
mixture of
knowledge
and
is taken up with reflections on the peculiar ignorance which is characteristic of the human mind.
In the fourth
workings of man mental
verse section
Philosophy
continues these
the
human
activity is
an appreciation of
imagination,
mind's
and reason.
Thus in
metrum
capacity for
general conclusions
the
mysteries of eternity.
We
progress
question of
the or
der
of
the universe is
of an
handled
as
have been in
an
Aristotelian treatise.
we are pre as polar
other
Instead
sented with a
posites
exclusively rational account of the problem at hand, dialogue between two interlocutors who at first appear in the
end complete each other's arguments.
op
but
who
we are not
of
the
On the
story
are
the various
hierarchy
even more
or order
it.
By
the
blending
thought, but
epistemological
level,
itself. That is, Boethius not only gives an account, in fact several accounts, of or der in the universe; he also tells a story about the revelation of order in the pro cess of human thought. He seems to imply that it is inadquate merely to give an
account without
without
placing that account in the context of a story, or just to tell subjecting it to the rigor of a philosophical account.
and
philosophy,
along with many in antiquity feel to be discourse, are here used to complement each other.
which we
an
Every
story
explanation,
interpretation;
and yet
to interpret,
or
to give
an account
of, is
by
itself
unsatisfying:
story if it is
not
to remain sterile.
By
constructing
262
text in
Interpretation
which various stories are subject
in
larger story, in
hierarchy, hierarchy ushers in the vision of God creating and viewing his creation as a poem, by intertwining all these strategies Boethius manages not only to produce a subtly nuanced and delicately balanced
which structured
is
according to an epistemological
and
finally,
in
depiction
such a
of
what
is
required
to make
poetry
and philosophy.
Early
in the
same
century in
which
Cassiodorus
composed
his Institutiones
that model of perfection for the ossification of the Greco-Roman tradition under the aegis of the Christian cult, and in
rough and guide
which
Benedict
produced
ready
patois
to the practice of
"holy ignorance",
on
Boethius
contrives a
rance, which, in
fact, betrays
its
author's part a
mastery
of
tion and an ability to handle that tradition creatively. Boethius himself was no
doubt nominally a Christian: for all intents and purposes there was no other cult available in the Latin West; one could not hold official posts without being a
Christian;
and
it is
as certain as
But the fact that many scholars of the that Boethius the author of
the
Consolatio
could not
have
composed
with
by
and
large
anxious
about ciation or
Boethius'
orthodoxy,
whether
they
expressed that
by
attempting to
and
troubling
suggests that
Christianity,
European Middle Ages, is an unusual and complicated one. are echoes of Christian doctrine and of the Christian scriptures to be found here and there in the Consolatio,*'1 but the truly significant fact is that in
western
There
Faced
39.
with
his
own
mortality Boethius
are
De Trinitate, Utrum
substantiae
Quomodo
in
bonae
bona (or De Hebdomadis), Contra Eutychen et Nestorium. The De Fide Catholica is com monly agreed not to be the work of Boethius. 40. See Courcelle, op. cit., pp. 333-44 for an enlightening discussion of the medieval tradition
of
Boethian
commentaries.
which
Courcelle
marshalls makes
it
Boethius
read the and
into
by
its lack
any
overt mention of
Christianity
by
41.
Christian
to
orthodoxy.
handy
list
of possible references
Holy
Scripture
see:
of
Philosophy
263
mercy of a God made man; rather he carefully traces the in knot and produces a portrait of man, ignorant and hungry for for immortality. Although
and
Christianity has
on sev
philosophy
poetry
as
handmaidens to revelation,
with
it is
the
nonetheless slow
deeply
suspicious of
hard
work of philosophy.
Boethius, in contrast,
discourse
poem,
which serves
philosophy"
"doing
question of
available
ages, and
to
be
exploited
by
to
not
Chaucer. The
Boethius'
personal allegiance
Christianity
done among
one another.
is probably
gentlefolk
it is just
unbelief
from
What
we
do know,
what
Boethius
allows us
fronted
with
death, he
chose to practice
philosophy
and poetry.
social research
AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOLUME
53, NUMBER 2
SUMMER 1986
SOCIAL RESEARCH
MADNESS
Roy
Porter
Individual Subscriptions:
$20;
Institutions: $40
Single copies available on request Editorial and Business Office: 66 West 12th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011 Room GF354
versus
the
Catonic Hero:
Rousseau
on
Popular
Leadership
Joseph Masciulli
St. Francis Xavier
University
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Prince
posed
to the
sance of
a political education op Christian that was dedicated to the renais prevailing understanding Roman republican virtue. The core of Machiavelli's doctrine of educa
and
tion
is
republican allows
in
spirit
albeit
harsh,
Its periphery,
tied to a
however,
notion of
for the
alternative of
princely
kingship
tyranny
Machiavelli's unscholarly readers, however, have concluded after reading The Prince that his advocacy of tyranny is the center of his consciously revolutionary teaching. A majority of Machiavelli's scholarly readers, on the
Most
of
other
hand, have
sought
recommendation of re
publican
statesmanship,
kingship,
and
tyranny by viewing
this
now
republicanism.1
Rousseau
the
first
of
and most
influential thinkers to
encourage
dominant scholarly
view
Machiavelli's theory. In putting forward his own republican political educa on Political Economy and the Social Contract, Rousseau
Machiavelli
tyrants
and
kings
important ally who only feigned to give the better to teach the people how to attain and
an
advice
to
safeguard
their freedom.
following analysis, I will attempt to show that there are suggestive par allels or family resemblances between Machiavelli's and Rousseau's doctrines of
In the
popular statesmanhip, more specifically, of their notions of the armed prophet or
founder,
the
senatorial
hero,
and the
legislator. I
will also
contend,
however,
virtue
that
virtue which
is
that
political affairs
to the
Rousseau
makes clear
in the Political
Economy that he
and
Machiavelli
are on
upholders of popular
freedom
Only
Cf.
Harvey
translation of
University
Chicago Press,
266
Interpretation
on
statesmanship based
statesmanship between the
will"
the
general
will, says
Rousseau, is legitimate:
there
the
kind
of
characteristic of a regime
in
which
is "a unity
of
interest
and
people and
anny, has
are
prevailed
its leaders. Nonetheless, the very opposite, tyr in the historical practice of politics, and tyrannical maxims
archives of
inscribed in the
history
and
"the
Machiavelli"
satires of
(P,
in,
247).2
Machiavelli, Rousseau
he teaches
censures
suggests, is writing on two levels: on the surface level, how to dominate peoples; but on a second, deeper level he tyrannical domination from the perspective of popular republicanism.
princes us
Rousseau tells
was convinced of
this
interpreta
tion of Machiavelli's
on
to the Discourses
Livy
and the
analysis, he claimed,
gave some
showed
kings, [Machiavelli]
people."
very
good ones
to the
Machiavelli,
the lover of
liberty
every
and profound po
litical thinker, was the enemy of the papal (Book III, Chapter 6: P, m, 409, 1480). 3
In his
moved
court and of
other
king's
court
comparative
reading,
praise
one would
by
Machiavelli's
who
leading Flor
entine
citizens,
in their
strate that
they
7).
cared
III, Chapter
defense defend
p.
for their earthly fatherland more than for their souls (Book More importantly, Rousseau could be confident of his interpreta
tion of Machiavelli's
teaching
in view of the latter's pathbreaking in the Discourses. In this work, attempting to the charges of "all the (Book I, Chapter 58;
as republican
writers"
likens
God: because
one
results
in
so much so that
it
seems as
if by
it [the people]
With
regard to
its
judgment,
heard advocating different alternatives, very rarely does one find it [the people] failing to adopt the better opinion, and incapable of appreciating the truth it hears. And, if in bold things and those which appear useful, as it is said above, it errs,
2. See the CEuvres completes de J. -J. Rousseau, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, 4 vols, thus far (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959-). P, in, 247 means vol. ill, p. 247, etc. For Machiavelli I have used the Opere, ed. Sergio Bertelli (Milano: Feltrinelli, i960). References
and Discourses are to vol. 1 and for Florentine History, vol. vn. For the Political Economy, I have consulted the Cole Everyman trans, and the Masters St. Mar tin's trans. For the Prince, I have of Dallas Press, 1980); usually cited Alvarez's trans.
(University
cited
Fr. Walker
used
trans.,
most accessible
ed.
rev.
the Modern
Library
see
Arthur
On Rousseau's relationship to
and as
Machiavelli,
the excellent
et son
survey
ed.
of the works
Machiavel,"
by
Paolo M.
in Rousseau
temps,
M.
Launay
(Paris, 1968),
17-35;
or
Political
Satire?"
background to satire, Garrett Mattingly, "Machiavelli's Prince: Political Science The American Scholar, vol. 27, no. 4 (Autumn 1958), 482-91.
versus the
Catonic Hero
passions,
267
in his
own
those of a people.
found, too,
be
persuaded that
it is
good to
ap
infamous life
be
or corrupt
easily
in
variety
of ways
persuaded to
A people,
says
Machiavelli,
balance
can
effectively be guided in its future actions it has about what is good or evil for it.
is less
or
by that
and
Though
less
on
a people
subject to
blind
passions than
kings
likely
to choose
incompetent
when
infamous
and corrupt
statesmen,
still
Mach
when
iavelli
grants
deciding foreign
affairs,
bold
issue. But,
as
well,
deliberating
about
domestic
matters.
For,
Machiavelli asserts,
a people will
usually
adopt the
better
opinion and
be
able to
falsehood,
provided
which, of course, is
popular rule
the
case.
Thus Machiavelli
must
stipulates that
for
to be
defensible,
must not
the people
be
"well-ordered"
(Dis. 1, 58;
p. 264).
That is to say, it
be corrupt,
but
or
rather
law-abiding
a people needs
heads
260-61;
1,
1-2):
perior to peoples
new
glory the people is by far superior [to princes]. And if princes are su in ordering laws, forming codes of civic life, establishing statutes and
much superior
it
indubitably
glory
of
in maintaining things once established, that those who ordered them (Dis. 1, 58; p. 265).
means
In this context,
to
by
"princes"
Machiavelli
the
leading
actors
in any
regime:
armed prophets or
founders,
be well-ordered, there must be a reciprocal, symbiotic, and dynamic relation ship between the few and the many grounded on their respective needs and pow
ers.
power
people
into
For
as
its part, the people has the it preserves their orders in the
present and
to
manifest
its
gratitude
towards its
leaders recog
on
nition
future. This
contributes the
conditions
in
im is
perial power, while the other side provides stable adherence and support
effectual
justice (Dis. 1, 1;
pp.
131-32).
It is,
more essen
version of an
implicit
social contract
dominate
9).
and
the
desire
not to
Like Machiavelli, Rousseau sees the broad outlines of a solution to the prob lem of political unity in the reciprocal relationship of the exceptionally virtuous few and the many who have the potential to acquire a popular or general will. In
268
the
Interpretation
section of
introductory
the Political
the
first time
self"
the
general will as
that gives
life
to
being, caring for the preservation and well-being of the of each part (P, in, 245). Conformity to the dictates of the general will
standard
the
for just
as opposed
to tyrannical statesmanship.
reflections on modern natural
The
right in la
an
to the ancient
If we judge
by his
first
use of
volonte
clear that
ideal
the
standard
that is
meant
by
of
application of
P,
in, 244-45,
248-49).
Nonetheless,
first delineate Rousseau's understanding of the general will echo and have a family resemblance to Machiavelli's teaching on the popular will in Discourses
that
1,58.
Now, in clarifying
omy,
what
he
a
means
by
Rousseau distinguishes
variety
is
not
homogeneous, he
smaller societies ways
maintains.
Rather, it is
lated,
permanent or
temporary, formal
these
or tacit
ify
ted
in many
"the
will,"
that
is,
of
the general
(P, in,
246).
United
by
their common
interests,
by
a will that
is
general
from the
perspective of
particular
and
hence
pernicious
can
from the
a
perspective of
a
[A person]
citizen.
be
devout priest,
can
brave
bad
[Their]
deliberation
be
very
the
pernicious to the
to those
which contain
obey the
latter in
preference
duties
of a citizen go
before those
of a
to
duty,
most
and
increases
less
and
becomes
gagement
sacred:
invincible
is
just,
the
voice of
the people
is in fact the
voice of
God (P, m,
246).
Rousseau
is the
seau
as much as
Machiavelli
ultimate and most authoritative source of political morality. even more emphatic than
Indeed, Rous
instead
of a
is
is
Machiavelli, employing
of
an
identity
simile
seau
(the
voice of
Furthermore,
Rous
unambiguous
the general
will are
only
just, for he
of of
contends
m,
245).
declarations may well be faulty from the perspective Though Rousseau raises the un-Machiavellian notion
earthly city
with
foreigners (P,
the possibility
of a unified caused
its
by
universal general will overcoming the divisions different peoples, he quickly sets aside this notion
of
and conducts
popular wills
(P, in,
245).
versus the
Catonic Hero
appropriates religious
Pointing
declarations, Rousseau stresses the same occult, popular excellence under lined by Machiavelli (cf. P, in, 248). Fourth, in the Political Economy Rousseau echoes Machiavelli's concern that
the people can
be
"seduced"
by
Machiavelli's incompetent
says
make
bad
judgments Rousseau
(P, in,
246).
And, later in
the Social
Contract,
less
key
contention
in Discourses 1,
58 that unlike
kings
who choose
or corrupt
magistrates, "the
prince."
than the
For,
to head a
republican government
These
family
people elevates only those of true merit (Bk. Ill, Ch. 6; P, in, 410). resemblances, echoes, or parallels in Rousseau's teaching of
Rousseau the
Machiavelli's Rousseau's
tween
premise of popular
acceptance of and
leaders
statesmanship are accompanied, moreover, by Machiavelli's notion of a unity of interest and will be the people albeit a unity grounded on a division of political
done, Rousseau
"sublime,"
asserts
divisions
the
that exceptional,
rare, heroic
virtue
political
ers,
11, 7;
P,
in, 381).
Rousseau
adumbrates
his
notion of
maxim of popular
he
restates
laws"
with
the
which statesmanship, "Follow in everything the general "administration be in in the form that the government's conformity of the general will (PE, P, in, 251). The laws are the central con
cern; Rousseau
initially
instrument
of
the laws
by
seems, learn
and
not to
employ
disproportionate
force to
uphold
the
law
to
retain
his
However, in
Economy,
If it is
them
a
the
this
first
section of the
Political
Machiavellian leitmotiv
to know how to
good
use men as
they
are, it
is
to make
what
there
is
a need that
they be;
and
the
most absolute
authority is that
which pene
is
exercised no
less
It
is
certain that
the
people are
in
the
long
run what
be. War
and
riors, citizens,
prince who
men when
it wants;
it
pleases
it;
despises his
subjects
not
every know
how to
render
them worthy of
esteem
(P,
in, 251).
According to Rousseau "the great art of ancient imitated by modern leaders; they can mold the wills
can
be
essentially
malleable men
Interpretation
will
to generalize
desire
formation
of
the citi
body is
Above all, for the citizen "the first of the laws is to respect the dered riors
necessary because naturally men are not political. to become political, he must learn to respect the laws;
laws,"
cannot
be
engen
by
written
249).
What is
is
comprehensive
and citizens.
fashioning by morals and manners appropriate to republican war Addressing himself to every potentially heroic prince, Rous
break
with
seau advocates a
the mercenary
politics of
rise to
disunited
to command men; if
laws obeyed, make them (P, in, 251-52). Undoubtedly, in this call to the virtuous few to overcome the
albeit with some
corruption of the
age, Rousseau
active
heroic
virtue
he
analyzed
is calling for the exercise of that in his earlier Discourse on the Virtue Most Nec he
stresses
indirection
work
an expert
force,
although
his
defining
P,
properly
contends
be
reduced
n, 1263, 1268,
1272).
Rousseau
that
Men do
not govern
themselves thus
by
abstract views.
They
are
only
made
happy by
being
constrained to
be so,
and
they
must
be
made
hero; it is
himself in
a condition
to receive the
order
blessings
of men whom
strains to
reason
carry the
11,
yoke of the
laws, in
finally
(P,
1263-64).
According
mon good and
heroic leader
must
Once the
people experience
order
com
justify
as
them
with
not emphasize
the use of
force
on
the
Hero,
and
instead
Nonetheless,
citizens to
be
first
and
(cf.
section
about the need for Economy last, coming to the aid of their fatherland when it n, P, in, 261). To fashion warriors, however, the
and
obeyed and
loved.
leader
must
be
a warrior as
well,
know how to
wield
as
Romulus,
who
is
referred to as a
founder in
section ni).
This heroic
virtue
Rousseau
of
calls
Economy
reminds us of
of
Machiavelli's advocacy
4.
heroic
leadership
his
See David R. Cameron, "The Hero in Rousseau's Political Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 45, no. 3 (July- September 1984), p. 401; and for an excellent study of the Discourse on the Hero that places it in its historical and contexts, see Diane Beelen Woody's unpub
literary
ecrits
de J.-J. Rousseau
Toronto,
(University
of
1981).
versus
271
us read
interpretive
Rousseau
original
on
espouses.
In it (Chapter 26,
whose
heading
and
trans
of
Italy
liberate her
de'
barbarians"),
says
the surface
level, Machiavelli
unite
exhorts
Lorenzo
Medici, ruling
prince of
What is needed,
Florence, to Machiavelli, is a
Italy
and regain
her
ancient glory. of
virtuous
leader
of
the greatness
as of
Moses,
in
Theseus (all viewed, along with Romulus, Chapter 6). Indeed, such virtue is present in the house
Cyrus,
and
armed prophets
the
de'
Medici, in
Lorenzo
ceded
himself,
and
he
him (Pr.,
102).
at present we
have
witnessed
by
God: the
sea
has opened;
a cloud
extraordinary happenings without example brought about has cleared your path; the rock has poured water;
you
it has
must
rained manna
do
yourself.
here; everything has run in favor of your greatness. The rest God does not want to do everything, so as not to take from us
that
our
free
us
(Pr.,
103).
If Lorenzo's
supposed
greatness,
however, depends
upon
extraordinary happenings without example, it is questionable. For these happen ings were preceded in sacred history, and are reported in the Bible as experi
enced
by Moses and the Jewish people on the way to their promised land. To be sure, moreover, Machiavelli is not reporting their occurrence a second time; in fact, in inventing a second occurrence he ridicules the first. Above all,
Machiavelli is making fun
virtue required of
Lorenzo,
to overcome the
corruption
petty autocrat who hardly possesses the in his native land. Indeed, this ridi only based on the fact that the par Lorenzo's is false. Furthermore, in
Lorenzo is
not
between
Moses'
divine
destiny
an
and
likening
such a ridiculous
none
theless be
in
ironic
manner
Moses did
not reach
the promised
land, neither would he attain the goal of a unified Italy. Machiavelli, then, is not seriously advising Lorenzo in The Prince. In
capable
satire:
the fol
lowing passage, addressing himself to men more enzo, he reveals what he really intends beyond his
it is
This
who no wonder
if
during
it
the
numerous revolutions
in
Italy
and
during
is
the numer
her military
strength
extinguished.
old orders were not good, and that there was no one
and
ones;
ing
man, as
do the
new
laws
newly
ris
103).
What is required, according to Machiavelli, are leaders who will be political arti whole people (in sans and put form in the prime object of politics constituted by a this case, the Italian people). In alluding to Roman virtue, moreover, Machia
velli shows
his
preference
for
(Pr.,
105).
272
Interpretation
is necessary to create the foundation for the life of citizens and life according to the rule of laws accepted by the popular will as a corrupt mercenary politics based on the collection and payment
concern was more
just, instead
of money.
Though Machiavelli's
in the direction
of
foreign
policy (the mercenary soldiers in Italy that precluded the attainment of national independence), and Rousseau's in that of domestic policy (monetary corruption
associated with
the
system of
taxation
as
he
elaborates
in
section in of
the Po
litical Economy),
nevertheless
both
view
requiring an armed prophet to provide the initial solution. In the Social Contract Rousseau leaves a place for the Machiavellian founder in his
hints
own
armed
theory, but emphasizes the notion even less than he had in the Political Economy. At the periphery of his discussion of the legislator, Rousseau
at
the necessity of an
armed
founder
who would
be
leader
of
warriors, and
whose
activity
says,
fully, he
is "true
that
imitative
What is
required
genius,"
nothing
(celui
de rien) (Book II, Chap. 8; P, in, 386). Unfortunately, he Peter the Great had only imitative genius, and thus failed to under concludes, stand that the Russians first had to be made into warriors, then civilized with the
qui cree et fait tout
appropriate
laws
and
444).
The
rather,
armed
founder is
not
Rousseau's
leadership;
it is the senatorial,
republican
hero
by Cato the
will con
Younger. Rousseau
considers
Catonic
virtue to
be the
virtue requires
form to the
will"
general
(P,
heroism
such virtue
de
Cato did, giving up his life to affirm the general good, even Caesar had won the physical battle on behalf of a tyranny that negated the
clear
popular will.
It is
will
"virtue"
in times
of peace and of
war; this
lence its
cal virtue or
passionate
fuel
or
zens,
and
however,
first
of all
energy (P, in, 254). For this love to develop among the citi the leaders must act in the manner of the most virtuous
Cato, protecting
not
of
the
tyrants,
Blinded
by
politicians
confound their
glory
with
Rousseau,
to
using
"dark
art"
consisting
force
and
fraud (P, m,
253).
This blind
for
versus
273
glory may result in the acquisition of power, but not of glory, for such produce a fragmented society of self-interested individuals unable to
his dogs
and
his herds,
and
of men.
If it be
fine
thing
your
show respect
then to
fellow citizens,
liberty,
be
increase daily:
they
will soon
come unlimited
(P,
in, 258).
accepts the
Rousseau,
we
see,
fully
,
political ambi
tion and the exercise of power are good things which can
competent way (e.g. the leaders of the Roman republic) ner (e.g., Louis XII of France) (Pr., Ch. 3).
satisfied either
in
or an
incompetent
man
All men,
to be
not
says
Machiavelli,
without
things and glory (Pr., Ch. 25), but "to kill fellow decides his citizens, to betray his friends,
seek material
religion"
faith,
pity,
without
can acquire
"imperium but
glory"
(Pr., Ch. 8;
we read
42).
If
one wants
tells
us
(if
it
as
having
a republican
intention),
that
nobility of mind prevalent in the Roman senate. Even Scipio 's easy "would have in time wronged [his] fame and glory, had he continued
. . .
since
he lived
under
the
government of
the
Senate,
ch.
these harmful
glory"
(Pr.,
17;
pp.
102-3
For,
is
exercised
in
of a republican
for
weaknesses of each:
For this
reason a republic
since
has
fuller life
able
fortune for
it is better
to
itself to diverse
diversity
in
suit
do. For
is
tomed to act
no
way, never
Hence,
when
longer
his ways, he is
inevitably
Rousseau,
as much as
according to the
the assemblies
in
(P, in,
257).
Citizens, then,
and,
most
will
be
virtuous
if they love their homeland. They will love their interests in life, property,
this is
not enough.
In addition,
love ally
as a
bond energizing
heroic
for the
others:
everywhere where
the
lesson is
not upheld
by
by
example,
mouth of
the instruction
remains without
fruit,
him
who
does
not practice
laurels,
preach
courage;
let
magistrates, grown
gray in
purple and on
the
tribu-
274
Interpretation
justice;
age
nals, teach
transmit
will
virtuous
from
to age to the
following generations,
the citizens,
261).
and
experience and
leaders,
and
virtue of
the
live
is
in the
humanity
for
in,
(P, n,
254-55),
of the
desire for
rooted
fraternity (P,
258-59),
will
love
fatherland
develop.
seau contrasts
To clarify the conjunction of love of the fatherland and political virtue Rous Cato the Younger with Socrates, Cato who opposed the tyrannical
of
designs his
Caesar
and
Pompey
1 134).
Rousseau's heart to
dying day
Catonic
the
(cf. P, I,
virtue
is
put
into
relief
in the Political
255).
5
Economy by being
philosopher
went about
contrasted
with
pure virtue of
The he
Socrates'
father
the
land
truth.
was
the
whole
world, says
Rousseau,
in the
as
in
search of
intellectual virtue,
in seeking after individual perfection, though he fought the sophists and taught a few individuals. Socrates proved his total dedication by dying for the philosophi
cal
way
of
life
and
was
totally
committed
to his par
ticular fatherland
his
personal
Living completely for his homeland, Cato discovered happiness in the happiness of his fellow citizens. As long as he was
Rome.
laws,
and
its liberty.
senate
Appearing like
of
"a
god
mortals,"
among Plutarch's account), uncorrupted, impervious to the blandishments and Caesar who sought to flatter and bribe the senators and people
sults of their
lites"
he
stood
his
ground
in the
Pompey
satel
with the re
foreign
in,
conquests.
when
Caesar
and
"his
(cf.
sect,
P,
would not
give
Caesar his
the salva
tion of
his life through Caesar's customary clemency towards the virtuous, he chose instead to commit suicide after reading the Phaedo several times, a dia logue in which Plato's Socrates discusses death and the possible immortality of individual
After
souls.
developing
be the
individualistic Socrates
worthy human
and the
communitarian
rates would
Cato, Rousseau
of
student of
Soc
being
poraries,
Cato
would
be "the
greatest."
tue, hence claiming that we should be instructed ond, in the final analysis Rousseau avers that we
worthy
5.
by
the
first
and
by
the sec
emulator of
Cato. "For
a people
[consisting
solely]
of wise men
has
never
and
entre
Socrate
et
pp. 48-64.
versus the
Catonic Hero
275
happy,"
instituted, but it is
leaders
as
not
impossible
to make a people
when such re
publican
Cato Cato
are
Rousseau
of of
views
as the model of
community (P, in, 245). excellence, then, from the perspective doing Rousseau has introduced an aspect
of the
his
general
"myth
the
of
antiquity,"6
especially
Roman
republic as
truly
democratic
and
senatorial
leadership
as concerned with
interests. For
about
even
clear that
Cato
cared
too much
his
character and
dignity
last to leave the Senate, and would never consent to economic measures that benefited the common people, if it was likely such measures would upset the
and
constitutional order centered
in the
928).
collective
leadership
of
the senate
under
the
law (Lives,
946-47, 936, Cato's perspective, according to Plutarch, was that of the conservative sena tors who, to be sure, showed humanity towards the common people, but were
pp.
fundamentally dedicated to senatorial ascendancy (Lives, p. 933). Rousseau's Cato takes his bearings by the happiness of the common people. The mediating
term
accounting for this mythical reinterpretation is Machiavelli's popular repub licanism based on the Roman model (although I do not want to discount other
influences,
seen,
above all
Rousseau,
as
as we
have here de
reflected on
Machiavelli's Prince
Discourses
background
material
for
developing
his
leadership. And he
reiterates
in his
claim
reformed model of
Cato,
be
of senatorial
leadership, Machiavelli's
the great
general
that a civil
order can
firmly based on
for life, property, and liberty from being oppressed by 9-10, 16-17). Such a popular foundation and perspective
sires
(Pr., Chs.
Mach
conforms to
iavelli's
general call
for
a politics
based
on
"the
effectual
truth of the
thing, than
this realism
to the imagination
thereof"
(Pr., Ch.
have
15).
Machiavelli
viewed as seen or
opposed with
idealism,
which never
he
been
Ch.
15):
wise
Plato's ideal
aristocrats,
of rule
by
Aristotle's ideal
Machiavelli
of rule
by
and
Augustine's ideal
ready
partook
in the
spiritual
community
of
the
by City of God.
Christian
princes who al
insists,
desire
however,
A
that
politicians assume
simply that
Rousseau's ideal
of patriotic republicanism
that is to be
shared
we
by
leaders
its
realistic or of
Machiavellian basis. As
leaders
and citizens
It is
certain
[l'
have been
produced
by
love
of
the fa
of
therland
amour
de la patrie]: this
live
sentiment which
6. Cf. Jean Cousin. "J. -J. Rousseau, interprete des institutions romaines dans le Contrat in Etudes sur le Contrat social (Paris, 1964), pp. 13-34; and Denise Leduc-Fayette, J. -J. Rousseau
et
social
le
mythe
pp.
103-16.
276
Interpretation
with
self-love out
[amour-propre] to all the beauty of virtue, gives to it an energy which disfiguring it, makes of it the most heroic of all the passions (P, m, 255).
see, the
essence of
even
But,
as we now
love
of
self-
regard
amour-propre
though
it is
experienced
by
ardor,"
themselves as a
"burning
and sublime
as
the
feels in
istic
loving
255).
the realistic
psychological
Rousseau does not, it seems, want to emphasize of all ideal foundation the self-regarding basis
republican
patriotism,
including
though the
modern world.
Nonetheless,
make
amour-propre
desire for
recognition on
part of the
conditions
that
the people
happy,
as
long
their
desire for
only be fulfilled
liberty
and
and
who
recognition.
That is to say,
sion
great
leaders
always experience a
ten
their
love
degree,
since as
thoroughgoing
leaders
for
exceptional
as well as common
tian solution
a struggle of
him from arguing for an essentially Aristotelian or Chris to the problem. From the perspective of the latter what is required is
our prudence and unrestrained passions or
between
between
our
love
God
and of ourselves.
If
we win
fection
and
hence
care about
individual in
terests; if
seau,
men
we
worst,
we
however,
"perfectionist"
approach that of
to do what
incapable
259).
doing
what
Rather,
effecitvely he advocates is
a public education
leads to
. .
an expansion of
the self to
identify
State,
If
[children]
its
are accustomed
early
of
to regard their
individuality
in
some
ex own
cept
by
body
the
existence as a part of
with
the greater
able to arrive
finally
at
identifying
way
Later
son to the
same passage Rousseau asserts, albeit rather vaguely in compari Second Discourse (cf. P. in, 189, 219), that an expanded or patriotic love results from a form of habituation of man's amour-propre (P, in, 260).
on
in this
Returning
Cato
lowed Cato to
on the
according to Rousseau's realistic psychology, al Rome before his personal glory. In the Discourse
on
the strength of
soul of
Cato
required to give a
losing
the
consulship instead
(P, 11,
1274),
soul,
a generous act
Caesar,
who also
strength of
would not
have
performed
(cf.
P,
versus the
Catonic Hero
277
strength
to the service
of
because
of
being first
self-
among
in establishing the
the common good
for
civil
freedom. Patrio
thoroughly self-regarding
but it is
an expanded
of a particular nation.
No
sooner
did
introductory Economy than he quickly laid it to rest, as we saw. For republican politics based on being spiritually superior to other states could not function in the absence of particular regimes. During the civil war, fleeing among strangers,
raise section
the Political
Cato for
refused
to shave,
or
ner when at
any longer recline in the Roman man most beautiful beloved, essentially inferior
and
hence
unworthy
of one's
love.
In Rousseau's
account
we
have
seen
that
Cato
in future
centuries
Contract, Rousseau
and
glory,"
among
mortals
(P,
in, 381;
cf.
245)-
Furthermore,
not on
force, but
on
his "great
soul"
to lead
they
adopt
the legislator, with such "pru clearly follows Machiavelli's account of the way civilizes a people (quoting from Discourses 1, 1 1 in a note dence and 384). to SC n, 7; P, in, However, unlike Machiavelli, Rousseau uses Lycurgus,
goodness,"
not
Numa
as
his
central example.
portrait of
In Rousseau's
him,
Lycurgus
made
the Spartans
happy,
even while
they
were unknown
to the
rest of
Greece.
Resigning
.
his
time
lawgiver
a wise advisor
he took
advantage of a
kingship following
to serve as a
revolutions
to
give
his
7-8 with
the Dis
180).
But the
Lycurgus
given
out
the Ca
underlines
in a "Fragment":
de
mauvais
ruse et
Quand Licurgue
traitemens
lois, il
de la
ses
des Lacedemoniens
il fut
meme contraint
d'user de
d'aller finir
stitution qui
jours hors de
a rendu
in la
les
le
peuple
le
plus
illustre
et
le
terre
(P,
in, 512).
278
Interpretation
readers
In the Social Contract's account, Rousseau simply assumed, one gathers, his knew Plutarch's portrait of Lycurgus and thus the requisite details of the
which
he
alludes
in the preceding
to
given
quotation.
Plutarch
recounts
that
persuaded
his
countrymen
swear an oath
that
they
the customs
or
laws he had
them,
until
he
returned
oracle at
oracle and
being
told that
good, he
that
However,
to assure
his laws
stead, he starved
returned to
Sparta. In
We have his
seen
of political
leadership, Catonic
sen
atorial virtue
is
combined with
foundation Machiavelli
advocated
in
leaders;
and
preliminary function to perform to clear the way for the der primitive or corrupt historical circumstances.
statesman,
un
there
is
a resemblance
to Machiavelli's
overcoming the power of fortune in political affairs, though Rous company with Machiavelli after an initial agreement.
a protest against the power of affairs a call to political men to
be
self-reliant and
active,
not
describing
the
fortune, Machiavelli
future
25).
at
first
employs the
image
of
fortune
as a torrential
embankments and
dikes in
quiet
times
uses prudential
fore in
be
subject to
fortune's
power
chaotic times
(Pr., Ch.
a
However, Machiavelli
fortune is like fickle
physical strength and
uses a second
image to depict
seduced
the power of
fortune:
mistress who
is effectively
by
forceful overtures,
daring;
and
imaginative,
res
The
legislators
and senatorial
heroes
who emerge
from
such
bodies
of advisors are
Machiavelli,
quered
one must
fortune's worthy foes (cf. Dis. 1, 1 1 ; 11, 1). grant, is not entirely certain fortune can be wholly con
calculation, though the unifying theme
of and
by
human fortune
daring
and adaptive
his
political education
in The Prince
Discourses is how
overcome
readers to
imitate
founders
Christian
compassion and
love.
debase
vulnerability, weakness,
sake of
affirming
versus the
Catonic Hero
279
and 25).
Indeed,
and
even
Machiavelli's
popular
symbiotic,
leadership
of
fortune.
Someone
of
authority,"
he asseverates,
or vice
could con
or will
into
republic,
cf.
versa,
fully found
deed, he
tyrannical
out enterprises of
this magnitude.
of such
"pernicious"
old ones of of
lazy,
and
idly
income
being
cultivation or
(Dis. 1, 55; 266). This new senate Mach necessary toil in iavelli envisages is made up of leaders who are resolute in the face of fortune,
who
have that
by
Camillus
me"
who averred:
"The dicta
torship did
luteness in
not elate
469).
Such
reso
in fortune
having
"no sway
them."
over
Still, Machiavelli
prepared one's
has competently
claims
of a part
to
happiness
intertwined"
chiavellian
direction, Rousseau
maintains
that the
ploys enlightened, calculating parsimony, future planning, and egali hence the power tarian tax measures can assure that public needs are satisfied
policies of
of
fortune
minimized.
In the
spirit of
of
fortune
as a tor
rential river, Rousseau, first of all, encourages the construction of public ware houses to prevent famine, just as Machiavelli had done in The Prince (P, in, 267;
Pr., Ch.
ies
10).
and argues
establishment of a citizen
Pr., Chs.
"the
12-13).
Third, both
advocate
parsimony
increasing
attacks
revenues
to prevent
16).
crushed"
with excessive
taxes the
Rousseau
tyranny
Machiavelli's
55; 266).
censure of
albeit less violently of entirely in the spirit the idle rich in the Discourses (P, in, 270-78; Dis. 1,
Machiavellian
volved
In the Social Contract, Rousseau even goes daring in the face of fortune. In in making
governmental
some
decisions, he says, prudence is stressed "too much, insufficient emphasis is given to fortune, so that by dint of deliberating, (SC, in, 2; P, in, 402). A head or leader the fruits of deliberation are often
lost"
280
Interpretation
the
political art well must
who exercises
native,
with
employ prudence, but also those imagi judgment and action that will harmonize affairs
fortune,
its
vagaries.
Thus, Rousseau
criticizes
Cicero for
himself to "a
spiracy. pated
employing emergency measures and hence subjecting in dealing with the Catilinarian con have
appointed a
Rather, he
dictator
the conspiracy
vigor,
leaving
nothing to
(SC, iv, 6; P, m,
of
457)-
Rousseau, then,
velli's
thought of himself as
as
following
Machia
Prince
and
Discourses
he
elaborated upon
for
republican
statesmen
in the Political
Economy
and the
Social Contract.
Rousseau did
not conclude
teaching
tion of
and
Machiavelli's
because in his
see
republican
interpreta
creative violence.
It is true that
violence: violence goes on
at
prefer
he
seems
(Dis. i,
ii).
However, he quickly
wanting.
reverses
he
admired
but found
Rome
was so corrupt at
Cato the
was
Younger,
with
a new armed
founder
with
or
needed, he implies, was instilling had known at the beginning of their regime they prophet like Romulus, but more sophisticated so
of
men
by
as to
be
able
to deal
382).
Machiavelli's advocacy
of
of
the priority
who
of
the action
puts
of
him
at odds with
Rousseau's
For
Rousseau
was convinced
leadership
other
be
oriented
imperialistic
mastery.
The
moral struggle
for republicanism
Rousseau
is
specific armed
long run
than the
dinated
pure
mere success
faith in the nobility and moral superiority of republicanism; Machiavelli faith to what he understood to be "the effectual of
Reason
and
William Mathie
Brock
University
I
How is the
of
student of
his
political
teaching?
commonwealth
by
In every version Hobbes promotes the peace of the teaching the rights of sovereign power and obligation of sub laws
of nature.
Always he does
In
so
by
insecurity
in the
absence of sovereignty.
Hobbes
other
argues
the case
rivals
of civil
for monarchy and attacks the pretensions of priests and authority. At the same time, there are many and striking
account of the
of
differences in Hobbes's
nature; in his treatment
passions,
natural
condition,
and
laws
of
it may take; in his response to the challenge of religious to civil authority. To ig nore these differences and treat Hobbes's teaching as if it were definitively stated in any
one of
these versions
supply.2
help
sometimes to
To
identify
but
Hobbes's
arguments
sume
found in
some
it,
on
the other
hand, is
to as
teaching
which
has
somehow
"come to
pieces."3
statements of
as
student can neither neglect nor exploit uncritically the several his teachings, might he not find in the fact of their existence a clue to the fundamental intention underlying Hobbes's political philosophy, if he
If Hobbes's
could
but
understand
how those
Do the succeeding
or even
ver
sions of
Hobbes's dubious
movement,
progress,
of
his
thought? Do
upon
a
we see
here Hobbes's
progress
from
a political science
dependent
and unattractive
account
of
merely
analyzes
"the formal
structure of essential
or a
movement that
I
parts
jeopardizes the
basis
of
and
Politic
in two
was
Tenia, De Cive
into English
in 1642,
republished
by
Hobbes
in 1647,
and translated
by
Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society. In the same year he published Leviathan. Hobbes published the first and second parts of his Elementorum Philosophiae in
Hobbes in
1651 as
1655 and 1658 and a Latin version of Leviathan in 1668. References to these works will usually occur in parentheses in the text with abbreviations EL, De Cive, and Lev. as required. Page references are to Pogson-Smith's edition of Leviathan and Gert's Man and Citizen (New York: Doubleday, 1972).
2. other versions.
Those opting for this method can rarely resist the temptation to import arguments from the See, e.g., C. B. Macpherson in his Introduction to Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Pen
p. 42 and notes 3 and 4. F. S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 13.
guin, 1968),
3.
282
attempt
Interpretation
to express it as if a result of his
said of either
natural
philosophy?4
Whatever
must
finally
self
be
hypothesis,
that
Hobbes him
version of
has indicated
latest
his
teaching
to its earlier
Hobbes's
political
and even
its
author's
rhetorical,
though
as philosophic,
is
suggestion
frequently
advanced
pursued,5
rarely
own political
Yet, recalling Hobbes's bold description (in Leviathan) of his science as a proper subject for public instruction and his repeated
in his
public
condemnation of eloquence
deliberations,
Hobbes's understanding
the
of
does
not exclude
in the
commonwealth's
de
liberations,
democracy
lutions
as
. .
not
doubt. Eloquence is
desperate
or
the
desired to attain,
the
amongst
people."6
to hold what they had attained, of authority and sway In the Elements of Law Hobbes argues that the misuse of result from the passions of the sovereign will be greatest where
sovereignty is in the hands of many assembled together because there every speaker will seek his own benefit or honour by "working on the passions of the
rest"
claim
that
democracy
wisdom,
is
superior
to monarchy be
cause
"to
show their
knowledge,
eloquence"
and
is
compared strained
is
a grievance
it"
to valiant men to
be
re
from
tions of great
eloquence
because they delight in (2.10.9). The public delibera assemblies fail because success here depends upon eloquence and
fighting
distorts the good, the profitable, the honest and their contraries; makes reasons from vulgar opinions rather than true principles; is
the
hearers'
by
passions;
and aims at
victory,
not truth
(2. 10.
11).
4.
While contemporary
now
readers no
longer
object
to Hobbes's
"wicked, blasphemous,
and atheis
tical
of of
views"
that
they
share
human
nature."
McNeilly
them, they still strain at the "unsavoury gnat which is Hobbes's view hopes to extrapolate from the progress he detects in successive versions
Hobbes's teaching to a statement freed of this objection. Ibid, 5. Compare Leo Strauss, The Politi cal Philosophy of Hobbes (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), 6-29, 169, and What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959), 170-96.
5. See, e.g., A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," in K. C. Brown, ed., Hobbes Studies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 35; Bernard Gert, ed., Man and Citizen (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 3; Sterling Lamprecht, ed., De Cive (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), xix. The suggestion is pursued in relation to the Clifford "on the Sovereign theory of authorization
Authorization"
by
Orwin,
suggestion
Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. I, 32. See that the theory constitutes a "rhetorical
also
Hanna Pitkin's
enthusiasm
for Orwin's
Leviathan
advance,"
Ibid.,
47.
On the
rhetoric ot
Gary Shapiro, "Reading and Writing in the Text of History of Philosophy (April 1980), and James Zappen, "Hobbes's Leviathan: Logos, International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Madison, Wisconsin, April,
as a whole see also
thos,"
Leviathan,"
xvi-xvii.
Reason
and
283
that the advice
In Leviathan Hobbes
of
members,
who participate
by
of
right not
knowledge, is
given
in
long
to
which
commonly
the
tors,
who are
favourites
assemblies, have
144-45).
capacity
defend innocent
"apart"
subjects
(2.19,
For the
part,
however,
than
from the
individuals in
an
As Hobbes's
uous
comparison of of
the
kinds
of commonwealth so
feature
of
his
political
science,
he treats
discussion
the qualities of
"apt,
and
inept
counsellors"
(2.25,
198).
In his Elements of Law and Citizen Hobbes also views rhetoric as a necessary condition of the dissolution of the commonwealth through sedition. According to both
works
if there be
discontent, dis
to
stir
posed
to
believe
sedition could
be rightful,
confusion of
and
hopeful
of
success, there is
one
"nothing
quicken
them"
the realm,
but
up
and
1).8
The leaders
sarily
lacking in both
"judgment"
and
According
such show
that
they
lack prudence,
one who
or
by
remembrance of
have led
their
seditions
of
succeeded;
they display
lack
wisdom,
of
the knowledge
of re
people'
the
themselves,"
since
it
be demonstrated be
just"
by
such
knowledge
or science that
"no
pretense of sedition
right or
of sedition are
imprudent, then,
as
they
false
expect
to succeed, unwise as
seem
they
justify sedition (De Cive 2.12.12). In fact, the taught by such men were already "insinuated by
to
.
sophistry"
[the]
both
of
Aristotle
and others
(El.
2.9.8).
That the
authors of
sedition must
be
eloquent
is
shown
by
a consideration of their
the
sense of
injury
and provoke
They
must
believe their
(El.
rebellion
just,
The
their chance of
2.8.14).
"turn their
The
fools into
madmen
enlarge their
hopes, [and]
De Cive
7.
reorganization of
the argument
in Leviathan
seems to
follow the
suggestion of
democracy which result from the deliberation of great assemblies would disappear if everyone within the democracy would mind his own affairs and the people "would be stow the power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or some very few, being
that the inconveniences
of
i.e.,
with
ministration
(2.10.15;
see also
El.
2.5.8).
"formal"
8. The
right,
and
the
theory
of sedition
in terms
of
discontent,
of
pretense of
hope
in
(2.8.1) but
and the
the same
theory is implicit in
Regimes
the
account of De
11).
Question
Canadian
452.
284
Interpretation
reason
(De Cive
2. 12. 12).
If, indeed,
great elo
passionate sense of
discontent
or can
and
hope
of
is,
be, just,
rhetoric
"the
fitted to the
passions"
only
The
success of a polit
the
commonwealth
against
dissolution
will
its ability to
render
the
appeal.9
turn
in Leviathan
wealth can
we are struck
secured
from these to the corresponding account of political dissolution by two changes. Hobbes now holds that the common
be
indefinitely
against
make use of
the reason
they
claim
is
at
fault
when commonwealths
do
perish of are
men as
they
are
orderers"
they
the makers,
now
of
rhetoric
does Hobbes
mention
or
Instead,
we observe
that
Hobbes's treatment
metaphorical;
man each
of each of the
internal
causes of or
is
compared to some
infirmity
mention
here
rendering common opinion safe against the danger of eloquence and thus a basis for Hobbes's hope that the commonwealth might become "immortal"? In any
case,
we
may
observe that
Hobbes does
not
here
much alter
his treatment
of
dis
content and
In
of the
all versions of
his
political science
Hobbes
proceeds
of
from the
examination of
internal
causes of
dissolution to
a
discussion
at
the duties or
"office"
the
sovereign
representative,
examined.
dangers just
least partly directed to the political In Leviathan this discussion is much expanded and
subjects
discussion
grounds of
significantly modified. The duty of the sovereign to instruct his his own essential rights as sovereign is given much
nence within
in the
greater promi
teaching
folly
of one's subjects
is
of
fundamental
9.
combination of
through the
and place
story of the daughters of Pelias who were persuaded by Medea to dismember their father his members in a boiling cauldron in order to restore his youthful vigor in De Cive as in the
application of this
of
folly
the orator's
hearers
story is altered in the later work so as to suggest a greater concern "the common Compare De Cive 2. 12. 13, El. 2.8.15.
people."
to "unlearned
of
those
"making
profession of the
laws"
(2.29,
249-51).
Speaking
the
exam solicit
ple of
neighbouring
Hobbes
innovation Hobbes
speaks of
"those that
<men> to
wealth
change"
but
gives no account of
these.
great"
diseases
of the common
speaks of
the popularity
draw
others
from "their
flattery and
reputation
may
serve
to
obedience to the
but he does
of as
in dis
cussing the potency of such a subject; he speaks here against the Senate after he had won the army and not, Elsewhere, in discussing the passions that most
dom
of
Caesar
in the Elements
crime not of
De Cive,
of
Catiline.
frequently cause
but
Hobbes discusses
their eloquence
the unwis
228).
"the first
movers
in the disturbance
of
commonwealth"
(2.27,
Reason
and
285
Neither already
civil
law
nor
sovereignty cannot otherwise be successfully fear of punishment can accomplish this. Those
who
do
not
by
that
they
are obliged to
obey
civil
law
hostility"
(2.30,
259).
"
In
all
statements of
his
political science
Hobbes
speaks
both
of
the
who and
young in the universities be themselves fully demonstrated foundations of civil and of the truly capacity of the vulgar to entertain true doctrine through their public and private instruction by
teach the
doctrine"
those educated
264-65).
in the
universities
In Leviathan Hobbes
"potent"
goes on
(De Cive 2.13.9; El- 2.9.8; Lev. 2.30, 260, to answer those who doubt the capacity
to receive this
instruction,
that the
difficulty
is
rather
by
the
who can
bridle their
eth
affections"
and
by
who reject
thereby lesseneth
their
authority"
that setteth
of
the
is
shown
by
their acquiescence
of
Christian
of
Religion";
true civil
on the
basis
the to
doctrine Hobbes
hear"
that
an unprejudiced man
"needs
no more
leam,
must
than to
what
be taught
on
the pattern
the decalogue.
Success in teaching the true civil doctrine depends upon the discovery of how "so many opinions, contrary to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false prin
ciples, have
ered nevertheless
been
so
deeply
rooted"
in the
people.
What is discov
of
is diverted
by
lack
leisure
or of
"from the
deep meditation,
which
the
learning
truth,
only in the
"
matter of natural
justice, but
(2.30, 264). Certainly Hobbes does not speak of this as a capac ily requires ity for scientific instruction as such "as for science, or certain rules of their ac
tions, [most men]
264;
are cf.
are so
not what
it
is"
De Cive,
"Preface,"
Prudence,
and eloquence as
seeming prudence,
among the "human possessed by few and by these in but few things
their possessors (1
.
powers"
but the
sciences are
"small
power"
they
are
and
all
only by Hobbes ac
men
knowledges
are
deliberations if
effect will
to avoid rash
sentences, reason's
be
slight and
conse
"if there be
concludes that
"reason,
and eloquence,
(though
well
not perhaps
in the
548)-
natural sci
together"
ences,
yet
If
moral science
very must, be so
stand
(547,
presented as
elo-
11.
In De Cive Hobbes
it is the
duty of the
sovereign
to
root out
by com
13.9).
manding, but
by teaching;
remarks
not
by
the Elements he
made
habitual,
cannot
only that opinions which are be taken away by force, and upon
but
reason"
In
length
time,
are
(2.9.8).
286
quence,
Interpretation
what should
be the
nature of
they
are
the
"way"
of reason are
"small
Geometry
use"
which
is the true Ge
"arts
of public
is least
of all acknowledged.
ometry,
on
the
other
advantage over
"the doctrine
of right and
wrong"
"perpetually
ignorance
of
disputed."
Geometry
79).
is
no matter of sci
of contention
for it "crosses
of
ambition"
no man's and
(Lev. i.ii,
Lack
ence, over,
or
ignorance
causes,
contribute much to
must
rely
on
and even
.
take
they have
come to
trust (1 1 1
78-79).
of
If lack
leisure
and concern
for
of
bodily
incapable
is
alone
science,
of
including
justice,
free
disputation,
must not
In Hobbes's Behemoth
alter
one of
the ignorance
of
their
duty
interest"
and
therefore
following
others
potent"
in
all other
doubt the
taught
other
discussant
like
other sciences
...
asks why the science of just and from "true principles and evident
be
and
"more easily than the preachers and democratical gentlemen teach rebel to a further doubt as to the existence of this science and the safety of one who should try to teach it, he adds that one writer has already prepared a suf
lion;"
ficient demonstration
the meanest
of
evident to
capacity.12
What
are
which
be sufficiently derived
how exactly
"evident"
are
they
II
How
perhaps a successful moral science should combine reason and eloquence
may
be better
understood
if
we consider that
failure
of
Hobbes's
predecessors
led Hobbes to
philosophy is
successors,
his
own
Socrates, his
especially Aristotle,
Than
more
almost complete.
said
. .
ignorantly;"
treat "attributes of
honour"
as
if "attributes
of na
have
written
has
not
than
illuminated
their understandings, it is
noted
have had
no effect.
We have already
Hobbes's
12.
212.
(Emphasis added.)
Reason
statement
and
287
by
the orators
of
of sedition
were
by the
of
"eloquent
sophistry"
Aristotle
and others.
Reader"
De Cive, Hobbes
goes so
far
"to
justice
...
to their own
judgments
apprehensions"
have been
bloodsheds"
(98,
emphasis added).
Indeed,
Hobbes does
existed
not
before "the
science of
was
"openly
exposed to
disputation"
by
the
first
philosophers who
nized
security depended upon the preservation of the supreme "join themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits, to the
state."
utter ruin of
the
Now, apparently in
justice
by
that
"prudence"
"civil
knowledge"
by
which
and
its
conduct
may be
furnished,
we
think,
by
have successfully
rule,
undermined
the natural or im
men's opinions as
authority "principles of
"practice
of all who
in
nature"
those "democratical
principles"
the
popular"
of their own
FW vi,
would
218).
The
success of
were
Aristotle
thus be great
scription of their
intention, but Hobbes does not, at least consistently, maintain Rather, Hobbes claims that Aristotle made natural inequality, or
politics
the naturally greater ability of some to rule, the foundation of his whole
and
rule of
"the
wiser sort
(such
as
he thought himself to be
for his
philosophy)"
losophers
he
"that had strong bodies, but were not phi (Lev. 1.15, 118; De Cive 1.3.13; El. 1.17.1). Measured
their
account
of
intention,
wise
the
rhetoric
of
the philosophers
or acquiesced
has
the
seldom
sought,
in,
the
have the
always, often,
by
force
own wisdom".
In
Cive Hobbes
"who
have lived
under
kings"
are
dissensions"
in
consequence of
of
the
(false)
science.13
civil
inequality
In any case, Aristotle's founding of politi has "weakened the whole frame of his politics
whereby to disturb
and
hinder the
peace of
This
seems
2.
10.3, note) especially when compared with that other fable of the ancients
to be the meaning of Hobbes's interpretation of the fable of Prometheus (De Cive "Preface" reported in the
(97).
288
one of
Interpretation
(El.
i.i.i).
another"
It
would seem
philosophy
Socrates
and of
his
successors
has established,
opinion,
by the
success of
dominance
individual
This
private
or rather
passion,
ity,
a pretext
for this
level
of
common opinion.
result can
be
connected
should
obtained
thereby
as wiser than
him
For the
proud at
least,
the
an admission of
inferior
wisdom not
have
to the
finally,
"ghostly"
claim
is
combined with
by
those
who
prepared
temporal
authority
and
subordination of
former. What is
rule of
by
wisdom,
that of those philosophers who considered themselves the wise, over the
Indirectly,
"the
scribed as
suppression of
philosophy
by
such
men, as neither
truth"
by
lawful
au
thority,
nor sufficient
study
are competent
judges
of
the
EWvi,
In
ation
283).
order
to determine the
character of
Hobbes's
proposed
situ
for
which
his
predecessors
a situation
de
to
point of view of
both philosophy
and commonwealth
and
identify the rhetorical dimension of this briefly the accuracy of Hobbes's account
phy.14
remedy it
will
be
useful
to consider
of the claims of
If
we
claim of
may doubt whether Hobbes has done justice to the reasons for the Socrates and his followers that philosophers should rule, we cannot
deny
ophy
Hobbes does
political
not acknowledge
is that those
Hobbes
beset
life
hardly
the prospects for this coincidence. Although the argument for this coincidence
could
be
made within
the perspective
of political
life
perhaps
perspective
made
it; philosophy
practice,
or call
upon,
by
the very
hearing
of such a
If, in
ical
is
a partial
science was
founded
nature
upon natural
inequality,
the possession
by
some of
greater wisdom
ers of
by whereby these ought to rule over the others, the teach that political science did not expect many, if any, actual regimes to reflect
very
this
exactly.
inequality"
this
inequality
upon
"founded
Nor did they apparently expect any regime to be if by this is meant the clear acknowledgement and
those who rule as their title to rule. Where
and
14.
For
a general
discussion
of
Modernity"
15.
its accuracy see Joseph Cropsey, "Hobbes and Moderns (New York: Basic Books,
the Transition to
1964). 225-28.
Reason
the
and
Rhetoric in
Hobbes'
Leviathan
289
claim of wisdom
likely to
wider accommodation
conflicting
claims to
may
sometimes obtain a
limited
on which
the
be
ad
in the
sig
nificantly
could
inequality
be
the virtual
both illustrated
by
Socrates'
city in
speech of
established
by
ants of some
city to depart
children
persuading to be raised
by
lie"
he
proposes to secure
fraternal dedi
organization
(4i4b-4i5d).
responds
to natural
inequality,
at result of
even
its
mem
bers,
will
be accepted, if
all, only
it is misrepresented,
Just
as
by
a powerful rule of
rhetoric, as the
direct
divine
agency.
in securing the
the
lovers
of
wisdom,
rhetoric must
apparently
indig
nation.
of
departure from the teaching of his employs to account for the nonrule,
contempt,
of philosophers which
compares
ob
(4870-489^. Socrates
neither
the
ple, is
very
to
perceptive nor
knowledgeable concerning
Mem
bers
of
this
ship's
here,
another
in
order
the
rudder.
They
doubt
whether
there is any
could never
true art of
navigation
if it does exist,
be
combined with
what
is clearly
whether
by
persuasion or
force. The
possessor of
not rule
art
is
of
not
he does
not possess
The possibility
or
his
depend
upon
the combi
of
arts,
the
persuasion of
the
shipowner
Hobbes
notes
the
somewhat similar
fact that
even
knowledge,
thing
any
men
attained without
others wiser
to
admit
that there are any great care or study and therefore deny in this than themselves. In De Cive this unwillingness of most that others might have a better claim to the civil science is pre
by
Socrates
that
and
his
successors.
they
all men
but themselves
and a
few others,
approve
by fame,
not
or
themselves, they
has become
94-95)nor
an argument
of prudence, albeit
facetiously
"Aristotle"
(Lev. 1.13,
Hobbes does
16.
deny
the disastrous
See
consequences of
for rule,
Aristotle, Politics
eds.,
i283bio-35.
also
H. V. Jaffa,
Cropsey and
Leo
Strauss,
History
of Political
Philosophy
(Chicago: Rand
McNally,
1963), 113-14-
290
Interpretation
the existence of some
perhaps even
kind
of art of of
does he
that
seek
to
persuade
those who
contend
for rule,
Hobbes insists, in
there is a natural
over
his
political men
claim
inequality
1.3.
others,
which was a
foundation
among Aristotle's
18).
justifying
the rule
by
some
doctrine,
Hobbes
must
1. 17.
i, De Cive
117-
What
we must consider
says
the
be denied because it is
both
"reason"
"experience."
and
is
against
"experience",
or
denied
by
because,
fully
ence,
have seen, those supposing themselves wiser have seldom if ever success imposed their claim. Whatever the conclusion to be drawn from this experi
which we
have
observed was
also offers a
kind
of explanation
for this
familiar to Hobbes's predecessors, Hobbes experience: "there are very few so fool
governed
ish,
1.
that
had
themselves, than be
by
others"
(Lev.
15,
118).
Once the
experienced unwillingness of
accept
comes possible
to conclude that
natural
knowledged
as a
of government.
human equality must be universally ac for the securing of peace and establishing
no man
is
by
nature the su
perior,
or
ruler,
any
other and
of an equal
liberty consis
claimed an supposed
have
they have
claim
the
is
governed.
as
is
also
denied
"by
reason"
inasmuch
can
be killed
by
it has previously been demonstrated that even the strongest the weakest in the natural condition. We must observe, how
inequality
that
by
the
laws
not
civil,"
Hobbes's
this
conclusion that
equality
reason
by
but
nature must
on
be
acknowledged
is
based
on
demonstration from
have
admitted
"if
nature
have
equal"
made men
or
"if
nature
made men un
equal."
Although the requirement that natural equality be acknowledged is deduced as necessary for peace in view of the unwillingness of most men to admit that any other is wiser than they are, it may be objected that what is required for peace corresponds with what teaches, in any case. In fact, all reason teaches
"reason"
in
all
frame
of our
hu
man
perishing,
a
and
strongest
and wisdom
itself
per-
weakest man to
kill the
.3).
istotelian
which
claim
that there is a
Does this teaching effectively contradict the Ar natural inequality among men in wisdom or virtue
justifies the
rule of some
by
others? names
of
When he
ing
but
"riches,
power, nobility
shown
of
wisdom,
as
forms
inequality
by
reason to
"come
Reason
from the
and
law"
civil
is"
13).
In Leviathan Hobbes
says
ity
that now
is introduced
in this
that is
by
because in the
account of
work a
equality
their
of
of prudence
he has specifically denied that there is a natural in basis for rule. Men are equal not only by reason of
at
the
hands
of others
but
also
in "the faculties
mind."
Men
are
indeed
prudence, than
equal selves
in
bodily
1
.
(Lev.
13,
94).
The
than others
since equal
the satisfaction of all with their share of some good is the best sign of an
distribution.17
If it be true that
prudence
is
obtain an
equal measure of
"they
unto,"
acknowl
in the
do
not
.
this difference
in the
passions,"
and various
by
men,
52-
if less
subject to
inequality
The
than
"judgment"
"fancy"
or
(Lev. 1.8,
57).
18
does be
not
of
of
prudence
converse.
does however
the wisdom
governed
by
not
difference in
wit
is the do
cause of and
the difference
in their
natural
is
who
those who
do
desire
power or more
dominion
prudent other
Hobbes does
own
assert
that a "plain
husband-man is
in
his
house,
than a
Privy
Counsellor in the
husband-man
affairs of an
man"
could perform
Privy justify a share of all or anyone in rule Privy Counsellors into the daily affairs
in any
only
case
event that what
the
Counsellor's
of prudence
is
not so great as
to
of
but
enough
to
restrict
the
intervention
is
added
conclude
"reason"
against the
Aristotelian
claim of natural
inequality
refutes
that claim,
if
at
all,
by
to a
kind
The
for equality
of prudence
is thus based
to admit any
that the
opinion, or
the passionate
refusal of men
than themselves.
If it is
pecular
to
rhetoric
its
common opinions
that men
ble to
speak of
edged as a rhetorical
Hobbes's insistence that human equality by nature be acknowl claim, or even to say that the Hobbesian commonwealth, at
rhetorical
role of
the
ment."
18.
latter
judg
ment and
292
Interpretation
equality
within
Hobbes's
political science
is indi
by
the
fact that it is
that
we see of
we are and
nature,
that
reasoning
perfor
in the ordinary
only
his
office.
commonwealth not
affirms
equality but
to
permits, or
living"
things
"necessary
commodious result
too
is
at
least
consistent with
"Want is less
of
be
to the
.8).
inequity
fortune;
is
alone"
attributable
to nature
(De
Homine
1 1
Ill
"At the
ture."19
centre of
Hobbes's
political
theory lies
examine
Although
we cannot
hope to
here the
we
in the into
Leviathan
as a
whole,
section of our
especially furnished in the Elements of Law and De Cive. We hope to show that the novel features of this account admit of such an explanation and, so understood,
indication
of
of the natural
condition
as
in Leviathan. This
analysis
finds in this
chapter
may also supply an alternative to that inter Hobbes's substitution of a formal analysis
earlier and
dubious
of Leviathan arbitrary Hobbes's concern for, or with pride or the passionate desire for glory has vanished, or is vanishing, from his central political argument. If Hobbes remains a is now concerning human nature, his and
"obsession" "pessimist"
"pessimism"
human
nature.20
his
political science. of
Can
one
diminishing
ments
6?21
say that Hobbes "does not miss the importance of glory in his
of
an
psychological
argu
At least four
mankind to
volve
irrational
creatures
in his
glory, comparison,
(Lev. 2.17,
130-31).22
Summarizing
argument
to the end of the twenty-eighth chapter, Hobbes says he has "set forth
159.
19.
20.
McNeilly, Anatomy,
Ibid.,
Ibid. Though there
146.
21. 22.
closely parallel treatments of this question in the Elements and De Cive in each version and especially in Leviathan Hobbes did not merely something from the earlier works. See notes 23 and 28.
are
Reason
and
293
compelled
have
him to
submit
himself to government) and explains the title of the reference to God's words to Job: "he [Leviathan] by
dren
pride"
present work
Leviathan
...
is
king
of
(Lev. 2.28,
246).
Vainglory is treated
passions
as
the most
important
the
apparently
constitute
which
as
the more
criminal sedition
(2.27, 228-29),
and
madness"
uance maketh
(1.8,
57).
Since
madness
"vainglory,
passion and espe
as
such.23
pride and
characterizes
human
in Leviathan,
cially in the discussion of the state of nature, than previously, it has hardly disap peared from Hobbes's teaching. Nevertheless, we must consider whether it has
become
quently
superfluous of minor
to Hobbes's
discussion
importance to Hobbes's
argument as a whole.
Does Hobbes's
longer
account of
of war no
depend
The improved
rized
argument
Hobbes's Leviathan is
said
to contain
can
be
summa
thus:
while
self-glorifying leads to
from the
pursuit of
glory,
possibility
nature of
of either
war.
a general on this
diffidence,
to a state of
lations
of
nature of
nature generally, but only works out the calcu any individual who must act in relation to others "when the specific indeterminate."24 A man may reasonably initiate antici these others is
account,
supposes
nothing
patory
general pects
violence when
he fears
violence violence
from
from that
that other
pursuing
an
incompatible
objective or
violence
for any
and
of
these
"Diffidence"
"anticipa
violence"
tory
pothetical"
formal
analysis of rational
deliberation
constitute a
"hy
In "be
were
argument
which
replaces
Cive.25
those
works
Hobbes had
is driven into
it
his
individual"
so that even
if violence
by
the
incompatibility
of objectives
would result
from the
universal
conflict.
and
The
"relentless drive for glory which is error in this interpretation begins to De Cive
which
Hobbes's from
preface to
is
supposed
based
human
nature
to the
23.
24. 25.
1 1
12
anticipatory
there
should
it is
finally
is hypothetical may be doubted even on McNeilly's understanding of hypothetical only in the sense that it is deemed reasonable "only if
war"
be
an
opportunity
of
making precautionary
to do so (166).
294
Interpretation
version of
formalized
who object
that he has as
wicked were
by
observes that
"though the
because
we cannot
distinguish
them"
anticipation
is
required of even
here,
not
as
human
motives
...
but the
deliberation"
bearing
man
is
not exact.
Hobbes's
"honest"
does
know
the others is
"wicked"
"righteous"
or
but he
must
have
an account of
human
bility. Similarly, though anticipatory violence may be caused by fear of anticipa tory violence the condition of diffidence within which this can occur presupposes
a certain
understanding
of
human nature,
or of
the
range of
its
possible
forms,
on
diffident;
in human
be
shown that
vanity,
or
self-glory, as a
of
remains essential to
of nature
the existence
diffidence
even
the state
in Leviathan.
account of
In his
the causes
of quarrel
in De Cive Hobbes
frequent"
calls
violence"
chief source of
yet admits
source
patibility
as stated
of objectives.
This
would
isolated human
to,
their
into the very choice of objectives and cause, or incompatibility. And indeed Hobbes says in De Cive that anything good, (2.5.5).
which
scarce esteems
. .
hath
in
the enjoyment
"equality
hope"
of
as
the
result of
"equality
of
from this derives enmity and war out of competition (1.13, 95). Has Hobbes thus found a sufficient cause of violence in the mere incompatibility
and
of
objectives,
or
We
means
satisfied?
new notion of
"equality
As
hope"
of
follows
his
ability."
"equality
of
we
seen, Hobbes argues in Leviathan for the first time that men are their physical vulnerability but also in their
ter he notes that "such
equal not
faculties
.
of
is the
nature of men
they
will
hardly
believe there be
many
men's
so wise as
wisdom
ity
ability"
of
equality of but it is not, of course, an acknowledgement of equality as it exists in beliefs. One can say that Hobbes derives "equality of from "equal only when he expands his account of the latter to include the vain
hope"
themselves
a proof of
to their own wisdom. Not equal hope of obtaining but fear derives from equality of ability when this is confined to the recognition how brittle the frame of our body is.2* In Leviathan then, though diffidence
"Dans
cet
26.
inferieur;
egal."
Montesquieu, De
1.1.2.
Reason
may
and
295
occur whenever
desire the
same
cannot
both
enjoy,"
that
paring himself with other men, can 130). The probability and possibility
pends upon can
relish of a
nothing but
is
eminent"
(2.17,
objectives"
true
"incompatibility of
de
the fact that at least some men proceed in this way, or that all
some might.
men
imagine that
That vanity,
or
is
a state of
war, is
finally
suggested
by the
of such men
things as
are
living"
passion that of
to peace, at
their own
by
industry (1.13,
If,
as we
98).
or
essential
in the
natural
condition, we
that
its
his
argument
is
re
is
men
before
for
"gain."
change
this
kind
within
Hobbes's
also
argument.
In the
especially in
violence;
thing"
of and
if glory is the chief cause of the "desire to its most frequent source, disagreement of
trines or politic
.
"appetite to the
same
opinion
prudence"
causes
.
"the
fiercest,
or
(De Cive
.5).
In Leviathan
"
is in
corporated
of equal
faculties
of
mind,
while
their differences of
seek
opinion are
(Lev.
1.
"trifles"
for
which
those who
glory
contend
whether
longer
supposes
of opinion
concerning "religious
strife; the
or
"civic
prudence"
important
greater part of
Le
viathan
is directed to the
for the
commonwealth posed
by
errors of reli
gious
doctrine. It is therefore
reasonable
opinion as also of
glory
could
be intended to
contribute
to the
practical
the
problem
commonwealth.
There
is,
we
believe,
a general
consistency
between the
revisions ports
changes
in Hobbes's
account of
nature of
sup
this
If the may be
pursuit
by
they
the
pursuit of reputation
in
relation
manner of satisfying those pursuing these ends within civil society. In De Cive can be obtained through the society of others, even if Hobbes argues that
"gain"
it
could
be
successfully through
of things
dominion,
were
this obtainable
(1. 1. 2). As
necessary for
commodious
living
industry
is
a passion
296
which
Interpretation
inclines
men
Society
does
(1
"the
and
of
cause of
my glorying in
myself,"
on the other
can
hand, according
.1.2).
to
De Cive,
no great or
lasting
in
society
be based
on this pursuit
Those forms
commonwealth
which there
ferior to that in
which
is opportunity for this pursuit are to this extent in there is none (De Cive 2.10.9). Since, further, "ambition
men"
and greediness of
honour
cannot
be
rooted out of
the
minds of
those who
it
by harming
(2.
the commonwealth
obey"
otherwise must
ambition
to
by
the
13. 12).
In Leviathan
the
application of rewards
understands
extend
beyond the
end
is
then
done,
when
they
that
have
well served
the common
so well re
are with as
little
expense of
the
common
treasure, both to
as
is possible,
to do
compensed, as others
as
thereby may be
encouraged
faithfully
they
by
which
they may be
enabled
it better (Lev.
2.30,
270)27
If the
something
other
"ambi We
tion to obey",
is
eminent
be trans
pursuit of
have already noted Hobbes's observation that the peculiarly human pursuit is of what is eminent since man's joy consists in his comparison of himself with oth
ers.
than.
We may now observe that this thought obtains its most radical form in Levia In the Elements of Law Hobbes had said that while bees pursue a common
men seek such goods as are
good,
distinct
contention; in Le
viathan
thereby
its
procure
determines
what
is
good
by
a
eminence
is
not a result
but
a cause of
tinct and eminent (El. 1.19.5; De Cive 2.5.5; Lev. 2.17, 130).
We have
which
seen that
in Leviathan
is
expressed
in their differences
concerning
religious
part of an argument
prudence and we
So far
as
Hobbes's
they
[those readers'] blood to wade to their own (De Cive, 103) the rhetorical merit of his new argument is considerable and it is augmented by other changes in his teachshould not ambitious men
"suffer
power"
27.
Compare
also
the extent
and status of
Hobbes's treatment
of
the prevention
of
idleness in De
of
The Elements
"has
and
natural appe
tite of the
bees is "conformable
private"
and
they desire
from their
while man
"scarce
esteems"
in the enjoy
do
possess."
Reason
ing.29
and
297
Though in the
by
partici need to
pation admit
it is
not violated
by
the
central to the
account of quarrel
in the
natural
condition,
equality
as
of
right fundamental to
of nat
Hobbes's treatment
ural
of the
men
laws
of nature.
Equity
the acknowledgement
equality among
has
moreover an
representative
in the
performance
of
increased role in guiding the sovereign of his office and a new role of great importance
of
in the judicial
Differences
all
interpretation
of opinion
the laws
the
commonwealth.30
concerning religious doctrine are no longer named at in Hobbes's treatment of the natural condition in
of religious
belief in ignorance
of natural causes
is
ac
importance in Hobbes's
examination of
the "qualities of
mankind work
living
If
unity"
earlier
in the
same
(Lev. i.ii,
suppose
such
differences
That
retain
only
that Hobbes
"trifles"
for
ing
be
glory invade
one another
(1
96).
men's
differences
"trifles"
is
not
immediately
In the
the
Elements of Law Hobbes had supposed it a duty of sovereigns "to religion they hold for since "eternal is better than temporal
best"
establish
good"
(2.9.2)
who
ignored
by
the partisans
religious
ferences
"trifles,"
of opinion
of opposing religious Dif doctrine may become a contention over that Jesus is the Christ and that "inward
faith"
doctrine.31
is
all
that is
required
for
salvation and
that this
faith is
any
external
actions,
even of
worship,
required of subject
by sov
ereign,
and
Leviathan}1
In the Elements of Law Hobbes had deplored the lack of progress in moral and civil philosophy evidenced by the fact that the writers on this subject have not re
solved
but
exacerbated
controversy
much as
while
every He had
man continues
needs
but that
supplied
by
"natural
mankind
contrasted this
efforts of
lack
with
pared
"magnitudes,
how their
to one
another;"
attributes
29.
To
eliminate
differences
the aim
Harvey
to Hobbes
of
avoiding
founding
politics or rule on
Science
Indirect
Government,"
30.
requirement
to seek peace if
obtainable
is
immediately followed by
he
the
rule
that
a man content
.
himself "with
100).
so much
liberty
against
( 1 14,
In De Cive the
same rule
is
presented as
(1
3.14).
32.
see
Orwin,
"On Sovereign
Authorization,"
35-38.
298
have
Interpretation
proceeded
have taken
"evidently "vulgarly
benefits
the things
from humble
principles"
while
received"
opinions as
Hobbes
these are
of scientific progress
in Leviathan but
condition of war
now
men must
lack in that
96-97)."
to which their
passions
Although,
or
because, Hobbes
in the study
effort to
continues
to
deny
is
the
opinion
of
and even
to suppose that
"the
harder study
profess
two"
of
the
of
(2.30, 271), he
study
or
makes
little
difficulty
that
that
they
should accept
the
those who
own
it. If Hobbes
attempts rather
to correct
men's
"vain
conceit"
of
their
ural
equality
and
society based
of
on
right
"harder
study"
the politics.
is
called upon
Hobbes's understanding
of men's
"vain
we could
reaction
is
at once
is
a title
wiser
far
as
common opinion
ing,
the
claim of
wisdom, that
opinion
implies
basis
on which
wise might
large
measure
the
subordination of
is
political
justice is the
this subordina
For
Hobbes,
on
the other
hand, inequality
of wisdom as a possible
basis
de
be denied. Hobbes
seeks rather to
derive from
belief in equality
As
is
form
of
rhetoric, Hobbes's
response
to
men's
powerful
kind
of rhetoric
(El. 1.13.7,
2.8.14).
speaks only of the absence of "ornaments and comforts of life, which (1 .14.12) and in De Cive of the lack of usually invented and "pleasure and beauty of ( 1 1 1 3) The famous enumeration occurs only in Leviathan 34. See Plato, Republic 441-42. If the pursuit of wisdom is itself a form of the pursuit of glory or power, as it is for Hobbes, this subordination is ruled out. If the spirited element is to be civilized it
33.
by
peace and
procured"
society
are
life"
must rather
be
subordinated to appetite so
far
as this
is
possible.
Rousseau
versus the
of
Savoyard Vicar:
The Profession
Faith Considered
Peter Emberley
Carleton
University
New
philosophic
forms
doubt
on
the existence of the gods to whom a people prays and can erode the traditional re
straints
by
which a
community regulates men's passions. Rousseau appeared to be particularly acute in his day because of what he per
and
to be the social consequences of modern materialism teaching. Men confronted one another
now
the modern
natural-right
as
equals, liberated
of
from had
earlier obligations
individualism
the
jeopardizing
social order
by dissolving
couraging a ruthless calculation of interest and advantage. Contrary to the teach ing of Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau did not believe that calculative reason and juridical
power could moderate and
appetites.
In fact, the
new
teaching
the
it is based, had
the human
given rise
to a predatory
that stood
in
the solidarity of
against
human freedom. Rousseau's teaching involves a sustained polemic what he perceived to be the public irresponsibility of the materialists and
innovations to
reconstitute moral
behaviour in
the
wake of
their disturbances.
more sensitive
Rousseau,
discourse
readers with ruption
fact that
philosophic
had
political
he
saw
the
modern
natural-right
teaching.
However, he
for
legislators
whose
future task
it
would
be to
bonds
within
the emerging
matrix
Thus, in interpreting
comes
Rousseau's
judgments, it be
or strategic case
necessary to
speculate
have dramatic
rather than philosophical significance and that this where religious and ethical matters are at
stake.1
Interpreters
References
are
of
Rousseau have
often
of
his
to Qiuvres
completes
Pleiade,
1
p.
.
1964), 4 vols.,
although
Books,
1979). sur
(1909),
135.
300
novel
Interpretation
of
of
the
social and
doctrines to the Biblical tradition, a tradition that constitutes a large part One of the consequences intellectual fabric of Rouseau's
time.2
this is that
readers
have
difficulty
orthodoxy
with
the same
with
not
to say ecclesiastics
ments might
in Rousseau's time.
Ignoring
have been
caution,
have
a strategic
value,
commentators of
Rousseau have
tional dualistic
This
restatement
to
occur
in "The Profession
Faith
of the
Savoyard
Vicar"
in Book IV
of
the Emile. With this Rousseau was said to have attempted to have made explicit his self-appointed task of rais
ancients,"
to charm corrupted
hearts,
and to have contemporary man "to the pitch of the souls of the sponded to the doctrines of Helvetius, La Mettrie, and Diderot (in. 961). It is
ing
re as
serted that
Rouseau did
not
merely
restore
structure of a
prominent
interpretation, then, is
freedom
to see
self-
"proto-Kantian"
as
Faith"
he
mology, and
with seminal
Much
of what
is
revealed
by
the vicar
is indeed
compatible
ideas Rousseau
expressed
explicitly in
such works as
d'Alembert,
the Moral
dedicatories to
other major
Letters, the Letter to Voltaire, and works. Moreover, immediately after the
wrote that
presentation of
faith, Rousseau
establish
he had
transcribed
it
"as
an example of
in
order not to
diverge
from the
method"
seau claimed
doubts
re-
result of
my
painful
thors,
cf.
Rousseau's broad grasp of both classical and Biblical Marguerite Reichenberg, "La Bibliotheque de J. -J. Rousseau
writes
material is attested to
Rousseau,"
by
various au
Annales,
was
xxi
(1932),
pp.
181-250.
in his Confessions:
way,"
"My
usual
evening reading
in
this
xi, 1,
580.
Grimsley, Rousseau and the Religious Quest (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), and The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); P. M. Masson, La Profession defoi du vicaire Savoyard (Fribourg: University of Fribourg Press, 1914);
examples of
As
this interpretation: R.
Romantic (London: Methuen, 1974); Ernest Cassirer, The Ques York: Columbia University Press, 1954); A. Levine, The Poli tics of Autonomy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976). The exceptions to the general opinion are A. Bloom, introduction to the Emile (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1979). C. Butterworth, inter
and
essay to The Reveries of the Solitary Walker (N.Y.: New York University Press, 1979), Yvon Belaval, "La Theorie du jugement dans Jean-Jacques Rousseau et son QZuvre (Paris: 1964), pp. 149-57, J. Cropsey, "The Human Vision of in Political Philosophy and the Is sues of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), and C. Orwin, "Humanity and Justice:
pretive
l'Emile," Rousseau"
The Problem
of the
of
Rousseau,"
of
1976.
None
latter, however,
Rousseau
search was
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
I have
301
in the
faith"
just
about what
what
profession of
(1.1018).
tended as
Apparently
his final
Rousseau
in the
in
few
commentators
have
A
questioned
his
openness or sincerity.
readers'
major reason
for
most
are
Rousseau's
own views
is that the
with
profession
is
Rousseau's troubles
Rousseau
that
Rousseau's mouthpiece, is
could air
literary
mask
through
which
his
in
less direct He
manner.
The
vicar claims
there
is
no
of
miracles, or to
the truth of
holy
also
fallible
authority.
The
vicar's approach
to
theology is
type
of
"natural
religi
constituted
by
man's natural
grasp
of
the
world around
him
rather
of revelation.
Since
by Rousseau,
I
shall
profession of
philosophical position.
argue,
however,
is in fact
and
Rousseau's
treatment
of philosophical
issues
his teaching. I
only with the externalities of the theological teaching of the Church leaving its foundations intact. The character of the rest of Rousseau's
contrast,
much more subversive of
teaching is, by
ings in
Christian
and classical
teach
disputing
radical character
indeed
as a
Rousseau's fundamental
novel general
the
It
mediates
be
tween his
teaching
his
contemporaries.
The
I would suggest, are ultimately more re Rousseau himself before the judgment of orthodoxy. De
vicar's views profession embraces a metaphysical
spite
all
dualism
and
that this
commitment entails.
Insofar
as
Rousseau
appears
to adopt some of
materialistic
is
an es
incompatibility in
submit
the
To
teaching
factors
and
"dramatic"
demonstration:
(a)
profession
is
an unacceptable
(b)
that there
are substantial philosophical claims made that are own views stated elsewhere. not seem
incompatible
proof
with
Rousseau's
cient.
However,
this
is
not suffi
Does it
extraordinary that
text that
is
not
his
but
one guaranteed
to
bring
is
a
censure?
To
explore and
to
present
the
view
that there
disjunction between
Rousseau's
sion.
and aim
the
vicar's positions
does
not explain
What
does it
serve
if it is
not
Rouseau's
302
Interpretation
Such
an explanation
moral matters?
is
a needed supplement
views.
to the
inquiry
and
follows my demonstration of It is necessary to make some preliminary remarks concerning the justification for engaging in interpretation of Rousseau's intention and the interpretive strat
egy I
shall employ.
the disjunction in
It is
Rousseau's
im
didactic
Rousseau
asserted that
read"
his books
would
diligently
(1933). He
was concerned
fects he
and so
be produced,
and
it is incumbent he
offers.
few
suggestions
It is
obvious that
Rousseau's
in the
discourse. Instead,
to
narratives, anecdotes,
these
frag
ments,
I have
deal
of trouble to
result of a
try
to
enclose
in
sentence, in a
line, in
if by chance, the
to
greater part of
my
readers ought
find my
long series of reflections. Often the speeches badly connected and almost en
the trunk
whose
to
perceive
branches
alone and
I have I have
them. But
it
was enough
for those
who
never wanted
105-
106).
many
Rousseau's images
encourages
reflection
on
the
"Reader,
spare me words.
If
be
quite able to
follow my
rules
in my detailed
writes with
It is
nonetheless pertinent
caution and
indirectly.
Especially
Rousseau
who so
constantly
parades
his
sincerity
and who
explicitly subtlety
claimed
and subterfuge of
many
a reader might
be
suspicious of an
and
interpreter's
attempt to
de
vir
his
in that
even
. .
Openness, sincerity, all, "Yes, with some pride of soul, I declare and I feel that writing I have carried good faith, veracity, and frankness as far, further
statements. are after
.
"simple
naivete"
has
done"
ever
(1
1035).
in
should be considered. First, Rousseau later, The Reveries of a Solitary Walker, that he of
whose read of
diverse, it
way
truth
to present the
readers
inquiry
in
such a
as to promote
unwilling
or unable
4.
iv, 802.
Rousseau
vealed
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
303
the
by
desire to
offer useful
teachings to
to mankind:
speak
"Love
of
the public
good
is the only
to the
public."5
He had
recognized
that
others were
socially harmful. The materialists had run roughshod over this dis tinction, but the diffusion of knowledge which they had effected had not pro duced human order. What would happen to the saluary effects of traditional re
straints on
the passions
notion of
the fear
the
of eternal
damnation,
or
soul,
or
the
mined
intrinsic nobility of just acts if science had deter that all human is souls, purposeless, and that the striving had
recognized
sole guide
that po
litical dangers
maxim,
vitam
being
of
posed
by
Interpreting
truth"
his life's
(1.1038).
"My
professed
truthfulness is
based
more on
feelings
integrity
and
justice than
on
factual
obligation
owed
but the
manner of
its
delivery
can reveal
different things to
suggest
at
the
future
readers who
may
legislators,
he
uses
may be effected. That transformation is obscured by the way his terminology, sometimes in the more radical way. It is
the admonition Rousseau gave to Mme. d'Epinay: "Learn
good
worthwhile
heeding
my vocabulary better, my
friend, if you
want us
Believe me, my terms rarely have their usual To turn now to the interpretive strategy I shall employ, it is well-known that there are significant tensions or disjunctions from one of Rousseau's works to an
meaning."6
other.
Yet he had
claimed
"I have
written on variouss
with
same
belief,
and, if
opinions"
you
like,
the same
(iv.928). Is there
whereby all the differences can be understood? In a letter to M. de Malesherbes Rousseau identified his principal writings in a description
provide the principles of
could retain of
which, in
hour, illuminated
me under
distributed in my three
principal
inequality,
form Rousseau's
and the
treatise on education,
three
works are
whole"
a single
(1.
1135-36).
This
decisive
Arts
principles of
thought are to
on the
the
and
Sciences,
for
the Discourse
and
the Emile.
most significance
J. -J.
Rousseau, Letter
p.
M. d'Alembert M. d'Alembert,
on the
Theatre,
transl.
by
Press,
1968),
132.
to
p. 28.
304
an
Interpretation
Rousseau's teaching because in this writing he elaborates the principles upon which the novelty of his thought is based. There is
of
interpretation
philosophic
to
support
his
claim.
indicated,
not
was
"a
writing in which these audaciously (in. 783). Years later, writing in his Confessions about his texts, he in dicated that "everything daring in the Social Contract was already said in the
principles were most
revealed"
boldly, if
Second
tise.7
Discourse,"
and
references
to that discourse
imply that it
against
significance
which
for
interpreting
the
accusations of
Archibishop, he
in
wrote
following
so
about
course and
his
earlier works
relation
to the Emile.
if the force
subject of them
what
did
being
fully
explained,
they
gained
with
in
they lost in
faith
less
reserve
Finally, in
locutor
which
suggest
only in
an order
publication
"was
retrograde
suggesting
of
courses
contain appears
principles.9
Thus, it
that
an
interpretation
of
Rousseau's teaching
as
Second Discourse
in reading Rousseau's other works need may that discourse. Indeed, the most important theoretical insights
toricization of consciousness and the
crucial
of
the hisexpe
significance of the
condition
human
rience
of
time as duration
supplies an
the necessary
for Rousseau's
of the contra
faith.10
pedagogical
innovations. This is
exist
important
conclusion
because
dictions that
Although
discrepancies have
completely surprisingly, in an is
a
suggestion of
disjunction Rous
of
Arch-
account
by
the
first
reviewer of
Emile,
the
Archbishop de
portion
Beaumont. In his
mandate against
the
Emile,
the
the significant
discussion
of the profession of
faith,
7.
8. T. Becket
J. -J. Rousseau, Confessions (London: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 379; iv. 556, and P. -A. de Honot, The Social Compact and the Mandate of the
p. 47.
796.
Archbishop
of
1, 932-33;
see
also, Roger
Princeton
10.
sur
University Press,
1986), for
interpretive
strategy.
or
I have
issue
the Lettre
la Providence Rousseau
often quoted
Although dressee
have
and
to support the
interpretation
Rousseau
efforts.
The
individual
a general
significance;
Rouseau's
of
portrait of
simply that the contents of each letter Mme. d'Houdetot in the Confessions (1.409)
1760
his
qualifications
(iv.
1070-71).
Rousseau
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
305
as
bishop
himself
also censures
as a
being
purely
to the the
on
mechanism."11
statement could
hardly
have been
to
made on
the
presentation
profession of
faith,
which although
heretical is
sustained
by
a metaphysical
dualism
be Rousseau's
The
statement
therefore
attests
to,
or points
to,
an apparent
disjunction between
of the rest of
the profession of
faith
and
the
Archbishop's
own
interpretation
the
Emile.
I. DRAMATIC FACTORS
Throughout the
taken
Emile, Rousseau
minds
be
the
teaching from
which
they
are to
learn how
in
a suitable
light
will provide
him
emotion and
on what
reflection
for
a month.
It is
he
sees as
his
looking
back
he
has he
seen that
makes about
it;
and
receives
from the
object
judicious to
consider
"dramatic"
consider the
factors
of
will
four
(a)
of
imagination
and
educational
method,
(c)
marily to the need to prevent the premature sire. The major dilemma confronted in that book is the tendency of Emile's imagination to arouse his desires through alluring and enticing images. Thus, the
by various manipulations to mute and to channel the influence of by eliciting and maintaining desire, instrumentalizing it, and ex control over the body of the nascent moral subject. It is necessary to em tending
tutor seeks
imagination
indication
sufficient
of what
is
at stake
in the Profes
with
moment
it is
Rousseau's
views
Faith is
situated
in the
context of
the exci
a mere
11.
about
T. Becket
and
P.
-A.
de Honot, op,
16.
The
Archbishop
wrote
the
following
could not
the Emile as a
whole:
"... containing
doctrines
calculated
ples of natural
justice
and
(p.
34).
He
have
basis
his reading
of
306
Interpretation
positions,
as a strategic
conflict of
"sexuality",
explore
the locus
of a positive
which
shall
presently.12
The
men
section
immediately
preceding the
focuses
upon
the
difficulty
have in acquiring ideas of the divine, of substance, and of disembodied spir its. Rousseau reiterates a theme sustained throughout the first three books, that
men can
world
by
perception:
"we
are
limited
by
our
faculties to
sensed"
(111.551). As he has
maintained
throughout Book
II,
ideas. Rousseau
have
animated
the world
their own
being. For
comprehending
their
natural
phic versions of
ativity"
own
forces, men created gods that were anthropomor fears, needs, and hopes. Rousseau relates this "cre
and to
to a certain primal
fear
the
rampant excursions of
the
imagination.
world
is
animated with
intention
and
will; an omnipotent
about sub of
will
motions of
the universe.
Men's ideas
in
a similar
fashion,
the
generated
by
ignorance
this observation?
The
second
feature
Rousseau's
prelude to
profession
is his
criticism of
Locke's
suggestion
first
then bodies.
procedure
Rousseau
against
that Locke's
method
is
the
order of
nature,
and
vealing because it shows the great divergence between the two thinkers regarding the foundation of virtue. Locke argues that virtue is the first and most necessary endowment for a gentleman and suggests that it is "absolutely requisite to make him
valued and
beloved
other's
by
himself."13
In
Locke's teaching,
esteem.
next.
esteem
important to
men
than
self-
Virtue,
of
appears
here
as
world and
the
Locke
continues
is to be "a true
Notion
God,"
imprinted early
things, as well as the benefactor of all that is in men's lives. The esteem of God makes men esteem themselves; the rec ognition of God's benefaction encourages humility and the love of fellow men. It is in the imitation of Christ that men become Christ-like; it is in being valued by
edged as the author and maker of all
good
God,
12.
that men acquire value in their own eyes. Locke's gentleman is to acquire
concerning Vic (New York: Vintage Books, 1980). John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University
critique of the
see
M. Foucault's
"repressive
hypothesis"
torian mores,
13.
in The
History
135,
of Sexuality,
vol. I
Press,
1902);
section
p. 99.
Rousseau
the
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
307
idea
of an
Deity,
whose greatness
is to be
through prayer.
of
discussion
how to
accustom children
to the dark
so
they
avoid
the fearful
imagining
that He
of other spirits
which, in their
fears, they
made
liable to
produce.
He
advises
that children
should
the
purpose and
is
ever
could come
to them.
Trusting
vigilant, protecting them against any in God, His goodness, and benefaction
primal fear, teaching men to endure patiently whatever His designs in store for them. Locke's precise argument for the study of spirits is have may that is serves "as an enlargement of our minds to which we are led both by Rea son and
Revelation."14
The knowledge
revelation.
children ought to
have
of
God
and their
own soul
is to be taken from
matter,
upon
reflection on
is necessary because which the senses are constantly engaged, does not itself encourage immaterial phenomena. Locke stipulates that "none of the great
of spirits
The study
be
resolved"
by
recourse
to explanations
of mere mat
forces
as
gravity
so
can
only be
explained
by
appealing to "the
of
Will
of a
Superior
Being
ordering
it."15
Now
tion
all of
much against
the educa
the revela
proposed
by Rousseau
purpose of
implying
has been
solely
his
to understanding the
natural phenomena
by
proper
required no recourse
to
spiritual explanations
experi
Moreover,
to
the
notion of an external
Will
intention towards
mitted.
Emile is
com
In
an attempt
Emile to
his heart, Rousseau has taught the unity around him from the point of view of his own he has
experimented.
utility ble
the
and
This
solip-
sistic self-contraction
core of material
is intended however to
guarantee some
indubita
facts
justifies Starobinski's
claim that
Rousseau banishes
divine, for "If the self interiorizes the last judge, it also interiorizes the cre ator: the self is his own origin, or better, he keeps the memory of his own ori it."16 Rousseau has insisted that gin and in his recollection he coincides with
Ibid., sec. 190, 156. Ibid., sec. 192, 157-58. 16. Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transperence et T obstacle suivi de sept essais surRouseau (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 329. The self-delusion of this Cartesian project on behalf of of material facts, and the danger of operationalizing doubt in experimentation and the indubitability
14. 15.
the mind's
enclosure within
its
technologically successful, is
of
explored
University
Making"
pp.
248-89,
copene-
in G. Grant's discussion
of
tration
knowing
12
and
ada, 4th
Series,
the meaning of the modem understanding of the truth as the Transactions of the Royal Society of Can in "Knowing and making (1974); its self-divinizing quality is captured by a remark of Merleau-Ponty that
of
Cartesian
consciousness assumes
308
Emile
Interpretation
not perceive
emanates
any intention beyond himself. No restraint is to appear that constraint is the natural necessity of an universe. purposeless Indeed, in Book II, in his discussion of the impersonal, source of the tyrannical will Rousseau had intimated that this turbulent state was from
a
precisely a product of the belief that there is an external will in the universe. Rousseau's comments on Locke's advice regarding revelation and trust in God's beneficient
Book II fear
the
of
where nature might remind
the reader of a
corresponding
imaginings"
section
in
Rousseau had
shown
arising from
world.
empirically examining the phenomena of The discussion in Book II involved an experience in a church and the
by
consequences of
That
to the broader question of religion and its psychological origin and so is relevant to
our
immediate
Rousseau's
project
in Books II
and
IV,
on
behalf
of
of
channelling
causes of a physical
with
ignorance
of
the
imaginging
spirits, to
relief
from
pain.
of natural phenomena
based
desire for
further; the latter aids in re of a need which is natural "The idea later, say
process"
known to the
child
turns
aside
that of a mysterious
upon some of and
(iv.499). Implic
itly, Rousseau
appears
the truths
of religious
ignorance,
about
thus plant
ing
in his
Rousseau
method
his
comments on
what
is
to transpire.
leads to
materialism.
Reflecting
Rousseau's
Emile's education,
however,
to
the
a
education could
notion of spirits.
What Locke's
method seeks
encour
the
Rousseau's
method appears
to exclude from
relief of
his estate,
literally,
close at
hand. No
authoritative
doctrine is
required
to shed light on
method prepares
is
meant
to pre-empt
for administering to future anxieties; Rous them. Rousseau's young student is educated
of
to question the
nations
world around
him in light
his
needs and
to seek natural
expla
for the
makes
effects
he
observes.
This
it
that
when
proceeds not me
"it is
enough
for
as
to
reveal all
principal question
in
sessing
what
for?",
and
his
him,
in the
faith
ever
supplement
Emile's functional
Is Emile
in
a condition such
direction?"
leads his
researches
in
that
(iv.557)
consider
is the
complex relation
between the
vicar
Rousseau
and
versus
the
Savoyard Vicar
This
309
to
be
raised
by
commentators
for it is simply
is directed to Emile.
But the
rupted
to whom the profession is actually addressed is described as cor "tyrants": rage, indignation, and a tempestuous vanity are his re by sponses to fate. Everywhere he sees only the viciousness of men and the ruses
youth men perpetrate under
man experiences a
hatred
and contempt
for
mankind.
Can
therapeutic profession
for
a youth
like this be
applicable to
Emile?
by
contrast
has
none of
division; he is truly
"pre-Fall"
innocent:
as pure as
His heart,
ther
his body, is
no more
made
familiar
a
with
disguise than
never
with vice.
Nei
have
him
coward;
of
has
vile
to disguise
naive
himself. He has
all the
indiscretion
innocence. He is uncalculatingly
(iv.706).
and
The self-sufficiency
and
self-dependency
as a
of
Emile
dependency
meant
of
fession is
for Emile
necessary
supplement
to his "natural
education
cautioned
that the
pedagogical
techniques used to
ad
the
teaching
of virtue must
be
appropriate to
the
character of
student; here the difference between the two is too glaring to permit the immedi
ate conclusion
can
benefit Emile. As
carefully shortly, the pedagogies of Rousseau and the vicar differ substantially. The
addressee of the profession
is
such
be
spe
cially tailored to his corrupted character. The vicar, too, is a special case. He, while
nal
sworn
involvement
The
youth well
is
witness
he
corrected
The
vicar's recur of
disunity
"Flesh,"
desire. To
alleviate this
he
"he founded
theories the
the uniformity of so
singular a
The
by
in. The
and, it
creed might
thus
appears
to provide a
for their
weaknesses and
guilt
be said, is
healing
response
to the dualism
they feel
within
themselves.
By
contrast, Emile is
ease.
worries and
beliefs
are
designed to
Moreover,
propriety Emile's own
careful
is
also
Any
indication
to
of weakness,
division,
or
dissimilarity
to
undermine
and
foundation he has
constructed.
Could the
Emile
requires?
310
Interpretation
and
The fourth
final feature to
which
the reader's
attention
is drawn is Rous de
them and the
seau's choice of
picts
accompanies
Orpheus teaching
transforming
virtue of
beasts
by
he
was said
to
have
lyre-playing. They, in
the
fright,
prostrate
divinity
as a
above.
Looking
of
up they
are given
divine benefaction.
to occur,
seems
particularly
concerns.
well-suited
revelation about
hallmark
that
between Orpheus
vicar's and
Emile's
For
what
is
singular about
inspired,
of note
for
our
sense of
disjunction,
the
was
its
attitude towards
sin committed
death. The
body was
soul paid
for the
by
the privilege of
beautitude in the
life
where men
afterlife.
life,
of
became like
for the
sacramental
inheritance
life
the
as a preparation
for the
delivering
the soul
an ascetic
dualistic
by
techniques of power.
Chastity,
the
as an
seeing the flesh as the site of various prohibiting imitatioDei and as the deja-ld of death, was
a supreme expression of
longing
for
purity.
It is
theology in its
celestial and
eschatological elements of
sentation.
It is
striking similarity to that underlying the vicar's pre what use Emile could have of such
attachments, his
shameless
opinions,
given
naivete,
myth also
in his life, and the lack of division in his soul. has a supplement, the character of which exposes
The
myth
brings forth in
images
of
addition to
its Apollonian
ele
host
the
fecundity
initiate's
the mystery
in the
religious
himself to the
experience of
the full
fertilizing
power of the
Earth Mother. Or
demptive,
priated
rhythmic regeneration of
later
by Christianity
innocence
symbol of
as
the prototype
Christ,
and
thus an
expression of
natural man's
hope
of union with a
transcendent god,
power while who
the
"orobouric"
androgyny
as a
within
of the
Orpheus. Thus
and
Orpheus
be depicted
Christ
who mediates
heaven
earth,
harmoniously
orders
The term
"supplement"
is Derrida's
and connotes
attempt to reappropriate
Jacques
infringing substitute, that is an intervention or insinuation, adding only to replace, Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp.
I45-63-
Rousseau
them
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
-311
from
within and
bestows
heavenly
them, he is more properly the fecundating While the Vicar affirms the Apollonian ble
of opposites places all
Earth
Mother.18
element which
in the Pythagorean ta
meaning, truth,
light
and
and ab
is
dark, heavy,
of
cold, earthy,
female, Rousseau's
sence,
own
teaching
admits
the re-emergence
the
the suppressed
tery
of
plentiude of
now on of
sanctity
of
life
and
the mys
the sacrality
of
cundity of the earth, I suggest, betrays a subtle suggestion that the Profession of Faith lacks a univocal meaning, permitting instead a disclosure of the last Dio
nysian
trace of
we shall
Orpheus.
see, Rouseau's
social world
As
vicar's:
it is
one
in
which
is radically distinct from that of the Sophies are submerged within the
and
rhythmic cycles of
birth,
growth,
fullness,
decay
of
the life
process.
Even
love's illusions do
able.
not
As
"biopower"
quanta of
break those cycles, making them instead only more endur the Emiles and Sophies participate in a recurrent
nature,
a cyclic
becoming
social
and
biocosmic
health
unity.19
of
mortality is
replaced
by
the
ideal
of
and
fertil is
no
ity,
transcendence.
Philosophy
longer
learning how to die, because death does not continue to be ontologically significant. Instead, philosophy is transposed into technical modes of interven
tion that invest the
appropriation of
life
the
chthonian
Orpheus, death is
no
destiny or fate
shall
but
scandal and
turn to an
Having
may
views.
considered
reader
experience some
hesitation in simply equating the vicar's and Rousseau's The substantial philosophic position to which I have already alluded and
is, however,
even more
indicative
of a se
disjunction
with
Rousseau's
There
are
two
sections
by
a polemic on
section of
his
epis
tun-
temology, his
18.
metaphysics, and
his
account of
For
discussion
of
Eliade, Rites
and
Row, 1958)
into
a
and
Ward,
1958).
For
an argument that
the
submergence see
"metabolism
with
cit.
leads to loss
of care
for "the
Hannah Arendt, op
312
Interpretation
is the
one with which we are
ing
and
whether
it is
compatible with
his epistemological views by proposing to speak with (iv.560). From this he "the clarity of the original understanding in (his) upon which views are supported. In philosophical principles his major draws the
The
vicar commences
the
us
understanding is
the young man does not or with innate ideas or princi for understanding capacity beyond those which he gradually grasps through trial and error, repetition,
derivative
capacity.
In the
Emile, too,
and
habituation. The
and natural
vicar appears
greater natural en
dowment
tion
tion,
by the recognition that his is an disparity need exist here, but it must be noted that without a further philosophy of history no ontological claim could be advanced by the vicar
is
qualified no serious which
Rousseau
would accept.
light"
The
to a guide in his
whether
delibera
the
(iv.569). The
or
is
not
told
this
is
part of
understanding"
allowed no such
if it is his "conscience", but however that may appeal in any of his deliberations. His judgments
of
be,
are
based
on
his "natural
researches"
are of
Rousseau's
account of
the
manner
in
which
Emile's
consciousness
there appears to be
quired
neither a natural
by
experience nor
The
vicar's questions
understanding apart from the prudence ac any inherent intellectual or moral sense. are addressed to what he experiences as a "frame of
a condition that he finds a "disturbing and pain uncertainty and ful state": "Doubt about the things it is important for us to know is too violent a mind of
doubt,"
state
mind"
(iv.568). He
suggests that
his
inquiry
is intended to
account
overcome
doubt; his
and
is
perplexity
profession
doubt that
merely quieting doubt. Such an inquiry ture of the inquirer himself rather than relating it to those facts by virtue of which the propositions are true or false. The vicar is more skeptical in some ways about knowledge than Rousseau:
We do
is potentially a for it is truth that is personally satisfying in limits truth to the effect of the inquiry and the na
not
measurements of neither
this
we cannot calculate
its
relations: we
we
nor
We do
not
know ourselves;
mysteries sur
know
Impenetrable
round us on all
sides;
they
Emile's
education
has been
by
contrast more
narrowly empirical,
of
and
ultimately
at
but
"operational"
theory
knowledge
cross-referencing his
various sensations.
and
con-
Rousseau
fined to
world.20
versus
the
Savoyard Vicar
-313
corporeal
source of
his certainty
Rousseau himself
we
know
shares
man's
grasp
of
However,
assertively than the vicar that the first laws of nature can be known, that general laws of science are derivable from empirical observations, that man's nature is governed by knowable psychological laws, and that the "ac
principle"
tive
is
controllable and
its working
ascertainable.
Indeed,
on
this last
nei
point, Rousseau clearly has given the impression that the active principle is
ther a spiritual nor a mysterious principle
physiopsychological
moreover
motion
of
but rather, nothing more than the the body. The sentiments it produces appear
account.21
to
be
explicable
by
a thermomechanistic
The
science of
the
by
upon a
understanding of human behaviour as subject to predictable modes of modification. In Book III Emile is taught the rudimentary principles of hydrostat
ics,
astronomy,
biology,
and
chemistry,
and
implying
nature
is
not one of
upon
tion of
about
form
passivity matter in
resignation, but
imposi
motion.
immediate,
his
that
palpable certainty.
The
and
vicar continues
resolves
inquiry by
he is
from this
existence
have
a natural no
"I"
implies the
presence of an
that
is
sensing (iv.570). Rousseau however does not believe that men naturally have a For Rousseau, as a reading of Books I sense of their own existence (1 v. 279
-80).
and
"I"
is
created
to,
relatively in the consciousness of, and resistance but the self is never immediately sensed. Rousseau's
"I"
training
that
"self."
develops from
a relation
between
a sensed
phenomenon and a
sensing human
The
awareness of modification
by
an external
re-
source and
the
machine with an
identity. There is
no substan
tial self
prior
to this
experience
its
that realizes
own existence
independent
of experience
It
was
for this
rea
various senses,
sense of a
Emile had to learn experientially to coordinate the effects he felt from his unable to rely on an inherent sense coordination or an innate
"I"
residing
that
experiences all
ment of existence
is
acquired
rather
achieved through
the
desire (iv.301).
20. 21
.
See
note 16.
Following La
Mettrie
and
Diderot, Rousseau
thought,
appears
to
identify
heat
as a stimulus
that gives
rise to
488.
hitherto believed to be
2,
by
a spiritual substance.
and
Bloom,
n.
Cf. J. Cropsey,
for
an account of
this thermomechanism.
314
Interpretation
suggests
What this
is
a radical appears
feature
of
Rousseau's teaching,
alien
to
his
a
contemporaries. unified
Rousseau
totality,
to
depicting
traversing
instead
the
body,
thus
dissolving, too,
consciousness and
Constituted be
as a
body,
the
indi be
be
represented as a
"machine", possessing
forces
must
flaws
must
be
corrected and
the capil
lary level,
a task
beneath
consciousness and
engaged
in
such
is
suggested
by
do
his understanding
not
sensa
convey
even to
and en
during
identity. The
vicar
infers from
certain effects
explaining the gradual construction of experience much lac's demonstration of the understanding of his statue-man. From Rousseau's
point of
view, the vicar's claims are unscientific for the vicar believes that spiri
his
mind.
The
vicar
then
force"
as one and
distinguishes
tinctive
perceptions one
from judgment
hence is
he has
dis
faculty,
being"
merely
sensitive
being
judg
The
vicar's position
exper
implies that
man
an autonomous reason
iencing
world.
individual
appeals to adjudicate
sensible
For Rousseau, this mode of judgment is not so obviously active, nor does he accept the idea that man has an autonomous reasoning capacity. He presents, at one point, the example of the appearance of a broken or bent stick in water.
Emile learns the true
character of
the stick
of sensations.
by
intelligible
His judgment is
consid
than that
which
perceive
it, but
through the
experience of original
he
would soon
does
not require a
informs his
nate
For example, whereas the vicar is puzzled as to how the mind could coordi its five senses as if it were in fact passive and denies that without an active
judgment
be
capable of
suggests an alternative.
Rousseau
Molyneux
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
Cheseldon
-315
experiment
suggest
of an a
his
contemporaries'
denial
He thus
suggests that
the copresence
of
different
sensations
comparison;
judging
is
a modified
form
of
sensing,
strengthened
by
In sum, the
ters into
ence
vicar
denies that
be the
ideas
and
sentiments, yet
Rousseau
states quite
comes
unambiguously that
there through the
"everything
and
which en
human understanding
means of
senses"
that experi
is the only
ideas
the
or principles prior
acquiring knowledge. For Rousseau there are no innate to experience. Faculties and sentiments are acquired by
perceptions of pain and
repetition of
sensations,
pleasure,
and
through habit.
Rousseau denies the autonomy of reason, for it "alone is not The fundamental activity of the mind resides not in itself but in
active"
(iv,645).
psychological
act"
(iv.453). The
senses correct
ideas, by
which
the
no
illusions
of perception are
dispelled,
to
which one
only
There is
mysterious,
nonempirical principle
Rousseau's
must
the extent to
which
the
body
The
vicar
subsequently to is to be
metaphysical
types of
motion
On the first
point
he
claims
that the
of animate
beings is
or
spontaneous and
of
"unorganized
moving itself
that animals that their
action"
machines"
matter
is
organized
in
such a manner
they
are capable of
motion,
sensitivity,
The
and
vicar
thought, thus extending far greater power to matter. doubts that intelligent life could possibly have emerged from "passive
and even some
dead
need
matter"
and
"blind
fatality,"
or
from
nonintelligent
life
and chance.
"I
not think.
only know that matter is extended and divisible in order to be sure that it can And for all that any philosopher who comes to tell me that trees sense and
suble
rocks
arguments,
can see
in him only
a sophist
attribute sentiment
It
seems to me that
discovered,
but
far from saying that rocks think, modern philosophy has do not think. It no longer recognizes anything
(iv.580).
sensitive
beings in
reveals
nature"
his solidarity with his contemporaries on precisely this point: reason or thought is not natural to man and deliberation is a product of ex perience, senstion, and habit. Moreover, in addition to Rousseau saying that ani
Yet Rousseau
mals are
only
thought, he He
also sees
ently
of
peculiar about
attributing vitality to
makes
matter.
suggests
movement"
"progressive
(iv.584).
it unnecessary that
plants should
and thought
316
Interpretation
second point of natural perceives a motion and
On the
around
him,
he
says
laws"
constant
observation
moves cause
animates nature
universe.
From The
a perception of
design
der,
the
derives the
certain
laws is
evidence of an
intelligent
will.
vicar
harmony
with a
is like
a watch
end"
"proclaims
of order
a supreme
(iv.579). The
"goodness
of
...
for it is
by
order
that He maintains
whole"
each part of
the
notion of
(iv.593).
Rousseau, by
Although the
contrast, posits a
perceived nature of
reality
social
as
flux
and
indeterminate
motion
is
turbulent
life,
acceptance of a
universe,
matter,
reality
as a result of
the
denying thereby
force that
that there
personified
sustains
is any overall design, final end, or divine and and directs the world beyond the appearance of
disorder. He
because the
"body
in
motion,"
continuous
to
flux,"
and suggests
that it is precisely
is in
constant motion
(iv.284,
303, 363). A
perception of
destructiveness
susceptibility to
nature,
painful
and
like
of
Lucretius, Rousseau
religion
appears concerned to
mind
by demystifying
and
of man
to be one of
hardship
pain, but
one which
an excessive
scendence
particular
if his pedagogy is followed. There is no reason for habituation to a posture of the intellect, nor for security in love of glory, because all is
a mortal and perishable
flux
nal
and
transition, "As
this
which
being,
should
go and
form
eter
ties
on
and
from
to understand
away, everything changes, everything disappear (iv.820) Although men may come the first laws of observable motion sufficient for their earthly pur
where
passes
earth where
tomorrow?"
shall
The
vicar continues
the theme
of order and
regularity
by turning
to the doc
by
impossible to
conceive
that "nature
finally
for the
prescribed
laws to itself to
which
it
outset"
the
(iv.579). He
flatly
ements.
notion
from
a common
prototype:
Rousseau
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
nature sets
-317
between the
various
species,
so
that
they
be confounded,
shows order.
its intentions
It took
It
was not
satisified with
establishing
nothing
could
disturb
that order
(iv.580).
of
Ap
pealing to
Moses,"
than to
a priori
reasoning
"the
writings of
that the
deferring more precisely to Buffon, the naturalist, Rousseau history of natural phenomena has been a product of "fortuitous
and
accidents"
argues
causes,"
"countless
and
the "chance combination of events which might never the passage of time
have
arisen"
(in.
162).
Describing
from
his
original
ignorance, Rousseau
uselessly starting from the same point, centuries passed in all the the first (in. 160). There was no benevolent guide to man's
ages"
writes:
"... the
generations multiplied
present state of
organization,
and
thus Rousseau disavows the teleological and to sustain the vicar's position. There is noth
view
ing
contradictory to Rousseau
in the
by
error.
Like the
stating for example that it is an error to believe that the senses urally functional for the utility of life. There are no gods who
end
design
or
to the universe.
"J"
strongly
suggest that
he believes
life to have in
no
from
a common
way designed. Indeed, one may go further and suggest that what Discourse particularly interesting is that in his analysis of each Second the
situates the emergence of a new practical
within a synchronic rather
historical stage, he
guage,
and
consciousness, lan
script,
disrupting
the human
the
notion of
continuity, the
species.
Thus, in
identity, and development in the history of Second Discourse, Rousseau appears to sustain
an argument
of
for the materiality of discourse ordering human consciousness. The third and final section of the vicar's philosophical position is his account within himself and as a consequence the soul. He senses a "violent
condition"
invokes
a notion of metaphysical
dualism. He but
admits that
he
cannot understand
of
substances
reason or
accepts that
the
idea
dualism "con
suggests
observation"
to
to
(iv.576-7). He
that
principles:
of eternal
of
justice
and moral
wise
the regions of
while
the intellectual
is the
other
him
basely
into himself,
subjected
him to the
means of
em
pire of the senses and to the passions all that the sentiment of the
by
these
The
vicar experiences
the
conflict of
is torn
by
remorse
senti-
and guilt
for his
coarser
shame as a
"tyrannical
318
Interpretation
that
ment"
after
the
fall,
the vicar
is
ashamed
and
his fears
does
so with
the self-righteous
hating
the
wicked
(iv.596). The
vicar's
shame and
side
feelings
of
wicked re
together with an
intense
which
is the
source of
"these transports
. .
raptures of
love for
and
great souls
this enthusiasm
for
the
by
his
active
reason, the
the original
unity
of natural man.
By contrast, Emile who has never been given cause to choose between desire and duty because his desires have never been rampant, is described, as we have
seen,
by
has
as undeceiving and naive (iv.642). While subject to the alienation caused human temporality underlying also the vicar's self-division, he nonetheless retained much of the artifice
Much
of
self-identity and immediacy to nature of natural man. has been deployed to achieve this, but an artifice wholly unlike that
moderate sentiments not
the vicar's current animadversions. The vicar's violent vacillations of love and
are
hatred his
By confining
be trans
existence within
himself, he has
would
others nor to
ported
by
raptures
that
What "divine
virtue":
his
mind.
of restoration
to self-unity is a
essence"
"innate
principle of
justice
and
Conscience,
a
conscience!
being
that
is ignorant
and
and
free; infallible
bad
like
God
(iv.600- 1).
He
capacity for
and
contemplation and
links to it
a natural per
ception of
"order, beauty,
virtue."22
vicar's project
self-division
is to be he
by
a moral
freedom
which
in the
natural
sentiment of con
actions to na
science,
thereby reconciling
or
sees as
his freely-determined
ture, he
his
and so
the Emile
restoring the original unity of his being. Rousseau never appeals in in the Second Discourse to these faculties or this resolution nor does
sense of
mention
any inherent
order,
beauty,
or virtue.
Instead, Emile's
experimental
sense
of order
is
restricted
his
science,
sense of beauty is fabricated and nurtured by the judicious manipulation of his imagination, and his virtue develops in the regulation of his heart by ideals that the tutor instills. The vicar ascribes to the natural character of the soul, a metaphysical structure that
Rousseau both
emplaced
reveals to
be
false hypostatization
of
structurally
and
historically
behaviours,
and
ignores in his
own peda
gogical techniques.
22.
iv. 582.
Rousseau
The bad
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
-319
vicar claims
love
of
hatred
of
the
are as natural as
it is these
relative senti
men are
ments able
by
nature.
By dint
regime.
of moral
sentiment,
just
The
vicar expresses
the view
acts as a natural
law governing
men's affairs:
of the natural
law
to
it in the
justice
me and sees me to
Where the
seau on
his
admiration
for
man's natural
sociability, Rous
to
care taken
by
nature
bring
men
facilitate
and
bonds"
least
how little it
men
prepared their
sociability
how little it
(in.
151).
contributed to
every
thing
not
have done to
argument
establish social
Rousseau's
that
man's nature
is
a product of
history,
is
by
nature a
being endowed
undermines
riences, in
sense.
fact
law in the
strict
If
we
law to
mean
(a)
that man
is
by
nature a
rational
is inclined toward acting according to reason and hence acting and that the principles of natural law are universally valid and eter (b) virtuously nal because they accord with an unchanging human nature, then Rousseau's po
being
sition
renders
him incapable
of
consistently maintaining
asocial and
a natural and
is
by nature
nonrational,
by finding
to
he is
to
makes
no natural order
he
must adapt.
For Rousseau,
and
Book V
will.
appears
to suggest, morality
is
an artifice of
imagination, ideals
the
human
The is
consequence of
vicar's
a privileged position
in
nature
for understanding the difference between Rousseau and the vicar. For Rousseau, nature has assigned no ranks; man does not represent the apex of the
crucial natural world.
The vicar,
the
by
find
myself
by
my
species in-
contestably in
first
rank"
light
on
the
vicar's
tion,
of
and
his
need
for the
palliative of
passion.
himself makes
mention
that raising
of
questions of meta
physics
pear to
amour propre
Many
the
The
"Can I
see
distinguished
congratulating
myself on
filling
it", he
this honour
asks
blessing
the
hand
which placed me
in
himself
(iv.583). On
servitude:
this imperiousness
can
be found
an obsequious
320
Interpretation
I
am
Being of beings,
you
.
.
on you ceaselessly.
The
it is the
charm of
my
weakness
myself up to my source, to meditate my reason is for it to annihilate itself before to feel myself overwhelmed by your Greatness
(i v. 594).
status
Emile is to
as
envisage of
for himself.
the soul for
Pride, they
vanity,
and
servility
are seen
by
Rousseau
distortions
are
based
on corrupt comparisons.
Comparisons
with others
and resentment
propre,
which
especially is enflamed
being
superior.
by comparisons
It is
and this
of
passions."
amour propre
up"
carry
of a and
man above
his
sphere,"
"looking
upon others.
produces a slavishness
dependency
constraints
turbulent,
ability
or
deception,
within
ultimately
more unjust.
It is the lack
of
desire to
cull
from
frustrated
amour
propre's
link
with
imagination that
intention. It is precisely amour the very idea of a sphere that tran Emile's
education
scends
human life.
reason
It is for this
attempt
that a
significant portion of
has been
an
to arrest the
emergence of amour
propre, the
source of
these attempts to
care
aspire
condition.
fully
contrived situations so
imperious
passions
sown.
Efforts to
surpass
by
and
may Godlike
passions
never
be
vir
hope,
not
unruly
vanity.
The
that to to
and
become
resentful
if that
recognition
is
forthcoming
will
are not
however
natural
can prevent
the child
nor
not perceive a
domineering
insisting
followed
mands.
believe that
be beseeched to
to its de
may
hope
The
analysis
of the source of
the tyrannical
will reveals
is
faulty
perception of reality.
passions
thus
a symptom of
defective
education.
Emile is
one who
corrupted soul
lives in the
ers or another.
The
and
finds his
source of
happiness in "contemplation
is the
source
...
Supreme
the
Being
the
beauty of
for
soul"
contemplation of
the
eternal order
is, for
height
of perfection
human beings. For Rousseau, this transcendence simply betrays a demand for recognition of others. The vicar does indeed seek recognition from others, be
traying his
slavishness
Rousseau
order
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
321
fellows"
moreover,
is calculating and hypocritical: "If I do a good deed without a witness, I know that it is seen and I make a record for the other life of my conduct in this
(iv. 308).
virtue of
one"
humility
of
to that of
humanity,
and
the su
redirect a
domestic fidelity, in seeking to glory attention to the man's earthly things. Belief in a transcendent realm and who is the author of commands regarding human virtue, or attempts to
and
honor to that
Deity
In the
surpass
the
human
condition
in heroic feats,
"vain-glory."
produces
misery
and
Letter to
Beaumont, Rousseau
revealed
precisely that
may have disturbed, in ideas. A too longer
seen
the
sublime
imaginations,
the
common
are no
in their
ordinary
light23
The teaching Rousseau wishes to convey is that by focusing upon the divine, men have lost the capacity to achieve justice and happiness in this world. As
well, this heroic striving has corrupted the regularity of their souls. Men therefore restrict their
allegiance and energies must
imaginary
his
weak
him imprudent
true duties.
one precept to give you and
I have only
strain your
it
comprehends all
the others.
and
Be
a man.
Re
heart
within
the
limits
of your condition.
ever narrow
a man
when
is
he
not
unhappy
to
as
Study long as he
closes
them. He
when
estate
in
imaginary
from
which
are
The only
those one
no
believes
a man
has
a right to
...
man wants
he is
the
longer
The illusions
of pride are
the
contemplation of
human misery
makes
the
As
being
should
go and
form
ties
on
erything changes,
morrow?
where
everything
passes
away, and
from
which
shall
disappear to
(iv.820)
between the
vicar's and
This
disparity
the
Rousseau's
views underscores
too the
divergent
pedagogies
they
"he
employ.
The
vicar attempts
to
instill it
love
of virtue
by depicting by portraying
count of
beauty
noble
of virtue
in
such a
way
as to make
alluring.
He does
so
others:
in his heart
deeds"
by
the ac
per
others'
deeds
formed them, the priest gave For reasons we have already Emile because it
would
in making the boy admire him the desire to perform like his
those who
had
(iv.653).
be
appropriate
for
hu-
exacerbate
intentions
ordinary
T. Becket
and
P. -A. de Honot,
op. cit.
322
man
Interpretation
and
bounds
Imitation,
and
divine, is
pedagogy that
to
"imaginary
estates",
supreme
ture, and the need for patient had taken men outside of the
Rousseau's
part.
endurance
in hope
future
"natural"
choice of preceptors
concerns
he intends to im
the
Chiron
Emile's
concerns are at
tant
dis
In sum,
constituted.
vicar
may discern from the god to whom a man prays how a man is The vicar's regard is for a god who exercises divine judgment; the
and torn
is corrupt, rebellious,
as a prison and sees
after
between desire
and guilt.
The
vicar sees
the the
body
life
as a period of atonement:
"... I my
aspire to
moment
when,
being
shackles of
body,
in
shall
be
me without contradiction or
happy"
division
only
myself
order
to be
on
the
immortality of the
for justice
soul and
the belief
pains endured
and virtue:
the
body long
and
enough
for the
The
order"
maintenance of
(iv.590).
duty,
by
of
quire a
the
union of
his
body
and soul.
hopes
and sufferings
thus re
belief in
eternal salvation.
Do
beliefs
sound
like the
sort of
teaching Emile
re
quires?
Emile is completely free from the worries, calculations, and recrimina tions the vicar's beliefs are intended to ease. The vicar's "virtue", like Locke's
which we examined
earlier,
depends
on a
transcendent,
punitive
God ("without
faith
no
scending
regulatory
ambitions.
men
prudence.
life (iv.632). Emile's virtue, by contrast, is constituted by a selfIt is based on knowing how to judge and circumscribe his
eternal salvation are
of
Hopes for
for they
cause
living":
In the uncertainty of human life, let us avoid above all the false prudence of sacrificing the present for the future; this is often to sacrifice what is for what will not be (iv.781).
Despite the
place
in the
Compared to the
heavenly
bodies
is
at an outer periphery:
The
himself in
relation to makes
whole
mea-
in
24.
relation to
himself the
heroes, he partook of the dual nature of beast and man and it is this that Rousseau emphasizes, reasons for which I explored in "Rousseau and the Domestication of Canadian Journal of Political Science, xvn:4 (December 1984), pp. 731-53.
Virtue,"
While Chiron
the teacher of
Rousseau
sures
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
323
Then he is
circles,
ordered
his
radius and
keeps to the in
circumference.
in
relation
to the
common
center,
and
(iv. 292).
man
is the
measure of
the cosmos; he
reflects
its
order and at
har
By looking
the order
a micro
himself,
the order in
nature
because he is
cosm of
response
to the
man
claims.
however,
or
is the
based
on
his
own construc
All
intelligibility
of accounts
root
in human
The
of
difference
is
most
revealed
in Rousseau's description
man's relation
Let
stay in the
center
the
middle of
his web;
we shall always
be
have
to
complain of our
weakness,
for
we shall never
feel it (iv.305).
metaphor
Rousseau's
metaphor
the dominant
has
being
ingly
satiric contrast of
described
philosophy
as a
flight
and who
garden
and
least
injury
to their
beauty,
taste."25
The
bee is
con
trasted to the
own world
modern
house-building
itself
feels that it
can produce
its
from
within
and perceives
itself
as self-sufficient.
Whatever the ambiguity of Rousseau's agreement with Swift's critique of the moderns, he nonetheless adopts this modern perspective. Rousseau rejects the
vicar's teleological conception of the universe, and
and
the
account of power
classical project.
have
mistaken a particular
historical
configuration
herself,
tion.
Rousseau's
acceptance
of mechanism
historicization
of consciousness requires
leaving
ancient
faith is, therefore, the most conservative part of Rouseau's work and should be taken as distinct from the radical teaching he propounds as the endur basis of his philosophy. However, we must now account for the reason Rous
fession
of
ing
seau might
Emile,
25.
an explanation
within
Book IV
of the
Books,"
Jonathan Swift, "The Battle Between the Ancient Satires (London: Dent, 1975),
objection could
and
Modern
and other
p. 151-
26.
An
be
made
to this reading
by
pointing
out that
in his dual
own name
embraces
some of
the vicar's
doctrines, particularly
of conscience and of
substances.
However,
324
Interpretation
If the
seau's
profession of
faith is
the theoretical
the
core of
Rous
teaching,
the
what purpose
does it
serve?
offer
following
possibilities.
First,
pil, but
gineer a
education which
is
offered
cal proposal
because
of
privileged attention
also
its
efficacy.
To
en
human
is
wager,
not
because Rousseau
of
appears
intimations
of
deprival
natural,
experiential
from
of the essential
trajectories
traversing
the
human
so
the
threatening the univocal script with which it has been outfitted. Like Styx-dipped Achilles, Emile's pedagogy is not invulnerable. After all, the se
reality,
quel to the
Emile is
tragic aftermath,
where
Rousseau
reveals that
the couple's
daughter dies in infancy, that they move to Paris, where following Sophie's se duction and impregnation by another man, Emile abandons her for a misan
thropic existence as a solitary. One might hypothesize that the juristic constitu tion of sovereign association
cases the civil profession of
as
vulnerable,
and
in both
en
serves as a palliative of
to the degeneration
of the
whose
unity
Profession,
self-unity is uncontaminated, might be the only the technical penetration has failed or been overwhelmed by other
to the second suggestion. In a corrupt, bourgeois
forces.
This leads
me
vicar's profession of
faith
can
inspire
virtue
by
portraying
a simulacrum of vir
men
tue,
vice.
dazzling
and
in its
charm and
beauty
alluring "natural
religion,"
manding
less inclined to
promote
hypocrisy
In this way,
teaching, one that is intended as a tract for the times. Indeed, Rousseau intimates that the profession has primarily a po litical task. At the beginning of the profession he announces that he is about to
speak to
citizen."
The
in the
general
Emile Rousseau
addresses
his
work to
those educators
heart."
who seek an
universal
to the human
This
since
declarations
views.
seem to
have the
role of
softening
work
be too
severe a
disjunction in
Although
sufficient evidence
for example,
by contrasting
will adduce or
der,
of
God,
only one argument. After the profession where one might expect that love of or of the inherent virtue and justice might regulate Emile's heart, Rousseau resumes his
a
hold
on the possessions
only
by
It is
by
their em
tyranny
must
to regulate nature
always
from
nature
proper
instru
Rousseau
address
versus
the
Savoyard Vicar
the
325
to mankind is in
where
contrast to
ical works,
he
speaks as a citizen of
Geneva to
other citizens.
In those
works where
he
speaks as a
didactic,
seeking to impart salutary truths and concerning himself with civic virtue and justice. In the Emile, generally, no such political fervor is expressed. Only in the introduction to the
otic or partisan
profession of
express
any
similar patri
sentiment,
Rousseau's
his
sole concern
"useful to
mankind":
and proceed
The truth
of revelation
is
subordinated
presenting As well, in Book XI of the Confessions, Rousseau in fact indicates that his
of
certain views to
his
contemporaries.
hearts
in writing had been to display the beauty of virtue so that he might move the of the Parisians. Although he believed that they were corrupt and had
to know virtue and morality,
could entrance with
they had
"delicate
sensitivity"
that Rous
felt he
his
accounts.
Rousseau
never
profession of effect
An
explicit statement
to the
only
provided
undermined
its intended
views un
effect.
Hence, his
and
is beautiful
as
he
presents
his
ambiguously
nected with
his
solutions reserve. of
unproblematic.
Only implicitly
not
does Rous
less
There is
a reason
for Rousseau's
the
difficulty
believe it
ble in his
man who
age
simply to
praise
temperance and exhort men to moderation. To the restraints, whose action is governed
has
by
the
the principle of
teaching
reveals
degree
of
suffering
as the
to be endured are
a
emphasized more
be
happily
enjoyed.
There is
im complexity to the relationship between happiness and virtue not of admin efficient means most calculates the mediately apparent to the man who to his desires, who has been exposed to modern materialism and the
istering
natural-right
teaching
Rousseau's
concerns
comical.
the
simulacrum of
virtue, that
teach alluring image for men already corrupted by ings. They are charmed by his text and are sent away with a surface view better which by dint of persuasion might than their old prejudices. In "corrupted
can serve as an
the
modern
hearts"
again
become disposed to
love
be
is
not
precisely
"the
sacrifices made
hearts."
to
duty
and
virtue always
not
have
for
corrupted
be
27.
sufficient
for the
more comprehensive
op. cit.
theory
of
T. Becket
and
P. A. de Honot,
supra, p. 37.
326
alted
Interpretation
plays a crucial pedagogical role.
win agreement neither of
virtue"
Beautiful images
charm even as
to the
these
suggestions
question of
why the
strat
of
Faith is
where
another
interpretive
his
egy
must
be
that in
looking
at the connection
between
political
Rousseau's
teaching
crucial
agenda plains
jects.28
a provocative
possibility
believe
and ex
Political
Economy
of
establishes an
on the political
technology
desire
as moral sub
As the Discourse
reason and power
and
simply
morality;
they
subjects,
by by the way
guided
What
of
makes
Rousseau
and
interesting
is his
problem:
how to
constitute an
economy
ar
desire,
power,
truth. That
desire,
power,
and
knowledge
of problematization
ticle
already early in his writings emerges, for example, in his for Diderot's Encyclopedic which offers us his agenda:
good
If it is
men as
they
are,
it is better
be. The
most absolute on
is
exerted no
less
his
will
authority is that which penetrates to the inner man than on his actions. It is certain that people are in the Train men, therefore, if
you want
long
run what
to
command men.
very
specific
which
historical
and political
reality
and
economy
of
bodies,
Foucault has
"governmentality."
This
art
has
as
"population"
as a unique
field
of
means
proper
well as
formations
knowledge
to governing
in their
multiple relations
in the
lation, territory,
him to be
and wealth
state,
man,"
the
desiring
acts, enabling
Thus, in
Economy,
the en
wealth and
Rousseau behaviour
involving
is to
exercise a
that
is,
toward the
of each
form
surveillance,
or
dressage
involving
and
hygiene,
Such
wealth,
fertility, birthrates,
dream
eighteenth
safety
of urban and
domestic
spaces.
fectly
transparent
so to
century
invented,
28.
speak,
its
exercise within
am
here pursuing
and
and
enlarging
by
mentality,"
Ideology
uality,
op. cit. supra.
Consciousness,
vi
(Autumn 1979),
pp.
5-21,
his histories
on sex
Rousseau
the social
ercises
versus the
Savoyard Vicar
from
it."
body,
above
juridicial
distillation
of power
into
a single will
the art of
government
deploys
a power
that circulates in a
dispersed
or
network of appara
focus. Individuals
simulta
neously
they
its
point
of application.
pectations
Moreover,
the individual
is the
his desires, knowledges, and ex Rousseau is precisely novel in this regard bodies
as effects of
because he
power, that
at
examines
how the
is, how they are constituted in the deployment of power, especially the level of desire. Here power is polyvalent; power has a productive character
it
produces
since
population management.
within the many governmental discourses of Commentators have hinted at this political technology
its accompanying exercise of power by referring to the refashioning con ducted by the soulcraft of the legislator and by suggesting that the reproduction
and
of the structure of
of power and
desire is
a technical ques
government
constitution of
their
constitution as quanta of
"Man"
labour
power or
biopower in
a popula
tion,
suggests
is
being made to
freedom
to
a appeal
be free. Commentators
that allow this
acknowledge
conditions of
"making"
"denaturing"
or
they
juridicial
conception of
power,
exercised
by
a superior wisdom.
I have
suggested
is
more refined:
diffuse;
the Dis
there are no
of social
power, only
forces. Indeed,
Political
moral
the Social
Contract,
course on
Economy
Emile,
to a discus
sion of
this
identify
free
and
dom
constituted
to be
is
at
one,
politics of
and
litical
Italian
"the
of
the Stoic
in the cosmopolis,
in feudal Europe,
the
condottieri
in the
city-republic
because the
measure
is drawn from
a new scientific
object,
population."
Let
me elaborate
this further:
inextricable from
subject
the dynamics of a
produce a
confessional
discursive
regime.
That
is,
the
is incited to
discourse
of truth about
and
images,
dreams,
decipher them
that
stirrings of
desire
which animate
is
construed as
is hidden. It
must
be
extracted, and
the subject,
know his
own truth.
renders
verbalization of
which the
moral subject
is
engaged
to achieve self-mastery,
in
which power/
knowledge
desire, instrumentalizing it
and
extending
con-
328
trol
over
Interpretation
the
is
actualized and an
in
society devoted to
of
a new polit
ical
optics
economy
orderly,
contented
bod
ies. It is
not a
morality
but
desire instru
eco
as a pervasive
mentation.
visibility in
we
economy
out
of
excitation, proliferation,
Sex, for
prohibitive
example,
find
in the Emile
now
becomes
as
political,
flesh"
(the Church teaching or the sovereign's power of new form as "sexuality": sex has become a locus
of
of the sovereign's
upon a positive
denial
of access
hereafter, but
Constituted
investment in
can
practices which
direct life
processes.
as a
body,
and
the individual
be
represented as a
"machine",
as a quantum of
"biopower"
rected,
with
possessing capabilities which must be optimized; flaws must be cor forces must be administered at the capillary level in this "metabolism Emile's
education
nature."
is
not a
pedagogy
of
of
precept,
of
knowledge
as
juridical
authority.
Instead,
lance,
occurs
incitement
what
is
not
the
repression of power.
through
disciplinary
incitement. The teaching of moral, juridical force, ruse, habit, and duties are deprecated rights, continually by Rousseau as ineffective and inap propriate for producing the new "natural who is to be integrated into soci
suppression and
man"
The
same mechanic
in the
constitution of
this
unique
where
Julie claims,
If
a mother
plete control.
is in the least watchful, she has the passions of her children under her com She has means of arousing and sustaining the desire to learn or any other far
as
desire;
do
and, so
they
freedom
not sow
and
to the
interiorization
makes possible.
in
by
en
sentiment"
obliges
Emile "to
keep
himself before
listening
to his nascent
desires."
At this
point where
immediately consummate his desire for Sophie, his temporary self-division is monitored by the policing of an inter nalized gaze. The procedure finally culminates in again shifting the surveillance,
in
fixing
desire to
a particular object:
the
imaginary
woman, who
will
eventually
solu
resorted to the
disciplinary
intensified
surveillance
serves,
and exercises
from without, a woman who governs, judges, ob the powers of desire over him. What this implicitly shows
"inner
sentiment"
effective
as
the
final,
conclusive moral
regu-
Rousseau
lator
and
versus
329
relation,
guaranteed
the
dependence
desire.
tutelary
by
a prudent
management of
served as a
Power dispersed
and
diffused to the
capillaries of this
society will ensure an efficient circulation of moral effects. The Profession is but a tool drawn from Rousseau's kit to this end, tactically contrived within a moral
project of
constituting disciplined
"biopower"
subjects.
Submerged
not
within
identifiable
to
by
their
the quanta of
they
contribute
Mankind,
as a
Emiles
and
tion, the
healthy
To conclude, I have
read as con
taining Rousseau's
trix and thus
philosophic principles.
The
vicar's system
is
open
to insur
mountable objections on
political ma
ineffective in regulating the social effects individualism fostered by materialism. The traditional restraints of
rendered can
is
dent morality
selfish
only be
the
seen as
arbitrary
or quaint
from the
point of view of
the
materialist
teaching
on
human
designs
now
have
philosophic sanction.
Rousseau had
consequences of
this new
teaching
simply
on social
revert
life
were calamitous.
However, he
presented
could not
refutable system of
morality may
upon men.
Although
such
depictions
and
of virtue as
by
the
vicar
hearts
dispose them to
possible to
findings
exempts
has
him from
mechanical necessity.
Man is
nature
lated
phenomena of nature.
It is from his
that the
nature must
of
elsewhere
in the
knowledge his
who
It
was of
Nietzsche,
"Man"
of
course,
and not
Rousseau
death
God,
But Rousseau
to
also seemed
"Man"
had become
problematic and
have
ventured on
the
path
implying
that
"Man"
is technically
constituted
through various modes of power, and that mo the public responsibility and caution
and political and willful
rality is but an armature of that power. It is Rousseau adapts in constituting the moral distinguishes him from many
of
subject,
however,
that
his inspired
followers.
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In Number
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I of
Hamilton,
"Publius,"
decide the
great question
of
really
capable or not of
and
choice,
or whether
they
are
good government
from
reflection
political con
stitutions
on accident or
force."1
America, according
to
was
having
its
political sys
it
by
by
hu
in
accordance with
reason,
a reason
lies in
The American
rather
principle
princip-
than accident.
The English
of
word
comes
cxgxr).
ium,
which
the Greek
governs the
or action of a
thing; it is
also
An
the development of a
thing is
thing
does
This
will
become
what a
beginning
will
the end,
by
determining what
not
become
become. An become
acorn
does
not
an oak.
The
as
principles
well.2
informing
the American
founding
would shape
the nation's
destiny
There
gime
the principles
the
upon which
the American re
is
supposed
to be
founded, but
best known
expression of
those
princi
ples understood as
both the
beginning According
the
and end of
is to
protect
individuals to
life,
liberty,
of
and
of course was
the author
the
Declaration,
it is his
name
to know Jefferson's
principles and
their
impor
States,
the
same cannot
be
said of
Alexan
polit
respect to
[Hamilton's]
ical
principles and
designs,
entertained."3
i. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 3.
ed.
Jacob E. Cooke
2.
Jeffery Wallin,
1980,
p. 3.
"Locke
and
the American
Founding,"
paper and
delivered
at
Meeting,
History
(Chicago:
University
Chicago
Press,
3.
1950),
pp.
122-27. p. 202.
John Marshall, The Life of George Washington (New York, 1925), Vol. V,
332
The
Interpretation
reputation of
subject
to wide vicissitudes of
opinion.
Talleyrand is
as
consider
Napoleon, Pitt,
choose
and
Hamilton
the three
age,
and
if I had to
three, I
would without
hesitation
give
Hamilton."4
According to
Guizot, "Hamilton
vital principles and
.
must
be
classed
fundamental
conditions of a government
there
is
order,
which
[Hamilton] did
ambitious
powerfully
restricted
to place
Nor
was
this
high
regard
for Hamilton
I
"That he is
shall
that laudable
kind,
which
prompts a man
name of
to
excel
in
whatever
hand."6
Hamilton
would not
Of course, contemporary approbation of Hamilton was by no means univer His erstwhile Federalist ally, John Adams, called him "the bastard brat of a The ambition for which Washington had praised Hamilton was Scots
sal.
peddler."
"[Hamilton]
was
in
delirium
of ambition:
he
had been blown up with vanity by the Tories, had fixed his eye on the highest sta tion in America, and he hated every man young or old who stood in his Your "ambition, pride and overbearing wrote Noah Webster, "have des
temper"
way."8
country."9
But it
was
Hamilton's
his
political
enemy,
who
branded him
as
the conservative
or,
indeed, reactionary
most
opponent of
Thomas Jefferson
a
firmly
fixed Hamilton's
by branding
him "not
and
monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed on only his allies characterized Hamilton as a proto-Caesar,
plan as an attempt to establish
America.11
corruption."10
Jefferson
and attacked
his financial
and corruption
in
To the
charge of added
being
opposed
to the principles
of
the revolution,
with
modern
historians have
himself,
"conservative"
Hamilton
"radical."
early
revolution
In
fact, Hamilton's
principles were
Hamilton was, moreover, perfectly consistent with the early Hamilton in the principles by which he took his bearings. The great debate
4.
be-
and Journals of George Ticknor (Boston, 1876), Vol. I, p. 261. Quoted in Melvin G. Dodge, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Putnam, 1896), pp. 7-8, 48. 6. To John Adams, September 25, 1798. The Writings of George Washington, John C. Fitzpat-
Life, Letters,
5.
rick, ed.
7.
pp. 460-61.
Quoted in William Coleman, ed., A Collection of the Facts and Documents Relative Death of Major General Alexander Hamilton (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1904), p. 249.
9.
to the
8. Quoted in Page Smith, John Adams (New York, 1962), Vol. II, Smith, John Adams, Vol. II, p. 1045.
p. 1085.
10. Jefferson, The Anas, in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds. The Life ings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library, 1944), p. 126. 11. Cf. e.g., National Gazette: "Brutus No. March 15 and subsequent Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Norton, 1979), p. 241.
,
I,"
and
numbers.
Alexander Hamilton
tween
on
Natural Rights
and
Prudence
333
and Jefferson, and the apparent conflict between the early and had late Hamilton, largely to do with means rather than ends. This is not to say that these differences were not considerable, even funda
mental
Hamilton
from
To "establish
government"
good
it is
not
sufficient
difference in the
world.
Hamilton's
vision of
Manufactures is perfectly consis doctrine found in his Full Vindication of the Measures
on
of Congress
(1774)
and
the
The Farmer Refuted (1775). His understanding of the same in 1800 as in 1776. But what he perceived as
Specifically, Americans
were no
had changed, as circumstances had changed. longer fighting a revolutionary war. They were
instead establishing institutions of government and learning to live together un der them. The public measures (and the public disposition) required for founding
were
required
revolution and
found
ing
served
As
a statesman
instrumental in the
founding
of
ton faced a major obstacle. The American people were a revolutionary people,
passionately attached to liberty. This passionate attachment to liberty led them to the belief that their will should rule in all things. Even established law was an
unacceptable constraint.
Hamilton
in the
people would
lead to anarchy and hence to tyranny, both destructive of true liberty. A major aspect of Hamilton's statesmanship consisted of attaching the American people
to the law and Constitution
of
by
making them law-abiding. Hamilton believed that liberty meant the citizens ought to be free to follow their natural inclinations, but that it was necessary for
there to be
what some
is
right
relationship between what the people are inclined to do and for them to do. Hamilton sought to teach moderation and justice to a
people through attachment to good
revolutionary
them to
respect
tures
of
international law.
great challenge was
In short, Hamilton's
into
cure
for
liberty in
order to se
to them the
blessings
at
of
liberty,
a
spirit of
fervor, Hamilton
showed
his
in
The
for
opposition to
of all
tyranny
.
and
disregard
authority into
When the
minds of
from
their
attachment
to ancient establishments
and courses,
they
seem
giddy
to turn
anarchy.12
[Emphasis added]
12.
ette and
To John
Jay
Jacob E. Cooke,
(November 26, 1775), The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syr 26 Volumes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-79), 1. 176-77;
Papers hereafter.
334 He
Interpretation
to this
central
returned
Ratifying Convention in
jealousy
1788.
In the
commencement of a revolution
nothing
lic
mind should
be influenced
by
an extreme spirit of
and to nourish
this
spirit, was the great object of all our public and private
came predominant and excessive. seemed
liberty be
In
forming
our
to
actuate
us,
and we appear
object
to have had
certainly
But, Sir,
there
is
another ob
little
capable of regard
of our
government,
in its
operation."
It
was
in attempting to
moderate
Thomas Jefferson
nent of great
and won
from posterity the reputation as a reactionary oppo of his earlier (radical, and therefore better) self. In this
choice of means
the statesman
prudence, the
to unchanging ends,
given
by
na
to deliberation.
Hamilton
importance to
principles and to
consistency in
holding
In disquisitions
are certain
depend
primary truths, or first principles, upon Though it can not be pretended that
certainty
with
knowledge have, in general, the same degree of yet they have much better claims in this re
men."1
conduct of
And in commenting on Jefferson's first although "a wise and good may,
man"
opinions,
must
such
changes, especially in
matters of great
be
rare.
The contrary is
and or
designing
lays down
an article of
faith, just
not
as
may
suit a present
convenience.15
The statesmen,
as
of
course, is
as
necessarily
a philosopher.
simply
a man of
action,
merely
to miss the important point that political decision and advocacy, while certainly
not
identical
with political
theory,
nonetheless
may be
grounded
in thoughtfully
articulated principles.
Our first
13.
problem
is to discover
what
Hamilton's
at the New York Ratifying Convention (24 June, 1788). Papers, v. 68. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison. John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Jacob Cooke town, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), pp. 193-95. 15. The Examination, Number XVI. Papers, xxv.564. Cf. Second Letter from 14.
Remarks
(Middle-
Phocion, Papers,
m.542-43-
Alexander Hamilton
though there
treatise.16
on
Natural Rights
and
Prudence
335
is
evidence
His
principles must
he intended to do so, Hamilton never wrote a political be gleaned from his pamphlets, reports, and let run to 26 thick volumes. There are however two pam collected,
Hamilton devotes to the dictates that
we
in
particular which
ples,
beginning
a
is is
Hamilton's
as
well,
since
writings.
In them is
full
discussion
good
of
human nature,
an articulation of what
for
man as man.
A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress, written in December 1774, and The Farmer Refuted, which followed in March 1775, provide the clearest
statement
of
Hamilton's
political
principles.17
In
view of
Hamilton's
voices
alleged a thor
"conservatism,"
truly
of
shocking.
He
here
radicalism.
basing
law. From
nat
rights, he derives
a radical
revolution.
was a response
to
an attack on
Congress
by
rector of
Westches
Seabury,
Farmer"
under
measures enacted
by
the
Congress in
to the so-called
or
Acts
passed
by
Parliament in
1774.
Hamilton, invoking
the law
of
nature, the genius of the British constitution, and the Colonial charters as justifi
cation
for the security of the individual in his life and property, set out to show that "the inhabitants of Great Britain [had no] right to dispose of the lives and
the inhabitants of America
"18
. .
properties of
lic
Seabury, in his reply, requested that Hamilton "explicitly [declare] to the pub Hamilton obliged him in The [his] idea of the natural rights of
which
mankind."
Farmer Refuted, to
of
he
added a
justification
colonists'
of the
cause
in terms
the British
constitution and
the
colonial charters.
Hamilton's two
of
pamphlets
provide one
of
the most
comprehensive
defenses
American
liberty
to
be
found,
cal
one
that is at least
author of
written
by
his future
politi
enemy, the
Seabury 's
onies
16.
position was
right
because, by definition,
"Mr. Hopkins
related relates: when
colony is
subordinate
consent
to the
to
Thus,
republication
alist], that he
meat;'
to
him,
'Heretofore I have
purpose
governm
words
indicating
his formed
to
write a
John C. Hamilton,
a
York,
1864), Vol.
I.,
pp.
xcii,
full in
the
history
it
upon
[He desired] to have the subject treated in reference to past Bacon's inductive philosophy, and to engage the assis of Lord experience and upon the principles William Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent (Boston: Little, tance of others in the
freedom
and
happiness
of mankind
enterprise."
Brown,
17.
1898),
pp. 327-28.
1.45-78.
The Farmer Re
Papers,
1.46.
336
there
Interpretation
be
no
could
lawful
resistance
Parliament. For
Hamilton,
there should be a
was rather
by the "petty
taxes
duty
they
of
East India
The dispute
"whether
the Parliament
Great Britain
or not
. .
laws,
and
impose
what
please upon
us,
It is true,
we are
upon
tea, but it is
without
not
for the
value of
the
thing
itself. It is because
upon which
ever.'9
to
that,
it is founded,
that principle
is
a right to tax us
principle.
There is
no unlimited power
is
a contradiction of
the law of
colonial
charters.20
says
Hamilton, is
one of
ignorance. He does
these rights is the
requires
of
fundamental
his
errors and
that
spell out a
doctrine
of political
obligation,
beginning
with
the law
of nature.
Good
and wise
we stand
in,
to himself and to
immutable institution
law,
which
mankind,
prior
to any human
whatever.21
Quoting Blackstone,
This is
tated
what
he
continues:
is
called the
law
of
of nature, 'which
being
dic
by
God himself,
the globe,
is,
It is
binding
over all
in
all
countries,
of
times.
No human laws
all their
are of
any validity,
or
derive
authority, mediately,
original.'22
The
law
as
it
applies
to man is
of
"twofold."
Hamilton's strong
formulation
the law of
nature: a
It is
.a
dictate
of
humanity
happiness
of our
fellow
and
especially those who are allied to us by the lines of blood, interest, mutual protection; but humanity does not require us to sacrifice our own security welfare to the convenience, or advantage of others. Self-preservation is the first
When
our
lives
it
would
be foolish
from
be detrimental to
1. 67.
1.43.
others.23
Papers,
Papers,
Papers, 1.87. 22. Papers, 1.87; Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1979 [First published, London, 1765-69], Vol. I, p. 41. 23. Papers, 1. 51.
of
Alexander Hamilton
The strong
command
on
Natural Rights
law
of nature
and
Prudence
337
The
weak
command of the
or at
is: "preserve
The
yourself."
is "help,
least,
do
not
harm,
others."
end of
mand
is to
preserve one's
life. The
means
individual, but
The "natural
by
the
mankind"
depend
and
the natural
law,
and
include the
liberty"
"personal
safety,"
to
freedom,
These
or
"which is the
same
life in
and
prop
natu
erty."24
with
rights to life, liberty, and property are the dictates of the law of nature. The relationship between
natural and self-preservation can
accordance
natural
law,
ral
rights,
be
understood
because the
supreme
being
"endowed
sue such able
[man]
with rational
faculties, by
the
things, as were consistent with his him to understand and employ "the means
reason
and which en
preserving
and
beatifying [his]
speak
existence."25
It is
est
principles."
"They
the plain
language to every man of common sense; and must carry conviction where the mental eye is not bedimmed, by the mist of prejudice, partiality, ambition, or
avarice."26
Reason
and
is
no civil
society, but
the sanctions against those who violate the law of nature are very weak
sence of civil society. no man
in the
ab
had any
nor
moral power
say is that "in a state of nature, to deprive another of his life, limbs, property or
can
him."
liberty;
Hamilton's
a problem
man
if,
that
is, every
he
must also
have the
right
In the
state of
nature, the
ily
his
comes
into
another,
and since
every
man
is the judge
of
own
cause, this
war.27
state of
The natural, inviolable rights which Hamilton in the state of nature, "since a right implies a law
of nature will always
proclaims are
The
weaker
dictate
of
the
be
"moral"
overwhelmed
by
to
power one
has in the
state of nature
turns
out
be
Because the
for
lead to
flict,
This
24. 25. 26.
thwarts the
intention
law. force
be
corrected
1.66. 1.87-88. 1.97.
by placing
27.
1952).
ed.
1.88. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Nelle Fuller (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 23 of The Great Books. Chapter XIII, pp. 84-86. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (New York: New American Library, i960), Second Treatise, Chapter III; Sections
Papers,
45.48-5I.
338
Interpretation
law
which says
do
not
harm
others.
In
other
law
its
minimal
purpose,
i.e.,
A
to secure self-preservation,
real sanction must
men must
be
prevented
from
harming
each other.
be
pro
does
correc
The
purpose of civil
society is to
protect
ordained
by
the law of nature, are not secure in the state of nature. "Civil
sanctions
liberty
is only natural liberty, modified and secured by the Again quoting Blackstone, Hamilton says:
The
principle aim of
society."
of civil
rights,
not
nature; but
which could
be preserved, in peace,
that
gained
by
social communities.
first
and
primary
human laws is to
individuals.28
For
sent of
civil
society to be just, it
must
be
on the con
the
governed.
No
reason can
be
assigned
why
over
his fellow
it.29
creatures more
with
the
government,
justly established
be liable to
the
of
must
be
voluntary compact,
as are neces
between the
rulers and
of
the ruled;
and must
such
limitations,
consent?30
latter; for
what original
title can
any
have,
purpose and
foundation
of civil government
from
first
principles or the
law
of nature.
Governments that
quotes
of
violate
these principles
are of
are
illegitimate. As Hamilton
nature];
them as are
any validity if contrary to [the law from this valid, derive all their authority
. . .
original."
To usurp dominion
power than
over a
people,
in their
own
despite,
or to
grasp
of
at a more extensive
which gives
they
are
every
man a right
willing to entrust, is to violate that law to his personal liberty; and can therefore,
added)31
nature,
confer no obligation to
obedience.
(Emphasis
not
Hamilton does
hesitate to
mate governments.
28.
1.
104,
88; Blackstone,
1. 120.
The
editors of the
Papers mistakenly
30.
31.
1.88. 1.88.
Alexander Hamilton
The
nations of an
on
Natural Rights
and
Prudence
339
world, have
inherent right, whenever they please to shake off the yoke of servitude (though sanctified by the immemorial usage of their ancestors;) and to model their gov
upon
ernment,
liberty.
are
When the first principles of civil society are violated, and the rights of a whole people invaded, the common forms of municipal law are not to be regarded. Men may then betake themselves to the law of nature; and if they but conform their actions, to
that standard, all cavils against
some events
them,
betray
either
ignorance
or
dishonesty. There
when applied
are
in society, to force
which
cannot
extend; but
to them
lose
all their
and efficacy.
which are
when
human laws
contradict or
discounte
nance
the means,
necessary to
any society,
laws,
and so
become
null and
void.32
similar
Hamilton clearly advocates a natural rights position expressed in language to that of Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. Hamilton's prin
ciples understood as
beginnings
are rooted
in human
free
His
principles
or
human
expansion of
liberty.
what
Guided
practice
by
he took to be the
natural ends of
men, Hamilton
varied
his
and place.
What
was
best simply,
Thus
might not
while
be best
under
the
circumstances.
This is the
essence of prudence.
in
private
Hamilton
criticized
the
various state
constitutions, in public he
attempted
tutions;
asserted
while
document,"
worthless
by
to
see
it ratified;
and while
he
that Jay's
as
Treaty
had been
woman,
negotiated
by
"an old
he publicly
defended it ditions
of
the best
means of affairs.
preserving the
regime under
international
Hamilton's fullest
account of prudence
ing
icy,
System
written after
his
resignation as
is found in The Defence of the Fund Secretary of the Treasury. But even in
of
his first
pamphlets there
is
brief discussion A
good
principles,
and prudence.
policy
require
First,
the necessity
of
the times
[must]
it, secondly
to
it
it
pretends
remedy: and
the
.
it
[must]
have
success.33
probability
of
wrote
that
his
duty
as
Secretary
of
the
Treasury,
and
by
implication the
.
duty
of
unite
probability of could not in good conscience, he wrote, "have submitted the best financial simply because it was too remote from the prevailing opinions
. .
ingredients
intrinsic
goodness
[and]
a reasonable
He
plan
"
32.
Papers, Papers,
1.
added).
33.
1. 52.
340
Interpretation
unaccomodated to In pursuing too far the idea of absolute perfection in the plan circumstances. The chance of an absolutely bad issue was infinitely enhanced, and the
evils connected with
it.
collapse of
Such
evils
included the
credit, the
subversion of union
(and hence
effective
of
property."34
Hamilton's
simple expediency.
Although
we should act
dence,
we must
keep
to
be
carried so
with
far
as to sacrifice to
ciple.
was
This is
never
justifiable. But
the
restriction of not
it
effecting the greatest possible good? To me this appeared the 3S and I acted under the influence of that impression.
policy
and
duty
But it
appeal
was also a
dictate
of
Hamilton's
of
prudence
to
recognize
is destructive
ervation of
principles.
This, it
seems
is the
source of
the
real
debate be
first principles, Hamilton believed that positive law that appeal. Revolutionary fervor is inappropriate to
society,
even one
must of
necessity
replace
living
in
a stable political
individual rights. Prudence teaches that ultimately individual rights can only be preserved when there exists in the regime a strong sense of law-abidingness.
that protects
Thus,
attempt
as suggested
before,
much of
Hamilton's
a regime of
liberty fully
make a
established
in America,
who
necessary to
their wills
revolutionary people,
see the on
directed,
necessity
of
infant
nation
whose survival
depended
powers,
a revo
other
shown
tional law.
to make an
an
government, to
order
might
be protected,
and
be
preserved.
In
order to understand
regime of
principles, it is helpful to
revolu
brilliantly
demon
was
strated, the
the
source of
both Hamilton's
"radicalism"
and
his
"conservatism"
"eminently
"Defense
respectable"
Blackstone.36
made of
Blackstone's
of the
Funding
System,"
Papers,
xix. 3-6.
Papers,
xix. 7.
and the
Calif.: Stanford
University Press,
1970),
pp. 9-37.
Alexander Hamilton
conservative
on
Natural Rights
and
Prudence
341
influence
to
on
the
Revolution. But he
also provided a
justification
for "the
olution.
resort
first
principles"
The jurist
of all
Jefferson
and of
accused
(along
with
Hume)
. . .
of
having
sophist
"made Tories
whose native
England,"
doing
feelings
of
independence do
not place
wily
ries
those
extraordinary
first principles,
which are
necessary
when
the con
tracts of
against
society
are
in danger
of
dissolution,
and the
law
proves
the violence of
fraud
or
oppression.38
writes that:
South Carolinian
no
spoke of
those
latent,
such
which no
...
climate,
mind
time,
no
destroy
or
diminish
To
Constitution
ideas
were
poisonous,
and pointed
plainly
to
anarchy.39
But the
precisely
British
constitution.
Indeed, it is found by
even of
threaten
desolation to
state, mankind
be
reasoned out of
their
feelings
of
humanity;
laws
are
liberty by
will
originally
es
tablished to preserve
positive
silent, experience
. . .
furnish
us with a of
[Abdication
very remarkable case, wherein nature and reason prevailed James II]. In these, therefore, or other circumstances, which a fertile
imagination may furnish, since both law and history are silent, it becomes us to be si lent too; leaving to future generations, whenever necessity and the safety of the whole
shall require no
37.
it,
the
exertion of
climate,
no
time,
which
diminish.40
To Horatio G. Spafford (March 17, 1814) in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (Washington, 1903), Vol. 6, p. 335.
38. 39.
ed.
A. A.
Blackstone,
1.243.
the
pp. 236-37.
Cited in Stourzh,
40.
Blackstone,
1.238.
Stourzh
maintains
impact
on
Hamilton,
espe
cially in terms of his understanding of natural law. Stourzh. pp. 9-36. McDonald minimizes the influence of Blackstone on Hamilton, suggesting that "he may have merely skimmed through [the
Commentaries] during
refer
the six
or eight weeks
to them in his
earlier pamphlet.
since he did between his writing of the two McDonald, p. 51 McDonald also claims that Hamilton did
.
tracts,"
not
not
of natural
came
Donald,
p. 57.
Concerning
p.
writes
Vattel."
unflawed
but generally
excellent
Hamilton."
McDonald,
378,
Stourzh's work will recognize was transmitted in the British tra Blackstone demonstrates the unique way in which the "natural dition. For instance, it is interesting to note at this point that Hamilton's use of Blackstone may point
law'
I follow Stourzh in this debate. Indeed, anyone familiar with how much my discussion here depends upon his view. I believe that
note 17.
the way to reconciling two apparently irreconcilable views of the Revolution: the
"legalistic"
"conservative"
or
view
Boorstin,
principles.
"ideological"
and the
view of
first
Taking
issue
with
Carl Becker's
342
Interpretation
For Blackstone (and Hamilton writing in 1775) the English law and the British constitution were coeval with the natural law. Thus the first Resolve of the Mas
sachusetts
House
of
Representatives
proclaimed
"that there
which are
rights
of
of
Government,
Rights
of
Mankind,"
God
and
Nature,
. .
and are
the
common
the Massachu
unalterable own
setts
Circular Letter
.
of 1768 expressed
"essential,
is absolutely his What a man honestly law."" into the British Constitution, as a fundamental
has
Revolution, Boorstin
the
common writes:
law in the
"According
to
arguments on a
finding
it
convenient
debate first
the
framework
of
the
of
imperial
constitution and
abstraction
until,
by
mid-1776,
a
law; but they gradually and inevitably climbed the ladder were thinking and talking in the arid heights of natural law they
of
kind
intellectual mobility
suit
near
disingenuousness
granted
.
which enable
grounds
to
their needs.
It takes for
ter
his
plea PP-
readily abandon the legal for the philosophical level of argument as a hired counsel could al Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago, from guilty to not
guilty."
1953).
77-78,
79.
on the other hand stresses the ubiquity of natural rights thinking, and goes far toward suggesting that there was no conservative element to the Revolution. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
Bailyn's interpretation
1967).
ral
Both
of
be
reconciled
by recognizing the special status of the natu by Blackstone, and the prudence of the colonists in
law
as
adapting their arguments to their needs. First of all, the absolute distinction between
and other species of
exist
positive
law
such as natural
law,
which we
for the Founders. Writers, particularly Christian writers preted the common law and the British Constitution in terms
was a
Fortescue
of medieval
merging
of common
law rights,
such as of
sacred
by
virtue of the
by
God
and revealed
by scripture
the
written with of
moral
law,
the
finger
man."
Quoted
by
Hamilton in Papers,
1.91
English
natural
the
fun
damental law
ticulated
of self-preservation.
Perhaps,
a
by Hobbes and Locke are Revolutionary period, who embraced incompatibility was not important.
Boorstin is
correct conservative
radical
later thinkers have argued, modern natural rights as ar incompatible with the older tradition, but for the statesmen of the lawyer's understanding
of
law
in their
in recognizing the importance of Blackstone to the founders, but he misses the Blackstone provided the means of constitutional reasoning used by the colo enterprise. The concern with the "true nature of the British Constitu
colonists'
the
inseparable from
Englishmen"
natural
fact that, as transmitted by Blackstone's Commentaries, that concern was law and natural rights. And further it is not disingenuousness but prudence,
mankind."
that led the Americans to change their arguments from a defense of the colonies in terms of the "rights
of
to the "rights of
were
as
Par
supremacy gained ground, the colonists suited their arguments to their changing needs. Thus John Adams recollected that during the drafting of the Declaration of Rights in 1774, it was dis
cussed
liamentary
"whether
we should recur
to the Law of
Nature,
as well as to
our
Galloway and Mr. Duane were for excluding the Law of Nature. I was very strenuous for retaining and insisting on it, as a Resource to which we might be driven, by Parliament much sooner than we were John Adams, The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, ed. L. H. Butterfield (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), Vol. Ill, p. 309. 41. Edmund S. Morgan, ed., Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 56. The Massachusetts Circular
and
aware."
American Charters
Grants. Mr.
Alexander Hamilton
on
Natural Rights
and
Prudence
fervor
on
343
three levels that
"security
of the
by]
ius
with equal
British constitution, and our [colonial] charters facility argue his position from natural law or from
"legiance."
Hamilton
could
a pre-Lockean un
derstanding
British
of such a concept as
constitution
both
confine allegiance
King;
and
found
it
upon
the principle of
role
protection."42
Blackstone's
in unifying, in the
minds of
Englishmen
and colonists
alike,
the law of nature and the British constitution is most this little noticed passage.
forcefully
demonstrated in
The
absolute rights of
are
sense,
usually
called their
liberties)
as
they
are
founded
they
of government
written:
Immediately
The idea
these
above
and practice of
where
liberty
vigour
in
kingdoms,
it falls little
perfection,
only be lost
or
de
by the folly or demerits of its owner: the legislature, and of course the laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to the preservation of this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject. Very different from the modern constitutions of other states, on
stroyed
the continent of
Europe,
and
from the
and
genius of the
imperial
law;
which
in
general are
calculated to vest an
despotic
power of
controlling the
grandees.43
Blackstone
argues
that all
men
have
certain natural
as would
be
long
of
nature,
and which
man
is
entitled
it."
The "natural
fit"
of man which or so
must be modified in "consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks der to receive the advantage of civil society. "Every man when he enters into
ciety gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a Civil rights, the absolute rights of individuals, are a number of "private immuni and consist in "that residuum of natural lib defined by "several
ties"
statutes"
purchase
erty,
which
is
not required
natural
by the
laws
of
society to be
sacrificed
to public conve
nience."44
The
rights,
"the
now
England,
lib
consist
in three
articles:
right of personal
security, the
right of personal
property."
erty;
and
The
preservation of
our civil
immunities in
these, inviolate, may justly be said to include the their largest and most extensive
sense.45
preservation of
Letter is
cited
Law"
(Ithaca,
42. 43.
44.
1955),
Papers,
1. 91.
1. 1 23, 1.125. 1. 125.
45
122-123 (Emphasis
added).
344 The
Interpretation
sum of
Blackstone's
argument seems
is
coeval with
the
All
to these
world
rights, but
has in fact
among
all
the legal
in the
to a greater extent
in his early
did in his
Summary
View of the Rights of British America, can be explained by a circumstance to which prudence must adapt itself. As Hamilton himself tells us, New York,
where
he
was
writing, had no
royal
charter,
and
his
careful argument
for the
did
not
it might,
with
no Charter, But, if it could support its claim to liberty in justice, plead the common principles of colonization: for enjoyment of
it
would
be
unreasonable
the most im
sacred rights
There is
no
need,
however,
of this plea:
The
to be
rummaged
They
hand
are
written, as
with a sun
for, among old parchments, or musty records. beam, in the whole Volume of human nature, by the
be
erased or obscured
of the
divinity itself;
by
mortal
power.46
as given
reflect a
Blackstonian
by
Blackstone,
and unlike
principles"
should
be
a rare
"Legiti absolutely required by the "prudence of the revolution, which may involve illegal acts, is to be undertaken only when the absolute safety of the people is at stake or, as quoted above, "when the first
stances, only
mate"
when
society are violated, and the rights of a whole people are in Resistance to Parliament is justified by that body's usurpation of the
people. and
rights of
the
Since the
end and
intention
of
government, is to
preserve
the
of the
of oppression
illegitimately
by
legitimate,
extralegal
may do
Such
originally designed to in
contrast
frequent
reaction
first principles, which explains his complacent and to Shays's Rebellion and the bloodshed of the French Revolu
to
tion. In a
America,"
letter to Edward Carrington, Jefferson spoke favorably of the "tumults i.e., Shays's Rebellion, "as a means to the firmness of our [state]
which,
even when
government,"
in error,
"keep
principles of their
institutions. To Madison he
wrote
46.
Papers,
1. 121-22.
on
Natural Rights
thing,
and as
and
Prudence
345
political world as
then
is
a good
necessary in the
of
storms
in the
physical."47
shown
Jefferson's ideas
which states
can
be found in free
gov
the Virginia
Declaration
Rights,
that "no
or
the
blessing
to
of
liberty
can
be
preserved to
any
to
people
but
by
firm
fre
adherence
to
justice,
to
moderation, temperance,
frugality,
and
virtue,
and
by
fundamental
principles."
According
Stourzh,
this empha
first
James
be traced back through George Mason, to John Trenchard, the authors of the influential
Burgh in his Political Disquisitions that "Machiavelli says, that to render a com monwealth long lived, it is necessary to correct it often, and reduce it towards its
and
Sydney
finally
to
Machiavelli.48
which
is
likely
to
be done
by
punishments and
examples."49
And
its first
[Machiavelli proposed] reducing every state, once in an age or two, to the integrity of principle. All human constitutions are subject to corruption, and must per
unless
ish,
they
are
timely
first
principles.50
Indeed,
original plished
which
long
existence to reli
gious sects or
principles."
republics, it is necessary frequently to bring them back to their The purification of the corrupt body politic could be accom
accidents"
by
"extrinsic
such as the
led to the
rebirth of
Rome,
or
"Franks"
obliges
often
conduct."51
Many
saw
lar tumults,
to
and
institutions. Sydney, for one, saw it Jefferson followed him in this regard.
and
also as a call
for
popu
Blackstone
agreed with
Jefferson that
maintained
an extralegal resort
should
Hamilton's
great
be
driven
by
directed had
admirers of
"little
rebellions,"
uary 30, 1787), Koch and Peden, p. 413; can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are
spirit of resistance?
To Edward Carrington (January 16, 1787), Koch and Peden, p. 411; To James Madison (Jan cf. to Col. Smith (November 13, 1787). "And what country
not warned
people preserve
pardon and
the
arms.
The remedy is to
to
facts,
must
"
them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty time to time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
P- 436.
Peden,
Stourzh,
pp. 34-37.
James Burgh, Political Disquisitions (London, 1774-75), Vol. Ill, p. 298. Algernon Sydney, Discourses Concerning Government, in The Works of Algernon
1772),
pp.
Sydney
p. 386.
(London,
51.
405,
124. ed.
Machiavelli, Discourses,
346
Interpretation
the whole of Machiavelli's the
essential correctness of of republics chapter on resort
they
have
read seen
to the
to the terrible
beginning beginning
writes
involved terrible
striking
deaths, i.e.,
arose.
a return
society necessarily
return to
beginnings is the
Machiavelli
renewal of
in this
to
section:
[Some men]
used
say that it
was
necessary to
maintain
reconstitute
it;
where
by "reconstituting
with which
they
ior
and
them when
instilling they had instilled of it Provision has to be made against [misbehav instituting necessity corruption] by restoring that government to what it was at its
meant men with
fear
origins.52
For Blackstone
rants undermine
ervation of against with
or
Hamilton, frequent
rebellions or rules
for overthrowing ty
be legitimate
expressed
under certain of
in Sect. 149
people
legislature,
when
they find
But however just this conclusion may be in theory, we cannot adopt it, nor argue from it, under any dispensation of government at present actually existing. For this devolution of power to the people at large, includes in it a dissolution of the whole
form
of government established
by
nal state of
equality; and,
by
before
enacted. all
annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all positive law No human laws will therefore suppose a case, which at
destroy
law
build
foundation;
legal
nor
they
make provision
for
so
desperate
an
event, as must
provisions
ineffectual. The
ment supposition of law therefore is, that neither the king nor either house of parlia (collectively taken) is capable of doing any wrong; since in such cases the law itself incapable of furnishing any adequate remedy. For which reason all oppres
which
feels
sions,
of
nec
essarily be
new
rule, or express
legal
provision:
but if
ever
upon
It
was
times"
which required
Revolution."
"new
emergencies
during
According
and
to Hamilton
a whole people
principles of civil
society
of
are
violated,
the rights of
invaded,
the common
forms
of municipal
law
are not to
be
regarded.
Men may
are
then
nature; and, if
they but
them,
betray
either
ignorance
dishonesty. There
52.
53.
Discourses
ill.
I,
p. 388.
Blackstone
1. 157, 237-38.
Alexander Hamilton
some events
on
Natural Rights
human laws
and
Prudence
347
in society, to force
and
which
cannot
lose
all
their
efficacy.54
But the
prudence of
lution is
not
that violence
Revolution is
not anarchy.
"radical"
Hamilton
"conservative"
the
Hamilton,
his
reaction to
the attack
on
the press
of
Tory
cited
letter to John
Jay
indicates:
press
Though I
and
fully
and
sensible
how dangerous
and pernicious
Rivington's
yet
has been,
is in every respect,
cannot
help
disapproving
In times up to
edge
condemning this is
great who
danger
of
fatal
extremes.
The
same state of
passions which
have
knowl
to quiet them,
opposition to
of all
tyranny
to
contempt and
authority
In
such
political pilots to
keep
men
steady
bounds,
of
on which account
mere will and
less
alarmed at
authority.55
every thing
which
is done
pleasure,
any
proper
It is the
prudence of the time that teaches that authority and government are nec essary to the protection of those rights for which the revolution was fought. And here, Hamilton faces a particular problem, a problem that, as his letter to Jay
demonstrates,
cern
concerned
him
even
in his
"radical"
youth,
him to the very end of his life. Reason teaches men the rights of
knowledge."
mankind.
But
everyone
has
not
the same
a pas
"stock
of reason and
"liberty."
Short-sighted,
passion can curbed
self-interested men
have
sionate attachment to
Such
be
made use of
in
opposition
to
tyranny
and
very principles of the Revolution, the principles of true lib erty. The passionate devotion to freedom, understood as merely the emancipa tion of desires is opposed to the reason and knowledge necessary to establish true
can undermine the
liberty. Reason
and
thority
and
and rules of
knowledge teach that it is necessary to establish a proper au law and government in order to protect the absolute rights of
individuals. But
men, driven
guide
by
"sufficient
stock of reason
knowledge to
them"
to limit their
desires,
will recognize no
54. 55.
in
principle
unlimited.56
Papers, Papers,
1.136.
1. 176-77.
1802):
56. produce
men.
"Nothing is
projects,
more
fallacious than to
on
expect
to
in
political
by
relying merely
the reason of
reasonable animals
for the
are
by the
impulse
of
passion
the very
moment
[the Republicans]
are
eulogizing the
fessing
faculty, they
xxv.605.
courting the
the
human heart
Papers,
348
What
Interpretation
prudence
dictates is the
of
moderation of
the passionate
which
love
of
liberty,
call
without which
the love
liberty
will turn
into anarchy,
in turn may
forth tyranny as a necessary corrective. Prudence dictates that revolutionary pas since the minds of men sion be replaced by new "establishments and
courses,"
ancient ones.
What this
means
of
the
ward
knowledge,
must guide
the people to
the
rights for
Peace
a
the revolution
authority and government, in order that those was fought are protected and maintained.
The
object then will
made
be to
make our
a
independence
herculean task
blessing. To do this
foundations;
be
levelled.57
We have
mains to
proves
now
happily
of
independence, but
flattering.
common
much re
be done to
reach the
fruits
of
it. Our
the
inefficacy
danger
we are receding instead of advancing in a disposition to amend its defects It is to be hoped that when prejudice and folly have run themselves out of breath we
moved,
may
return
errors.58
Hamilton
Revolution, hostility
to
authority in
general
attachment to
liberty;
there
was a
tendency for
just
problem
people"
law, based
account
informed in
by
a concern
for
principle, but
of
taking into
people. gov
human
nature
such a
way
as
the
"It is
an axiom
well as manners
form
ernments."59
According
by
the
democratic temper
wished
rule of
passions, prejudices,
and
providing an antidote to the chaotic interests. This was to be done both by proper be the
was
by
force
and
by example.
This
example would
very principles upon which the Revolution lows its actions to be swayed by passion
Good
government
forms
Good
object of
authority,
which
in turn
attains
the
honorably
57.
58.
arbitrarily
or
be worthy of respect. It must act tyranically. "It will be shocking and indeed an
must
To John Laurens (August 15, 1782), Papers, in. 145. To John Jay (July 25, 1783), Papers, in. 416- 17. Second Letter from Phocion, Papers, m.553. Cf. Montesquieu, Sur les romains et de leur decadence. "Dans la naissance des societes, ce
qui causes sont
59.
de la
gran
deur des
les
chefs
des
font l'institution; et c'est ensuite l'institution CEuvres Completes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964), p. 436.
republiques qui
forme les
chefs
des
Alexander Hamilton
eternal reproach pendence
on
Natural Rights
and
Prudence
349 inde
ad re
to this country, if we
begin the
by
a violation of all
the principles of
honesty
policy."
and
true
By
just,
signals
hering
doom
is
The failure
of good government
in America
the
of
the cause of
freedom
everywhere.
The
world
has its
eye upon
America. The
noble struggle we
have
made
in the
cause of of our
liberty, has
example
occasioned a penetrated
kind
of revolution
in human
sentiment. and
The influence
pointed the
has
the
inquiries,
But in
to
which
may
shake
regions of
despotism,
. .
has
way to
order
us
justify
the revolution
by
its
fruits."
If the
outcome of
the experiment
in
self-
happiness,"
illustrious
world will
bless
and
verified
the lesson
govern
long
taught
by
the enemies of
liberty;
fit to
despotism
over
only made for the rein and spur: liberty. The advocates of the latter With the
themselves, that they must have a we shall then see the final triumph of
must acknowledge
it to be
an
ignis
fatuus,
greatest advantages
that
ever a people
had,
we shall
cause of
human
That the
uated
cause of
human
be betrayed, human
nature must
be habit
to
certain
behavior
away from certain tendencies. Otherwise self-gov government is not possible. Self-government requires mod
and
The
statesman needs to
do
more than
merely
establish
institutions. He
to
principle
teach
who
moderation.
By teaching
to
"those
of public
manners
necessary for
self-government.
'Tis
lasting
bias to the
they
If
justice,
moderation,
liberality,
constitution, the
tone,
blessings to the
community.
If
by
humour, passion and prejudice; if from resentment to individuals, or a dread of partial inconveniences, the constitution is slighted or explained away upon every frivolous pretext, the future spirit of government will be feeble, distracted and arbitrary.
The
rights of the subject will
be the
sport of
will
every party vicissitude. There will be fluctuate with the alternate prevelancy
no
of
contending
factions.62
(May
14, 1783).
Papers,
ni.557-
ill. 355.
350
There
Interpretation
is,
"paternalism"
of
course,
a certain
responsibilities
in Hamilton's
attempt
to educate
in
self-government.
But this merely takes have the same "stock of reason and
the
in
commun
welfare of
The
welfare of
the
establishment of good
law
and
the attachment
and
law,
and
by
passion,
humour,
interest
alone cannot
be properly
attached to
Men passionately attached to liberty must be est lies in developing habits of law-abidingness.
act on
made
They
in
be
shown
that if
they
the basis
of
of
"political
expedience,"
which
practice amounts
to acting on
law."
the basis
passion,
manifested
in
good
humour, and interest, rather than on the basis of principle as law, they put themselves "out of protection of They
scepter
in
effect
.
"transfer the
of government
to those
.
of
individu
als
[T]hey
the community
all
against another
[and thereby]
war."
enact a civil
They
"undermine
those rules,
convent
by
which
individuals
can
and
momentary
to
tions which
ignores principles,
well return
while
people, may
haunt them.
Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to grat ify momentary passions, by letting into the government, principles and precedents
which afterwards prove
fatal to
themselves.64
By teaching
which made
true self-interest
lay
in
developing
for
a character good
them
law-abiding
laws,
Hamilton tried to
The
passionate attachment to
liberty which
characterized the
Revolution
was appropriate
erty but was not appropriate to the establishment and maintenance of true liberty. The role of the statesman and the policy dictated by the "prudence of the
was
times"
love
of
liberty
so
that the
blessings
of
liberty
may
be
obtained.
If
fulfilling
would
the passions
great
unreasoning
men should
become
danger
be
and make
independence."65
Were the
our
people of
America,
either
with one
voice, to ask,
do to
liberties
happiness? The
answer would
be "govern
well"
or external
hostility. Abuse
or
its diminution
loss. But if
63. Papers, m.556, 551. 64. Papers, in. 485-86. 65. Papers,
111.494.
Alexander Hamilton
on
Natural Rights
and
Prudence
35 1
another
base the
the
government of the
the
few,
like
have
acted
same
part,
will experience
slavery.66
It
the
should now
be
clear
They
must
must
be fought
for
threatened
by tyranny
and
oppression,
and
they
be
protected
by
civil authority.
The
passions released
in the
end
destroy those rights, because of passionate hostility to authority on the one hand, and the use of authority by mobs to destroy rights on the other. Passionate men must be attached to good laws. They must be taught that their true interest lies in law-abidingness, that the constitution is the implementation
of
those principles
political
for
which men
lent
expedience, introduces
eventually
men unsafe
in their liberty.
political career
Hamilton's
havior. His
the
a model of prudential
be
of
aim was
the
character of
suited to the times, because not everyone had the knowledge. Hamilton realized that only a central gov
the
enjoyment of
Revolution, but
the char
hostile to authority, particularly centralized au thority. Hamilton had to do what he could to make all authority as decent and
people was
the American
effective as
he could,
while at
Thus,
as shown
during
its aftermath, Hamilton publicly praised extant political authority, either the Congress and Articles of Confederation, in order to en
in the people, i.e.
private
,
affection
for
a rule of
conduct,
and
of
law-abidingness;
the
while
in
he
the
the
inadequacy
authority
Articles
and
the
attachment of
ernment.
This is
not
hypocrisy, but
prudence.
His
praise of extant
was
purpose of
adoption of the
improved
the the
Federal
did
not end
character of
the
use of the
institutions available,
men
formed
by
then
form the
character of
be
able
to
ensure the
implementation
was
and perpetuation of
for
which
the
Revolution
fought.
66. Papers,
in. 495.
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Autonomous
Morality
and
Peter Simpson
Catholic University
INTRODUCTION
refer
what
I principally
mean
by
the
term
is that tradition
theorizing
that
wants
to separate off
moral values
thinking from other forms of thinking, such as thinking about natural and to set it in a realm of its own where it operates according to its own objects, internal logic without having any foundation in anything outside itself. In this
and moral sense
morality is
autonomous
own
independent
sphere.
This
autonomy is
often expressed
'ought'
by
the
Morality is
is not, for
'ought'
not
and
this
is
instance, like
rests
the facts about the contingent desires and interests people to do if one is to satisfy
and
have,
moral
force
peculiar
to
itself,
is
somehow uncontaminated
by
Unless
one recognizes
this
peculiar
'categori
of moral
character of
thinking
or
at
all.1
Another way
that
of
stating the
same
thinking
idea is to say that morality is nonnaturalist, to do and what counts as morally good is
different from thinking about how things are or about the true and false. In this sense it is said that moral thinking is volitional rather than cognitive, for it is
quite not constituted acts of
but
rather
will,
or acts of choice
acts of thought.
morality
as an
independent
is thus
un
derstood
as
arising from the fact that it is constituted by independent, spontane will. As both senses of independence used here are to be counted as
autonomous
autonomy, the
morality
of
my title
must
be taken to
em
brace both.
An
earlier version of this article was read
Society
at
its
conference
in
Cork, March
that followed.
1.
1984.
am grateful
to the
other participants
and
helpful discussion
Having a Point", in Hudson, The Is/Ought Ques Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Macmillan, London, 1970), pp. 274-75 (though see also pp. 276-81); the very interesting article of Duff, "Desire, Duty in Philosophy, 55, 1980, pp. 223-38; Foot, Virtues and Vices (Blackwell, and Moral
E.g. Phillips
and
tion
233;
Oxford,
1948),
1878),
essays 11 and
12;
p. 22;
Crombie, An
Paton, The Moral Law (Hutchinson University Library, London, (RKP, London, 1962), vol. I, p. 275;
354 The
of
Interpretation
claim
often
looked
upon as
the guarantee
its
peculiar and
collapsed
distinctive character, without which it into something quite different. But one may also
and
equally look
realm of
upon
it
as
divorce,
or a
knowl
the
it like this, as he made starkly evident It is, in fact, this theme of the autonomy
or split
morality
as
constituting
divorce
in human
of
existence
article.
Considering the
influence fluence
serves
the ideas of autonomous morality today, and even more so the in Kant in contemporary moral philosophy, it is a theme that perhaps de more attention than it is usually If I choose to approach it from the
of
given.2
vantage of
history, it is
not
because I think
of
be
ex
its origins, but because in many cases, and espe in this the internal logic of a philosophical position can become case, cially clearer if seen in its process of growth. The precise bearing and significance of
plained or refuted
in terms
different
be better
elements seen
in
a united
if observed
they still have in that whole, may it in their beginnings. In this way, when one re may be able to discern in it what before had escaped
whole, and which
outside
My
deal first
in
what
follows
not
will
be Kant (though I
will
regard
him
just
as the
finest but
day.3
also the
exponent of
the idea
of autonomous
sible, if anyone
is, for
My
remarks
be exhaustive, either with respect to history or with respect to the philosophy of Kant. I hope, nevertheless, that they will be pertinent and
will of course not
provocative.
THE
REALISM'
OF MACHIAVELLI
In tracing any historical development one is always faced with the problem of how far back to go. Wherever one stops it will always be possible to continue
beginning
as
Big
Bang).
in
pose.
one needs to go
back
as
far
is
required
choice
where the
with Machiavelli. I cannot really justify this because the justification is precisely the ensuing argument importance of Machiavelli for my theme will become clear. I can,
2. E.g. Hare, Freedom and Reason (O UP, Oxford, 1963), pp. 34, 219; Moral Thinking (Claren don, Oxford, 1981), pp. 4, 9-11; Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, Oxford 1972), pp. viii, 256; Foot, op. cit, pp. I57flf. 3. Cf. Von Wright, Varieties of Goodness (RKP, London, 1963), p. 1.
Autonomous
Morality
as
and the
355
fact
that Machiavelli
one of the chief
ing
something original;
being
thought.4
Since
autonomous
doctrine
(nothing
like it
exists
morality as I have described it is a typically modern in ancient moral thought which is far more holistic
would not
and naturalist
velli.5
in character), it
of
be surprising if it has
about
roots
in Machia
There
has,
course, been
of
much
debate
the novelty
of
Machiavelli,
and
I have jection
man
no
intention here
entering this
debate.6
ment of
his thinking
which
is especially
which
relevant
for my
This is his
good
re
of
by
nature a supreme or
highest
for
(namely human
perfection),
is discoverable
by
de
life. This, one may say, was the and in chapter 15 of The thought, very Prince Machiavelli gives what is effectively his dismissal of it. Declaring his in of tention to write something "useful", and separating himself from the
termines the character and structure of the good
substance of ancient moral and political
"orders"
others, he
tion of
matter,"
was
going to
go to the
"effectual truth
of
the
not the
of
"imagina
it."
dition,
seen,
velli's
on
the thinkers
princedoms that
what
have
been
or
shall call
Machia
'realism', instead
his
refusal
speculations
about, and
construc
best regime,
on
in the
classical
writers, and
his in
speaking
getting
in that
The effort,
by
the imaginative
construction of
see as
far
best
realize man's
highest good,
and
the attempt to
as
live
by
that good,
is
rejected
by
Machiavelli
a
both
Machiavelli's
orientation
work
may have
to
for he
wants not
speculate
confessedly practical rather than theoretical yet his practical but to get results
"Nature,"
teaching is
that
basis.
created men
in
everything";7
cannot obtain
and again:
having
power
desire everything,
4.
to obtain
few
of
them, there
re-
E.g. Berlin, Against the Current (Hogarth Press, London 1979), essay on "The Originality of Foundations of Modern Political Thought (CUP, Cambridge, 1978),
pp.
1,
180-86;
Procacci,
Machiavelli: II Principe
"ought'
Discorsi (Feltrinelli,
Milan,
1979),
Intro.,
p. xcii.
was argued in a famous article by Anscombe, The novelty of the modern autonomous "Modem Moral Philosophy", in Hudson, The Is/Ought Question, pp. I75~95 (it originally appeared in Philosophy. 33. 1958). The thesis has been recently and more elaborately re-argued by Maclntyre,
5.
op. cit.
While 1
1953).
somewhat
different
History,
Chicago,
7.
6. For
a summary of the varying views, see the essay by Berlin, note Discourses: Bk. I ch. 37; all translations, whether of Machiavelli
,
4.
or
356
suits are
Interpretation
in human minds, and For Machiavelli men's desires turn
an
continually
ill
content
disgust
to
with
possessed".8
out
be both insatiable
self-interested.
Men's
sees
good
is their
private
good, their
vantage.
As he
it,
men are
directed
tingent and self-regarding passions, and to all of them equally, not to one more than another. There can
one that
be
no sense
in speaking
possessor.
or of
satisfy the
passions are
infinite but
man's
that he can
satisfy them,
is
understood as one of
misery
frustration. The
is hostile to
'realist'
Machiavelli, in fact,
vicious
speaks almost as
if
nature
had been
deliberately
to
man.
vision is of man as a creature of selfish At any rate his in a hostile world where he is forever condemned to frustration in
The
contrast
the ancient
vision could
hardly be
greater.
It
is, therefore,
aspects to
of some
of
supreme end
for
have two
nothing
desirable;9
it: (i) it is the fully satisfying object of (ii) it is an ordered hierarchy responding to the
Man is
a
objective
hier
archy
of
human
nature.
being
made
of
up
of parts and
rightly
the discipline
reason, and
when
they
preserve
and assist
the activity of reason (in art, science, philosophy, etc.). It is not the
whatever one
desire
sires
will
be
satisfied
by
may subjectively and contingently happen to the supreme good, for it may be that some of these de
lack the necessary subordination to reason. Attaining the supreme good in volves not just the satisfaction of desire, but also the disciplining and control of
desire,
be the
with
so
exceed
the
rational state
proves
to
most
desirable
and
fully
satisfying
nature.10
because it is the
The
most noble
objectively satisfying life; but it is also the noble is understood as the highest and most ele
most
vated,
and
in the
the most
com
development
of
soul,
where
and most
the
at
hierarchy
of one's
being, it follows
case, be the
what man
also,
least in the
of nature
ultimate
noble and
life
is the intention
itself: this is
8. Ibid.: Bk. 2, Preface. E.g. Boethius. De Consolatione Philosophiae, ill, I2l5bi8; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q. 1, a. 5.
9. 10.
prose
2;
ticles
on
This is certainly the thrust of Plato's and Aristotle's happiness, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, qq. 1-5.
ethical
thought,
Aquinas in his
ar
Autonomous
Morality
and the
357
self-control,
one
becoming good
not oppose or
and
does
inclinations but
is the
follows them.
no natural
For Machiavelli,
however,
the
reverse
case.
Man has
inclina
he is just
by
whatever
restless urge
desire
(though this
reach), but
in the
sense of an ordered
hierarchy. There is
longer any
the
equally
natu
of
By
thus retaining the idea of complete satisfaction and rejecting the idea the idea of complete satisfaction of one's
order and
yearning for it
and a
cruel.11
hierarchy, being and one's become, instead of something ennobling and elevating, a curse burden; and man's world, instead of friendly and beneficent, hostile and
cease
rather a problem
and
misery; happi
satisfied, misery if they are not. Complete happiness is impossi can at least contrive to get what one can. In Machiavelli's case this
are of the
takes the
form
devious
his
political science
artful prince
is
for
pleasures of
of
lasting
other an
Hobbes.
man
Hobbes
presents
in his
tively
even
quote one of
nor summum
striking
passages:
as
There is
(utmost aim)
is
spoken of whose
in the books
Nor
any
more
live
desires is
are at an end
than
he
imaginations
are at a stand.
Felicity
the
man's
desire from
the
former
being
still
desire is
not
to enjoy
only
and
instant
time, but to
forever
the way of
his future
quest
This insatiable
that in
for is
a
satisfactions
Hobbes'
view,
"perpetual
and restless
ceaseth
only in
death;"
for
is
not
satisfaction now
but
an abil
con-
ity
his
men
into
Aristotle
was as aware as
Machiavelli
unlike most
of the
of
notion of
hierarchy, he holds,
ch. 1
passions 12.
is
natural and
Leviathan,
Ibid.
ultimately 1; I have
the
changed
to
into line
with
current conventions.
13.
358
Interpretation
flict,
since
they
of each other.
competing for limited goods and so striving to From this results the "war of everyman against
are
satisfied or
get
the
better
everyman"
where,
far from
being
secure, each is in
continual
fear
of violent
death.
the
This
picture
is
quite parallel
not acquired
for
'wickedness'
think, is
not
far to
how to
exploit
it to
one's own
advantage, Hobbes in
a quite
endeavours
by finding
stitute
a substitute
to refound morality on its basis. He does this in for the traditional idea of a highest end; only
condition
effect
sub
Hobbes'
is
rather a
necessary assuring
than a supreme
end.
In the
state of war of
everyman against at
all, let
alone of
pensable
to replace
can be sure of getting any satisfaction for the future, the one absolutely indis it with a state of peace. Peace is the uni
necessary condition for the attainment of any satisfaction whatever, hence for the attainment and safe enjoyment of anything that the individual
decent
"natural
laws",
peace is necessary for any life. Hobbes accordingly constructs a set of rules or purpose is to secure peace; they are, as he calls them,
"convenient
rules of
articles of
peace".14
They
are also at
Hobbes'
moral
theory. That
is why I
call
for the
For
as the ancients
the moral
by
to the highest
good of
human perfection,
condition of
Hobbes
Hobbes'
understands
the
by
reference to the
necessary
peace.15
theory may be ingenious but the morality that results has a certain feature that, for my present theme, deserves particular notice. It creates a two fold split or divorce. First of all there is a divorce that it creates between the
moral
life
life.
Morality consists
sake of
in the
rules of
peace,
and these
rules consist
satisfying
some of one's
passions, the
try to satisfy all is to achieve but the war of everyman against nothing everyman, and that in turn is to achieve nothing but the frustration of all one's passions. One has, therefore, a choice be
tween
them. For to
satisfying some passions or none; one certainly cannot satisfy all. But just as there is this divorce between the moral life and the fully satisfied life, so there is a divorce beween the moral life and the natural life. nature
man pursues
the satisfaction of
as a
By distinction,
and
restraint, back in short along frustrate it; for even if the frustration is partial and is justified in the name of satisfaction, it is still frustration and a frustration that one cannot entirely avoid. This is implicitly admitted by Hobbes, but it has taken a modern Hobbesian, G. J.
morality
comes
check,
on
nature, to hold it
to
Warnock,
14. 15.
who
ch.
consciously
constructs
his morality
on
the
Hobbesian model,
to
Ibid.,
13.
Ibid.,
ch. I5,adfinem.
Autonomous
point out
Morality
and
359
re
likelihood
a general psychic
malaise.16
of
ture of
morality
ture are
in insoluble
conflict.
Machiavellian
'realism'
Hobbes
uncov
and
Descartes, by
pic
further
it,
uncover another.
Along with
Machiavelli's
briefly
and
mentioned, a picture of
knowledge
as a
advantage.
To
control
force,
of the
his understanding passions of men, and much more on his understanding of how to control The Machiavellian prince is a man who knows how to manipulate men,
Machiavelli
prided on on
exploit
himself
his knowledge,
them.17
and
to
with a superior
technique.
quer
The
man of
knowledge in this
is known.
sense
is
a man who
knows how to is
con
human
nature and
other words,
power and
for the
Machiavelli
picked
his knowledge to
control
of
man, but
Bacon,
who
up Machiavelli's idea of knowledge as conquest, thought it could and should be applied to the conquest of nonhuman things as well, so that they could be exploited for human advantage. It seemed to Bacon, who at least for this life
accepted
Machiavelli's
picture of
man,18
that even
if
satisfaction,
lot
more of
could overcome
the
hostility
the
of external nature
by
science,
tion.
and so exploit
nonhuman
things for
human
of
Bacon, in fact,
seeing but
the advantage of
implicitly having
accused
Machiavelli
being
one-sided, of
not
and of thus
failing
to
just
by
force
and
trickery,19
by
life"
man's vellian
If Hobbesian morality was one alternative answer to the Machia problem of how to deal with man's insatiable passions, Baconian science What Machiavelli thought to
secure
was another.
by
ruthless
politics, Bacon
hoped to fictional
secure
by
technological science.
His
vision of
is
representation of
Bacon's
16.
new method of
for this
pur-
Right
and
17.
18.
The Object of Morality (Methuen, London, 1971), pp. 161-62; 10719. Wrong (Penguin, 1977). pp. See the dedicatory epistles of The Prince and Discourses.
Mackie, Inventing
Advancement, in Works, ed. Spedding, Ellis and Heath (Longman, London, 1857-74), Instauration, Preface, Works, vol. I, pp. 125-33.
Advancement, bk. 1; in Works: Advancement, bk. 1, in Works:
vol.
vol.
m, m,
vol.
360
pose21
Interpretation
purpose which still
predominately animates the pursuit of technologi cal science to this day), has however precisely the same consequence for human new morality had for human acting namely a split or di knowing as
Hobbes'
(a
vorce of man
from
nature.
Previous
had, in Bacon's
view,
and
proper method.
It had
and
by the
"immediate
senses,"
natural perceptions of
the
a
had tried to
of things.
But this is
hopeless
can
procedure
because the
too gross to
judge
nature
directly; they
nature.
they
port
can report
only judge it by means of artificial aids; that is, but it is the experiments that must re
science
For Bacon's
is
science; the world is just bodies and efficient causes, operating without reference to ends, that is without any inherent teleology. The world is just a collection of
goalless
facts.22
It
on
technological science seems best able to operate, for such a science that the natural be
to calculable rules, so that artificial
first
requires
can
devices
be
built
with
the necessary
to embody and
exploit
them;
and second
it
requires that
rected to one
wills.
thing
is free to
use
them exactly as he
by
science as
objectively
by
the
knowledge
revealed
by
artificial experi
ments
alone,
by
familiarity
nature
be
restored
between the
But it is
at once evident
by
is only
as
required no
because
access
by
to
has,
such,
direct
the nature of
things,
him in
part
to overcome
this, he only
remains nature.
ever gets
original
divorce is
never abolished.
It
the case that the mind and the senses are not
by
nature
fitted to know
This divorce is
great
in the
also,
founders
of modern
science,
who
conquest of nature
for human
advantage.24
skep
has,
as
yond
its result, and indeed intended result, the setting of the world of things be human access behind a screen of or inner mental entities, which are
'ideas'
always the
direct
one
only
ever
knows the
21.
consciousness,
bution
22.
of the
Advancement, bk. i, in Works, vol. Ill, pp. Work, in Works, vol. 1, pp. 125-45.
Novum Works:
294-95; Great
Instauration, Preface
and
Organum,
and vol.
11,
sect.
2,
stauration,
23. 24.
Preface
Distribution
121, 138;
of the
1,
pp.
Advancement, bk. 2, in Works, vol. ill, pp. 357-59; Great In Work, in Works, vol. I, pp. 121, 138. Novum Organum: Preface, and I sect. 50.
Autonomous
extent world
Morality
ends
and
Noble
361
picture of the real
of
that
God
guarantees one's
ideas
are
Descartes
up
with
is
extensions, devoid
all sensible
typically
scientific and at
foreign to
what we are
familiar
with
This
is
marked al
and
Descartes is
by
more
opposing
characteristics
what
confidence
confidence
noticeable, for it is
they both
passions.
stress,
of man
to conquer nature
for
his
own
increasing
satisfaction of
his
But the
despair
hand in hand
with
divorce be
tween mind and things on which the new method of science was
founded. Man
may be
of
able to conquer
the world for his own use, but the real nature or essence
cut off
that world
is forever
screen of more or
less delusive
For the
of
We have
long
despair
by
another
name, the
task,
as this exists
in its typically
confining the human mind within nar rower bounds than had traditionally been allowed by laying down for it its legiti mate sphere of competence. It seemed very clear at the time, indeed, that if this
was outset that of
was not
form,
from the
done the
no
mind would
fly
off
in
all
directions into
areas where
it had
and
could
have
knowledge,
ignorance
gerly
and useless
could produce
nothing but
schools of the
day
was ea
seized upon as
soon came to
precisely to determine the scope and competence of the hu man mind, and so to impose on it the necessary ascetic discipline and restraint that the previous scholastic tradition of philosophy had signally ignored. This be
systematic rigor, was
in
Locke,25
and
from him it
passes over
latterly, A. J.
this
Ayer.26
Taking
nature
in the
sphere of
knowledge together
the
divorce from
nature
sphere of morals
has in
gen
the tradition of
eral
realism
may be
called
in
fact,
such a
as was suggested
try
to
show more at
length, in Kant's
critical
most
ingenious
philosophy that one gets perhaps the just this theme. One also gets in
significant answer
to the
Ma
had
exercised
Bacon
ch.
and
Hobbes.
Essay
One
is
on
I,
sect. 7.
tempted to suggest, in the light of this, that whereas the ancient tradition was severe as
but indulgent
as regards speculative
thought, the
modem
Machiavellian tradition
passions.
is the
reverse
362
Interpretation
Following Bacon
ject
of our
and
immediate
ob
knowledge
and experience
further, however,
purely
know anything
except what
is in
some
way
a matter of
patterns of
they
are
imposed
on sensible experience
by
in the
act of
patterns of
unity,
knowing. For the mind, according to Kant, is endowed with these or categories as he calls them, a priori, that is, it possesses its
structure.
Consequently,
whenever
it
must of
categories.
Knowledge is
a matter of
subsuming sensible or empirical data under laws or to that data. He expressly models himself here on the proce
Newton,27
the
by people like Copernicus, Galileo and for, like many in his own day and since, he was deeply impressed by success of modern science and became convinced that it had the key to
of modern science as practiced
general.28
knowledge in
were part of
But if the
actual procedures of
contemporary
confined
science
empir
his inspiration
here,
and
the major
influence
on
was
undoubtedly the
icism
edge
of
Hume.
Following
to
ideas
and
knowl in
imagination)
grasped at the
sensation;
he showed,
with
fair success,
that in such a gutted experience there is nothing universal or necessary. Kant ac cepted that Hume was right about what experience in itself is like but because he
recognized that
there was
no science without of
and
because he
source of
accepted
the reality
science, he
another
found it in the
mind.
One
of the
immediate
consequences of
of
we can never
have knowledge
Kant's epistemology is the claim that anything but what can be given in sensible
form,
purely quantitative, in mathematics, or sensuous as well, in the nat There is no such thing as genuine metaphysical knowledge, that is knowledge of the being as being of things. In complete consistency with the tra
either
ural sciences.
dition
of epistemological
despair that he
was
rejected
his
view we can
selves
only know appearances; the real being that things have in them is forever hidden from us. This leads him to distinguish two worlds: the
know,
and
the
noumenal
world, the
27. 28.
world of realities
First
Critique,
b,
pp. xiv-xxii. p.
First Critique, B,
Autonomous
The
Morality
and
363
phenomenal world
is the
ence, and
erned more
attributed to
and
it
by
described
by
lacks any objective teleology. But, and this is necessity by important for present purposes, the description Kant gives of man insofar
mechanical part of
as
he too is
the
natural or phenomenal
world, proves to be
and
no other
than
previously
by
Machiavelli purely
Hobbes;
man
is just
a crea
selfish and
lack any
natural order
ing
themselves.29
by
reflection on
universality
world of
Hume,
he
was
forced
to the
mind
selfish world of
Hobbes. In the
first
case
this addition took the form of the a priori categories or patterns of unity;
in the
second case
of
autonomy
imperative.
to have struck
him
as characteristic of
it. First,
moral
judgements have
a special claim or au
thority
wants
that applies
that,
(the only
one
had
as
natural).
If morality is
something behave
and
as
the
one
moral
judgement
requires
if
one will
wants
some want
no
in the process;
longer
if
has
no such
want, or one's
'ought'
ought to
do
sense of
used one's
vary
with
the state of
in morality is not hypothetical like this. It does inclinations, but rather stands independently of
even in opposition to them; it is, as he says, in some sense 'categorical'. Second, morality is something elevated and sublime, but if one subordinates it to particular inclinations, which are all selfish, one will make of it something low and base, and destroy all its peculiar worth. Third, morality is bound up with freedom. Men, in judging and acting morally, do so without external constraint
them,
or compulsion nal
will.30
from
natural
causes;
they
are
exercising free
All three
the
of
these
elements were
lacking
by Hobbes
accept
on
basis
of
Machiavelli's
view of man.
Kant
therefore,
the
a
Now in
doing this,
Second Critique, in Gesammelte Schriften (Konigliche Preussiche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, i9ioff.; hereafter referred to as AA [Akademieausgabe]), vol. v, pp. 21-25, 3529.
(Also in
1898,
pp.
far
'being'
up is not, for sensible data, nor to such data plus Kantian categories, rather it em of man (or his of things, and it is by discernment of the
the scope of human knowledge. Knowledge
'being'
hierarchical
end
was tied
discerns the
supreme end.
The
rejection of ancient
epistemology is thus
of a piece,
logically
above. 30.
the rejection of the ancient idea of a supreme end; cf. also note 26
Groundwork, AA,
vol.
iv,
364
Interpretation
morality, the vision that
as
did
the
see
something fine
of
and
splendid,
something objectively
valid
for
all men
independently
choice.
involving
free
assent of
human
For these
or
in the
ancient vision of
the su
the noble,
of soul.
But if Kant
was sym
truly
good
life
must
their understanding
of what
he
rejected
their claim that the noble was part of nature and was an object
knowledge. The
reason
for this is
of course not
of
knowledge,
alism'
or
his
acceptance of
distinguishable) element of the 're Machiavelli. Kant firmly believed that in the world of knowledge, the
world, none of the aspects of morality
phenomenal
he had
noted could
be found. Baco
The
nian
phenomenal world
world of
Machiavellian
realism and
science,
of man as a
insatiable
facts. Kant was, therefore, forced to find the origin of what was moral in the noumenal world. This had some important results. properly To take first the questions of the moral good, or of the noble, and of freedom.
of valueless
The
as
manifestly
and
no
longer be
regarded as an object of
knowledge in
it had been
by
only knowable
ticular selfish
desires),
consequently,
to do so
by
some
On the contrary nothing knowable can deter choice; if the will is determined it cannot be by anything
accessible to
directly by
the
will
says
spontaneity, its
own
of scientific nature.
endowed must
evidently
belong
to the
noumenal
hence
nonknowable sphere.
If the
impossibility
prior acts of
of
the will's
being
deter
mined
any
thinking,
means
that it has
to determine itself
sphere makes
of this self-determination in the noumenal freedom something entirely unknowable. Kant thus only secures the nobility and freedom associated with morality at the cost of shifting both into a sphere that lies completely beyond human grasp. The free acts of the will that
setting
beyond human
explanation and
This does
not
mean,
however,
on
take;
the
of categorical
contrary one can say quite specifically that they imperatives or categorical 'oughts'. Morality is
about
action,
or about
how to behave
are
typi-
31.
Groundwork,
ch. 3.
Autonomous
cally
these
one ought
ruled out expressed
'oughts'
Morality
of
and
the
365
in terms
'should'
'ought'. In the
of
are relative
to the good
to
do
is
so and so
because it is
part
good.
this way of
other
'ought'
understanding
than contingent,
by denying
and selfish.
to knowledge
of moral
ative
low,
Consequently
'ought'
case
rel
judgements
about
with an
that is not
is,
in his
own
'ought'
is just the
pure
idea
of prescription or
all that
is left
to
it
when
'oughts',
or
and
imposition
the
of a moral command. of an
legislation,
autonomy
commanding
it certainly has nothing to do anything that can be known; and it is essentially volitional, not It is thus in Kantian categorical morality that the distinction
own mysterious will
'is/ought'
than one's
its first
and
certainly its
classic
expression.32
This is one, and perhaps the most important, but there is a further one that deserves mention,
'ought'
aspect of
and
that
separation of stood
from
'ought'
Kant's moral thought, follows from it; for the has to be under
and removes
'ought'
in
purely formal
way.
If one takes
'ought'
an
judgment
from
rela pre
it, in
the manner
described,
as
any
is
by following
what
the
'ought'
judgment
scribes,
'ought'
'ought'
one as a
is left,
has been said, merely with the formal character of the prescription or a command. Now this purely formal character of
was understood
by
Kant
as not
universal
tion (the
'ought'
reason given
is that
what
is formal is
necessarily
universal).
prescrip The be
in
which
itself,
imperative,
if it
can
requires that
any
be
examined to see
made a universal
law for
stand,
and
ble
duty. This
interests that
individual,
This
also
it the
at
categorical character
that
is necessary for
morality.
enables
Kant,
to give a moral
dignity
acter of man's
desires
these
were pictured
in Machiavellian
one can
For
while men
it
only desires
or
interests that
know to be
exist
in
are
their
particular
felt
and self-interested
preferences, it is
nevertheless possible
can
they
subsumed un
der the
32.
categorical
imperative,
the
principle of
morality,
and
be
made
into
uni-
Some people,
it
plain
e.g.
Anscombe (see
no sense of or
that
duty
note 5 above), have argued that this begins with disinterested duty, or unfounded r itonomous 'oughts', since he obligation is tied to, and follows, some interest one has and cannot be
'ought'
it
arise on
its
own
(Treatise,
ed.
1888,
pp.
523)-
366
Interpretation
laws. Morality, in begins as
'ought'
versalized prescriptions or
other
words, becomes a
kind
of
self-interest.33
of
universalizing
carries
the
whole
Kant's
stand
its
significance.
If one
not
it is, therefore, of some importance to under looks at how Kant expressly regards the principle in
one will
peace.
his
ethical writings
(and
izing
of
is little
find that
universal
The formal
principle
is that
from
one's self-interested
desires
which are
incompatible
one
with oth
others.
pursuing their self-interested desires, or which Or, to put it differently, one is free, and has
bring
into
conflict with
a right
to pursue
happiness,
in
desires, in
upon
whatever
way
one
wishes, so
long as
does
or
not
infringe
freedom
of another
to pursue his
doing hap
the
piness,
his
self-interested
desires, in
whatever
way he
wishes.34
Right is the
and
restraining
and
checking
result
of one's
desires sufficiently to
were
avoid
conflict;
way to ensure this is precisely the device of universalizing one's desire. One asks
what would
be the
if everyone
be
conflict or
all, then it is
not
right.35
Kant's
than
moral
idea
of right
is
no more
Hobbes'
idea
it is its logical
as well as
historical
heir.36
In this
sense
Kant
on
never gets
beyond Hobbesian
morality.
He
does, however,
manage to
bestow
this morality something of that ancient sense of the noble that Hobbes
(along
33.
with
not
do this
Reason,
104-105.
Theory and Practice, AA, vol. vm, pp. 290-91 (also in Riess, Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 748;.); compare with Metaphysic of Morals, AA, vol. vi, pp. 380-81, 396
34.
(Abbott,
35.
pp.
291, 307);
also
AA,
vol.
vi,
pp.
The
contradiction
that shows
230-33 (Riess, be
423),
and
pp. 133-35).
universalized
is
than
of thought
tion to
(e.g.
this
will perhaps
help
to
meet
Mill's
objec
1910,
ch.
1,
The
conflict of
desire
to appeal to the undesirability of consequences, for it is precisely the repugnance to one's desire of the consequences of an action when this action is universalized or conceived as done by everyone that
shows one cannot
desire it
as
universalized,
even
though
one could
desire it
when conceived as of
done
only
by
oneself.
This does
lies
at
the
bottom
Kant's
principle of
not utilitarianism
Hare's
ver
his
'fanaticism'), for an
happiness for
a
done
happiness
of
few
would means
by
universalizing, though it
consider whether
would or could
be
a case of utilitarianism.
What it
worth
is that
or not
one
has to
to
desire
in
order
know
whether
the
is
universalizable
in the
relevant sense.
It is
same structure as
Hobbes'
instinctively
cannot
leads to consequences he
the unfettered pursuit of private ordinarily desires desire (namely the misery of war) if everyone does the
and
same.
36.
sect.
11,
This becomes especially clear in such of Kant's political pamphlets as Theory and Idea for a Universal History, especially 4th and 5th propositions;
and vol.
Practice.
vm,
pp.
AA,
289-306, 20-22.
Autonomous
character of
Morality
and the
367
tion.
For
by
Hobbesian morality; rather he changes its motive and its justifica making his expression of this formal character, namely the principle into the
categorical
of universalizing,
imperative (in
into
which
is
idea in
of oughtness or command
good or
desire), he
aims
to
and
for itself,
Hobbes'
(which it
In this way the principle is separated from never was for Hobbes), and so has been
Kant,
with
his
sense of of
categorical, that
is independent
is low
and
actual, contingent
and
desires;
sublime, that
will
is independent
spontaneously
passions.
of what
selfish; the
free,
less
by
itself
and not
by
more or
'oughts'
of
autonomy,
and respect
for
such,
all
knowable,
that the
the noble comes to rest in Kant's thought. As one can see from the
that thought traced above, this
a
movement of
sense of
the no
and
Machiavellian
of
inclinations
this
conclusion
is
no
by
Kant himself:
Duty! thou sublime, mighty
of your noble name
. . .
what
is
your
origin,
and where
with
is found the
. .
root
.
descent,
which
proudly
kinship
inclinations?
It
can
self.
of
(as
part of
above
him
other
is freedom
and
independence
the
the whole
of
viewed at
being
is
subject
to special
laws,
pure practical
laws
by
its
own
reason.37
from
Kant may thus have succeeded in restoring something of the noble to morality within a Machiavellian context (which Hobbes failed to do), but because of
context
forces him to
alter that
of categorical
'oughts', the noble is reduced to a sort of universalizing that differs from Hob besian peace only because it is conceived as an unfounded and awesome com
mand.
For this
reason
Kant's
noble
has
By
Kant's
own admission
'higher'
morality
Hobbesian morality is too low for morality, yet his own appears to be no more than Hobbes backed up by the un
founded
'ought'
of noumenal, that
that can be
and
noble
here is
the sheer
unfounded and
all
'oughtness'
nothing else, it
would seem
ignoble
made
mysteriously imperious.
Perhaps, however,
Hobbes is
37.
this
is
little
extreme.
What Kant
regards as
ignoble
about
not
the
peace
he
commends
but the
grounds on which
he
commends
it,
vol.
v,
pp.
86-87; Abbott,
p.
180.
368
Interpretation
namely selfish interest. So in removing this but keeping the idea of peace, Kant ignoble imperious as removing something noble is not so much making But this is to forget the logical origin of the idea of from an ignoble context.
Hobbes'
peace.
This is only devised in the first place on the basis of a Machiavellian view For it is because men are conceived as creatures whose de just
particular passions
these
passions.
how the satisfying passion by all. The say that man has a not just in view of
is,
making this problem a moral one is to ask be harmonized with the satisfying of by in the end, to universalize. All that Kant adds is to
one can
mysterious what
he
gets out of
capacity to it.
respect
By
which
contrast
the
ancient vision of
view of
the natural
man
passions,
and a
right
to the
them,
What
needs
cerned
instead is how to
subordinate
the
passions so as
and promote
in the
end, a
in thought
and action).
terly
opposed
to ancient
moral
thought. When
he
speaks of
man, he calls it seeing beyond the boundaries cally in the case of "moral
perfection of
"fanaticism,"
by
which
he
means
"the delusion
or,
of
of
sensibility (sense
'ought'
perception)";38
specifi
fanaticism,"
thing
other
duty,
and
in
particular
noble.39
the at
Kant
ideas fiercely. To
exhort men
to action
by
be
appeal
to
protested
self-
motive
that
is "pathological", to
some
love
kind
or sentimental
thinking"
romanticism,
and
to induce an
a
"airy,
superficial, fantastical
goodness of
of
duty.40
of
that
are
flatters
men
they have
for
"voluntary
to the
when, in
fact, they
"yoke"
necessary to repeat
about
It is
not
his beliefs
the
natural
the
limitations
human knowledge
man.41
This
opposition
to the ancient
noble
is
placement of
it
'ought'
by
the pure
duty
has
meant
has, besides
the
of
real
from the
natural and
from the knowable, also the separation the moral from the beneficial and expedient,
38.
(deriving directly
or
from Hobbes)
the
most de-
of
Third Critique:
presupposed a
sect.
29,
AA,
vol.
v,
p. 275.
Kant
the ancient
vision of per
fection
capacity of the mind to penetrate beyond sensible being of things; that is the main reason why he rejected it. 39. Second Critique AA, vol. v, pp. 84-86; Abbott, pp. 178-79.
,
properties to the
intelligible
40. 41.
pp.
Ibid.
Groundwork, AA,
vol.
iv,
pp.
441-44; Second
Critique, AA,
vol.
v,
pp.
35-41;
Abbott,
124-30.
Autonomous
sirable and
Morality
and
the
369
satisfying life. Since, for Kant, to speak of how something benefits one or makes one better off or fully satisfied is, if it is to have any graspable content and not be merely empty ideas, to speak of something empirical and
fully
pleasant,42
selfishly
the low and selfish
now
he necessarily associates the beneficial and satisfying with and so dissociates them from It has duty and the
moral.43
become
fairly
standard,
at
least in
some
same separa
tion and to equate the selfish with the prudent and to tion between the moral and what
sometimes put what
deny
benefits the
individual.44
in terms
good
of x.
the distinction
between
what
it is to be
it is to be
for
Such
distinction
would
tolerated
by
Plato's
Socrates,
first
who
something
as
be
far
to
curse
the
man who
just. There
are others
who
have
made
In this
veloped of
article
I have tried to
roots
and
show
of autonomous
morality
as
de
in
by
Hobbes,
of
Bacon
and
Descartes,
'realism'
Machiavelli.
Having
herited despair
42. 43.
and made of
own a
bestial,
human inclinations,
and a
mechanis-
being
of
things,
See the
It is
in the is
worth
noting that
of man
Kant
as, if not
more
than, Machiavelli
and
Hobbes that
prais
He
goes
ing nature for being cruel and vicious for it is misery that is nature's engine to compel men to develop towards morality by forcing them to universalize their particular passions; Third Critique, sect. 83,
AA,
tics
vol.
v,
pp.
AA,
vol.
vm,
p. 21. of Aristotle's
44.
See the
in
Saunders'
note I
and also
remarks
in the translation
Poli
1,
(Penguin,
45.
198
1),
p.
390,
Aristotle's
own remarks
in bk. 7,
ch.
to which
Saunders is
kind
referring.
and of course
there
is the
general
teaching
of
justice is
health
and
of soul and a
man
precisely
(e.g.
443c-445b).
Foot
Warnock
and others also wish to reunite the prudential and the moral
by
relating the moral to human benefit and harm, but they do, or were inclined to do this, by giving up the idea of the noble and returning to the selfishness of Hobbes (e.g. Foot, op. cit., p. xiii). For a
ent to violate the
Socratic position, one may compare Whately : "If anyone really holds that it can ever be expedi that he who does so is not sacrificing a greater good to a less injunctions of duty that it can be really advantageous to do what is morally (which all would admit to be inexpedient),
more
will come
wrong, and
forward
and acknowledge
that to be his
to protest, for my
deepest abhorrence,
against what
princip
conceive
Rheto
ric,
in Longmans, London, 1877, p. 316. Also Veatch. 'Telos and Teleology in Aristotelian D. J. O'Meara. Studies in Aristotle (Catholic University of American Press. Washington, 1981). One
Ethics,'
ancient authors,
he
wanted
fection
and elevation of
and
Beyond Good
370 tic,
Interpretation
nature, Kant devises
an autonomous noble.
nonteleological science of
'oughts'
self-willed categorical
consequence of
man existence.
making more absolute fundamental splits in hu reaffirming The moral is divorced from the natural and knowable and also
and
from the
One
prudential and
the
fully
splits
cannot
have been
overcome or
doned in the
historical development
cardinal
of autonomous
morality
since
The Kant, for they have distinction, remains today as much dependent on empiricist notions of the 'is', or of 'facts', and a selfish understanding of human desires as it was for Kant; and
thesis
of autonomous
morality, the
is/ought
there
is
still
moral
has
not
been
understood
properly
if it is
from
These
morality,
as
derived
is lot
an examination of
historical origins, do
not
in themselves For
one
amount
to a refu
a
tation,
of
either of
the
them.
thing
there
back up the Machiavellian account of the natural man very (the appeal to facts of history is one of the strong points of Machiavelli's work). Yet one must not forget that there are other ways of coping with this evidence
good evidence to
without
ther.46
going the way of Machiavelli, and so have, in fact, throughout this paper,
are with the more ancient one.
without
contrasted
of
Kant
ei
account of
how things
revealed
my
own
Certainly
for
one who
is drawn towards
place
to the noble, the ancient vision is far more promising. Still it has not been
to settle this
my
aim
help
issue is.
46.
Aristotle, Politics,
1253*29-39.
Review Essays
Faith
and
Reason in
Contemporary
Perspective
Apropos
of a
Recent Book
Ernest L. Fortin
Boston College
After
centuries of
heated
and often
attempt
to
reopen
the
question of
faith
and reason
is bound to
challenge.
anachronism or at convenient
best
daring
terms,
once used as
knowledge
whose problematic re
western
thought,
our
have
"religion"
"experience,"
substituted
both
of which are
supposedly less
that
"reason"
readily accessible to us. No one is likely which has a certain prima facie evidence
longer claim,
"varieties"
and we
have
all
and others
sible
of religious
experience,
it is
pos
to
become
if
we
have
no
them our
selves.
Indeed,
degree
of openness
to
prevail regard
ing
described but
entitled
require no
justification. It
suffices that
to account
"authentic."
Everyone is
having
be
or answer
any
Since their
objects are
presumed to
pale of rational
discourse,
judged irrelevant is
unanswerable.
not always
easy to tell
an authentic experience
from
There is
no
feel
when
I have
toothache,
and,
having
is
had
what others go
through
ence
when
they
similarly
afflicted.
If, however,
if it has to do
issues
as subtle and
elusive as those
belief,
may be in
more than
order.
Seemingly
profound experiences
to be nothing
passing fancies, delusions, or momentary infatua deeper have tions. Others obviously roots, but even they are not wholly unam biguous in so far as they are apt to be mediated if not actually induced by the larger context of opinion to which they belong. For all practical purposes the world is what we see in it, and what we see in it is, with rare exceptions, what we
fits
of enthusiasm,
have been
taught to see
in it. Our
thoughts and
feelings
are
rarely
ours alone.
They
tend to be those of our time or of our society and are generally shared
by
They
they
372
owe
Interpretation
both their plausibility and their authority. The Hindu who is persuaded that is not indulging in a private fantasy or expressing a purely per sonal view. His is noticeably different from that of the party-goer
"knowledge"
who
much
backyard has
wings.
Still, it is
not
different
for
granted.
This
simple observation
is
traditions,
they
often
"religions"
speaking
of
differ widely from one another. Hence the modern habit in the plural rather than of in the singular, as
"religion"
was
character of
been
called
include
some reference
follows that, once the normative into question, any effort to evaluate to criteria that are not indigenous to any
them.
great
The
theologians of the past were not wholly unaware of the problem and
preferred a more objective approach
accustomed.
that is why
we
they
have
lately
was
become
They knew
"faith"
of
ultimately
grounded
in
an experience of some
sort, whether it be
God had
his message,
but they denied that it was a simple matter of subjective experience and insisted that the formulation of its content be submitted to the external control of reason. The
assumption
mind's natural
ous
that, although the divinely revealed truth exceeded the capacity, it did not run counter to it and was not totally impervi
was who reveals
to it.
was also
the author
of
himself,
between
antici
the
dogmas
It
of
the
and the
independent findings
be
pated.1
Christianity
was not
was
in
become in fact
a universal reli
people and
gion.2
its
incongruent
or
demonstrably
were
false. The
assent that
they
rationabile obsequium
(cf. Romans,
capable.
12:1).
It
human beings
theoretically
of
There
was of
danger
philosophic as
investigation
its
roots and no
allowing
long as the investigator was competent. If Philosophy could be employed, not indeed as a pass judgment on the truth or falsity of Revelation, but
its meaning
and counter
any
be
leveled
It is
against quite
it in the
name of reason.
possible,
however,
reason
Christian faith, medieval theology downplayed its component, just as, in its eagerness to react against
the
prone to overlook
experiential or
this tendency,
singular merit
theology is
example,
its
rational component.
and
The
See, for
2.
Cf. Augustine,
City
contra
Gentiles, I,
Faith
and
Reason in
Contemporary Perspective
a
373
Christian
Theology,1
happy
proaches and
by
balance between these two ap restating the problem as it posed itself phenomenology
to
subtitle
by
using the is
contributions of modern
it. As its
suggests, Sokolowski's
in
to
what
now called
"fundamental
of
theology."
Its immediate
that of
rea
is
not so much
the life of
faith
with
son as
to
make sense of
theology is
or
said
to proceed
by
way
of clarification rather
than
by
way
of
inference from
premises to conclu
space"
sions.
It
horizon
(cf.
within which
the
"meaning"
of
these teachings
can
of
believers
most
and
interested
nonbelievers alike
of not
Accordingly, it is
of manifesta a
tion,"
disclosure"
or a
"theology
necessarily in
opposition
to,
"theology
for the theology of the Middle Ages. Its thesis is that there is imbedded in the structures of the Christian faith a coherent pattern of
of
things,"
Sokolowski's becomes
term
thought that
culiar
fully
manifest
only
when we reflect
thematically
it
with
on
the pe
understanding
to
of
God that
underlies
it
and contrast
vades
and religious
thought.
According
terms
of
Sokolowski,
the world, a
being
that
in any religious tradition other than Christianity is God is not in any way affected by the existence or nonexis
not
tence of the
responsible
world.
God is
himself a
both for its coming into being and its continued existence, he gains nothing from its presence, just as he would lose nothing from its absence. Take God away and nothing is left of the world, but the converse does not obtain, for
even
if there
were no
world, God
would still
undiminished
greatness"
goodness and
(p.
107).
In him
and
tence
or
coincide.
'better' "
but there is no When he creates, "there may be (p. 19). This insight, as we learn from the first chapter of the book, is
celebrated
being
is
all of
than
be
conceived.
formula according to which God is the The distinction that it presumes from
common experience.
unlike
any
In
imply
have
no mean
ing
no
(cf.
pp. 32-33).
Without
daughter,
there
is
father
The
present case
rela
tionship
3.
of
direction
+ 172.
ad
only.4
Notre Dame
For
London:
University
of
1982.
Pp.
xiv
4.
lum,
where
Aquinas
a real
of
the relation
God to the
creature
is
no more than a
"relation
(relatio
374 God is
perfect
Interpretation
no more perfect
for
having
created
the
for
not
having
created
it. Such
thought, for
and
being in
the
universe.
"In Greek
God is merely the most perfect Roman religion, and in Greek and Roman
the
most
powerful,
most
inde
self-sufficient,
most
being."
the context of
unchanging beings in the world, but they are ac Hence "the possibility that they could be
though
anyone"
to
god of
(p.
everything that is not divine were not, is not a possibility that occurs 12). This is true of the Olympian gods, but it is also true of the
matter
how Aristotle's
god
is to be de
thought, he is part of the world, and it is obviously necessary that there be other beings besides him, whether he (pp. 15-16). Within this framework, the whole of na is aware of them or
scribed,
the prime
mover or
the self-thinking
not"
ture
is looked
upon as a rational
necessity
and
is treated
as such.
have
equally
stantial one
characteristic of
of
simply does not arise. The the later Platonic tradition, despite its
existed principle of all
is
on
the transcendence
the divine
things, for
of what
even
here the
itself"
transsub-
One
or
the Good
is
still
"taken
'part'
as
by being
18).
over,
for,
and
in many, book
never
As the
rest of the
so well
(p.
which attention
Christian life
the
and thought.
It is indispensable to
vine
ner
Incarnation, di
the man
governs
in
Christians
the
Scriptures,
them,
and relate
is
not to
im
portance of that
distinction is
fully
cease
to
be
mysteries
mysterious
but only that one then begins to see more clearly wherein their character lies (cf. pp. 37-39). Such an approach has the great advan
(pp.
Contrary
there
thinkers,
is
tem of symbols
finds among contemporary religious Christian reducing theology to a complex sys designed to convey a purely human meaning. On this score,
to what one so often
no question of
Sokolowski
be
or
Lonergan,
of
whose
"transcendental
and
arrives at
God through
an analysis
human thought
its
alleged
demand for
complete or unrestricted
knowl
edge.
world
Unlike Sokolowski, Rahner and Lonergan take the createdness of the for granted, for only on that assumption can it be regarded as transparent
to God and
hence
"completely
fails to
intelligible."
As
consequence,
neither of them
Christian
give
Their tran
mind.
"due
It
refuses to accept
it
as a real
entirely
within a perspective
pp. 108-109).
seems to
detect in their
approach a
Faith
or
and
Reason in
Contemporary
with
Perspective
natural and
375
the supernatural
orders.5
His
dealing
this
of
Karl
Barth,
but
who goes
gether
makes us us
by leaving
that this
112).
repudiation generates
One further
point
Christian theology itself. Since that dis tinction is not entirely beyond the scope of reason, it does not strictly speaking belong to the realm of faith, but since it has not in fact been discovered without
world occupies a unique position within
hesitates to describe it
stands at
advantage.
Because it
as
it
Nonbelievers
will
have
fewer difficulties
accepted
it
or at
it than they do with the dogmas of the faith, and, having least been made to see that it is not manifestly contrary to rea
reluctant to concede that the
reason
son,
they
pp.
will
be less
not accessible
to human
alone, do
not require
it (cf
xii, 39,
and 113).
parallels
was mentioned
in the theologically lean and impover earlier, its topic and the level on
it is taken up are more typical of former ages than of ours and the thesis that it lays before us is argued with a cogency that one admires all the more as it
rarely found elsewhere today. One can only hope that, by raising once again the thorny issue of the rapport between faith and reason, and by raising it in a
is
so
manner
that is both
respectful of
develop
trend
in
religious
There does
not appear
it
sets out
to
do,
the
be
and even
if they it
As such, it
prized
stands
may in
has
always
looked
upon
as an
ally
rather than an
enemy
of
from the
same
premises, and
they
its point of departure, is bound to arrive at similar conclusions and will agree that the Christian faith cannot be dismissed as meaningless, that its main tenets are
neither patent absurdities nor
and
hence that
scribe to them
without
lapsing
obvious contradictions.
This said,
more
from its
more modern
(and
sometimes
disclosure"
"theology
of
medieval
is really
as
new as
it
claims
theologians
brought to
5.
their various
formalities, they
the same terms
See
esp. pp.
101
or
where
up in
much
but
without
any
mention of either
Rahner
Lonergan.
376
can
Interpretation
concerned than we are with or manifest of
the manner
in
which
light,
no
"presenced,"
are
themselves to us. To
intention
things"
tandem"
separating the two theologies, which, he (p. 93); but he nevertheless sees them as different.
takes the Christian distinction between
"theology
in
on
of
God dis
the world for granted and concentrates on its two terms, the
zeroes
"theology
of
closure"
distinction, however, is
imply
that one
wherein
has already analyzed its terms and de they differ. The medievals may pos
sibly have taken the distinction between God and the world for granted, but there is reason to think that Sokolowski, who highlights that distinction, tends to take
its
terms
for
in
granted. point
A
elian
case
is his insistence
or
on
Aristot
God,
which
may
do full justice to the complexity of Aristotle's Unfortunately, the texts in which the problem is taken up
may
not
in the Metaphysics
relatively few in
number
and, as the
long
history of Aristotelian scholarship demonstrates, notoriously pret. Ascertaining what exactly Aristotle may have meant by
task, especially
and
difficult to inter is
no small
mover"
"God"
is
applied not
the
but, in
to the outermost
heaven,
all of
the
heavenly bodies,
Greek tradition, it
self. The ambiguity is noted by Cicero, who observes apropos of Aristotle's lost dialogue On Philosophy: "At one moment he assigns divinity exclusively to the
world
itself a god;
elsewhere
he
the world, assigning to this god the task of regulating and sustaining the movement of the world by means of a revolution of some sort; then he calls the
celestial
world which
heat (or ether) a god, not realizing that the heaven is he himself had previously designated by the name of
a part of
god"
that
(De Nat.
to the
Deor.,
1. xiii. 33).
Clearly,
a
some of
Aristotle's
"divine"
beings
belong
is concerned, but it is
that whole. The
is himself
"part"
of
variously
cf.
as
"self-subsisting
an
actuality"
I07ib20),
"eternal
and
atixr\v,
odoiav
ioj2b2-j;
dxivr)xov,
I07ib5), the
good at which
universe aims
he himself does
not
depend
them or receive
subject of sacred
theology,
which
anything from them. God is appropriately begins with him and studies
him.6 He is not as such the subject of metaphysics or erything else in relation to being,7 first philosophy, which takes as its theme knows nothing of being qua God as he is in himself, and would not speak of him at all were it not for the fact
becomes
unintelligible without
him. Significantly,
6. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., I, q.l, a. 7. 7. Cf. Metaphysics, I003a2i, I004bi5, I025b2,
etc.
Faith
and
Reason in
Contemporary
Perspective
311
God is discussed only toward the end of the Physics and the Metaphysics, where he is introduced as the extrinsic final cause of the world, as distinct for its intrin
sic
final
its
parts
As for the
(cf.
being
it
linked to the
world as to
be
unthinkable without
pp.
ments
16-18), it too may have to be re-examined in the light of other state that bear on this subject. The problem comes up at least once in the Meta
physics,
stances.
in
connection with
the discussion
of
"reasonable"
(evXoyov)
to suppose
set at ei
is identical to that be
of
the spheres,
which
is tentatively
is
not
forty-seven. Yet he
in any way
no means
to the
(cf. Met.,
I074ai4-3i).
Even if these
accurate,
however, they
are
by
fatal to Sokolowski's
him from the God
sight
thesis; for
Aris
difference
still separates
comes most
in Sokolowski's discussion
than
view
God. The
pages
bring
issue
of all
more
familiar
according to
which
between the
the
the philosophic
traditions turns
tence.8
in the final
of creation or
divine
omnipo
Between a God who is defined exclusively as the thought that thinks it self, is ignorant of what goes on in this world, and has nothing to do with its
all-powerful cre
no middle
coming into being or its governance on the one hand, and the ator of the biblical tradition on the other, there is obviously
term.
From this
point of view at
least it is certainly
possible
God,
who not
only
beings in
but,
as the
within
ipsum
esse subsistens or
would appear
uniquely being.
being,
al
side when
creation
philosopher owes
by the
by
it
in
West, Is
lam, Judaism,
ined that
one still
son case
Christianity. It does
thoroughly, the philosopher hard to see how God could produce beings other than himself and it is thing, be said to be infinite or to exhaust the totality of being. As far as human rea
follow necessarily that, having exam will be more inclined to accept it. For
knows, nothing
"more"
can
be
added
"greater"
something
but nothing
the
problem
or
provides elucidate
us
with a good
shorthand statement of
it. It is equally
8. See inter multa alia Averroes, Decisive Treatise, in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (N.Y., 1963), I73"75; Maimonides, Guide, 11. 13.
378 hard to
Interpretation
see
how
who is defined as pure and changeless actuality could cre from potency to act and hence without undergoing some kind passing Finally, if God can create, he also has the power to intervene in the a
God
them as
he
sees
fit.
Anything
that is not
inherently
possible.
In that case,
the
science
live
with
realization
by
omnipotence
the
an unknown
factor
or an element of unpre
dictability into
Much
tled with these
issues, it is fair
goes on
problems
have
always
been
clearer
much when
he
to
explain
God
and
the
world
is
doctrines in
be
so
far
as
it "en
and the
affections"
demands the
collaboration of
before it truth, be
can even
be
stated
(pp. 123,
142).
While
not
itself
properly
supernatural
it
at
much
in
belong
exclusively to the
not claim to
should
be
that
part, did
In Topics I04b6-i7, he
factory
his "fewest
solution,
he
also makes
it
clear
own alternative to
difficulties"
the others only because it was the one that offered the (cf. Met., iojsa2-j) and shed the greatest amount of light on
being
Since
and so
becoming
that had
dominated the
whole of pre-Socratic
philosophy.9
being
taking
our
from
Socrates,10
Sokolowski's
account of
human
or moral things.
particular
instance begins
(pp. 53-68) that takes its bearings from the Nicomachean Ethics
the nature of moral agency as
categories or and
well as on
and
fo
cuses on
Aristotle's division
of
human
types
formal
nent, the
incontinent,
who
by Kant,
character
is
used as a
to
moral
in
classical
thought. For
Kant,
the ethical
and
life is
conceived
solely in
between inclination
duty
or
between
The
virtues and
human
wholeness
habits have practically no role to play in it and the all but disappears. Kant had the right idea when he
of
9.
this
frequently
I075a25-I076a5. 10.
Faith
"related
and
Reason in
Contemporary
Perspective
divine"
379
(p. 56), but that is about responsibility to the issue of the as much as Sokolowski is willing to say in his behalf. For an adequate assess ment of natural moral phenomena "we must get out from under and this is
moral
Kant,"
where
Aristotle
can
be
most
helpful to
us
(p.
The Aristotelian
tian view,
view of
morality is subsequently
some extent
Chris
which modifies
it to
and,
by
virtues and
None
of
these
tinue to serve as a
taken to mean
are
virtues
destroys the
virtues,
"ballast"
for Christian
action
be
introduced,
means rather
situation,
what
supposed more
man would
be
expected
(p. 82). To be
specific,
perspective
The Christian
ought
does
not
bring
in
do according to the nature of things; the Christian illumination of what is to be done consists first of all in confirming what is good by nature, and in appreciating
to that
what
is
good
according to
therefore
nature
is
not
willed
by God.
simply good in itself but also good be What is good by nature is not set over what
what
is
good
by
grace
is
good
by
grace
is
not
simply a in the
While there is
to applaud
in
all of
this,
help thinking
even the
that
Sokolowski's determination to
suspicion of
absolve
Christian
him to
from
faintest his fa
later
irrationality
has
again caused
the evidence in
vor. Among other things, his interpretation of the Ethics stresses only ments as may be thought to be neutral in regard to the distinction that made
such ele
was
between
the kind
pagan and
Christian
virtue. of
spirit that
about the
of proce resolve
dure,
to
level
they
to the
morally
good or
most
important,
The
attaches
to
in the Aristotelian
scheme.
for the assertion that Christian morality does not contradict pa but merely redirects or refines it by privileging "certain aspects of morality " (p. 83). Generally speaking, it exhibits a livelier concern natural moral
way is thus
gan
paved
goods"
11.
Sokolowski's
remarks
concerning the difference between natural and Christian morality are between the Augustinian and Thomistic views of natural virtue
"false"
virtue; 78-79 and 88). In simple terms, for Augustine natural virtue without faith is for Aquinas, it is virtue, albeit only relative virtue. This apparent discrepancy is rightly said to find its explanation in the fact that Aquinas distinguishes more sharply between the order of nature
(cf.
pp.
"true"
It is not unimportant to note, however, that Augustine, who generally works Platonic framework, tends to study all things in the light of their highest principles. Just as Plato denies that virtue without true knowledge is genuine virtue, so Augustine denies that virtue
and the order of grace.
within a
without
faith is true
virtue.
380
Interpretation
human beings have in
common
with what
"as
created and
loved
and redeemed
by
God"; it
and of all
to the
needs and
dignity
of
it is
more emphatic
in its
proclamation of
"the
natural
equality
men,"
later to be
not even
reasserted
None
of
this,
Rousseau (pp. 83, 96). by Hobbes, Locke, the addition of humility to Aristotle's list of virtues, con
and
natural goodness.
stitutes an obstacle
to the pursuit of
Humility
as a
may
affect one's
worth, but it does not enter into the believer any less secure in his actions
humility"
and supernatural
is
proof enough
ably together (p. 85). All well and good, different types
he
of
save
two vastly
compelled
which one
is
sooner or
later
to choose. Luther may have exaggerated but he was not entirely wide of the mark
when
pronounced
books,"
worst of all
one that
"flatly
the
opposes
divine
virtues."12
and
happen to
agree on
many
of
thing
proves
promotes one
depending
on one's
highest
one at that.
(p.
81)
says a good
justice
above
nobility,
once
thereby stripping
required of
of
splendor.13
Magnanimity,
achievement
it is
everyone,
inevitably
albeit
ceases to as
be the
rare
described in Book IV
the Ethics. It
becomes,
Aquinas
would
have it,
moral
the most necessary of the (Summa Theol., 11-11, qu.129, a. 5). This alone does not make Christian morality any less but to anyone who is not inclined to
virtues
"reasonable,"
a part of
measure
human
perfection
by
could make
it look
and
somewhat
it in the New Testament, it less lofty. For better or for worse, there are not
what said about
is
"ladies"
"gentlemen"
many
tried
12. 93-9413.
anywhere
in the Bible,
and
and
to
behave
as
if they
were
Saul
Michal
immediately
to
pp.
the German
i960),
77, Sokolowski
use of
notes
by
and
food
way of comparison that, whereas "natural temperance, for drink in view of health and the exercise of reason, in
.
fused
toward
asceticism."
No
one
denies,
of
more
ascetical than
reflects a
purely
natural
interesting
point
in Sokolowski's
statement
is that it
purely instrumental conception of natural virtue, which is regarded as a means to a further end, whether it be bodily health or the healthy condition of the mind. No mention is made of the Aris
totelian notion of moderation and moral virtue generally as something (xaXov) or desirable for its own sake; cf. Nic. Ethics, ni5bi3 and 24: rn6i 2 and b2o; H17JI7; 1 1 igai8 and bi7;
"noble"
120a23,
et passim.
Faith
mind
and
Reason in
Contemporary
their
Perspective
381
soon
learned to
rue
mistake.14
Along
as
similar
lines, it is
significant
and
has
the
between Christ
Socrates (who
and
was not a
far
as
of
"goods"
highly
than others,
Simply put, by valuing some moral Christianity risks inhibiting the devel
to the attainment of
human
excellence.
evident
The from
and
problem
that
purely philosophical standpoint moral virtue is fully supported by nature that its normal requirements are always consonant with the good of society
a
as a whole.
To
cite
only
one of
by Sokolowski,
can
Christian
on ratio
ity's
infanticide
be defended
Christian grounds, but the reasons that purport to justify it may have to be pondered in the light of other reasons that militate against it in certain
nal as well as on
circumstances.
Aristotle, Sokolowski's
to
spokesman
for
natural
be limited One
be
allowed
I i35b20-26).
strict observance of
the
rules of justice as
derstood
would
the
no regard
survival, but
as
neither
Aristotle
nor
any
of
far
to
maintain
everywhere possible.
Confronted Ages
with
of
the Middle
applicability
of all
As
one of
them expressed it
ted.15
universally admitted is not rational and what is rational is not universally admit The question with which we ultimately come face to face is whether, in
the absence of a
legislating God,
it. Sokolowski
separable
puts us on
he
that "the
divine is in
obligatory
from
a sense of
the good
and
the
natural
(p.
55).
The
moral man as
such,
one
candidate
revelation.
straightaway to the comparatively brief but incisive appendix that is devoted an examination of the relationship between Christian belief and This brings
us
the political life (pp. 157-64). Sokolowski notes perceptively that the privatiza tion of
religion necessitated or
brought
about
by
liberal
poli-
Cf. I Samuel, 15:1-9; II Samuel, 6:16-23. Cf. Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace,
11. 12.7-8.
382
Interpretation
part of
tics on the
theology. Such
phers and
was not
political
theory
and
lively
interest in
taining
in
society.
One
to the
present-
day
but
rule
is to be found in the
gives
works of
Leo Strauss
his disciples, to
whom
Sokolowski
full
credit
for
having
this problem
with whom
he
nevertheless
feels
compelled
cial points.
gion
Specifically, he sees no warrant for the allegation that revealed reli renders "the political life, or at least the preservation of natural right impos
in
so
sible"
far
as
it
body
politic
"as
superior
to
intelligence
or natural abil
else
but because they are the repositories of certain higher truths to which no one is privy. His answer to that charge is that Christianity leaves the realm of na
political
equally
"a group
of people who
by
possess."
virtue of of all
they
of
None
of
its
central
doctrines, least
human
158).
necessities"
normal operations of
reason or contravenes
the
political order
(p.
acknowledges that
Strauss'
position on
these
as the
"communication
of commandments
reason"
and
that,
as the
story
of
Abraham
and
"may
even appear to
be
irrational."
Such its
an
understanding is for
to
Christianity,
more whose
which,
we are again
told,
(p.
159).
Equally
of the
objectionable
in Sokolowski's
eyes
between the
distinction between
nature and
political virtues
faith, along
with
the Christian
the obligations
they
risk of
losing
acknowledges the
threat that the weakening of the sense of the sacred poses to civil society. For the
same
odds with
reason, Sokolowski cannot accept the view that Athens is permanently at Jerusalem or that philosophic reason and religious belief can coexist
an
only in
uneasy
and
finally
unresolvable
tension
of
According
to
Strauss,
this tension is
what prompted
many
conceal their
them openly they should un dermine the salutary opinions by which most people live and on which society depends for its well being. This peculiar mode of writing may have been preva lent among philosophers in the past, but Sokolowski denies its relevance to
by disclosing
Christianity
on
not enter
into
competi-
Faith
tion with
and
Reason in
and
Contemporary Perspective
other writer can
383
reason"
finds its
or
home."
The Christian
dispense
this
form
of concealment oth
deliberate
dissimulation,
not
because he is
known"
more
honest
or
forthright than is
ers, but because the things he believes in "do not what is believed and what is (p. 162).
necessitate a conflict
between
Christianity
not a conven
tion,
formulating for
the uneducated
in
way that is
thoughts about the ultimate, the sacred, the necessary, the obligatory, or the
whole
that philosophy then scrutinizes and reveals as mere opinion. Unlike the
God
of whom
unlike
Strauss speaks, the Christian God is not "unfathomable the God of the philosophers, he is not intellect alone. As the ipsum he is both Will
the
and
will,"
and
esse
subsistens,
Intellect
the other.
Moreover,
telligibility
exercise of
fact that he
does
not
deprive
nature of
its in
the
or prevent
discerning
that
intelligibility by
their unimpeded reason. Hence the Christian need not prescind from
speculates about the world.
what
What he does
as a phi
losopher is
world
no
different from
he
would
do if he
were convinced
that the
is
eternal and uncreated. acute comments are all the more welcome as
Sokolowski's
unusual
they
frequently
analysis of
critical of not
Strauss
entirely
unsympathetic
to him and he
fully
appreciates the
posed
by
the fact that one cannot always tell whether Strauss is speak
Strauss certainly
religion as a
merely paraphrasing the authors about whom he writes. implied that many of these authors looked upon revealed
politically useful myth, however cautious they may have been in stating that view. What is more, he never expressly disagrees with them. But nei ther does he profess to agree with them; for only a completed philosophy, as dis
tinct from a philosophy that
quest
understands
itself
for
falsity
was
of revealed
rule out
its
in
ophy.
He knew that,
limits,
"teachings"
the
ophers could
be harmonized
of
the achievements
of
Averroes, Maimonides,
in
which
Thomas Aquinas
as examples
the various
ways
leaves
a
untouched of
the
question of whether
the
way
life
rather
with the
believer's human
pacity
of
reason or cannot
be
nailed
down
to quarrel
ment against
it
would
have to be based
on premises
influence
Rahner
of
divine
revelation.
Sokolowski has
he
reproaches
possi-
and
Lonergan
with not
accepting the
384
Interpretation
to
be
reluctant
Using
Strauss
against
himself,
so
to speak, Sokolowski
of
quotes a statement
to
the
"By becoming dignity dignity of man and therewith of the goodness of the world,
aware of the
we understand
it
as created or
uncreated,
which
is the home
of man
because it is
the home
of
the human
mind."16
From that
not
statement
he infers that
as
by
Strauss'
be interpreted
just
another convention
that the Christian thinker is not required to choose between nature on the one
and creation and grace on
hand
beside
to the
of
the point,
however, inasmuch
convention; but
as
Sokolowski has
general and
not proved
but merely
in
the full
asserted
in
Christianity
particular
even
if it is not, in it
we should miss
import
the
statement
if
we were
to see
a simple acknowledgment of of
fact
that there is a
large
area of agreement
vealed religion.
lel
passage
plexed,"
The total picture comes into view only when in the essay entitled "How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Per where Strauss explains that the same conclusion in the instance under
immateriality of God may occa be drawn from two different and opposed premises, to wit, the eternity sionally of the world or its creation in time. But he is careful to add that the results in each
consideration, the existence, oneness, and
case are not
simply identical:
someone might
For instance,
would
have
Germany
her
be
she won,
she
be
assured
by
have
abstracted
ally against Soviet Russia; but from the difference between Germany as the
need
tyrannically
whose
is
characterized
by
Will
and whose
in
knowledge."
Granted, in
his
the vast
majority
of cases
the
human
reason alone as
the one who seeks to please God above all else are
likely
regarding
what
is to be done in
a particular set of
But there is also something of importance to be learned from the few remaining cases in which their actions could conceivably differ. As a Christian theologian, Sokolowski can hardly be blamed for taking excep tion to the Maimonidean and Straussian view according to which God is essen tially Will rather than Intellect and for countering it with the Thomistic view, for
16.
1968),
17.
p.
Education?"
in Liberalism, Ancient
and
180.
Faith
which
and
Reason in
as much
Contemporary Perspective
as
385
Thomas'
God is
position
is
he is Will. The fact is, however, that theological interpretation of the biblical datum that draws heavily
Intellect
philosophy.
on
Aristotelian
If
is
a
said about
Scriptures,
which
is
what
different
vision emerges.
obvious not
numerable other
only from the paradigmatic story of Abraham and Isaac but from in biblical passages as well, the biblical God does not give any rea he does
or what
sons
for
what
he demands
of
outlook
is only
slightly modified in the New Testament, which replaces what is now called the Old Law with the new and in some fashion perhaps even more paradoxical "com
mand"
of
love. It is
no accident
that
within
vol-
untaristic emphasis on
the
divine
will again comes massively to the fore in the late-medieval theologians as Scotus and Ockham.
Closely
related
to this problem
is the
whole
issue
of esoteric
writing,
which
figures prominently in Straussian hermeneutics but which is supposedly out of place in the Christian world. In his treatment of this matter, Sokolowski laments
the fact that more
and alludes
is
not
known
about
the way
Strauss interpreted
according to
Aquinas'
works
to a "Straussian oral
tradition"
which
Strauss
in
would
have
161).
considered
believer"
a philosopher than a
(p.
is
no
way
of
knowing
advance
what a
truly
great mind
never questioned
whenever
Aquinas'
the sincerity of
religious
beliefs. It did
not surprise
him that,
possible, Aquinas consciously and deliberately interpreted Aristotle's text in the manner that best accords with the Christian faith. Strauss was also intrigued by
Aquinas'
habit
of
with some of
his Christian
predeces
sors of
by
(reverenter)
a practice reminiscent
their
Islamic Aquinas
was
not
to suggest, the
matter
however,
is that
that
he
regarded
as an esoteric writer.
upon
The truth
of
genuine esotericism
less frowned
than ignored
where
for
long
who
time
it
survived
of a pedagogical
which
resort
when
Aquinas,
vaguely
at
acquainted with
it
Pseudo-Dionysius, leaves it
uses at other moments in his saying that, while it may have had its legitimate apud modernos est inconsuetus tory, it was now largely abandoned
Be that
as
it may, Sokolowski
home"
ophy
to
of
which calls
for
a world of
in
which
"the
and so well
does away
with
"many
the
paradoxes and
philo
describes between
religion and
(p.
163).
The
be
made more
rather
simply
by
not
stating that,
as a charis not
love
than of the
and
Law, Christianity is
ed.
linked to any
18.
particular political
community
does
Prooemium,
1.
386
code of
Interpretation
laws
by
which such a
any rate, it
that its
was
governed.19
On that level
at
criticism still a
that could be di
is
imperatives
in full
accord with
life. As
reason
we
have had
occasion
may feel compelled to embark upon courses of action that Christian morality reproves. One does not solve that problem by ar guing that none of the teachings of the Faith violates the "natural law"; for, the
itself,
wise and
decent
rulers
law properly so-called is itself a product of the Christian world and a What Christian theol reflection of its own understanding of natural though not always, what it has already chosen calls is sometimes, ogy to define as reason.
natural
morality.20
"reason"
It is easy, too easy perhaps, to say that "Christian Revelation leaves the
ral necessities and natural
natu
truths
intact, including
in
po
litical
life,"
positions of
much of
its
civil society (p. 158). Everyone knows that throughout Chruch did arrogate to itself the right to exercise political
in
authority and to impose its ethical demands on society as a whole. Sokolowski, who does not dwell on the subject, would probably reply that this is a simple his torical accident based on a misunderstanding of Christian principles on the part
of
frequency
Strauss'
been
to
the centuries
inspire in the
19.
minds of others.
with which that misunderstanding has does little to allay the fears that it continues criticisms are not proper to him and to
ception of
On that basis, Sokolowski argues for the greater transcendence of the New Testament con God over against that of the Old Testament (cf. pp. 1 24-29). The God of the Old Testa
"interventionist"
God
who
does
not allow
His
dominion
over
the world no
doubt
him
apart
but for
all
that,
"they
speak of
'the
thing'
same
truly
while
As Sokolowski himself eventually recognizes, however, this super eminently transcendent character of the Christian God is often obscured in ordinary Christian piety. The whole argument, which is as subtle as it is profound, would require a much more detailed exami
nation than any that can be accorded to it here. One Testament's highly original notion of the
error"
(p.
regrets
only that
more
is
Old
of
"holiness"
(in
"transcendence")
riddle that
God,
one
the problem in a
20.
As
yet
recent studies
theory
presents a
which
no
has
been
able
to crack.
Cicero,
the expression
is
used in a clearly moral sense, identifies the natural law with right reason, thereby depriving it of its strictly legal status (cf. Republ., in. 22). The Church Fathers refer to it only sparingly and more as a
fully developed doctrine. The first theological treatises devoted expressly to it date only from the thirteenth century and are proper to the Christian West, where the natural law proved especially helpful as a means of bridging the gulf between the ecclesiastical and the temporal
commonplace than as a
powers.
Since the
frequently
been
Church
itself is the
authentic
interpreter
natural
of
is
the natural
law
fact that may seem somewhat strange if, as is accessible to the unassisted human reason. On this point, see the
law,
puzzling remarks by T. E. Wassmer, "Natural Law: Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 10, p. 262.
Contemporary Theology
Philosophy,"
and
New
Faith
his
and
Reason in
Contemporary Perspective
and
387
as
"school."
dedicated Christians
far
back
as
regrets that
Sokolowski,
who
blames
it
more
us"
theory, has
not taken
seriously himself. What he regards as the not the political life but the Lebenswelt of
"first for
which
is
modern
phenomenology,
is
not
particularly
noted
ities
This,
more than
anything else, is
lends to his
life"
analysis a
slightly
abstract
(p.
97),
an air of remoteness
from the
of
It is not necessary to add that the foregoing remarks barely touch the surface Sokolowski's essay and are in no way meant to detract from its outstanding merits. They will have achieved their purpose if they encourage others to read
the book for themselves and to read it say, there are
same
with all
few
recent
books
of
be
recommended with
the
degree
We live in
a peculiar
age,
one whose
leading
soon
thinkers are
frequently
and,
embarrassed
by
and reason
in
our midst
not
knowing
what
them,
would
just
as
ignore them
wants
altogether.
Et le
combat cessa,
faute de
combattants
Sokolowski
no
them
longer
as evident
which
to us as it was to our
forebears. His is
a coura
geous
book,
fashions
of the
day
and refuses
to be in
timidated
ment.
by
It is
dispassionate book,
of so much of
as remarkable
of
of
irrationalism
a
present-day
thought.
Theologians Rahner
ogy,
and
will
find in it
challenging
alternative most
by
Lonergan,
will also
influential be
in Catholic theol
and
it
more moderate
never
in their
criti
most part
they have
investigate. A
sure sign of
success
is
every
thing
that
is it.
said
in it in
order
to
be
profoundly
edified
by
Thought
A "Review df Culture
A Representative Notes
on
and
Idea
the Comic
Imaging
Avery
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Tracy Ellis
Theology
of
Death
Writing
Toni Morrison
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Pluralism in America
and
John
Courtney Murray
Michael Novak Karl Rahner
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and
Practice
Theology
the Arts
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Deterrence
of
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EMINENTLY READABLE.
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The Name
of
the Rose.
Jovano-
This is
tration of
no mere medieval
story.
It is
a paean a
laughter,
a celebration of
cerebration,
laudation
of
Levellerism,
and
epiphany
in the
guise of a
The story by now is well known, so little can be lost by it. Adso of Melk, the Ishmael-Watson of this adventure, is
novice assigned as amanuensis
briefly
a
to William
of
Baskerville,
of
in 1327,
by
arrange a
ciscans and
Avignon ("Heaven
grant
distasteful to the
righteous"
abbey in
northern
Italy.
They
arrive on a
Sunday
of
in
November
die
and
week,
has
which
monks
violent
deaths, Adso
floor
day
of
Jesus"
[p. 335])
in
("a fraternal debate regarding the poverty hilarious brawl (Thursday morning), and a mad
mouth a
by
(Friday
of the
night).
stuffing the pages of a forbidden book into his The week ends (Saturday, the seventh day) with
and
total
"ecpyrosis"
abbey, starting in
taking
with
it the
of
Library
around which
revolved.1
everything
smashed, pounded,
And
all
Silence is shattered,
and
pulverized and
by
an
endless
conversations, rememberings,
not
whisperings
to speak of meaningful
Italian
as a
monastery.
itself
detective
story: a or
the
typeface, traveling
after
"W"
the
(which is not,
all,
Italian
and
letter)
and who
is
as
guid,
apparently
drug-taking
man could
be
this
lanky, lan
pages, in
probable whereabouts of a
1.
seen; then in a
conversa-
Echoing, in
we run over
libraries,
of
havoc
we must make?
hand any
volume
di
vinity
or school metaphysics,
for instance
let
us ask.
Does it
contain
any
abstract
reasoning
con
cerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion."
390
tion
with
Interpretation
the abbot he is presented
with an unsolved murder
(it turns
out
to be a
suicide of
sorts)
which soon
of an apparent series of
homicides.
essen
And therein lies the reality and the mystery: there is no series! in which they are located, is of the deaths, the The
"seriality"
the investigative
intentionality
of the
"detec
(and
of
the reader, the first time around) and, at the end, in the retrospective
the main villain of the piece (Jorge of
convinced
rationalizations of
Burgos),
the
who permits
deaths"
"that
divine
plan was
directing
these
the "Seven
Trumpets"
of old
Apocalypse,
a pat
by
a somewhat
dotty
monk,
Alinardo,2
but they
491),
pattern; "There
plot,"
was no
says
William
*
at the end
(p.
and
the
whole of
mystery is
of
a triumph of
Nominalism!
The fabric
tapestry is
woven of a woof of
detective
story crisscrossing
terstices
warp
crammed with a
philosophy (epistemological and political), the in nap of details about things medieval. There is some bits
of citron scattered all
everyone,
through
literary
jected to
a course
with
of
for any reader ever sub Phalaris (p. 486), "the castrate
(p. 188),
Abelard,"
his Sic
mounta
of a golden
the
figure Darii (p. 261), Occam's razor (p. 91), Buridan's ass (or horse, p. 24), and finally Wittgenstein's ladder (p. 492), making it a sort of intel lectual coffee table book. There is even comic relief, especially the convocation
syllogistic
of
friars
in
a melee of
boasting
and
namecalling,5
be ignored.
list"
The list
with
"accidental"
of such
delights
could go
on, but
(p.
73).
We
must
His gumming of the chick-peas (p. 159) is pure Italian, a kind which is not Consider, for example, the Seventh Trumpet Jorge's cramming of the "forbidden into his mouth:
2. 3.
book"
of peninsular mentioned
family-joke.
connection with
in
out of
the angel's
honey;
and as soon as
I had
eaten
hand, and ate it up; and it was in my it, my belly was bitter. Rev. 10; 10.
mouth sweet as
Jorge enjoys eating the Second Book of Aristotle's Poetics it's the only time he laughs in the entire book (p. 481) but of course it kills him. 4. The final clue, p. 457, entails taking words as things and not even as signs. 5. A personal note. At one point in the interchange, "The Dominican Bishop
"martyr-dropping"
of
here can only be to Piano Carpini (no relation), a Franciscan friar sent with two others of that order by Innocent IV on a mission to the Mongols in 1245. The comedic intention here may well be to point up the igno rance of the bishop's Franciscan opponent, who does not challenge his facts. But insofar as Adam Smith makes his own mistake about poor Piano (conflating him with another Franciscan, sent by
sent reference
stood up.
'I
can prove
[i.e., Franciscans]
three Dominicans
Louis IX in 1253 [as per the Modern Library Wealth of Nations, pp. 389-99]), that there is some plot afoot to obscure the efforts of old Carpini.
we can
only
suspect
of
the Rose
391
form"
of the novel, its philosophical forego completely any indulgence in the detective-story "mat Echoing, therefore, the wonderful list of fundamental philosophical ques
tions offered
by Kant,
we shall approach
of
the
following I Deciphering
.
concerns: of puzzles
2.
The
3. 4.
The
the simple
Laughter7
1. DECIPHERING OF PUZZLES
The very first thing that William of Baskerville does, his "act the abbey, is to discover the location of a horse he has never William's
mysteries
address"
of
to
seen
(p.
23).
of
Seinsverhaltung
(p. 304),
a
am
in
other
words, is that
of an
decipherer
. .
of codes
(p. 166),
as
inquisitor I
[even] better
God forgive
me.
Because
Bernard is
on
interested,
not
in
discovering
at a
but in
burning
the accused.
[But] I,
knot.9
the contrary,
must also
find the
most
a nice complicated
And it
be because,
to
when as a philosopher
I doubt the
world
has
an
order, I
am consoled
discover, if
(p.
least
a series of connections
in
394).
epistemology is made to flow, a notion of truth modeled on the solving of puzzles. The procedure is packed into a peculiar ity of translation (there are several such) in a passage occurring just after William
consolation a whole
has
explained
to Adso the
principles of
solving
mystery (pp.
was not at all
304-305):
Adso]
that William
interested in
the
truth,
which
is nothing but
the adjustment
and the
can be particular, that individuation can be formal, is a characteristic theme among Scholastics, and it is no accident that the protagonist and his favorites (Roger Bacon and William of Occam) are all Franciscans although Duns Scotus, whose is haecceitas, never appears in person. Scotus, however, had little or nothing to say politically. 7. Laughter, of course, is the classical of man and the central concern of the book.
6. That forms
the Franciscan
"specialty"
"property'
For surely it
gether'
cannot
be
an accident
that the
Eskimo
expression
for the
conjugal act
and
cal"
laughing together,
between Adso
and
his
midpoint of
novel
book!
and a
8. One
of the
really
grand
inquisitor, if ever
9.
was
with
that noble
with
interested only in
causes"
his
or who
is
wicked. and
[p. 207]) Reasoning about such the only judge of that can be
ultimate
I believe
God"
(p.
30).
392
Interpretation
amused
himself
by imagining
how many
possibilities
(p. 306;
p. 309.
Emphasis
added.)10
is precisely what William was doing, and it is what the investigator into puzzles must do, but the formula being echoed by Adso is you should bite your tongue the rendered as the adequation of (even
"Adjustment"
of course
usually
"correspondence"
between) thing
and truth
and
when
puzzle-
solving is
the
made
the model of
learning (i.e.,
becomes
appropriate
term,
success.
"adjustment"
is
puzzles.
There
are
in the solving
the
puzzles, and
they
are
inevitably
ders,"
problematic
for
a science
built
on
"sets,"
ticulars, clusters,
or concepts
even manifolds of
particulars;
according to
which
they
are
to be arranged or
The relationship is suggested in a couple of lines omitted from the translation. William is speaking of "the science [Roger] Bacon spoke of (p. 207):
Observe, I
things,
not of
things.
Science has to do
things."
their
terms,
indicate
singular
ordering.
Early in the tale, when he was expatiating to Adso on the epistemology of his discovery of the missing horse (pp. 27-28), William describes the process by which a vague and general idea is gradually replaced by more specific ones as we
come closer
When
still
closer,
you will
then
define it
as an animal.
.
And finally,
when
it is
closer,
you will
be
able to
proper
distance
And only when you are at the And that will be full knowledge,
an
the
learning [l'intuizione]
horses,
not
of the singular
of
[pace Aristotle!]. So
hour
ago
could ex
pect all of
paucity saw the when I intellect's hunger was sated [intuizione]. And deduction only my my me brought know that previous had then did I single horse. reasoning my Only close to the truth. And so the ideas, which I was using earlier to imagine a horse I had
. .
because
the
vastness of
of the
not yet
seen,
were pure
were signs of
the
idea
of
'horse';
(p. 28;
the
only
when we are
lacking
things
p. 36).
Brunellus
.
appears
again, in
disquisition
on
hypothesis testing:
.
.
I line up so solving a mystery is not the same as deducing from first principles. many disjointed elements [tanti elementi sconnessi] and I venture some hypotheses. I didn't know which hypothesis was right until I saw the cellarer [looking for a
horse]
Then I
understood
that the
. .
Brunellus hypothesis
(p. 305;
p. 308).
was
the
only
right one.
I won, but I
might also
have lost
306 of the
1980).
English translation
and p.
Subsequent dual
references will
rosa,
n.
proposizione e
proposizione sulle e
fare
con
le
i termini indicano
cose
//
nome
della rosa,
p. 210.
of
the Rose
393
procedure with the
"usual"
Adso
contrasts
William's
one:
"I
un
at
that moment my master's method of reasoning, and to that of the philosopher, who reasons the ways of the
intellect"
it
seemed to me
so
quite alien
by first principles,
(pp. 305;
who
that his
12
intellect
almost assumes
divine
p. 308).
William's
rejection of
philosopher,"
"reasons
by first
in
and
"almost
assumes
divine
intellect"
is
grounded
his tender
concern
for the
prerogatives of
the divine
will:
must believe that my proposition works, because I believe it I must assume there are universal laws. Yet I but to by experience; cannot speak of them, because the very concept that universal laws and an established order [un ordine dato delle cose] exist would imply that God is their prisoner, whereas
learned it
God is something absolutely free, so that if He wanted, could make the world different (p. 207; p.
210)13
His
will
He
Adso
sympathizes:
a
"Yours is
difficult
life,"
said.
Brunellus,"
episode of
two days
"Then there is
an order a
in the
[un
ordine
del
mondo]!"
I cried, triumphant.
answered
"Then there is
p. 211).
bit
of order
in this
poor
head
mine,"
of
William
(p. 208;
Order, in short, is a function of the individual mind; and the way of discover of inquiry, is the process of deci ing it, the type and paradigm, the very
"form"
phering.
The
page or are
(pp. 165-67)
systems
particularly
William
(p. 166)
to the
ways of
breaking
is to
them:
in
deciphering
a message
guess what
it
means.
laughed.14
remarked on
which
has built
of
[costruito]
master:
the
(p. 279;
p.
and on the
contrasting temperament
his
"On
ideas
individual things;
and a
laws,"
and
afterward, too,
p. 36).
came
to him
from his
being
both
Briton
(p. 28;
13.
"Universal
all
of course,
is
quite equivocal.
derstands does
not
act and they would be understood even if, per impossibile, [the divine will] William Ockham. Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contin Appleton-Centurygents. Trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann. New York: intentions of the creative original). But the Crofts, Meredith Corporation, 1969, p. 84 (brackets in the
willing)."
principles naturally, as
if before the
As Occam says, "[The divine intellect] un act of the divine will (since their truth
were not
divine rally
bound
by
prior to
its act,
same
elicits
posite.
In the
way
that act in such a way that it could at one and the same instant elicit its op the divine will, insofar as volition itself alone is naturally prior to such an in
object p.
contingently in
such a
intend
14.
object."
the
opposite
(Ibid.,
83) In
other words,
way that at the same instant it could God's freedom to make another world is
not compromised
by the
here,
laws
of
of this one.
The problem,
is
not science
but
miracles.
The
echo,
hardly be accidental,
of
than the
learning,
394
Not
sage,
of
Interpretation
exactly.
Some hypotheses
[He
can
be formed
on the possible
first
words of
the mes
and
whether
the text.
right tack.
But it
could
apply concerning the cipher before them.] also be just a series of coincidences. A
.
from
them can
to the rest
.
rule
[una [asks
regola
Found
In
this
our
where?
Adso.]
see whether
it is the
right one.
remember
there
is
no secret
writing that
added).
cannot
be deciphered
with a
bit
of patience
(p. 166;
p. 171.
Emphasis
Lest
we
be lulled his
by
the
detective
into thinking that the showing topic here is the deciphering of codes, William's very next sentence is: "But we (p. 167). It is the library which risk losing time, and want to visit the
off expertise
in the techniques
of
his trade
library"
must of
the
be deciphered, the library which is "a great labyrinth, sign of the labyrinth as old Alinardo says (p. 158); and the library is the heart of the
world,"15
world"16
abbey (p. 36), which is itself a "mirror of the quence of infoliated symbols of symbols. Upon their from their first frightful
Adso
remarks night-visit to
(p. 120), be
all
in
a se
emergence
not
(by
accident!)
the
library
(it may
entered
by day)
to
William,
world
is,
and
are,"
be if there
were a procedure
p.
182).
Again
we must not
dally
with
young monk, is
puzzle
a place
William,
friar, it is
to enjoy.
Rather, by
be
a somewhat
ing
us now
try
to discover the
by
which order
is to
While they are wandering around the library in the darkness of that first night, William recites, "from an ancient text I once a complicated scheme for
read,"
one's way out of a labyrinth, involving making a mark with charcoal or something like that. every juncture unless it already has three marks
finding
at
...
And
by observing this rule [questa regola] you get out? [Adso asks.] Almost never, as far as I know, [William replies] (p. 176; p. 180).
15.
Its
wings and
branches
in terms
from
which the
books
or authors
not unlike supposedly came, so it is quite literally a "sign of the maps, with the Mediterranean Sea in the center and all places located in a circle
world"
16.
a condition:
you would
answer,
for there to be
a mirror of
world
form,
con
cluded
William,
for my
adolescent mind
(p.
120).
of
the Rose
much
rules of and
"ancient
texts."
heroes
of the
Library,
from
what standpoint?
and
by
means of
must,"
mathematics.
says
William the
next
.
the outside, a
asks
way
of
describing
me
the Aedificium as
shouldn't
it is inside.
.
Adso.
Let
think, it
be
so
difficult.
And the
labyrinth making signs with charcoal? No, he [William] said, the more I think
about
it,
the
am convinced.
Perhaps I
didn't
needs
in recollecting the rule well, or perhaps to get around in a labyrinth one to have a good Ariadne who awaits you at the door holding the end of a thread.
succeed so
But threads
ten
long
don't
exist.
And
also
if they
fables
speak the
truth) that
tance. The
laws
be
equal
to exist, that would signify (of labyrinth only with outside assis inside.17 to the laws of the
were
will we
figure it
out? as
"We
will use
Only
mathematical
sciences,
Averroes says,
known absolutely [in modo assoluto] (p. 215; p. the obvious conclusion: "Then you do admit universal notions.
those
Adso jumps to
(cf.
p. 208).
Not
quite.
Mathematical
that
by
our
intellect in
or
such a
way
they function always as truths, either because they matics was invented before the other sciences. And the
mind
are
innate
because
mathe
library
was
built
by
human
fashion, because without mathematics you cannot build labyrinths. And therefore we must compare [confrontare] our mathematical propositions with the propositions of the builder, and from this comparison science can
that thought
in
a mathematical
be
produced
[e di
a science of
terms
upon
termini].
dragging
me
into discus
sions of metaphysics
(p. 215;
p. 219).
There is
constructed
after
William has
re
and
layout
that
of
asks
him admiringly,
library
inside?
looking
outside,
at
it from
it
it in His
not
mind, as
if from the
[la regola],
[pace Hegel!],
do
know its
rule
because So
one can
having found it already made. know things by looking at them from the
deve
essere cosi
outside!
[exclaims
Adso.]
17.
Lasciami
metodo
pensare, non
cui
difficile.
E il
di
volevate percorrere
il labirinto facendo
No, disse,
per girare
un
Forse
bene la regola,
forse
di
in
un
labirinto bisogna
avere una
bona Arianna
il
capo
filo. Ma
non esistono
fili
cosi
lunghi. E
(spesso le favole
dicono la verita) che si esce da un labirinto solo con un aiuto esterno. Dove le leggi deU'esterno siano reason this passage is omitted uguali alle legge dell'interno (pp. 218-19 of the Italian). For some from where it belongs on p. 215 of the English translation.
396
Interpretation
creations of art
The
[Le
cose
deH'arte], because
[le
we retrace
in
our minds
,
the opera
are
Not the
cose
[non
sono
opera]
(p. 218;
p. 222).
And there
"Ancient
we
have
it,
texts"
are of no use
whose
in solving the
"equal"
puzzles of
this
world.
Only
some
some
"outside
assistance,"
laws
are
to the internal
laws, only
point of view
that
"regola,"
"as if from the only in labyrinth of this world. the And way that Ariadne's thread, that equivalent to God, is "the mathematical
conceives
outside,"
the
world
make our
sciences."
We
of
must
be forgiven this
at a
serpentine
the
there to
must
be
said
again, is
no mere
detective
story.
creational
cosmology, where
The
intelligible,
a
when
the
intelligibility
as such
is timeless
and
(who sees)
(who seeks)
kind
of
divinity?
The
ancient
lem
and
it
emerges
early in the is
middle ages
least partly meaningless. The modern prob (the Franciscans did not discover
the particular,
world where
they merely
popularized
it)
is the
In
"Divinity"
everything
intelligible
par
ticular (God
being unable to make anything meaningless), intelligibility as such? Where and what, one asks, are the
in short, do God's
18.
"mode"
is left to
To what,
and
There is
their
"world"
no separate and
of
mutual
Forms,
absolute
simplicity
excludes
multiplicity
it?"
exclusivity
"Yes.
Adso then asks, "But for the library this suffices, doesn't (p. 218), and William replies But only for the (p. 219). The implication for the story-line is that mathematics
library"
.
the
would
be to
exclude
free
acts
from the
analytic
"mathematical
science."
19.
Aquinas'
On
Being
and
Essence: "Human
. . .
na
ture, then,
nature
have the
character of a species
only
as
it
exists
in the intellect.
And
although
the
existing in the intellect has the character of a universal from its relation to things outside the in tellect, since it is one likeness of them all, nevertheless as it exists in this or that intellect, it is a cer
tain particular species apprehended
exposition on the third
men
by
the
was thus
clearly in
error
in his
book
of
the De
Anima, for he
of the
of that
form does
not come
from the
likeness it is. In
the same way, if a material statue represented a great number of men, it is agreed that the statue's im
age or
likeness
would
ter, but it
(On 1949,
would and
Being
have an individual and proper act of existing as it existed in this particular mat have community inasmuch as it would be the common representative of many Essence. Trans. A. A. Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, St. Thomas tends to be
Agent Intellect
on
men.'
pp. 41 -42.)
Averroes'
rejection of
the
particularity
of
it to be
taken seriously.
of
the Rose
397
"concepts"
though,
sought
as was so
Plato
way?
could
an
be the
"Ideas"
which
intention to
use
them in a general
In
fine, Nominalism,
must
its
have floundered aimlessly for years until a flexible number-system appeared, to provide an armature for scientific inquiry. (Imagine Galileo trying to work with Roman numerals!) And the verities of "mathematical
science"
But Nominalism
are so self-assured
or
because they
p.
are
innate
can
because
mathematics was
sciences"
other
of
215)
be
bracketed
with no
off
(".
dragging
into discussions
be
metaphysics"
p.
215)
success of experimental
inquiry
("I
won
"p.
305).
squeezed
attempt to show
accidental
by
trade an
inquisitor? Ancient
scientific experi
did
not
inquire
being
or put
ments); it accused,
imputed
were
"categories,"
then
awaiting
results
that
"largely
and
for the
part"
most
being is
to expect an
answer
from it and,
unable to check
satisfied with
anything that
"works."
Thus,
ing mode, on the other hand, confronted with the sullen silence of the accused (being doesn't speak; we speak, and maybe God speaks), too often retired to its
chambers and the somber consolations of skepticism.
"misology"
Modern
nihilism
is
dif
ferent thing; it is a resulting not from a disappointment with argu ment (as Socrates would have it in the Phaedo) but from a bitterness over the
loneliness
of a reason which
of
finds itself
suggests
so often unrewarded
by the
now-Godless
(as Kant
metaphor,
396).
words about
as
the
model of phers
judiciary
and ci
nature")
are taken as
being itself,
even
then
inevitably
is
all.
the methodologies
investigative knowl
reporting
edge,
and
and of
rules
for the
achievement of
success,
could not
be,
for
pagan philoso
Labyrinths (and
languages)
or a
are made
by
peo
Measure does
A Jew
not make
anything;
it simply is
it is; indeed, it is
within
"what."
Christian
might well
the context
20.
(202-206),
ing
to do with languages
in
their
variety
and complexity.
But the
hilarity
of
Cratylus indicate precisely the impossibility, in ancient thought, of using language as the model for being. The Name of the Rose also has some very amusing derivations (e.g., pp. 282, 283, 288), but a little fun-poking and not epistemological. their intention is only historical
398
not
Interpretation
benign Puzzler. Our
the
author
immediately
A
wish?
reportedly
no
longer
shares
that
faith;21
context of
his
puzzlement could
be? A
mem
at
ory?
cruel
hoax? A
cosmic
joke,
perhaps.
For,
as
Adso writes,
the
rosa pristina
nomine,
nomina nuda
tenemus."22
The
and
political
thrust
of
of
this "medieval
detective
story"
is
deep
and
passionate,
the
"moments"
its dialectic
are present
from the
(p.
start.
Adso
of
Melk is
of
the
born in
a castle
335).
William
of Basker-
ville, if
p.
15)
after
clearly of peasant stock is basically British (apparently which is almost as good. And we soon realize that the "bad
a
Scottish,
(this
guys"
is,
abbot,23
detective story) all come from aristocratic backgrounds (Abo the all, and Jorge of Burgos, the blind old keeper of the secrets, to name the
while
main
ones),
the victims
not
the
suicidal
girl caught
in the inquisitorial
web of
Bernard Gui
from "i
semplici,"
absence of
Duns Scotus in
all
the
finally dawns on us, after reflection, that the laudatory references to Franciscan doctors can
only be due to his virtual silence on political matters, whereas all the others Roger Bacon, Occam, Grosseteste (a semi-Franciscan) were outspoken, and
sometimes quite
active,
politically.
The
action
d'etre
of the
is
on
poor,
or to
have
advocated
at
condemnation and
prosecution,
heretical,
of all
the groups
throughout
Italy
in the
recent past.
Of
the question is
"poor"
not whether
Christ
was poor:
it is
be
poor.
And
or
does
owning
it means, rather,
p. 349).
keeping
renouncing the
and
legislate
on
earthly
(p. 345;
Heresy
as
fact, but
it
were
of
practice and
principle,
the
"heresy"
at
issue
the
illegitimacy
of wealth as
social order.
for
the
Establishment,
.
makes
the connection:
gism: P-
The Fraticelli derive from that doctrine [of the poverty of Christ] a practical syllo they infer a right to revolution, to looting, to the perversion of behavior (p. 150;
155)-
21. 22.
Cf. Current Biography, April 1985, Vol. 46, No. 4, Which has been translated as: "the
"approximately"
p.
14b.
name,
23.
we
hold
alone."
only
as a
names
Ibid.,
p.
15b.
Abbone, in
be
rendered as
"Big
Daddy,"
if
we mix
languages
little.
of
the Rose
399
order of the civilized world
...
[all
heretics]
(p. 151;
p-
155)-
are
158).
This is
logical"
a very function
political of
book,
and
it
presents
in
no uncertain
ven, in
our own
theology in the Middle Ages (a thing unknown, thank hea time), when the poor and downtrodden made use of the faith to theology
to support their dominion.
justify
As William
Every battle
guish
against
heresy
wants
only this: to
keep
the
as
lepers,
in the definition
and
is
wrong?
Come, Adso,
di dottrina]. The
have
problems"
other
206.
Emphasis
of
added).
William
simple
Baskerville is very
concerned
for
what
he
calls
"i
semplici,"24
the
folk.
cellarer was right
"So the
those their
simple
folk
always
even
for
I did
was
who speak
in their favor,
for
those
like Ubertino
!"
and
Michael,
as a
who with
words of penance
simple
to
rebel soon
was
in
such
despair
that
not consider
to be burned
witch]
not even a
Fraticello,
did
by
Ubertino's
mystical
for
something that
not concern
her.
"So it
is,"
William
answered me sadly,
(p. 406;
p.
409)
What is to be done?
The
of
solution
is
not
to
be
a matter of
on
the
part
the ruling
class.
imperiously
at
case
by
the
abbot,
"
. .
Adso:
more
Cluniacs,
hurt.
worse
than princes,
baronial than
barons!"
"Master
"
.
ventured,
[Adso is the
same stuff
son of a
baron].
"You be quiet,
the
[della
stessa pasta].
Your band
you
[Voi]
the simple.
If
a peasant comes
along
but
as
saw
yesterday, you
do
not
may hesitate to be
shielded.
receive
over
to the
secular arm.
But
own, no; he
must
Franciscan,
and
a plebeian
rat's nest of
24.
plici
His interest in
knowledge
of medicinal
et
(simples) in Italian,
other eats
must
be just
language,
the
ideolog
ical
significance
than the
by
poison
he himself
spread on the
pages
he
finally
400
this
.
.
Interpretation
holy
But
the
now
house? Ah no, this is something Abo [the abbot] cannot allow at any price. the challenge is not just a matter between me and Abo, it is between me
business [tutta la
of
"
and
whole
vicenda].
(p. 450;
pp. 453-54).
"The between
business,"
whole
"Cluniacs"
course, is
not
or even rather
the conflict
(wealthy
monastics)
and mendicant of
friars;
it is
a mat
"orders."
Earlier, in speaking
enlarges:
spiritual
inventions
Lord.25
. .
of
the simple.
out
have been
a good
illiterate,
What
p.
must
be
done? Give
learning to the
simple?
Too easy,
or
too
difficult.
(p. 205;
208) [Ba
the
be the
through a
different knowledge
processes,
that
represented also
the
heap
of expectations
of the simple.
So I think that, since I and my friends today believe that for the management of human affairs it is not the church that should legislate but the assembly of the people, then in the future the community of the learned [comunita dei dotti] will have to pro
pose p.
this
new and
*
humane theology
which
is
natural
philosophy
206; 209).
Not
yet a political
which makes
manifest
the role of i
voice of
are
in their
ex
way the
the
Christian
(pp.
people"
tent that there is one, is presented mainly in William's speech to the friars and
prelates on
Thursday
(p.
352-56).
Pope
and
Emperor
in
"poverty,"
with
the
we
Emperor [Marsilius
backing
of
the
Franciscans
William
of
for his
purposes
13).
"But
...
Padua
and
Baskerville]
man
would
like the
idea
of
hu
rule"
(p.
346).
The
the
Emperor,
the
the two
Williams (the
one of
Occam,
the
other
fictional)
and
Marsilius
Emperor in his
/
semplici.
struggle with
the
Unfortunately
it didn't
God."
that
way.
For
"The
voice of
Midrash Samuel
p. 346.
Leo Rosten's
cious reader, 26.
Treasury of Jewish
truly
catholic
William
must
This is the
its
magic"
"holy
in
connection with
the spectacles,
"where
God's
and
knowledge is
one of
made manifest
is to prolong man's very (p. 87; p. 95). 27. Professor Eco may share some of William's views on the role of the learned. Cf. the refer ence, in Current Biography, April 1985 (p. 14a), to his association with a "Gruppo "a group of writers concerned with social in the 1950s and 1960s. In that same brief biography our au thor's analysis of popular diversionary culture is spoken of: "He objected not to occasional escapist amusement but to an exclusive diet of the kind of entertainment that neither provokes social criticism
ends
63,"
change"
for
reform.'
needed
(ibid.)
of
the Rose
401
the whole medieval order of
destroy
things,
was
the emerging mercantile, manufacturing, and civic tidal wave which later
came, in Italy, the Renaissance. (Cf. Aymaro's complaint, new force is money.
pp.
be
124-27.) The
what
it has in
your coun
in
mine.
much of
.
life
elsewhere
on
dominated
and regulated
by the bar
have
tering
of goods.
goods serve
bishops,
from
to take money
into
account.
.
form
of a call to poverty.
bishop to
(pp.
magistrate, considers
126-27).
a personal
enemy the
poverty too
much
Money
tinctions,
will
be the
nexus of
the
on
dis
and
the specter of
it
horizon
even
makes
naive,
passe, than
Adso
provides
only
a paraphrase of
revolutionary William's
adumbra proposals
He
cleared
his throat, be
press
its
will might
way in which the people could ex He said that to him it seemed sen
sible for such an assembly to be empowered to interpret, change, or suspend the law, because if the law is made by one man alone, he could do harm through ignorance or
malice
(p. 352;
p. 357).
Even Aristotle
could
Aristotle
state,
could not
live with that; but there is also the church, a problem have foreseen. William proposes a separation of church and
power, in this world, in the hands
of
the prince.
and therefore
[Christ] did
worldly
that
not want
the apostles to
have
command and
dominion,
be do
it
seemed a wise
thing
should
relieved of
any
. . .
or coercive power.
But
what should
the
prince
with a
heretic?
The
at
heretic if his
. .
action
harms the
community.
But
the
power of
the
prince ends
(p. 354;
pp. 358-59).
In
other
elemental principles of
Enlightenment
political
philosophy
of
"mainstream,"
already be found in medieval thinkers who, if not precisely were no less real. (William mentions Marsilius of Padua and John
startle read
Jandun
at
this point [p. 355], but there were others.28) This may
the period,
ers
totally
for have
unacquainted with
but
as there
acedia
not
anyone who
has
to
be
a medievalist to realize
that, for
ill,
antiquity.
A lot
into
later became
self-evident principles.
28.
See, for
Aquinas,
law be
longs
either
has
care of
5.7., la Ilae, Q.
90,
art.
3,
corpus.
402 What
Interpretation
we ought
world and
the
do, then, is to strive for the elimination of injustice in this i.e., "demo institution, again in this world, of more equitable
to
cratic"
political systems.
What is
somewhat
the
by
secular ethic.
William's abiding
respects:
concern
is for "the
folk,"
simple
i semplici,
earth
and
this in two
pp.
201-
(e.g.,
203);
and real
et passim).
The first
concern
being
for the
downtrodden.30
or as mere political
It may therefore be set aside as religious sentimentality and of no import for a purely rational and natural sentimentality More
program.31
important,
and
fairly
unique, is the
"gnoseological"
function
Bacon's
The
of
semplici.
Following
simple
his brief
presentation of
Roger
sociological
proposals, William
expands upon
in their
search
have something more than do the learned doctors, who often become lost for broad general laws. The simple have a sense of the individual
sense
[intuizione], by itself, is
not enough.
The
29.
Right
showing Adso how a lens can magnify without changing what is seen through it "I'm saying more than I seem to and immediately launches into his dis Roger Bacon's political program (pp. 205-206) and Occam's epistemology (pp. 206after
says
be,"
207). 30.
Aristotle, for
of
possibility
of a
kind
of collective wisdom
in
an as some
sembly
of
the freeborn:
for
where
individual, it may be
argued, has
course,
they
are not
(Politics in, vi, 4; Loeb translation, p. 233.) Taken individually, to be trusted with the highest offices (vi, 6; p. 225), but "for them not to partic
a number of persons without political
ipate [at all] is an alarming situation, for when there are ours and in poverty, the city then is bound to be full of
must
hon
enemies"
other words,
be handled,
even
manipulated,
but surely
not
loved.
31.
No
sentimentalist
charming
mate
of medieval
himself, however, William offers an intriguing explanation of that most images, St. Francis preaching to the birds. After speaking of lepers as the ulti
outcasts, he
says:
are a sign of exclusion in general. St. Francis understood that. his preaching to the [says Adso,] "I've heard that beautiful story, and I admired the saint "Oh, the company of those tender creatures of God.
The lepers
about
Have
you
been told
birds?"
yes,"
who enjoyed
"Well, him, he
what
they
When Francis
went out on
to the
cemetery
I
and
it's a story the order has revised today. city and its magistrates and saw they didn't understand began preaching to ravens and magpies, to hawks, to raptors
feeding
corpses."
"What
horrible
thing!"
said.
(p. 202)
of
the Rose
403
truth of their own, perhaps truer than that of the doctors of the church
p. 208).
The
are
lens,
we
remember,
made
things more
of
visible,32
folk in
"bearers
of a truth
wise"
the
natural
sight
into "the
How
individual."
continues:
so
maintaining,
to speak, their operative virtue [la virtii operativa], the the transformation and
capacity
was
betterment
of their world?
This
(pp. 205-206;
p. 208).
And Bacon's
solution
legislation
by
direction
of
those
Magic"
is
"splendid
enterprise"
(Adso's expression,
206)
which
Bacon
and
possible.
the
we must be sure that the simple are right in possessing the sense of individual [l'intuizione dell'individuale], which is the only good kind [l'unica buona]. However, if the sense of the individual [l'intuizione dell'individuale] is the good
But to believe in it
only
[l'unica
buona], how
which
in recomposing
[ricomporre]
will
the
universal
laws through
and,
p.
interpreting
209)
become
Adso
asks
how it
can
be done. William
Occam."
says
he "no longer
know[s],"
and re
fers to
"my
friend William
doubts in my
How
without
of
He has
sown
=
mind.
[giusta,
cannot
correct], the
prove. a
proposition can
Because if only the sense of the individual is just that identical causes have identical effects is
universal
difficult to lift
I discover the
an
bond that
if I
The
finger
the relations
of position
of new entities?
For
[relazioni]
are
the
single
[modi] in which my mind perceives the connections entities, but what is the guarantee that this [questo
PP-
(pp. 206-207;
209-10)
"Intuition
singular,"
of
the
he had said,
But
when now
talking
about
his
discovery
other
of
knowledge."
the
individual breeds
indi
laws
from
of
their
interconnections, is
not
overwhelmed
by
ceptions.
This is
Nominalism
at
its
simplest
what
Engels
not at
will call
it.
Practice is
32.
issue:
and epistemological function of William's spectacles is only one of the many which shimmer through the text. For example, like mirrors, and even light itself William says, "perhaps my poor p. 208: "And when this fork [the spectacles] is on my poor (Order a function of vision, and vision a function of technology?) head will be even more
The dramatic
leitmotive
nose,"
orderly."
a matter of
days,
hours, is itself something of a mystery! 33. Or, for that matter, from what Kant calls
"dogmatism,"
at
it from
another angle.
404
Interpretation
worked out
In fact, I have
this
proposition: equal
thickness
[of
lens]
corresponds nec
essarily [deve corrispondere] to equal power of vision. I have posited it because on other occasions I have had individual insights [intuizione individuali] of the same type. To be sure,
herbs
of
therefore34
anyone who
the same
every
the
herb
of a given type
or that
every lens
p. 210).
But
sion?
what
has this to do
everything.
In
way,
For
by
all
this perplexity
is
interconnecting
are
it), but
return
all
agree, both
simple and
learned,
up for grabs (as the simple might that individuals may be named.
We He
friars
and prelates.
mentions
Adam,
"encouraged"
by
God "to
names."
give
things
though some in our times say that nomina sunt consequentia rerum, the book Genesis is actually quite explicit on this point: God brought all the animals unto Adam to see what he would call them: the whatsoever Adam called every living crea
In
fact,
of
ture, that
was
enough to call,
nevertheless
name thereof. And though surely the first man had been clever in his Adamic language, every thing and animal according to its nature, he was exercising a kind of soverign right in imagining the name that in
the
his
opinion
best
Because, in fact, it is
now
known that
men
impose different
are the same
things,
for
all.
designate concepts, though only the concepts, signs of [How would we know that?] So that surely the word "no
to that
men"
comes
from
"nomos,"
is to say
"law,"
by
men ad
placitum, in
other words
by
free
(p. 353;
p. 357).
The derivation (nomen from nomos) is much too wild to have been without historical justification; but it's backwards! For surely naming
accord"
offered
comes
(like money, in first, generalized imposition "by free and collective legislative and impositions on then, Locke) decree, behavior, or positive law. by
simple
have
no
illusions
about this.
With their
native
insight into
unconcern
for
word games or
for dalliance
with
universals, the
are
imposed,
they
The faith [i.e., the theology which] is the hope it offers (p. 203).
a movement proclaims
doesn't
offered
by
(p. 206)
[are]
the
heap of expectations
of
the
(ibid.),
not
or,
as
34.
The
"therefore"
consequent,
here, is
"law"
"therefore"
by
a
his
experiences.
There
are rewards
for
"correct"
inductions; but
completely,
the
kind
of compulsion
specifying
the
is
of a
different
order
a side
issue.
of
the Rose
405
man can wish
it, in
another
to have on earth
abundance of
the land of
(p.
475).
as
For if
imputed
the ma
names, all
Protagoras implied
"leadership,"
jority
and
rules
rule, because
given the
right kind
of
it can);
Nominalism (l'intuizione
dell'individuale)
it
Hope
by
nature overrides
was
cannot
be
grounded
in itself. The
expecta
genius of
Hobbes
bed
beneath the swamp of vanities. William's hopes are grounded in for "the simple and his universe is a kind of polenta with an
folk,"
(i.e., Italian)
seasoning.
The distinctions in it
are all
spoon-made,
of
ul
timately
lem
of
quantitative and
reason, the
either/or of moral
ducing
For
latent
for chewing That's the prob a cosmologically disengaged Nominalism, its inherent relativism, re moral judgment to sentimental indignation.
condemnation, to
dig
out
on.35
all
grounds
its weaknesses, Christianity provided the many with ontological for hope for a millenium or so, along with and perhaps at the cost of its for Nominalism. Now only the hope remains, politically, and with merely naming as the mode of science. William reflects, towards
has
support
it the
residue of
the end:
I have
never
of
signs,
Adso; they
the
are the
only things
man
with
world.
What I did
the relation
among
[connecting
deaths, but
another,
plan.
only]
a sequence of causes
contradicting
one
which proceeded on
their
own,
creating relations that did not stem from any I behaved stubbornly [da ostinato] pursuing a ordine], when I should have known well that there is
then?
,
Where is
all
semblance of order
my wisdom, [parvenza di
(p. 492;
no order
in the
universe
P- 495)-
And then he
order our mind
quotes
"a
mystic"
who
had
said
that "the
after
imagines"
attain something.
But
discover that,
even of
if it
was
"meaning"
useful, it
was meaningless
Use is
of course the
ladders,
but there's
It's hard God is
goes on:
cannot
to accept the
be
an order
in the
universe
because it
the
free
God
and
His
omnipotence
[cf.
p. 207].
So
freedom
of
condemnation, or at
least the
(pp. 492-93;
P- 495)-
We
must not
be
put off
by
this
lightning
shift
William's
who
tender regard
for God's
prerogatives
has
itself to Adso,
finally
This
all
begins to think:
be forgiven these lapses into
on
gastronomical
35.
reviewer must
metaphor,
ian. (Cf.
food,
e.g.,
pp.
406
Interpretation
and
express a
theological conclusion:
with
"But
can a necessary being exist totally difference is there, then, between God and
polluted
[intessuto]
the possible?
What
Isn't affirming God's absolute omnipotence and His absolute freedom [disponibilita] with regard to His own (p. 493; choices [miracles?] tantamount to demonstating that God does not
primigenial chaos?
exist?"
p.
496)
and
William's response,
ences
Adso's
"unpacking"
of
it
remind us of all
the refer
text:36
William looked
"How
could a
at me without
man
betraying
any
feeling
in his features,
and
he said,
learned
[un sapiente]
to
your
go on
sapere] if he
words.
question?"
answered yes
communicating his learning [il suo I did not understand the meaning of his
"Do
mean,"
you
would
be
learning [sapere]
you could no
to?"
any more if the very criterion of truth were lacking, or do longer communicate what you know because others would not
p.
(p. 493;
496)
that point the roof caves in
here,"
And
answer: a
of course at
(literally!)
and
William
cannot
"There is too
much confusion a
final double-entendre,
Dominus."
commotione assertion!
he says, and the mystery ends with joke: "Non in commotione, non in (ibid.) It looks like the echo of a prayer, but it's an little
grammatical
4. LAUGHTER
This is
very
funny book,
"But
often
in places, It
must
and
laughter
ripples through
The Name
and
seri-
of the Rose
36.
as a recurrent theme.
therefore
finally
p. 96).
be dealt with,
against
For
example:
the treasures of
men
learning
"
must
but,
. . .
rather,
against other
learned
[sapienti],
(p.
88;
the simple
that;
little below
"You
see?"
William
says
said.
certain secrets
remain veiled
by
arcane words.
Aristotle
communicating too many arcana of nature and art breaks Which does not mean that secrets must not be revealed, but
how"
[sapienti]
decide
when and
(p. 88;
p. 96).
He
explains
further: "I
fellows"
meant
that, since these are arcana from which both good and evil can derive, the learned man [il sapiente] has the right and the duty to use an obscure language, comprehensible only to his (p. 89;
P- 97)-
There is later a brief recapitulation of much the same thing, but it is omitted from the translation. After saying (p. 97) that learning (scienza) consists "also of knowing what we could do and perhaps William explains: "Look, that is why I said to the master glazier today that the should not learned man must in some manner conceal the secrets that he discovers, in order that others not make
do,"
wicked use of
needs
to
reveal
hidden."
library
oggi
appears
to me
dicevo
il
sapiente ma
deve in
segreti che
scopre, perche
altri non ne
facciano
cattivo
uso,
bisogna scoprirli, On
132, Jorge
biblioteca
mi pare piuttosto un
reminds
have been
subdued rather
than raised
[piuttosto
sciolte]"
sopite che
(p. 132;
p.
139).
And finally, putting God above God creates; it does not conceal
all
this exoteric-esoteric
interplay, William
[nasconde]"
(478;
p. 482).
of
the Rose
407
an
blind
old
Jorge says, in
early interchange
"With his laughter [Cosi ridendo] the fool says in his heart
est'"
William, [implicitamente],
with all
'Deus
non
(p. 132;
p.
139).
This is
a
book
about a
book,37
book!"
vengeance"
because be
of
as must
well-
known
by
book
Comedy,
Jorge
piece,
cause
is
somewhere
and
Burgos,
one-time
Librarian
to it. Jorge
is
against
laughter,
not
just be
he's
a puritanical
we shall see.
The theoretical
and
climax of
the
central orgasm on
the kitchen
and and
floor) is
William
of
the last
of
debate, in
the hidden
room pp.
of the
471-82).
"text"
Comedy
with
the role
from
the
Aristotle:
we
dealt
tragedy
and saw
and
fear, it
pro
purification of
those feelings. As
promised, we
will now
deal
mime) and
of
the ridiculous,
it
listing
includes.]
(p. 468;
pp.
471-72)
And then,
few
pages
later, William
he thinks
will
be impor
Comedy
of of
that
is, from
as a
joy
Comedy
does
tell of
famous
base
the
and ridiculous
it does
showing the defects and vices of ordinary men. Here Aristotle sees the tendency to laughter as a force for good, which can also have an instructive value [un valore cognoscitivo];
protagonists.
It
by
through witty
metaphors, though
it tells
us things
differently
from the way they are, as if it were lying, it actually obliges us to examine them more closely, and it makes us say: Ah, this is just how things are, and I didn't know it. Truth reached by depicting men and the world as worse than they are or than we believe them
to
be,
worse
in any
case
the] lives
of
the saints
have
Jorge.]
p. 475).
Philosopher,"
Fairly
But
says
close,
[replies
Jorge]
(p. 472;
what can
be
so terrible about
by
the
Jorge:
book"
37.
is
here, like
mirrors and
the rose
itself.
is surely like a book written by the finger of God in which every creature is description and mirror of life and death, in which the humblest rose be (p. 297; p. 282. Emphasis added). comes a gloss of our terrestrial progress [cammino terreno] Adso
...
the whole
"
Of
course
meaningless
images in
is
no one
to write and
nothing to
rose, even
up.
egalitarianism
goes nowhere;
it only looks
408
Interpretation
book
Every
look
by
that man
has destroyed
. .
a part of
the
learning
that
Christianity
;
had
ac
cumulated over at
the
.
centuries.
Before,
we used to
look to heaven
now we
the earth.
what
But
frightened
you
in
all
ant's
laughter is weakness, corruption, the foolishness of our flesh. It is the peas Still, laughter remains base, a defense entertainment, the drunkard's license;
.
for the
simple
[i.e.,
relaxation
. .
Aristotle's
the doors
Poetics], here
But here, [in the Second Book of for the mob] the function of laughter is reversed, it is elevated to art,
.
of
learned
[dotti]
.
are opened
to
it, it becomes
the object of
philosophy, and
theology
sermon on
(p. 474;
the last
p. 477)-
Jorge is
a preacher
(see his
days,
pp.
398-405),
and
this,
his
argument against
laughter, is
be
modo negativo.
It
cannot
escaped.
villein
freeing
oneself of the
fear
of the
he has
overturned
his
[dotti]
that could
legitimatize the
the
reversal.
Then
what
nately,
an operation of
belly
would
be transformed into
at that moment,
again
an operation of the
[intelletta]
then,
when
To the
the
villein who
laughs,
dying
does
license is past,
to the
the
liturgy
imposes
on
him [i.e.,
Mardi
could
Gras], according
be born the This book
of new
of
destructive
the
to
destroy
death through
from fear.
.
could prompt of
idea that
this
to have on
the abundance
. . .
the
land
Cockaigne. But
the
is
have.
if one
day
somebody,
brandishing
words of
as a phi
losopher,
were
to raise the
weapon of
laughter to the
the rhetoric
if the
by
of
of
of
the pa
images
of redemption were
to be replaced
by
impatient
even
pp.
dismantling and
William,
upsetting
every
holy
and venerable
image
day
you,
knowledge,
would
be
swept away!
(pp. 474-76;
478-79)
would manage.
William feels he
of the
Jorge
goes on to
blasphemy,
(p.
afraid
our
shine"
piety
But if
one
476).
and no
day
longer
as a plebeian exception
but
as ascesis of the
learned
of
testimony
of
Scripture
liberal
the art
be
made
acceptable,
and no
longer
at the
mechanical
someone could
Incarnation,'
have
no weapons
to combat that
blasphemy.
(pp. 476-77;
P-
480)
of course quite
And there
gets that
we
spo-
of
the Rose
409
ken of, variously and at some length, by ancient works on rhetoric. The differ ence, to be sure, is that the ancients used ridicule to defeat an opponent, a
particular
individual,
where
use of
ridicule to
destroy
an
idea
unless,
by
some stretch of
Incarnation"
is to be taken to
(pp. 131, 197, 78, 95) differentia and not from "the dark
of man animals
which
and Laughter, the flows, traditionally, from the powers of corporal (Jorge,
matter"
dramatic form;
p.
477);
have dealt
with
Comedy (and,
Poetics
v.
as
he says,
with
hexameter
a
a second
book (as
per
1),
and
it is indeed kinds
pity that
poetry,
no
copy distinguished
"fine doings
resented
of
his treatment
remains.
Comedy
is for him
one of two
of
nature,"
"according
the
to the poet's
of
the "more
serious"
representing
exalted nature
and
doings
fine men,
while
those of a
less
rep
men"
(Poetics
iv.
real para
graph we
have, he
summarizes:
Comedy,
full
base
or ugly.
as we
have said, is
a representation of
inferior people,
not
indeed in the
bad, but the laughable [i.e., the ludicrous] is a species of the It consists in some blunder or ugliness that does not cause pain or disas
ter,
an obvious example
being
the comic
mask which
is ugly
and
distorted but
not
painful
(Poetics
v. 1-2).
And that's
ously"
about
not at
first treated
seri
(v. 3),
perhaps
not
Aristotle did treat seriously of Comedy in some subsequent book of the Poetics, we can hardly expect, from what we do have, that his treatment would have
given much comfort
to Levellers
of
any time
or
type.
Laughter is
another matter.
pleasure,"
our reaction to the ridiculous For Socrates, laughter is a "mixed posturing of our friends (Philebus 49e-50a). The paradigm is a mild derision,
tinged
perhaps with
pity, a
looking
down
on
the foolishness
of mortals.
There
in Plato, and they must have been hilarious to very amusing his contemporaries; but at no point does laughter provide insight into anything deeper than human ignorance (cf., perhaps, Gorgias 509b). For Aristotle, laugh
are some
passages
ter
is
a polemical technique:
As for jests,
good
since
they may
Poetics36
sometimes
be
useful
in debates, the
advice of
Gorgias
was
opponents'
to confound the
stated
earnest with
jest
and
their jest
with earnest.
We
have
38.
in
the
of
jests there
Not in
what we
have. He
also
having
discussed the
ridiculous
that too
Cicero,
some such as
the
presentation
is lost. On the offchance, however, that his discussion was still through the mouth of Julius Caesar of the role of wit in oratory
chs. lviii-lxxiii).
available might
to
of
be
with:
"for
neither great
vice,
laughter"
is
a subject
and
(ch. lviii);
little
later he
cautions:
"so in this,
lx). And
he
refers
repeatedly to kinds
(ch. buffoonery is to be studiously avoided by the and are "far from beof jesting which are "not suited to
us,"
orator"
410
Interpretation
gentleman, others not.
employed on one's own
ing
Irony
is
more
gentlemanly than
buffoonery; for
the
first is
another
(Rhetoric hi,
Laughter is
being"
a rhetorical a
device, for
ancient
no
laughing
In his
at oneself always a
tleman"
to it.
who
reaction
to Jorge
Burgos
hates laughter
of
and
never
William
mankind
Baskerville
suggests that
Perhaps the
make truth
love
is to
make people
laugh
at
the truth, to
laugh, because
passion
lies in
learning
to
free
ourselves
from [the;
dalla] insane
That is "love
for
perhaps
going too
with
far, contrasting
quoted
as
passion" mankind"
[of]
the "insane
alchemist"
by Jorge,
who attributes
"the
cre
to divine
laughter"
remains
true that
laughter,
the
"property"
of
by
philosophy,
which
has
always preferred to
deal
with
the species-differentiating
"rationality."
Laughter
should
be taken
more seriously.
Science
presumes to report on
being
in
a systematic manner.
Philosophy,
being,"
second-level theoretical a
endeavor,
a
attempts
to analyze "reports
on
also
in
disciplined
and
way.
But humor is
more primal
"theoretical
mo
dality,"
laughter
a visceral response
being."39
Laughter
that
sudden and
fortunate
cancellation of
of expectations
permeated
the
neurons
(i.e.,
(they
seem
to)
ex
not
at the antics of
foreseeing,
But
lar.40
unlike
This
pompous
. .
philosophy (and science) the object of laughter is very particu twit does not achieve the essence of great-souledness to
.
which
he
aspires
and
his its it
it. Reason
notices the
discrepancy be
not compro
that the
discrepancy
does
the universal
what what
and
(Wickedness does
sal; that's
is
"evil"
about
it!)
the theoretical posture of humor: it
That is
is different
about
is
not sys
tematic. Like poetry, humor reveals and then moves on; there
is
no
analysis, no
of
demonstration,
and
indeed
unlike
poetry, there is
Cicero
seldom even a
rereading
it.
education"
(ch.
lxii).
on
i860.
Oratory and Orators, trans. J. S. Watson. New Throughout, jesting is what the superior do at
that its object cannot be
the
inferior.
alludes to the reflective character of
39.
Kant
laughter,
directly a cause of
Critique of
"play
representations."
of
54.
at particular groups of
We may laugh
of
the Rose
-411
lightning flashes,
something is seen,
and
is theoretical, but it is
Consider, for
opponents
at
bit
of comic relief
movies"
although, to be sure,
Italian
movie.
that
piety is
not
boast,
and that
boast
of
it
are
fools, in
something important
but
in
error as
the wicked are in error (we note that Bernard Gui remains aloof
as such
throughout)?
Piety
is
untouched
by
the squabble.
Of course there may be a larger intention in the incident. The friars may be in error not merely because piety cannot be an objective possession but because
there
is nothing to be
pious about
are
The
battling
.
brothers
are
fools
no
either
because
either
human
or
because there is
purport.
God. In
however,
what
"comportement,"
a metaphysical
and
visceral response
and
that
by
nature
thought, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, are its only humorists?) Laughter is a living thing and dies under the knife. There is another reason for the virtual absence of laughter in the history of
modern
philosophy (aside from the natural gravitas of philosophical "types"). Philoso phy is the examination of the utterances of a putative wisdom. This means not
proverbs,
whose context
,
is life
that's why
measure
they
whose context
if
laughter, like
with all
that of proverbs,
its
is life itself, the whole fabric of lived experience and hopes and fears and trying once again, a con
generalizing instrumentalities of philoso because the deal with "Virtue is
knowledge"
text which
phy.
the
abstractive and
In
other
utterance
vino
same reflective
wanna
what can
it do
with
In
duck?"
buy
a
classical
"The fabric
of
was not a
system, for
philosophy, not
was
even a
proper theoretical
context,
and
it
could not
too
much chaos
in it, too
and
too
much raw
hope in it,
despair, it
of
be added) in
a philosophical uni
verse.
The thin
sive
and
at
bitter laughter
the foibles of
laughter
mortals
(that's us,
folks!) is
not real
laughter
the
aside
the biting wit, mainly because it's no fun\ That kind of humor is quite possible in the most hope-less theoretical
41.
sea
ironic
empyrean,41
but from
As in Lucretius, De
winds trouble would
rerum
natura, Bk.
II,
is,
the
from
He
goes
on
be, by
right
thinking, to
In
fundamentally
hopeless
dread.
412
Interpretation
great wit
a hope-less universe humor reveals only par ticulars, this foolishness, this ignorance, this discrepancy with the universal. For laughter to have a metaphysical function the individual must have a cosmic sig because that's what hope is, in the long run, the conviction that we nificance
particulars are not mere
laugh
their
is feared, bellies.
not
loved,
even
by
his
friends,
instances,
more or
less defective,
or
of some universal.
which
thing is not accessible to classical science universal is the object, and the particular is barely
Such
a
philosophy, for
the
thinkable.
philosophy,"
Of
course
with
"no tincture
of natural always
for the
simple
folk
of whom
of
Of these it may be asked: If humor is theoretical, is their "theory"? And if laughter needs hope, what have they to look for
said).
life"
and
"the life
reason."
of
Ra
tionality
is theoretical; it
puts particulars
into
a context.
And life
as such
overrides the
given, does
is but
pitches
hope"
theory
is
the "raw
between them
a
when
the work
real
But
mism
"life
reason"
of
another thing.
As the
luxury
is
pessi
(the
Sadducees,
so too
we
remember,
folk
their
materialism),
that
of the
is,
of academics
generally
need not
is their transcendence
hopes in
and
fears
partiality."
Living
mic significance.
as
they do in
disciplines, they
no cos
fear death
and
Christians,
on
whether
by
circumcision or
in the
spirit
(or from
forgetfulness, living
borrowed cosmology, as it were), and for both learned and simple among them, the particular is of absolute significance; they are mea sured by a Particular and their particularities will be attended to by the Measure.
question
not42
The
is
Christ
ever
laughed
William
also
believes
he did
but
Only
imum
when
the universe
itself is
labyrinth,
to be sure ("The
max
the maximum of
order"
a system
nonetheless
and whole,
the production of a cosmogenic Will giving significance to parts then can the individual have universal significance and laughter only
an epistemological
function.
course,
was unknown
Such
thing,
of
to pagan consciousness
well aware of
especially
perhaps
and
Professor Eco is
it (although
42.
have"
(p.
161).
because, omniscient as the son of God had to be, he knew how we Christians would be Again, aside from the implicit Monophysitism, the sweet pessimism of the learned,
God's
omnipotence to make
who
have
no need of
it
all
observing
as
from
an upper tier.
of
the Rose
-413
enthusiasms). an enormous
We
must
hoax,
theological
deadpan, in
which an
tion.
One
dence
of
not
trans
lated in the
Italian)
appears
in the
course of
Adso's
of opposites
(a characteristically
medieval
theme) in
Is it
possible
And this, it
more not
is the teaching left us by Saint Thomas, the greatest of all doctors: the it remains a figure of speech, the more it is a dissimilar similitude and openly 43 the more a metaphor reveals its truth (p. 248). eral,
seems,
lit
The
girl
passage occurs
in the
the
midst of
Adso's
the
center piece of
book,
one might
say
its
most obvious
func
tion
is to
call
into
question the
in the
must
raptures of some
(as possibility of any other kind of "igneous Saint Hildegard, p. 239; cf. also Ubertino, on p. 231), but it
significance.
ardor"
have is
larger
of
Irony
witty
one
form if it
saying
what
is
not
.
it tells
us
things
differently from
the
as
by
which
Could there be any more implausible to convey the essential dependence of modern political and
were
(p.
472).
thought on Medieval
and vengeance
theology
virtue!"
"of theft
among
monks of scant
(p.
394)?
"There
P-
was no plot
and
I discovered it
by
mistake
492)
43.
dirsi in
Epurre
hanno lasciato i
massimi
Saint Thomas]:
omnis ergo
figura tanto
evidentius veritatem
demonstrat
nome
similem
similitudinem
figuram
//
della rosa,
Annals
Metastudies
of the
of
Scholarship
and
Humanities
Social Sciences
announces a special
issue:
Science
Edited
A
collection of essays
and the
Imagination,
Volume 4, number 1: available October 1986. Issue price: $7.00. Annual subscriptions:
by
G.S. ROUSSEAU.
from
the
1985
Berkeley Conference, sponsored by the Society for Literature and Science. Themes include: the history of the con cept of energy, the "two debate,
French Blake's
science
cultures"
mail,
$1.00
issue.
prospects
for
Contributors: Stuart Peterfreund, Lance Schachterle, George Slusser, Nelson Hilton, Mark L. Greenberg, Donald R. Benson, John Woodcock, G.S. Rousseau.
Affirmative
Action, Liberalism,
and
Teleology
Out
of
and
the Crisis
of
Doctrinaire Liberalism.
1985. 201
pp.:
contemporary political affair, namely, the policy of affirmative action, the federally-dictated preferential treatment of cer tain groups in American society. The title of the book, Out of Order, adumbrates
a philosophical about a
This is
book
its themes
which
are,
bluntly
of affirmative action
is le
gally out of order, morally pernicious, and logically incoherent and that the ideo logical environment of the policy, i.e., doctrinaire liberalism, is a swamp.
The book is
philosophical rather
It is
only
incidentally
wrought
carefully
conveys the importance of offering and main belief. for Indeed, it displays the arguments for affirmative taining any action in clear ordinary English as well as in the now unfashionable symbolic no
arguments, it
reasons
of
all, because it is an
inquiry
of
into the
doctrine
which
houses the
the
policy.
[B]eneath the
affirmative
decisions
[concerning
(p.
1).
policy
action]
we shall
discover
fundamental debate
The task,
as
see
it, is
to
dominant
the
social
liberalism],
ments and our
to recognize
it
such, to
recognize
extent
to
which
evaluations, to understand
and
its history, to
note
its
peculiar
society,
gradually
to unfold the
distortions to
which
it is
topic,
a comment about
to
whom
it is
is in
order. on
Such
a reader
must, of course, be
these the
someone who
is
still open to
discussion
the
book
has in mind,
out of
liberals
dismiss its
author
simply for raising doubts and offering objec tions concerning a policy which has taken on the cast, among its advocates, of a sacred action (p. 101). Indeed, it is one of the themes of the book that through hand
as a racist and a sexist
416
the
Interpretation
and practice of affirmative
theory
principle
that of
liberty
itself
by
by
engag
the
patently
elitist posture.
In
all
these
ways
in
fundamentally
in
democracy unmistakably fascism. Professor Capaldi consciously and unhesitatingly draws the comparison between liberalism and fascism (Chapter 7), yet interprets the crisis of liberalism
which are
but
evocative of
not
in terms
of
elitist,
and egalitarian
as a
There is
the term
a terminological
demon
which
"teleology"
to
name
liberalism for
have the
following "working
consists of a
Liberalism
basic
psychological
theory
and
derivative theories
general and
of social
its basic psy theory chological component can be defined as teleological. A theory is teleological if it seeks to explain any act, event or process as the outcome of goal-directed behavior (p. 19).
structure, politics, and history. The
of
liberalism in
Capaldi
terms
tion for the
seems to
comply
with a
fairly
recent convention
not
in the
use of
the
"teleology"
"teleological,"
and
but it is
theory
of
to call it
descrip by
become
its
its
exorcism more
difficult. This
will
clearer
in the
course of
in terms
of
his
own usage.
for hav
ob
ing
"teleological"
fundamental to their
affirmative action).
universal excuse
for
Dis
they
say, does
not permit
potential"
[their]
true
(p. 90),
or to accomplish their
"innate built-in
insist, is
such blockages, especially when the discrimination has been covert. It is the remedy that will permit (if not ensure) the oppressed to "achieve their The proponents use the same sort of language in response to those who will
poten
inevitably
viously
be disadvantaged
oppressed.
policy which gives hyperadvantages to the pre But the terminology is curiously inverted in the arguments
a
by
to
mollify the
The
following
are
examples:
1.
Nobody
and
qualifications.
deserves anything anyway, even by virtue of their Professor Capaldi quotes two affirmative action
abilities or
"theorists,"
John
Rawls
Richard Wasserstrom.
one
[Rawls] No
deserves his
191).
greater natural
capacity
favorable
start
ing
place
in society (p.
Affirmative Action,
Liberalism,
and
Teleology
417
any
of these
not
deserve
having had
not
things [home
most
environment, class, schooling] vis-a-vis other part, deserve their qualifications, and since
not
individuals, they do
because
of
they do
in any strong
sense
deserve to be
admitted
(Reflection
the high
upon
the
level
discuss
questions of ethics
of
and politics.
They
might remind
him
of
p.
Le
Cour-
they
too might be
likened
logician
who
flies higher
and
higher in ever-decreasing
with one
fundamental
aper
as a needle-thin umber
bird).
Affirmative
action
of
it really
3.
redresses past
injustices
and
only
appears to treat
unjustly those
of
who
are
134-35).
long
run
Capaldi's)
history
will
dividual
can
be fulfilled
and secure
society in which it is realized that "no in in that fulfillment as long as others are
"teleological"
not"
we
have
what
Capaldi
calls
the
character of the
"reAog"
built into
"fulfillment"
and
He
he
asserts unam
biguously
needs,
with an untenable
combination of
and
determinism (pp. 2, 127) and speaks teleology desires having to be fulfilled (pp. 20, 125). In fact he uses
of
drives,
1
"teleology"
features
of
the thought
of
Hobbes (p.
82,
n.
10), Bentham (p. 170), Mill (indirectly; pp. 179, 190), and even Hegel (pp. 170-71). Even when he explains, without taking exception to it, that what liber als mean by (as in "rational animal") is the calculating and maximizing
"rational"
of self-interest
views of
(p. 83), he is clearly echoing Hobbes, Bentham, and Mill whose humanity and society could hardly be called teleological. But more of
now an
this
later; for
II
The book is
composed of three parts,
evident either
visually
or typographically.
The
author
tells us so on
four. The
eight-chapter struc
ture, however, is evident both from the table of contents and the format. There is an introduction and a section of endnotes, both of which are important for an ap
preciation of the
book
as a whole.
The index is
as
useful
and
the dedication to
ac-
Sidney
Hook is
an opponent of affirmative
418
Interpretation
tion, yet a devotee of liberty. Epigrams mark the ing its message mythically and cryptically.
The first chapter,
tion,"
beginning
of each chapter
bear
which
is
entitled
contains a ceded
upon
historical
and sociological
discussion
centers
Blacks
and
case of oppressed
than
women or
ordinary person or average reader, the case of Blacks is the most apparent. Finally, liberal intellectuals regard Blacks as having a superior moral stature (p.
3).
Thus Capaldi
wishes
for
affirmative action as
they
minds of
tion, "the
school"
is the
most
in
order to combat
racism and
society.
and
Capaldi alludes,
sions, to
acts of
slavery,
to
Congress
familiar
episodes
does
so
in
order to
illustrate the
changing
and so
too to
so
Capaldi,
was
increase the
as to alter
carry
engineering
appointed elitists
power structure
to the advantage of
self-
An
would
(shuckin'
jivin'
example of such
and
in Black
street
vernacular)
fully
was
eliminating integrated schools, nay, nay, ideally integrated schools. A new hypothesis formulated that of covert oppression. The hypothesis was then tested by
student performance.
be that
of
segregated schools
to
studying
The hypothesis
was reformulated to
say that
to
such
performance
is
a result of conditions
beyond
student control.
An
appeal
statis
establishes,
of
hidden
variables
differences in
results. an
Further
employed
is
made
runner,"
image
by
that, in the
and
race
1964 speech. The metaphor is in for life, liberty, and the pursuit of
oppression,
need
happiness Blacks,
certain
having
Such
are
in
order
race
to
bondage
duties
in
order
to participate
fairly
in the
intended to
spe
gap
agency to
carry
out
government
(p.
19).
In this
ganized
context
Capaldi
or
was official
action of
Affirmative
Branch
the
Action, Liberalism,
and
Teleology
that
of
-419
Rickey,
so
in
order to prove
essential
affirmative action.
The
aim of
chapter called
"Twisting
the
is to
show
how
laws, executive orders, the words and actions of the federal bureaucracy (especially, the Department of Health, Educa tion, and Welfare and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), and the
decisions
and opinions of
happenings
the
federal
judiciary
all contributed
to the drama of
affirmative action.
Capaldi
He
concludes
by an
of
his
torical
hallucination
is imagined
as
results of slavery.
places before the reader a compelling assemblage leave little doubt that the law has been
"twisted."
facts
of 1968
forbids
actual
discrimination. It
effects of past
meant sion
to foster
action"
"affirmative
is
not
of 1964.
occurs
in the
usage of
i.e., in Executive Or
der #1
1967.
1246 of
1965
and
it is
extended
who
But it
was not
the President
issued Order
#4
in 1968,
of
and
in
1970 and
and
1971
The
expression
is defined in terms
minority
"quotas"
of
"goals
timetables"
"underutilization."
and of
concept and
The term
is
not used
by
these
intention becomes
and
parasitic
"underutilization"
on the term
which, in turn,
are
is defined
"the
determined
by
sta
tistical survey.
ultimate
logic
of affirmative
action"
(p.
30).
The
proponents of
it
ployment
of
opportunity
essary to Whites in
"genuine"
the
economic
gaps
between Blacks
sense of
to achieve an
ideally integrated
society.
The
the terms
"ideally"
and
ages.
is
in
Capaldi
evolution
assures
is
implies. He denies, however, that the change must be in that direction contention that in which is defined by liberal ideology. He does not challenge the should be un he evolves. The law evolution, says, Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence,
derstood from
ervoir of
on
"a
vast res
"logical
or metaphysical system of
first
principles
nature"
about universal
human
view
from
deduced (p.
32).
He
not as
acknowledge
they
is that the
420
Interpretation
law is truly and properly formed in the courts and in the bureaucracy, not in the legislature. The relevant cases that Capaldi adduces both for the theoretical issue
of the
policy of affirmative action are Swann (1971), Griggs (1971), De Funis (1974), Bakke (1978), and Weber
of practical
formation
(1979)-
When the
reader reflects on
Capaldi's
account of
problem of re
action, he is
the even
deeper problem
meaning itself. If the meaning of the law is the bureaucracy say it is, then it is not unreasonable to
of
any
word
is
what whoever
is in
charge says
it is. The
Wonderland in the
presence of
the
King of Hearts
Professor
"the
oldest rule
in the
book."
In
chapters
three,
the
four,
and
five
Capaldi
considers
paradox of
victim of
its demise
by
virtue of
seem.
is
it may
Free-floating
ideas have
they
Taking
academic
responsibility for the consequences of folk believe to be part of the game or the job.
among
justify
not
doing
following
cal
necessarily from
necessity where it is not at issue. At any event Capaldi offers the reader a valuable analysis of four competing conceptions of the university. Each conception has its advocates who then create
factions. Without
how two
as the
adox.
listing
(1)
all of
of
them
of
(2)
the university
and
agency Capaldi
disinterested
factions
the par
appears
to favor the
research
model,
as
he
calls
it, but
conceives
of
it in
his debatable
version of
"[t]he disinterested
...
knowledge is
It is
unintelligible to
It is
anti-deterministic"
anti-teleological
(p.
54).
here
pursuit of
knowledge is
the
contraposed to
teleology
and tele
university is that the contemporary submitted itself to the federal government (p.
on
65)
and
in their
conversion
from
a
edge to
being
solvers of social
The university has chosen to yield its freedom for ences, in their bid for the prestige and fundability in the direction
of manipulative
funding,
of the natural
sciences,
move
rhetoric,
of social
engineering,
and of an aca
demic
The
priesthood.
modern
subverted
by
empire
builders in
the administration who confuse their national ambition with the existence of a national
purpose,
by
liberal-culture,
and
by
and
Teleology
not
421
subjection
that
natural scientists
have
and subversion.
history
of
the
federal
seems
funding
of
reminds control.
even when
it
That
the
history
federal bureaucracy,
union,
which gave
birth to
complex"
academic-bureaucratic
fuss
or ob
scope and
importance to the
and
complex"
to
federal intrusion
the
tinkering
smooth
by
dubious
The
reader
is invited to
tragedy
the
of
monster
savages
pathos of
tragedy
part of which
is the
of
unspoken
tragedy
of affirmative action
by
virtue
liberal
paternalism
fail to
develop
mentary democracy (p. 153). The liberal Frankensteins, Kerr and Derek Bok, seem to escape the destruction they (pp. 79, 82). In their
stract
however,
such as
Clark
speech and
intellectuals
who
in their deeds they can be collated resemble Tom Wolfe's umber bird.
those ab
The policy
deny,
of
the radical
the
university. of
When faced
with
doctrine
and
the
impractability
the policy,
they simply
the terms of
rules of action
(p.
106).
belonging
to the
They regard the objections and con fallacy of the slippery slope, confus
turn, the logic of the speculative order with the way things happen in the practical order. The objections and concerns are not fallacious because the practical order is not one of ideas following necessarily from each other but one
ing, in
their
of events
following probably
p.
from
each other.
The
slope
is slippery in the
practi
(cf.
102).
The fifth
vited
libertarian
of
recommendation.
reader
is in
quality
control
of the
medical
profession
through a
truly free
heaven forbid, the government. Anyone who wishes to practice medicine should be permitted to do so. The mode of preparation would be by means of a sort of medieval guild apprenticeship. For the patient or consumer, it would be a matter
of caveat emptor.
Capaldi
expects
his
recommendation
to be greeted
with scorn
medical by liberal power-brokers. Their interest, he insists, is not Blacks. It lies tion, nor in increasing medical service by and for
skill or with
innova
an
so that no statistical or
invidious
comparisons can
achieving be
an
made.
They
want,
in short, to
according to
they
regard as a sacrament.
422 The
Illogic
Interpretation
sixth chapter which opens of
Affirmative
Action"
is
regarded
by
as
"the
philosophic
heart
of
the
book"
rhetoric of
affirmative action
which contains
four
concepts:
potential,
(3)
the
dis
tribution of
talent,
and
(4)
compensation.
and analysis of
these con
cepts constitute
counter-
prejudice
a social
policy of exclusion against individuals who belong to certain groups whereas the latter is a psychological tendency of some people to regard other people accord
ing
to a
preconceived model.
prudential
judgments, hasty
sion.
generalization,
of composition or
divi
The
existence of
neither a
not evidence of
discrimi do
nation.
It is
necessary
for discrimination. He
not
adds,
however,
deny
Discrimination,
which prevented
far
as
United States
history
schools, restaurants,
hotels, lavatories,
begin
the fact
of actual
discrimination
and
is then
used as a rhetorical
society
as a whole.
Redressing
human
device for promoting the realignment of injustices is merely the occasion for the more
The transition from
actual
mystical
delights
of
reconstruction.
discrimi
nation to mythic
discrimination is
impact."
accomplished
by
conceptual shifts
from "dis
crimination"
effects"
"percep
tion of a negative
and
accepted, the
rhetorical
ground. sole or
But the policy of affirmative action requires discrimination to be the major cause of impairment of the capacity to compete and that
means all practices
"discrimination"
private or
public, past,
present or
future,
actual or per
ceived to
be
actual
participation."
ing
to
Capaldi, is
second
demonstrable,
since
such
impairment.
"key"
The
concept shows
of
discrimination if
Capaldi
"potential"
merely if he has
not
been
al
lowed to
develop
to
his full
potential. and
urges
correla appli
tion between
cable not
"discrimination"
is
so
all-embracing
or group. of
that it is
Blacks but to nearly every individual only correlation is that its entails the total
"logic"
The
point of the
reordering
as
"potential"
124).
argu and
He
can
imagine
indefinite
"potentials"
number of
for
individual
which
development
and
Teleology
423
such an untenable re
The
concept of
of
"potential"
is forced into
lationship
tions of
evaporate
with
the doctrine
liberty"
"causal
determinism"
"individual
(pp.
"key"
"responsibility"
and
remain
in the
argument tend to
125-28).
concept
The third
tribution of
"potential"
in the
argument
for
affirmative action
use of
is that
of
"dis
the
talent."
Two
assumptions reside
in the
this concept,
(1)
of
Blacks is
equivalent
(2)
the distribution of
talent
whole
is proportionately equal to the percentage of Blacks and Whites in the population. The reader is warned, however, about a shift in the use of the
talent.
argument
notion of
The
those
begins
with an acknowledgment
in
competitive
the
promotion of
The
shift
is
the
fundamental
Western
society.
action
the fundamental
views and
or
"Western
manners."
The
different
It is
not a
allow
but
one
intended to
change
the
If, however,
bution
of
"talent"
means what
is generally
upon,
then there can be no empirical evidence, Capaldi asserts, for the presumed distri
notions of racial intelligence and of group superi intelligence and other talents are properties of individuals, not ority, arguing that of groups. The demand for evidence of a correlation between discrimination and
distribution
unequal
of
talent
is
of
distribution is
crimination
unequal
distribution
of
talent. The
knows,
short of actual
affirmative action
do
not offer
independent
measurement of
"talent"
talent prior to
so that
dis
it may be crimination. They do not even clarify the grasped independently of the notion of discrimination. But they do fall back on the rhetorical tactic of charging their critics with racism. They insist either on the
notion of
belief that
upon the vinced ment
are no objective criteria. They remain supremely con been no discrimination, distribution of talent and achieve had there that, balanced a conviction which is a matter of blind faith. would be racially
occur
to these
advocates at
"compensation"
The be
as
concept of
by
them is shown
by
Capaldi to
"discrimination."
hazy
and
inapplicable
be
fault,
(2) demonstrate
it
was
discrimination that
424
Interpretation
led to the
caused or
inability
it
at
this point, he
the persons to
crimination"
would surely add a third condition, viz., (3) they must identify be compensated.) Because these advocates use the notion of "dis as a theoretical term rather than as the description of an actual state
of
affairs,
tional social
to denominate an
themselves
infinite
series of uninten
from four
a coherent use of
the term
"compensation"
Since the
validity
since
these
concepts
is
essential
for the
the argument
of affirmative
action, and
the
argument
is devoid
of
the
essential components
for validity
and
(pp.
188-91).
The
is
concerned with
the politics
of affirmative
They
are not so
because they
are ar
bitrary
or
merely
polemical.
Every
claim
is the
result of a
tightly
reasoned and
The controversy stems from the fact that the claims are contrary to the predominant opinions in the predominantly liberal intellectual es tablishments. Among these claims are (1) liberal state activism which created the
reasonable argument.
policy of affirmative action erodes the democratic process, a frequently ism in the name of eliminating oppression
sion
(2) liberal
state activ
(pp. 144-48),
which
is then
used as a pretext
liferation
cism
is fascist in theory
practice, and
not
(3) fas
is
is essentially and historically a movement of the left 156-57). A not so incidental feature of Capaldi's discussion
of state activism
justify
the activism. He
the two schools of thought which dominate the law schools and prevail in
of
the interpretation
law, i.e.,
Capaldi
same
says
differences, both
from the
the
law whereby it is conceived of "scien and from a presumably value-free perspective. Although he chose not to, Capaldi might have added an ironic touch to his argument by quoting a locus
classicus
for
such a view of
of Law
and
which states
in these
investigations,
has
ever.
It designates
The
problem of
law,
.
as a scientific
problem, is
concept of
technique, not a problem of morals law from the idea of justice is difficult because both are con
in
general speech
confused
p. 5).
in
(Kelsen,
Not only can such a conception of law but it is hardly scientific. For it would be
not
about
law,
that
facts
and
Teleology
425
"He
stole
such statements as
the
expressed
"stole"
is
not a
fact
or a
description. He
plus a
in the
"stole,"
word
signifies someone's
"fact"
(or
would say that it is a value judgment, The word fact, i.e., "He took the disapproval superimposed upon the "society's")
book."
of
taking
use
the book.
proposition
Not to
affairs
the
"He
stole the
book"
for
is
not
to
describe that
not
event.
Not to
ment of
fact is
the
"He
that
book"
stole
be
used
to assert a fact
is
so
be trusted to law
recognize
about
anything, let
alone
law.
which stresses will
It is this
whatsover
positivistic view of
and sanction
alist's view
(that law is
not what
the
what
the judges
decide)
that causes
lawyers in the
department
Health, Education
and
Op
portunity Commission did what they did with affirmative action (i.e., push peo ple around) (p. 150). The corridors of the law are not insulated against the echoes
of
barbarism. The
overall
federal judges is
who subscribed
strategy did depend, of course, on there to liberal social doctrine. Since the
being
view
enough
that law
ciples on which
has become prevalent, Capaldi asks for the prin the judges decide. He answers that they do in fact anticipate the decisions in the form
required
consequences of their
by
social scientists.
Law be
comes, he sadly concludes, "an instrument of social engineering for achieving (p. 150). It is communal ends insofar as they are elicited by the social
scientists"
the tell-tale
signs of
which are
In his final
chapter
of
liberalism
differently
from the way he does in his first chapter. The later distinction is historical as one between classical liberalism and modern liberalism. He means by "classical lib no reference to ancient views of freedom but rather the views found in
eralism"
the
Whig party in England after 1832 and as expressed in the thought of Jeremy Bentham. In order to achieve the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest
people,
certain conditions must
number of
be
met.
For the
classical
liberal,
these
The
modern
liberal
calls
has
rhetorical advantages,
liberal
appears
to
than a value
judgment. The
concept of
polemical power.
moreover,
has, therefore,
called
Anyone
who
insensitive
or malicious.
proponent of
If the
the
satisfaction of a need
does
not
lead to
antic a
need cannot
be blamed,
since a need
is but
Need, how
need not
be
recognized
by
426
Interpretation
is
contrived
"consciousness-raising"
in
order
be
educated as
to
its
(p.
"true"
needs.
cation and
is ready with relish to assume the task of edu thereby increases its bureaucratic growth in a geometric progression The
activist state
conceptual shift
172).
from
classical
liberalism to
modern
liber
a concomitant geographical
root
shift
States
where
it took
in the thought
of
Society"
and policies of
and
Deal"
have
added
Lyndon Johnson
and
and was
brought to
in those
harvest
during the
"regimes"
of
Richard Nixon
Jimmy
Carter. It
was
last two
"regimes"
character of modern
liberalism betrayed
itself,
since
action confirmed
concept of
security
through
freedom through equality of opportunity into a collectivist notion of equality of result. Inspired by their purity of heart and their pity, liberals
wish
the modern
to "realign
society,"
as
Capaldi
puts
it, i.e.,
to trans
form human beings into something they have never been, by means of the cre ative power of the state. Since the church could not bring about the kingdom of
heaven
the
on
in
realistic
the university as its sanctuary. the reader, cannot resist or oppose the
within
reminds
liberals, especially
the universities, be
it
shares
Capaldi
eases
his
al
although
brief,
proffer
the
Our tradition is
precedents
epitomized
in Anglo-Saxon
set of
jurisprudence,
It is
a
a tradition of multiple
not a
deductive
first
principles.
future. It is
tradition of
individualism,
human
We
this individualism
of
with
it. Individualism
beings
choices and
living
[reviewer's emphasis] responsible for their according to self-imposed rules. This individualism is the result currents of thought. It existed as an ideal in the Renaissance as
even
an
of
in the Reformation. It
has
medieval roots
about whether
the active
intellect
was
found in
individual
soul or a group.
most relevant
for
our
purposes, it has
deep
roots
of common
law.
The
great
fosters
paternalism
by
making the
state the
Ill
If it be
so
that
doctrinaire liberalism is
the
dominant
and
ideology
both in the
uni
versities and
in the communications
industry,
there is
no counter-evidence
for this
not
being
written not
only
soundly
ar-
and
Teleology
421
which
book but
a courageous one.
are
he lives
and moves
has his
being
and of
publishing
The
domains
For in
at
"priests,"
which
have their
a
own
holy
ikons
acted
and
naturally their
own priesthood.
angry.
and sacrilegiously.
guardians protect
nor
him! In the
friendly
wrong him
harm him.
doctrine of human nature and of morality as a species doctrine is, at least, misleading and, at most, false. Throughout the book, Capaldi calls the theory which is used to justify affirmative action
To
regard
the utilitarian
of teleological
policy
teleology. Yet on the last page of the text and in an endnote, he calls the
"liberal-utilitarianism,"
theory
mon.
the
on
for his de
might
Why,
lie in
his Humean
among
which
lies in the
of ethics. and
recent convention
analytic philosophers
in their discussions
of ethics which
It is the
convention
moral
is found in textbooks
distinguish Such
Plato is
classify
doc
"Whiggish"
labels
instructive than to
Our
call
idealist
or
Aristotle
such
complaint
not with
but
inappropriate,
29.
or
imprecise labels. An
ample of a
is William
13,
(1977),
p.
28,
where
that between
consequentialist
theory is
is
vention
equivalent
to a teleological theory,
while a nonconsequentialist
theory
con
equivalent
73.
The
use of
regarding
also
not
only the
modern positions of
and
Mill but
the
ancient position of
Epicurus
as
hedonism
kinds
of
teleologism.
as
Epicurus
and
share
the same
bed,
far
as
is concerned,
of
with
Plato, Aristotle,
this
Aquinas.
One
the
problems with
convention
is the
confusion
between is
a conse a cause.
and ends
A is
consequence
is
Furthermore,
"purpose"
an end
not a purpose,
"end"
words
are
frequently
computers.
used synonymously.
things
have
knives, trees,
which
to intelligent agents
by
they
perform actions.
direct
The
end of a
tree
is to grow, take
executes
no purpose poses
in reproducing
whereas make
human
agents
may
use a tree
etc.
for landscaping, to
of
"purpose,"
furniture,
to hide
behind,
human beings willing them; purposes stem from their however, is synonymous with the term
"end"
"purpose"
being
willed.
"intention."
Many
ac-
"intention."
use
the term
to
mean
or
Another
problem with
the
convention comes
428
Interpretation
the
presumption
counts of ethics on
i.e.,
radically true. As
"deepest"
a result ethical
level is
to the
(or
whether or not
the
"is"). Those
nature are
deemed deontological.
The
convention
exclusively
dualistically.
contrast,
another recent
By
way
of
(1980) by Ethel Albert, Theodore Denise, and Sheldon Peterfreund, restricts to Plato and Aristotle alone (pp. 10, 30). Very the description
"teleological"
authors
do
not even
positions of
apply it to Aquinas. And they certainly avoid and Mill. Such avoidance how
a teleological ethics can
them
from in
having
to
be
accommo
mechanistic
beliefs
nature
particular.
this exercise in textbook canvassing is to suggest that ( 1 ) Capaldi in regarding utilitarianism as a teleological doctrine, (2) to do so is a mistake, (3) his demon is utilitarianism not teleology, and (4) utilitarianism through its teaching that morality consists in the moral agent's maximizing plea
point of
is
not alone
sure
for the
teaching whereby it is
of
the agent's
and
duty to do so
doctrinaire liberalism
Edmund Burke's has it dawned
its policy
of affirmative action.
doctrine did
not occur
Mill
nor
contemporary
utilitarians.
It is
a caution worth
noting
The
great
inlet
by
which a colour
for
oppression
has
is
by one man's
the
pretending to determine concerning the happiness of another, and by claiming a right to use what means he thinks proper in order to bring him a sense of it. It is
ordinary
and
It may very well be Mill's effort to transform individual ism into a universal ethical hedonism by means of the
psychological
hedon
"deontological"
concept of
duty
("the
pure
idea
of
duty")
the
utilitarian
been
supplied
by
worldly
time
success.
Louis
Auchincloss'
in
our
else
In this respect, it is
interesting
and
instructive
to compare Capaldi's
account
Michael Sandel's in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982). What is instructive in the comparison is that while both are in agreement about liberalism and its product the policy of affirmative
of affirmative action and with
liberalism
and
Teleology
a criticism of
429
liberalism, especially
Capaldi
gives
as
found in the
John Rawls
whereas
his
at
in the
comparison
for but mostly against affirmative action. What is of in is that they disagree profoundly about the philosophical
ground of while
liberalism
Sandel
finding it to be
more
deeply rooted
in deontology,
to consequentialism and
p. 3).
to
teleology (Sandel,
deontology: (i) a moral sense wherein it is (2) foundational sense wherein it is opposed For Sandel, utilitarians are liberals but not liberals in
senses of
a
"truest"
liberal is
and
deontologist liberals in
kind
of
Kantian.
calls the
For Capaldi,
utilitarians are
liberals
they
are
what
Sandel
foundational sense;
tion for
utilitarians are
teleologists.
Their disagreement
what
extend,
at
this deeper
level,
to Sandel's prescrip
view of
will which
the human
the
limiting
the teleological
order
(Sandel,
pp.
175-
involve,
limit to
and a guide
not
to
speak of a concept
of nature as of
having
an order
distinct from
and
to
but
not
independent
human
to an
assertion made
twice at the
center of
Profes
sor
Capaldi's powerfully
reasoned
text
only be discon
puts
certing to the
same
sympathetic reader.
In the first
it may
offer
to the advocates
him. In the
the liberals
it
him in the
boat
level
with
he
otherwise opposes.
it may
his
deeply
held
convic
That
assertion
not
have natures;
(p.
desires"
every
one of us
has
multiplicity
of
conflicting
91).
Yet
on
the last
page of the
text, he
(p.
".
human beings
are autono
self-
mous moral
agents,
for their
choices and
living
according to
imposed
rules"
179).
no
or the conflict, then nothing to sort out the multiplicity Capaldi can have no Professor that claim the advocates of affirmative action will or courts people manipulated either by the by the social firm objection to
conflicting desires
with
having
engineers.
Human beings,
by
not
having
Here
natures, are as
infinitely
malleable as when
they
are
unlimitedly
autonomous.
we should remember
that
John
Dewey
(whose
notion of
human
nature
impulses"
is primordially "a formless void of become 125), he also said that "any impulse may position according to the way it interacts with
is strikingly like Capaldi's) said that man (Human Nature and Conduct, p.
organized
into
almost
any dis
and
(Human Nature
Conduct,
p. 95).
as much as
For Capaldi, Dewey, and liberals, human beings can be done to do. And if this is so, then the human world has to take the they
can
430 form
Interpretation
another, one bundle of conflicting
desires
advo
against
another,
and one
batch
The
Professor Capaldi's
appeal
to reason a sham
instrument
of
privilege and to
keep
others
his will, impulse, or desire to hold on to his position of from achieving the objects of their desires, their im
wills, and
living
according to their
own self-imposed
no
deepest level
Capaldi wrong about it, then the sympathetic reader will worry that Capaldi has placed himself in the same deontological boat with the liberals,
liberalism
and
especially the doctrinaire liberals he so deeply opposes in the political matters. To say that human beings have no nature, no natural ends, only a multiplicity of conflicting desires, is to remain silent about what the principle of construction or
selection might
be
either of ends or
desires
is
distinct from
seem
choice
not
liberal-utilitarianism may
as are
not col
twisting
disinterested
pursuit of
law, to knowledge, to re
con
jecting
ism),
the
notion and
fact
of merit on
radical egalitarian
to recognizing no
or
limits
struct, reconstruct,
deconstruct the world, and to remaining silent or not destruction committed by a tyrannical pursuit of duty in
of others.
will wonder and
Finally
phasis]
worry
conviction
[reviewer's
em ac
agents,
responsible
for their
choices and
living
rules"
is too
heavily
taxed
by
a
convic
no natures
but do have
desires. It is difficult to
Even if he
understand what
conflicting
should escape
the
charge that
dom) into
but
which
is theirs
"to
by
virtue
beings, an autonomy which they do not choose of being human, he might be persuaded to accept the
policy and its liberalistic idea that human beings have a nature to be
fulfilled"
suggestion roots
is
not
(p. 90). He
forcefully
than
he does
the
idea that be
per
be fulfilled. He
might
a multi
plicity of conflicting desires, then it must be reason which enables them to judge and determine the multiplicity and the conflict and that it is freedom which en
ables them
just be
what
to make a selection. Such a combination of reason and freedom may the nature or end of human beings is.
Thinking
of
Jurgen Habermas
Robert R. Sullivan
John
Jay College
of Criminal Justice
Der
philosophische
By
Suhrkamp Verlag,
Die
neue
1985.)
Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1985.)
I
The New Left's
distinguishing
other
claim
is that
cultural
formations
can
determine
seri
the forms that industrialization takes and hence are themselves worth
as
taking
ously determines culture, the New Left holds that culture, including politics, can deter mine economics. This being the case, the New Left addresses itself to intellec
tuals
rather
determinants. In
words,
where
held that
economics
than
flesh
and
blood workers,
and
in
an
keeping
with
this
shift
neo-
in addressee, it
class.
also perceives
its
opponent to
be
intellectual
class of
conservatives rather
old conservatives of on
capitalist)
the
This is
standing Marx
key
we need
thinking
of
of the
That thinking is
in two
volumes published
in German in be
1985.
At
first
sketched prove
above, but
upon
reflection
that is to say,
of the
with
interpretation
both
to
understandable
in terms
dominant
cultural
thinking.
The first
as one of
book,
Der
philosophische
Habermas 's
major works.
It
lectures, for
for
the
now
being
pub
lication
by
1986.
The Philo
sophical
Discourse
Modern,
of the
and the
body
and
of
as
philosophical
defense
modern
of
thinkers
who
might
be
out of what
Max Weber
of modernism's rationality.
book's
and
Die neue Uniiber ungainly in German it is best to put it into equally ungainly English as The New
is
Shortsightedness. It is
made
up
of newspaper
features, introductions
to other words,
books,
other
it is a collage in which Habermas's thinking is applied. It will most likely for it very nicely not be translated in accessible book form, which is too bad,
complements
432
Interpretation
The two books, taken together, strongly suggest that there is a coherent cut ting edge to Habermas's latest thinking. On the one hand, he is going back to the
drawing board to construct a powerful philosophical defense of enlightenment as being essential to the modern. On the other hand, he is testing his philosophical vision against counterenlightenment reality, and although he may be pleased by
the test results, the fact that he feels a need to defend the
postmodern modern and criticize
the
(read: counterenlightenment)
opposition
suggests upper
intellectual
hand.
II
In the Philosophical Discourse
period as an ated.
on the
the modern
Age
of
Reason,
are
and
this
is
meant
literal
sense not
to be depreci
All
by
Habermas to be
emerging different In
They
dominated
by
one or another
form
of
mythos,
but
the
modern age
is dominated
by logos, by
reason
itself,
and
other
absolutely superior to every other age of words, Habermas is a Hegelian who holds the
Absolute Mind. What this
means can
to be the
embodiment of
way: whereas
be
put
in the
following
modern
age,
as the
every past mythological age can be refuted Age of Reason, cannot be refuted by another
reason cannot
by
reason, the
reason.
It is Catch 22,
Hegelian
style:
be
refuted
by
absolute
primacy
of reason.
Hence the
modern age
is
Any
attempt
to
step
out of
it, any
attempt
to
initiate
a postmodern
age,
is
deception,
and
an effort at
counterenlightenment,
on the
a regression
to myth.
Modern, Hegel is
thinker
considered
first
by
modern
because he
understood the
quality of reason in the modern age. Absolute here means, if I read Habermas correctly, that dialectic is not simply a matter of talking-thingsthrough (the literal, classical meaning of the term), but is also a term that ade quately describes the underlying structure of historical reality. In other words, dialectical thinking is a reflex of real historical relationships. The recognition of
this absolute quality of reason is what
distinguishes the
modern as an age of
history. Over
against
this
Hegelianism, Habermas
be
called postmodern
thinkers who
might
In
one
variety of more recent because they do not accept the argu way or another, Habermas then takes all or, even, irrational. Nietzsche, Heidegger,
taken to be thinkers who understood that
considers a
Bataille, Derrida,
they
son.
and
Foucault
are all
of
could not
break
out of
the Age
Reason
by
They
modernism.
Nietzsche,
so
this argument goes, sought to clear the way for the coming of
Thinking
of Jurgen Habermas
433
Heidegger
sought the
of
Dionysius,
Destruktion
the European
metaphysical
Reason,
today
as a
and
Heidegger's
iron
irrationality
burning
of 1933.
Derrida
word
seeks
text and
a return
to the spoken
research
way
out of the
in in
In
sane asylums
he find Europeans
who were
out-of-their-
minds,
so to
thereby
beyond
reason.
an extended argument
documenting
hopelessness
anything
called
postmodern,
here
means post-Hegelian.
Habermas's Diskurs is in my opinion a brilliant but deeply biased book. In the currently fashionable debate over the meaning of the postmodern, Habermas nar rowly
concentrates
rationalism of
Hegel. The
result
is
interesting
as an absolute and
matter of
to
Hegel,
then
disagreeing with the absolute rationality of the modern. postmodern, which by definition disagrees, can be characterized
counterenlightenment movement rather
narrowly
as a
new
(nothing really
a
new can
be
said
from the
Absolute Reason).
Habermas's
and pre
In
vious
fashion,
has its
clear value.
In
none of
this
on
finally
all of
is the local
significance of
it
sheds a retrospective
light
Habermas's previous books and helps to throw into sharp relief just how rational ist they really were. But the greater significance of Habermas's Hegelianism lies
in
what
it
allows
him to do
with
the
postmodern.
This term is
accorded an ex
treme definition
synonymous with
irrational,
reactionary, counterenlightenment,
and, yes,
counterrevolutionary.
It is
Habermas's
ur
bane
style to go all
not
short of
its
clearly loaded
against
the postmodern.
Ill
In the New Shortsightedness, Habermas continues his critique of any effort to refute the absolute reason embodied in the modern age. The second book
makes up for this by applying As Habermas's thinking to the contemporary already noted, it is a collec tion of newspaper articles, interviews, introductions to other books, and other
lacks the
philosophical argument of
the first
but
world.
recently
by
pieces, but
with
the
help
be
of the
book, it
The
finally
Haber
the
re-
Habermas defends
434
Interpretation
I believe this
argument
because it is
with
a political argument.
actual
That is to say,
architecture
have to do
the
help
but have do
political
well
making of the city, the polis, and it cannot significance. It shapes the public space, and for better or
worse, we
looking
at
Habermas's
com
ments on architecture as an
indirect
political argument.
The
conventional modernist an
by
Habermas to be buildings
of
in the
Wright, Mies
der Rohe,
Corbusier
was a
are
taken to be buildings
post-
that cannot
modernist
be improved
upon.
Granted there
decline in
World War II
that
functionalism
modernist claim
function, I
take Habermas to be restating the basic Marxist proposition that economics ought
politics.
also
view of post
The
willingness
to
its reactionary quality. Ar freely chaic values are resurrected and put into place, the public place, in the form of stone. The details are literally tablets handed down to us from on high. They thus
the past, and this suggests to Habermas
represent
for Habermas
an attempt
public spaces.
However
intriguing
it is to
politically conscious Habermas as archi interesting section in the second book is his lengthy
read the
come as a surprise
for those
that there
is
such a
thing
as neu-Konservatismus
an
intense
response.
The
in Germany, reader is
initially inclined,
into different
that Habermas
But this
prejudgment
is is
pulled
simply pour the same arguments is quickly overcome as the reader unexpected moves of this book.
will
and
German
neo-conservatism that
phenomenon
remarkable
for its
distant American
and
it
allows
become
its
oriented
in
re
spect
impresses Habermas
values and
about
American
neoconservatism pretive
democratic
reliance on
inter
sociology to make its case. Habermas is careful not to lay too much praise on American neoconservatism, but considering the source, this is a most remarkable treatment. Partly, however, Habermas is generous toward American
neoconservatism so
is taken
by
that he can set it off against German neoconservatism, which Habermas to be undemocratic and basically unsociological (read:
presentation of
unrealistic) in its
servatism
not
sketch of
German
this
neocon
turns out to be
make
startlingly incomplete
that
and
really
because
incomplete
ness,
which could
be
called
one-sidedness, it is clearly
wrong.
Where Habermas
Thinking
be
of Jurgen Habermas
435
critic, the
same cav
be let
off
lightly
for his
shortcomings as an architectural
alier
cannot
accorded
his
view on
German here I
neoconservatism. am
neoconservative argument
and
and
following the
begins
think
ing
that
Carl
Joachim Ritter in
with a move
distinguishes
from
old conservativism
vatives
still
Where old conser life in traditional institutions like the family or the
out
Germany.1
church,
draw
the
the
logic
of
Nietzsche's
of
claim
about the
death-of-god based
on religious sanction.
religious
and
it is precisely
Let
me put
this
key
point
in
different
By definition,
the
institutions
of
depend
upon a
divine
sanction.
Indeed,
tradition makes
if it is
not the
originally
revealed at creation.
Correspondingly,
and also
by
def
sanction
put
deity
is
at
least
precisely because they cease to for worldly institutions. God is not necessarily dead, on hold in respect to societal institutions. Therefore, a
societal
is
needed
for
institutions,
is that
(logos)
provides
therefore has to
do
philosophy that understands itself as the new authorizing agent, fully operating under the dictates of logos. Habermas, as a modernist in the above sense, has no problem if he is dealing
with
by
with
some
traditionalists, but he has a real problem if he is dealing with someone or group that claims to be providing a better reason than he and can back up
what
has, I
the en
lightened
desirability
of
putting
short of
an opponent's argument
in the best
possible not
his
He does
that German
thinkers. He
thereby
follows:
That
and
argument continues as
god
the corresponding release from the restrictions of tradition, German neocon that
relativization of
constitutional order.
This
sounds
like
a contradiction
a
mandates
neoconservatives
it is
dialectical truth
such
Freedom is
I
the
Under
conditions, as Dostoev-
There is
are
thers
no adequate study of German neoconservatism, but by consensus the founding fa Carl Schmitt. Arnold Gehlen, and Joachim Ritter. More recent neoconservatives are Ernst
Forsthoff, H. Schelsky,
thinkers.
and
with
436
ski's
Interpretation
would
Grand Inquisitor
of
or
lowance
istence
and
of some
legitimate
order.
order,
neoconservative
the provision of
of some
legiti
mate
authority
type.
The
ment
is to be found in limited,
constitutional govern
(the Rechtsstaat),
and
German
in
principle
to supporting this
This argument,
now was
political,
may be
put
originally
characterized
by
premises acceptable
community were unreasonable because they unnecessarily repressed human freedom. These premises were also restated as political goals, and with their
achievement
that
is to say,
with
the
political relativization of
the traditional au
thority
of
family,
church,
and
principality
the premises
more or
thereby
it
was
But
absolutist
continued,
less like
cause,
or
to eliminate all
forms
of author
ity,
even
authority
of
guarantees the
freedoms
achieved
by
to be absolutely
neoconservatism
position
is irrational.
application of
this political
thinking,
that a
red
see an
of
integral
connection
and
between the
student movement of
1980s.2
the 1970s,
They
thread
move
liberation
This
dissident Ger
intellectuals
Rechtsstaat.
of
the Federal Re
nonetheless a
public
which, however
faulty
and
clumsy
Helmut Kohl, is
to be found
real
Specifically,
German
democracy,
classical
and the
defending
this
Enlightenment
political
form.
seeks to arrive at a
direct democracy,
has its
charms at the
local level
of
Green
Party
meetings
(al
though even
nation-state
here the
has
charm
proven
is wearing thin) but which at the level of the German to be dangerous illusion. The reason is not hard to find.
neoconservatives the equivalent of
Direct
democracy
is for German
Habermas's
speech sit
famed ideal
speech situation.
democracy
and
ideal
desirable
decision-making. But
problems of a
writ
large
that is arise,
call
different
magnitude writ
Habermas has
never recognized
these. Direct
democracy
interest
large,
it
is
liberation from
It is
of powerful private
groups
or, if
they
Revolution
Seewald,
1974).
Thinking
tyranny
of Jurgen Habermas
of a
437
extinguished, to the
bodily
needs of
famed
speech situation
determining
tain kind of
sion-makers
is only apparently a device for excluding outside interests from political decisions. In reality it is a device for ensuring that a cer decision will always be made, and this is one that compels deci
to
decide in favor
of equality.
Coercionless
coercion
of
(zwangsloser
speech
Zwang), Habermas
situation, and this
once called
the ideal
is for German
hardly
a reasonable
basis for
political constitution.
Habermas's
cause
second
disappointment be
it continually refers back to contemporary German neoconservatism as the intellectual opponent of the New Left but never once adequately confronts the
pages.
course
the
Modern, Habermas's
suggestively referred to in his first book, The Philosophical Dis recent thinking is liable to have a
strong influence in the next few years on the American academic debate over postmodernism. It would have been ideal if Habermas had actually locked horns
with
his
chosen
pull
up just
short of
that
confronta
tion.
IV
Cultural formations,
relativization,
shorn
of their
divine sanction,
that
are
ripe
material
for
they
will
be
understood as
the ex
human interest in domination. In this respect, the only difference between Habermas and Karl Marx is that Habermas believes that freepression of one or another
floating
world.
cultural
formations
still
have influence,
even a
Marx,
now
gods, as
with
being fully
determined
by
economics.
Habermas does
not
claim
deeply
informed
by
his
of
Freud
is that
archaic cultural
forms
power of
determine action,
Culture,
Marx's
shorn of
its divine sanction, becomes mere convention, and the ques convention is a legitimate one, with or without is to say, in
is
a mode of a
society
still more or
less
centered on
infallible authority,
culture
ensuring
temporal
from one generation to continuity by passing divinely sanctioned values religion and becomes a to be a ceases or Judaism another. But when Christianity are not and ask why going to be satisfied -life, the children are going to
way -of
with
they
be
Habermas has
never persuaded
himself that
an autonomous political
commu-
438 nity
Interpretation
to exist, but I believe the reasoning here
presented makes
ought
the argu
ment
functioning deity,
does
not need
of such an
discourse to
even
human interest,
interest
of
painstakingly
cultural
created
bodily needs, from overwhelming and privatizing the public forum. This sounds at first glance like a formula for
and
authoritarianism,
in
similar
in
motivation
with guar
Indeed, if one is to believe Madison majority in Federalist # io, the United States Constitution is a conspiracy of enlighten ment reason against the dictates of the populist body.
the excesses
of
Put differently, authority in a desacralized world must be a reasoned thing, and this implies that mind find it within its scope to erect limitations to even its
own
activities, especially
of
when
these are
determined
by
the
ments"
logically
I
to the
idea
stitutional
German,
of
has
been
clear
that this
is the direction
to do
his
reasoning.
that in
Habermas's latest
what
books, especially
culture
Modern,
he is really
attempting in the
is
modern
Dictatorship
of
of the
Sitting Class,
namely, intellec
inescapable
consequence of
substitution of a new
the bodily functions that should de worldly absolutism form for the otherworldly absolutism that has passed away.
and
The
suspicion
here
fully
we
credit
German
neoconservatives
like Arnold
absolutism
suspicion3
have
Only by
the
shifting
meaningfully
record
death-of-god,
Like
perience.
wish
could
in architecture, German neoconservatism is a mixed ex say it was humorous, but it is hardly this. More often in the way it is
expressed and received.
than not, it is
heavily Germanic
be
far
as
its
argument can
construed
lightheartedly
from
tower, it is not putting forth a program of consistent tra ditional values, designed to do combat with the dragons of a godless modern world. It is rather arguing for a Rechtsstaat that will secure the open society or, the same thing put differently, will secure a space in which all values may be set
a crenelated castle
to play.
Play
3.
suggests
1979),
45-47, 55
and
Einblicke (Frankfurt,
Thinking
with
of Jurgen Habermas
that there is
439
the playing of depends upon it
means
no end outside of
the game.
Similarly
the
Rechtsstaat, its
Just
as so
own
legitimacy
having
to the
functionalism is
the
a goal that
is
ulterior
forms
of an authentic
architecture,
Habermas's thinking
are ulterior motives
and cause
him to
question
to
legitimate
modern
barrassing
German German
claim
in the
This primacy of politics is a rather em world, but it is still the claim that is central to
politics.
neoconservatism. neoconservatism
does
not
take it to be an
actually does take politics seriously because it expression of some forces or purposes outside itself.
Habermas, in contrast, questions the legitimacy of the Rechtsstaat because he does not, finally, take politics seriously. Somewhere in his soul Habermas be
lieves that economics, His New Left
claim
which
is morbidly serious,
of
ought to
determine
politics.
ics is only a claim about what is in fact the case in a less than Utopian reality. What Habermas wants is the banishment of the city itself, at least the city that still controls its destiny, and this is, after all, the only kind of city worth keeping.
If
you are
and
The Journal
of
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The Journal
University
Book Reviews
Jerusalem Eidelberg.
cloth,
vs.
Athens: In Quest
Md.:
of a
General
of
Theory
of
Existence. By Paul
393
pp.:
Press
America,
1983. xviii +
history
of
mankind, two
Athens."
for
men's
Jerusalem
Jeru for religion, revelation, and traditional authority whereas Athens for philosophy, reason, and freedom of thought. Eidelberg dissents.
are not
and
To "almost
in this
conflict,"
These dichotomies
shall present evidence
are a
distortion
of the
truth. We
indicating that there is far greater rationality and intellectual of King David and King Solomon than in the city of Plato and
of
Knowledge,
which
can
knowledge,
without
Jerusalem. Indeed, we shall see the Tree of Life, yields madness and
Eidelberg's
sor
be unthinkingly dismissed. As
many
of
a student of
Profes Torah
on
guidance through
the
important
"Athens."
neighborhoods of
master
Fortified
and
Strauss
Torah
or of
the
he
would
between
ancients and
he
was otherwise
Eidelberg
noire, tice
can
makes
glimpses a truth
denied
by
ultimately harmonize,
and modern
and
humanity
is
perfectible.
He
makes perhaps
revelation
entirely rational,
means
superior to phi
losophy
fection
tence"
by
which
human
per
can
be
achieved.1
Eidelberg
intends to
provide a
"general
theory
of exis
based
that
upon a rational
understanding
of the
Torah. In
doing
so, he intends
to
show
is
not
knowl
'scientists'
edge; the
fail.
Eidelberg
1
.
The first
By
"true
revelation,"
I do
not refer to
may
not
be rational, but
rather
442
Interpretation
principles"
of
the "Torah
Theory
Existence."
of
Following
Zimmer
Eidelberg
mechanics and
the general
so
discusses twentieth-century physics, arguing that both quantum theory of relativity disprove the physics of classical
Athens but do
confirm
by
pointing beyond
physical existence
itself.2
This tends to
the Torah
and unified, any physical or mental existent, process, or law as is a form of idolatry, the worship of a created thing. Thus the Torah stands against any form of monism, as distinguished from monotheism. Although many scholars contend
'nature,'
Eidel
the
berg
God, 'Elohim,
in
creation.
appears
in
relation to
multiplicity
man
forces
manifested
However,
these forces do
not constitute
is
its
existence
Creator."
Another
ly
but to
"natural'
cyclical
God's names, HaShem, appears in relation not to cyclical than the linear, providential, teleological laws "more laws. This exemplifies the principle of "asymmetric comple
of
fundamental"
mentarity"
whereby
ement of each
own'
nature and
history
are ordered
by
means of
dualities,
world
one el
duality being
are
has 'its
governed,
finally, by
nonphysical
tinctive
physical world so
harmony
world."
with
Far from
"the
being
knowledge"
about and
structure of
re
lationship
tion"
between
existence,"
nonphysical
physical
scientific
and
mathematical rigor. of
Judaism thus
avoids the
"self-gratification
spiritualism"
Sem
ites. Two
ate
law
daily
and
activities, and
Finite Halacha (DineiAdam), governing immedi the Infinite Halacha (Dinei Shamayim), governing "the
the
conduct of
individuals
and nations
throughout
history"
combine
law,
rational
ity,
skepticism.
morality in a manner Plato and Aristotle would regard with considerable But the philosophers are the descendents of Esau, "the or despite their best
efforts
nations"
goyim,
who
inhabit
of
and exploit
the physical
world and
serve egalitarianism.
The descendents
Jacob,
in
the
Israelites, inhabit
Torah
of
the spiri
accordance with
principles of
of
Esau
and the
descendents
Jacob
serve
laws
descendents
whereas
might say, however, that the best Esau know that they do not know what they are doing, the best of the descendents of Jacob do know something of what they are
perfection of mankind.
One
of
doing. In the
second chapter as
pride with
Torah anava,
'forgets'
usually translated
'humility.'
Plato's Socrates
jus
(The
his final
Reason: Insiders
and
"H
ED"
Publications,
1979.
Book Reviews
word
443
"gentle"
Eidelberg
far have
translates
as
as
is translated
"tame"
as
by
Allan
Bloom.)
read
He
goes so
to argue
(citing
would
ing
dichotomy
living,
life"
He
also
contends eliminate
if the
unexamined
life is it
not worth
"it
be
unjust
to
But this
as
were
deadly
reading
of
Plato fails if
that Plato
not
purpose.3
Eidelberg
charges
indeed
all
deify
murder
God.
This
manifests
is the human
for the
excellence
vice par
is anav, "does
wisdom or
himself
as
credit
for his
greatness,"
means of
to
him."
"Judaism is based
cyclical
gratitude,"
on
gratitude
laws,
apprehensible
by
laws
HaShem, inaccessible
to the
unaided
human
mind.
(Eidelberg denies
and can
laws,
once
given, "must
be tested like
to eluci
any scientific theory: by its internal logical consistency date nature and history.
. .
and
by its
power
.")
The
man of Torah of
does
not want
to make a name
for himself; he
wants
only to
sanc
tify
the
the name
HaShem. To sanctify
much as
wisdom and
power, so
the
from
which power
in
form
of
just
rule and
dominion follows.
In this way the judges of the Sanhedrin excel Plato's philosopher-kings. In the third chapter Eidelberg writes that "Machiavelli only vulgarized Plato Plato's "city in or made public what Plato preferred to remain
speec private."
is "founded
force"
on
truth."
and
"preserved
must
by
force
mitigated
by
fraud
yet all
(One
serving for
the
'truth'
identical to Plato's?)
Eidelberg
inhumane Platonic
scribed
of
founding
with
that
de
in the Laws)
the
founding
of
Israel,
and
earth,"
"the
particularly Moses.
and
with
the efforts
Infinitely
only God,
from
idolatry of nationalism
be, like Moses,
perfect
would
be
proud as a nation
nation would
time-
each 'di
vidual member of
this
humbleness
ual and
to a
society
of
Israel.
3.
Put
another
be
said to argue,
who want
justice
more
injustice to
you want
justice
that muchT
not
lover
of
This does
merely
conventional view of
mortals, if this
444
Interpretation
overcomes
Thus Judaism
munity
makes
by Plato. Eidelberg argues that philosophy inevitable because philosophy understands cyclical nature only; anava would be irrational in a meaningless, ever-wheeling cosmos. In "is a fit and alldeed, what has lately come to be called
a tension
best described
this tension
'self-actualization'
universe,"
as
Spinoza
more-or-less
openly
philosopher and
permanent
Absolutely
Transcendent be
is
"insoluble"
by
the
finite human mind; "mysticism, insofar as it involves with HaShem, is utterly foreign and abhorrent to the
actions'
sup
Torah,"
God's transcendency or holiness. We can only know God "indirectly : through nature, history, and especially through through His works or
denial
of
His
most
illuminating
work, the
Torah,
which
"harbors orally
bolic
ple,
logic"
"only
long
and rigorous
discipline, have
mastered ordered
deliberately
dis
teachings of the
The
what
following chapters include two on history, two on science, and two on might very loosely be called psychology. In the chapters on history, Eidel
six
berg
writes
function
of
is,
idolatry."
primitive
was
to de
"rationalism"
Being
with
being
known,"
thus
deifying
of
creation ex nihilo
is the fundamental
also
conflict
between Athens
Jerusalem."
Aristotle's
Mover,"
"empiricism"
deifies intellect
about
by
defined
as
"thought thinking
an offense of mind
itself."
"Prime
would
be
absolutely
serves
inscrutable,
and
to the philosopher's
Eidelberg
ob
lectual
creativity"
paradoxically "imposes limits to man's intel because it "denies the possibility of man ever over the power to natural laws.
nature,"
"modulate"
of nonphysical
laws from
which
the laws of
The moderns,
image'
one might
say, absurdly
try
to use nature to
But the only way to truly conquer nature is to employ nonnatural 'in God's rather than the ersatz laws; creativity creativity of self-deifying philosophers, is the promise of Judaism. In
destroying
the
Despite
teaching, the
classical
Greek
philosophers
regarded as
idea
As
of
equality in the
this nature
be
equally
good needed
artificial.
Eidelberg
fails
to produce one
regime?"
Further,
of
fails
to sustain a just
hierarchy.
son
Eidelberg
Torah incidents
as
Abraham's
binding
his
Isaac
during
the
Book Reviews
conquest of
445
Canaan might easily be cited if one wished to raise questions con cerning the justice of God and the Israelites. Accordingly, he argues that "Abra ham's sacrifice teaches us that although man is nothing in relation to God, he
. . .
is the
acme of
God's
creation."
of
the
Canaanites, it
was
done "to stamp out the pagan practice of sacrificing the innocent for the sake of the Jewish practice contrasts with the perhaps proto-Machiavellian acts
guilty.'"
of
Plato's founders. It
Christianity,
"The hence
which
Eidelberg
blames
sacrifice.
a
pagan practice of
form
of aristocide
egalitarian.
sacrificing In practice,
by eliminating the coherent and comprehensive system of laws of the Torah, Christianity was forced to adopt the patchwork laws of pagan nations, laws which
could not
but
Nazarene Caesar
or
Christianity
and to
is
the
Caesar's
God's,
when
in truth, nothing in
a monotheistic universe
belongs to Caesar.
The
church/state separation
leaves
Christianity
vulnerable
to the separation of
morality and politics effected by its enemy, Machiavelli. intellect" "sacrifice of required by the Christian doctrine "The Book
of
Eidelberg
faith"; it
decries the
of salvation
by
faith.
Truth
requires
infinitely
the
more than
belief
"The
or
requires acts
...
of observance of
commandments.
deification."
suicide of
the mind
is
suicide.
Chapters
seven concern
(i.e., Galilean/Newtonian)
preserves
of
and
twentieth-century
mental
ics,
respectively.
Galileo
for
mathematics
this
upper
rung
Plato's
hierarchy
Galileo
closer to epistemological
universe
democracy."
For in
contrast
to Plato Galileo
believes the
infinite
and
irrational,
for distin
or egalitar
curved
from straight,
the
circumference
from
center.
Relativity
cosmology."
and
an
grounds
for
an atheist positivism.
of
ele
which,
having
of
destroying
paganism or
primitive
God."
idolatry,
were now
Newton
added an empiricist
preventing mankind from recognizing the only true determinism to this modern brew. Twentiethsubstitutes a objects
century
physics
nonmaterialist
that
for contingency or uncertainty"; Einstein "as by immanent necessity and not as a result of the
not
Relativity theory
over
a necessity looks the necessary incompleteness of any mathematical system demonstrated by Godel. It also contradicts the microphysical indeterminacy pos
ited
by
another
branch
contemporary physics, quantum mechanics. For these Eidelberg can insist that physics now suffers from theoretical
of
446
Interpretation
spectacular practical
successes.
disarray, despite
Whitehead
"apart from
He
points
to the concept of
creatio ex nihilo as
"admits"
he
writes of
that
some notion of
'imposed
law,'
statistical
law
or
'the doctrine
im
absolutely Eidelberg relapsing into lawless and asserts that statistical laws "are not
tropy."
manence provides
no reason
why the
goes
be steadily
chaos.'"
self-sustaini
only laws in operation, "the universe would now be in a state of complete Contra Einstein, "God does play dice with the world, only the dice
'loaded.'"
are
This
Eidelberg
of chapters
eight and
nine,
the human soul as seen in Jews and in non-Jews. the decline into entropy is human ac
will should serve
what prevents
tion, insofar
the
divine
"stiff-necked"
Will,
and
the
willful,
that Will
are
Jew is
abundantly
The
elaboration." excellence."
manifest as to require no
non-Torah
world,
by
contrast, has
will.
sunk
In its
'pluralism,'
into deification of, first, the human it now deifies even baser emotions,
which
the
intellect
comparable
to that
Eidelberg imputes
of
to Chris
tianity.
Eidelberg
means
returns
to
Plato for
of
an
explanation
this.
He
advances
Nietzschean interpretation
that
Socrates'
last
words:
"I
owe a cock
to
Asclepius"
life is
disease,
of
an absurdity.
the unexamined
life
living, he
mankind) to death.
condemned
(One
might
in fact
life, leaving
his
the
'die.') "Socrates
conquered all
emotions
all save
truth."
Having
"emotion"
severed this
from the
of experience
data"
op
posed
to the
range of
contention that no
human circumstance. In setting standards, the Torah nei indulges the emotions; it guides them to assist men to fulfill for overcoming the cyclically of nature and the death princi
Obviously,
this
unaided
human
reason cannot
Halacha"
on
eros of
which
"emotions"
than the
intel
and
lect, Eidelberg
others.
the
difficulty
noticed
by
Leo Strauss,
Stanley Rosen,
Book Reviews
It is
or always
447 theory
of
ideas
mentality
runs
into the
clusions
an exercise
exempting his thought from its own con in self-deification, a sort of parody of the Biblical verse,
paradox of
'My
thoughts.'
Unfortunately,
HaShem.
these
'gods'
gracious
restraint
of
Eidelberg
course of some
final
chapter
"The Conquest
Death."
of
In the
advancing a non-Kabalistic interpretation of the Eden story, he offers hints on how to interpret the Torah. By eating from the Tree of Knowl
he,
not
God,
'owned'
the Garden. He
thereby
subordi
his
in
tence,
one
man
searching for knowledge. In descending to a lower level of exis caused tension between his mind and his body, yielding death on the
the other. Had Adam and Eve then
eaten
hand
and shame on
of
would
have been
eternal. unto
As it
is, Socrates
God
was
life, for
redeem
man,"
is "sickness
go
death."
allowed man
But "to
leaving
the
domain of "create
necessary."
"synthesize quantity
quality"
matter,"
natural
of conservation-of-energy.
Qedusha,
the "nonphysical
energy"
will
find
no refuge
in this book.
Eidelberg
and and ex
his
promise
to
challenge
"many
eros
cherished
convictions, skeptical
more
dogmatic
alike."
In
doing
detailed
easily
for
completion could
reach an
impasse, however.* In order to fully understand Judaism as Eidelberg represents it, one needs instruction in the esoterics of the Torah and the Talmud. To receive that is, one must decide the issue in advance, at this, one must become Jewish
least is to
provisionally.
(Else
one must
greatest
The Torah
master can
all practical
philosopher says
he is to the
man who
true
life
of
'know'
Does God
smile?
*Part
much
of
from the
scope of the
areas with
depth, Eidelberg
(if they
are
the main points, not the nuances. This means that the book's weak
and were unavoidable once
nesses
that)
Eidelberg
chose to give
it
that
strength.
448
Interpretation
by
Robert A. Goldwin
and
for Public
Policy Research,
1985.
125
pp.:
$13.95;
paper,
$5.95.)
Will Morrisey
The
eous
discrepancy
between
political speeches
deeds
of political men
has
simply from the difference between theory and practice. But much of it does not. Most regimes today fail to defend rights. Their rulers give every sign of
results unwillingness or
inability
to
do
so.
Their
citizens
and
that is
abuses.
term
have
them, understanding it
can
merely mention rights but actually helps to make "a valuable contribution to the safety and The
editors
happiness
tives.'
world."
have
in
three
by
'liberals,'
three
by
'conserva
essayists
present
historical interpretations
of
Constitutional father
focusing
of
on
Madison's
campaign to add
writes
of
when
hostile
voters
threatened to
the Constitution in
its
form. Rutland
are
argues
bills
reciprocally influential. He goes so far as to call the Constitu tion "a living, breathing for this reason, although his one example of this (that we no longer have slaves) required nothing less than a civil war and an
document"
rights"
amendment to
be effected,
as we
lived
and
breathed.
Rutland evidently regards the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment (as interpreted by twentieth-century Supreme Court justices) the principal Con
rights. Public opinion alone rarely protects he contends. adequately, Abolitionists, religious zealots, suspected Confederate sympathizers, IWWs, pacifists, conscientious objectors, "support stitutional guardians of
our rights
Americans'
Soviet
until
Union,"
labor
leaders,
"denied"
their civil
liberties
the
umbre
Fourteenth Amendment to
do not immedi in ately threaten the peace. To this day, public opinion "can never be our republic, but public opinion continues to favor abridgement of accord rights;
cover all public speech and action that
ignored"
and an executive
branch dedicated
informed"
to the preservation
individual
which
rights must
be strong
not
opinion,"
"today
is
nearly
in
previous eras.
re
indifference,
judicial
interpretations becomes
rights,"
'advancement'
meaning
of
obscure when
the
'liberal'
faith in
progressive enlightenment
dims.
Book Reviews
The late
sumption
449
Herbert J. In his
political scientist
Storing
contradicts of
Rutland's
prime as
by denying
seal
"the
the heart
American
of
liberty
is to
Rights."
of
campaign
Rights, Madison
Antifederalists'
defeat
group
separating them from "the large did rest, not on fundamental hostility
by
to the basic
design
of the
Constitution, but
more secure.
on
protected."
liberties
makes
were not
sufficiently
rights a
Storing
of
Rights
Americans'
bly have
limit To
risk
developed
Without it, "our courts would proba law of individual rights to help to test and
rally"
power."
governmental use
is to
"undermin[ing]
main
"the
political
business
of
the American
people"
but
as self-government.
"Even
presumption of
legitimacy
can
and perma
Storing
if it
Rights
as
'first
principles'
interfere
with
this presumption,
ment.
thus
with
the practical
of republican self-govern of
Accordingly,
tail"
the
Constitution,
not
the beginning.
The Bill
of
Rights
provides a opens.
fitting
close
to the
parenthesis around
the Constitution
But the
substance
is
design
design,
cal
not
its
preamble or
to make it act wisely and responsibly. It is in that its epilogue, that the security of American civil and politi
liberty
lies.
One
might even
infer that
as
Storing
ment go so
far
to use it to further
consent.
The
discuss contemporary
ways of
interpreting
the Con
stitution.
Law
scholar
ises, but
meaning
conclusions"
trying
to give concrete
and expression
new
embodied
in
an authoritative
legal
text,"
and
form
of constitutional adjudication
has
emerge
reform,"
Called "structural
large-scale
this
organi
dication
assumes
that "the
operations of
threaten "our
assumes
values"
constitutional
more
formidably
that these
organizations
must
be restructured,
"reflect[ing]
privilege
quo."
healthy
skepticism
about
of power
and
in
en
society."
American
terprise "requires a
with the
bors."
The
reformers
intend to "create
on
a new status
Their
measure of
activity
is
at odds neigh
picture of
him
as a passive umpire,
enterprise."
The judge
now
"becomes the
manager of a reconstructive
Fiss
450
charges
with
Interpretation
that the older "dispute
resolution"
model of
judicial
conduct
"begin[s]
not sub
indifference toward
this charge.
objection
public values or
ignorance
them."
of
He does
stantiate
A familiar
to
such vigorous
activity
by judges is
tion, 'Who
Fiss
replies
litical system,
is based
upon consent.
personal moral
expertise,
of which
authority rests not on "some have but on the process that limits none, they
method
by
which a public
be
construed."
This
process
and
morality indepen
also
dence. One
might
note
bringing independence
meant
brings responsibility obviously, the more powerful you are the responsible for it does not of course bring the responsibility
phrase yield
by
the
can
'a
responsibility.'
sense of even
Further,
keen
sense of
responsibility
different,
opposite,
results
authoritative
depending upon the public morality a judge legal text. Fiss himself suggests some of this by
itself becomes
so
much
judiciary
one
those
dangerous, large-scale
justice
given
to do.
ever present
by
what
is
realistic."
Fiss
darkly:
[he warns]; they will bargain; they will become That is to say, having become politicized, judges get political.
"They
adap
will negotiate
Political
scientist
Walter Berns
framers'
judicial
conduct
eccentric.
Under the
independence to the
exercise
tively today
vide
the
power who
that
by
judgment that only with it could they effec natural right belongs to someone else, the
people"
constituting
nonetheless
"create
as
doing
if it
avowedly,"
so
"openly
and
of
Fourteenth Amendment
New
empowered
the substance of privileges and immunities. Until the 1925 case Gitlow
York,
Amendment had
not
been
con
joined. But
subsequent justices have made up for lost time. Far from commending the American founders sought "to devise a system in which moral differences would not become political The
'idealism,'
issues."
founders, Berns
discovered in
sidiary rights (notably liberty) as self-preservation entails. Without spurning dec larations of rights, the founders never supposed mere declarations sufficient. The defense
of natural rights requires an artificial structure
will
"designed to but
ensure that
the country
be
governed
not
by
simple majorities
by
constitutional are
majorities,
private civil
none
majorities
limitations that
kind
defined
by
rights."
This defense
of artificial
structure, a
diverse interests,
not
dominate the
others.
While
noble, this
Book Reviews
"great modern
451
project"
Berns
cautions
is "not ignoble"; it encourages liberty, prevents tyranny. that "while rights, properly understood, can be secured, not all These
wants
wants can
be
satisfied."
wants of
criminals, but
us
they
the
also
include
at
Berns tempts
to think
latter
least
dangerous
'low*
as
the
former.
right
The
be fed
assertion combines
to
eat
but the
right of
to
for
survival with
the
'high'
language
'ide
now
alism'
in
a manner that
may be
peculiar
moralists
before
hunger
Charity has
based
upon
earned praise
enforced
charity, charity
as a
demand
"subsistence
rights,"
Political
Rights."
scientist
Henry
Shue
set
mostly document
on recent called
lists
of moral goods.
rights"
forth
curity."
emphasizes
the obligatory
rights; "the
whole point of
imposing
sistence
duties,"
justifiable demands,
the
right
liberty of other people by Having the right to life, for refrain can justifiably demand that I from killing you. "Sub having
rights upon
is to limit the
them.
rights"
extend
wherein
human beings
control nature
before. Famine is
of
no
longer
men; "specification
sensible,
well-
informed
for the
allocation of political
philosophy
Shue
with
criticizes the
Reagan Administration's
that foster "cold war
replacement of
"human
rights
"political
rights"
goals."
He
charges the
Administra
tion with
allies as
hypocrisy because, he
Marcos'
rights abuses
by
such
Turkey
and
Philippines
condemning
abuses
in the Soviet
subsistence rights
[are] betrayed in
see our aside
the pursuit of
gains"
illusory
their
not change
own unjust
Leaving
the question of
the
overlooked
human
rights abuses
by
allies,
leaving
aside
might repent
if only they
thought us sincere, it
be
said
argue consistently.
If,
have
litical
ical"
crime
Stalin in the
1930s and
a po serve
"ideolog
for
Attempting
to separate "human
are political ani
from "political
if human beings
when
rights"
differently in
and
to "subsistence
their conceptions
"political
differ. If if other
commercial republics
rarely
or never
deliberately
is
an
cause of
famine,
regimes
do,
then the
issue
of political rights
issue
human
rights.
If,
moreover, certain
communist
kinds
republicanism
(e.g.,
regimes)
wield
considerably
more power
than
certain other
kinds
of regimes
that also
(e.g.,
452
Interpretation
right-wing
dictatorships)
then there is no
in
con
centrating one's public attention on the former and not on the latter. The decision to do so involves prudential deliberation and may be called into question by pru dential deliberation. But to make that decision primarily a matter of rights under
mines
John Locke
patriarchalism.
"subsistence
rights"
as
Shue
to
feed the
people,
who are as
his
'children.'
The
absence of state-guaranteed
"subsistence
rights,"
natural right
bor,
perhaps reflects
reservations about
originating in the philosopher's dislike of tyranny and his esteem for human in dustry. In the volume's most substantial essay, Nathan Tarcov examines the con
ception of rights seen
in the Declaration
of
Independence
and
the
Constitution.
He finds it
individualistic than Shue does, but not simply individualistic. Tarcov observes that the Declaration of Independence speaks of both individ
more
exist
"people,"
in
the
mean an organic a
entity,
a race or nationality.
Shared labor
not enough.
people constitutes
land,
by
individuals'
lives
and
fortunes.
The
naturally free
individuals, in
to
each of
life, liberty,
and
by
nature
belong
them,
The Dec
by
its final
pledge of
individuals'
lives, fortunes,
right
and sacred
honor.
"people"
to call this
definition
of a
ultra-Lock
that the
fortunes, and sacred honor tion life, liberty, and the pursuit
pursuit of
Declaration's closing formulation lives, differs significantly from its opening formula
of
happiness. Go
so
far
as
happiness
means
property (a
that de
cisively
honor"
confirms
makes sense
be made), and you still cannot accurately contend that "sacred in Lockean terms. The sanctity of honor sounds far more
needed
aristocratic than
anything Locke endorses, and more careful research is fix the meaning of this evocative phrase. This notwithstanding, Tarcov clearly shows the relation of
to
individuality
to
collectivity in the Declaration. The Constitution, he argues, embodies an analo gous relation between the country and humanity. Universalist but humanitarian, Constitutional rights inhere in human nature itself "but their security is primarily Locke teaches that "civil so something each people must accomplish for has the right to secure the rights of those who have consented to it"; ciety only accordingly, "we have believed that American patriotism is the most effective
form
the
philanthropy."
itself."
of
individuals
who consent
American nationhood, then, directly serves the rights to participate in it while indirectly serving (by
of
exam-
Book Reviews
pie) the
vast numbers of
in it. Against
and
Fifteenth
amendments
fundamentally
that "the the
the
Constitution's
Constitution
moderate
individualism,
Tarcov
observes
amended
protects
violation on
basis
of their
classes
stitutional
individuals."
Con
did) but
as shift
coalitions of
individuals
and
interests
Extensive
representatives.
the power
to
policy thus
undermines
by
constitutional majorities of
function.
protected
natural rights of
individuals
by
the Consti
from
by
Clas
of
cultivation of vir
tues,
the
fostering
unity,
and
the
teaching
of truth.
The
classical
politeia
...
is
the
form taken
by a political community,
the ruling
part
determined
by
who rules
political goal of
the
personal goals of
the individuals in
it. This
in
conception reflects
that
political rule of a
is
natural.
The American
conception of a a single
constitution,
in
con
trast, is that
stood as
written
document,
under
the
expression of
the
whole people.
The Constitution
not so
grants
powers of government
rule others or
from the
natural right of
individuals,
so that the
remaining
be
more
secure.
timocracy (Federalist #8
explic
itly
erty
contrasts
the
agricultural
with
the
ancient
("Securing prop
who would
rights
is
Tarcov does
the question
of
blinding ourselves
desires."
to
the
desirability
and
empty
yearning.
Our
discourse is impoverished if we
us,
rights
and never
debate
what what
is
for
if
we
would make us
only happy.
happiness
and never
discuss
In protecting the right to speak by means that reward civility and rationality, the Constitution subtly orients some American souls toward distinctively human happiness and away from either the irritable self-righteousness of men who mis
take themselves for
selves
gods or
the
them
mistakes
incline
men
to tyranny.
"/.
The The
(New) Science
2 3.
(17-4-1:
history history
parts
of philosophy
of science.
history
of human ideas
Folklore
Some The
and parts
of
ethnography.
Giambattista Vico
4.
of the of
history
of
language.
history
is
religious
beliefs... literature.
Forthcoming
William Bowusma
on
lilimunlxit;
7.
S
Allan Megill
on
Foucault
on
history
history
Wellek
critics
9.
10
Economic history...
of education.
his
on
Ronald Aronson
Daniel Wilson
Sartre
11 12
Pohtnal
and social
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history,
of
and
on on
Lovejoy
intellectual
The historical
Donald
Kelley
history
Arthur 0
Lovejoy (1938)
it in:
William Courtenay, Neal Gilbert. Ileiko Oherman and Charles Trinkaus on Ancients and Moderns
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Journal
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Rush Rhees
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Rochester
14627
Rochester, N.Y
Short Notices
Freedom
of
Expression: Purpose
as
Limit.
By Francis
and
Canavan. (Durham,
The Claremont Insti
1984. xv + 181
N.C.,
pp.:
Political Philosophy,
Will Morrisey
"One
of
developments in
in
recent
intellectual
if not in
history
practice
is the
metamorphosis of
court."
freedom
into freedom
principle
Words
are
inseparable from
for speech,
oral and
ideas
"Expression, in
Canavan
purpose."
writes
"to disturb
[this]
dis
opinion."
insufficiently
cussion of minds
reflective public
and
finest
chapter contains an
uncommonly
purpose,
reasonable
his
must
have
some
defines,
that
is, limits,
freedom
served
by
Supreme
Court has consistently recognized, the First Amendment's primary purpose "is to produce a government controlled by a public opinion that has been formed
through free and rational debate
issues,"
on public
nography
Amusingly
no
enough,
Justices,
ences
to
discover
Constitutionally
valid
distinction be
and Fanny Hill, easily discern important differ speech and commercial advertising, the latter deemed
legitimately pressions by
conduct
ruled
by
strict
laws
Canavan
arbitrary judicial
ex
attention
and more or
less
speech."
rational
In
nine man
six of
Wortnoteworthy writers on freedom of speech: Milton, Locke, Spinoza, (a Jeffersonian democrat and author of A Treatise Concerning Political En
and the
quiry,
and
two
of the Press, published in 1800), Mill, Bagehot, Laski, twentieth-century American legal scholars, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and
Liberty
Alexander Meiklejohn.
pression, Canavan does
Having
not
insisted
upon
of ex
fail to
considerable
and
learning
among these
Locke's
be
more controversial
Laski). Be that
as
shows that
liberty's
defenders in the
de
fended freedom
of speech as
inducement to reason,
Indeed,
456
Bagehot
Interpretation
went so
far
as
by
discussion"
would
rechan-
nel sexual
into intellectual
shows
Canavan
when
Mill
and
his followers optimistically presumed that moral progress must result from lib erty, and then began to collapse when such writers as Laski and Meiklejohn ut
terly
stant
abandoned
God"
as progressivism 's
optimism receded.
"[T]o
assert that
temptation of contemporary
liberals."
Canavan's final
chapter
eloquently
summarizes
the
argument:
Freedom to
to
reason
in the
originally advocated for the services it would render truth. Now it is defended on the ground that, not only is
there no
standard
definitive
standard
by
which we
by
which we can
distinguish in
reason
may judge what is true, there is not even any in the pursuit of truth from passion in
gain, or the libido dominandi in its drive
or greed
quest of
for
power.
position
is to
expression
in
Nihilism
,
for
right.
philosophy bears nihilism within itself from the beginning, in contending that reason is a scout for the passions. Modernity's may attempt more to make reality than to apprehend it. This ques
might ask
One
if modern
political
'rationalism'
tion takes
one
viding
a cogent
beyond Canavan's study, which carefully leads us to it, thus pro introduction to the issues raised by the modern right to freedom
of speech.
Philosophical Apprenticeships.
R.
of
Goethe's
sense,
autobiography in the
effects of
usual
but primarily
makes accessible
twentieth century
Germany, including
hermeneutical
of
devastating
nobis
university Nazism
on
atmosphere of
and
the
stance of not
focusing
self-
providing
in
person
he
came
contact.
ger, Rudolf
Paul Natorp, Max Scheler, Martin Heideg Bultmann, Gerhard Kriiger, Richard Kroner, Hans Lipps, Karl Reinhardt, Karl Jaspers, and Karl Lowith; but many other figures, some perhaps
are separate chapters on
There
readers
in
an
ingenuous
and
revealing
but equally important for Gadamer, are discussed way. Gadamer leads us through the
university
Short Notices
communities of
457
and
Heidelberg, discussing
colleagues and
at
first
are
his fellow
his
friends. We
made aware of
in Greek philosophy, particularly Plato, and in the poets, most notably Holderlin, Rilke and Paul Celan. It is, of course, not possible to discuss all of this rich material in a brief re
view.
his interest
We hear
influence dur
with
ing
ger,
Gadamer's
in Marburg. We hear
about
his Habilitation
Heideg
about whose
be
mentioned
here.
refers
The term
'turn'
to a bend
hairpin
or switchback
in the
path
that goes
up
mountain.
One does
here;
is
order to con
question
answered.
Heidegger
would
was then
find
expression
orienting himself to an intensive interpretation of Nietzsche that in a two-volume work, the real counterpart of Being and Time
(p.
50-
There is
substantial
discussion
of
Nazism, highlighted by
the
following
piv
otal sentences:
see
a widespread conviction
any danger in this pale instrument is easy to understand. It was in intellectual circles that Hitler in coming to power would he had
used
deconstruct the
nonsense
and we counted
the
We
were to
leam
differently
(p.
75).
The descriptions
vision of the
of
trying
to maintain
his university activities under the super the surreal. It was not an easy time for anyone.
Among Marburg
students, it
come
was
then
said of with
Kriiger
and me:
With Kriiger
one
leams
to
be exact;
Gadamer
one
we
know
is (p. 64).
what
One
gleans
insight into
of the
contemporary
educational methods as
us now as to
anthologies and
xeroxing
are anathema
him;
ine kind;
introductory
courses should
be taught
by
full professors,
not
by
begin
ning teachers;
one cannot
speak of
"educational
influence"
at
the uni
philosophical
interest,
of
of
course,
are
Gadamer's
re
hermeneutics,
appended
scattered
forth in
an
Philosophical
Hermeneutics."
Early
on we are told:
a
means
that
it is
that
not at all
new,
or even
method
is
which
is
as old
as the unrequited
147).
458
We
Interpretation
are told that
of modern sci
ence than
from
old
There
history
that indicate a
attempt
is
made to
philosophize, the
remembrance of
being
happens in
But
no
nonetheless
it
is
no
history
of
being. Remem
brance has
is
no such
history. There is
as a
growing
forgetfulness, but in
.
Philosophy has no history. The first person to write a history of philosophy that really was a history was also the last: Hegel
thing
growing
remembrance.
(p.
187).
human
ex
the world, to the unending dialogue of the soul with itself (and oth
ers),
which
is
what
this
book,
one must
simply
it. It
forever lost to
us.
Forthcoming
Harry V.
John C. Jaffa
Articles
and
Consent in
Koritansky
and
James C. Leake
Tacitus'
Teaching
(first part)
and
the Decline
of
Liberty
at
Rome
Discussion
Pamela Jensen
and the
American
Will
Morrisey
Delimiting Philosophy
Reviews
Philip
J. Kain
on
Morrisey
on
John J. Schrems
ISSN 0020-9635