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International Journal of Computer Science Engineering

and Information Technology Research (IJCSEITR)


ISSN 2249-6831
Vol. 3, Issue 2, Jun 2013, 55-78
TJPRC Pvt. Ltd.

A SIGNIFICANT APPROACH ON A SPECIAL CASE OF GAME THEORY

TJPRC Pvt. Ltd.,

K. V. L. N. ACHARYULU1, MADDI. N. MURALI KRISHNA2, SATEESH BANDIKALLA3 & NAGU VADLANA4


TJPRC Pvt. Ltd.,
1

Faculty of Mathematics, Department of Mathematics, Bapatla Engineering College, Bapatla, India


2

II M.C.A, Department of M.C.A, Bapatla Engineering College, Bapatla, India

Faculty of Computer Science, Department of MCA, Bapatla Engineering College, Bapatla, India

Faculty of Computer Science, Department of MCA, Bapatla Engineering College, Bapatla, India

ABSTRACT
A special case of game theory problem is identified and investigated for getting optimal pure mixed strategies in a
non both row and column dominant game with the assistance of Browns Algorithm in this paper. The problem presents a
non dominance nature for both rows and columns. It is instituted with the premise of having same quantity in (i,j) and (j,i)
actions.Few noteworthy determinations are found by computing

maximum number of possible iterations with the

classical Java program .The results are also shown in the graphs where ever necessary and feasible. The Lower bounds
and Upper bounds are also traced in each scientific computation.The consequences are observed at each computational
level.

KEYWORDS: Game Theory, Players, Strategy, Pay-Off Matrix, Optimal Solution, Lower Bound, Upper Bound
AMS Classification: 91A05, 91A18, 91A43, 91A90

INTRODUCTION
Real Life problems need firm decision making in a competition situation even though they have many opposing
parties with mutual conflicting interests. In a competition, the course of actions for each competitor may be finite or
infinite. In pure strategies each player cognizes incisively what other player is going to do. But in mixed strategies, the
players have a set of strategies and each player is always prevented to imagine the other players selected course of action.
The main objective in any game problem is to maximize expected gains or to minimize expected losses. Sometimes it is
also noticed that one of the pure strategies of a player is always inferior to at least one of the remaining ones. Then the
superior strategies dominate the inferior ones. In this investigation, the authors have considered a special case in which any
of the strategies does not dominate on the other. Browns algorithm yields an approximate solution for the value of the
game and exact value will be obtained at some high degree of accuracy. It is also acknowledged as Iterative Method of
approximate solution.
K.V.L.N.Acharyulu and Maddi.N.Murali Krishna[1,2] investigated few game theory special problems and
established some fruitful results. McKinsey [7] formulated theory of Games in 1952. Raiffa, R. D [6] hashed out the nature
of games and possible decisions in 1958.Later Dresher, M [5] focused on strategies and applications of game theory in
1961.Afterwards Rapoport [4], Levin and Desjardins [3] explicated the conceptions of game theory to make a good path in
operations research. Billy E.Gillett [2] discussed how to solve the large size of problems in the games by employing
Browns algorithm.
In the continuation of their work, the authors constructed a 15x15 game problem which is a special case of game
theory and evaluated with the aid of Browns Algorithm. It has no dominance nature on both the rows and columns. The

56

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

precept of this model is followed by taking the same action on ((i,j) and (j,i) components. Noteworthy results are found by
computing maximum number of possible iterations. The incurred results are given in the conclusions and also the
necessary graphs are illustrated. The iterations are calculated from 50 th iteration to 500th iteration. The authors utilized
Brown's algorithm with the help of programming language of Java for this investigation. The influences among the actions
of Player A and the actions of Player B are established. The errors are also calculated in each iteration and shown in a
table. Upper bounds and Lower bounds are estimated for classifying the nature of the game. The uttermost possible
iterations have been reckoned to reach the best optimum mixed strategies for the players.

BASIC FORMATION OF 15x15 GAME


The game with 15 rows and 15 columns is construted with the 15 possible actions of player A & Player B. One
player selects only one single action from his/her set possible actions. It consists of fifteen possible actions of A
i.eA1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8,A9,A10,A11,A12,A13,A14,A15 which will effect on the other fifteen possible actions of
player B i.e B1,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6,B7,B8,B9,B10,B11, B12,B13, B14,B15.The pay off matrix can be represented as
1
16

17

18
19

20
21

22
23

24

25
26

27
28

29

16
2

17
30

18
31

19
32

20
33

21
34

22
35

23
36

24
37

30
31

3
43

43
4

44
55

45
56

46
57

47
58

48
59

49
60

32
33

44
45

55
56

5
66

66
6

67
76

68
77

69
78

70
79

34

46

57

67

76

85

86

87

35
36

47
48

58
59

68
69

77
78

85
86

8
93

93
9

94
100

37
38

49
50

60
61

70
71

79
80

87
88

94
95

100 10
101 106

39
40

51
52

62
63

72
73

81
82

89
90

96
97

102 107
103 108

41

53

64

74

83

91

98

104

109

42

54

65

75

84

92

99

105

110

29
42
50
51
50
53
54

61
62
63
64
65
71
72
73
74
75

80
81
82
83
84
88
89
90
91
92

95
96
97
98
99
101 102 103 104 105

106 107 108 109 110

11 111 112 113 114


111 12 115 116 117

112 115 13 118 119


113 116 118 14 120

114 117 119 120 15


25
38

26
39

27
40

28
41

MATERIAL AND METHODS


The authors adopted Browns algorithm to solve this special case of 15x15 game in which row and columns both
dominated. Browns Algorithm:
Step 1: Player A chooses one of the possible actions(Ai1) from A1-A15 to play, and Player B then plays with the possible
action Bj1 corresponding to the smallest element in the selected action Ai1.
Step 2: Player A then picks out the possible action (Ai2) from A1 - A15 to play corresponding to the largest element in the
possible action (Bj1) selected by Player B in step 1.
Step 3: Player B sums the actions of Player A has played thus far, and plays with the possible action of Bj2 corresponding
to a smallest sum element.
Step 4: Player A sums the actions of Player B has played thus far, and plays the possible action (Ai3) corresponding to a
largest sum element. After the required iterations are computed,then go to step 5; otherwise, come back to step 3.
Step 5: Compute an upper and lower bound and respectively.

Largest sum element from step 4


Number of plays of the game thus far

and

Smallest sum element from step 3


Number of plays of the game thus far

Step 6: let Xi be the portion of the time Player A played row i with i=1,2,...,m and let Yi be the proportion of the time
Player B played column j with j=1,2,...,n. These strategies approximate the optimal mini max strategies. Upper and
Lower bounds on the value of the game where are calculated in step 5. The Process completes.

57

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

RESULTS
Brown's algorithm is applied on constituted game to derive the best optimum mixed strategies for both the
players from 50th iteration to 500 th iteration with the help of Java Program. The effects on all possible actions of player
A from player B are given in the following tables from Table(1) to Table(0).
Table 1: By the Choice of Action A1: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50
105
851
923
993
1061
1127
1191
1253
1313
1371
1427
1481
1533
1478
1527

1352
2004
2593
3133
3624
4066
4459
4803
5098
5344
5541
5689
3292
3528
5570

155
1651
1773
1893
2011
2127
2241
2353
2463
2571
2677
2781
2883
2878
2977

100
2794
4096
5285
6375
7366
8258
9051
9745
10340
10836
11233
11531
8818
9520
6736

205
2451
2623
2793
2961
3127
3291
3453
3613
3771
3927
4081
4233
4278
4427

150
4244
6196
7985
9625
11116
12458
13651
14695
15590
16336
16933
17381
14768
15520
7486

255
3251
3473
3693
3911
4127
4341
4553
4763
4971
5177
5381
5583
5678
5877

200
5694
8296
10685
12875
14866
16658
18251
19645
20840
21836
22633
23231
20718
21520
8236

305
4051
4323
4593
4861
5127
5391
5653
5913
6171
6427
6681
6933
7078
7327

250
7144
10396
13385
16125
18616
20858
22851
24595
26090
27336
28333
29081
26668
27520
8986

Table 2: By the Choice of Action A1: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
355
8594
4851
12496
5173
16085
5493
19375
5811
22366
6127
25058
6441
27451
6753
29545
7063
31340
7371
32836
7677
34033
7981
34931
8283
32618
8478
33520
8777
9736

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
405
10044
5651
14596
6023
18785
6393
22625
6761
26116
7127
29258
7491
32051
7853
34495
8213
36590
8571
38336
8927
39733
9281
40781
9633
38568
9878
39520
10227 10486

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
567
11479
6555
16681
7021
21470
7481
25860
7935
29851
8383
33443
8825
36636
9261
39430
9691
41825
10115 43821
10533 45418
10945 46616
11351 44503
11646 43930
11621 12811

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
617
12903
7355
18755
7871
24144
8381
29084
8885
33575
9383
37617
9875
41210
10361 44354
10841 47049
11315 49295
11783 51092
12245 52440
12701 50427
13046 47174
13071 16291

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
667
14353
8155
20855
8721
26844
9281
32334
9835
37325
10383 41817
10925 45810
11461 49304
11991 52299
12515 54795
13033 56792
13545 58290
14051 56377
14446 53174
14521 17041

Table 3: By the Choice of Action A2: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
135
1358
823
1981
949
2597
1019
3137
1087
3628
1153
4070

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
185
2800
1623
4073
1799
5289
1919
6379
2037
7370
2153
8262

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
235
4250
2423
6173
2649
7989
2819
9629
2987
11120
3153
12462

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
285
5700
3223
8273
3499
10689
3719
12879
3937
14870
4153
16662

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
335
7150
4023
10373
4349
13389
4619
16129
4887
18620
5153
20862

58

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

1217
1279
1339
1397
1453
1507
1559
1504
1553

4463
4807
5102
5348
5545
5693
2464
4267
5680

2267
2379
2489
2597
2703
2807
2909
2904
3003

9055
9749
10344
10840
11237
11535
7990
10259
6846

Table 3 - Contd.,
3317
13655
3479
14699
3639
15594
3797
16340
3953
16937
4107
17385
4259
13940
4304
16259
4453
7596

4367
4579
4789
4997
5203
5407
5609
5704
5903

18255
19649
20844
21840
22637
23235
19890
22259
8346

5417
5679
5939
6197
6453
6707
6959
7104
7353

22855
24599
26094
27340
28337
29085
25840
28259
9096

Table 4: By the Choice of Action A2: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
385
8600
4823
12473
5199
16089
5519
19379
5837
22370
6153
25062
6467
27455
6779
29549
7089
31344
7397
32840
7703
34037
8007
34935
8309
31790
8504
34259
8803
9846

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
435
10050
5623
14573
6049
18789
6419
22629
6787
26120
7153
29262
7517
32055
7879
34499
8239
36594
8597
38340
8953
39737
9307
40785
9659
37740
9904
40259
10253 10596

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
597
11493
6527
16666
7047
21482
7507
25872
7961
29863
8409
33455
8851
36648
9287
39442
9717
41837
10141 43833
10559 45430
10971 46628
11377 43683
11672 45517
11647 12081

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
647
12917
7327
18740
7897
24156
8407
29096
8911
33587
9409
37629
9901
41222
10387 44366
10867 47061
11341 49307
11809 51104
12271 52452
12727 49607
13072 48761
13097 15561

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
697
14367
8127
20840
8747
26856
9307
32346
9861
37337
10409
41829
10951
45822
11487
49316
12017
52311
12541
54807
13059
56804
13571
58302
14077
55557
14472
54761
14547
16311

Table 5: By the Choice of Action A3: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
121
1369
865
2019
909
2580
1018
3159
1086
3650
1152
4092
1216
4485
1278
4829
1338
5124
1396
5370
1452
5567
1506
5715
1558
3422
1503
3449
1552
5596

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
171
2811
1665
4111
1759
5272
1918
6401
2036
7392
2152
8284
2266
9077
2378
9771
2488
10366
2596
10862
2702
11259
2806
11557
2908
8948
2903
9441
3002
6762

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
221
4261
2465
6211
2609
7972
2818
9651
2986
11142
3152
12484
3316
13677
3478
14721
3638
15616
3796
16362
3952
16959
4106
17407
4258
14898
4303
15441
4452
7512

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
271
5711
3265
8311
3459
10672
3718
12901
3936
14892
4152
16684
4366
18277
4578
19671
4788
20866
4996
21862
5202
22659
5406
23257
5608
20848
5703
21441
5902
8262

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
321
7161
4065
10411
4309
13372
4618
16151
4886
18642
5152
20884
5416
22877
5678
24621
5938
26116
6196
27362
6452
28359
6706
29107
6958
26798
7103
27441
7352
9012

59

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

Table 6: By the Choice of Action A3: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
371
8611
4865
12511
5159
16072
5518
19401
5836
22392
6152
25084
6466
27477
6778
29571
7088
31366
7396
32862
7702
34059
8006
34957
8308
32748
8503
33441
8802
9762

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
421
10061
5665
14611
6009
18772
6418
22651
6786
26142
7152
29284
7516
32077
7878
34521
8238
36616
8596
38362
8952
39759
9306
40807
9658
38698
9903
39441
10252 10512

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
583
11497
6569
16697
7007
21458
7506
25887
7960
29878
8408
33470
8850
36663
9286
39457
9716
41852
10140 43848
10558 45445
10970 46643
11376 44634
11671 43957
11646 12732

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
633
12921
7369
18771
7857
24132
8406
29111
8910
33602
9408
37644
9900
41237
10386 44381
10866 47076
11340 49322
11808 51119
12270 52467
12726 50558
13071 47201
13096 16212

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
683
14371
8169
20871
8707
26832
9306
32361
9860
37352
10408 41844
10950 45837
11486 49331
12016 52326
12540 54822
13058 56819
13570 58317
14076 56508
14471 53201
14546 16962

Table 7: By the Choice of Action A4: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
122
1379
866
2029
949
2629
979
3129
1097
3670
1163
4112
1227
4505
1289
4849
1349
5144
1407
5390
1463
5587
1517
5735
1569
4274
1514
2734
1563
5510

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
172
2821
1666
4121
1799
5321
1879
6371
2047
7412
2163
8304
2277
9097
2389
9791
2499
10386
2607
10882
2713
11279
2817
11577
2919
9800
2914
8726
3013
6676

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
222
4271
2466
6221
2649
8021
2779
9621
2997
11162
3163
12504
3327
13697
3489
14741
3649
15636
3807
16382
3963
16979
4117
17427
4269
15750
4314
14726
4463
7426

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
272
5721
3266
8321
3499
10721
3679
12871
3947
14912
4163
16704
4377
18297
4589
19691
4799
20886
5007
21882
5213
22679
5417
23277
5619
21700
5714
20726
5913
8176

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
322
7171
4066
10421
4349
13421
4579
16121
4897
18662
5163
20904
5427
22897
5689
24641
5949
26136
6207
27382
6463
28379
6717
29127
6969
27650
7114
26726
7363
8926

Table 8: By the Choice of Action A4: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
372
8621
4866
12521
5199
16121
5479
19371
5847
22412
6163
25104
6477
27497
6789
29591
7099
31386
7407
32882
7713
34079

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
422
10071
5666
14621
6049
18821
6379
22621
6797
26162
7163
29304
7527
32097
7889
34541
8249
36636
8607
38382
8963
39779

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
584
11500
6570
16700
7047
21500
7467
25850
7971
29891
8419
33483
8861
36676
9297
39470
9727
41865
10151 43861
10569 45458

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
634
12924
7370
18774
7897
24174
8367
29074
8921
33615
9419
37657
9911
41250
10397 44394
10877 47089
11351 49335
11819 51132

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
684
14374
8170
20874
8747
26874
9267
32324
9871
37365
10419 41857
10961 45850
11497 49344
12027 52339
12551 54835
13069 56832

60

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

8017
8319
8514
8813

34977
33600
32726
9676

9317
9669
9914
10263

40827
39550
38726
10426

Table 8 - Contd.,
10981 46656
11387 45479
11682 42500
11657 13381

12281
12737
13082
13107

52480
51403
45744
16861

13581
14087
14482
14557

58330
57353
51744
17611

Table 9: By the Choice of Action A5: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
123
1389
867
2039
950
2639
1030
3189
1047
3629
1173
4131
1237
4524
1299
4868
1359
5163
1417
5409
1473
5606
1527
5754
1579
5125
1524
2018
1573
5423

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
173
2831
1667
4131
1800
5331
1930
6431
1997
7371
2173
8323
2287
9116
2399
9810
2509
10405
2617
10901
2723
11298
2827
11596
2929
10651
2924
8010
3023
6589

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
223
4281
2467
6231
2650
8031
2830
9681
2947
11121
3173
12523
3337
13716
3499
14760
3659
15655
3817
16401
3973
16998
4127
17446
4279
16601
4324
14010
4473
7339

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
273
5731
3267
8331
3500
10731
3730
12931
3897
14871
4173
16723
4387
18316
4599
19710
4809
20905
5017
21901
5223
22698
5427
23296
5629
22551
5724
20010
5923
8089

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
323
7181
4067
10431
4350
13431
4630
16181
4847
18621
5173
20923
5437
22916
5699
24660
5959
26155
6217
27401
6473
28398
6727
29146
6979
28501
7124
26010
7373
8839

Table 10: By the Choice of Action A5: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
373
8631
4867
12531
5200
16131
5530
19431
5797
22371
6173
25123
6487
27516
6799
29610
7109
31405
7417
32901
7723
34098
8027
34996
8329
34451
8524
32010
8823
9589

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
423
10081
5667
14631
6050
18831
6430
22681
6747
26121
7173
29323
7537
32116
7899
34560
8259
36655
8617
38401
8973
39798
9327
40846
9679
40401
9924
38010
10273 10339

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
585
11503
6571
16703
7048
21503
7518
25903
7921
29843
8429
33495
8871
36688
9307
39482
9737
41877
10161 43873
10579 45470
10991 46668
11397 46323
11692 41042
11667 14029

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
635
12927
7371
18777
7898
24177
8418
29127
8871
33567
9429
37669
9921
41262
10407 44406
10887 47101
11361 49347
11829 51144
12291 52492
12747 52247
13092 44286
13117 17509

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
685
14377
8171
20877
8748
26877
9318
32377
9821
37317
10429 41869
10971 45862
11507 49356
12037 52351
12561 54847
13079 56844
13591 58342
14097 58197
14492 50286
14567 18259

Table 11: By the Choice of Action A6: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
124
1391
868
2041
951
2641
1031
3191
1108
3691

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
174
2833
1668
4133
1801
5333
1931
6433
2058
7433

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
224
4283
2468
6233
2651
8033
2831
9683
3008
11183

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
274
5733
3268
8333
3501
10733
3731
12933
3958
14933

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
324
7183
4068
10433
4351
13433
4631
16183
4908
18683

61

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

1113
1246
1308
1368
1426
1482
1536
1588
1533
1582

4072
4534
4878
5173
5419
5616
5764
5239
1923
5433

2113
2296
2408
2518
2626
2732
2836
2938
2933
3032

8264
9126
9820
10415
10911
11308
11606
10765
7915
6599

Table 11 - Contd.,
3113
12464
3346
13726
3508
14770
3668
15665
3826
16411
3982
17008
4136
17456
4288
16715
4333
13915
4482
7349

4113
4396
4608
4818
5026
5232
5436
5638
5733
5932

16664
18326
19720
20915
21911
22708
23306
22665
19915
8099

5113
5446
5708
5968
6226
6482
6736
6988
7133
7382

20864
22926
24670
26165
27411
28408
29156
28615
25915
8849

Table 12: By the Choice of Action A6: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
374
8633
4868
12533
5201
16133
5531
19433
5858
22433
6113
25064
6496
27526
6808
29620
7118
31415
7426
32911
7732
34108
8036
35006
8338
34565
8533
31915
8832
9599

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
424
10083
5668
14633
6051
18833
6431
22683
6808
26183
7113
29264
7546
32126
7908
34570
8268
36665
8626
38411
8982
39808
9336
40856
9688
40515
9933
37915
10282 10349

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
586
11506
6572
16706
7049
21506
7519
25906
7982
29906
8369
33437
8880
36699
9316
39493
9746
41888
10170 43884
10588 45481
11000 46679
11406 46438
11701 41053
11676 13934

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
636
12930
7372
18780
7899
24180
8419
29130
8932
33630
9369
37611
9930
41273
10416 44417
10896 47112
11370 49358
11838 51155
12300 52503
12756 52362
13101 44297
13126 17414

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
686
14380
8172
20880
8749
26880
9319
32380
9882
37380
10369 41811
10980 45873
11516 49367
12046 52362
12570 54858
13088 56855
13600 58353
14106 58312
14501 50297
14576 18164

Table 13: By the Choice of Action A7: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
98
1399
844
2049
916
2649
986
3199
1054
3699
1120
4149
1107
4472
1240
4893
1295
5188
1349
5434
1402
5631
1454
5779
1505
5878
1555
1413
1499
5342

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
175
2843
1669
4143
1802
5343
1932
6443
2059
7443
2183
8343
2227
9066
2416
9837
2526
10432
2634
10928
2740
11325
2844
11623
2946
11614
2941
7197
3040
6510

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
225
4293
2469
6243
2652
8043
2832
9693
3009
11193
3183
12543
3277
13666
3516
14787
3676
15682
3834
16428
3990
17025
4144
17473
4296
17564
4341
13197
4490
7260

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
275
5743
3269
8343
3502
10743
3732
12943
3959
14943
4183
16743
4327
18266
4616
19737
4826
20932
5034
21928
5240
22725
5444
23323
5646
23514
5741
19197
5940
8010

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
325
7193
4069
10443
4352
13443
4632
16193
4909
18693
5183
20943
5377
22866
5716
24687
5976
26182
6234
27428
6490
28425
6744
29173
6996
29464
7141
25197
7390
8760

62

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

Table 14: By the Choice of Action A7: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
375
8643
4869
12543
5202
16143
5532
19443
5859
22443
6183
25143
6427
27466
6816
29637
7126
31432
7434
32928
7740
34125
8044
35023
8346
35414
8541
31197
8840
9510

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
425
10093
5669
14643
6052
18843
6432
22693
6809
26193
7183
29343
7477
32066
7916
34587
8276
36682
8634
38428
8990
39825
9344
40873
9696
41364
9941
37197
10290 10260

400th Iteration
Player
Player
A
B
587
11508
6573
16708
7050
21508
7520
25908
7983
29908
8439
33508
8811
36631
9324
39502
9754
41897
10178
43893
10596
45490
11008
46688
11414
47279
11709
39487
11684
14685

450th Iteration
Player
Player
A
B
637
12932
7373
18782
7900
24182
8420
29132
8933
33632
9439
37682
9861
41205
10424
44426
10904
47121
11378
49367
11846
51164
12308
52512
12764
53203
13109
42731
13134
18165

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
687
14382
8173
20882
8750
26882
9320
32382
9883
37382
10439 41882
10911 45805
11524 49376
12054 52371
12578 54867
13096 56864
13608 58362
14114 59153
14509 48731
14584 18915

Table 15: By the Choice of Action A8: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
99
1400
845
2050
917
2650
987
3200
1055
3700
1121
4150
1185
4550
1163
4816
1302
5195
1356
5441
1409
5638
1461
5786
1512
5885
1562
1420
1506
5349

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
176
2844
1670
4144
1803
5344
1933
6444
2060
7444
2184
8344
2305
9144
2339
9760
2533
10439
2641
10935
2747
11332
2851
11630
2953
11621
2948
7204
3047
6517

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
226
4294
2470
6244
2653
8044
2833
9694
3010
11194
3184
12544
3355
13744
3439
14710
3683
15689
3841
16435
3997
17032
4151
17480
4303
17571
4348
13204
4497
7267

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
276
5744
3270
8344
3503
10744
3733
12944
3960
14944
4184
16744
4405
18344
4539
19660
4833
20939
5041
21935
5247
22732
5451
23330
5653
23521
5748
19204
5947
8017

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
326
7194
4070
10444
4353
13444
4633
16194
4910
18694
5184
20944
5455
22944
5639
24610
5983
26189
6241
27435
6497
28432
6751
29180
7003
29471
7148
25204
7397
8767

Table 16: By the Choice of Action A8: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
376
8644
4870
12544
5203
16144
5533
19444
5860
22444
6184
25144
6505
27544
6739
29560
7133
31439
7441
32935
7747
34132

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
426
10094
5670
14644
6053
18844
6433
22694
6810
26194
7184
29344
7555
32144
7839
34510
8283
36689
8641
38435
8997
39832

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
588
11510
6574
16710
7051
21510
7521
25910
7984
29910
8440
33510
8889
36710
9247
39426
9761
41905
10185 43901
10603 45498

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
638
12934
7374
18784
7901
24184
8421
29134
8934
33634
9440
37684
9939
41284
10347 44350
10911 47129
11385 49375
11853 51172

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
688
14384
8174
20884
8751
26884
9321
32384
9884
37384
10440 41884
10989 45884
11447 49300
12061 52379
12585 54875
13103 56872

63

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

8051
8353
8548
8847

35030
35421
31204
9517

9351
9703
9948
10297

40880
41371
37204
10267

Table 16 - Contd.,
11015 46696
11421 47287
11716 39600
11691 14587

12315
12771
13116
13141

52520
53211
42844
18067

13615
14121
14516
14591

58370
59161
48844
18817

Table 17: By the Choice of Action A9: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
100
1401
846
2051
918
2651
988
3201
1056
3701
1122
4151
1186
4551
1248
4901
1218
5111
1362
5447
1415
5644
1467
5792
1518
5891
1568
1426
1512
5355

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
177
2845
1671
4145
1804
5345
1934
6445
2061
7445
2185
8345
2306
9145
2424
9845
2449
10355
2647
10941
2753
11338
2857
11636
2959
11627
2954
7210
3053
6523

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
227
4295
2471
6245
2654
8045
2834
9695
3011
11195
3185
12545
3356
13745
3524
14795
3599
15605
3847
16441
4003
17038
4157
17486
4309
17577
4354
13210
4503
7273

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
277
5745
3271
8345
3504
10745
3734
12945
3961
14945
4185
16745
4406
18345
4624
19745
4749
20855
5047
21941
5253
22738
5457
23336
5659
23527
5754
19210
5953
8023

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
327
7195
4071
10445
4354
13445
4634
16195
4911
18695
5185
20945
5456
22945
5724
24695
5899
26105
6247
27441
6503
28438
6757
29186
7009
29477
7154
25210
7403
8773

Table 18: By the Choice of Action A9: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
377
8645
4871
12545
5204
16145
5534
19445
5861
22445
6185
25145
6506
27545
6824
29645
7049
31355
7447
32941
7753
34138
8057
35036
8359
35427
8554
31210
8853
9523

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
427
10095
5671
14645
6054
18845
6434
22695
6811
26195
7185
29345
7556
32145
7924
34595
8199
36605
8647
38441
9003
39838
9357
40886
9709
41377
9954
37210
10303 10273

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
589
11511
6575
16711
7052
21511
7522
25911
7985
29911
8441
33511
8890
36711
9332
39511
9677
41821
10191 43907
10609 45504
11021 46702
11427 47293
11722 39606
11697 14593

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
639
12935
7375
18785
7902
24185
8422
29135
8935
33635
9441
37685
9940
41285
10432 44435
10827 47045
11391 49381
11859 51178
12321 52526
12777 53217
13122 42850
13147 18073

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
689
14385
8175
20885
8752
26885
9322
32385
9885
37385
10441 41885
10990 45885
11532 49385
11977 52295
12591 54881
13109 56878
13621 58376
14127 59167
14522 48850
14597 18823

Table 19: By the Choice of Action A10: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
101
1403
847
2053
919
2653
989
3203
1057
3703

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
178
2843
1672
4143
1805
5343
1935
6443
2062
7443

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
228
4293
2472
6243
2655
8043
2835
9693
3012
11193

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
278
5743
3272
8343
3505
10743
3735
12943
3962
14943

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
328
7193
4072
10443
4355
13443
4635
16193
4912
18693

64

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

1123
1187
1249
1309
1272
1420
1472
1523
1573
1517

4153
4553
4903
5203
5358
5650
5798
5897
1537
5255

2186
2307
2425
2540
2557
2758
2862
2964
2959
3058

8343
9143
9843
10443
10848
11340
11638
11837
6477
7055

Table 19 Contd.,
3186
12543
3357
13743
3525
14793
3690
15693
3757
16348
4008
17040
4162
17488
4314
17787
4359
12477
4508
7805

4186
4407
4625
4840
4957
5258
5462
5664
5759
5958

16743
18343
19743
20943
21848
22740
23338
23737
18477
8555

5186
5457
5725
5990
6157
6508
6762
7014
7159
7408

20943
22943
24693
26193
27348
28440
29188
29687
24477
9305

Table 20: By the Choice of Action A10: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
378
8643
4872
12543
5205
16143
5535
19443
5862
22443
6186
25143
6507
27543
6825
29643
7140
31443
7357
32848
7758
34140
8062
35038
8364
35637
8559
30477
8858
10055

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
428
10093
5672
14643
6055
18843
6435
22693
6812
26193
7186
29343
7557
32143
7925
34593
8290
36693
8557
38348
9008
39840
9362
40888
9714
41587
9959
36477
10308 10805

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
478
11543
6472
16743
6905
21543
7335
25943
7762
29943
8186
33543
8607
36743
9025
39543
9440
41943
9757
43848
10258 45540
10662 46738
11064 47537
11359 42477
11758 11555

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
640
12971
7376
18821
7903
24221
8423
29171
8936
33671
9442
37721
9941
41321
10433 44471
10918 47171
11301 49326
11864 51218
12326 52566
12782 53465
13127 46145
13152 14615

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
690
14421
8176
20921
8753
26921
9323
32421
9886
37421
10442 41921
10991 45921
11533 49421
12068 52421
12501 54826
13114 56918
13626 58416
14132 59415
14527 52145
14602 15365

Table 21: By the Choice of Action A11: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
102
1404
848
2054
920
2654
990
3204
1058
3704
1124
4154
1188
4554
1250
4904
1310
5204
1368
5454
1325
5555
1476
5802
1527
5901
1577
1541
1521
5259

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
179
2844
1673
4144
1806
5344
1936
6444
2063
7444
2187
8344
2308
9144
2426
9844
2541
10444
2653
10944
2663
11245
2866
11642
2968
11841
2963
6481
3062
7059

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
229
4294
2473
6244
2656
8044
2836
9694
3013
11194
3187
12544
3358
13744
3526
14794
3691
15694
3853
16444
3913
16945
4166
17492
4318
17791
4363
12481
4512
7809

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
279
5744
3273
8344
3506
10744
3736
12944
3963
14944
4187
16744
4408
18344
4626
19744
4841
20944
5053
21944
5163
22645
5466
23342
5668
23741
5763
18481
5962
8559

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
329
7194
4073
10444
4356
13444
4636
16194
4913
18694
5187
20944
5458
22944
5726
24694
5991
26194
6253
27444
6413
28345
6766
29192
7018
29691
7163
24481
7412
9309

65

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

Table 22: By the Choice of Action A11: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
379
8644
4873
12544
5206
16144
5536
19444
5863
22444
6187
25144
6508
27544
6826
29644
7141
31444
7453
32944
7663
34045
8066
35042
8368
35641
8563
30481
8862
10059

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
429
10094
5673
14644
6056
18844
6436
22694
6813
26194
7187
29344
7558
32144
7926
34594
8291
36694
8653
38444
8913
39745
9366
40892
9718
41591
9963
36481
10312 10809

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
479
11544
6473
16744
6906
21544
7336
25944
7763
29944
8187
33544
8608
36744
9026
39544
9441
41944
9853
43944
10163 45445
10666 46742
11068 47541
11363 42481
11762 11559

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
641
12973
7377
18823
7904
24223
8424
29173
8937
33673
9443
37723
9942
41323
10434 44473
10919 47173
11397 49423
11769 51124
12330 52571
12786 53470
13131 46255
13156 14514

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
691
14423
8177
20923
8754
26923
9324
32423
9887
37423
10443 41923
10992 45923
11534 49423
12069 52423
12597 54923
13019 56824
13630 58421
14136 59420
14531 52255
14606 15264

Table 23: By the Choice of Action A12: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
103
1405
849
2055
921
2655
991
3205
1059
3705
1125
4155
1189
4555
1251
4905
1311
5205
1369
5455
1425
5655
1377
5703
1530
5904
1580
1544
1524
5262

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
180
2845
1674
4145
1807
5345
1937
6445
2064
7445
2188
8345
2309
9145
2427
9845
2542
10445
2654
10945
2763
11345
2767
11543
2971
11844
2966
6484
3065
7062

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
230
4295
2474
6245
2657
8045
2837
9695
3014
11195
3188
12545
3359
13745
3527
14795
3692
15695
3854
16445
4013
17045
4067
17393
4321
17794
4366
12484
4515
7812

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
280
5745
3274
8345
3507
10745
3737
12945
3964
14945
4188
16745
4409
18345
4627
19745
4842
20945
5054
21945
5263
22745
5367
23243
5671
23744
5766
18484
5965
8562

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
330
7195
4074
10445
4357
13445
4637
16195
4914
18695
5188
20945
5459
22945
5727
24695
5992
26195
6254
27445
6513
28445
6667
29093
7021
29694
7166
24484
7415
9312

Table 24: By the Choice of Action A12: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
380
8645
4874
12545
5207
16145
5537
19445
5864
22445
6188
25145
6509
27545
6827
29645
7142
31445
7454
32945
7763
34145

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
430
10095
5674
14645
6057
18845
6437
22695
6814
26195
7188
29345
7559
32145
7927
34595
8292
36695
8654
38445
9013
39845

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
480
11545
6474
16745
6907
21545
7337
25945
7764
29945
8188
33545
8609
36745
9027
39545
9442
41945
9854
43945
10263 45545

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
642
12974
7378
18824
7905
24224
8425
29174
8938
33674
9444
37724
9943
41324
10435 44474
10920 47174
11398 49424
11869 51224

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
692
14424
8178
20924
8755
26924
9325
32424
9888
37424
10444 41924
10993 45924
11535 49424
12070 52424
12598 54924
13119 56924

66

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

7967
8371
8566
8865

34943
35644
30484
10062

9267
9721
9966
10315

40793
41594
36484
10812

Table 24 - Contd.,
10567 46643
11071 47544
11366 42484
11765 11562

12231
12789
13134
13159

52472
53473
46258
14517

13531
14139
14534
14609

58322
59423
52258
15267

Table 25: By the Choice of Action A13: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
104
1406
850
2056
922
2656
992
3206
1060
3706
1126
4156
1190
4556
1252
4906
1312
5206
1370
5456
1426
5656
1480
5806
1428
5802
1582
1546
1526
5264

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
181
2845
1675
4145
1808
5345
1938
6445
2065
7445
2189
8345
2310
9145
2428
9845
2543
10445
2655
10945
2764
11345
2870
11645
2869
11741
2968
6380
3067
7169

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
231
4295
2475
6245
2658
8045
2838
9695
3015
11195
3189
12545
3360
13745
3528
14795
3693
15695
3855
16445
4014
17045
4170
17495
4219
17691
4368
12380
4517
7919

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
281
5745
3275
8345
3508
10745
3738
12945
3965
14945
4189
16745
4410
18345
4628
19745
4843
20945
5055
21945
5264
22745
5470
23345
5569
23641
5768
18380
5967
8669

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
331
7195
4075
10445
4358
13445
4638
16195
4915
18695
5189
20945
5460
22945
5728
24695
5993
26195
6255
27445
6514
28445
6770
29195
6919
29591
7168
24380
7417
9419

Table 26: By the Choice of Action A13: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
381
8645
4875
12545
5208
16145
5538
19445
5865
22445
6189
25145
6510
27545
6828
29645
7143
31445
7455
32945
7764
34145
8070
35045
8269
35541
8568
30380
8867
10169

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
431
10095
5675
14645
6058
18845
6438
22695
6815
26195
7189
29345
7560
32145
7928
34595
8293
36695
8655
38445
9014
39845
9370
40895
9619
41491
9968
36380
10317 10919

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
481
11545
6475
16745
6908
21545
7338
25945
7765
29945
8189
33545
8610
36745
9028
39545
9443
41945
9855
43945
10264 45545
10670 46745
10969 47441
11368 42380
11767 11669

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
643
12981
7379
18831
7906
24231
8426
29181
8939
33681
9445
37731
9944
41331
10436 44481
10921 47181
11399 49431
11870 51231
12334 52581
12687 53377
13136 46896
13161 13889

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
693
14431
8179
20931
8756
26931
9326
32431
9889
37431
10445 41931
10994 45931
11536 49431
12071 52431
12599 54931
13120 56931
13634 58431
14037 59327
14536 52896
14611 14639

Table 27: By the Choice of Action A14: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
105
1365
851
2015
923
2615
993
3165
1061
3665

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
155
2807
1651
4107
1773
5307
1893
6407
2011
7407

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
205
4257
2451
6207
2623
8007
2793
9657
2961
11157

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
255
5707
3251
8307
3473
10707
3693
12907
3911
14907

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
305
7157
4051
10407
4323
13407
4593
16157
4861
18657

67

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

1127
1191
1253
1313
1371
1427
1481
1533
1478
1527

4115
4515
4865
5165
5415
5615
5765
1497
5810
5223

2127
2241
2353
2463
2571
2677
2781
2883
2878
2977

8307
9107
9807
10407
10907
11307
11607
7023
11802
6389

Table 27 - Contd.,
3127
12507
3291
13707
3453
14757
3613
15657
3771
16407
3927
17007
4081
17457
4233
12973
4278
17802
4427
7139

4127
4341
4553
4763
4971
5177
5381
5583
5678
5877

16707
18307
19707
20907
21907
22707
23307
18923
23802
7889

5127
5391
5653
5913
6171
6427
6681
6933
7078
7327

20907
22907
24657
26157
27407
28407
29157
24873
29802
8639

Table 28: By the Choice of Action A14: Player A Vs Player B from 300- 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
355
8607
4851
12507
5173
16107
5493
19407
5811
22407
6127
25107
6441
27507
6753
29607
7063
31407
7371
32907
7677
34107
7981
35007
8283
30823
8478
35802
8777
9389

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
405
10057
5651
14607
6023
18807
6393
22657
6761
26157
7127
29307
7491
32107
7853
34557
8213
36657
8571
38407
8927
39807
9281
40857
9633
36773
9878
41802
10227 10139

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
567
11466
6555
16666
7021
21466
7481
25866
7935
29866
8383
33466
8825
36666
9261
39466
9691
41866
10115 43866
10533 45466
10945 46666
11351 42682
11646 43456
11621 15194

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
617
12890
7355
18740
7871
24140
8381
29090
8885
33590
9383
37640
9875
41240
10361 44390
10841 47090
11315 49340
11783 51140
12245 52490
12701 48606
13046 46700
13071 18674

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
667
14340
8155
20840
8721
26840
9281
32340
9835
37340
10383 41840
10925 45840
11461 49340
11991 52340
12515 54840
13033 56840
13545 58340
14051 54556
14446 52700
14521 19424

Table 29: By the Choice of Action A15: Player A Vs Player B from 50 - 250 Iterations
50th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
105
1359
851
2009
923
2609
993
3159
1061
3659
1127
4109
1191
4509
1253
4859
1313
5159
1371
5409
1427
5609
1481
5759
1533
1491
1478
5174
1527
5853

100th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
155
2801
1651
4101
1773
5301
1893
6401
2011
7401
2127
8301
2241
9101
2353
9801
2463
10401
2571
10901
2677
11301
2781
11601
2883
7017
2878
11166
2977
7019

150th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
205
4251
2451
6201
2623
8001
2793
9651
2961
11151
3127
12501
3291
13701
3453
14751
3613
15651
3771
16401
3927
17001
4081
17451
4233
12967
4278
17166
4427
7769

200th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
255
5701
3251
8301
3473
10701
3693
12901
3911
14901
4127
16701
4341
18301
4553
19701
4763
20901
4971
21901
5177
22701
5381
23301
5583
18917
5678
23166
5877
8519

250th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
305
7151
4051
10401
4323
13401
4593
16151
4861
18651
5127
20901
5391
22901
5653
24651
5913
26151
6171
27401
6427
28401
6681
29151
6933
24867
7078
29166
7327
9269

68

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

Table 30: By the Choice of Action A15: Player A Vs Player B from 300 - 500 Iterations
300th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
355
8601
4851
12501
5173
16101
5493
19401
5811
22401
6127
25101
6441
27501
6753
29601
7063
31401
7371
32901
7677
34101
7981
35001
8283
30817
8478
35166
8777
10019

350th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
405
10051
5651
14601
6023
18801
6393
22651
6761
26151
7127
29301
7491
32101
7853
34551
8213
36651
8571
38401
8927
39801
9281
40851
9633
36767
9878
41166
10227 10769

400th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
455
11501
6451
16701
6873
21501
7293
25901
7711
29901
8127
33501
8541
36701
8953
39501
9363
41901
9771
43901
10177 45501
10581 46701
10983 42717
11278 47166
11677 11519

450th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
617
12930
7355
18780
7871
24180
8381
29130
8885
33630
9383
37680
9875
41280
10361 44430
10841 47130
11315 49380
11783 51180
12245 52530
12701 48646
13046 50940
13071 14474

500th Iteration
Player Player
A
B
667
14380
8155
20880
8721
26880
9281
32380
9835
37380
10383 41880
10925 45880
11461 49380
11991 52380
12515 54880
13033 56880
13545 58380
14051 54596
14446 56940
14521 15224

CONCLUSIONS

The player B influences partially on all available actions of player A.

It has obtained good correlation among the iterations.

Sufficient accuracy is enhanced by successive iterations.

INFLUENCES OF PLAYER B ON THE AVAILABLE ACTIONS OF PLAYER A


The effect of Player B on the possible actions of Player A are illustrated from Fig.1 to Fig.15 at each computation.

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

69

70

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

CONCLUSIONS

In any scientific computation the influence on one from other has gradual gain only up to some period of time

There is sudden fluctuation observed in the considerable duration

Steep declines have been identified in the course of action at the end of the game

Systematic and coherent influences are formed

The strong compatibility is established between the competences

From the middle of the game normal distribution growth has been traced

OPTIMUM MIXIED STRATEGIES OF PLAYER A AND PLAYER B


The optimum mixed strategies of the playerA from the iteration 50-500 are obtained as shown in
the following tables from Table-31 to Table-50.
Table 31: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 50th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
0.02 0.44
0.02 0.06

Action A2
A
B
0.92
0
0.04
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.66
0.02 0.3
0.02 0.04

Action A3
A
B
0.94
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.48
0.02 0.46
0.02 0.06

Action A4
A
B
0.94
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.32
0.02 0.6
0.02 0.08

Action A5
A
B
0.94
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.16
0.02 0.74
0.02 0.1

Action A6
A
B
0.94
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.14
0.02 0.76
0.02
0.1

Action A7
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.88
0.02 0.12

71

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

Table 32: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 50th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.88
0.02 0.12

Action A9
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.88
0.02 0.12

Action A10
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.86
0.02 0.14

Action A11
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.86
0.02 0.14

Action A12
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0.86
0.02 0.14

Action A13
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0.86
0.02
0.14

Action A14
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.86
0.02
0
0.02
0.14

Action A15
A
B
0.96
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.86
0.02
0.14
0.02
0

Table 33: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 100th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.28
0.01 0.22
0.01
0.5

Action A2
A
B
0.96
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.36
0.01 0.15
0.01 0.49

Action A3
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.27
0.01 0.23
0.01
0.5

Action A4
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.19
0.01
0.3
0.01
0.51

Action A5
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.11
0.01 0.37
0.01 0.52

Action A6
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.01
0.38
0.01
0.52

Action A7
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0.01 0.45
0.01 0.53

Table 34: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 100th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0.01 0.45
0.01 0.53

Action A9
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0.01 0.45
0.01 0.53

Action A10
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01 0.52
0.01 0.48

Action A11
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0.01 0.52
0.01 0.48

Action A12
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0.01 0.52
0.01 0.48

Action A13
A
B
0.97
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0.53
0.01 0.47

Action A14
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.46
0.01
0
0.01 0.54

Action A15
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.46
0.01 0.07
0.01 0.47

Table 35: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 150th Iteration
Action A1
A
0.986
0
0
0

B
0
0
0
0

Action A2
A
0.973
0.013
0
0

B
0
0
0
0

Action A3
A
0.98
0
0.006
0

B
0
0
0
0

Action A4
A
0.98
0
0
0.006

B
0
0
0
0

Action A5
A
0.98
0
0
0

B
0
0
0
0

Action A6
A
0.98
0
0
0

B
0
0
0
0

A
0.98
0
0
0

Actio
n A7
B
0
0
0
0

72

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.006

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.186
0.146
0.666

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.006

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.24
0.1
0.66

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.006

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.18
0.153
0.666

Table 35 Contd.,
0
0
0.006
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.126
0
0.006
0.2
0.006
0.006 0.673 0.006

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.073
0.246
0.68

0
0.006
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.006

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.066
0.253
0.68

0
0
0.006
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.006

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.013
0.3
0.686

Table 36: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 150th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.013
0.006
0.3
0.006
0.686

Action A9
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.013
0.006
0.3
0.006
0.686

Action A10
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006 0.346
0.006 0.653

Action A11
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.346
0.01
0.653

Action A12
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0
0
0
0.006
0.346
0.006
0.653

Action A13
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0
0.006
0.353
0.006
0.646

Action A14
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.306
0.01
0
0.01 0.693

Action A15
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.306
0.006 0.046
0.006 0.646

Table 37: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 200th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.14
0.005
0.11
0.005
0.75

Action A2
A
B
0.98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.18
0.005
0.075
0.005
0.745

Action A3
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.135
0.005
0.115
0.005
0.75

Action A4
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.095
0.005
0.15
0.005
0.755

Action A5
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.055
0.005
0.185
0.005
0.76

Action A6
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.05
0.005
0.19
0.005
0.76

Action A7
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.005
0.225
0.005
0.765

Table 38: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 200th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0

Action A9
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0
0
0

Action A10
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0

Action A11
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A12
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A13
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A14
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A15
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

73

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

Table 38 Contd.,
0
0
0
0.005
0.005

0
0
0.01
0.225
0.765

0
0
0
0.005
0.005

0
0
0.01
0.225
0.765

0
0
0
0.005
0.005

0
0
0
0.26
0.74

0.005
0
0
0.005
0.005

0
0
0
0.26
0.74

0
0.005
0
0.005
0.005

0
0
0
0.26
0.74

0
0
0.005
0.005
0.005

0
0
0
0.265
0.735

0
0
0
0.005
0.005

0
0
0.23
0
0.77

0
0
0
0.005
0.005

0
0
0.23
0.035
0.735

Table 39: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 250th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.112
0.004 0.088
0.004
0.8

Action A2
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.144
0.004
0.06
0.004
0.796

Action A3
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.108
0.004 0.092
0.004
0.8

Action A4
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.076
0.004
0.12
0.004 0.804

Action A5
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.044
0.004 0.148
0.004 0.808

Action A6
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.04
0.004 0.152
0.004 0.808

Action A7
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.008
0.004
0.18
0.004
0.812

Table 40: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 250th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.008
0.004
0.18
0.004 0.812

Action A9
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.008
0.004
0.18
0.004 0.812

Action A10
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004 0.208
0.004 0.792

Action A11
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0.004 0.208
0.004 0.792

Action A12
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0.004 0.208
0.004 0.792

Action A13
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0.004 0.212
0.004 0.788

Action A14
A
B
0.992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.184
0.004
0
0.004 0.816

Action A15
A
B
0.992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.184
0.004 0.028
0.004 0.788

Table 41: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 300th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.993
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.093
0.003 0.073
0.003 0.833

Action A2
A
B
0.986
0
0.006
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.12
0.003 0.05
0.003 0.83

Action A3
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.09
0.003 0.076
0.003 0.833

Action A4
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.063
0.003
0.1
0.003 0.836

Action A5
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.036
0.003 0.123
0.003
0.84

Action A6
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.033
0.003 0.126
0.003
0.84

Action A7
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.003
0.15
0.003 0.843

74

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

Table 42: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 300th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.003
0.15
0.003
0.843

Action A9
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.006
0.003
0.15
0.003 0.843

Action A10
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003 0.173
0.003 0.826

Action A11
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0.003 0.173
0.003 0.826

Action A12
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0
0
0.003 0.173
0.003 0.826

Action A13
A
B
0.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0.003 0.176
0.003 0.823

Action A14
A
B
0.993
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.153
0.003
0
0.003 0.846

Action A15
A
B
0.993
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.153
0.003
0.023
0.003
0.823

Table 43: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 350th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.994
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.08
0.002 0.062
0.002 0.857

Action A2
A
B
0.988
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.102
0.002 0.042
0.002 0.854

Action A3
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.077
0.002 0.065
0.002 0.857

Action A4
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.542
0.002 0.857
0.002
0.86

Action A5
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.031
0.002 0.105
0.002 0.862

Action A6
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0285
0.002
0.108
0.002
0.8628

Action A7
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.002
0.128
0.002
0.865

Table 44: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 350th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.002 0.128
0.002 0.865

Action A9
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.002 0.128
0.002 0.865

Action A10
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002 0.148
0.002 0.851

Action A11
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0.002 0.148
0.002 0.851

Action A12
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0.002 0.148
0.002 0.851

Action A13
A
B
0.991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0.002
0.151
0.002
0.848

Action A14
A
B
0.994
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.131
0.002
0
0.002
0.868

Action A15
A
B
0.994
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.131
0.002
0.02
0.002 0.848

Table 45: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 400th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A2
A
B
0.98
0
0.005
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A3
A
B
0.982
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0

Action A4
A
B
0.982
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0

Action A5
A
B
0.982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0

Action A6
A
B
0.982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A7
A
B
0.982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

75

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.012

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.07
0.095
0.835

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.012

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.09
0.057
0.852

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.012

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.067
0.095
0.837

Table 45 Contd.,
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.047
0
0.002
0.13
0.002
0.012
0.822
0.012

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.027
0.165
0.807

0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.012

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.025
0.165
0.81

0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.012

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.202
0.792

Table 46: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 400th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.002
0.2
0.012
0.795

Action A9
A
B
0.982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.005
0.002
0.2
0.012
0.795

Action A10
A
B
0.992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002 0.13
0.002 0.87

Action A11
A
B
0.992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0.002 0.13
0.002 0.87

Action A12
A
B
0.992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0.002 0.13
0.002 0.87

Action A13
A
B
0.992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0.002 0.132
0.002 0.867

Action A14
A
B
0.985
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.115
0.002
0.105
0.012
0.78

Action A15
A
B
0.995
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.115
0.002
0.017
0.002
0.867

Table 47: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 450th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.062
0.002
0.14
0.011 0.797

Action A2
A
B
0.937
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.08
0.002 0.106
0.011 0.813

Action A3
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.06
0.002 0.14
0.011
0.8

Action A4
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.042
0.002 0.171
0.011 0.786

Action A5
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.024
0.002 0.202
0.011 0.773

Action A6
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.022
0.002 0.202
0.011 0.775

Action A7
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0.002 0.235
0.011
0.72

Table 48: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 450th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004

Action A9
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004

Action A10
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Action A11
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0

Action A12
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0

Action A13
A
B
0.984
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0

Action A14
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.102

Action A15
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.102

76

K. V. L. N. Acharyulu, Maddi. N. Murali Krishna, Sateesh Bandikalla & Nagu Vadlana

0.002
0.011

0.233
0.762

0.002
0.011

0.233
0.762

0.002
0.011

0.164
0.835

0.002
0.011

Table 48 Contd.,
0.162 0.002 0.162
0.837 0.011 0.837

0.002
0.011

0.148
0.851

0.002
0.011

0.148
0.748

0.002
0.011

0.062
0.835

Table 49: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A1 - A7 at 500th Iteration
Action A1
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.056
0.002 0.126
0.01
0.818

Action A2
A
B
0.984
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.072
0.002 0.096
0.01
0.832

Action A3
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.054
0.002 0.126
0.01
0.82

Action A4
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.038
0.002 0.154
0.01
0.808

Action A5
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.022
0.002 0.182
0.01
0.796

Action A6
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0.002
0.182
0.01
0.798

Action A7
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0.002 0.212
0.01
0.784

Table 50: Optimum Mixed Strategies of Player A & Player B from Action A8 - A15 at 500th Iteration
Action A8
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0.002
0.21
0.01
0.786

Action A9
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0.002
0.21
0.01
0.786

Action A10
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.148
0.01
0.852

Action A11
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0.146
0.01
0.854

Action A12
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0
0
0.002
0.146
0.01
0.854

Action A13
A
B
0.986
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.002
0
0.002
0.134
0.01
0.866

Action A14
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.092
0.002
0.13
0.01
0.774

Action A15
A
B
0.988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.092
0.002
0.056
0.01
0.852

UPPER BOUNDS AND LOWER BOUNDS AT ALL COMPUTATIONS


At each play of the game the smallest sum element selected by player B divided by the number of place of the
game is known as lower bound.Similarly At each play of the game the largest sum element selected by player A divided by
the number of place of the game is called as upper bound.The Values of U.Bs and L.Bs in 15x15 game are shown in the
tables from Table (51) to Table (52).
Table 51: Lower Bounds and Upper Bounds at 50th Iteration 250th Iteration
50
LB
27.04
27.16
27.38
27.58
27.78
27.82
27.98
28
28.02
28.06
28.08
28.1
28.12

UB
30.66
31.18
31.16
31.38
31.58
31.76
31.1
31.24
31.36
31.46
31.54
31.6
31.64

100
LB
UB
27.94 29.77
28
30.03
28.11 30.02
28.21 30.13
28.31 30.23
28.33 30.32
28.43
30.4
28.44 30.47
28.45 30.53
28.43 30.58
28.44 30.62
28.45 30.65
28.45 30.67

150
LB
28.29
28.33
28.406
28.473
28.54
28.553
28.62
28.62
28.63
28.62
28.62
28.63
28.633

200
UB
29.51
29.68
29.68
29.753
29.82
29.88
29.93
29.98
30.02
30.053
30.08
30.1
30.113

LB
28.47
28.5
28.555
28.605
28.655
28.665
28.715
28.72
28.725
28.715
28.72
28.725
28.725

250
UB
29.385
29.515
29.51
29.565
29.615
29.66
29.7
29.735
29.765
29.79
29.81
29.825
29.835

LB
28.576
28.6
28.644
28.684
28.724
28.732
28.772
28.776
28.78
28.772
28.776
28.78
28.78

UB
29.308
29.412
29.408
29.452
29.492
29.528
29.56
29.588
29.612
29.632
29.648
29.66
29.668

77

A Significant Approach on a Special Case of Game Theory

27.3
27.18

30.66
30.66

28.07
28.01

29.77
29.77

Table 51:Contd.,
28.38
29.513
28.535
28.34
29.5133
28.505

29.385
29.385

28.628
28.604

29.308
29.308

Table 52: Lower Bounds and Upper Bounds at 300th Iteration 500th Iteration
300
LB
28.64
28.66
28.703
28.736
28.77
28.77
28.81
28.81
28.81
28.81
28.81
28.816
28.816
28.69
28.67

UB
29.25
29.34
29.34
29.376
29.41
29.44
29.46
29.49
29.51
29.52
29.54
29.55
29.556
29.256
29.2568

350
LB
UB
28.69
29.22
28.714 29.294
28.74
29.29
28.774 29.322
28.8
29.35
28.8
29.37
28.83
29.4
28.84
29.42
28.84
29.43
28.83
29.45
28.84
29.46
28.842 29.471
28.842 29.477
28.734 29.22
28.717 29.22

400
LB
UB
28.6975 29.115
28.7325 29.18
28.7425 29.1775
28.75
29.205
28.7575 29.23
28.765
29.2525
28.77
29.2725
28.775
29.29
28.7775 29.305
28.8575 29.395
28.86
29.405
28.8625 29.4125
28.8625 29.41
28.665
29.115
28.7525 29.1925

450
LB
UB
28.67
29.04
28.704 29.104
28.713 29.102
28.72
29.126
28.72
29.14
28.73
29.16
28.73
29.18
28.74
29.2
28.74
29.21
28.82
29.226
28.82
29.235
28.83
29.24
28.846 29.246
28.644 29.046
28.733 29.046

500
LB
28.706
28.734
28.742
28.748
28.754
28.76
28.764
28.768
28.77
28.842
28.846
28.848
28.862
28.68
28.76

UB
29.042
29.094
29.092
29.114
29.134
29.152
29.168
29.182
29.194
29.204
29.212
29.218
29.222
29.042
29.042

CONCLUSIONS

In general the pure optimum mixed strategy may not be obtained directly in a non both row-column. dominant
game.But this peculiar game proves that there is a chance of evidence to gain the required approximate pure
mixed strategy in a game problem.

Component wise influences on a set of actions of Player A are identified in any computation.

Player B has initially not influenced by player A, but finally effected.

Player A is a strong competent than Player B at the beginning of the game but the dominance is reversed at the
end of game.

In the considered maximum iteration the lower bound is obtained as 28.26 and upper bound is 29.042 .

The error is gradually decreasing as 3.48,1.76,1.17,0.88,0.704,0.5868,0.503,0.44,0.313,0.282 from the first


iteration to last iteration.

The value of the game lies between 28.26 and 29.042 ie 28.26 29.042.

The difference between the bounds is 0.282 only at the last computation.By the continuation of the problem the
game tends to become strictly deterministic game.

ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS
The authors are grateful to the principal, HOD & the Faculty members of Dept. of M.C.A, Bapatla Engineering
College for their encouragement.

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