Presidential Address: Substance in Aquinas's Metaphysics

by John F. Wippel

When we turn to Thomas Aquinas's many discussions of substance, we are immediately struck by his heavy dependence upon Aristotle. This occasions little surprise, of course, in light of Thomas's considerable debt to the Stagirite for so much of his philosophical reflection. At the same time, many elements of Thomas's metaphysical thought are not to be found in the texts of Aristotle. Thus Aquinas's theory of distinction and composition of essence and act of being (esse) in finite beings, his metaphysics of participation, his views concerning creation, to mention but three items, these are as absent from Aristotle's metaphysics as they are central to his own. l What, then, of Thomas's understanding of substance? Even as we acknowledge his considerable debt to Aristotle in developing this topic, do we find truly original elements in his analysis of substance? In addressing myself today to some facets of Thomas's teaching on substance, I shall also attempt to keep in the background the issue of his debt to Aristotle concerning the same. 2 And in my conduding remarks I shall briefly return to this. Because the points associated with Thomas's metaphysics of substance are many and varied, in this paper I shall limit myself to the following four: (1) substance and being (ens); (2) substance taken as individual subject (suppositum) and substance taken as nature or quiddity; (3) the "definition" of substance; (4) substance and esse (act of being).
1. Substance and Being (Ens)

Here we should recall that throughout his career Thomas repeatedly insists that what the intellect first conceives, and that to which it reduces its other conceptions, is being (ens).3 As I understand this, the priority Thomas has in mind applies to the order of resolution (analysis). This is to say that no matter what we may discover about a given entity, for instance that it is large or small, moving or stationary, living or nonliving, etc., eventual analysis will lead us to recognize that for it to be any of these things it must first and foremost enjoy being. As Thomas explains in De veritate, quo 1, a. 1, that which the intellect first conceives and into which it resolves all its other conceptions is being (ens). Other conceptions of the intellect are gained by

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some kind of addition to being. But nothing can be added to being from without, as if it were extrinsic to it, in the way a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject. This is so, continues Thomas, because every nature is being essentially, i.e., intrinsically. And Aristotle has shown in Metaphysics III that being itself is not a genus. 4 In this same context Thomas goes on to note that certain things are said to "add" to being insofar as they express a mode which is not expressed by the name being itself. This can happen in two ways. It may be that the mode expressed by such a name is some special mode of being. There are differing grades or degrees of entity, and therefore different modes of being. Corresponding to these, the different genera of things are derived. s Here Thomas has in mind the division of being into its ten supreme genera or categories or predicaments. As he puts it, substance does not add to being any difference which might be regarded as a nature superadded from without. Rather by the name substance a certain special mode of being is expressed, i.e., being per se. 6 As is also well known, Thomas goes on in this same context to single out certain general modes of being which are as broad in extension as being itself or, as he phrases it, which follow upon every being. These result in what subsequent scholasticism often refers to as the transcendental properties of being.' For our purposes, however, Thomas's reference to certain special modes of being, i.e., to the predicaments, and in particular, to substance, is allimportant. First of all, this suggests that within the range of finite being Thomas does not think that we first discover accidental modes of being, or accidents, and then reason from our awareness of these to knowledge of an underlying subject or substratum which we would identify as substance. On the contrary, what we first recognize intellectually is either explicitly or implicitly grasped as being or as a being. Once we have thus discovered being, subsequent analysis should enable us to distinguish explicitly therein between that which exists in itself, or substance, and that which does not but only in something else, or accidental being. 8 Secondly, I can hardly overemphasize the importance in Thomas's metaphysics of his view that substance and the other predicaments, when viewed ontologically, are themselves modes of being. He certainly acknowledges that the predicaments may be regarded as supreme and generically distinct kinds of predicates which may be affirmed of a subject. But more significant is his repeated association of these modes of predication with the modes of being which they both express and presuppose. This is implied by our text from De veritate. quo 1, a. 1, and is brought out explicitly in his derivations of the predicaments both in his Commentaries on Metaphysics V and on Physics IIJ.9 In sum, as Thomas sees things, it is because to exist in itself is a supreme

The Metaphysics of Substance

way or mode in which being is realized that we can understand it that way, derive a kind of predicate which expresses this understanding or concept, and therefore speak of substance. And because there are other supreme ways in which being is realized as existing in something else, corresponding to our understanding or concepts of these, we derive other names or predicaments for them, i.e., for the nine classes of accidents. In the order of discovery, our reflection upon these supreme kinds of predicates (which we may regard as predicaments in the logical sense) may assist us in arriving at more explicit knowledge of the corresponding underlying modes of being (which we may regard as predicaments in the ontological sense). But in the order of reality, for Thomas there can be no doubt. Primacy is to be assigned to being. Because there are these different levels or modes of being, we understand them in different fashion and are justified in assigning different predicaments to each of them. to In light of his emphasis on the primacy of being when it comes to our discovery of the predicaments, we are not surprised to find Thomas agreeing with Aristotle that substance is the prime instance of being itself. Thus in Metaphysics IV, ch. 2, Aristotle comes to grips with the fact that the name being is used in different ways. This seems to pose some threat to his claim in ch. 1 that there is a science, i.e., one science, that studies being as being. Aristotle counters with his theory of pros hen equivocation and maintains that all secondary instances of being are so named by reason of their relation to the primary instance of being, ousia or substance. 1I Thomas follows Aristotle's thinking on this point, and gives it a central role in developing his own theory of analogy of being.1l This is clearly brought out in Thomas's Commentary on Metaphysics IV, ch. 2; but this thinking is already present in his discussion of analogy at the very beginning of his career, as can be seen in his De principiis naturae. The presentation offered there of analogical predication is modelled on Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics IV, ch. 2, and is also deeply indebted to Averroes' Commentary on the same text. This is so even though neither Aristotle nor the Latin translation of Averroes uses the term "analogy" in the contexts in question. \3 To return to Thomas's Commentary on Metaphysics IV, there we find him writing that some things are described as beings because they enjoy being in themselves. These of course are substances. Substances alone are beings in the primary sense. All other instances of being are so named because in some way they are related to substance. t4 After reproducing Aristotle's somewhat haphazard listing of a number of other ways in which things may be named beings because of their relationship to substance, Thomas sums this up in his own fashion. These different modes of being, he writes, may be reduced to four types: (1) negations and privations; (2) generations and corruptions; (3) things that do not exist in their own right

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but only in something else, such as quantities, qualities, and the properties of substance; (4) that which exists in reality and enjoys what Thomas calls a firm and solid being (esse). This alone exists in itself and is again identified by Thomas as substance. IS In this reduced listing of the different ways in which being may be realized, most important for our purpose are the members of classes three and four, that is to say, quantities, qualities, and the other accidents we may presume (class 3), and substances (class 4). Substance is being in the primary sense, Thomas again reminds US. 16 In preparing to derive the ten predicaments in his Commentary on Metaphysics V, Thomas first mentions substance. In this case, he notes, the predicate or predicament is said to signify or be predicated of what he now calls "first substance." And he identifies "first substance" as the particular or individual substance of which everything else is predicated, as for instance, when we say "Socrates is an animal," the predicate animal is affirmed of Socrates-the first substance.!' I mention this to show that Thomas is familiar with Aristotle's distinction between first substance and second substance in his Categories. Nonetheless, the more frequent and, I think, more important contrast for Thomas is not between first substance and second substance, but between the-subject or suppositum (first substance) and nature or essence. But we shall return to this below. 18 In Lectio 10 of his Commentary on this same Bk. V (ch. 8) of the Metaphysics, Thomas there finds Aristotle singling out four modes or kinds of substance. First of all there are individual substances such as simple bodies and even mixed bodies when they are composed of similar parts as in the case of stones and living things and their parts. These are said to be substances because other things are predicated of them. Thomas identifies these as the first substances mentioned by Aristotle in the Categories. As a second mode or kind of substance Thomas lists the intrinsic formal cause (causa essendi) of a first substance, i.e., its substantial form. As a third mode of substance he mentions the parts of substances which set limits to them in some way, i.e., lines, points and numbers. (These are regarded as substances by some.) Finally, as the fourth mode or kind of substance he names the quiddity of a thing which its definition signifies. Concerning this fourth mode, Thomas notes that it is according to this mode-substance taken as quiddity-that genus and species are said to be the "substance" of that of which they are predicated. 19 Following Aristotle's lead, Thomas quickly reduces these four modes to two. He immediately eliminates the members of class three, i.e., the limiting or terminating parts of substance, as viable candidates for the title substance. Substance in the first sense, i.e., the ultimate subject or first substance, continues to be regarded as substance in the primary sense and is referred to as a hoc aliquid ("this particular something") which subsists in

The Metaphysics of Substance

itself and is separate; for it is distinct from all else and is not communicable to others.20 By denying that the individual substance or subject can be communicated to others, I take Thomas to mean that it is not predicated of anything else, to be sure. But even more important for Thomas is the fact that it cannot be shared in by others in the way a common nature or essence might be shared in by individual instances of the same. l1 In order to complete his reduction of Aristotle's classes of substances to two, Thomas now combines substance taken as form (i.e., as substantial form) with substance taken as quiddity. Both substantial form and quiddity may be regarded as principles by means of which something is. But when we speak of (substantial) form, writes Thomas, we view it as a principle which is directly ordered to its appropriate matter. When we speak of quiddity, we rather have in mind the quiddity as ordered to its subject or suppositum, that is to say, to that which is signified as having the quiddity or essence. 22 In effect, therefore, he is subsuming substance taken as form under substance taken as essence or quiddity. We should not conclude from this, however, that for Thomas the quiddity of a material being is reducible to and identical with its substantial form. Substantial form is rather included within the quiddity or essence, along with prime matter, Thomas would always maintain, even though this does not in fact appear to have been Aristotle's position.23 Thomas's reduction of this fourfold division of substance to a twofold division brings us to Part II of our paper.
2. Substance as the Individual Subject (Suppositumj and Substance as Nature or Quiddity

For Thomas's purposes this appears to be the most important division of substance. This is evident from his clearly independent writings, that is, writings in which he is not commenting on Aristotle or others. For instance, in Summa theologiae I, quo 29, a. 2, he notes that substance may indicate either (1) the quiddity of a thing which its definition signifies-i.e., ousia or essentia to give the Greek and Latin equivalents; or (2) the subject or suppositum which subsists within the genus substance. As Thomas puts this in Summa theologiae III, quo 17, a. 1, ad 7 (and in quo 2, a. 6, ad 3), substance may be expressed either as essence or nature, on the one hand, or as subject (i.e., suppositum or hypostasis), on the other. Or as he had explained in his earlier Summa contra gentiles IV, ch. 49, substance may be understood as a subject within the genus substance, and when it is so used it is also known as hypostasis. Or it may be taken as signifying a thing's quiddity (quod quid est), i.e., its nature. 24 It is true that in a much earlier discussion in his Commentary on I Sentences (dist. 25, quo 1, a. 1, ad 7), Thomas offers a somewhat different division. There he is defending the Boethian definition of a person as an

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individual substance of a rational nature. He notes that the term substance is spoken of in four ways: (1) as essence (taken this way the name applies to all genera including accidents, just as does essence); (2) as an individual within the genus substance, i.e., first substance or hypostasis; (3) as second substance; (4) in a more general way which abstracts from first substance and second substance. In fact, remarks Thomas, it is in this fourth way that the term is used in Boethius's definition of person, a point which he also makes much later in his career (see De potentia, quo 9, a. 2, ad 7; ST I, quo 29, a. 1, ad 2). But of more immediate interest to us are the second and third usages of substance mentioned here, that is, first substance and second substance. 25 Should we not conclude from this that Thomas's more frequent contrast between subject (suppositum) and nature is really the same as that between first substance and second substance? Or to put this another way, should we not identify substance taken as nature or essence or quiddity with second substance?26 Other texts strongly suggest that any such identification would be ill advised. For instance, Thomas discusses the relationship between nature and suppositum in considerable detail in De potentia, quo 9, a. 1. There he is considering the relationship between person, on the one hand, and essence, subsistence, and hypostasis, on the other. Once again he recalls that according to Aristotle substance is used in two ways. It may signify the ultimate subject which is not predicated of anything else, i.e., an individual within the genus substance. Or it may signify the form or nature of a subject. To support this distinction Thomas recalls that many individual subjects, for instance, many men, share in a given nature. Therefore we must distinguish between that which is one and that which is multiplied. The common nature is signified by the definition which indicates what the thing is. Because of this, this common nature is also known as essence or quiddity. But certain items are found in an individual substance which are not included in the common nature, i.e., individual matter and the individual accidents which determine such matter. 27 From this Thomas concludes that essence is related to an individual substance in which it is realized as a formal part of the latter. For instance, it is in this way-as part to whole-that humanity (standing for essence) is related to Socrates (an individual subject). Therefore in matter-form composites we cannot say that an essence is completely identical with its subject. Consequently, the essence cannot be predicated of the subject. Thus we cannot say that Socrates is humanity.28 In simple substances, however, there is no such distinction between an essence and the subject in which it is realized; for in them there is no matter to individuate a common nature. In them essence and what Thomas now calls subsistence are identical.29 Thomas also notes that substance taken as subject (suppositum) enjoys two distinctive characteristics. First, it needs no extrinsic subject to serve as

The Metaphysics of Substance

its support; therefore it subsists, or exists in itself and is known as o1501 WOl I in Greek or as subsistentia in Latin. Second, it also serves as a foundation for accidents and is therefore said to "stand under" them. Because of this it is also known as hypostasis by the Greeks and as "first substance" by the Latins. Hence if hypostasis and (first) substance differ logically or conceptually, they are one and the same reality. 30 From all of this we may conclude that in material entities substance taken as essence or nature is not completely identical with substance taken as subject. Nor are the two totally diverse. As realized in a concrete individual, they stand in a part-whole relationship to one another. 31 And the contrast between them is not to be identified with that between first substance and second substance. Second substance can be predicated directly of its subject, whereas, in material beings, a nature, when taken as a part, cannot be predicated directly of its subject or suppositum. While we can say Socrates is a man (second substance), we cannot say that Socrates is humanity (nature). For confirmation of the points we have just made we may turn to Thomas's Commentary on Metaphysics VII, ch. 3. There he is explaining Aristotle's preliminary division of substance (ousia) into four modes: (1) quiddity, essence or nature (quod quid erat esse); (2) the universal, viewed as substance by the defenders of Platonic forms; (3) the primary genus for a thing, i.e., unity and being according to some; (4) the subject, that is, the particular substance of which all else is predicated. Once more Thomas identifies substance taken as subject (see class 4) with the first substance of Aristotle's Categories. He adds that second substances, i.e., genera and species, stand under accidents, but only by reason of first substance. 32 But Thomas also notes that the first member of this fourfold division of substance-substance as essence, nature or quiddity-does not appear in the division in the Categories. Hence it is neither first substance nor second substance. This is so, explains Thomas, because quiddity taken as such does not enter into the division into the predicaments except insofar as it serves as a principle for each. In other parts, it is not a genus or species (second substance) or an individual (first substance), but only a formal principle for each. Again, therefore, we find Thomas refusing to identify substance taken as essence, nature or quiddity with second substance. 33

J. "Definition" of Substance
As some of the texts we have analyzed indicate, and as Thomas often notes in other contexts, a substance is that which has being in itself. And as our text from De potentia, quo 9, a. 1 states, substance taken as subject (1) subsists or exists in itself, and (2) stands under or supports accidents.34 But if a substance can fulfill this second function and support accidents, this is

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only because it enjoys the first, that is, because it exists in itself. Given this, we might expect Thomas to define substance as a being which exists in itself or per se-as an ens per se-and accident as that which exists in something else. Nonetheless, as E. Gilson pointed out in an interesting study published in 1974, almost from the beginning of his career until its end, Thomas repeatedly makes the point that "being in itself (per se)" is not the definition of substance. As Gilson also noted, in saying this Thomas finds himself in agreement with A vicenna, even though we are hard pressed to find this stated by the Muslim philosopher in those exact terms.35 At first sight such a view is somewhat unsettling, at least as regards the definition of substance. Given Thomas's belief in Eucharistic transubstantiation, we are not surprised to find him refusing to define an accident as "that which exists in something else" but rather as "that to which it belongs to exist in something else."36 But why does he reject "that which exists in itself" as an appropriate definition of substance? In what appears to be his earliest explicit discussion of this (In I Sent. , d. 8, quo 4, a. 2), Thomas examines an argument in support of the claim that God falls within the predicament substance. According to this argument, a substance is that which is not in a subject but which rather is a being (ens) in itself (per se). Since this can also be said of God, God must be included in the genus substance,l1 Against this Thomas counters that, according to Avicenna, "that which is not in a subject" is not the definition of substance. As regards the positive part of the proposed definition - being per se, being is not a genus. And the negative part of the alleged definition-not in a subjectposits nothing. Therefore, to speak of "being which is not in a subject" is not to identify any genus. 38 The implication is that if the proposed definition cannot identify any genus, it is not a satisfactory definition. To prove that "being which is not in a subject" does not identify any genus, Thomas reasons that whatever falls within a genus must have a quiddity which does not include esse (the act of being) in its intelligible content. But the name being (ens) does not express quiddity but the act of being (in other words, the name being-ens-is taken not from the essence or quiddity of a thing but from its act of being). Therefore it does not follow that if something is not in a subject that it is included in the genus substance. What does follow is this: If something has a quiddity to which it belongs to exist not in a subject, only then will it be included in the genus substance. But it cannot be said that God has a quiddity to which it belongs to exist not in a subject. Therefore God does not fall within the genus substance. 39 We may wonder why we cannot say that God has a quiddity to which it belongs to exist not in a subject. Thomas will reply that this is because God's essence is identical with his esse. As Thomas had already argued in the corpus of this same article, if something is to be included in a genus, its

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quiddity must differ from its act of being. (Here we meet one of Thomas's ways of arguing for the distinction between essence and existence [esse].) To repeat, if something falls within a genus, its essence and esse must differ. But, continues Thomas, essence and esse are not distinct in God. Therefore God falls within no genus. 40 As Thomas remarks in another helpful discussion in his Commentary on IV Sentences, to exist in itself is not the definition of substance. Rather its definition or "quasi-definition" is this-"a thing (res) to which it is given or belongs to exist not in something else."41 For fuller discussion of this in a somewhat later text we may turn to Summa contra gentiles I, ch. 25, dating from 1258-1259. There again Thomas is attempting to show that God is not contained in any genus. His fourth argument runs this way. A thing falls within a genus by reason of its quiddity because a genus is predicated in quidditative fashion. But Thomas has already shown in ch. 22 that God's quiddity is identical with his esse. We cannot say that God is present in a genus by reason of his esse, continues Thomas, for then being itself (ens), which signifies the act of being, would be a genus. (In other words, we cannot say that God is present in a genus by reason of his essence without implying that he is present therein by reason of his act of existing; for in God the two are identical.) But to say that God is in a genus by reason of his act of existing would be to make of esse and therefore of being (ens) a genus. Neither is acceptable to Thomas. 42 In this same context Thomas poses this objection for himself. It might be granted that the name "substance" taken strictly does not apply to God since God does not stand under any accident. Nonetheless, the reality signified by that name is present in God. Therefore God is in the genus substance. This follows because a substance is a being in itself, and so is God. 43 To this reasoning Thomas replies once again that being in itself is not the definition of substance. He had already argued that being is not a genus. The "in itself" (per se) part of the proposed definition implies nothing but a negation, i.e., that something does not exist in something else. From this it follows that a substance is a thing to which it belongs to exist not in a subject. In this description, the name "thing" (res) is taken from the substance's quiddity. Therefore, he concludes, implied in the meaning of substance is that it have a quiddity to which it belongs to exist not in something else. But this cannot be said of God. We may assume that Thomas's reason for denying that this can be said of God continues to be the same: to be so defined is by implication to have an essence that is not identical with one's esse. 44 Thomas sums up much of the same thinking in a still later treatment in De potentia, quo 7, a. 3, ad 4. 45 He again makes the point that being is not a genus; for nothing can be added to being which does not itself participate in being. But a difference should not participate in its genus. 46

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In this same context Thomas also writes that if substance could be defined in spite of the fact that it is a most general genus, this would be its definition - a thing (res) to whose quiddity it belongs to exist not in something else. In addition to reasserting his preferred "definition" of substance, here Thomas also adds to his reasons for denying that substance can be properly defined at all. Substance itself is in fact a most general genus. There can be no more general genus, such as being, of which substance would be a species.47 In sum, therefore, according to Aquinas "being per se" is not the definition of substance. If substance could be defined, the definition should rather be "a thing to whose quiddity it belongs to exist not in something else (or to exist in itself)." Even this is not a definition of substance in the strict sense but only a quasi-definition. This quasi-definition cannot be applied to God, since it implies distinction of essence and esse on the part of that which is so defined. Hence, it is clear that Thomas's theory that essence and esse are diverse in creatures and identical in God controls much of his thinking about the appropriate way of "defining" substance.

4. Substance and Esse (Act of Being)

In this part of my paper I wish to focus upon Thomas's understanding of esse as act of being and the role this plays in the ontological structure of the first substance or subsisting subject (suppositum). In Section 2 we have seen that Thomas correlates the individual subject or suppositum with nature as whole and as formal part, at least in material entities. This implies some kind of distinction between the two, and one that is not merely conceptual or mind-dependent. Given Thomas's view that essence and esse differ in created entities, this suggests another possible way for him to approach the distinction between an individual subsisting subject and its nature. When considering this relationship, Thomas might simply appeal to the distinction between the individuating characteristics present in material substances and the nature which is realized in each. This will imply that subject and nature differ in such entities. On the other hand, he might turn to his theory of distinction of essence and act of being (esse). Since this distinction also applies to created spiritual entities, from this approach it would follow that even in them the distinction between the subsisting subject and its essence or nature is more than merely conceptual or minddependent. Most frequently Thomas adopts the first approach. This we have already seen, especially in De potentia, quo 9, a. 1.48 In a much earlier discussion in his Commentary on III Sentences (d. 5, quo 1, art. 3), he defends the theological position that in Christ there is only one person. He notes that in certain cases nature and person differ really (secundum rem), and in other cases only

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conceptually (secundum rationem). He identifies nature as he uses it here with quiddity. By a person he understands this particular something which subsists with its given nature, in other words, an intellectual subsisting subject or suppositum. Because simple things lack matter, they are identical with their quiddities. But the quiddity of a matter-form composite is not to be identified with that composite entity. The meaning of the quiddity (of humanity, for instance) includes only those principles which are essential to man as such, but not the individuating characteristics which are present only in individual instances of humanity. Therefore, because humanity is taken as a part, it does not include in its meaning the whole, i.e., the subsisting subject. Hence humanity (or nature) does not subsist. The individual subject subsists as that which has humanity.49 In sum, in this text Thomas holds that in a simple entity such as God, nature and the subsisting subject do not really differ. And though Thomas does not spell this out in so many words, the implication appears to be that nature and the subsisting subject do not differ really in created spirits either; for in such beings there is no matter and hence no individuating characteristics in addition to specific characteristics. Thomas makes this final point very clear elsewhere, for instance, in Summa contra gentiles IV, ch. 55. There he remarks that "in man nature and person differ since a man is composed of matter and form; but this is not true of an angel."50 Hence here we have an explicit rejection of (real) distinction between nature and the individual subject in created spirits, i.e., in angels. Thomas expresses the same view in other contexts, for instance, in De potentia, quo 7, a. 4 (of 1265-1266), in De spiritualibus creaturis, art. 5, ad 9 (ca. 1267-1268) and in his Commentary on Bk. III of the De anima (ca.
1266-1269).5\

But in Quodlibet II, quo 2, a. 2 of Christmas, 1269, a different picture emerges. In this disputation Thomas had been asked to determine whether in an angel the subsisting subject and nature differ. Again he appeals to the distinction between nature, when it is taken as signifying the substance of a thing, and the subsisting subject or suppositum. Nature signifies the substance of a thing in the sense of essence or quiddity. The subsisting subject or suppositum is an individual within the genus substance, and is also known as a hypostasis or first substance. 52 Because sensible substances are better known to us, Thomas first turns to them. After presenting and criticizing a view which would identify the form of the part (substantial form) with the form of the whole (the entire essence) in such beings, he offers his own solution. 53 Nature or essence is that which is signified by the definition of a thing. In material entities this includes both matter and form. Thomas appeals to Aristotle's Metaphysics VII where he finds the Stagirite asking whether each and every thing is identical with its

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quiddity (quod quid est). Aristotle concludes that in things which are said to be per se, a thing (res) and its quiddity are one and the same. This is not so in the case of things which are said to be only per accidens. 54 In order to determine when nature and the subsisting subject or suppositum differ, Thomas now offers a working principle: if a being is such that something can "happen" to it which is not included in the definition (ratio) of its nature, such a thing will differ from its quiddity (quod quid est). In other words, in such a being the subsisting subject differs from its nature. This is so because the definition of a thing's nature applies only to that which is included in the intelligible content of its species; but an individual subject or suppositum includes not only that, but other things which may "happen" to that subject. Therefore, Thomas reminds us again, the subject or suppositum is designated as a whole, but the nature or quiddity only as a formal part. 55 Until this point Thomas's solution is consistent with what we have seen in earlier texts. But now he returns to the case of immaterial entities. In God and God alone is there nothing accidental in addition to his essence; for God's essence and esse are identical. Therefore in God the subsisting subject is completely identical with the divine essence. In angels, however, this is not the case. Something does "happen" to an angel in addition to what is included in its essence or nature. First and foremost, the esse of an angel is added to its essence or nature. In addition, remarks Thomas, other things also happen to an angel which belong to the angelic subsisting subject, but not to its nature. By these I take it that Thomas has in mind accidents such as operative powers and operations. 56 Unlike his earlier treatments, therefore, in this text Thomas clearly distinguishes between the subsisting subject or suppositum and its nature even in created spirits or angels. His major reason for doing so is the distinction of essence and esse in such beings. As he puts this in his reply to the first objection, it is because no angel can be identified with its esse that something does "happen" to an angel in addition to its essence, i.e., esse and certain accidents. And as he specifies in replying to the second objection, esse is not included within the definition of a subsisting subject or suppositum. But esse does belong (pertinet) to such a subject. Therefore the subject and its nature cannot be completely identical in any entity in which essence (res) and esse differ. 57 This discussion raises some difficulties about Thomas's final position. Various attempts have been made to reconcile his presentation in Quodlibet II with his earlier treatments. Perhaps he has simply changed his mind. If not, how are the earlier discussions to be brought into harmony with Quodlibet Il?58 In my opinion, the most promising solution has been offered by O. Schweizer. At times Thomas uses the term "suppositum" or subsisting subject to signify an individual nature which is ontologically complete in

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itself. At other times, as in Quodlibet II, he uses this term so as to include not only the individual essence or nature but a thing's act of being (esse) as well. When taken in this second and broader sense as including esse (and other accidents, we should add), the subject will differ from its nature in all created entities, not merely in those that are material. But when this term is taken in the narrower sense so as not to include the act of being (esse), the subject or suppositum will not really differ from the nature of a created spirit. 59 In sum, Schweizer's solution would resolve our problem by suggesting not that Thomas has changed his position in Quodlibet II, but that there he gives a different meaning to the suppositum or subject,f1O Another way of approaching this problem of interpretation has occurred to me, and I would like to propose it in tentative fashion as lending additional weight to Schweizer's solution. In referring to the relationship between essence and esse in created beings, Thomas often uses the language of Boethius. This is to say, he often describes this as a distinction or composition of "that which is" (quod est) and esse.6\ When Thomas speaks this way, we should take it that he is emphasizing not the "is" (est) but the "that which" (quod) in the expression "that which is." Because of this emphasis on the quidditative side of a concrete entity, Thomas can say that such an entity ("that which is") is other than and enters into composition with its act of being. Even in a created spirit its "that which is" when so understood will not include its act of being (esse).62 For instance, in De spiritualibus creaturis, art. 1, ad 8, Thomas explains that to be composed of "that which is" and that "whereby it is" (quo est) is not the same as to be composed of matter and form. If form may be described as "that whereby something is," matter cannot, properly speaking, be referred to as "that which is." "That which is" (quod est) is what subsists in the order of being. In other words, I would interject, it is the subsisting subject or suppositum. Therefore, continues Thomas, in material entities this is the matter-form composite. In immaterial substances it is the simple form itself. And that whereby such a thing exists is its participated act of being itself (esse). Because of this Thomas distinguishes between "that which is" and esse as between essence and act of being in all created substances. 63 Mutatis mutandis, I would suggest, we may say much the same of Thomas's understanding of suppositum in his more frequent way of contrasting this with nature. Just as the expression "that which is" may be taken as signifying the concrete subject which exists, but with the emphasis on the quidditative aspect of the same, so the suppositum or subsisting subject may be taken as signifying this same subject and with this same quidditative emphasis. When the suppositum is so understood, the individual nature or essence will be related to it as formal part to concrete whole. Because in material entities

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the concrete whole includes individuating characteristics in addition to the essence, there is some kind of real as opposed to merely conceptual distinction between nature and suppositum in such entities. Because such individuating characteristics are not present in angels, in them Thomas identifies nature and suppositum when he understands suppositum in this fashion, that is, when he emphasizes the quidditative aspect of the same. On the other hand, Thomas might emphasize the "is" (est) in the expression "that which is" when referring to a subsisting entity. When he does this, he will understand the subsisting subject as including its act of being together with its essence or nature. When so understood, therefore, the subsisting subject or suppositum will differ really rather than merely conceptually from its nature or essence even in created spirits, not merely in material entities. It is in this way that Thomas understands suppositum in Quodlibet II, quo 2, a. 2. This shift in usage is significant, it seems to me, for two reasons. First, it brings out more forcefully the role of esse within the structure of any subsisting subject or suppositum. When such a subject is viewed as a whole and in the second way just distinguished, it must include esse as well as essence or nature. This is not to say that a definition of the subject or suppositum will include esse; for definitions are limited to the quidditative side of things. But one's full understanding of a suppositum should also include reference to its act of being. Second, this approach brings out more clearly the distinction between Thomas's solutions for two distinct issues: (1) How can there be many individuals within the same species? This is the problem of individuation. (2) How is one to correlate and distinguish between a subsisting subject (suppositum) and its essence or nature? This is the problem we have been considering. Mere appeal to the presence of individuating factors within a matter-form composite might lead one to think that Thomas's answer to the first (in terms of his theory of individuation) is also his answer to the second. His appeal to the presence of the act of being within the subject or suppositum in resolving the second issue indicates that such is not the case.

Concluding Remarks
Thomas's understanding of substance and accidents enters into many other aspects of his metaphysics which I have not even mentioned. For instance, it controls his defense of real distinction between the soul and its powers. It is crucial for his defense of unicity of substantial form in individual substances. And it evidently enters into the difficult issue concerning whether distinct existences are to be assigned to accidents as well as to substances themselves.

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Rather than dwell on these issues here, we may simply ask ourselves whether Thomas's metaphysics might be described as a metaphysics of substance, or as a metaphysics of esse. Substance plays a considerable role in his metaphysics, as we have now seen at least to some degree. At the same time, when it comes to his understanding of substance- the primary instance of being- Thomas builds upon and goes beyond Aristotle. In Aristotle there is nothing like Thomas's theory of distinction and composition of essence and esse in finite substances. Moreover, for Thomas esse is so important within the structure of a subsisting substance or subject that he refers to it as the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections in the wellknown passage from De potentia, quo 7, a.2, ad 9. 64 To put this another way, for Thomas metaphysics has as its subject being as being or being in general (ens commune).65 The primary referent for the term being is substance for Thomas as well as for Aristotle. But for Thomas a substance can enjoy being in actuality only by reason of its act of being (esse). Hence if Thomas does have a metaphysics of substance, as indeed he does, it is a metaphysics in which esse plays a primary role within the structure of every existing substance. This we do not find in Aristotle.
The Catholic University of America Washington, D. C.

NOTES
1. E. Gilson's many studies have rightly emphasized the importance of the primacy of existence in Thomas's metaphysical thought, as well as the significance of his doctrine of creation. See, for instance, Being and Some Philosophers. 2d ed. (Toronto, 1952); The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956); Elements of Christian Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y., 1960); Introduction alaphilosophie ehntienne (Paris,1960); Le thomisme, 6th ed. (Paris, 1965). For an earlier work which makes Thomas's theory of distinction between essence and existence most central to his metaphysics see N. Del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae ehristianae (Fribourg, 1911). For classical studies of the importance of participation in Thomas's metaphysics see C. Fabro, La nozione metafisiea di parteeipazione secondo S. Tommaso, 2d ed. (Turin, 1950); L. Geiger, La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, 2d ed. (Paris, 1953). 2. Here I shall not be concerned with the historical accuracy of his interpretations of Aristotle concerning substance, especially because Professor Verbeke has addressed himself to Aristotle's position in the first paper in this session. 3. For some ofthese references see De ente et essentia, Prooemium, (Roland-Gosselin ed., p. l/Leonine ed., Vol. 43, p. 369); In De Trinitate, q. I, a. 3, obj. 3 (Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate, B. Decker, ed. [Leiden, 19591, p. 69); see p. 73 for Thomas's reply, which indicates that he accepts this part of the objection); In I Sent., d. 38, q. I, a. 4, obj. 4 and Thomas's reply (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, P. Mandonnet, ed., Vol. 1 [Paris, 1929], pp. 905,906); De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 (R. Spiazzi, ed., p. 376/Leonine ed. Vol. 22.3, p. 593); In I Met.,lect. 2 (In duodeeim libros Metaphysieorum Aristotelis, R. M. Spiazzi, ed. [Turin-Rome, 1950], n. 46, p.

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13); Summa theologiae, I-IIae, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1: ..... dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens: unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens .... Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est .... " (Turin-Rome, 1950, p. 242). 4. "IIlud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod (with Leonine) conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens. ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae Metaphysicae" (Spiazzi ed., p. 2/Leonine ed., Vol. 22.1, p. 5). I am taking resolvit as the verb for the noun resolutio or analysis. The same seems to be implied by Thomas's remark in ST I-Ilae, q. 94, a. 2: "Nam iIlud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit" (ed. cit., p. 426). Also note Thomas's remark that every nature is being essentialiter in the text from the De veritate: ..... quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens" (ibid.). 5. Ibid. Note in particular: "Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera." 6. Ibid. ..... sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus essendi, scilicet ens per se; et ita est in aliis generibus." 7. Ibid. 8. This interpretation is reinforced by the next point in my text, i.e., that Thomas views substance and the other predicaments as supreme modes of being, with the emphasis on being. when we consider them ontologically rather than merely logically. 9. See In V Met., lect. 9, nn. 889-890,ed. cit., p. 238. Note in particular: "Unde oportet. quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia 'quoties ens dicitur,' idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur. 'toties esse significatur,' idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse." Also see In III Physic., lect. 5 (In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio, M. Maggiolo, ed. [Turin-Rome, 1954]), n. 322, p. 158: " ... sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse iIIud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta." For more on this and on Thomas's derivation of the predicaments see my "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)," Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1987), pp. 13-34, esp. pp. 17-19,25. 10. See the texts and contexts cited in the previous note. Also note the following remark concerning our concepts (literally: "understandings") of things: "Licet modus significandi yocum non consequatur immediate modum essendi rerum, sed mediante modo intelligendi; quia intellectus sunt similitudines rerum, voces autem intellectuum, ut dicitur in primo Perihermenias" (In Vll Met., lect. 1, n. 1253). For Aristotle see De interpretatione, c. 1 (l6a 1-5); for Thomas's Commentary on this see In libros Peri Hermeneias expositio, lect. 2, R. M. Spiazzi, ed., 2d ed. (Turin-Rome, 1964), n. 15. 11. l003a33-1003b 19. Cf. the remarks concerning this by Professor G. Verbeke in this same volume, pp. 35-51. 12. For a good overall presentation of this see B. Montagnes, La doctrine de {'analogie de ['etre d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin (Louvain-Paris, 1963), Ch. 1, Section 1, "L'unite d'ordre par reference a un premier" (pp. 24-41). 13. See De prinCipiis naturae, ch. 6 (Leonine ed., Vol. 43, pp. 46-7). For Averroes see In IV Met., com. 2 (Venice, 1562), Vol. 8, ff. 65rb-va. For a comparison of these two texts see Montagnes, pp. 177-80. 14. Note that Aquinas, following Averroes, specifies that the primary instance of beingsubstance- is related to other instances as a subject, not as an end or as an efficient cause. He continues: "Alia enim dicuntur entia vel esse, quia per se habent esse sicut substantiae, quae

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principaliter et prius entia dicuntur. Alia vero quia sunt passiones sive proprietates substantiae, sicut per se accidentia uniuscuiusque substantiae .... " Un IV Met., lect. 1, n. 539, p. 152). 15. Ibid., nn. 540-543. Note Thomas's remarks concerning the third and fourth classes: "Tertium autem dicitur quod nihil habet de non ente admixtum, habet tamen esse debile, quia non per se, sed in alio, sicut sunt qualitates, quantitates et substantiae proprietates. Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per se existens, sicut sunt substantiae." 16. See n. 543: "Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur." 17. In V Met., leet. 9, n. 890. "Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam." See n. 891: "Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere. Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur." On this see my "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation ... ," p. 20, and n. 21. 18. See section 2 below. For Aristotle see Categories, ch. 5. 19. In V Met., lect. 10, nn. 898-902. Here Thomas does not pause to explain in what sense the parts of animals, such as hands and feet, are to be regarded as substances in this first way. He is content to mention them, along with demons, because Aristotle has done so. As regards the primary mode of substance he concludes: "Haec enim omnia praedicta dicuntur substantia, quia non dicuntur de alio subiecto, sed alia dicuntur de his. Et haec est descriptio primae substantiae in praedicamentis" (n. 898). On the fourth mode see n. 902. There Thomas distinguishes the quiddity or essence of a thing from substance taken in the second way, i.e., as substantial form. They differ as humanity differs from soul. This is because the form is a part of the essence or quiddity of a thing, and the quiddity or essence includes all the thing's essential principles. Because genus and species do not signify the form alone but the whole essence of the thing, they can be described as the substance of that of which they are predicated in this fourth way. 20. See nn. 901 and 905, for the elimination of the third mode. On substance in the first sense see n. 903. Note in particular: " ... quorum unus est secundum quod substantia dicitur id quod ultimo subiicitur in propositionibus, ita quod de alio non praedicetur, sicut substantia prima. Et hoc est, quod est hoc aliquid, quasi per se subsistens, et quod est separabile, quia est ab omnibus distinctum et non communicabile multis." He goes on to develop three differences between particular or individual substance (first substance) and substance taken as universal: 1) particular substance is not predicated of any inferior, as is universal substance; 2) universal substance does not subsist except by reason of the individual substance which subsists per se; 3) universal substance is realized in many, but individual substance is not. 21. See n. 903 and note 20 above. 22. See n. 904. 23. For a helpful comparison and contrast of Aristotle and Aquinas concerning this see A. Maurer, "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951), pp. 165-76. 24. For the first text see ed. cit. , p. 157. There Thomas supports his twofold usage of substance by citing Aristotle's Metaphysics V. See ch. 8 (1017b 23-26), the text in Lectio 10 of his Commentary on the same (see nn. 903-905), and our discussion of this in the preceding paragraphs of this study. For ST III, q. 17, a. 1, ad 7 see the Marietti ed. (Turin-Rome, 1948), p. 130; for q. 2, a. 6, ad 3 see p. 30. For the Summa contra gentiles see Editio leonina manualis (Rome, 1934), p. 504. Thomas's immediately following comment expresses his personal view concerning the claim of the parts of a substance to be called "substances" (see my note 19

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above): "Sed neque partes aiicuius substantiae sic dicuntur particulares substantiae quasi sint per se subsistentes, sed subsistunt in toto. Unde nec hypostases possunt dici: cum nulla eorum sit substantia completa." 25. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 605. 26. Already militating against accepting this suggestion is the fact that here Thomas has singled out essence (which we might identify with nature) as the first way in which substance is used, and distinguished this from the third way-second substance. 27. Ed. P. M. Pession (Turin-Rome, 1953), p. 226. Note especially: "Quidquid ergo est in re ad naturam communem pertinens, sub significatione essentiae continetur .... " 28. Ibid. Note especially: "Comparatur ergo essentia ad substantiam particularem ut pars formalis ipsius, ut humanitas ad Socratem. Et ideo in rebus, ex materia et forma compositis, essentia non est omnino idem quod subiectum; unde non praedicatur de subiecto .... " 29. Ibid. Note in particular: "In substantiis vero simplicibus, nulla est differentia essentiae et subiecti, cum non sit in eis materia individualis naturarn communem individuans, sed ipsa essentia in eis est subsistentia." 30. Ibid. Note in particular: "Patet ergo quod hypostasis et substantia differunt ratione, sed sunt idem re." 31. "Essentia vero in substantiis quidem materialibus non est idem cum eis secundum rem, neque penitus diversum, cum se habeat ut pars formalis; in substantiis vero immaterialibus est omnino idem secundum rem, sed differens ratione" (p. 226). For more on the relation between first substance and second substance see De pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 6 (p. 228). 32. In VII Met., lect. 2, nn. 1270-1274. Note his remark about substance taken as the subject: "Patet autem, quod subiectum hie dicitur, quod in Praedicamentis nominatur substantia prima, ex hoc, quod eadem definitio datur de subiecto hic, et ibi de substantia prima" (n. 1273). As Maurer points out, as early in his career as his De ente, Thomas identifies essence, quiddity and quod quid erat esse, and attributes this identification to Aristotle. But for Aristotle the concept of what a thing i~ (ro~ ra(mv) is not completely identical with his understanding of quod quid erat esse (TO Ti 1v elva/). See "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," p. 172. 33. Ibid., n. 1275. This text should be used to interpret Thomas's remark in InX Met., lect. 3, n. 1979, that second substances signify a certain nature in the genus substance. 34. See n. 30 above and the corresponding part of our text. For some texts where Thomas identifies substance as being or existing in itself (per se) see De ver., q. 1, a. 1 (cited above in n. 6); In IV Met., lect. 1, n. 539 (see notes 14 and 15 above); In V Met., lect. 10, n. 903 (see note 20); De pot., q. 9, a. 1, ed. cit., p. 226 ("quasi per se et non in alio existens"). 35. "Quasi Definitio Substantiae," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, A. Maurer, ed. (Toronto, 1974) , Vol. 1, pp.111-29. Gilson has found what appears to be the text in Avicenna which Thomas has in mind. See Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, S. Van Riet, ed., and G. Verbeke. intr., Tract. VIII, ch. 4 (Vol. 2, pp. 403-04). Cf. Gilson, pp. 112-14. Even so, we must admit that "to be notin a subject" is equivalent to "to be in itself," if we are to regard this as the text Thomas envisions. 36. On this see Gilson, pp. 121-25; and Ch. VII, Section 3 of the book on Aquinas's metaphysics I am now completing. 37. Mandonnet ed., Vol. I, p. 221. See argo 2. 38. Ibid., pp. 222-23. Note especially: "Ens enim non est genus. Haec autem negatio 'non in subiecto' nihil ponit; unde hoc quod dico. ens non est in subiecto, non dicit ali quod genus .... " 39. Ibid., p. 223. 40. Ibid., p. 222. Note in particular: "Omne quod est in genere, habet quidditatem differentem ab esse, sicut homo .... In Deo autem esse suum est quidditas sua .... Et ideo Deus (for: Deo) non potest esse in aliquo genere." For more on Thomas's argumentation here and elsewhere that presence in a genus entails distinction of essence and esse see my Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 134-39.

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41. In IV Sent., dist. 12, quo 1, a. 1, ql. 1, ad 2 (Moos ed., Vol. 4, p. 499): "Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut probat Avicenna in sua Meta., per se existere non est definitio substantiae; quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas eius, sed esse eius. Et sua quidditas non est suum esse .... Sed definitio vel quasi definitio substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse vel debetur non in alio." 42. Ed. cit., p. 26. In order to make the point that being (ens) is not a genus, Thomas refers to Aristotle's procedure in Metaphysics Ill, ch. 3 (998b 22). If being were a genus, a difference would have to be identified which would restrict being to its various species. But no difference participates in a genus so as to include the genus in its intelligible content. For then a genus would be twice included in the definition of the species. Hence a difference must be something which is extrinsic to the meaning of the genus. But nothing can fall outside the intelligible content of being, since being is included within the intelligible content of those things of which it is predicated. Therefore being cannot be contracted by any difference and, consequently, is not a genus. For the dating see J. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino. 2d ed. (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp. 359-60. 43. Ibid., p. 27. 44. Ibid. Note especially: "Oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur hoc modo, quod substantia sit res cui conveniat esse non in subiecto; nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse; et sic in ratione substantiae intelligitur quod habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in alio." 45. In this question Thomas is again attempting to show that God is not included in any genus, not even that of substance. See ed. cit., pp. 193-94. Weisheipl dates this in 1265-1266 (Friar Thomas, p. 363), 46. Ed. cit., p. 194. 47. "Sed si substantia possit habere definitionem, non obstante quod est genus generalissimum, erit eius definitio: quod substantia est res cuius quidditati debetur esse non in ali quo" (ibid.). Again Thomas concludes that this "definition" of substance cannot be applied to God. 48. See section 2 above, pp. 6-8, and the text cited in note 31. 49. Moos ed., Vol. 3, p. 196. 50. Ed. cit., pp. 515-16, ad 4: " ... quiain homine aliud est naturaet persona, cum sit ex materia et forma compositus; non autem in angelo, qui immaterialis est." Note that here Thomas is meeting a series of objections against the fittingness of the Incarnation, and in this particular case, by showing that it was more fitting for the nature of man to be assumed by the Word than for an angel to be assumed precisely because of the distinction in man between nature and person. S!. For the first see Quaestiones disputatae, Vol. 2 (Turin-Rome, 1953), p. 195; for the second, M. Calcaterra and T. S. Centi, eds., ibid., p. 390: " ... dicendum quod in compositis ex materia et forma, individuum addit supra naturam speciei designationem materiae et accidentia individualia. Sed in form is abstractis non addit individuum supra naturam speciei aliquid secundum rem, quia in talibus essentia eius est ipsummet individuum subsistens .... " (ital. mine). The term subsislens indicates Thomas is speaking of the suppositum, not merely of an individuated instance of nature. For the third text see In 111 De anima. A. M. Pirotta. ed. (TurinRome, 1959), Leet. 8, n. 706/Leonine ed., Vol. 45.1, p. 209. Note that in this context Thomas speaks of there being no distinction in such beings between res and quod quid est. By this I take him to have in mind the relationship between the subject (res) and its nature or quiddity (quod quid est). For the dates of these two last-mentioned works see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, pp. 364,378 (as corrected). The dating of Thomas's Commentary on the De anima continues to be disputed. For a review see B. Bazan, "Le commentaire de S. Thomas d'Aquin sur Ie Traite de !'time. Un evenement: l'edition critique de la commission leonine:' Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 69 (1985), p. 532. For another text see ST I, quo 3, a. 3 (ed. cit., p. 16).

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52. Quaestiones quodlibetales. ed. by R. Spiazzi (Turin, 1956), p. 25. Note especially: "Suppositum autem est singulare in genere substantiae, quod dicitur hypostasis vel substantia prima .... " For the date see Weisheipl, p. 367. 53. In his Commentary on Metaphysics VII Thomas assigns this position to Averroes and rejects it. See In VII Met., lect. 9, nn. 1467-1468. Against this he accepts the view which he assigns to Avicenna (see n. 1469). according to which the form of the whole-the quiddity of the species-differs from the form of the part as a whole differs from its part; for the quiddity of the species is composed of matter and form. though not of this form and this individual matter. He also assigns this position to Aristotle. For discussion see Maurer, "Form and Essence ... ," pp. 165ff., 169ff. 54. Ed. cit., p. 25. For Aristotle see Metaphysics VII, ch. 6 (1031a 16-1031b 28). To illustrate his point. Thomas notes that a man is nothing other than what it is to be a man (quod quid est hominis), presumably because a man is said to be per se. A white thing is not completely identical with what it is to be white, since it is a substance which has a quality-whiteness. Hence a white thing is an illustration of something which is said to be per accidens. Cf. In VII Met., lect. 5, especially nn. 1377-1379. Thomas does not conclude from this that when quiddity is taken as a part (e.g., humanity) that it is completely identical with the concrete subject (e.g., a man). For some helpful remarks concerning this in Aristotle see A. C. Lloyd, Form and Universal in Aristotle (Liverpool, 1981), pp. 37-38. 55. Ibid. "Secundum hoc ergo, cuicumque potest aliquid accidere quod non sit de ratione suae naturae, in eo differt res et quod quid est, sive suppositum et natura .... suppositum autem non solum habet haec quae ad ration em speciei pertinent, sed etiam alia quae ei accidunt; et ideo suppositum signatur per totum, natura autem. sive quidditas, ut pars formalis." 56. Ibid. Note especially: "In angelo autem non est omnino idem: quia aliquid accidit ei praeter id quod est de ratione suae speciei: quia et ipsum esse angeli est praeter eius essentiam seu naturam; et alia quaedam ei accidunt quae omnino pertinent ad suppositum, non autem ad naturam." 57. Ed. cit., pp. 25-26. Note from the end of his long reply to objection 1: "Sed quia non est suum esse, accidit ei aliquid praeter rationem speciei, scilicet ipsum esse, et alia quaedam quae attribuuntur supposito, et non naturae; propter quod suppositum in eis non est omnino idem cum natura." 58. L. De Guzman Vicente has attempted to do this, and regards the treatment in Quodlibet II as decisive. As for texts where Thomas seems to identify nature and suppositum in created spirits, De Guzman Vicente suggests that if in these texts Thomas speaks of simple substances taken generally, he really has in mind only God. See his "De notione subsistentiae apud sanctum Thomam," Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 71 (1968), pp. 418-19. Unfortunately, this will not resolve the difficulty. Consultation of the above passages in which Thomas identifies nature and suppositum in immaterial beings reveals that by implication in all of them and explicitly in some he has in mind created immaterial entities, not merely God. See notes 49, 50, and 51 above. 59. Person und hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg. Schweiz, 1957), pp.85-89. 60. See p. 88. Note that Schweizer also cites ST III, q. 2, a. 2 (dating from 1272-1273). There Thomas writes that something is found in certain subsisting things which does not pertain to the intelligible content of its species, i.e., accidents and individuating principles, "sicut maxime apparet in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita" (Turin-Rome, 1948), p. 23. In this text Thomas also writes that since in God there is nothing in addition to the divine nature, in him suppositum and nature do not really differ. Might not this be taken as implying that Thomas would again distinguish between nature and su ppositum in angels because of the distinction in them between essence and esse'? See Schweizer, pp. 97-98. While this text does not exclude that interpretation, it does not assert it; it is noncommittal concerning the issue of angels.

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The Metaphysics of Substance

61. For this in Boethius see his De Hebdomadibus. Axiom II: "Oiversum est esse et id quod est.. .. " See his The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. 1. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 40. 62. For soine texts where Thomas makes this contrast see De ente, ch. 4 (Roland Gosselin ed.,pp.35-36/Leonineed., Vol. 43,p.377); In/Sent. ,d.8,q. 5,a.1 (Mandonneted., Vol.l,p227); /n De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2, in Opuscula theologica, ed. by M. Calcaterra (Turin-Rome, 1954), p. 398, n. 32; ST I, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4; SCG II, ch. 52 (where the entire chapter is devoted to proving that in created separate substances there is composition of esse and quod est (or substantia); Quodlibet II, q. 2, a. 1 (ed. cit., p. 24). 63. Ed. cit., p. 372. 64. Ed. cit., p. 192. 65. See Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, B. Decker, ed. (Leiden, 1959), q. 5, a. 1, ad 6 (p. 171); quo 5, art. 4 (p. 194): ..... quae habet subiectum ens in quantum est ens"; and the Prooemium to his Commentary on the Metaphysics (p. 2):
", .. ens commune."