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The Opening of Genesis Part VII.

On the Creation of All Things at the Beginning of Time according to the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) With an Exposition of the Text by St. Thomas Aquinas
by Bart A. Mazzetti

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

1. The Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council. Cf. the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). Canon 1 complete:1
1. Confession of Faith We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immeasurable, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible and ineffable, Father, Son and holy Spirit, three persons but one absolutely simple essence, substance or nature. The Father is from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without beginning or end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal; who by his almighty power at the beginning of time created from nothing both spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is to say angelic and earthly, and then created human beings composed as it were of both spirit and body in common. The devil and other demons were created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing. Man, however, sinned at the prompting of the devil. This holy Trinity, which is undivided according to its common essence but distinct according to the properties of its persons, gave the teaching of salvation to the human race through Moses and the holy prophets and his other servants, according to the most appropriate disposition of the times. Finally the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, who became incarnate by the action of the whole Trinity in common and was conceived from the ever virgin Mary through the cooperation of the holy Spirit, having become true man, composed of a rational soul and human flesh, one person in two natures, showed more clearly the way of life. Although he is immortal and unable to suffer according to his divinity, he was made capable of suffering and dying according to his humanity. Indeed, having suffered and died on the wood of the cross for the salvation of the human race, he descended to the underworld, rose from the dead and ascended into heaven. He descended in the soul, rose in the flesh, and ascended in both. He will come at the end of time to judge the living and the dead, to render to every person according to his works, both to the reprobate and to the elect. All of them will rise with their own bodies, which they now wear, so as to receive according to their deserts, whether these be good or bad; for the latter perpetual punishment with the devil, for the former eternal glory with Christ. There is indeed one universal church of the faithful, outside of which nobody at all is saved, in which Jesus Christ is both priest and sacrifice. His body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine, the bread and wine having been changed in substance, by God's power, into his body and blood, so that in order to achieve this mystery of unity we receive from God what he received from us. Nobody can effect this sacrament except a priest who has been properly ordained according to the church's keys, which Jesus Christ himself gave to the apostles and their successors. But the sacrament of baptism is consecrated in water at the invocation of the undivided Trinity namely Father, Son and holy Spirit and brings salvation to both children and adults when it is correctly carried out by anyone in the form laid down by the church. If someone falls into sin after having received baptism, he or she can always be restored through true penitence. For not only virgins and the continent but also married persons find favour with God by right faith and good actions and deserve to attain to eternal blessedness. (emphasis added)
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Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Vol. 1. Nicaea 1 to Lateran V (2 vols. London, 1990), I, pp. 222 ff.

Text and translation:


Canon 1 1. Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus, aeternus, immensus et incommutabilis, incomprehensi-bilis, omnipotens et ineffabilis, Pater, et Filius et Spiritus sanctus: tres quidem personae, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino; Pater a nullo, Filius autem a Patre solo, ac Spiritus sanctus pariter ab utroque, absque initio, semper ac sine fine; Pater generans, Filius nascens, et Spiritus sanctus procedens; consubstantiales, et coaequales, et coomnipotentes, et coaeterni; unum universorum principium; creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium; qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni; sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit. CANON 12 We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immeasurable, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible and ineffable, Father, Son and holy Spirit, three persons but one absolutely simple essence, substance or nature. The Father is from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without beginning or end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal; who by his almighty power at the beginning of time created from nothing both spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is to say angelic and earthly, and then created human beings composed as it were of both spirit and body in common. The devil and other demons were created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing. Man, however, sinned at the prompting of the devil.

Cf. The First Vatican Council (1870):3 Constitutio dogmatica Dei Filius. de fide Catholica. Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius on the Catholic Faith:
But now, with the bishops of the whole world sitting and judging with Us, gathered together in this oecumenical Synod by Our authority in the Holy Spirit, We, having relied on the word of God, written and handed down, as We have received it, guarded in a holy way and accurately set forth by the Catholic Church, from this chair of Peter, in the sight of all, have determined to profess and to declare the saving teaching of Christ, after contrary errors have been proscribed and condemned by the power transmitted to Us by God Chap. I. of God, Creator of All Things The holy, catholic apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one, true, living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will, and in every perfection; who, although He is one, singular, altogether simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed distinct in reality and essence from the world; most blessed in Himself and from Himself, and ineffably most high above all things which are or can be conceived outside Himself.
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Cf. Norman P. Tanner, op.cit. Cf. Denzinger EN 1599 (http://www.clerus.org/bibliaclerusonline/en/dme.htm [3/17/11]).

This only true God by His goodness and omnipotent power, not to increase his own happiness, and not to add to, but to show forth His perfection by the blessings which He bestows on creatures, with most free choice, immediately from the beginning of time made each creature out of nothing, spiritual and bodily, namely angelic and worldly, and then the human, common as it were, composed of both spirit and body [Lateran Council IV, can. 2 and 5] But God protects and governs by His providence all things which He made, reaching from end to end mightily and ordering all things sweetly [cf. Wisd. 8:1]. For all things are naked and open to His eyes [Heb. 4:13], even those which by the free action of creatures are in the future. The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning (or principal) and end (or goal) of all things can be known, from created things, by the light of natural human reason: for the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made [Rom. 1:20]; nevertheless, it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal to the human race, in another and supernatural way, Himself and the eternal decrees of His will, as the Apostle says: God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the Prophets, last of all, in these days has spoken to us by His Son [Heb. 1:1, can. 1]. (emphasis added)

Compare also the following translation of the text of the Decree: Cf. Concilium Lateranense IV a. 1215 Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, J. Alberigo, J.A. Dossetti, P.P. Joannou, C. Leonardi, P. Prodi, H. Jedin, (1973), pp. 230 271 From H. J. Schroeder, Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils: Text, Translation and Commentary , (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1937). pp. 236-296
We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immense, omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible, and ineffable, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; three Persons indeed but one essence, substance, or nature absolutely simple; the Father (proceeding) from no one, but the Son from the Father only, and the Holy Ghost equally from both, always without beginning and end. The Father begetting, the Son begotten, and the Holy Ghost proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal, the one principle of the universe, Creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal, who from the beginning of time and by His omnipotent power made from nothing4 creatures both spiritual and corporeal, angelic, namely, and mundane, and then human, as it were, common, composed of spirit and body. The devil and the other demons were indeed created by God good by nature but they became bad through themselves; man, however, sinned at the suggestion of the devil. (emphasis added)

Notice that this translation, as with first excerpted above, leaves the word simul untranslated, whereas the intervening version has immediately; a most interesting choice. See further below.

2. The text of the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), with my own translation. Cf. Canon 1 (= Denzinger-Schnmetzer, 800) (tr. B.A.M.):
Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus, unum universorum principium; creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium; qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni; sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. Homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit. We firmly believe, and simply confess, that there is only one true God, one principle of all things; creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; who, by His almighty power, established together5 out of nothing from the beginning of time both orders of creature, the spiritual and the corporeal, the angelic, namely, and the mundane, and then the human, consitituted as it were in common (with both)6 from spirit and body. For the Devil and the other demons were created by God good in nature, but became evil by their own doing. But man sinned at the prompting of the Devil.

3. Commentary by St. Thomas Aquinas. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Primam Decretalem (On the First Decretal)7 (tr. B.A.M.):8
Est autem considerandum, quod Ariani postponebant filium patri, primo quidem quantum ad essentiam, dicentes, quod essentia patris est dignior quam essentia filii: et ad hoc excludendum subdit, consubstantiales, quia scilicet una est essentia patris et filii in nullo differens. Secundo vero quantum ad magnitudinem, non quod in Deo sit magnitudo molis, sed magnitudo virtutis, quae est perfectio bonitatis suae. Dicebant enim patrem esse filio maiorem etiam secundum divinitatem: et ad hoc excludendum subdit, et coaequales. Secundum humanitatem vero dominus dicit Ioan. XIV, 28: pater maior me est. Now it must be considered that the Arians placed the Son after the Father, first with respect to essence, saying that the essence of the Father is of greater dignity than the essence of the Son; and in order to exclude this he adds, consubstantial, since there is one essence of the Son and the Father differing in no way whatsoever. But second, with respect to greatness, not that in God there is greatness of bulk, but rather greatness of virtue, which is the perfection of His goodness. For they used to say that the Father is greater than the Son also with respect to divinity: and so to exclude this he adds, and co-equal. But with respect to humanity, the Lord says in John (14:28): The Father is greater than me.

For the the justification of my translation, see further below. With both, that is to say, of the foregoing natures. Compare the translation found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 337 (= Neuner-Dupuis): and then ( deinde) the human creature, who as it were shares in both orders, being composed of spirit and body. Hence the creature man, as possessing the nature called human, is understood to be in part angelic and in part mundane. See further below. 7 Excerpted from super primam et secundam decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum, in Opera Omnia, Tomus XL (Rome: Sancta Sabina, 1969), pp. E1-E50. 8 Note that I have begun with the last section of the preceding part of the Angelic Doctors exposition, since the final point he makes, regarding the lemma one principle of all things, is integral to the portion of the Decree with which we are concerned.
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Tertio quantum ad potestatem, dicentes filium non esse omnipotentem: et ad hoc excludendum subditur, et coomnipotentes.

Third, with respect to power, saying the Son is not almighty: and to exclude this it is added, coomnipotent.

Quarto quantum ad durationem, quia dicebant Fourth, with respect to duration, since they used filium non semper fuisse: et ad hoc excluden- to say the Son did not always exist: and to exdum subdit, coaeterni. clude this he adds, co-eternal. Quinto quantum ad operationem. Dicebant enim quod pater operatur per filium sicut per instrumentum suum, vel sicut per ministrum: et ad hoc excludendum subdit, unum universorum principium. Non enim filius est aliud principium rerum, quasi inferius quam pater, sed ambo sunt unum principium. Et quod dictum est de filio, intelligendum est de spiritu sancto. Fifth, with respect to operation. For they used to say that the Father worked through the Son as through an instrument, or through a minister: and in order to exclude this he adds: one principle of all things. For the Son is not another principle of things, as though He were inferior to the Father, but both are one principle. And what is said of the Son here should be understood of the Holy Spirit as well.

Deinde accedit ad alium articulum, qui est de Then he comes to the next article, which concreatione rerum, ubi varias opiniones exclu- cerns the creation of things, wherein he exdit. cludes various opinions. Fuerunt enim aliqui haeretici, sicut Manichaei, qui posuerunt duos creatores: unum bonum, qui creavit creaturas invisibiles et spirituales, alium malum, quem dicunt creasse omnia haec visibilia et corporalia. Fides autem Catholica confitetur omnia, praeter Deum, tam visibilia quam invisibilia, a Deo esse creata; unde Paulus dicit Act. XVII, 24: Deus qui fecit mundum et omnia quae in eo sunt, hic caeli et terrae cum sit dominus, etc., et Hebr. XI, 3: fide credimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Unde ad hunc errorem excludendum dicit: creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium. Aliorum error fuit ponentium Deum quidem esse primum principium productionis rerum, sed tamen non immediate omnia creasse, sed mediantibus Angelis mundum hunc esse creatum: et hic fuit error Menandrianorum. Et ad hunc errorem excludendum subdit: qui sua omnipotenti virtute; quia scilicet sola Dei virtute omnes creaturae sunt productae, secundum illud Psal. VIII, 4 (3): videbo caelos tuos opera digitorum tuorum. For there were some heretics, like the Manicheans, who posited two creators, one good, who created invisible and spiritual creatures, the other evil, who they say created all things visible and corporeal. But the Catholic Faith confesses that all things apart from God, both visible and invisible, were created by God; and so Paul says in Acts (17:24): God, who made the world, and all things therein; he, being Lord of heaven and earth, etc., and Heb. (11:3): By faith we understand that the worlds were prepared by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things which are visible . And so to exclude this error he says: Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal. There was another error of those holding God to be the first principle of the production of things, but nevertheless not to have created all things immediately, but held this world to be created through the mediation of angels: and this is the error of the Menandrites. And in order to exclude this mistake he adds: who by His almighty power; the reason being that every creature has been produced by God according to the Psalm (8:3): For I will behold thy heavens, the works of thy fingers.9

Likewise, all things were created through the Person of the Son:

Alius fuit error Origenis ponentis quod Deus a principio creavit solas spirituales creaturas, et postea quibusdam earum peccantibus, creavit corpora, quibus quasi quibusdam vinculis spirituales substantiae alligarentur, ac si corporales creaturae non fuerint ex principali Dei intentione productae, quia bonum erat eas esse, sed solum ad punienda peccata spiritualium creaturarum, cum tamen dicatur Gen. I, 31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Unde ad hoc excludendum dicit quod simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam.

There was another error of Origen, maintaining that God from the beginning created only spiritual creatures, and afterwards when some of them had sinned, created bodies by which these spiritual substances were bound, so to speak, by certain chains, as though corporeal creatures were not produced from the principle intention of God, because it was good for them to be, but only in order to punish the sins of spiritual creatures, whereas it is said in Genesis (1:31): God saw all things which he made, and they were very good. And so in order to exclude this he says that He established together both creatures,10 the spiritual, namely, and the corporeal, the angelic, to wit, and the mundane. There was another error of Aristotle, maintaining that all things were created by God but from eternity, and that there was no beginning of time, whereas it is written in Genesis (1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth .11 And in order to exclude this he adds, from the beginning of time. There was another error of Anaxagoras, who held the world to have been made by God from some beginning in time, but the matter of the world to have pre-existed from all eternity, and not to have been made by God, whereas the Apostle says in Romans (4:17): who calleth those things that are not, as those that are . And in order to exclude this he adds, out of nothing. There was another error of Tertullian, maintaining the soul of man to be corporeal, whereas the Apostle says in I Thess. (5:23): that your whole spirit, and soul, and body, may be preserved blameless in the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, where he manifestly distinguishes the soul and spirit from the body. And in order to exclude this he adds: then, meaning God established, the human, meaning nature, constituted as it were in common (with both), from spirit and body; for man is composed from a spiritual as well as a corporeal nature.

Alius error fuit Aristotelis ponentis quidem omnia a Deo esse producta, sed ab aeterno, et nullum fuisse principium temporis, cum tamen scriptum sit Gen. I, 1: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Et ad hoc excludendum addit, ab initio temporis. Alius error fuit Anaxagorae, qui posuit quidem mundum a Deo factum ex aliquo principio temporis, sed tamen materiam mundi ab aeterno praeextitisse, et non esse eam factam a Deo, cum tamen apostolus dicat Rom. IV, 17: qui vocat ea quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt. Et ad hoc excludendum addit, de nihilo. Fuit autem alius error Tertulliani ponentis animam hominis corpoream esse, cum tamen apostolus dicat I ad Thess. V, 23: integer spiritus vester et anima et corpus sine querela in adventu domini nostri Iesu Christi servetur ; ubi manifeste a corpore animam et spiritum distinguit. Et ad hoc excludendum subdit: deinde, scilicet condidit Deus, humanam, scilicet naturam, quasi communem, ex spiritu et corpore constitutam; componitur enim homo ex spirituali natura et corporali.

For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him. (Col. 1:16)
10

Cp. Sir. 1: 18: Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul, He who lives forever created all things together [or in common; LXX koine]. On the interpretation of simul here, see further below. 11 As if to say, the world did not always exist, but had, rather, a beginning, namely, in time.

Secundum autem praedictum Manichaeorum errorem ponentium duo principia, unum bonum et unum malum, non solum attendebatur distinctio quantum ad creationem visibilium et invisibilium creaturarum, ut scilicet invisibilia sint a bono Deo, visibilia vero a malo, sed etiam quantum ad ipsa invisibilia. Ponebant enim primum principium esse invisibile, et ab eo quasdam invisibiles creaturas esse productas, quas dicebant esse naturaliter malas: et sic in ipsis Angelis erant quidam naturaliter boni ad bonam creationem boni Dei pertinentes, qui peccare non poterant; et quidam naturaliter mali, quos Daemones vocamus, qui non poterant non peccare, contra id quod dicitur Iob IV, 18: ecce qui serviunt ei, non sunt stabiles, et in Angelis suis reperit pravitatem. Similiter etiam circa animas hominum errabant, dicentes, quasdam esse bonae creationis, quae naturaliter bonum faciunt, quasdam autem malae creationis, quae naturaliter faciunt malum, contra id quod dicitur Eccle. VII, 30 (29): Deus fecit hominem rectum, et ipse immiscuit se infinitis quaestionibus. Et ideo ad haec excludenda, dicit: Diabolus autem, scilicet principalis, et alii Daemones quidem a Deo natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali , scilicet per liberum voluntatis arbitrium: homo vero Diaboli suggestione peccavit , idest, non naturaliter, sed propria voluntate.

Now with regard to the aforementioned error of the Manicheans, holding there to be two principles, one good and one evil, not only was a distinction observed with regard to the creation of visible and invisible creatures, such that the invisible were from the good God, but the visible from bad, but even with regard to the invisible things themselves. For they held the first principle to be invisible, and from it certain invisible creatures were produced, which they used to call evil by nature: and so among the angels themselves, some were naturally good (as pertaining to the good creation of the good God), who could not sin; and others naturally evil, whom we call demons, who could not but sin, contrary to what is said in Job (4:18): Behold those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness. They likewise also went astray where the souls of men were concerned, saying that some were of the good creation, which they make naturally good, but some of the evil creation, which they make naturally evil, contrary to what is said in Ecclesiasticus (7:29): Only this I have found, that God made man right, and he hath entangled himself with an infinity of questions . And so in order to exclude this, he says: But the Devil, meaning (their head and) principal, and the other demons were created by God good in nature, but became evil by their own doing , meaning by their own free will: But man sinned at the prompting of the Devil , that is, not naturally, but by his own will.

Notice that St. Thomas takes the word simul with the verb condidit rather than as modifying the phrase ab initio temporis, leading some commentators (for whom, see the texts following) to question whether he understood the Decree to be asserting the simultaneous creation of the spiritual and corporeal creatures, a matter I discuss at length below. I have followed the Angelic Doctor in this point.

4. Excursus on St. Thomas commentary by William A. Wallace, O.P. Cf. William A. Wallace, Aquinas on Creation: Science, Theology, and Matters of Fact,
The Thomist, 38 (1974), 485-523 (excerpt), pp. 511-522: Why Aquinas chose not to make explicit use of the Fourth Lateran in the texts cited [in the foregoing discussion of the question of the eternity of the world] is a problem in its own right that is best left to historians of medieval theological methodology. In any event, the decrees of the Fourth Lateran were not unknown to him, and in fact were probably the single most important factor shaping his foregoing interpretations of Church teaching on creation. Evidence in support of this thesis may be marshalled from a brief analysis of a work recently issued in critical edition by the Leonine Commission, namely, St. Thomass Commentary on the First Decretal of Gregory IX.45 This decretal contains the decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran, itself directed against the heretical teachings of the Albigensians and the Cathari. Aquinas composed the commentary probably at the instigation of Giffredus of Anagni, who was socius of the provost of Saint-Omer, Adenulf of Anagni, at whose request, in turn, Reginald of Piperno published St. Thomass lectures on St. Johns Gospel. Giffredus was archdeacon of Todi from 1260 onwards; as Adenulfs socius he was probably present with him in the curia of Urban IV, then residing at Orvieto. It is known that from 1261 to 1265 Aquinas, being on particularly friendly terms with Urban, was in residence at the curia during academic terms, and it is probable that Giffredus attended his lectures while there.46 The time of composition is not certain,
45

Expositio super primam et secundam decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum, in Opera Omnia, Tomus XL (Rome: Sancta Sabina, 1969), pp. E1-E50. 46 For details on Giffredus, see A. Dondaine and J. Peters, Jacques de Tonengo et Giffredus dAnagni auditeurs de S. Thomas, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 29 (1959), pp. 52-72. page 511 although it seems that Aquinas wrote the commentary for Giffredus when he returned to Rome to set up the Studium at Santa Sabina from 1265 to 1267, at which time he also began his masterwork, the Summa Theologiae. Two decrees are commented on by Aquinas, the first Firmiter as already noted, and the second Damnamus, which refutes and condemns the libellus of Joachim of Flora directed against the Trinitarian doctrine of Peter Lombard. Aquinas treats the two quite differently, glossing over the second in summary fashion but analyzing the first precisely and completely, explaining it lemma by lemma with great care, and using all of the resources of the theologian in so doing. It is difficult to know what historical documents were available to him for this purpose, for these are not clearly indicated in the commentary, but some reconstruction will be attempted in what follows. The Leonine editors cite only the commentary of Henry of Susa (Hostiensis) on the first decretal, to which portions of Aquinass exposition bear some resemblance and which they feel he may have used in preparing it. 47 The portion of the text of Firmiter that bears on the problem of creation in time is the following: Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus . . . , unum universorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium: qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam; ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. . . . 48

47

Opera Omnia, Tome XL, p. E6. See Henricus de Segusio, In primum decretalium librum commentaria (Venice: Apud luntas, 1581). A summary description of this work is given by Pierre Michaud-Quantin, Commentaires sur les deux premires dcrtales du recueil de Grgoire IX au treizime sicle, Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ed. Paul Wilpert. Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1963), pp. 103-109. 48 Denzinger-Schnmetzer (hereafter abbreviated DS), 800. page 512 Each of the phrases or lemmas after the ellipsis, beginning with unum universorum principium, is the subject of comment by Aquinas and worthy of note for the conciliar hermeneutics it embodies. Before translating these portions, however, it may be mentioned that Henry of Susa is extremely brief when commenting on the above passage. At the phrase, unum universorum principium, he merely notes that this is directed against the Marchionistae, who hold for two principles, one good and one evil. From this he jumps to the phrase, simul ab initio, where he writes, somewhat cryptically, that the Church which will endure to eternity, created all things simul, wherefore in the beginning God created heaven and earth. He then goes on to note that Gods creation cannot be said to be simul and summarily explains the creation of angels and men: but he first created angels, and on the sixth day created men, quasi communem, i.e., as an intermediate between the angelic and the earthly. . . ,49 As opposed to this brief exposition, Aquinass commentary is lengthy and proceeds articulatim, reading as follows for the successive lemmas indicated in italics: unum universorum principium The Son is not another principle of things as if he were inferior to the Father, but both are one principle. And what is said here of the Son is to be understood of the Holy Spirit also.50 Instead of taking this phrase as part of the exposition relating to God the Creator, as Henry had done, Aquinas annexes it to the preceding portion of the decree treating of Trinitarian doctrine and sees it as directed against an Arian teaching to the
49

Ed. cit., fol. 5v. The text reads as follows: [Universorum.] Contra Marchionistas, qui asserunt duo principia bonum et malum . . . [Simul ab initio] Inde ecclesia, qui manet in aeternum, creavit omnia simul, unde in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, [simul] et tamen simul dici non potest. [Humanam] Sed primo creavit angelos et sexto die creavit homines. [Quasi communem], i.e., mediam inter angelicam et mundanam. . . . 12 50 E34.389-393. In this method of citation the figures before the period give the page number and those following it the line numbers in the Leonine edition. page 513 effect that God operates through the Son as his instrument or minister. The passage is not otherwise noteworthy, merely showing that Aquinas does not follow Henry on the interpretation of this lemma, if indeed he used him as the basis for his commentary. creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium
12

To this gloss, cp. St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, translated by Mary C. Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee, 1949), art. 2, replies to the contrary iii: iii Furthermore, what is intermediate must have something in common with both of the extremes. But there cannot be anything which is partly corporeal and partly spiritual . Therefore, there cannot be any medium between soul and body. (emphasis added) Likewise human nature cannot be such a mean.

10

Some heretics like the Manicheans posited two creators, one good who created invisible and spiritual creatures, the other evil who they say created all visible and corporeal things. But the Catholic faith holds that everything apart from God, both visible and invisible, has been created by God. Whence Paul says in Acts 17:24, God, who made the world and all things therein, he being Lord of heaven and earth, etc. and Hebrews 11:3, By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God, that from invisible things visible things might be made.51 The reference here to two creators occurs also in two of Aquinass other writings. 52 Of more interest is the identification of the Manicheans, which might be taken to mean the ancient sect but more probably refers to the Neo-Manicheans against whom the decree was directed. It is difficult to document the teachings of the latter in detail, since most of their manuscripts were destroyed by the Inquisition. The essential elements, however, are recorded in an anonymous Liber de duobus principiis written around the middle of the thirteenth century, which incorporates a section De creatione. 53 One of the adversaries of the sect was the Dominican master, Moneta of Cremona, who composed a lengthy Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque at about the same time. The first chapter of Bk. 1 of this treatise is devoted to a detailed
51 52

E34.396-407. In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, and De potentia, q. 3, a. 6. [cf. also De Articulis Fidei et Ecclesiae Sacramentis, pars 1. (B.A.M.)] 53 A. Dondaine, ed., Un Trait no-manichen du xiiie sicle, le Liber de duobus principiis . . . (Rome: Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1939), pp. 99-109. page 514 exposition and refutation of their teaching on the two principles. 54 Both works accord with the brief description given above by Aquinas. qui sua omnipotenti virtute Another error was that of those holding that God is indeed the first principle of the production of things, but that he did not create this world directly but through the intermediary of angels. This was the error of the Menandrites, and to exclude this it adds qui sua omnipotenti virtute, because, namely, it is only by the power of God that all creatures have been produced, according to the Psalmist 8:4, I shall see the heavens, the works of your hands ...55 The reference to the Menandrites Aquinas might have gleaned from the exposition of the Decretals ascribed to Isidore; they are also discussed by Isidore in the Etymologia and by Augustine in De haeresis.56 simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem, et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam Another error was that of Origen, holding that God at the beginning created only spiritual creatures, and afterwards because certain of them had sinned he created bodies to which he would bind their spiritual substances by some
54

Moneta Cremonensis, Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque, ed. Thomas A. Ricchini, O. P. (Rome: Typographia Palladis, 1743), pp. 1-35. This edition contains an account of the life and writings of Moneta, as well as histories of the Cathari and Waldenses.

11

Moneta is best known to Dominicans as the friar in whose cell at Bologna their founder St. Dominic died in 1221. Already a master of arts at the University of Bologna, Moneta became a Dominican in 1220 at the urging of Dominic and Reginald of Orleans. Dominic, of course, had preached against the Albigensians, Cathari, and Waldenses in Languedoc until 1217; then, in 1220 and 1221, enlisting the help of Moneta and others, he launched a similar mission in northern Italy. He had solicited Innocent III in 1215, precisely at the time of the Fourth Lateran Council, for confirmation of his new Order of Preachers, for which approval had been given the following year, on December 22, 1216. 55 E34.410-418. 56 See the references given by the Leonine editors at line 414. page 515 kind of bond, as if corporeal creatures were not produced by Gods principal intention because it was good for them to be, but only to punish the sins of spiritual creatures. For it is said in Genesis, 1:31, God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. 57 This passage is extremely important for Aquinass exegesis of the decree because of the way in which he divides the text. Instead of commenting on the entire lemma, simul ab initio temporis utramque condidit creaturam, he deletes the phrase ab initio temporis so that the simul need not take on a strict temporal sense but instead is made to modify the verb condidit. Possibly Aquinas here had his eye on the Greek text of the Septuagint, which translates the simul of Ecclesiastes 18:1, Creavit omnia simul, with the word koin, thereby permitting a translation such as, He created all things equally. This procedure allows Aquinas to avoid some of the difficulties regarding the teachings of the Fathers on the simultaneous creation of the spiritual and corporeal orders, on which there was far from unanimous teaching. 58 The exegesis given above, of course, still permits a temporal interpretation but does not highlight this as strongly as the text on which Aquinas is commenting with its immediate juxtaposition of simul and ab initio temporis. ab initio temporis Another error was that of Aristotle, holding that all things were indeed produced by God but from eternity, and that there was no beginning of time. But it is written in Genesis 1:1, In the beginning God created heaven and earth. 59 Here we are back to the key text and the Biblical support used so frequently by Aquinas. What is most noteworthy is the explicit
57 58

E34.419-E35.428. For some details, see my introduction, notes, and appendices to Vol. 10, Cosmogony, of the new English translation of St. Thomass Summa Theologiae (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967). 59 E35.432-436, page 516 identification of Aristotle as the adversary behind the decree. Over a century earlier Peter Lombard had called attention to this error in distinction 1 of the second book of his Sentences, and already in his commentary on this work Aquinas had identified the opinion as heretical.60 The question that naturally suggests itself is whether Aristotles teachings were being actively proposed by the Albigensians and the Cathari, and thus should be considered the object of ecclesiastical condemnation. Dondaines study of the Liber de duobus principiis provides some evidence of Aristotelian influence in Neo-Manichean doctrines, 61

12

but these are scant compared to Moneta of Cremonas Adversus Cartharos et Valdenses. In chapter 11 of book 5, entitled De novitate mundi et de rationibus quibus philosophi probant mundum esse aeternum and running to 34 folio pages in the edition of 1743, Moneta reveals the extent to which his adversaries were indebted to Aristotle and his various Arab commentators.62 Thus it is not unlikely that this teaching had been taken up by those against whom the decree was directed and hence was the object of its censure. de nihilo Another error was that of Anaxagoras who held that God made the world from some beginning in time, but that the matter of the world preexisted eternally and was not made by God. But the Apostle, [speaking of God,] states in Romans 4:17, Who calls those things that are not, just as those that are.63 The reference to Anaxagoras here is similar to that to Aristotle in the previous comment and is supported by other identifications in Aquinass works, where he traces the teaching on the eternity of matter back to this Greek philosopher. 64 Again there
60 61

In II Sent, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5. Ed. cit., pp. 18, 50, 141. 62 Ed. cit., pp. 477-501. 63 E35.437-443. 64 In II Sent., d. 1, q. I, a. 1; In VIII Physicorum, lect. 1, n. 5. page 517 seems little doubt that this was an Albigensian or Neo-Manichean teaching, for the Liber de duobus principiis teaches that creation does not take place ex nihilo, but rather consists in a type of making (factio) from something as from a pre-existing matter. 65 Moneta touches on much the same material without addressing the speculative issue explicitly but concentrating on arguments to show that God actually did create the visible, corporeal, and material things of this world.66 deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam There was another error of Tertullian teaching that the soul of man is corporeal, but the Apostle says in 1 Thessalonians 5:23, Let your whole spirit and mind and body serve, and here he manifestly distinguishes soul and spirit from the body. To exclude this [error] the decree adds, then God created a nature that was human, as constituted of both spirit and body: for man is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. 67 Aquinass source for Tertullians teaching is probably Isidores Etymologia and the comments attributed to him on the Decretals.68 As Moneta shows in detail, the heretics of his time had developed an elaborate doctrine proposing a traducianist explanation of the origin of the human soul along lines similar to that taught by Tertullian. 69 Thus Aquinas is probably correct in also seeing this ancient error, revived in the century previous to his writing, as a target of the decree. diabolus autem et alii daemones quidem a Deo natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali According to the aforementioned error of the Manicheans

13

65

Ed. cit., p. 103; the title of the relevant section reads: Quod creare et facere sit ex aliquo tanquam ex preiacenti materia. 66 Ed. cit., Bk. 1, cc. 6, 8 & 9, pp. 69-104. 67 E35.444-453. 68 See the references given by the Leonine editors at line 444. 69 Ed. cit., Bk. 2, ch. 4, pp. 129-138. page 518 holding for two principles, one good and one bad, not only was a distinction made with respect to the creation of visible and invisible creatures, namely, that the invisible were from the good God, the visible from the bad, but also with respect to invisible things themselves. For they taught that the first principle was invisible and that certain invisible creatures were produced by it which they said were naturally bad; and so among angels there were certain who were naturally good pertaining to the good creation of the good God, who could not sin, and certain others who were naturally badwhom we call demons who could not not sin. This is contrary to what is said in Job 4:18, Behold those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness. 70 With this Aquinas rejoins the Neo-Manichean doctrine with which he started this portion of the commentary. The teaching on the angels, of course, was a major issue with the Albigensians, and a considerable portion of the Liber de duobus principiis is devoted to this type of teaching.71 Similarly, this is a substantial matter for Moneta, who devotes chapters 4 through 7 of his first book to a refutation of the errors it contains. 72 The foregoing analysis, while far from complete, should serve to indicate Aquinass general competence as a conciliar exegete and to fill in some of the authoritative sources on which he probably relied, but which he does not mention, in his various systematic treatments of creation in time. In presenting the text translated and annotated above the Leonine editors remark that the literary genre of the work is that of a summary exposition intended for private use and not a technical work intended for publication. 73 Even in spite of this circumstance, however, it is still possible to reconstruct some of the apparatus known in a general way to Aquinas and hence providing the documentary
70 71

E35.454-470. Ed. cit., pp. 82-98. 72 Ed. cit., pp. 44-80. 73 p. E6. page 519 background for his commentary. When all this is taken into account it appears that, with one or two exceptions, his statement of the Catholic faith is quite consonant with the positive teaching and the censures of the Fourth Lateran Council. 74 Before returning to recent theologies of creation and their relation to problems raised by modern science, it may prove worthwhile to pursue briefly the question whether Aquinas had a true sensus ecclesiae and whether his reading of the Fourth Lateran still accords with Church teaching as developed since his time. The principal addition to that teaching came in the second half of the nineteenth century, when atheistic, materialistic, and pantheistic teachings were being propagated throughout Europe. The First Vatican Council, in its constitution Dei Filius, at that time reasserted the doctrine on creation defined by the Fourth Lateran.75 The major part of the decree bearing on this subject is actually a verbatim repetition of the text from the Fourth Lateran beginning with the words simul ab initio temporis and concluding with ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. The Vatican decree did, however, amplify the doctrine somewhat, for it added that the world was created by

14

God alone (hic solus verus Deus), thereby excluding angels or devils acting as Gods instruments in the creative act, and that God in so creating acted of his own free will (liberrimo consilio).76 It also appended five canons condemning specific departures from the Catholic faith, including materialism, which would assert that nothing exists apart from matter77; pantheism, which would identify the substance or essence of all things with God, 78 or would hold that such things emanated from the
74

The exceptions would be the assertions regarding motion, which are made in the context of Aristotelian physics and thus are quite remote from the matters taught by the Fourth Lateran. 75 DS 3002. 76 Ibid.; note that these additions incorporate the teachings of St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 5 and q. 46, a. 2, into the statement of the Fourth Lateran. 77 DS 3022. 78 DS 3023. page 520 divine substance or are its manifestation in an evolutionary process, etc. 79; or some combination of the two that would deny that the world and all it contains, in both the spiritual and material orders, was produced by God from nothing according to its entire substance. 80 The final canon further condemned the teachings of Georg Hermes and Anton Gnther, asserting explicitly that creation was not necessitated in any way but was a completely voluntary act of God ordered to the manifestation of his own glory. 81 An interesting question arises as to whether, in reasserting the simul ab initio temporis phrase of the Fourth Lateran, the Fathers of the First Vatican Council intended to make any further precisions in this teaching. Among the documents of the Council is a disputation by the future cardinal, J. B. Franzelin, S.J., delivered before twenty-four deputed conciliar fathers and bearing on the schema from which the definition was finally made. 82 There were four different versions of the constitution Dei Filius, but each contained this very same expression.83 Franzelin pointed out to the conciliar fathers that it was not completely certain that the word simul in the Lateran decree was meant to define the temporal simultaneity of the creation of the material and angelic orders. In substantiation of this he called attention to Aquinass commentary on the Decretals and the way in which his exegesis of the text permitted a reading of simul in the sense of the Greek koin to mean that all creation proceeded equally from a single divine plan. Arguing from this and similar documents, most theologians
79 80

DS 3024. DS 3025; the Latin text reads secundum totam suam substantiam, which echoes Aquinass teaching in the Commentary on the Physics, Bk. 8, lect. 2, cited supra, p. 81 Ibid., cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 44, a. 4. 82 Document 554; see J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 53 vols. in 60 (Paris: 1889-1927), Vol. 50, p. 337, n. 6. 83 These are given in an appendix to Jean-Michel-Alfred Vacant, tudes thologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican daprs les actes du concile, 2 Vols. (Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1895), Vol. 1, pp. 686-687; see also pp. 690-693. page 521 hold that Vatican I did not intend to go beyond the Fourth Lateran in making more precise the time at which angels and the material universe were created. They did intend to affirm, however, that such creation took place broadly at the beginning of time and that man was not created until some later period .84 From this it should be apparent that Aquinass exegesis of the decree Firmiter is not only consonant with the

15

constitution Dei Filius but was possibly influential in the way in which the latter was formulated and hence can throw light on how it is to be understood. Moreover, that the teaching of the Catholic Church on creation in time has not changed since Vatican I is clear from the encyclical letter Humani Generis, which lists the denial of the worlds having had a beginning (mundum initium habuisse) among theses contradictory to the decrees of the First Vatican Council.85 Finally, in the preparatory schema for a dogmatic constitution of Vatican II to be entitled De deposito fidei pure custodiendo, it was proposed to devote chapter 8 to the creation and evolution of the world and therein to assert again and explain more fully the worlds creation at the beginning of time. 86 Because of the decision to concentrate on pastoral rather than dogmatic matters, however, this schema was never adopted and thus did not become part of the Second Vaticans decrees. <>
84

E. g., Vacant, op. cit., pp. 221-227; see also the article on the angels by the same author in the Dictionnaire de thologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant et al., 15 vols. (Paris: 1903-1950), Vol. 2, cols. 1267-1272. 85 DS 3890. 86 Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus. Series prima, cap. 3, n. 12. Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum Secundum (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis, 1962), p. 33. (emphasis added)

16

5. Comments on the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) taken from the exposition of St. Thomas Aquinas.13 Cf. William A. Wallace, Aquinas on Creation: Science, Theology, and Matters of Fact,
The Thomist, 38 (1974), 485-523; excerpted from pp. 513-519: Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus . . . , unum universorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium: qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam; ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali. . . . 48
48

Denzinger-Schnmetzer (hereafter abbreviated DS), 800.

unum universorum principium The Son is not another principle of things as if he were inferior to the Father, but both are one principle. And what is said here of the Son is to be understood of the Holy Spirit also.50
50

E34.389-393. In this method of citation the figures before the period give the page number and those following it the line numbers in the Leonine edition. creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium Some heretics like the Manicheans posited two creators, one good who created invisible and spiritual creatures, the other evil who they say created all visible and corporeal things. But the Catholic faith holds that everything apart from God, both visible and invisible, has been created by God. Whence Paul says in Acts 17:24, God, who made the world and all things therein, he being Lord of heaven and earth, etc. and Hebrews 11:3, By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God, that from invisible things visible things might be made.51
51

E34.396-407.

qui sua omnipotenti virtute Another error was that of those holding that God is indeed the first principle of the production of things, but that he did not create this world directly but through the intermediary of angels. This was the error of the Menandrites, and to exclude this it adds qui sua omnipotenti virtute, {who by His almighty power} because, namely, it is only by the power of God that all creatures have been produced, according to the Psalmist 8:4, I shall see the heavens, the works of your hands ...55
55

E34.410-418.

simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem, et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam

13

Cf. Expositio super primam decretalem De fide catholica et sancta Trinitate et super secundam Damnamus autem, 1259-1268, Leonine 40E, 1969.

17

Another error was that of Origen, holding that God at the beginning 14 created only spiritual creatures, and afterwards because certain of them had sinned he created bodies to which he would bind their spiritual substances by some kind of bond, as if corporeal creatures were not produced by Gods principal intention because it was good for them to be, but only to punish the sins of spiritual creatures. For it is said in Genesis, 1:31, God saw all that he had made, and it was very good.57 ab initio temporis Another error was that of Aristotle, holding that all things were indeed produced by God but from eternity, and that there was no beginning of time. But it is written in Genesis 1:1, In the beginning God created heaven and earth. 59
59

E35.432-436.

de nihilo Another error was that of Anaxagoras who held that God made the world from some beginning in time, but that the matter of the world preexisted eternally and was not made by God. But the Apostle, [speaking of God,] states in Romans 4:17, Who calls those things that are not, just as those that are.63
63

E35.437-443.

deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam There was another error of Tertullian teaching that the soul of man is corporeal, but the Apostle says in 1 Thessalonians 5:23, Let your whole spirit and mind and body serve, and here he manifestly distinguishes soul and spirit from the body. To exclude this [error] the decree adds, then God created a nature that was human, as constituted of both spirit and body: for man is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. 67
67

E35.444-453.

diabolus autem et alii daemones quidem a Deo natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali According to the aforementioned error of the Manicheans holding for two principles, one good and one bad, not only was a distinction made with respect to the creation of visible and invisible creatures, namely, that the invisible were from the good God, the visible from the bad, but also with respect to invisible things themselves. For they taught that the first principle was invisible and that certain invisible creatures were produced by it which they said were naturally bad; and so among angels there were certain who were naturally good pertaining to the good creation of the good God, who could not sin, and certain others who were naturally badwhom we call demonswho could not not sin. This is contrary to what is said in Job 4:18, Behold those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness. 70
70

E35.454-470.

14

a principio, literally, from the beginning, sc. of time, as the next lemma indicates, and so which is noncommittal with respect to the simultaneity or otherwise of the creation of the two orders.

18

6. On the three orders of creature God created in the beginning. Cf. the Decree Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) (= Canon 1; DenzingerSchnmetzer, 800) (tr. B.A.M.):
Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus, unum universorum principium; creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium; qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul15 ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. We firmly believe, and simply confess, that there is only one true God, one principle of all things; creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; who, by His almighty power, established together out of nothing from the beginning of time both orders of creature, the spiritual and the corporeal, the angelic, namely, and the mundane, and then the human, consitituted as it were in common (with both)16 from spirit and body.

7. Anatomy of the argument. By His almighty power the one true God from the beginning of time established together out of nothing 1. the spiritual (order of) creature, and 2. the corporeal that is (a) the angelic and (b) the mundane (both being sorts of nature, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains in his commentary) and then 3. the human, constituted, as it were in common (with both [of the foregoing natures]), from spirit and body.17 And so, in addition to the angelic and mundane natures, there is (c) a nature in part angelic and in part mundane.
15 16

I address the meaning of simul below. Sc. of the foregoing natures. As noted above, I take the common here to regard both the angelic and the mundane natures. 17 The as it were indicating that the nature called human is not constituted from an angel and a body as its composing parts, but rather shares in the natures of the spiritual and corporeal orders of creature.

19

In sum, it is the teaching of the Decree that from the beginning of time God established together out of nothing 1. the spiritual creature, understood as possessing the nature called angelic, and 2. the corporeal, the nature of which is mundane or this worldly, and then 3. the creature in part spiritual and in part corporealthat is say, the order of creature having something in common with the angelic or other-worldly nature, as well as the mundane or this-worldly, which is the creature man. In this regard, compare the following: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 50, Proem (excerpt) (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Post haec considerandum est de distinctione corporalis et spiritualis creaturae. Et primo, de creatura pure spirituali, quae in Scriptura sacra Angelus nominatur; secundo, de creatura pure corporali; tertio, de creatura composita ex corporali et spirituali, quae est homo. Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

That is to say, after the foregoing matters have been treated, the distinction between the corporeal and the spiritual creature is to be considered. And first, (a consideration is to be made) about the purely spiritual creature, angel; second, about the purely corporeal creature (left unnamed here, but which is properly called body), and third, about the creature composed of the corporeal and the spiritual (which is to say, having a composite nature), which is man. Cf. ibid., Ia, q. 75, Proem (excerpt) (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur. Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance.

That is to say, after the consideration of the spiritual and the corporeal creature, the next subject to be considered is man, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance. The three orders of creature in sum, then, are the spiritual ( angel), the corporeal (body), and the thing composed, in a manner of speaking, of both (man). Their three natures in sum: the angelic, the mundane, the human. Their order of creation: the spiritual and the corporeal established together at the beginning of time, and then the creature partaking of both orders, and hence, so to speak, common. 20

8. Texts where simul is translated. Cf. F.J. Sheed, Theology and Sanity (New York, 1947; 5th impression 1951), Ch. XI, The Created Universe:
The Church has amplified this. The Fourth Council of the Lateran defined that God by His almighty power created [out of nothing] together18 in the beginning of time both creatures, the Spiritual and the Corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly, and afterwards [deinde] the human, as it were a common creature, composed of spirit and body.

Cf. J.F. Clarkson et al. eds., The Church Teaches (St. Louis: Herder, 1955), p. 146:
who, by his almighty power, from the very beginning of time simultaneously created out of nothing both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, that is, the angelic and the mundane. And afterwards he formed the creature man, who in a way belongs to both orders, as he is composed of spirit and body.

Cf. Josef Neuner, S.J. and Jacques Dupuis, S.J., eds., The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church (New York, 1982) (= CCC, n. 327): who by His almighty power from the beginning of time made at once (simul) out
of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly, and then (deinde) the human creature, who as it were shares in both orders, being composed of spirit and body.

Cf. The First Vatican Council (1870). Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius on the Catholic Faith, Ch. 1. Translation taken from Norman P., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Vol. 1. Nicaea 1 to Lateran V (2 vols. London, 1990), I:
Chap. I. of God, Creator of All Things <> This only true God by His goodness and omnipotent power, not to increase his own happiness, and not to add to, but to show forth His perfection by the blessings which He bestows on creatures, with most free choice, immediately19 from the beginning of time made each creature out of nothing, spiritual and bodily, namely angelic and worldly, and then the human, common as it were, composed of both spirit and body [Lateran Council IV, can. 2 and 5]

Cf. Pascal P. Parente, The Angels: Morning Stars of Creation, being Chapter 1 of his book The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition (Rockford, IL, 1994):20

18

Note that translating simul by together neither commits one to the simultaneity of their creation nor precludes it, thereby making it a most suitable choice. 19 Note that if the word is so translated, it could be taken to mean without the mediation, sc. of any creature. 20 (http://www.ewtn.com/library/mary/angel1.htm [3/17/11])

21

(God) by his almighty power created together in the beginning of time both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly , and afterwards the human, as it were an intermediate creature, composed of body and spirit .

9. Texts where simul is not translated. Cf. H.J. Schroeder, Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils: Text, Translation and Commentary, (St. Louis, 1937):
who from the beginning of time and by His omnipotent power made from nothing creatures both spiritual and corporeal, angelic, namely, and mundane, and then human, as it were, common, composed of spirit and body.

Cf. Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils , Vol. 1. Nicaea 1 to Lateran V (London/Washington, D.C., 1990):
who by his almighty power at the beginning of time created from nothing both spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is to say angelic and earthly, and then created human beings composed as it were of both spirit and body in common.

22

10. Towards a defensible interpretation of simul. For the commonly accepted view, cf. Fr. Pascal P. Parente, The Angels: Morning Stars of Creation, being Chapter 1 of his book The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition (Rockford, IL, 1994):
Pure spirits, the closest image and likeness of the Creator, were the effect of a divine act of creation. A spirit world was produced, at once, in its fullness and in its grandeur. When, at the word of the Almighty, lights first rays lit up the primeval, shapeless world, still wrapped in a mist as in swaddling clothes, a wondrous song, a joyful melody filled the new heavens with never-ending strains. The Lord recalls these primordial times when He asks: Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? . . . When the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God made joyful melody.[1] These sons of God, living witnesses of the creation of the material universe, were our Angels, the morning stars of creation. It is an article of faith, firmly established in Scripture and Tradition, and clearly expressed in Christian Doctrine from the beginning, that this spirit world, our Angels, began with time and was created by God. This traditional belief of both the Old and the New Testament was given a more formal and solemn expression in the fourth Lateran Council in 1215: (God) by his almighty power created together in the beginning of time both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly, and afterwards the human, as it were an intermediate creature, composed of body and spirit.[2] From this definition we learn that the Angelic spirits were created when time began and not from eternity. Like all other creatures they were produced by the almighty power of God, out of nothing. <> The wording of the definition by the Lateran Council, reported before, which seems to be opposed to the opinion of priority of creation of the Angels, creates no difficulty whatever. It is said there that God created together ( simul) in the beginning of time both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the Angelic and the earthly. It is commonly admitted that the word together ( simul) in this case has not the meaning of parity of time or simultaneousness, but parity of action. The expression was taken from Scripture where it is said: He that liveth forever created all things together,[12] meaning not that all things were created at the same time, but that all things were likewise created with no indication of time. Saint Thomas points out that this definition of the Lateran Council was aimed at a Manichaean heresy of emanation. 21 It did not bear on the time of creation of the Angels but on the fact that they were produced by the act of creation, just like the corporeal, earthly creatures.[13] ENDNOTES 1. Job 38:4, 7. As a matter of fact, the Greek version of the Septuagint of the book of Job, which is a rendition of the accepted sense rather than of the letter of the text, translates sons of God of our Vulgate as Angels, and the same verse reads as follows: When the stars were made, all my angels praised me with a great voice. 2. D. 428. A similar definition was given in the Vatican Council in 1869, D. 1782, 1801. <> 12. Ecclus. 18:1. 13. Opusculum XXIII. (emphasis added)
21

On the contrary, as we have seen, the Manichean heresy St. Thomas references held that there were two independent creators, one good, one evil, a doctrine which has nothing to do with emanationism.

23

For an expression of the same view by an older theologian, cf. A Manual of Catholic Theology: Based on Scheebens Dogmatik, Volume 1 By Matthias Joseph Scheeben, Joseph Wilhelm, Thomas Bartholomew Scannell (London, 1903), Book 3, sec. 118:
V- The Fourth Lateran and the Vatican Councils have defined that Angels were not created from all eternity, but that they had a beginning. God ... at the very beginning of time made out of nothing both kinds of creatures, spiritual and corporal, angelic and mundane (sess. iii., c. 1). That the creation of the Angels was contemporaneous with the creation of the world, is not defined so clearly, and, therefore, is not a matter of Faith. The words simul ab initio temporis, according to St. Thomas ( Opusc. xxiii.), admit of another interpretation, and the definition of the Lateran Council was directed against errors not bearing directly on the time of the creation of the Angels. The probabilities, however, point in the direction of a simultaneous creation: the universe being the realization of one vast plan for the glory of God, it might be expected that all its parts were created together. (emphasis added)

Cf. also F. H. Reusch, Nature and the Bible: Lectures on the Mosaic History of Creation (Edinburgh, 1886), Ch. VII, pp. 108-109:
Again, appeal has been made in this controversy to a decree of the Fourth Lateran Council in the year 1215. But this decree was not intended to define the meaning of Gen. L 1. In it God is described as the One Principle of all things, the Creator of all invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal beings, Who by His almighty power has in the beginning of time brought forth both creations from nothing, the spiritual and corporeal, the angelic and the earthly, and then the human, etc. 1 This declaration was directed principally against the heresy of the Kathari and Waldenses, who held that the visible world was not created by God, but traced its origin to a second, essentially evil Principle. 2 Against this error the Church urges the revealed doctrine that God is the One Principle of all things, and has created the material as well as the spiritual world. There was no occasion for declaring that this revealed doctrine is plainly taught or purposely hinted at in the first verse of Genesis; or that the spiritual world was meant by the word heaven in this verse; and I can see no justification for finding this in the Decree of the Council. 3 [omitted] [omitted] 3 The Council did not even assert the simultaneous creation of the angels and of matter; and therefore did not reject the opinion held by [108-109] many of the Fathers, and especially by most of the Greek Fathers, that the angels were created a long time before the material world. Klee, Dogmatik, ii. p. 220. Michelis, Entwieklung, etc., p. 10. The simul in the Lateran Decree no doubt comes from the phrase, Sir. xviii. 1: Qui manet in aeternum, creavit omnia simul, i.e. The Eternal created all things at once, all things without exception, e)/ktioj ta\ pa/ntaj koinh=. (emphasis added)
2 1

For the text of Sirach, cf. Louis Lavalle, Augustine and Orthodoxy in the Creation Day Debate (The Presbyterian Witness. Fall, 1998), p. 3:
Although we do not share Augustines view of the Apocrypha, his rationale from Sirach 18:1 disappears if one examines the original Greek on which the Old Latin was based. The Old Latin reads, according to Taylor, the translator of Augustines commentary, He who lives forever created all things together, 11 or at the same time, from the Latin simul, from which we get simultaneous.

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The original Greek reads, He who lives forever created all things in common, from the Greek, koine, the same word used in speaking of the common or koine Greek of the time of Christ. The RSV which included a new translation of the Apocrypha from the Greek paraphrased this into, created the whole universe. There is no extant Hebrew text of Sirach 18:1.(emphasis added)

Cf. Pete Holter, Re: Augustine and creation?. Posted to Catholic Answers, 26 Dec. 2009:22
In his The Literal Meaning of Genesis: An Unfinished Book , 7:28, Augustine quotes from Sirach 18:1, He Who lives forever created all things simultaneously (Latin: Qui manet in aeternum creavit omnia simul), and this understanding of this verse becomes one of his interpretive keys to Genesis 1. Likewise, in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis , Bk. 5, 3:6, he quotes from this verse in Sirach again as he is working out the meaning of Genesis 2:4.

Cf. Louis Lavalle, Augustine and Orthodoxy in the Creation Day Debate ( The Presbyterian Witness. Fall, 1998), pp. 2-4:
However, particularly in his earlier commentary, Augustines interpretation of Scripture was influenced by Greek philosophy and science. Through both Neoplatonist philosophy and the science of spontaneous generation, Augustine saw three phases of creation: the unchangeable forms in the Word of God, seminal [reasons] created in the instant of creation, and a later springing forth in the course of time. <...> How did these secular beliefs affect Augustines view of the six creation days? In the words of Louis Berkhof, Augustine was evidently inclined to think God created all things in a moment of time, and that the thought of days was simply introduced to aid the finite intelligence.8 Looking at Augustines own words, taken from his Genesis commentary, we read, In this narrative of creation Holy Scripture has said of the Creator that He completed His works in six days, and elsewhere, without contradicting this, it has been written of the same Creator that He created all things together . . . Why then was there any need for six distinct days to be set forth in the narrative one after the other? The reason is that those who cannot understand the meaning of the text, He created all things together, cannot understand the meaning of the Scripture unless the narrative proceeds slowly step by step . . . For this Scripture text [2-3] that narrates the works of God according to the days mentioned above, and that Scripture text that says God created all things together, are both true.9
Augustines references to Sirach, an Apocryphal book, have been italicized for emphasis. Sirach 18:1 was Augustines key verse to defend that everything recorded in Genesis 1 and 2 had been created simultaneously. It provided the Biblical support for his philosophy and science. A Platonic god could not be involved in his creation on a day by day basis. And spontaneous generation provided for things coming into existence after creation, but not just in six days, since everyone knew that it was still occurring. Augustine reasoned he was giving priority to the authority of Scripture because he accepted the Apocrypha as Scripture. The Apocrypha was part of the Old Latin version upon which Augustine depended, for he could not read Hebrew and was not proficient in Greek when he wrote his commentary. This hindered his study of Scripture and limited his access to the early Greek fathers, such as Theophilus of Antioch, who defended six-day creation. 10
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(http://forums.catholic.com/showpost.php?p=6096831&postcount=12 [4/7/11])

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Although we do not share Augustines view of the Apocrypha, his rationale from Sirach 18:1 disappears if one examines the original Greek on which the Old Latin was based. The Old Latin reads, according to Taylor, the translator of Augustines commentary, He who lives forever created all things together, 11 or at the same time, from the Latin simul, from which we get simultaneous. The original Greek reads, He who lives forever created all things in common, from the Greek, koine, the same word used in speaking of the common or koine Greek of the time of Christ. The RSV which included a new translation of the Apocrypha from the Greek paraphrased this into, created the whole universe. There is no extant Hebrew text of Sirach 18:1. Since Jerome did not accept the Apocryphal books as canonical, he never retranslated Sirach. The Roman Catholic church, which kept the Apocrypha in the Bible, incorporated the Old Latin text of Sirach into the Vulgate. [See Figure 1.] Perhaps due to his correspondence with Jerome and his study of Greek, Augustine appears to have moderated his position in The City of God. <> Sirach 18:1, the key verse in his commentary, was never mentioned in his lengthy discussion of creation in The City of God. [3-4] Figure 1 Sirach 18:1, Augustines Key Verse in his Commentary OL & VG tr. LXX tr. Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul. he who lives forever created all things simultaneously. Ho zon eis ton aiona ektisen ta panta koinei He who lives forever created all things in common.

There is no extant Hebrew text. Key: OL-Old Latin; VG-Vulgate; LXX-Septuagint; tr.-authors translation.
8 9

Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977(1938), 127. Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 4.33-34, 52-53. 10 John H. Taylor, note in Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1, 271. See Theophilus, To Autolycus, 2.4, 10, 15, Oxford Early Christian Texts, and authors The Early Church Defended Creation Science, Impact No. 160, Institute for Creation Research, October 1986. 11 John H. Taylor, note in Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1, 254. (emphasis added)

In addition to the foregoing, cf. John B. Jordan, Stanley Jaki on Genesis 1, Biblical Chronology, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1998:
In his third lecture, Jaki surveys the interpretations offered by the early Church writers. His survey is interesting. It shows that the early Church firmly believed in a literal six-day creation week, though many preached the passage typologically and/or allegorically. Some, such as Basil, tried to reconcile the passage with the scientific-philosophical thinking of their day, but never denied its historicity. Augustine was an exception. He held that the work of the week of creation took place instantaneously, because of a verse in the apocrypha that he took to mean that. The cosmogony in Genesis 1, however, he took quite literally, and expounded at length on what it meant as regards the actual arrangement of the universe. All this Jaki finds regrettable.

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(The Wisdom of Ben Sirach, or Ecclesiasticus, says in 18:1, He who lives forever created the universe. In the Latin version that Augustine used, however, this statement was mistranslated as He who lives forever created all things simultaneously.) 23

Suggesting a very different interpretation is the following: cf. the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Part One. The Profession of Faith. Section Two. The Profession of the Christian Faith. Chapter One. I Believe in God the Father, nn. 325-327:
Article I I Believe In God The Father Almighty, Creator Of Heaven And Earth Paragraph 5. Heaven and Earth 325 The Apostles Creed professes that God is creator of heaven and earth. The Nicene Creed makes it explicit that this profession includes all that is, seen and unseen. 326 The Scriptural expression heaven and earth means all that exists, creation in its entirety. It also indicates the bond, deep within creation, that both unites heaven and earth and distinguishes the one from the other: the earth is the world of men, while heaven or the heavens can designate both the firmament and Gods own place our Father in heaven and consequently the heaven too which is eschatological glory. Finally, heaven refers to the saints and the place of the spiritual creatures, the angels, who surround God. 186 327 The profession of faith of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) affirms that God from the beginning of time made at once ( simul) out of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly, and then (deinde) the human creature, who as it were shares in both orders, being composed of spirit and body.187 186 Ps 115:16; 19:2; Mt 5:16.
187 Lateran Council IV (1215): DS 800; cf. DS 3002 and Paul VI, CPG 8. (emphasis added)

Note that, however one translate simul, it must be taken in opposition to ac deinde; but the latter, meaning and then, is a temporal expression, determining the former also to have a temporal meaning, in which case it could not express merely the note of parity of action, as Parente supposed above. Again, whereas the text of the Decree makes explicit that the human came after the other natures, no such before and after is marked out with respect to the preceeding two, leading one to suspect that no mention is made of such an order in their case because there was none. Again, one may also argue that, just as the natures belonging to the two orders are found together in man, so they were created together by God at the beginning of time. Again, St. Thomas interpretation of certain lemmas of the Decree tends in that direction, as, for instance, the overthrow of Origens position takes away a reason for supposing the bodily nature to have been created at an indefinite time after the spiritual. Finally, additional reasons for understanding simul to mean at the same time are to be found in the following texts of the Angelic Doctor:

23

One should note here that St. Augustines concern is not with the question of the simultaneity of the creation of the sprititual and the corporeal orders of creature in precision from every other creation, but with the larger question of whether or not the work represented as taking place over the Six Days was actually accomplished in one, in which case the two orders would indeed have been created at once.

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11. St. Thomas Aquinas on whether all things were created at the same time. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Sentences 2.2, d. 12. In Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny (London, 1998), art. 2-3:
Article 2: Are all things created simultaneously, distinct in their species? It seems that they are. 1. It is said in Sirach 18:1, He who lives for ever created all things together. 2. Moreover, there is more distance between the spiritual and corporeal creature than between two corporeal creatures. But spiritual and corporeal things are held to have been made at the same time. Therefore much more so must all corporeal things. 3. Moreover, as is said in Deuteronomy 32:4, The works of God are perfect, nor can any reason be given why their perfection should be deferred in time, something a creature cannot achieve by itself nor from any one other than God. Therefore since species are distinguished by their specific perfections, it seems that from the beginning all things are created distinct in species. 4. Moreover, the work of creation manifests the divine power. But the power of an agent shows less when its effect is completed successively than when it is produced immediately in its perfection. Therefore it seems that all things are distinct from the beginning. 5. Moreover, it is clear that God produced the whole work of one day in one moment. Therefore it seems ridiculous to say that he stopped acting for a whole day until the beginning of the next, as if he were exhausted. Therefore it seems that creatures are not distinguished by the succession of days, but from the beginning of creation. 6. Moreover, the parts of the universe are mutually dependent and the lower are especially dependent on the higher. But where things depend on one another, one is not found without the other. Therefore it seems unfitting to say that first there was water and earth and afterwards the stars were made. ON THE CONTRARY: Augustine says that the authority of Scripture at the beginning of Genesis is greater than the most perspicacious human genius. But there it is written that different creatures came to be over the course of six days. Therefore it seems necessary to maintain this. Moreover, nature imitates the activity of the creator, but in natural activity there is a process from the imper-fect to the perfect. Therefore it seems that this should be so also in the work of creation. Therefore it seems that all things are not distinct from the very beginning of creation. RESPONSE: It should be said that what pertains to faith is distinguished in two ways, for some are as such of the substance of faith, such that God is three and one, and the like, about which no one may licitly think otherwise. Hence the Apostle in Galatians 1:8, But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach a gospel to you other than that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema!

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Other things are only incidental to faith insofar as they are treated in Scripture, which faith holds to be promulgated under the dictation of the Holy Spirit, but which can be ignored by those who are not held to know scripture, such as many of the historical works. On such matters even the saints disagree, explaining scripture in different ways. Thus with respect to the beginning of the world something pertains to the substance of faith, namely that the world began to be by creation, and all the saints agree in this. But how and in what order this was done pertains to faith only incidentally insofar as it is treated in scripture, the truth of which the saints save in the different explanations they offer. For Augustine holds that at the very beginning of creation there were some things specifically distinct in their proper nature, such as the elements, celestial bodies and spiritual substances, but others existed in seminal notions alone, such as animals, plants and men, all of which were produced in their proper nature in that work that God governs after it was constituted in the work of the six days. Of this work we read in John 5:17, My Father works even until now, and I work. With respect to the distinction of things we ought to attend to the order of nature and doctrine, not to the order of time. As to nature, just as sound precedes song in nature, though not in time, so things which are naturally prior are mentioned first, as earth before animals, and water before fish, and so with other things. But in the order of teaching, as is evident in those teaching geometry, although the parts of the figure make up the figure without any order of time, still the geometer teaches the constitution as coming to be by the extension of line from line. And this was the example of Plato, as we are told at the beginning of On the Heavens. So too Moses, instructing an uncultivated people on the creation of the world, divides into parts what was done simultaneously. Ambrose, however, and other saints hold the order of time is saved in the distinction of things. This is the more common opinion and superficially seems more consonant with the text, but the first is more reasonable and better protects Sacred Scripture from the derision of infidels, which Augustine teaches in his literal interpretation of Genesis is especially to be considered, and so scripture must be explained in such a way that the infidel cannot mock, and this opinion is more pleasing to me. However, the arguments sustaining both will be responded to. Ad 1. It should be said that, according to Gregory, all things are said to be created together in the substance of matter not in specific form, or even in its likeness, such as the rational soul, which is like the angels and is not produced from matter. Ad 2. It should be said that all corporeal things share in matter, whether it be one or several, and because matter does not precede the compound [composite], therefore in order that the order of time might respond to the order of nature, corporeal matter is first made and then distinguished by forms. But corporeal nature is not produced from the spiritual either as from matter or as from efficient cause, and therefore the argument does not work. Ad 3. It should be said that just as the creature does not have existence of itself neither does it have perfection, and therefore in order to show both, God wills that the creature does not exist at first and afterwards does, and similarly it was first imperfect and afterwards perfect. Ad 4. It should be said that not only power should be shown in creation, but also the order of wisdom, such that the things which are prior in nature are first created.

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Ad 5. It should be said that in order to show the diverse natures of distinct things, God willed that one day should answer to each distinction of things, not out of any necessity or weariness of the agent. Ad 6. It should be said that a thing does not have the same nature as once perfected and in its coming to be, and thus although the nature of the completed world requires that all es-sential parts of the universe exist simultaneously it can be otherwise in the making of the world, just as in the perfected man the heart cannot be without the other parts, and yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is generated before all the other members. Ad 7. It should be said that the authority of Sacred Scripture is not derogated when it is differently explained, the faith being saved, because the Holy Spirit made it fruitful with a greater truth than any man can discover. Ad 8. It should be said that it is due to the imperfection of nature that it comes from the imperfect to perfection, since without doubt it would give the ultimate perfection of which it is capable, saving, however, the condition of the work. Therefore it is not necessary that in this the divine work be similar to the operation of the creature. (emphasis added)

12. Whether the spiritual creature was created before the corporeal. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 61, art. 3 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Whether the Angels Were Created before the Corporeal World? We proceed thus to the Third Article: Obj. 1. It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i. 2): Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God? Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii): Some say that the angels were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof. Obj. 2. Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity. Obj. 3. Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature. On the contrary, It is said (Gen. i. 1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Now, this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before corporeal nature.24
24

Cf. Fr. Pascal P. Parente, The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition (Charlotte, NC, 1994), Ch. 1: Thus, for example, Saint Epiphanius: The word of God clearly declares that the Angels were neither created after the stars nor before heaven and earth. It must be regarded as certain and unshakable the opinion that says : None of the created things did exist before heaven and earth, because in the beginning God created heaven and earth so that this was the beginning of all

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I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole . Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose works are perfect, as it is said Dt. xxxii. 4, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius, as Jerome says. Reply Obj. 1. Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world. Reply Obj. 2. God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold. Reply Obj. 3. All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe. If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Genesis i., In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the words, In the beginning, must be interpreted, In the Son, or In the beginning of time: but not, In the beginning, before which there was nothing, unless we say, Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 61, art. 4, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
I answer that, As was observed (Article [3]), the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over all corporeal nature. (emphasis added)

Now as I show in my commentary on the Work of the Six Days, the co-existence of the angelic world is repeatedly implicated throughout the Mosaic account of creation, lending support to St. Thomas view; but for the present, the following texts will further strengthen our claims: 13. Supplemental texts expounding the beginning of all things according to Genesis 1:1.
creation, before which none of the created things existed.[8] 8. Adversus Haereses, Panar., 65, 5. (emphasis added) Notice how the foregoing statement decides the question solely by drawing out the implications of Genesis 1. See further the supplemental texts given just below.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 46, art. 3. c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers; slightly rev. B.A.M.):
I answer that, The words of Genesis (1:1), In the beginning God created heaven and earth, are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning ; and to exclude this the words In the beginning are explainedviz. of time. And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things , against which In the beginning is explainedin the Son. For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), Thou hast made all things in wisdom, it may be understood that God made all things in the beginningthat is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), In Himviz. the Son were created all things. But others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is explained thus: In the beginningi.e. before all thingsGod created heaven and earth. For four things are stated to be created togetherviz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature. (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD, 1952), q. 4, art. 2, replies to the contrary 3:
3. The disposition of a thing that is already complete is not the same as its disposition while yet in the making: wherefore although the nature of a perfect and complete world requires that all the essential parts of the universe exist together, it could be otherwise when the world was as yet in its beginning: thus in a complete man there cannot be a heart without his other parts, yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is fashioned before any other part. It may also be replied that in this beginning of things the heavenly bodies and all the elements with their substantial forms were produced together with the angels, all of which are the principal parts of the universe ; and that on the following days, something was done in the nature already created, and pertaining to the perfec-tion and adornment of the parts already produced. (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, Book II. In Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings. Edited and translated with an introduction and notes by Ralph McInerny (London, 1998), dist. 12, art. 2, obj. 6, ad 6:
6. Moreover, the parts of the universe are mutually dependent and the lower are especially dependent on the higher. But where things depend on one another, one is not found without the other. Therefore it seems unfitting to say that first there was water and earth and afterwards the stars were made. <> Ad 6. It should be said that a thing does not have the same nature as once perfected and in its coming to be, and thus although the nature of the completed world requires that all essential parts of the universe exist simultaneously it can be otherwise in the making of the world, just as in the perfected man the heart cannot be without the other parts, and yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is generated before all the other members. (emphasis added)

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But with respect to the meaning of beginning here, we have seen Epiphanius explain the words of Genesis 1:1 as follows:25
Thus, for example, Saint Epiphanius: The word of God clearly declares that the Angels were neither created after the stars nor before heaven and earth. It must be regarded as certain and unshakable the opinion that says: None of the created things did exist before heaven and earth, because in the beginning God created heaven and earth so that this was the beginning of all creation, before which none of the created things existed.[8] 8. Adversus Haereses, Panar., 65, 5. (emphasis added)

Hence, the angels must have been created at the same time as the mundane world, a conclusion we may let stand as our final word on this subject.

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Cf. Fr. Pascal P. Parente, The Angels: In Catholic Teaching and Tradition (Charlotte, NC, 1994), Ch. 1.

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14. Supplement: On the division of the Creed into articles. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 8, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
I answer that, As stated above (Articles [4],6), to faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christs Incarnation, by Whom we have access to the glory of the sons of God, according to Rm 5,2. Hence it is written (Jn 17,3): This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent. Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christs human nature, which is the mystery of godliness (1Tm 3,16). Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the Godhead. In like manner, with regard to Christs human nature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christs incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles. Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one article.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Primam Decretalem (On the First Decretal) (tr. B.A.M.):
In the last place one must consider that the articles of the Christian Faith are reckoned by some to be fourteen, but by others, twelve. For according to those who reckon them to be fourteen, seven articles pertain to the Godhead, but seven to the humanity [of Christ]. But those which pertain to the Godhead are distinguished as follows: There is one article on the unity of the divine essence, which the Symbol touches on when he says: I believe in one God. A second concerns the Person of the Father, which is touched on when it says: the Father, the Almighty. A third concerns the Person of the Son, which is touched on when it says: and in Jesus Christ His Son . A fourth concerns the Person of the Holy Spirit, which is touched on when it says: And in the Holy Spirit . A fifth concerns the effect by which we are created in nature, which is touched on when it says: Creator of heaven and earth. A sixth concerns Gods effect according as we are created again in grace, which is touched on when it says: the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins ; the reason being that by grace we are gathered into the unity of the Church, we communicate in the sacraments, and we obtain the forgiveness of sins. A seventh article concerns Gods effect by which we are perfected in the being of glory both with respect to the body and with respect to the soul; and this is touched on when it says: the resurrection of the flesh, the life everlasting.

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But the seven articles pertaining to the Incarnation are distinguished as follows: The first concerns the conception of Christ, which is touched on when it says: who was concealed by the Holy Spirit. But the second concerns His birth, which is touched one when it says: born of the Virgin Mary. The third concerns His passion, which is touched on when it says: suffered, died, and was buried. The fourth concerns his descent into hell [: he descended into hell]; the fifth His resurrection [: the third day he rose again from the dead ]; the sixth His ascension: he ascended into Heaven; the seventh His return in judgment: He will come again to judge the living and the dead. But others holding there to be twelve articles, put down one article concerning the Three Persons; and the article concerning the effect of glory they divide into two, so that there is one article concerning the resurrection of the flesh, and another concerning eternal life: and thus the articles pertaining to divinity are six. Again, they include the conception and birth of Christ under one article; and so the articles concorning His humanity are also six, so that all told they are twelve.

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15. On the error of Origen. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 47, art. 2, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Art. 2. Whether the inequality of things is from God? <> I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God . For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies . But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good (Gn. 1:31). And, as Augustine says ( De Civ. Dei ii, 3): What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred suns in the world? (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 65, art. 2. c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to Gods original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away . But this position is erro-neous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the produc-tion of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, God saw that it was good (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origens opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the suns body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. (emphasis added)

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book II: Creation I. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by James E. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), cap 44:
Chapter 44 THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS DOES NOT HAVE ITS SOURCE IN THE DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR DEMERITS [1] We now have to show that the distinction among things did not result from diverse movements of free choice in rational creatures, as Origen maintained in his Peri Archon. For he wished to oppose the objections and errors of the early heretics who endeavored to prove that the heterogeneous character of good and evil in things has its origin in contrary agents. Now, there are, as Origen saw, great differences in natural as well as human things which seemingly are not preceded by any merits; some bodies are luminous, some dark, some men are born of pagans, others of Christians, etc. And having observed this fact, Origen was impelled to assert that all diversity found in things resulted from a diversity of merits, in accordance with the justice of God. For he says that God, of His goodness alone, first made all creatures equal, and all of them spiritual and rational; and these by their free choice were moved in various ways, some adhering to God more, and some less, some withdrawing from Him more, and some less; and as a result of this, diverse grades in spiritual substances were established by the divine justice, so that some were angels of diverse orders, some human souls in various conditions, some demons in their differing states. And because of the diversity among rational creatures, Origen stated that Cod had instituted diversity in the realm of corporeal creatures so that the higher spiritual substances were united to the higher bodies, and thus the bodily creature would subserve, in whatever other various ways, the diversity of spiritual substances. [2] This opinion, however, is demonstrably false. For in the order of effects, the better a thing is, so much the more is it prior in the intention of the agent. But the greatest good in things created is the perfection of the universe, consisting in the order of distinct things; for always the perfection of the whole has precedence of the perfection of the individual parts. Therefore, the diversity of things results from the original intention of the first agent, not from a diversity of merits. [3] Then, too, if all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, it must be said that one of them would not depend, in its action, upon another. But that which results from the concurrence of diverse causes, one of which does not depend on another, is fortuitous. In accordance with the opinion just cited, therefore, this distinction and order of things is fortuitous. Yet this, as we have proved above, is impossible. [4] Moreover, what is natural to a person is not acquired by him through the exercise of his will; for the movement of the will, or of free choice, presupposes the existence of the willer, and his existence presupposes the things proper to his nature. If the diverse grades of rational creatures result from a movement of free choice, then the grade of none of them will be natural, but every grade will be accidental. Now, this is impossible. For, since the specific difference is natural to each thing, it would follow, on that theory, that all created rational substancesangels, demons, human souls, the souls of the heavenly bodies (Origen attributed animation to these bodies)are of one species. The diversity of natural actions proves the falsity of this position. For the natural mode of understanding proper to the human intellect is not the same as that which sense and imagination, the angelic intellect, and the soul of the sun, require-unless, perhaps, we picture the angels and heavenly bodies with flesh and bones and like parts, so that they may be endowed with organs of sense;

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which is absurd. It therefore remains that the diversity of intellectual substances is not the consequence of a diversity of merits, resulting from movements of free choice. [5] Again, if natural things are not acquired by a movement of free choice, whereas a rational soul owes its union with a certain body to preceding merit or demerit in keeping with the movement of free choice, then it would follow that the union of this soul with this body is not natural. Neither, then, is the resulting composite natural. Nevertheless, according to Origen, man and the sun and the stars are composed of rational substances and such and such bodies. Therefore, all these thingswhich are the noblest among corporeal sub-stances are unnatural. [6] Moreover, if the union of a particular rational substance with a particular body befits that substance, not so far as it is such a substance, but so far as it has merited that union, then it is not united to that body through itself, but by accident. Now, no species results from the accidental union of things; for from such a union there does not arise a thing one through itself; thus, white man is not a species, nor is clothed man. From the hypothesis in question, therefore, it would follow that man is not a species, nor is the sun a species, nor the moon, nor anything of the kind. [7] Again, things resulting from merit may be changed for better or for worse; for merits and demerits may increase and diminish-a point particularly stressed by Origen, who said that the free choice of every creature can always be turned to either side. Hence, if a rational soul has obtained this body on account of preceding merit or demerit, then it is possible for it to be united again to another body; and it will follow not only that the human soul may take to itself another human body, but also that it may sometimes assume a sidereal bodya notion in keeping with the Pythagorean fables according to which any soul could enter any body. Obviously, this idea is both erroneous as regards philosophy, according to which determinate matters and determinate movable things are assigned to determinate forms and determinate movers, and heretical according to faith, which declares that in the resurrection the soul resumes the same body that it has left. [8] Also, since multitude without diversity cannot exist, if from the beginning any multitude at all of rational creatures existed, then there must have been some diversity among them. And this means that one of those creatures had something which another had not. And if this was not the consequence of a diversity in merit, for the same reason neither was it necessary that the diversity of grades should result from a diversity of merits. [9] Every distinction, furthermore, is either in terms of a division of quantity, which exists only in bodiesso that, according to Origen, such distinctness could not exist in the substances first created; or in terms of formal division. But without a diversity of grades there can be no formal division, since division of this kind is reduced to privation and form. Necessarily, then, one of the reciprocally divided forms is better and the other less good. Hence, as Aristotle remarks, the species of things are like numbers, one number being in addition to or in subtraction from the other. Therefore, if there were many rational substances created from the beginning, there must have been a diversity of grades among them. [10] Then, too, if rational creatures can subsist without bodies, there was no need to have introduced distinctness in the realm of corporeal nature on account of the different merits of rational creatures; because, even in the absence of a diversity of bodies, diverse grades in rational substances could be found. If, however, rational creatures cannot subsist without bodies, then the corporeal creature also was produced from the beginning simultaneously with the rational creature. Now, the corporeal creature is more remote from the spiritual than

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spiritual creatures are from one another. So, if God from the beginning established such a great distance among His creatures without any antecedent merits, it was unnecessary for a diversity of merits to have been acquired previously in order that rational creatures might be constituted in diverse grades. [11] Again, if, corresponding to the multiformity of rational creatures there is multiformity in corporeal creatures, then, for the same reason, corresponding to the uniformity of rational creatures, there would be uniformity in the corporeal nature. Consequently the corporeal nature would have been created, even if multifarious merits of rational creatures had not preceded, but a corporeal nature uniform in character. Hence, prime matter would have been createda principle common to all bodiesbut it would have been created under one form only. But prime matter contains potentially a multiplicity of forms. On the hypothesis under consideration, prime matter would therefore have remained unfulfilled, its one form alone being actualized; and this is at variance with the divine goodness. [12] Moreover, if the heterogeneity of corporeal creatures arises from the various movements of the rational creatures free choice, it will have to be said that the reason why there is only one sun in the world is that only one rational creature was moved by its free choice in such a way as to deserve being joined to such a body as the sun. But, that only one rational creature sinned in this way was a matter of chance. Therefore, the existence of only one sun in the world is the result of chance; it does not answer to a need of corporeal nature. [13] The spiritual creature, furthermore, does not deserve reduction to a lower status except for sin; and yet, by being united to visible bodies, it is brought down from its lofty state of being, wherein it is invisible. Now, from this it would seem to follow that visible bodies are joined to spiritual creatures because of sina notion seemingly akin to the error of the Manicheans who asserted that these visible things originated from the evil principle. [14] This opinion is clearly contradicted by the authority of sacred Scripture, for in regard to each production of visible creatures, Moses says: God saw that it was good, etc. (Gen. 1); and afterwards, concerning the totality of His creatures, Moses adds: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. By this we are clearly given to understand that the corporeal and visible creatures were made because it is good for them to be; and that this is in keeping with Gods goodness, and not because of any merits or sins of rational creatures. [15] Now, Origen seems not to have taken into consideration the fact that when we give something, not in payment of a debt, but as a free gift, it is not contrary to justice if we give unequal things, without having weighed the difference of merits; although payment is due to those who merit. But, as we have shown above, God brought things into being, not because He was in any way obliged to do so, but out of pure generosity. Therefore, the diversity of creatures does not presuppose a diversity of merits. [16] And again, since the good of the whole is better than the good of each part, the best maker is not he who diminishes the good of the whole in order to increase the goodness of some of the parts; a builder does not give the same relative value to the foundation that he gives to the roof, lest he ruin the house. Therefore, God, the maker of all things, would not make the whole universe the best of its kind, if He made all the parts equal, because many grades of goodness would then be lacking in the universe, and thus it would be imperfect. (emphasis added)

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Cf. Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity. Book XV,


Chapter 21. Of the Likeness of the Father and of the Son Alleged to Be in Our Memory and Understanding. Of the Likeness of the Holy Spirit in Our Will or Love. 40. I have undoubtedly taken pains so far as I could, not indeed so that the thing might be seen face to face, but that it might be seen by this likeness in an enigma, in how small a degree soever, by conjecture, in our memory and understanding, to intimate God the Father and God the Son: i.e. God the begetter, who has in some way spoken by His own co-eternal Word all things that He has in His substance; and God His Word Himself, who Himself has nothing either more or less in substance than is in Him, who, not lyingly but truly, has begotten the Word; and I have assigned to memory everything that we know, even if we were not thinking of it, but to understanding the formation after a certain special mode of the thought. For we are usually said to understand what, by thinking of it, we have found to be true; and this it is again that we leave in the memory. But that is a still more hidden depth of our memory, wherein we found this also first when we thought of it, and wherein an inner word is begotten such as belongs to no tongueas it were, knowledge of knowledge, vision of vision, and understanding which appears in [reflective] thought; of understanding which had indeed existed before in the memory, but was latent there, although, unless the thought itself had also some sort of memory of its own, it would not return to those things which it had left in the memory while it turned to think of other things. 41. But I have shown nothing in this enigma respecting the Holy Spirit such as might appear to be like Him, except our own will, or love, or affection, which is a stronger will, since our will which we have naturally is variously affected, according as various objects are adjacent or occur to it, by which we are attracted or offended. What, then, is this? Are we to say that our will, when it is right, knows not what to desire, what to avoid? Further, if it knows, doubtless then it has a kind of knowledge of its own, such as cannot be without memory and understanding. Or are we to listen to any one who should say that love knows not what it does, which does not do wrongly? As, then, there are both understanding and love in that primary memory wherein we find provided and stored up that to which we can come in thought, because we find also those two things there, when we find by thinking that we both understand and love anything; which things were there too when we were not thinking of them: and as there are memory and love in that understanding, which is formed by thought, which true word we say inwardly without the tongue of any nation when we say what we know; for the gaze of our thought does not return to anything except by remembering it, and does not care to return unless by loving it: so love, which combines the vision brought about in the memory, and the vision of the thought formed thereby, as if parent and offspring, would not know what to love rightly unless it had a knowledge of what it desired, which it cannot have without memory and understanding. Chapter 22. How Great the Unlikeness is Between the Image of the Trinity Which We Have Found in Ourselves, and the Trinity Itself. 42. But since these are in one person, as man is, some one may say to us, These three things, memory, understanding, and love, are mine, not their own; neither do they do that which they do for themselves, but for me, or rather I do it by them. For it is I who remember by memory, and understand by understanding, and love by love: and when I direct the mind's eye to my memory, and so say in my heart the thing I know, and a true word is begotten of my knowledge, both are mine, both the knowledge certainly and the word. For it is I who know, and it is I who say in my heart the thing I know. And when I come to find in my memory by thinking that I understand and love anything, which understanding and love were there also before I thought thereon, it is my own understanding and my own love that I find

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in my own memory, whereby it is I that understand, and I that love, not those things themselves. Likewise, when my thought is mindful, and wills to return to those things which it had left in the memory, and to understand and behold them, and say them inwardly, it is my own memory that is mindful, and it is my own, not its will, wherewith it wills. When my very love itself, too, remembers and understands what it ought to desire and what to avoid, it remembers by my, not by its own memory; and understands that which it intelligently loves by my, not by its own, understanding. In brief, by all these three things, it is I that remember, I that understand, I that love, who am neither memory, nor understanding, nor love, but who have them. These things, then, can be said by a single person, which has these three, but is not these three. But in the simplicity of that Highest Nature, which is God, although there is one God, there are three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Chapter 23. Augustine Dwells Still Further on the Disparity Between the Trinity Which is in Man, and the Trinity Which is God. The Trinity is Now Seen Through a Glass by the Help of Faith, that It May Hereafter Be More Clearly Seen in the Promised Sight Face to Face. 43. A thing itself, then, which is a trinity is different from the image of a trinity in some other thing; by reason of which image, at the same time that also in which these three things are is called an image; just as both the panel, and the picture painted on it, are at the same time called an image; but by reason of the picture painted on it, the panel also is called by the name of image. But in that Highest Trinity, which is incomparably above all things, there is so great an indivisibility, that whereas a trinity of men cannot be called one man, in that, there both is said to be and is one God, nor is that Trinity in one God, but it is one God. Nor, again, as that image in the case of man has these three things but is one person, so is it with the Trinity; but therein are three persons, the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of both Father and Son. For although the memory in the case of man, and especially that memory which beasts have not viz. the memory by which things intelligible are so contained as that they have not entered that memory through the bodily senses has in this image of the Trinity, in proportion to its own small measure, a likeness of the Father, incomparably unequal, yet of some sort, whatever it be: and likewise the understanding in the case of man, which by the purpose of the thought is formed thereby, when that which is known is said, and there is a word of the heart belonging to no tongue, has in its own great disparity some likeness of the Son; and love in the case of man proceeding from knowledge, and combining memory and understanding, as though common to parent and offspring, whereby it is understood to be neither parent nor offspring, has in that image, some, however exceedingly unequal, likeness of the Holy Spirit: it is nevertheless not the case, that, as in that image of the Trinity, these three are not one man, but belong to one man, so in the Highest Trinity itself, of which this is an image, these three belong to one God, but they are one God, and these are three persons, not one. A thing certainly wonderfully ineffable, or ineffably wonderful, that while this image of the Trinity is one person, but the Highest Trinity itself is three persons, yet that Trinity of three persons is more indivisible than this of one. For that [Trinity], in the nature of the Divinity, or perhaps better Deity, is that which it is, and is mutually and always unchangeably equal: and there was no time when it was not, or when it was otherwise; and there will be no time when it will not be, or when it will be otherwise. But these three that are in the inadequate image, although they are not separate in place, for they are not bodies, yet are now in this life mutually separate in magnitude. For that there are therein no several bulks, does not hinder our seeing that memory is greater than understanding in one man, but the contrary in another; and that in yet another these two are overpassed by the greatness of love; and this whether the two themselves are or are not equal to one another. And so each two by each one, and each one by each two, and each one by each one: the less are surpassed by the greater. And when they have been healed of all infirmity, and are mutually equal, not even then will that thing which by grace will not be changed, be made equal to that which by nature cannot change, because the creature cannot be equalled to the Creator, and when it shall be healed from all infirmity, will be changed.

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44. But when the sight shall have come which is promised anew to us face to face, we shall see this not only incorporeal but also absolutely indivisible and truly unchangeable Trinity far more clearly and certainly than we now see its image which we ourselves are: and yet they who see through this glass and in this enigma, as it is permitted in this life to see, are not those who behold in their own mind the things which we have set in order and pressed upon them; but those who see this as if an image, so as to be able to refer what they see, in some way be it what it may, to Him whose image it is, and to see that also by conjecturing, which they see through the image by beholding, since they cannot yet see face to face. For the apostle does not say, We see now a glass, but, We see now through a glass.

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St. Thomas Aquinas On the First Decretal of Gregory IX


A Partial Translation by Bart A. Mazzetti (c) 2013

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Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super primam et secundam Decretalem ad archidiaconum Tudertinum Textum Leoninum Romae 1968 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcn atque instruxit De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica [69293] Super Decretales, n. 1 Salvator noster discipulos ad praedicandum mittens, tria eis iniunxit. Primo quidem ut docerent fidem; secundo ut credentes imbuerent sacramentis; tertio ut credentes sacramentis imbutos ad observandum divina mandata inducerent. Dicitur enim Matth. ult. 19: euntes, docete omnes gentes, quantum ad primum; baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti , quan-tum ad secundum; docentes eos servare omnia quaecumque mandavi vobis, quantum ad tertium. Inter quae tria decenter fidei doctrina praemittitur. Est enim fides omnium bonorum spiritualium fundamentum, secundum illud apostoli Hebr. XI, 1: est autem fides substantia (idest fundamentum) sperandarum rerum. Est etiam fides per quam anima vivificatur per gratiam, secundum illud apostoli Galat. II, 20: quod autem nunc vivo in carne, in fide vivo filii Dei ; et Habac. II, 4: iustus autem ex fide sua vivit. Ipsa est per quam anima a peccatis purgatur, Act. XV, 9: fide purificans corda eorum. Ipsa est per quam anima iustitia ornatur, Rom. III, 22: iustitia autem Dei est per fidem Iesu Christi. Ipsa est per quam anima Deo desponsatur, Oseae II, 20: sponsabo te mihi in fide. On the Highest Trinity and the Catholic Faith On the Decretals, n. 1 Our Savior, when sending out his disciples to preach, enjoined upon them three things: first, that they teach the faith; second, that they impart the sacraments to believers; third, that believers to whom the sacraments have been imparted be led to observing the divine commandments. For with respect to the first, Matthew (28:19-20) says: Going, therefore, teach ye all nations;26 but with respect to the second, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; but with respect to the third, Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. Under these three headings the doctrine of the faith is suitably introduced. For faith is the foundation of every spiritual good, according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:1): Now faith is the substance (that is, the foundation) of things to be hoped for. And it is also faith by which the soul is made to live, according to the Apostle (Gal. 2:20): (And) that I live now in the flesh, I live in the faith of the Son of God; and Habacuc (2:4): But the just lives [Vulg. shall live] by his faith. The very thing by which the soul is purged of its sins (Acts 15:9): Purifying their hearts by faith. The very thing by which the soul is adorned with justice (Rom. 3:22): (Even) the justice of God, [is] by faith in Jesus Christ. The very thing by which the soul is espoused to God (Hos. 2:20): (And) I will espouse thee to me in faith.

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Where feasible, all quotations from Scripture have been taken from the Douay-Rheims version.

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Ipsa est per quam homines in Dei filios adoptantur, Ioan. I, 12: dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius. Ipsa est per quam ad Deum acceditur, Hebr. XI, 6: accedentem ad Deum oportet credere.

The very thing by which men are adopted as sons of God (John 1:12): He gave them power to becomes sons of God, to them that believe in his name. The very thing by which an approach is made to God (Heb. 11:6): (For he that) cometh to God must believe (that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him). The very thing, then, by which men attain to the reward of eternal life, according to John (6:40): (And) this is the will of my Father that sent me: that everyone who seeth the Son and believeth in Him, may have life everlasting. Fittingly, therefore, the Vicar of Christ when he is about to propose the commandments by which the Church founded by the preaching of the Apostles is peacefully governed, gives [his undertaking] the title On the Faith. But it must be considered that, since there are many articles of faith, some of which appear to pertain to the Godhead itself, but some to the human nature which the Son of God assumes in the unity of the Person, but others to the effect of His divinity, still, the foundation of the whole of faith is the First Truth itself, since by reason of it all other things are contained under faith, inasmuch as they are somehow referred to God. And so the Lord says in John (14:1): You believe in God, believe also in me , by which we are given to understand that one believes in Christ inasmuch as He is God, as though faith were principally about God. But among those things which we hold by faith, this is unique to the Christian Faith, that we confess a Trinity of Persons in the unity of the divine essence. For we are marked out under this [sign] by professing Christ through baptism, as is clear from what was adduced above: Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. But other things which we assert about God are found to be common to us and to others; for example, that God is one, almighty, and other things held by faith about God if such there be, which not even the Jews and the Saracens deny.

Ipsa denique est per quam homines aeternae vitae bravium consequuntur, secundum illud Ioan. VI, 40: haec est voluntas patris mei qui misit me, ut omnis qui videt filium et credit in eum, habeat vitam aeternam. Convenienter igitur Christi vicarius propositurus mandata quibus Ecclesia per apostolorum praedicationem fundata pacifice gubernatur, titulum de fide praemittit. Sed considerandum est, quod cum multi sint articuli fidei, quorum quidam videntur ad ipsam divinitatem pertinere, quidam vero ad humanam naturam, quam filius Dei in unitatem personae assumpsit, alii vero ad diviniatis effectus, fundamentum tamen totius fidei est ipsa prima veritas divinitatis, cum omnia alia ea ratione contineantur sub fide, inquantum ad Deum aliqualiter referuntur. Unde et dominus discipulis dicit Ioan. XIV, 1: creditis in Deum et in me credite; per quod datur intelligi quod in Christum creditur inquantum est Deus, quasi fide principaliter de Deo existente. Inter ea vero quae de Deo fide tenemus, hoc est singulare fidei Christianae ut Trinitatem personarum in unitate divinae essentiae fate-amur. Sub hac enim professione Christo per Baptismum sumus consignati, ut patet per id quod supra inductum est: baptizantes eos in no-mine patris et filii et spiritus sancti. Alia vero quae de Deo asserimus, nobis et aliis communia esse inveniuntur; puta, quod Deus sit unus, omnipotens, et si qua alia de Deo fide tenentur; quae etiam Iudaei et Saraceni non diffitentur.

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Unde ad insinuandum proprium et singulare dogma fidei Christianae, non praetitulavit fidei tractatum de Deo, sed de Trinitate. Addit autem, summa, quia divina Trinitas arcem quandam tenet inter plurimas Trinitates ab ea derivatas. Derivatur enim ab illa Trinitate divina quaedam Trinitas in anima nostra, secundum quam ad imaginem Dei sumus secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Derivantur etiam ab ipsa aliae Trinitates in singulis creaturis, prout modum quendam et speciem et ordinem habent secundum quae in eis divinae Trinitatis quasi quoddam vestigium invenitur, ut Augustinus docet in libro de Trinitate.

And so in order to suggest the proper and unique dogma of the Christina Faith, he has entitled his treatment of faith not On God, but rather On the Trinity. But he adds, the Highest, because the divine Trinity holds a certain supremacy among the many Trinities derived from it. For from the divine Trinity derives a certain trinity in our soul, according to which we take on the image of God with respect to memory, intelligence, and will. Other trinities also derive from it in particular creatures, according as they have a certain mode, species, and order with respect to which a certain trace of the divine Trinity is found in them, as Augustine teaches in his book On the Trinity (XV. 21ff.).

Ad discretionem igitur omnium harum Trinita- In order, therefore, to distinguish all these trinitum quae a divina descendunt, dicitur de summa ties which descend from the divine one, [this Trinitate. work] is called On the Highest Trinity. Sed de hac Trinitate divina diversi haeretici diversa errantes senserunt: quorum Sabellius abstulit personarum distinctionem dicens patris et filii et spiritus sancti esse unam essentiam et unam personam, sed solum differre nominibus; Arius vero posuit trium personarum esse diversas substantias, et dignitate et duratione differentes: quae omnia et consimilia fides condemnat Catholica. Quia igitur de summa Trinitate et aliis ad fidem pertinentibus hic tradere intendit quod fides Catholica tenet, ideo additur, et fide Catholica. Dicitur autem fides Ecclesiae Catholica, idest universalis, ut Boetius dicit in libro de Trinitate, tum propter universalium praecepta regularum, tum propterea quia eius cultus per omnes pene mundi terminos emanavit; haereticorum vero errores sub certis terrarum angulis includuntur. But with respect to this divine Trinity different heretics went astray thinking different things; one of whom, Sabellius, took away the distinction of Persons, saying the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one essence and one Person, but differ solely by the names; but Arius held the three Persons to be diverse substances, differing by dignity and duration, all of which and similar things the Catholic Faith condemns. Since, therefore, he intends to hand on what the Catholic Faith holds about the highest Trinity, as well as other things pertaining to the faith, he therefore adds, and the Catholic Faith, that is to say, universal, [for,] as Boethius says in his book On the Trinity [cap. I], [this faith is called Catholic and universal] both by reason of the precepts of its universal rules, as well as because its cultus has spread to nearly all the ends of the earth, whereas the errors of the heretics are restricted to certain corners of the earth. But because faith in the Holy Trinity is to be considered, one must first understand that the act of faith is twofold, namely, to believe with the heart, and to confess with the mouth, according to Romans (10:10): With the heart we believe unto justice; but, with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation.

Quia de fide sanctae Trinitatis considerandum est, primo oportet scire, quod duplex est actus fidei, scilicet corde credere et ore confiteri, secundum illud Rom. X, 10: corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem.

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Uterque autem actus aliquid requirit ad sui perfectionem. Nam interior actus fidei exigit firmitatem absque omni dubitatione, quae firmitas provenit ex infallibilitate divinae veritatis, cui fides innititur; unde dicitur Iac. I, 6: postulet autem in fide nihil haesitans. Sed confessio fidei debet esse simplex, idest absque simulatione, secundum illud I ad Timoth. I, 5: finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta. Debet etiam esse simplex, idest absque erroris permixtione, secundum illud I ad Thessal. II, 3: exhortatio nostra non fuit de errore. Debet etiam esse absque variatione, II ad Cor. I, 18: sermo noster qui fuit apud vos, non fuit in illo est et non.

But both acts require something for their perfection. For the interior act of faith stands in need of firmness apart from any doubt, which firmness arises from the infallibility of the divine truth, which the Faith makes known; and so it is said in James (1:6), But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. But the confession of faith should be simple, that is, without any dissimulation, according to I Tim. (1:5): The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith. But it should also be simple in the sense of being without any admixture of error, according to I Thess. (2:3): For our exhortation was not of error, nor in deceit. But it should also be without variation, II Cor. (1:18): Our preaching which was to you, was not It is and It is not.

Quantum ergo ad primum dicit, firmiter credi- With respect to the first, therefore, he says, We mus; quantum ad secundum et simpliciter con- firmly believe; with respect to the second, and fitemur. simply confess. Ulterius autem considerandum est quod fidei Christianae articuli a quibusdam duodecim, a quibusdam quatuordecim computantur. Secundum enim illos qui computant quatuor-decim, septem articuli pertinent ad divinitatem, septem vero ad humanitatem. In the last place one must consider that the articles of the Christian Faith are reckoned by some to be fourteen, but by others, twelve. For according to those who reckon them to be fourteen, seven articles pertain to the Godhead, but seven to the humanity [of Christ].

Illi autem qui ad divinitatem pertinent, sic dis- Now those which pertain to the Godhead are tinguuntur, distinguished as follows: ut unus sit articulus de divinae essentiae unitate, qui tangitur in symbolo cum dicitur: credo in unum Deum. Secundus est de persona patris, qui tangitur cum dicitur: patrem omnipotentem. There is one article on the unity of the divine essence, which the Symbol touches on when he says: I believe in one God. A second concerns the Person of the Father, which is touched on when it says: the Father, the Almighty.

Tertius est de persona filii, qui tangitur cum A third concerns the Person of the Son, which is dicitur: et in Iesum Christum filium eius. touched on when it says: and in Jesus Christ His Son. Quartus est de persona spiritus sancti, qui tangi- A fourth concerns the Person of the Holy Spirit, tur cum dicitur: et in spiritum sanctum. which is touched on when it says: And in the Holy Spirit.

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Quintus est de effectu, quo a Deo creamur in esse naturae, qui tangitur cum dicitur: creatorem caeli et terrae. Sextus de effectu Dei secundum quod recreamur in esse gratiae, qui tangitur cum dicitur: sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam, sanctorum communionem, remissionem peccatorum. Quia per gratiam Dei in unitatem Ecclesiae congregamur, sacramenta communicamus et peccatorum remissionem consequimur. Septimus articulus est de effectu Dei quo perficimur in esse gloriae et quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam; et hic tangitur cum dicitur: carnis resurrectionem, vitam aeternam.

A fifth concerns the effect by which we are created in nature, which is touched on when it says: Creator of heaven and earth. A sixth concerns Gods effect according as we are created again in grace, which is touched on when it says: the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins ; the reason being that by grace we are gathered into the unity of the Church, we communicate in the sacraments, and we obtain the forgiveness of sins. A seventh article concerns Gods effect by which we are perfected in the being of glory both with respect to the body and with respect to the soul; and this is touched on when it says: the resurrection of the flesh, the life everlasting.

Articuli vero septem ad incarnationem pertinen- But the seven articles pertaining to the Incartes sic distinguuntur, nation are distinguished as follows: ut primus sit de Christi conceptione, qui tangitur cum dicitur: qui conceptus est de spiritu sancto. Secundus autem est de eius nativitate, qui tangitur cum dicitur: natus ex Maria virgine. Tertius est de eius passione, qui tangitur cum dicitur: passus, mortuus et sepultus. Quartus est de descensu ad Inferos: quintus de resurrectione: sextus de ascensione: ascendit ad caelos. Septimus de adventu ad iudicium: inde venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos. Alii vero ponentes duodecim articulos, ponunt unum articulum de tribus personis; et articulum de effectu gloriae dividunt in duos, ut scilicet alius sit articulus de resurrectione carnis, et alius de vita aeterna: et sic articuli ad divinitatem pertinentes sunt sex. The first concerns the conception of Christ, which is touched on when it says: who was conceived by the Holy Spirit. But the second concerns His birth, which is touched one when it says: born of the Virgin Mary. The third concerns His passion, which is touched on when it says: suffered, died, and was buried. The fourth concerns his descent into hell [: he descended into hell]; the fifth His resurrection [: the third day he rose again from the dead]; the sixth His ascension: he ascended into Heaven; the seventh His return in judgment: He will come again to judge the living and the dead. But others holding there to be twelve articles, put down one article concerning the Three Persons; and the article concerning the effect of glory they divide into two, so that there is one article concerning the resurrection of the flesh, and another concerning eternal life: and thus the articles pertaining to divinity are six.

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Item conceptionem et nativitatem Christi sub uno articulo comprehendunt; et sic etiam articuli de humanitate sunt sex: unde omnes sunt duodecim. Primo igitur prosequitur articulum primum de essentiae unitate; unde primo ponit unitatem divinae essentiae: unus est solus verus Deus, secundum illud Ioan. XVII, 3: ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum. Deut. VI, 4: audi Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est: per quod excluditur error gentilium ponentium multos deos.

Again, they include the conception and birth of Christ under one article; and so the articles concerning His humanity are also six, so that all told they are twelve. He proceeds therefore first to the first article concerning the unity of the divine essence; and so he puts down first the unity of the divine essence, (saying): there is only one true God, according to John (17:3): That they may know thee, the only true God. (And) Deut. (6:4) (adds): Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God: whereby the error of the Gentiles positing many gods is excluded. Now he says true God, because He is essentially and naturally God; for some are called gods not in truth, [but] by adoption, or by participation in divinity; or as being so named, according to the Psalm (81:6): I have said: You are gods. They are also called gods according to the opinion of those laboring under a mistake, according to the Psalm (95:5): All the gods of the Gentiles are devils. Then he shows the excellence of the divine nature or essence. And first with respect to this, that He is not comprehended by time: which is meant when it says eternal. For that is called eternal which lacks a beginning and an end, and because its being is not varied by past and future. For nothing is withdrawn from it, nor can anything come to it anew. And so He says to Moses in Ex. (3:14): I am Who am, since His being is not made new either in the past or in the future, but He always has being in the present. And the Apostle says in his Letter to the Romans (16:26): Which now is made manifest by the Scriptures of the Prophets, according to the precept of the eternal God. Second, that the greatness of God incomparably exceeds every greatness of the creature is shown when it says, immense. For that can be measured by something else which, if it exceed in greatness, still, the excess is according to some proportion. In this way the double measures the sextuple, inasmuch as three times two makes six. But the sextuple exceeds the double according to a certain proportion, according as the double measures the sextuple, because it is three times it.

Dicitur autem verus Deus, quia est essentialiter et naturaliter Deus; dicuntur enim aliqui dii non veri, per adoptionem, vel per participationem divinitatis; sive nuncupative, secundum illud Psalm. LXXXI, 6: ego dixi: dii estis. Dicuntur etiam aliqui dii secundum opinionem errantium, secundum illud Psalm. XCV, 5: omnes dii gentium Daemonia. Deinde ostendit excellentiam divinae naturae sive essentiae. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod non comprehenditur tempore: quod significatur cum dicitur, aeternus. Dicitur enim aeternus, quia caret principio et fine, et quia eius esse non variatur per praeteri-tum et futurum. Nihil enim ei subtrahitur, nec aliquid ei de novo advenire potest. Unde dicit ad Moysem Exod. III, 14: ego sum qui sum, quia scilicet eius esse non novit praeteritum nec futurum, sed semper praesentialiter esse habet. Et apostolus dicit ad Rom. ult. 26: nunc patefactum est per Scripturas prophetarum secundum praeceptum aeterni Dei.

Secundo ostenditur quod Dei magnitudo excedit incomparabiliter omnem magnitudinem creaturae, cum dicitur, immensus. Illud enim mensurari potest per aliquid aliud, quod si excedat in magnitudine, tamen excessus est secundum aliquam proportionem. Sicut binarius mensurat senarium, inquantum ter duo faciunt sex. Senarius autem excedit binarium secundum aliquam proportionem, secundum quam binarius mensurat senarium, quia est triplum eius.

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Deus autem excedit magnitudine suae dignitatis omnem creaturam in infinitum; et ideo dicitur immensus, quia nulla est commensuratio vel proportio alicuius creaturae ad ipsum; unde dicitur in Psalm. CXLIV, 3: magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis eius non est finis; et Baruch IV [III], 25, dicitur: magnus est et non habens finem, excelsus et immensus. Tertio ostenditur quod excedit omnem mutabilitatem, cum dicitur, incommutabilis, quia scilicet nulla est apud ipsum variatio, secundum illud Iacob. I, 17: apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. Quarto ostenditur quod sua potestas transcendit omnia, cum dicitur, omnipotens, quia simpliciter omnia potest; unde ipse dicit Gen. XVII, 1: ego Deus omnipotens. Et si quis obiiciat id quod apostolus dicit II ad Tim. II, 13: ille fidelis per-manet, negare seipsum non potest, et ita non est omnipotens: dicendum, quod negare seipsum, est deficere a se ipso, non posse autem deficere non est ex defectu potentiae, sed ex potentiae perfectione, sicut etiam apud homines ex magna fortitudine est quod aliquis vinci non possit. In hoc ergo vere Deus omnipotens ostenditur quod omnia potest facere, et in nullo potest deficere. Quinto ostenditur quod excedit omnium rationem et intellectum, cum dicitur, incomprehensibilis. Illa enim comprehendere dicimur quae perfecte cognoscimus, quantum cognoscibilia sunt. Nulla autem creatura tantum potest Deum cognoscere quantum cognoscibilis est, et propter hoc nulla creatura potest eum comprehendere; unde dicitur Iob XI, 7: forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies? Quasi dicat, non. Et Ierem. XXXII, 18, dicitur: dominus exercituum nomen tibi, magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis cogitatu. Sexto ostenditur quod excedit omnem locutionem, cum dicitur, ineffabilis, quia scilicet nullus potest sufficienter effari laudem ipsius: unde dicitur Eccli. XLIII, 33: exaltate illum quantum potestis; maior est enim omni laude.

Now God infinitely exceeds every creature in greatness by reason of His dignity; and so He is called immense, because there is no common measure or proportion of any creature to Him; and so it says in the Psalm (144:3): Great is the Lord,: and of his greatness there is no end; and Baruch (3:25) says: It is great, and hath no end: it is high and immense. Third, that He surpasses every kind of change is shown when it says unchangeable, because there is no variation in Him, according to Jas. (1:17): with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration. Fourth, that He surpasses everything by His power is shown when it says almighty, because He can do all things without qualification; and so He Himself says in Genesis (17:1), I am God almighty. And if someone object that the Apostle says in II Tim. (2:13): If we believe not, he continueth faithful, he cannot deny himself, and that He is not [therefore] almighty, it must be said that to deny Himself is to fall short of Himself, but He cannot fall short from a lack of power, but from the perfection of His power, just as among men someone cannot be overcome due to his greatness of courage. But that God is truly almighty is shown in this, that He can do everything, and falls short in nothing. Fifth, that He exceeds every reason and understanding is shown when it says, incomprehensible. For we comprehend those things which we know perfectly, to the extent things are capable of being known. Now no creature can know God to the extent that He is knowable, and for this reason no creature can comprehend Him; and so it says in Job (11:7): Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? as if to say, no. And Jer. (32:18-19) says: the Lord of hosts is thy name. Great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought. Sixth, that He exceeds every utterance is shown when it says ineffable, since no one can sufficiently offer Him praise: and so it is said in Ecclesiastics (43:33): exalt him as much as you can; for he is above all praise.

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Deinde accedit ad articulum Trinitatis, ponens quidem primo nomina trium personarum, cum dicit: pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, quae quidem exprimuntur Matth. ult., 19: docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti. Sed circa haec tria nomina diversimode aliqui erraverunt. Sabellius enim dixit, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus solis nominibus disting-uuntur, dicens, eundem in persona esse, qui quandoque dicitur pater, quandoque filius, quandoque spiritus sanctus, propter rationes diversas; et ad hoc excludendum subditur: tres quidem personae: alia est enim persona patris, alia filii, alia spiritus sancti. Arius vero posuit, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sicut sunt diversa nomina, ita sunt diversae substantiae; et ad hoc excludendum subdit: sed una substantia. Verum quia substantia secundum usum vocabuli aliter sumitur apud nos et aliter apud Graecos, ne circa hoc possit esse aliqua deceptio, subdit, seu natura. Apud Graecos enim hypostasis, idest substantia, accipitur, sicut apud nos persona, pro re aliqua subsistente, quam dicimus suppositum vel rem naturae, sicut hic homo est suppositum, vel res humanae naturae. Apud nos vero secundum communem usum loquendi, substantia dicitur essentia vel natura rei, secundum quod humanitas dicitur natura hominis.

Then he comes to the article on the Trinity, first putting down the names of the Three Persons when it says: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which are expressed in Matt. (28:19-20): Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. But with respect to these three names, some men have gone astray in different ways. For Sabellius said that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinguished solely by their names, saying that the one who at times is called Father, at times Son, at times Holy Spirit, are the same Person, by reason of di-verse notions; and to exclude this he says: three Persons: for one is the Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit. But Arius held that, just as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are different names, so they are different substances: and to exclude this he adds: but one substance. But because substance according to the use of the word is taken in one way among us [Latins] and in another way among the Greeks, lest there be some deception concerning this, he adds, or nature. For among the Greeks hypostasis, that is, substance, is taken the same way Person is among us, [namely,] for something subsisting, which we call a supposit or thing of nature, just as this man is a supposit, or thing of human nature. But according to the common manner of speaking among us, substance means the essence or nature of a thing, according to which humanity means the nature of man. Thus, therefore, we are given to understand that in the divinity there are three subsisting things, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but there is one nature simply in which they subsist, which cannot happen in human things. For Peter and Paul and John are indeed three things subsisting in human nature: but human nature, even if it be one species in these three, is nevertheless not one and the same in number, and thus they are three men and not one man. But because in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit there is one divine nature, we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, and not three gods.

Sic igitur datur intelligi, quod in divinitate tres sunt subsistentes, scilicet pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, sed una numero simpliciter natura est in qua subsistunt: quod in rebus humanis contingere non potest. Petrus enim et Paulus et Ioannes sunt quidem tres subsistentes in natura humana: sed natura humana, etsi sit una specie in istis tribus, non tamen est una et eadem numero; et ideo sunt tres homines, non unus homo. Quia vero in patre et filio et spiritu sancto est una numero natura divina, dicimus quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unus Deus, et non tres dii.

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Posset autem aliquis prave intelligere unam essentiam trium personarum, ita scilicet quod una pars illius naturae esset in patre, alia in filio, alia in spiritu sancto; sicut si diceremus unam aquam esse in tribus rivis defluentibus ab uno fonte, ita scilicet quod una pars aquae est in uno rivo, alia in alio, tertia in tertio. Si autem sic esset una natura trium personarum, sequeretur quod divina natura esset composita ex pluribus partibus: et ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit, simplex omnino, idest nullam compositionem habens. Omne enim compositum posterius est his ex quibus componitur; sic ergo aliquid esset prius Deo, quod est impossibile. Sed posset aliquis quaerere: si trium personarum est una simplex natura, unde ergo tres personae distinguuntur? Et ideo ad hoc respondens subdit: pater a nullo, filius a patre solo, ac spiritus sanctus pariter ab utroque. Ubi considerandum est, quod quidquid in divinis absolute dicitur, commune est et unum in tribus personis: sicut quod dicitur Deus bonus, sapiens et omnia huiusmodi. Ibi vero solum invenitur distinctum, ubi aliquid invenitur pertinens ad relationem originis, quia scilicet pater a nullo est, et secundum hoc innascibilis dicitur. Filius vero a patre est per generationem, secundum illud Psal. II, 7: ego hodie genui te, et secundum hoc patri attribuitur paternitas, et filio filiatio. Spiritus autem sanctus ab utroque procedit; et secundum hoc spiritui sancto attribuitur processio, patri vero et filio communis spiratio, quia scilicet communiter spirant spiritum sanctum. Sic igitur quinque sunt notiones secundum quas distinctiones personarum designantur in divinis: scilicet paternitas, per quam ostenditur quod a patre est filius, filiatio per quam ostenditur quod filius est a patre; processio per quam ostenditur quod spiritus sanctus est a patre et filio; innascibilitas, per quam dignoscitur quod pater a nullo est; communis spiratio, per quam ostenditur quod pater et filius communiter spirant spiritum sanctum.

But someone could understand one essence in three Persons in a debased manner, such that one part of that nature would be in the Father, another in the Son, another in the Holy Spirit, just as if we were to say there is one water in three streams flowing from one spring, such that one part of the water is in one stream, another in another, and a third in a third. If, however, there were one nature in three Persons in this way, it would follow that the divine nature would be composed of many parts: and so in order to exclude this he adds, entirely simple, that is, involving no composition. For every composite is subsequent to the things from which it is composed; in this way, then, something would be before God, which is impossible. But someone might ask: If there are three Persons in one simple nature, how, then, are the Three Persons distinguished? And so responding to this he adds: the Father from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit equally from both. Where it must be considered that whatever is said absolutely in the Godhead is one and common in the three Persons, just as God is called good, wise, and everything of the sort. But something distinct is found there only where something is found pertaining to the relation of origin, because the Father is from none, and in this respect He is called unbegotten. But the Son is from the Father by generation, according to the Psalm (2:7): This day I have begotten you , and in this respect fatherhood is attributed to the Father, and sonship to the Son. The Holy Spirit, however, proceeds from both, and with respect to this to the Holy Spirit procession is attributed, but to the Father and the Son in common, spiration. There are thus five notions according to which the distinctions of the Persons are designated in the Godhead: namely, fatherhood, by which it is shown that from the Father is the Son; sonship, by which it is shown that the Son is from the Father; procession, by which it is shown that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; being unbegotten, by which it is shown that the Father is from none; common spiration, by which it is shown that the Holy Spirit is spirated by the Father and the Son in common.

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Sed rursus posset alicui occurrere falsa cogitatio, ut quia in rebus humanis filius a quodam principio temporis incepit a patre generari, et generatio eius non semper durat, sed certo termino temporis finitur, sic etiam sit circa originem divinarum personarum: ut scilicet filius ab aliquo tempore inceperit a patre generari, et aliquo tempore eius generatio fuerit finita, et similiter de spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit: absque initio semper ac sine fine pater generans, filius nascens, spiritus sanctus ab utroque procedens.

But additionally, a false thought might occur to someone [along these lines], seeing that in human things a son begins to be generated by a father at a certain point in time, and his generation does not go on, but is limited by a certain term, so also in the case of the origination of the divine Persons, so that the Son will have begun to be generated from the Father at some definite point in time, and at some definite point in time his generation will have come to an end, and likewise with the Holy Spirit. And so to exclude this he adds: eternally without beginning or end the Father generating, the Son being born, the Holy Spirit proceeding from both. An example of this, albeit an imperfect one, can be found in creatures. For we observe that a ray proceeds from the sun, and as soon as there was a sun, the ray proceeded from it, nor will the ray ever cease to proceed from it as long as the sun exists. Now thus does the Son proceed from the Father as a ray does from the sun, and so the Apostle says in his Letter to the Hebrews (1:3): who is the brightness of his glory; but the Holy Spirit proceeds from both as heat does from the sun, and so it is said in the Psalm (18:7): there is no one that can hide himself from his heat. But this example falls short insofar as the sun did not always exist, and so neither did its ray always proceed from it: but since God the Father always was, the Son always proceeds from Him, and the Holy Spirit from both. Another example is given in the human soul, in which the word conceived within proceeds from memory, and love proceeds from both. And so also from the Father proceeds the Son just as His word, and the Holy Spirit as the love common to both of them. But this example falls short in two respects: First of all because the human understanding did not always exist; second, because the word is not actually conceived in his heart. But the divine intellect always was, and always understands without interruption, and so a word always arises in it, that is the Son, and a love proceeds, which is the Holy Spirit. But because the Arian heretics had the Son coming after the Father, and the Holy Spirit after both, he therefore excludes it consequently.

Cuius exemplum aliqualiter in creaturis inveniri potest licet imperfectum. Videmus enim quod radius a sole procedit, et statim quod fuit sol, radius processit ab eo, nec unquam desinet ab eo radius procedere quandiu sol erit. Sic autem filius procedit a patre, ut radius a sole, unde dicit apostolus ad Hebr. I, 3: qui cum sit splendor gloriae; spiritus autem sanctus ab utroque procedit, sicut calor a sole et radio, unde dicitur in Psal. XVIII, 7: nec est qui se abscondat a calore eius. Sed hoc exemplum deficit quantum ad hoc quod sol non semper fuit, et ideo nec radius eius semper ab eo processit: quia vero Deus pater semper fuit, semper ab eo processit filius, et ab utroque spiritus sanctus. Potest et aliud exemplum poni in anima humana, in qua verbum interius conceptum, a memoria procedit, et ab utroque procedit amor. Et ita etiam a patre procedit filius sicut verbum eius, et spiritus sanctus sicut amor communis utriusque. Sed hoc exemplum deficit in duobus. Primo quidem quia intellectus humanus non semper fuit; secundo, quia non semper verbum in corde suo actualiter concipit. Sed intellectus divinus semper fuit, et semper absque intermissione intelligit, unde semper in eo oritur verbum, quod est filius, et procedit amor, qui est spiritus sanctus. Quia vero haeretici Ariani filium patri postpone-bant, et spiritum sanctum utrique, ideo hoc consequenter excludit.

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Est autem considerandum, quod Ariani postponebant filium patri, primo quidem quantum ad essentiam, dicentes, quod essentia patris est dignior quam essentia filii: et ad hoc excludendum subdit, consubstantiales, quia scilicet una est essentia patris et filii in nullo differens. Secundo vero quantum ad magnitudinem, non quod in Deo sit magnitudo molis, sed magnitudo virtutis, quae est perfectio bonitatis suae. Dicebant enim patrem esse filio maiorem etiam secundum divinitatem: et ad hoc excludendum subdit, et coaequales. Secundum humanitatem vero dominus dicit Ioan. XIV, 28: pater maior me est. Tertio quantum ad potestatem, dicentes filium non esse omnipotentem: et ad hoc excludendum subditur, et coomnipotentes.

Now it must be considered that the Arians placed the Son after the Father, first with respect to essence, saying that the essence of the Father is of greater dignity than the essence of the Son; and in order to exclude this he adds, consubstantial, since there is one essence of the Son and the Father differing in no way whatsoever. But second, with respect to greatness, not that in God there is greatness of bulk, but rather greatness of virtue, which is the perfection of His goodness. For they used to say that the Father is greater than the Son also with respect to divinity: and so to exclude this he adds, and co-equal. But with respect to humanity, the Lord says in John (14:28): The Father is greater than me. Third, with respect to power, saying the Son is not almighty: and to exclude this it is added, coomnipotent.

Quarto quantum ad durationem, quia dicebant Fourth, with respect to duration, since they used filium non semper fuisse: et ad hoc excluden- to say the Son did not always exist: and to exdum subdit, coaeterni. clude this he adds, co-eternal. Quinto quantum ad operationem. Dicebant enim quod pater operatur per filium sicut per instrumentum suum, vel sicut per ministrum: et ad hoc excludendum subdit, unum universorum principium. Non enim filius est aliud principium rerum, quasi inferius quam pater, sed ambo sunt unum principium. Et quod dictum est de filio, intelligendum est de spiritu sancto. Fifth, with respect to operation. For they used to say that the Father worked through the Son as through an instrument, or through a minister: and in order to exclude this he adds: one principle of all things. For the Son is not another principle of things, as though He were inferior to the Father, but both are one principle. And what is said of the Son here should be understood of the Holy Spirit as well. Then he comes to the next article, which concerns the creation of things, wherein he excludes various opinions. For there were some heretics, like the Manicheans, who posited two creators, one good, who created invisible and spiritual creatures, the other evil, who they say created all things visible and corporeal. But the Catholic Faith confesses that all things apart from God, both visible and invisible, were created by God; and so Paul says in Acts (17:24): God, who made the world, and all things therein; he, being Lord of heaven and earth, etc., and Heb. (11:3): By faith we understand that the worlds were prepared by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things which are visible.

Deinde accedit ad alium articulum, qui est de creatione rerum, ubi varias opiniones excludit. Fuerunt enim aliqui haeretici, sicut Manichaei, qui posuerunt duos creatores: unum bonum, qui creavit creaturas invisibiles et spirituales, alium malum, quem dicunt creasse omnia haec visibilia et corporalia. Fides autem Catholica confitetur omnia, praeter Deum, tam visibilia quam invisibilia, a Deo esse creata; unde Paulus dicit Act. XVII, 24: Deus qui fecit mundum et omnia quae in eo sunt, hic caeli et terrae cum sit dominus, etc., et Hebr. XI, 3: fide credimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent.

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Unde ad hunc errorem excludendum dicit: creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium. Aliorum error fuit ponentium Deum quidem esse primum principium productionis rerum, sed tamen non immediate omnia creasse, sed mediantibus Angelis mundum hunc esse creatum: et hic fuit error Menandrianorum. Et ad hunc errorem excludendum subdit: qui sua omnipotenti virtute; quia scilicet sola Dei virtute omnes creaturae sunt productae, secundum illud Psal. VIII, 4 (3): videbo caelos tuos opera digitorum tuorum. Alius fuit error Origenis ponentis quod Deus a principio creavit solas spirituales creaturas, et postea quibusdam earum peccantibus, creavit corpora, quibus quasi quibusdam vinculis spirituales substantiae alligarentur, ac si corporales creaturae non fuerint ex principali Dei intentione productae, quia bonum erat eas esse, sed solum ad punienda peccata spiritualium creaturarum, cum tamen dicatur Gen. I, 31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Unde ad hoc excludendum dicit quod simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam.

And so to exclude this error he says: Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal. There was another error of those holding God to be the first principle of the production of things, but nevertheles not to have created all things immediately, but held this world to be created through the mediation of angels: and this was the error of the Menandrites. And in order to exclude this mistake he adds: who by His almighty power; the reason being that every creature has been produced by God according to the Psalm (8:3): For I will behold thy heavens, the works of thy fingers.27 There was another error of Origen, maintaining that God from the beginning created only spiritual creatures, and afterwards when some of them had sinned, created bodies by which these spiritual substances were bound, so to speak, by certain chains, as though corporeal creatures were not produced from the principle intention of God, because it was good for them to be, but only in order to punish the sins of spiritual creatures, whereas it is said in Genesis (1:31): God saw all things which he made, and they were very good. And so in order to exclude this he says that He established both creatures together,28 the spiritual, namely, and the corporeal, the angelic, to wit, and the mundane. There was another error of Aristotle, maintaining that all things were created by God, but from eternity, and that there was no beginning of time, whereas it is written in Genesis (1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth .29 And in order to exclude this he adds, from the beginning of time. There was another error of Anaxagoras, who held the world to have been made by God from some beginning in time, but the matter of the world to have pre-existed from all eternity, and not to have been made by God, whereas the Apostle says in Romans (4:17): who calleth

Alius error fuit Aristotelis ponentis quidem omnia a Deo esse producta, sed ab aeterno, et nullum fuisse principium temporis, cum tamen scriptum sit Gen. I, 1: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Et ad hoc excludendum addit, ab initio temporis. Alius error fuit Anaxagorae, qui posuit quidem mundum a Deo factum ex aliquo principio temporis, sed tamen materiam mundi ab aeterno praeextitisse, et non esse eam factam a Deo, cum tamen apostolus dicat Rom. IV, 17: qui vocat ea quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt.
27

Likewise, all things were created through the Person of the Son: For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him. (Col. 1:16)

28 29

For other translations of this oft-disputed passage, see further below. As if to say, the world did not always exist, but had, rather, a beginning (sc. in time).

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Et ad hoc excludendum addit, de nihilo. Fuit autem alius error Tertulliani ponentis animam hominis corpoream esse, cum tamen apostolus dicat I ad Thess. V, 23: integer spiritus vester et anima et corpus sine querela in adventu domini nostri Iesu Christi servetur ; ubi manifeste a corpore animam et spiritum distinguit. Et ad hoc excludendum subdit: deinde, scilicet condidit Deus, humanam, scilicet naturam, quasi communem, ex spiritu et corpore constitutam; componitur enim homo ex spirituali natura et corporali. Secundum autem praedictum Manichaeorum errorem ponentium duo principia, unum bonum et unum malum, non solum attendebatur distinctio quantum ad creationem visibilium et invisibilium creaturarum, ut scilicet invisibilia sint a bono Deo, visibilia vero a malo, sed etiam quantum ad ipsa invisibilia. Ponebant enim primum principium esse invisibile, et ab eo quasdam invisibiles creaturas esse productas, quas dicebant esse naturaliter malas: et sic in ipsis Angelis erant quidam naturaliter boni ad bonam creationem boni Dei pertinentes, qui peccare non poterant; et quidam naturaliter mali, quos Daemones vocamus, qui non poterant non peccare, contra id quod dicitur Iob IV, 18: ecce qui serviunt ei, non sunt stabiles, et in Angelis suis reperit pravitatem. Similiter etiam circa animas hominum errabant, dicentes, quasdam esse bonae creationis, quae naturaliter bonum faciunt, quasdam autem malae creationis, quae naturaliter faciunt malum, contra id quod dicitur Eccle. VII, 30 (29): Deus fecit hominem rectum, et ipse immiscuit se infinitis quaestionibus. Et ideo ad haec excludenda, dicit: Diabolus autem, scilicet principalis, et alii Daemones quidem a Deo natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali , scilicet per liberum voluntatis arbitrium: homo vero Diaboli suggestione peccavit , idest, non naturaliter, sed propria voluntate.

those things that are not, as those that are . And in order to exclude this he adds, out of nothing. There was another error of Tertullian, maintaining the soul of man to be corporeal, whereas the Apostle says in I Thess. (5:23): that your whole spirit, and soul, and body, may be preserved blameless in the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, where he manifestly distinguishes the soul and spirit from the body. And in order to exclude this he adds: then, meaning God established, the human, meaning nature, constituted, as it were, in common [with both] from spirit and body; for man is composed from a spiritual as well as a corporeal nature. Now with regard to the aforementioned error of the Manicheans, holding there to be two principles, one good and one evil, not only was a distinction observed with regard to the creation of visible and invisible creatures, such that the invisible were from the good God, but the visible from bad, but even with regard to the invisible things themselves. For they held the first principle to be invisible, and from it certain invisible creatures were produced, which they used to call evil by nature: and so among the angels themselves, some were naturally good (as pertaining to the good creation of the good God), who could not sin; and others naturally evil, whom we call demons, who could not but sin, contrary to what is said in Job (4:18): Behold those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness. They likewise also went astray where the souls of men were concerned, saying that some were of the good creation, which they make naturally good, but some of the evil creation, which they make naturally evil, contrary to what is said in Ecclesiasticus (7:29): Only this I have found, that God made man right, and he hath entangled himself with an infinity of questions . And so in order to exclude this, he says: But the Devil, meaning (their head and) principal, and the other demons were created by God good in nature, but became evil by their own doing, meaning by their own free will: But man sinned at the prompting of the Devil, that is, not naturally, but by his own will.

Deinde accedit ad articulum incarnationis; et

Then he comes to the article on the Incarnation;

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quia Evangelium Christi, sicut dicit apostolus Rom. I, 2: Deus ante promiserat per prophetas suos in Scripturis sanctis, ideo praemittit de praenuntiatione prophetarum, circa quam etiam quidam erraverunt. Nam Manichaei et alii quidam haeretici vetus testamentum dixerunt non a bono Deo, qui est pater Christi, sed a malo Deo esse traditum, et per consequens doctrinam veteris testamenti semper fuisse mortiferam; quod manifeste falsum ostenditur per hoc quod dominus dicit Ioan. II, 16, de templo Iudaeorum loquens: nolite facere domum patris mei domum negotiationis, ubi manifeste patrem suum dicit Deum veteris testamenti, qui in templo Iudaeorum colebatur. Ariani vero dixerunt, in veteri testamento diversis visionibus filium apparuisse, non autem patrem: quod manifeste falsum ostenditur per hoc quod Abrahae in figuram Trinitatis tres viri apparuerunt, ut legitur Gen. XVIII. Cathaphryges etiam posuerunt, prophetas veteris testamenti quasi arreptitios esse locutos, non intelligentes quae loquebantur, contra id quod dicitur Dan. X, 1: intelligentia opus est in visione. Ad hos igitur errores excludendos dicit, quod haec sancta Trinitas, de qua scilicet dictum est, quae scilicet est secundum communem essentiam individua, et secundum personales proprietates discreta per Moysem et sanctos prophetas aliosque famulos suos. Ubi videtur distinguere vetus testamentum, scilicet in legem quae per Moysem data est et in prophetas, sicut fuit Isaias, Ieremias, etc. et in eos qui Agiographa conscripserunt, sicut fuit Salomon, Iob, et alii huiusmodi, quos famulos Dei hic nominat; secundum quam distinctionem dominus dicit Lucae ult. 44: oportet impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege et prophetis et Psalmis de me. Iuxta ordinatissimam dispositionem temporum: quod ponitur ad excludendum obiectionem gentilium, qui fidem Christianam irridebant ex hoc quod post multa tempora, quasi subito Deo in mentem venerit legem Evangelii hominibus dari. Non autem fuit subitum, sed convenienti ordinatione dispositum, ut prius humano generi per legem et prophetas fieret praenuntiatio de

and because the Gospel of Christ, as the Apostle says (Rom. 1:2):

xx

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Christo, tanquam hominibus tunc parvulis et minus eruditis, secundum illud Gal. III, 24: lex paedagogus noster fuit in Christo, et hoc est quod dicit, quod iuxta ordinatissimam dispositionem temporum doctrinam humano generi tribuit salutarem, non mortiferam, ut Manichaei dicebant. His igitur praemissis, accedit ad ipsum incarnationis mysterium explicandum, in quo etiam diversos errores excludit. Ubi primo sciendum est, quod Sabelliani confundentes divinas personas concedebant patrem esse incarnatum, quia dicebant eundem in persona esse patrem et filium. E contrario autem Ariani dividentes substantiam divinitatis, ex hoc quod filius est incarnatus, et non pater, volebant concludere aliam esse essentiam patris et filii, et aliam operationem utriusque. Fides autem Catholica media via inter utrumque incedens, propter distinctionem personarum dicit filium solum esse incarnatum (est enim facta incarnatio per unionem in persona, non in natura, ut infra determinant); propter unitatem autem naturae et operationis in tribus personis, dicit totam Trinitatem operatam fuisse incarnationem; et hoc est quod dicit: et tandem unigenitus Dei filius Iesus Christus a tota Trinitate communiter incarnatus. Fuit etiam error Helvidii, qui posuit Mariam quidem virginem concepisse et peperisse, sed post partum non semper virginem permansisse, sed ex Ioseph postmodum alios filios genuisse; et ad hoc excludendum dicit: ex Maria semper virgine. Alii vero, scilicet Ebionitae, gravius erraverunt, dicentes etiam Christum ex Ioseph semine esse conceptum; ad quod excludendum subditur: spiritu sancto cooperante est conceptus. Fuerunt autem alii, scilicet Manichaei, qui dixerunt Christum non veram carnem accepisse, sed phantasticam, contra id quod dominus discipulis aestimantibus post resurrectionem eum phantasma esse, dixit, Luc. ult. 39: spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere; ad quod excludendum dicit, verus homo factus. Ariani vero dixerunt quod filius Dei assumpsit

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solam carnem sine anima, et quod verbum fuit carni loco animae. Sed postea Apollinaristae dixerunt eum habere animam sensitivam tantum, contra id quod dicitur Matth. XXVI, 38: tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; et Ioan. X, 18: potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam; et ideo ad hoc excludendum dicit, ex anima rationali. Alii vero, scilicet sequaces Valentini, posuerunt corpus Christi non esse assumptum de virgine, sed de caelo allatum, contra id quod dicitur ad Gal. IV, 4: factum ex muliere; et Rom. I, 3: qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem . Et ad hoc excludendum dicit, et humana carne compositus. Circa ipsam autem unionem contrarie erraverunt Nestorius et Eutyches; quorum Nestorius posuit unionem esse factam solum secundum inhabitationem gratiae, sicut etiam in aliis sanctis Deus dicitur esse per inhabitantem gratiam, ut sic Dei et hominis sit alia et alia persona, contra id quod dicitur Ioan. I, 14: verbum caro factum est, idest filius Dei factus est homo; quod non potest dici de aliis quos per gratiam inhabitat. Eutyches vero posuit, quod facta est unio Dei et hominis in unam naturam, ita scilicet quod Christum asserebat esse quidem ex duabus naturis, non autem in duabus quia scilicet intendebat quod ante incarnationem erant duae naturae, Dei et hominis; sed post incarnationem facta est una natura. Unde ad utrumque excludendum dicit: una in duabus naturis persona viam vitae manifestius demonstravit. Fuerunt enim quidam Eutychis sectatores, scilicet Theodosius et Gaianus, qui ponentes unam naturam in Christo, quasi ex divinitate et humanitate confectam, diversimode erraverunt: nam Theodosius posuit illam naturam esse corruptibilem et passibilem; Gaianus autem incorruptibilem et impassibilem. Et ad hos errores excludendos, subdit: qui cum secundum divinitatem sit immortalis et impassibilis, secundum humanitatem factus est passibilis et mortalis. Deinde accedit ad articulum passionis, dicens: qui etiam pro salute humani generis in ligno crucis passus et mortuus. Post quem ponit articulum de descensu ad Inferos, dicens:

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descendit ad Inferos. Postea vero ponit articulum de resurrectione Christi: et resurrexit a mortuis. Ac deinde ponit articulum de ascensione, dicens, ascendit in caelum. Sed notandum est quod horum articulorum veritatem praedictus Arii et Apollinaris error salvare non potest. Si enim Christus animam non habuit, sed verbum fuit carni loco animae, et in morte separatum fuit a carne, consequens est quod illud quod carni convenit, de filio Dei dici non possit: unde non potest dici quod filius Dei iacuit in sepulcro, vel quod a mortuis resurrexit. Similiter etiam dici non poterit quod ad Inferos descendit, quia divinitati secundum seipsam, cum sit omnino immobilis, ascendere et descendere convenire non potest. Et ideo ad excludendum praedictum errorem, praedictorum articulorum veritatem explicat subdens: sed descendit in anima, et resurrexit in carne, ascenditque pariter in utroque. In morte enim Christi anima est separata a carne, sed divinitas indivisibiliter utrique, scilicet animae et carni, mansit unita. Unde cum anima Christi descendit ad Inferos, dicitur filius Dei descendisse secundum animam sibi unitam. Similiter etiam cum caro Christi, quae in morte quodammodo ceciderat, resurrexit ad vitam, dicitur filius Dei, qui secundum divinam naturam mori non poterat, secundum carnem resurrexisse, per hoc quod caro iterato animam resumpsit; et sic secundum utrumque, idest secundum animam et corpus, ascendit in caelum. Deinde ponit articulum de adventu ad iudicium, dicens: venturus in fine iudicare vivos et mortuos. Dicit autem vivos eos qui reperientur vivi in adventu iudicis, mortuos autem eos qui ante fuerunt praemortui: quod non est sic intelligendum, quasi aliqui sint futuri qui non moriantur, sed quia in ipso adventu iudicis morientur et statim resurgent. Vel vivos et mortuos intellige spiritualiter, idest iustos et peccatores. Et quia aliqui fuerunt ponentes quod in finali iudicio aliqui salvabuntur non propriis meritis, sed precibus aliquorum sanctorum donati; ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit: et redditurus singulis secundum merita sua, tam reprobis quam electis. Deinde ponit articulum resurrectionis generalis, quae pertinet ad effectum gloriae, dicens: qui omnes tam reprobi quam electi cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus, quae nunc

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gestant: quod ponitur ad excludendum quorundam haereticorum errorem, qui dicunt, quod resurgentes non habebunt eadem corpora quae nunc per mortem deponunt, sed quaedam corpora de caelis allata; quod est contra illud apostoli I ad Cor. XV, 53: oportet corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem. Consequenter assignat rationem resumptionis corporum, cum dicit: ut recipiant secundum opera sua, sive bona fecerint, sive mala. Quia enim homo aut bene aut male operatus est in anima simul et corpore, iustum est ut in utroque simul damnetur aut praemietur. Et quia Origenes posuit quod poena damnatorum non erit perpetua, similiter nec gloria beatorum; ideo ad hoc excludendum dicit: et illi cum Diabolo poenam aeternam, et isti cum Christo gloriam sempiternam. Sicut enim invidia Diaboli mors intravit in orbem terrarum, ut dicitur Sap. I, 24, ita per gratiam Christi reparamur ad vitam, secundum illud Ioan. X, 10: ego veni ut vitam habeant, et abundantius habeant. Deinde accedit ad articulum qui est de effectu gratiae: et primo tangit effectum gratiae quantum ad Ecclesiae unitatem, cum dicit: una est fidelium universalis Ecclesia, extra quam nullus salvatur omnino. Unitas autem Ecclesiae est praecipue propter fidei unitatem: nam Ecclesia nihil est aliud quam congregatio fidelium. Et quia sine fide impossibile est placere Deo, ideo extra Ecclesiam nulli patet locus salutis. Salus autem fidelium consummatur per Ecclesiae sacramenta, in quibus virtus passionis Christi operatur, et ideo consequenter exponit quid fides Catholica sentiat circa Ecclesiae sacramenta. Et primo circa Eucharistiam, cum dicit: in qua scilicet Ecclesia ipse idem Christus est sacerdos et sacrificium, quia scilicet ipse obtulit semet ipsum in ara crucis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis, ut dicitur ad Ephes. V, 2, in cuius sacrificii commemorationem cotidie in Ecclesia offertur sacrificium sub sacramento panis et vini. Circa quod sacramentum tria determinat. Primo quidem veritatem rei sub sacramento contentae, cum dicit: cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur. Dicit autem veraciter, ad excludendum errorem quorundam qui dixerunt quod in hoc sacramento non est corpus Christi

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secundum rei veritatem, sed solum secundum figuram, sive sicut in signo. Dicit autem: sub speciebus panis et vini, ad excludendum errorem quorundam qui dixerunt quod in sacramento altaris simul continetur substantia panis, et substantia corporis Christi; quod est contra verbum domini dicentis, hoc est corpus meum. Esset enim secundum hoc magis dicendum: hic est corpus meum. Ut ergo ostendat quod in hoc sacramento non remanet substantia panis et vini, sed solum species, idest accidentia sine subiecto, dicit: sub speciebus panis et vini. Secundo ostendit quomodo corpus Christi incipiat esse sub sacramento, scilicet per hoc quod substantia panis convertitur miraculose in substantiam corporis Christi, et substantia vini in substantiam sanguinis; et hoc est quod dicit: transubstantiatis pane in corpus Christi et vino in sanguinem potestate divina, ut ad mysterium perficiendum unitatis, idest ad celebrandum hoc sacramentum, quod est ecclesiasticae unitatis signum, accipiamus ipsi de suo quod accepit ipse de nostro. In hoc enim sacramento accipimus de corpore et sanguine Christi, quae filius Dei accepit de nostra natura. Tertio determinat ministrum huius sacramenti, in quo etiam tangit ordinis sacramentum, et hoc est quod dicit, et hoc utique sacramentum nemo potest conficere, nisi rite fuerit sacerdos ordinatus: quod est contra haeresim pauperum Lugdunensium, qui dicunt quemlibet hominem istud sacramentum posse conficere. Addit autem: secundum claves Ecclesiae, quas ipse concessit apostolis et eorum successoribus Iesus Christus. Quod dupliciter potest intelligi: vel quia sacerdos rite ordinatus claves Ecclesiae suscipit, vel quia secundum potestatem clavium sacerdotalis ordo confertur. Sunt autem claves Ecclesiae auctoritas discernendi et potestas iudicandi. Deinde accedit ad sacramentum Baptismi; circa quod primo tangit formam, cum dicit: sacramentum vero Baptismi quod ad invocationem individuae Trinitatis, videlicet patris et filii et spiritus sancti; haec est enim forma Baptismi: ego te baptizo in nomine patris et filii et spiritus

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sancti, ut traditur Matth. ult. 19. Secundo ponitur materia, cum dicitur, consecratur in aqua. Non enim in alio liquore potest hoc sacramentum perfici, nisi in vera aqua. Tertio ostendit quibus sit conferendum hoc sacramentum, cum dicit: tam parvulis quam adultis: quod ponitur ad excludendum errorem Pelagianorum, qui dicebant parvulos non habere peccatum originale, propter quod oporteat eos ablui per Baptismum. Quarto tangit ministrum huius sacramenti, cum dicit: in forma Ecclesiae a quocumque rite collatum proficit ad salutem; quod est contra errorem Donatistarum, qui baptizatos ab haereticis dicebant non suscipere verum Baptisma, sed esse rebaptizandos. Fides autem Catholica recognoscit verum Baptisma a quocunque fuerit collatum in forma Ecclesiae supradicta. Deinde accedit ad sacramentum poenitentiae, dicens: et si post susceptionem Baptismi quisquam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per veram poenitentiam semper potest reparari; quod ponitur ad excludendum errorem Novatianorum, qui dicebant quod peccantes post Baptismum non possunt reparari per poenitentiam. Deinde accedit ad sacramentum matrimonii, dicens: non solum autem virgines et continentes, verum etiam et coniugati, per fidem rectam et operationem bonam placentes Deo, ad aeter-nam merentur pervenire beatitudinem; quod ponitur ad excludendum errorem Tatianorum et Manichaeorum, qui nuptias damnabant. De aliis autem sacramentis mentionem non facit, quia circa ea non fuit specialiter erratum.

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