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THE UNITY OF PLATOS GORGIAS

This book brings out the complex unity of Platos Gorgias. Through a careful analysis of the dialogues three main sections, including Socrates famous quarrel with his archrival Callicles, Devin Stauffer shows how the seemingly disparate themes of rhetoric, justice, and the philosophic life are woven together into a coherent whole. His interpretation of the Gorgias sheds new light on Platos thought, showing that Plato and Socrates had a more favorable view of rhetoric than is usually supposed. Stauffer also challenges common assumptions concerning the character and purpose of some of Socrates most famous claims about justice. Written as a close study of the Gorgias, The Unity of Platos Gorgias treats broad questions concerning Platos moral and political psychology and uncovers the view of the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric that guided Plato as he wrote his dialogues. Devin Stauffer is Assistant Professor of Government at The University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Platos Introduction to the Question of Justice and coauthor and cotranslator of Empire and the Ends of Politics: Platos Menexenus and Pericles Funeral Oration.

To Dana

The Unity of Platos Gorgias

RHETORIC, JUSTICE, AND THE PHILOSOPHIC LIFE

Devin Stauffer
The University of Texas at Austin

cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521858472 Cambridge University Press 2006 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format isbn-13 isbn-10 isbn-13 isbn-10 978-0-511-14646-6 eBook (EBL) 0-511-14646-9 eBook (EBL) 978-0-521-85847-2 hardback 0-521-85847-x hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

Acknowledgments

page vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 Examining the Master of Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Prelude The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two 17 20 29

Polus and the Dispute about Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Socrates Description of Rhetoric Are Rhetoricians Powerful? The Turn to Justice and the Socratic Thesis Polus Refutation of Socrates Socrates Refutation of Polus 43 50 55 58 64

The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles . . . . . . . . 82

Callicles Opening Speech Socrates Examination of Callicles View of Justice Moderation versus Immoderation, and the Question of Hedonism 102 85 92

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric . . . . 123

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis 127

vi Socrates Situation, the Question of Assimilation, and the Issue of Self-Protection Callicles and His Heroes, True Rhetoric, and Socrates True Political Art The Logos about the Afterlife

Contents

140 149 167

Conclusion: A Final Reection on Noble Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Bibliography Index 183 189

Acknowledgments

For their nancial support while I was working on this book, I would like to thank the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, Kenyon College, and The University of Texas at Austin. I would also like to thank the readers for Cambridge University Press and the colleagues and friends who helped me in various ways during the years I spent working on this book. In particular, I am grateful to Fred Baumann, Christopher Bruell, Kirk Emmert, Robert Faulkner, Pam Jensen, Lorraine Pangle, Thomas Pangle, and Tim Spiekerman. An earlier version of a section of Chapter 3 appeared in the Review of Politics in the Fall of 2002.

vii

Introduction

ew philosophers have endured more criticism and abuse in modern times than Plato. As one of the great gures of the classical

tradition, Plato was subjected to powerful attacks by the founders of modern philosophy and their followers, who set out to succeed where they thought the na ve and utopian ancients had failed. And the attacks on Plato continue unabated today, as postmodernists look back to his works to nd the source of the faith in reason that they want to root out of the West. Yet, for all that, Plato has not lost his power to attract and enchant. Those who rst sought to overthrow the intellectual authority of classical philosophy, men such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, would be amazed to learn that their foe continues to attract partisans and even devotees. And more recent critics, such as Derrida and Rorty, are similarly dismayed that their efforts nally to put Plato to rest have not succeeded. Is it not a strange feature of our late modern or postmodern age that there still remains serious interest in Plato? Yet perhaps the very difference between Plato and his critics, from

the early moderns to those of our time, can help us to understand why his works have not lost their appeal. For one of the most powerful things drawing readers back to Plato today is their sense that his works contain a richer and truer account of human life, of the soul and its deepest concerns, than one can nd even in the greatest works of modern philosophy. In particular, many sense that the modern philosophers, by emphasizing mans undeniable fear, self-interest, and desire for power, fail to do justice to the loftier aspects of our humanity and
1

Introduction

to the highest aspirations that are, if not always the most effective, perhaps the most revealing expressions of human nature. And more simply, readers are drawn to Plato by what has always drawn readers to him, but now is made all the more appealing by its absence from modern thought: an answer to the question of the best life, conveyed by a moving portrait of a noble gure who lived that life. Of course, to feel an initial attraction to a thinker is not yet to understand his thought, to say nothing of judging its adequacy. Especially for those of us who are drawn to Plato by an enchantment with his vision of the philosophic life as it was lived by Socrates, that initial attraction, if it is to be more than the idle dreaming that his modern critics claim Plato encourages, must transform itself into a more serious encounter with his work. What precisely is Platos account of the philosophic life? How is it related, for instance, to his understanding of virtue, his estimation of political life, and his analysis of human nature and human concerns? When we probe questions such as these, we are likely to nd ourselves before long in a state that Plato would have called aporia a state of perplexity, or, translated more literally, a state of being without a path. The primary source of our aporia is the apparently chaotic, strikingly foreign, and undeniably daunting world that one enters in reading Platos dialogues. Platos dialogues, for all of their immediate attractiveness, are extremely complex and difcult, perhaps especially so on basic questions such as those I have just posed. It is true and part of their appeal that Platos works address some of the simplest questions of human life. But they treat those questions in ways that are anything but simple or straightforward. They certainly were not written for readers with the habits formed by our modern embrace of convenience and efciency. The experience of reading Plato, then, is likely for many of us to be a mixture of attraction and frustration, or of initial attraction followed by a sense of the great difculty of understanding Platos treatment of the issues under discussion in the dialogues. This mixed experience in reading Plato is provoked by no dialogue more than by the Gorgias. On the one hand, Plato presents Socrates

Introduction

in the Gorgias as the noble gure whose intransigent defense of moral principle and the philosophic life draws so many admirers. Especially in his dispute with Callicles, the most outspoken critic of the philosophic life that we nd in Platos corpus, Socrates comes to sight as a hero. In this most memorable part of the dialogue, Socrates confronts and responds to an attack that has been called, in a famous remark by Paul Shorey, the most eloquent statement of the immoralists case in European literature.1 The tension and gravity of the conict between Socrates and Callicles have led commentators to speak of the unforgettable intensity, the moral fervor and splendor, the vast scope and profundity, and the peculiar emotional power of the Gorgias.2 If a story attributed by Themistius to a lost dialogue of Aristotle is to be believed, they are probably also what led a Corinthian farmer, after reading the Gorgias, to abandon his farm and devote his life to Platonic philosophy.3 More broadly, the conict between Socrates and Callicles especially the heroic role that Socrates plays in that conict makes it easy to understand why the Gorgias has always been regarded as one of Platos greatest works, and why it has been popular in every age in which Plato has been read, including his own. On the other hand, the conict between Socrates and Callicles occupies, roughly speaking, only half of the dialogue. And when one surveys the dialogue as a whole, it quickly becomes a bewildering maze without any clear unifying theme. Largely for this reason, most
1. Shorey, What Plato Said, 154; Shorey is quoted by Dodds, Gorgias, 266, Newell, Ruling Passion, 1011, and Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 126. See also Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 22: Once at least in the history of philosophy the amoralist has been correctly represented as an alarming gure, in the character of Callicles. So powerful is Callicles attack on Socrates that several commentators have expressed the view that Plato must have felt considerable sympathy with it. See Dodds, Gorgias, 1314; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1378; Kagan, The Great Dialogue, 161. 2. These phrases are from Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 125; Taylor, Plato, 103; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:126; Dodds, Gorgias, 31. 3. The passage from Themistius can be found in Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:317n.

Introduction

interpretations of the Gorgias have focused almost entirely on the second half of the dialogue, especially in their general pronouncements of what the dialogue is about. We are told, for instance, that the dialogue is about the challenge of defending the basic principles of Socratic morality against attack from spokesmen for its most drastic alternative;4 that its purpose is to put a typical life of devotion to the suprapersonal good against the typical theory of the will to power at its best such that life and the way it should be lived . . . is the real theme;5 and that in the Gorgias Plato sets out to defend the Socratic belief about justice especially by compelling even a highly critical interlocutor to accept the Socratic belief.6 These claims reect the most widely held view of the dialogue. Broadly speaking, the Gorgias is most often read as a crucial part of Platos presentation of or, according to some, a crucial stage in his development of a moral position capable of overcoming the arguments and attractions of even the most radical immoralism.7 Yet this view of the dialogue takes its bearings primarily by the section of the dialogue in which Socrates confronts Callicles. The claims I have quoted display the common but questionable tendency to begin from the second half of the Gorgias in trying to make sense of the whole. Admittedly gripping and important as the Callicles section is, it is doubtful that the unity of the dialogue and its true theme can be understood without an adequate consideration of the entire dialogue. Attempts to treat the dialogue as a whole, however,
4. 5. 6. 7.
Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 127. Taylor, Plato, 106. Irwin, Platos Ethics, 95. Allowing for considerable differences of nuance and emphasis, this view is especially common in works that treat the Gorgias in broader studies of Platos thought or that discuss the development of classical philosophy as a whole. For a sense of the very wide range of sources in which a version of this view can be found, see, in addition to the sources from which I have quoted above, Jaeger, Paideia, 2:13659; Shorey, What Plato Said, 14150; Voegelin, Plato, 2445; Santas, Socrates, 21821; Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 17; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 15660; MacIntyre, After Virtue, 1401.

Introduction

are rare, and, in my view, none has successfully explained how its different parts t together.8 To be sure, the temptation to move quickly to the conict between Socrates and Callicles is great. Not only are the intensity and gravity of that section attractive, but even a brief overview of the movement of the dialogue can show how complex and apparently disorganized it is. Before the battle between Socrates and Callicles, the dialogue opens with Socrates arrival at a site in Athens where the famous rhetorician Gorgias has just nished giving a display of his rhetorical powers.

8. While there have been many discussions of the Gorgias in broad studies of Platos thought, these discussions generally make only cursory mention of large sections of the dialogue, often virtually ignoring the rst half. This is true also of the many articles that have been written on the Gorgias. Of the few book-length works devoted entirely to the Gorgias, two are the well-known commentaries of Terence Irwin and E. R. Dodds. Since these are written as commentaries accompanying editions of the Greek text, however, they provide many interpretive remarks without offering a complete or unied interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. Beyond the works of Irwin and Dodds, Ilham Dilmans Morality and the Inner Life is subtitled A Study in Platos Gorgias. Dilman himself stresses, however, that his book is intended less as a close textual interpretation of the dialogue than as a wide-ranging reection on a cluster of questions presented in the Gorgias approached as having a life independent of the dialogue (vii). Dilmans study, in any case, proceeds in a very different way from my own, and it leads to very different conclusions. The same is true of George Plochmann and Franklin Robinsons A Friendly Companion to Platos Gorgias. While Plochmann and Robinson search, as I do, for the unity of the dialogue, they end up, in their nal attempt to provide an intuitive awareness of the unity that binds together the dialogue, listing nine conclusions that have more to do with unity in the cosmos as a whole than with unity in the sense of the coherence of the parts of the Gorgias itself (see 3501). Finally, one of the most interesting and impressive interpretations of the Gorgias is Seth Benardetes The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, half of which is devoted to the Gorgias. Although I have beneted from Benardetes study, his many fascinating observations are pieced together in a cryptic fashion that seems intended more to point the reader down intriguing roads of reection than to present a clear path that leads from the surface of the text to a unied interpretation of the dialogue.

Introduction

Socrates speaks rst with Gorgias and then with a young admirer of Gorgias named Polus. A summary of the main themes discussed in these conversations and then in the Callicles section can sufce to bring out the difculty of grasping their unity. After discussing with Gorgias the character of the art of rhetoric and its relationship to justice, Socrates argues with Polus about the nobility of rhetoric, and then engages him in a longer argument about the temptations of tyranny and about whether it is worse to do injustice or to suffer it. The conclusion of Socrates argument with Polus in particular, the conclusion they reach that doing injustice is indeed worse than suffering it prompts Callicles entry into the conversation. Callicles responds to a brief provocation from Socrates by delivering a long, vehement attack both on the position Socrates took in his argument with Polus and on Socrates way of life as a whole. But following Callicles attack, which seems initially to bring a measure of clarity to the dialogue by directing the conversation to the question of the best life, Socrates returns rst to the question of justice, then abruptly turns away from that question to discuss moderation and self-control. The discussion of moderation and self-control is followed by a critique of hedonism, after which Socrates returns to the theme of rhetoric, turns for some time to the issues of virtue and the proper aims of politics, and then nally comes back again to rhetoric and to the contest between the philosophic life and the political life. This is an oversimplied summary of the dialogue that does not include, among other things, the theme of punishment, the issue of self-protection, or the account of the afterlife at the end of the dialogue. What could possibly tie this apparent chaos of a dialogue together? The unity of the Gorgias can be brought out only by a careful study of the dialogue as a whole, one that follows its every twist and turn, constantly examining the connections between its various parts. Beyond even what is typical of Platos dialogues, the Gorgias is full of strange passages, questionable arguments, and confusing transitions. Only a reading of the dialogue that begins from the surface and works through the complexities that appear even or especially on the surface can

Introduction

reasonably hope to uncover what the dialogue is really about. Such a reading is what I have attempted in what follows. I have tried to avoid imposing an order on the dialogue that is not its own. Rather than defending from the outset a thesis about the dialogues meaning or ultimate aim, I have attempted to follow the path of the dialogue itself, raising and wrestling with questions as they come up in the course of thinking ones way through the text, and allowing the themes of the dialogue and the connections between them to disclose themselves gradually. In short, I have tried in my writing to reproduce something close to my own experience of reading and reecting on the dialogue. Admittedly, my approach requires some departure from the most common modes of analysis and presentation, which have advantages in terms of clarity and structure of argument. Yet it seems to me that Platos own art of writing requires a mode of reading and writing that cannot be tightly bound by conventional practices. Without entering deeply here into the complex arguments over the signicance of Platos dialogue form, let me state my basic view.9 Because Platos dialogues are written as unfolding dramas, full of puzzles, perplexities, and even intentionally awed arguments, they require readers to do more than take in information and arguments as they read. They require readers to wonder, to question, even to speculate and then test speculations against later passages, and, above all, to think about the issues under discussion in a way that at once leads beyond the text and also returns continually to the details and movement of the conversations Plato presents. In my view, what more conventional approaches to reading and writing on Plato gain in clarity and orderliness of presentation,

9. There are a number of excellent discussions of the character of Platos dialogues and how they should be read. Those that I have found most valuable are Klein, A Commentary on Platos Meno, 331; Strauss, The City and Man, 5062, On a New Interpretation of Platos Political Philosophy, 34852; Alfarabi, Platos Laws, 8485; Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 1718; Bolotin, The Life of Philosophy and the Immortality of the Soul, 3941, Platos Dialogue on Friendship, 1213; Sallis, Being and Logos, 16; Ahrensdorf, The Death of Socrates and the Life of Philosophy, 37.

Introduction

they lose in arbitrariness of interpretation, which is the result of taking passages out of context and imposing on Platos writings a structure that is not their own. For these reasons, too, I think it is counterproductive to give at the outset of an interpretation a full description of where one is headed. The journey through a Platonic dialogue should be a journey of gradual discovery, and that process is distorted if the destination is announced before one begins. Nevertheless, let me try to provide some orientation by saying a word about the issues in the Gorgias and the place of the dialogue in Platos corpus. In the following study, as I have indicated, I try to follow the movement of the Gorgias on its own terms or as it comes to sight by following the movement of the text. Yet it is important to keep in the back of ones mind the relationship of any particular dialogue to the broader whole composed of all of Platos dialogues. But what does that mean? Since there are many ways of viewing Platos corpus many ways of looking at its overall purpose, many ways of ordering the dialogues, many ways of dividing them into groups, and so forth any attempt to consider the place of a single dialogue would seem to cast one into a sea of difcult questions that have been the subject of long-running controversies. As with the question of the signicance of Platos dialogue form, these controversies are too vast to be considered in detail here.10 I would submit, however, that it makes the most sense to approach Platos corpus in the way that is suggested by a sweeping look at the most obvious theme of the dialogues as a whole. That theme is the life of Socrates. Accordingly, Plato himself would seem to recommend an approach that focuses, in the rst place, on his account of Socrates life, and that follows the indications the dialogues provide about the contribution each of them makes to understanding that life.
10. The most helpful discussion of these controversies, and especially of their roots in the nineteenth century, divide between Friedrich Schleiermacher and Karl Friedrich Hermann, is Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 36 48. For two discussions that approach the same issues from a perspective different from Kahns, see Irwin, Platos Ethics, 316, and Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 45106.

Introduction

Unlike the common efforts to uncover the development of Platos own thought as it purportedly moved away from its Socratic origins, this approach is in accord not only with the surface of the dialogues but also with Platos claim that there are no writings of Plato but that those that bear his name belong to a Socrates who has become beautiful and young.11 If one takes this approach to Platos dialogues, the dialogue that most immediately suggests itself as the proper starting point, and as a guide to the others, is the Apology of Socrates. Although this dialogue occurs near the end of Socrates life, it contains the most direct portrait of that life. Socrates defense speech at his trial, as it is reported in the Apology, even includes a kind of Socratic autobiography. According to this autobiography, the most important event in Socrates life the event that gave his life its distinctive character was a report he received of a pronouncement by the priestess who spoke for the god at Delphi that no one surpassed him in wisdom.12 Socrates responded to this report by devoting much of the rest of his life to the examination of his fellow citizens as a way of testing the gods claim, and thus was born his distinctive form of philosophizing.13 Now, whatever one makes of Socrates response to the pronouncement of the Delphic Oracle whether one admires it as a model of piety, or raises an eyebrow at Socrates unwillingness simply to bow to the authority of the god one of its outcomes, as Socrates stresses, was to arouse the ire of many of Socrates fellow citizens. This outcome would have been
11. Second Letter 314c24. While Platos remark points to the central importance of his portrait of Socrates, it also suggests that that portrait may be an embellishment of the historical Socrates. This remark from the Second Letter should be considered together with Seventh Letter 341b7342a1, another important statement by Plato on his own writings that is in harmony with the statement in the Second Letter. Although the authenticity of Platos letters has been challenged, a strong defense of their authenticity is Morrow, Platos Epistles, 316. See also Caskey, Again Platos Seventh Letter, 22027; Rosen, Platos Symposium, xiiixviii. 12. Apology 20c421b5. 13. Apology 21b823c1.

10

Introduction

predictable, for Socrates examinations of the claims to wisdom made by some of his fellow citizens not only led to the humiliation of a number of prominent Athenians, but also implied a refusal on his part to accept the conventional or orthodox views of justice, nobility, and other important matters.14 To make matters worse, Socrates did not conne this refusal to himself but spread it to at least some of the young Athenians who became his followers.15 Even in Athens, which was far from the strictest of the ancient cities, such heterodoxy did more than make one an outcast from the comfortable circle of communal belief. We must not forget the simple fact that Socrates was on trial for his life on charges of not believing in the gods of the city and corrupting the young. If the fury of the Athenians is hard for us to grasp, that is a reection of the great difference between our own modern liberal political orders and earlier ones that were not shaped by the modern efforts to do away with the conict that led to Socrates execution. In short, the picture of Socrates life that emerges from the Apology is one that conrms and goes a considerable way toward explaining the conict between that life and the city. The Apology teaches us never to forget Socrates activity of relentless questioning, nor the ultimate response to that activity by the city of Athens. The picture of Socrates life that emerges from the Apology should remain in our minds as we approach Platos other dialogues. This is especially true of the Gorgias, for the Gorgias and the Apology are linked in both minor and major ways. One of the minor links comes at the very beginning of the Gorgias, where Socrates arrives on the scene together with his friend Chaerephon, the same man whom he credits with asking the crucial question of the Delphic Oracle in the Apology. Of the connections of more obvious signicance, the clearest is the prominence of rhetoric as a theme in both dialogues. In the Apology, Socrates denies that he either practices or teaches rhetoric, and he traces the citys hostility toward him, in part, to the fact that he was slandered
14. See especially Apology 21c323a7. 15. See Apology 23c2d1, 33b9c4.

Introduction

11

for many years while no one spoke up on his behalf.16 Socrates suggests, then, that rhetoric might have helped to protect him, had he been more willing to practice it himself or had someone practiced it on his behalf. And this is tied to another broad issue that also links the Gorgias to the Apology, the issue of what may be called, in broad terms, the defensibility and the nobility of Socrates life. In a section of the Apology that follows Socrates Delphic autobiography and his direct response to the ofcial charges against him, Socrates raises an objection that sounds very similar to an objection Callicles raises in the Gorgias. Perhaps someone would say, says Socrates, conjuring up a potential critic of his life, Arent you ashamed of engaging in a pursuit from which you now run the risk of dying?17 Not only does this objection sound as if it could have come from the mouth of Callicles, but Socrates response in the Apology bears many similarities to positions he takes in the Gorgias. Most important, he argues in both dialogues that considerations of reputation and safety should be subordinated to considerations of justice.18 At least in the Apology, however, the fact that Socrates offers this argument as a response to an objection he himself raised, and by doing so presents himself as a hero resembling the great Achilles,19 should give us some pause. Moreover, while he suggests that his life resembled that of Achilles in his willingness to put justice above all other considerations, especially his concern to protect his own life, Socrates goes on to respond to the understandable question of why his devotion to justice did not lead him into politics by pointing to the risks to his life that political activity would have entailed.20 The context, character, and seeming inconsistency of Socrates self-presentation in this crucial section of the Apology should
16. See Apology 17a118c8. 17. Apology 28b35. 18. Compare, e.g., Apology 28b530c1 with Gorgias 508c4513d1 and 521b4 522e6. 19. See Apology 28b329b9. 20. Compare Apology 28b531c3 with 31c433a1, especially 32e233a1. Consider also 28d529a2 in light of 21a2c2.

12

Introduction

lead us to wonder about its purpose. Might Socrates response to the Calliclean objection he conjures up belong to an effort on his part to win for himself a certain reputation in his most public and memorable of all speeches? In other words, it is reasonable to wonder whether, despite Socrates disavowal of rhetoric, there is not something rhetorical about his speech at his trial. Could it be that Socrates was more open to rhetoric than he explicitly suggests? To be sure, such a conclusion would require attributing to Socrates a greater concern with reputation and with the goods provided by reputation than his explicit self-presentation suggests he had. But is it not possible that that very self-presentation was a part, not to say the heart, of a kind of rhetoric? If the Apology leaves us wondering about these and related questions, the Gorgias can be of help. For in the Gorgias, we nd a much fuller treatment both of rhetoric and of the question of the defensibility and nobility of Socrates own life. Questions similar to those I have just raised about the Apology will come up in the course of our consideration of the Gorgias. For example, we will consider whether Socrates famous arguments about justice including his striking claim that doing injustice is always the greatest of all evils, and thus always worse than suffering injustice should be read as straightforward expressions of his own convictions. What are we to make, for instance, of Socrates frequently overlooked acknowledgment that, in defending this claim, he is not defending a view that he knows to be true but merely taking a position that no one he encounters can oppose without becoming ridiculous? Might Socrates defense of this claim serve more to reveal the depth of the human concern for justice, even within the souls of such seeming cynics as Polus and Callicles, than it does to uncover Socrates own deepest convictions? And might Socrates, in defending this view and also in presenting his own life as one of heroic resistance to Calliclean temptations, be pointing toward a form of rhetoric that is nobler than the sophistic rhetoric practiced by Gorgias? On this last point, it is of course well known that the Gorgias contains a severe critique of rhetoric. In fact, this

Introduction

13

critique is second only to Socrates duel with Callicles as the most memorable feature of the dialogue. But a thorough consideration of the dialogue as a whole will challenge the common conclusion that Socrates was simply a critic of rhetoric. Socrates critique of rhetoric, I will suggest, should be understood as a critique only of a certain kind of rhetoric, not as a critique of rhetoric as such. This surprising conclusion, together with the unsettling questions that will arise about the true character and purpose of Socrates claims about justice, will lead to a new view of the lessons of the Gorgias. This new view of the Gorgias can ultimately help us to see Socrates himself in a new light, and to better understand the philosophic life he lived. Finally, given the importance of the themes of rhetoric and the philosophic life in the Gorgias, a new understanding of the dialogue can also shed light on the aims of Platos own literary-rhetorical project. For the project through which Plato has given us a Socrates who has become beautiful and young was guided by his appreciation of the issues and problems that nd their fullest expression in the Gorgias. Before concluding this introduction and turning to the body of my study of the Gorgias, I should say a word about the sources I have consulted in the course of my work on the dialogue. My interpretation has been inuenced by a consideration of the views of other scholars, including classicists, philosophers, and political theorists. One of the challenges of Platonic scholarship is to try somehow to synthesize or at least to give due consideration to a wide range of interpretations, produced by a wide range of approaches. I have tried to give a fair hearing to and to learn from commentators who approach the text with assumptions and interests very different from my own. I also have been inuenced by transcripts of two courses on the Gorgias taught by Leo Strauss in 1957 and 1963. These transcripts have shaped my views of the Gorgias as much as any published work I have read. I have beneted from E. R. Doddss authoritative edition of the Gorgias and his excellent commentary. Unless otherwise noted, all references in the

14

Introduction

body of my text are to Doddss edition of the Gorgias. The translations from the Greek are my own, although I have frequently consulted the recent translation of the dialogue by James Nichols Jr. All other references to classical texts are in the footnotes; they refer to the most widely available Greek texts, which for Platos works are the Oxford editions edited by John Burnet.

1 Examining the Master of Rhetoric

he Gorgias is divided into three main sections of unequal length. The shortest of the three sections is Socrates opening conver-

sation with Gorgias, which is followed by a longer conversation with Polus, and then by Socrates much longer confrontation with Callicles. This movement from briefer to lengthier conversations would seem to mirror the dialogues ascent in intensity. That is, the dramatic tension is greater and the themes are more profound in the Polus section than in the Gorgias section, and the Polus section is surpassed in turn by the Callicles section.1 Yet the impression conveyed by this movement,

as I stressed in the introduction, should not lead us to overlook the crucial question of the unity of the dialogue: What ties the three sections together? Nor should we overlook the fact that the dialogue is called Gorgias, a title that may be intended to call attention to the special importance of the opening section of the dialogue as somehow holding the key to its unity. A more obvious reason that the dialogue is named after Gorgias is that he is the person to whom Socrates has come to speak as the dialogue opens (447a1c4). He is also by far the most eminent of Socrates three interlocutors. A man who in his own time and for several generations afterwards would need no introduction, Gorgias was one of

1. Many have stressed this feature of the dialogue. See, e.g., Friedlander, Plato, 2:244; Taylor, Plato, 11516; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:138; Dodds, Gorgias, 45; Voegelin, Plato, 28; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 76.
15

16

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

the ancient worlds most famous rhetoricians and teachers of rhetoric. Although he came from Sicily, Gorgias was a cosmopolitan man who spent his life traveling from city to city. His travels were business travels. He was in search of audiences to whom he could display his art of rhetoric and students to whom he could teach it. Since he accepted pay for teaching the art of clever speaking, and since he was surely in some sense a wise man, Gorgias can be loosely classed as a sophist.2 Yet Gorgias is distinguished from at least many of the sophists, and in particular from Protagoras, the most famous of all sophists, by his denial that he was a teacher of virtue. Unlike Protagoras and many other sophists, Gorgias limited his teaching to rhetoric; and he imposed this limitation on himself not out of humility but out of disdain for those who claimed to teach virtue.3 Gorgias opinion of himself, if not of the worth of teaching virtue, was just as high as Protagoras. In fact, it was so high that, if reports can be trusted, he liked to appear on public occasions wearing a purple robe styled after the robe worn by the king of Persia, and when he visited Delphi his offering was a golden statue of himself.4 Gorgias pride is on full display when we meet him in the Gorgias. He boasts that he can answer any question put to him (447d6448a2), laments that no one has asked him anything new for many years (448a23), and proclaims that he is no ordinary rhetorician but a good one, if you wish to call me, as Homer says, what I boast that
2. In the Greater Hippias, Socrates refers to Gorgias as the sophist from Leontini (282b45). The question of whether Gorgias should be regarded as a sophist has been a matter of considerable debate. The most direct discussion of the issue is Harrison, Was Gorgias a Sophist? 18392; See also Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, 26, 4445; Rankin, Sophists, Socratics, and Cynics, 3545; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 2, 6073, 9597; Consigny, Gorgias, Sophist and Artist, 132; Dodds, Gorgias, 610. 3. See Meno 95b9c4; consider also Philebus 58a7b3, Greater Hippias 282b4 c1. Compare Protagoras 316c5320c4. 4. See Dodds, Gorgias, 9; Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, I.9.16. On Gorgias pride and wealth, see also Romilly, The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens, 5, 3536; Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, 26.

The Prelude

17

I am (449a78). When Socrates arrives at the beginning of the dialogue, Gorgias has recently nished giving a display of his powers. As he learns from Callicles, with whom Gorgias is staying during his visit to Athens, Socrates has shown up too late and missed the splendid feast (447a16).5

THE PRELUDE (447a1449c8)

Socrates blames his late arrival on his companion Chaerephon, who caused him to miss Gorgias display by compelling him to linger in the agora (447a78). In greater need of an explanation than his late arrival, however, would seem to be Socrates desire to come at all. But the opening of the dialogue encourages us to consider these questions together: Why was Socrates delayed in the agora? And why was he eager to leave behind whatever he was doing in the agora in order to come to see Gorgias? A possible answer to the rst of these questions emerges if we consider the man who kept Socrates in the agora: Chaerephon. For it may be no mere coincidence that this is the same Chaerephon who, according to Socrates autobiography in the Apology, asked the famous question of the Delphic Oracle Is there anyone wiser than Socrates? which set in motion Socrates efforts to examine his fellow citizens in order to test the veracity of the gods answer

5. The precise location of the conversation presented in the Gorgias is left unclear. While some have suggested that the dialogue takes place at Callicles house, Dodds has convincingly argued that it is more likely that it occurs in some unspecied public building in which Gorgias has been speaking. Dodds suggests that, after an initial encounter between the main participants outside the building, they then move indoors. See Dodds, Gorgias, 188. Consider 447c7, d6. See also Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 141; Taylor, Plato, 106. The date of the conversation is also unclear. The dramatic date of the Gorgias is impossible to establish due to a series of conicting indications within the text itself. On this issue, see Dodds, Gorgias, 1718; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 7; Taylor, Plato, 1045; Fussi, Why Is the Gorgias So Bitter? 42.

18

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

that no one surpassed him in wisdom.6 Since the examinations that were made necessary by the gods answer to Chaerephons question took place in public,7 there may be a deeper meaning to Socrates claim that he was compelled by Chaerephon to linger in the agora. Whatever the true nature of the compulsion in question,8 Socrates lingering in the agora may refer to the time he was forced to spend investigating the claims to knowledge raised by his fellow citizens. In other words, it may refer to his activity of dialectical crossexamination that at a certain point in his life became central to his search for wisdom.9 If that is what Socrates is referring to, his interest in speaking to Gorgias comes to sight as a departure from that activity, although perhaps one connected to it. Could Socrates activity in the agora somehow contribute to his eagerness to seek out Gorgias? To avoid speculating any further, let us limit ourselves for now to observing that Socrates unidentied activity in the agora forms the backdrop against which the Gorgias unfolds. Socrates claims that he has come to see Gorgias because he wishes to learn from him the power of the mans art, and what it is that he proclaims and teaches (447c23). Now, the most straightforward way of learning these things would seem to be to watch a display such as the one Gorgias has just completed before Socrates arrival. But Socrates rejects the offer of another display by Gorgias. He says that he wishes instead to converse (dialechthe nai) with Gorgias (447b1c4). Socrates preference for a conversation rather than a display a

6. See Apology 20e621b9. That the role played by Chaerephon at the beginning of the Gorgias establishes a link with the Apology is suggested also by Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 1401, and Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 28. 7. See Apology 21b823d2, 29c631a7. 8. Consider Apology 37e338a8. 9. On Socrates turn to his distinctive dialectical activity, see, in addition to Apology 20c423d2, Phaedo 96a6102a1. See also Phaedrus 229c6230d5; Xenophon, Memorablia, I.2.1116. Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 1428, helps to illuminate the passage from the Apology.

The Prelude

19

preference for what would seem to be a less direct path to his stated aims adds to the mystery surrounding his intentions in coming to see Gorgias. And further adding to that mystery is Socrates decision not to question Gorgias directly, but to begin by using Chaerephon as a front man (see 447b8d5). By pushing forward and urging on Chaerephon, a pale and skinny man nicknamed the bat, who was perhaps the strangest of Socrates many strange friends,10 Socrates provokes a skirmish between Chaerephon and Polus, an admirer of Gorgias who displays the appropriateness of his name, colt, by leaping in to answer in Gorgias place. The bat takes on the colt, or, alternatively, the poor mans Socrates takes on the poor mans Gorgias, in what is supposed to be an examination of the identity of Gorgias art but ends up as a comedy leading to a speech by Polus in praise of Gorgias art as the noblest of all arts (447d6448c9). Since Chaerephon proves to be less than a master of crossexamination, Socrates must step in to object to Polus speech. And we may safely assume that Socrates never intended to let Chaerephon do all of his work for him. Nor does Socrates want to spend much time speaking with Polus. He shoves him out of the way so that he can speak with Gorgias. Socrates does this by complaining to Gorgias about Polus speech: rather than answering Chaerephons question by identifying Gorgias art that is, by saying what it is Polus instead praised that art as if someone were blaming it (448d1e4). In other words, Socrates complains that Polus gave a rhetorical rather than a dialectical answer. With this complaint, together with Socrates further elaboration of it (448e6449a2), an important distinction between rhetoric and dialectics begins to emerge out of the din of this early bickering (see especially 448d910). The most obvious difference between the two, according to Socrates suggestions, is that rhetoric involves giving long speeches, whereas dialectics involves brief questions and brief answers (449b4c6). But Socrates also points to another, perhaps more
10. Chaerephons peculiarities made him a favorite target of Aristophanes ridicule. See Clouds 104, 144ff., 5034, 831, 1465; Birds 1296, 1564.

20

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

fundamental, difference through his complaint about Polus speech: the difference between praising something as if someone were blaming it, on the one hand, and saying what that thing is, on the other (see again 448e37).11 Socrates thus succeeds, even before beginning his conversation with Gorgias, in bringing to the surface the difference or, perhaps better, the issue of the difference between Gorgias art of rhetoric and his own art of dialectics. To be sure, Socrates early treatment of this issue would seem to be critical of rhetoric. And yet we must bear in mind that rhetoric is the art about which Socrates has come to speak with Gorgias. The dramatic situation, in other words, may shed light on the conversation. As we have already observed, Socrates has come to one of the most renowned rhetoricians to inquire about rhetoric, leaving the agora where, we may surmise, he was practicing dialectics. By the end of the prelude to their conversation, Socrates has secured Gorgias commitment to have a dialectical discussion. But it will be a dialectical discussion about rhetoric and one, we may suspect, that will differ in its aims from Socrates agora dialectics. In any case, the prelude we have considered does not solve, but serves only to introduce, the mystery of Socrates interest in Gorgias.
THE ENSNARING OF GORGIAS, PART ONE (449c9455a7)

If the prelude has already indicated something about the character of rhetoric, Socrates conveys something further through the analogies he offers as he begins to question Gorgias about his art. Socrates analogies are the arts of weaving and making music (449d24). Although he brings up these arts merely to illustrate the sense in which the various arts stand in relation to various beings (e.g., the art of weaving is
11. See Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1312: According to Socrates, whereas dialectic seeks to state what a thing is, rhetoric praises or blames by proclaiming what kind of thing something is. At rst sight rhetoric involves praise and blame, whereas dialectic seeks knowledge that is more fundamental and, perhaps, dispassionate.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

21

about [peri] the production of cloaks), Socrates choice of these two arts as his examples heightens our suspicion that his knowledge of rhetoric runs deeper than he lets on. For couldnt rhetoric be described as a kind of weaving of speeches rather than threads to create protective cloaks?12 And doesnt rhetoric move mens passions and bewitch their souls in a manner similar to music?13 Despite these indications that he is not without some understanding already, Socrates presents himself as eager to learn about rhetoric from Gorgias. The question he puts to him to initiate their conversation is, What among the beings is rhetoric about? (449d12), or, reformulated, About which of the beings is rhetoric a science? (449d9). Gorgias initial reply is, about speeches (449e1). But Socrates quickly points out that rhetoric is surely not about all speeches; it is not about the speeches, for example, that make clear to the sick by what way of life they would become healthy (449e14). If we put the suggestion conveyed by this example together with that conveyed by the preceding analogies, we are led to the suggestion that rhetoric more closely resembles an art that provides protection through the creation of cloaks and an art that sways mens passions than it does an art that might clarify the path to true health. The purpose at hand, however, is not to uncover Socrates view of rhetoric but to learn about the art from Gorgias, the presumed master. Or rather, this is Socrates professed purpose, as we have seen. Socrates opening question about rhetoric is only the beginning of a long examination of Gorgias about the nature of his art. Yet this examination will ultimately lead to the ensnaring of Gorgias in a kind of Socratic trap: Gorgias will be lured into a crucial blunder, which will then allow Socrates to win a victory over him. Since their conversation ends in this way, and since we have already been given reason to wonder about Socrates motive in approaching Gorgias and to suspect that Socrates knows more about rhetoric than he lets on, we should keep
12. Cf. Protagoras 316d3e5. 13. Cf. Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 811.

22

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

awake our doubts that Socrates professed purpose is the nal word about his true purpose. But it is better to withhold judgment about Socrates true purpose until we have followed the steps in his examination of Gorgias. Before considering why Socrates ensnares Gorgias, we need to see precisely how he ensnares him. Socrates has already given two statements of his guiding question to Gorgias. His second formulation, which speaks of rhetoric as a science (episte me , 449d9), has the effect of drawing Gorgias attention more directly to the knowledge possessed by the rhetorician; and Gorgias afrms that he regards the rhetorician as a knower (see 449e56). Yet this movement makes even more difcult the task that Socrates sets for Gorgias of distinguishing rhetoric from the other arts, since many of the other arts can also be said to be about speeches, namely, about those speeches that concern the subject matter (to pragma) of which each art has knowledge (see especially 450b1 2). For instance, just as the medical art is about speeches (those about diseases), so the gymnastic art is also about speeches (those about the good and bad condition of bodies). Are these and other such arts, Socrates asks, also to be regarded as rhetorical since they are about speeches (450a3b5)? Gorgias rst attempt to escape this difculty is not to point to a particular subject matter (a pragma) of which rhetoric alone among the arts has knowledge, but rather to suggest that rhetoric is distinctive because it operates entirely through speeches. Unlike the other arts, each of which involves some handiwork toward which the artisans knowledge is directed, rhetoric, according to Gorgias, has its entire action and efcacy through speeches (450b6c2). But this will not sufce. For while there are indeed many arts that involve a considerable amount of handiwork, Socrates reminds Gorgias that rhetoric is far from the only art that operates primarily through speeches. Arithmetic, calculation, geometry, draughts-playing, and many other arts involve just as little handiwork and operate just as exclusively through speeches as rhetoric does (450d4451a6). Thus, Socrates reasserts the issue to Gorgias: try to say what rhetoric, which has its power in speeches, is about (451a67).

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

23

That Socrates goes on at considerable length to explain how various arts are about various subject matters (see 451a7c9) makes only more striking the extreme brevity of Gorgias responses throughout this opening section of their conversation. In fact, this is the most striking feature of Gorgias early attempts to distinguish rhetoric from the other arts. Next to Socrates lengthier speeches, Gorgias replies are so remarkably brief that it becomes increasingly difcult to explain them merely by Gorgias desire to live up to his playful boast that his vast rhetorical repertoire includes even an unsurpassable capacity for brief-speaking (see 449b6c8). A more serious reason that Gorgias is so unforthcoming suggests itself if we reect on the topic at hand: the difference between rhetoric and the other arts. For whereas in the other arts, as Socrates has indicated, the speeches of any given art are speeches about the subject matter of which that art has knowledge, that is, about the pragma of the art (see again especially 450b23), this can be questioned in the case of rhetoric. Is it really true that what the rhetorician speaks about is the same thing that he knows? Might it not be the case, instead, that while the rhetorician gives speeches about many subjects, and most importantly about justice, injustice, and other such matters, what he knows is not so much these subjects themselves as the effects that speeches about them have on peoples souls?14 If so, then the true subject matter of rhetoric is only in a sense speeches. In a deeper and more precise sense it is the passions or the human soul, as opposed to the subjects about which the rhetorician speaks. But why would this lead Gorgias to give such brief answers? Why wouldnt he explain the difference between rhetoric and the other arts and correct the false impression that the relationship of rhetoric to its subject matter is as simple as that of the other arts? The reason he

14. Consider Protagoras 312d3e6, Phaedrus 259e1260a4, 267a6b2, 272c10 273c5. See also Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 811. On Gorgias appreciation of the psychological impact of rhetorical speeches, see Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 6569.

24

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

does not do so, and the explanation of his brevity, is unlikely to be a lack of understanding on Gorgias part. A more plausible explanation, especially given Gorgias expertise, is that he is aware that the difference between rhetoric and the other arts is not unproblematic for rhetoric. For if rhetoric has the character just ascribed to it, a problem becomes visible: when speaking about justice, injustice, and other such matters, the rhetorician must give the impression that these are his primary concerns, although his deepest concerns or the true objects of his attention are the souls of his listeners and the effects his speeches will have on them. But doesnt this expose rhetoric to the charge of deception and manipulation in matters in which honesty is most demanded?15 And doesnt rhetoric thus appear as the most morally questionable of all arts? Gorgias brevity, I suggest, reects an awareness of this problem and thus of the need to conceal the true character of his art. To put this suggestion another way, his brevity is the brevity of reserve or caution, not a sign of slowness or of pride in his capacity for brief-speaking. But Socrates gives Gorgias a chance to be more forthcoming about his art by shifting the central question as he moves forward. Socrates guiding question to Gorgias has so far been, in short, What is rhetoric about? (see especially 449d12, d89, 450b35, 451a67). But after reconrming Gorgias view that rhetoric operates through speeches, Socrates now asks: What is this thing among the beings that these speeches that rhetoric uses are about? (451d16). Although it had already been stressed that rhetoric operates through speeches, only now does Socrates ask about the subject of those speeches themselves, as opposed to the matter of which the art itself has knowledge. This difference may appear slight, but its signicance can be seen by reecting on the possible divide that I have sketched between what the rhetorician knows and what he speaks about. Socrates new question, no longer requesting an identication of the deepest object of
15. Compare Apology 17a118a6; see also Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 6869.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

25

the rhetoricians knowledge, allows for a franker and fuller answer. And Gorgias takes the opening he has been offered, thus conrming that caution has been the source of his restraint. Although still brief, Gorgias response is now much bolder: the speeches that rhetoric uses ) (451d7 are about the greatest and best of human affairs (pragmaton 8). With this response, the rst glimmers of Gorgias view of rhetoric become visible. But since Gorgias continues to show some reserve by clinging to his brief-speaking, Socrates responds to Gorgias bolder answer with a further maneuver. First, he twists Gorgias answer by acting as if his claim was not that rhetoric speaks about the greatest and best of human affairs but rather that rhetoric provides human beings with the greatest and best benet (compare 452a45 and c6d4 with 451d58). Socrates is then able to provoke Gorgias by presenting him with three rivals who would challenge Gorgias (supposed) claim that rhetoric provides the greatest good for human beings. Reminding him of a drinking song according to which to be healthy is best, second is to have become beautiful, and third is to get rich without fraud, Socrates conjures up a doctor, a physical trainer, and a moneymaker to defend the arts that provide each of these goods and to ask Gorgias what benet could possibly justify the supremacy of rhetoric (451d9 452d4). Although he distances himself somewhat from this challenge by speaking as the voice of these rivals, Socrates not-so-subtle strategy here hardly rises above the level of taunting. To crack Gorgias reserve, Socrates uses a blunt weapon to strike at his pride. While his attack is crude, Socrates proves to have chosen his target well. Gorgias responds to the demand of his rivals that he identify this greatest good that rhetoric provides for human beings (see 452c8d4) by giving a bolder and fuller statement than any he has given thus far. The good that rhetoric provides, he proclaims, is that which is truly the greatest good and the cause of freedom for human beings themselves and at the same time of rule over others in each mans own city (452d58). Despite its boldness, however, Gorgias statement is not without ambiguity. For what, according to Gorgias, is the greatest good? Is it the possession of his art itself or the freedom and rule of

26

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

which the art is the cause? A literal reading of his statement suggests the former, but that is a more enigmatic answer than the latter.16 To understand the ambiguity of Gorgias reply, we must consider his own situation as a teacher of rhetoric. Gorgias himself is a rhetorician, but not one who has directed his art to its typical end. Rather than enter politics himself, he is content to train aspiring politicians in the art of speaking persuasively. This choice may reect a kind of respect or appreciation on his part for knowledge itself, or at least for the expertise that belongs to his art; yet the knowledge or expertise to which he has devoted himself would seem to be directed toward the service of other ends.17 Certainly, Gorgias must appeal to these other ends in order to attract students, who are eager to possess the rhetorical art not for its own sake but for the sake of those ends, or, stated more bluntly, he must advertise with a more alluring slogan than learn rhetoric for its own sake.18 Gorgias advertising becomes clear in his response to Socrates request that he say more about the great good that rhetoric provides. No longer speaking as if the art of rhetoric were somehow itself the greatest good that is, no longer preserving the ambiguity of his preceding statement Gorgias indicates his interest in potential students by speaking to them directly:19
I at any rate say that [the good provided by rhetoric] is to be able, by using speeches, to persuade judges in law courts, councilors in the council, assemblymen in the assembly, and in any other gathering, whenever there

16. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 17. 17. Consider Republic 341c4342e11, 345e5346d8; see also Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 135. 18. See Dodds, Gorgias, 10: Men like Callicles did not pay high fees to Gorgias because they enjoyed playing tricks with words, but because they were hungry for power. 19. We can gather from this passage and from others (see, e.g., 455c6d5, 458b4 c5) that an audience is watching the conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. When Gorgias uses the second person in his following statement, he is speaking directly to the members of that audience. On this issue, see Lewis, Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias, 1989.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

27

is a political gathering. And in fact with this power you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave and that moneymaker will come to sight as a moneymaker for another, not for himself, but for you, the one with the ability to speak and to persuade multitudes. (452e18)

If Gorgias pride is one spur to frankness, his related desire to expand his following of students is another. And most important is the character of his bold and frank appeal to potential students. Promising them power and success, he expresses no qualms at the prospect of manipulation and exploitation.20 Given the blunt and amoral tone of Gorgias statement, we may be surprised that Socrates does not respond to this statement with a condemnation of rhetoric. Instead, he responds by embarking with Gorgias on a joint effort to clarify further the nature of rhetoric, an effort that has at least the appearance of elaborating a view they share (consider 452e9455a7). Among the points acknowledged, the soul is now mentioned for the rst time as the object of the rhetoricians concern: the rhetorician aims to produce persuasion in the souls of his listeners (see 453a47). Also, Gorgias now speaks even more openly about the most important topics of the speeches used by rhetoric. Perhaps encouraged by the impression that he and Socrates are in agreement, Gorgias distinguishes rhetoric from the many other arts that can also be said to produce persuasion by saying that rhetoric produces persuasion in law courts and in other mobs, and about the things that are just and unjust (454b57). Rhetoric uses speeches that are, above all, about justice, and it is further distinguished

20. Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 100, is wrong to claim that Gorgias does not defend rhetoric as a means to increase personal power; he sees it as an art existing for the benet of the community. Romilly, The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens, 6870, and Weiss, Oh, Brother! 2034, present more nuanced views, but they, too, describe Gorgias as more public-spirited than he is. More accurate, in my view, are Dodds, Gorgias, 10; Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1335; Rankin, Sophists, Socratics, and Cynics, 43; Murray, Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias Art of Rhetoric, 3579.

28

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

from those arts that produce persuasion by teaching people about their subject matters. Unlike those arts that produce knowledge, rhetoric produces the persuasion of mere belief, or, as Socrates puts it, rhetoric is a craftsman of belief-instilling [pisteutike s] rather than didactic [didaskalike s] persuasion about the just and the unjust (454e9455a2). This last point might seem to be a serious criticism of rhetoric. Is it not a sign of rhetorics inferiority to the didactic arts, and even of its manipulative character, that rhetoric produces belief (or trust, pistis) rather than knowledge? Yet Socrates offers a defense of the manner in which rhetoric operates. His defense of rhetoric is as simple as it is powerful: the rhetorician must stick to mere belief-instilling persuasion (pisteutike s peithous) because he would not be able in a short time to teach such a large mob such great matters (455a57).21 That this argument is offered by Socrates rather than Gorgias strengthens the impression at this point that Socrates and Gorgias are in agreement. If their conversation ended here, it would be very hard to see what might divide them. And the argument that Socrates makes is certainly not without force. Since political life requires even the wisest speakers to speak for limited amounts of time before many who do not share their wisdom, effective political speech must include appeals to mere opinions or beliefs, appeals that have the necessary effect of strengthening or further instilling those very opinions or beliefs. This necessity preventing political speech from being simply didactic has been explained best by one of the wisest of all political speakers, Thucydides Diodotus, who famously described the necessity in the same speech in which he bowed to it.22 Socrates own acknowledgment of the truth of the basic Diodotean insight into the nature of political speech should
21. Compare Apology 18e519a7, 37a2b2. See also Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 2122; Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 141. 22. See Thucydides 3.4243. On this passage in Thucydides, see Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides, 15862, Democracy and Distrust, 31325; Bolotin, Thucydides, 2831.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two

29

make us wonder where exactly the difference between Socrates and Gorgias lies, and whether Socrates is not a more complicated, not to say less hostile, critic of rhetoric than he is generally taken to be. At any rate, we should keep this passage in mind when we come to Socrates later criticisms of rhetoric and as we continue to wonder about the still unanswered question of Socrates interest in Gorgias.23

THE ENSNARING OF GORGIAS, PART TWO (455a8461b2)

If the impression that he and Socrates are on the same page has encouraged Gorgias to be outspoken about his art, Socrates gives Gorgias a further push before abandoning him. Socrates gives this further push by combining another argument meant to rufe Gorgias pride in his art with a direct appeal to Gorgias desire to attract students. Socrates argues, rst, that when cities make some of their most important decisions, they turn for counsel, not to rhetoricians, but to experts in the arts most relevant to the matters at hand; for instance, they turn to doctors or shipwrights when they are choosing doctors or shipwrights, to architects when they are constructing walls, harbors, or dockyards, and to skilled generals when they are making battle plans (455b2c2). Or what do you have to say about these things, Gorgias? (455c23).

23. Most commentators share the views of Barker, Greek Political Theory, 134, that Socrates and Plato held a severely unfavorable view of rhetoric, and Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 71, that one of the aims of the Gorgias is to reject rhetoric utterly. See, e.g., Jaeger, Paideia, 2:127 32; Friedlander, Plato, 2:24755; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:3701; Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, 1424; Irwin, Platos Ethics, 9597. More nuanced views can be found in Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 13149; Weiss, Oh, Brother! 195206; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 96109; Black, Platos View of Rhetoric, 36174. As Black points out, there are a number of passages in other dialogues that support the suggestion that Socrates and Plato held a more complicated and less negative view of rhetoric than most suppose. In addition to Phaedrus 259e1279c8, see Republic 414b8415c7, 459c8d2, 493c10494a5; Statesman 303e7304e1; Laws 663a9664c2.

30

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

To make sure that Gorgias will respond to this question or challenge with the least possible detachment, Socrates then reminds him of his claim to be a teacher of rhetoric and urges him to bear in mind that there may be potential students among those listening to their conversation (455c38).24 Socrates even goes so far as to present himself as a kind of recruiter for Gorgias. Or, more precisely, he presents himself as a go-between who is promoting Gorgias business (see 455c5) while also speaking up for Gorgias potential students who may be too ashamed to ask the questions on their minds (see 455c6d1). The shame that may be holding these potential students back may extend beyond their hesitancy to question such a prominent man as Gorgias. For their questions, spoken through the mouth of Socrates, are blunt and self-interested: What will there be for us, Gorgias, if we associate with you? About what things will we be able to counsel the city? About only the just and the unjust or also about those things Socrates just mentioned? (455d2e4). Socrates could not pose the challenge in a more provocative way: Try, then, to answer them (455e5). The temptation that Socrates holds out to Gorgias proves to be more than he can resist. Socrates has been dangling a piece of bait in front of Gorgias, and Gorgias quickly seizes it. Announcing his intention to reveal clearly the whole power of rhetoric, he begins by objecting to one of the examples in Socrates previous argument. For surely you know, he protests, that these dockyards and the Athenian walls and the preparation of the harbors have come about from Themistocles counsel, and others from Pericles, not from the craftsmen (455d6 e3). Gorgias invocation of Themistocles and Pericles, the greatest of all Athenian statesmen-rhetoricians and the men most responsible for

endon onton ) at 455c6 refers, as 24. Socrates reference to those inside (ton Dodds explains, to those who had been listening to Gorgias earlier speech and are now observing the conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. See Dodds, Gorgias, 209.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two

31

the rise of the Athenian empire, is only a prelude to his longest speech, which proclaims and celebrates the power of rhetoric. In his speech, Gorgias argues that rhetoric is a kind of master ability, because it is the only art that is able to gather under itself all of the other arts and to put them into its service or into the service of the man who possesses it (456a78; see again 452e48). This bold claim is to some extent obscured by Gorgias rst example, in which he describes his own ability as a rhetorician to help his brother and other doctors by convincing their patients to submit to painful treatments (456b1 5). Although this example conveys the impression that the rhetorician is an excellent servant of others, Gorgias is unwilling to leave matters at that, and he goes on to make a much different argument on behalf of rhetoric. Rhetoric allows the rhetorician himself, if he wishes, to triumph in any public contest. For instance, if a rhetorician were to enter a city to compete with a doctor in a contest that required each of them to speak in the assembly about why he should be chosen as the citys doctor, the doctor would get nowhere and the rhetorician would get the job if he wanted it (455b6c2). And the doctor is just one of the craftsmen who could easily be defeated by the rhetorician, for there is nothing about which the rhetorician would not speak more persuasively than any of the other craftsmen before a crowd (456c6 d5). In short, Gorgias argument is that rhetoric is so powerful that the rhetorician always wins (see 456c67). But there is a problem with this argument. For, although it may be a strong argument for the power of rhetoric, arent the victories that rhetoric enables the rhetorician to win over the other craftsmen undeserved? Gorgias argument, in other words, draws attention to what makes rhetoric so attractive to potential students, but it does so at the expense of highlighting what is dubious about rhetoric: the ability to win undeserved victories is an ability that enables one not only to defeat the other arts but also to triumph over justice itself. This problem helps to explain the dramatic and sudden turn that occurs in the middle of Gorgias speech. Immediately after boasting about

32

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

the power rhetoric gives the rhetorician, Gorgias changes course and argues that rhetoric must not be used unjustly (see 456c6d5; the shift comes at 456c7).25 According to Gorgias new argument, rhetoric is like any other powerful skill such as skill in boxing or the ability to ght with weapons that must not be turned to an unjust use. And if it is ever turned to an unjust use, he argues, the teacher should not be blamed or punished, since he imparted the art to be used justly and did not expect the student to abuse his skill: If someone, having become a rhetorician, does injustice with this power and art, one should not hate the teacher and expel him from the cities. For he imparted it for the sake of a just use, but the student used it differently. It is just, then, to hate, expel, and kill the one who uses it incorrectly, but not the one who teaches it (457b5c3). Now, this remarkable change in Gorgias speech reects his awareness of the straits in which the dubiousness of rhetoric leaves him as a teacher of rhetoric who has spoken so openly about the power of rhetoric. Wanting to trumpet the power of his art in order to attract students, Gorgias is caught between this desire and his awareness that the teacher of an unjust art must worry about the wrath of the cities. This tension governs his speech, explaining its movement (compare especially 456b6c6 with 457a4c3).26 Yet to say that Gorgias has an awareness of the problem posed by his boasts about the power of rhetoric is not to say that his awareness is sufciently acute or that his solution to the problem is satisfactory. His solution, to repeat, is to claim that he imparts the art of rhetoric to be used justly and thus to try to shift all of the blame to the student whenever it is used unjustly. But this is hardly convincing, since surely a teacher must bear some responsibility for the unjust use to which a student puts his lessons, especially if that teacher attracts students in the rst place by holding

25. This shift in Gorgias speech is stressed also by Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 23; see also Weiss, Oh, Brother! 199202. 26. Compare Protagoras 316b8d3. A similar tension can be found in Protagoras famous speech, which runs from 320c8 to 328d2 of the Protagoras.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two

33

out a vision of the undeserved victories his students will be able to win once they possess his art (see again 452e18, 456b6c6). Gorgias has said much more than he should have. He has crossed a crucial line by drawing so much attention to the power of rhetoric for accomplishing unjust ends. Perhaps if his art were indeed all-powerful, he would have no need to worry about its public reputation. But the power of rhetoric is not so great that it can overcome the need for concealment.27 Considering the retreat with which his speech ends, Gorgias must have some sense that he made a mistake in the rst part of his speech. If this leaves him worried after his speech, Socrates immediate reply cannot be encouraging. For Socrates tells Gorgias that he has spotted an inconsistency in what Gorgias has said (457e15). In other words, Socrates lets Gorgias know that he now has him on a hook. And Socrates sets this hook more deeply in Gorgias mouth by giving a long speech about the difference between competitive arguers who love victory and truth-seekers who would gladly be refuted if they said something false (457c4458b3). Claiming to belong to the latter group himself, Socrates gives Gorgias the choice of afrming that he, too, is such a person and thus continuing the conversation or breaking off the conversation where it stands. This choice, of course, is no real choice at all, since no one with a sense of pride could well declare himself a lover of victory who would prefer ight to refutation. Gorgias makes some effort to squirm off the hook by appealing to the members of the audience, who, he points out, must be tired from watching the display he gave even before Socrates arrival (458b4c2). But this feeble attempt at escape backres when Chaerephon and Callicles speak for the whole audience in urging Gorgias and Socrates to continue (458c3d4). As he himself acknowledges, Gorgias is stuck,
27. Gorgias dilemma is discussed also by Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 8084; Shorey, What Plato Said, 1367; Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1334; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 6870; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 2425; Murray, Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias Art of Rhetoric, 35961.

34

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

since it would be shameful to abandon the conversation, especially for a man who boasts that he can answer any question put to him (see 458d7e2). Socrates proceeds slowly. He also proceeds in a direction that comes as a surprise, because he does not expose Gorgias nearly as harshly as he could. First, Socrates addresses a point that thus far has been left unclaried. According to the earlier account of rhetoric at which Socrates and Gorgias had arrived, rhetoric is effective when the rhetorician is speaking to an audience that does not have knowledge of the subjects about which the rhetorician speaks. In short, rhetoric is persuasion of nonknowers. Socrates now repeats this point, but adds another: not only is rhetoric persuasion of nonknowers, but it is also persuasion by nonknowers. Or rather, Socrates does not so much assert this view himself as examine whether it is Gorgias view. Socrates primary example is the contest between the doctor, who is a knower, and the rhetorician, who is a nonknower of the medical art who nonetheless manages to be more persuasive among other nonknowers (459a1 b6). Although Socrates begins from this medical example, we can see the true signicance of the issue at hand by considering the more important case: justice. For, according to the account of rhetoric that Gorgias accepts, at least for a moment, it would seem that the rhetorician need not be a knower of justice either (consider 459b6c5). In setting forth this account of rhetoric, Socrates, we should note, no longer refers to rhetoric as an art but calls it a certain device [me chane n] of persuasion that has been discovered so as to appear to nonknowers to know more than the knowers (459b8c2; see also 459d5e1). While Gorgias would not agree in depriving rhetoric of its designation as an art, he expresses no disagreement with this description of rhetoric. In fact, since he even praises rhetoric so understood (see 459c35), we may reasonably conclude that this is Gorgias true view of rhetoric. Yet, especially when it comes to justice, the problem remains at least the political problem that arises for a teacher of an art with so much capacity for injustice. And this is the problem we expect Socrates

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two

35

to expose as he turns from an account of rhetoric that bears only implicitly on the question of justice to an explicit consideration of the relationship between rhetoric and justice (459c8e1). We expect at this point an exposure of the irresponsibility and danger of teaching an art that manipulates justice without requiring knowledge of justice. But instead Socrates offers Gorgias a path by which he can escape this difculty. After drawing out the possibility that rhetoric is related to justice, nobility, and the good as it is to other matters that is, as a device of nonknowers that enables them to appear to other nonknowers to know more than the knowers Socrates offers Gorgias the other alternative, namely, that a knowledge of justice, in particular, is an essential prerequisite to learning rhetoric and that students must either come to Gorgias with a prior knowledge of justice or be taught this as their rst lesson (459e18). Now, whatever may be Gorgias true view and we can be fairly certain at this point what that is he can hardly refuse the escape route Socrates offers him. Even if that route entails an embarrassing reversal and a blow to his pride, it is far better than the alternative. Wisely, Gorgias accepts his fate and afrms that any student who comes to him without a prior knowledge of justice will learn it from him (460a34).28 According to the account Gorgias thus accepts, if not the one he really believes, the rhetorician must be a knower of justice. Yet to leave it at this would be to leave the matter incomplete. For to say that the rhetorician must be a knower of justice could have different meanings. It could mean, for instance, that the truly artful rhetorician must understand the character of justice and of peoples concern with justice if he is to persuade effectively (consider 459e78 in its possible difference in meaning from 459e56). Such a rhetorician could be called just in the limited (and unconventional) sense that he has

28. That Gorgias acceptance of Socrates suggestion here is guided by prudence rather than conviction is stressed by Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 804, and Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1335. For further conrmation, see Meno 95b9c4.

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Examining the Master of Rhetoric

learned the just things (consider 460a5b7, which could be taken to suggest such a view). But would such a man not only know the just things but also do them? Does knowledge of justice necessarily issue in just action or at least in the wish or intention to do the just things and avoid injustice (see 460b8c3)?29 By posing this last question, which admits of only one answer for a decent man or a prudent one, Socrates foists on Gorgias an understanding of what it means for the rhetorician to be a knower of justice that is itself in accordance with justice or ordinary decency. If this understanding does not reect Gorgias true view (consider phainetai, it appears, at 460c2, c6, and e2), and if it causes him some humiliation to accept it and thereby amend his earlier presentation of rhetoric (see 460c7461a7), Gorgias must nevertheless feel grateful to Socrates for offering him this relatively gentle way of escaping from the dangers into which Socrates has helped him lead himself. More generally, if we step back and survey the situation at this point, we can imagine that his conversation with Socrates must make a powerful impression on Gorgias. By his own description, Gorgias entered the conversation as a man supremely condent in his ability to handle all questions and defeat all comers (see 447c58, 449a78). Not having faced a real challenge in years (448a13), the famous rhetorician has been quickly outmaneuvered by a strange, street-wandering Athenian who has arrived with his odd friend claiming to be eager

29. Some have objected to Socrates line of argument here by pointing to the questionable assumption that knowledge of justice will necessary lead one to act justly. See, for instance, Irwin, Gorgias, 1268; Shorey, What Plato Said, 136; Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 160. What this objection misses, however, is that Socrates is not so much presenting an argument of his own as he is putting the question to Gorgias. Also, by focusing on the logical cogency of Socrates argument, commentators such as Irwin do not bring out the moral implications of Socrates line of questioning or the true character of the pressure he is bringing to bear on Gorgias. Better in this respect are Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 21, 29, and Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 7984.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two

37

to learn from him. And to make matters worse or better or at any rate more impressive, Socrates has not only managed to trap Gorgias by luring him into the crucial mistake of speaking more openly than his better judgment would dictate, but he has also shown his superiority and goodwill by then freeing his captive without inicting much damage; he has merely humbled Gorgias pride rather than destroying his precious reputation. Gorgias must at this point be experiencing something akin to awe, an emotion with which he has little familiarity. Certainly, Socrates has managed to gain his attention, and Gorgias must not know what to make of Socrates concluding statement that the two of them would need to spend much time together in order adequately to sort out the matters they have been discussing (see 461a7b2). Is Socrates proposing some kind of continued association? What is this mysterious wizard after? If these are Gorgias thoughts at the end of his conversation with Socrates, we must admit that they are ours, too. It is clear that Socrates has won a strategic victory by outmaneuvering Gorgias. But his reasons for doing so are still unclear. We may safely assume that Socrates wished to make an impression on Gorgias. But to what end? One possible explanation is that Socrates wished to discredit Gorgias in order to combat his harmful inuence as a teacher. Perhaps Socrates conversation with Gorgias is part of a larger Socratic project aimed at exposing the sophists as teachers of injustice and protecting the young from the dangers of sophistic education.30 Yet the difculty with understanding Socrates conversation with Gorgias as part of such a larger project is that Socrates is remarkably polite and respectful in his treatment of Gorgias. Socrates never delivers, in particular, the nal blow that one would expect if he were trying to discredit Gorgias. In fact, Socrates treatment of Gorgias is so gentle that it appears not as the treatment of

30. For different versions of this common suggestion, see Jaeger, Paideia, 2:127 9; Friedlander, Plato, 2:246; Dodds, Gorgias, 15; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 15661; Lewis, Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias, 200; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 98.

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Examining the Master of Rhetoric

a rival one wishes to destroy but as the treatment of a friend, or at least a potential friend.31 This suggests a different explanation of Socrates intention in making an impression on Gorgias, one that also can better explain why Socrates concludes his conversation with Gorgias with a statement that can be taken as an invitation to continue and deepen their acquaintance. Socrates may be genuinely interested in establishing a friendship with Gorgias, a friendship that could even become an alliance.32 To better understand why Socrates would have such an interest, we ought to return for a moment to the scene at the beginning of the dialogue when Socrates rst arrived. In that scene, Socrates approached Gorgias after having been compelled by Chaerephon to linger in the agora. If my interpretation of that scene was correct that is, that it was meant to point to Socrates dialectical cross-examinations of his fellow citizens, which are being temporarily left behind so that he can come speak with Gorgias then we can now go a step further. Socrates cross-examinations, as the Apology can help remind us, aroused considerable anger in many of his fellow citizens. Indeed, they were so inammatory that we can understand why Socrates would become interested in the assistance of a man like Gorgias. It makes sense that, at a time in his life when he was compelled by Chaerephon to spend much of his time in the agora, Socrates would also gain a newfound interest in rhetoric. And while Socrates has managed to defeat Gorgias in a conversation on Socratic terms, he has not denied that Gorgias possesses great talents as a rhetorician. Can Socrates effort to make

31. Socrates treatment of Gorgias should be contrasted with his much harsher treatment of Protagoras in the Protagoras. After humiliating Protagoras before many of his admirers and students, Socrates leaves the scene as soon as they have nished talking (see Protagoras 362a14). The difference between Socrates treatment of Gorgias and his treatment of Protagoras is noted also by Shorey, What Plato Said, 134, and Weiss, Oh, Brother! 200. See also Fussi, Why Is the Gorgias So Bitter? 4950, 55. 32. Compare the similar suggestions offered by Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 131, 137, 1489, and Weiss, Oh, Brother! 195206. My suggestion is closer to that of Nichols.

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39

an impression on Gorgias, then, be explained as a step in a broader plan to secure his friendship and assistance? To be sure, even if Socrates has not denied that Gorgias is a talented rhetorician, he has brought out a weakness in his understanding of rhetoric and its relationship to justice, a weakness that is displayed even or especially in Gorgias rhetorical self-presentation. The suggestion I have just offered is exposed to a difculty. By bringing out Gorgias imprudent boastfulness, Socrates has brought out a more serious aw in his appreciation of the power and importance of justice. Could a man who sufciently understood this power and importance out justice as openly as Gorgias does? Gorgias boasts about the power of rhetoric to win undeserved victories and his refusal to teach justice to his students a refusal that he has revoked only under pressure and thus insincerely disclose a certain blindness on Gorgias part. Socrates, then, has done more than ensnare Gorgias. He also has brought out a crucial aw in an otherwise talented and impressive man. In keeping with this, Socrates will soon go on to criticize Gorgian rhetoric harshly. He will describe it as a form of attery whose practitioners do not understand the very passions they atter. Yet the aws of Gorgias and of Gorgian rhetoric do not necessarily belie the suggestion that Socrates is seeking to establish a friendship and an alliance with Gorgias. For these aws may be remediable. Perhaps Gorgias can be brought to a better appreciation of justice, and perhaps his rhetoric can be reformed. At any rate, Socrates does not depart after his conversation with Gorgias.33 He stays and speaks rst with Polus and then with Callicles, and the dialogue, far from declining, rises to a more heated discussion of more important themes, including the theme of justice. Could the increased intensity and the more direct discussion of justice have something to do with Socrates effort, now that he has made an impression on Gorgias, to continue speaking with him indirectly?
33. Contrast Protagoras 360e6362a4.

2 Polus and the Dispute about Justice

et me restate the suggestion with which I concluded the last chapter and say a further word about how it can help us understand

the unity of the Gorgias. I have suggested that Socrates is interested in Gorgias as a potential ally. The reference at the beginning of the dialogue to Socrates lingering in the agora can help us begin to understand Socrates need for such an ally; later passages, especially in the Callicles section, will help us expand and deepen our understanding. But even if Socrates is in need of an ally with outstanding rhetorical abilities, Gorgias would seem to have proven to be a disappointing candidate. For the result of Socrates conversation with Gorgias is an impressive Socratic victory that serves not only to impress Gorgias but also to bring out Gorgias lack of wisdom on a crucial issue. To repeat, Gorgias boasts about rhetoric and his (genuine) view of the prerequisites of the rhetorical art reveal that he takes justice too lightly. Yet, as I observed, Socrates does not abandon the discussion after Gorgias defeat, even though he no longer continues to speak with him directly. And I suggested that the continuation of the dialogue may be a continuation of Socrates conversation with Gorgias, henceforth to be conducted indirectly but nonetheless intended to remedy the aws in Gorgias understanding and to continue to lay the foundation for an alliance. In other words, Socrates may not have given up hope in Gorgias. He may still be pursuing, in the rest of the dialogue, the goal that originally led him to leave the agora to come speak with Gorgias.

40

Polus and the Dispute about Justice

41

An indirect approach in fact makes sense after Gorgias has been defeated. The virtues of an indirect approach can be seen if we consider more precisely what Socrates would want to accomplish in the rest of the dialogue. If my suggestion about Socrates overarching intention is correct, Socrates would have several tasks that remain to be completed. First, he has only begun to introduce himself and his ways to Gorgias. Thus far, Gorgias has seen only an impressive display of Socrates abilities in argument. He has seen little of the character of Socrates own activity or the substance of his thought. Socrates, then, must continue to introduce himself to Gorgias by making him aware of his own situation and activity. But this aim must be combined as it can be combined with an attempt to remedy the crucial deciency in Gorgias wisdom. For if a Socrates-Gorgias alliance is to be an alliance Socrates would desire, Gorgias must be brought to a better understanding of justice and its power in the human soul.1 In short, Socrates must try in some manner to teach Gorgias. And if the heart of the lesson to Gorgias concerns the importance of justice, that also bears on Socrates third and nal task: to sketch at least the outlines of a new, more just form of rhetoric, thereby suggesting a nobler use to which Gorgias might put his powers. That these are Socrates aims will be veried, I think, by a study of the rest of the dialogue. But assuming for now that they are, we can understand why they are best accomplished indirectly. By watching Socrates in action and observing what Socrates reveals about himself and others, Gorgias can learn lessons that would carry less force if conveyed simply by arguments in a direct discussion. In particular, Socrates efforts to teach Gorgias about the power of justice in the human soul can proceed in no better way than by revealing that power in the souls of specic human beings, especially those in whom the concern for justice seems absent. Thus, we should not be surprised that Socrates will soon make a remark that indicates his continued interest
1. Compare Phaedrus 271c10274b4.

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Polus and the Dispute about Justice

in Gorgias (see 462e8463b1). But neither should we be surprised that he now welcomes the opportunity to speak with Polus. Before his conversation with Gorgias, Socrates had shown no interest in Polus and had treated him as a mere roadblock on the way to Gorgias; but now Socrates shows much more willingness to engage him in a conversation (compare 448d1449a4 with 461c5d4 and 463e1 464a1). Socrates is given the opportunity to converse with Polus when Polus bursts into the conversation to protest Socrates treatment of Gorgias. Polus complains about the great rudeness of Socrates exploitation of Gorgias sense of shame. According to Polus, Socrates manipulated Gorgias by forcing him to concede, out of shame rather than conviction, that knowledge of justice is a prerequisite to learning the art of rhetoric (see 461b3c4). Now, insofar as Polus, an admirer of Gorgias and himself a teacher of rhetoric, speaks so openly of Gorgias sense of shame and the reasons for it, he would seem not to share it. Our rst impression of Polus is of a rash and shameless young man who will boldly go where Gorgias quickly realized he should not tread.2 Yet we can see from even his opening outburst that apparent shamelessness is only one aspect of Polus character. After all, when he enters the conversation, Polus is angry at Socrates, thus betraying a sense of justice, if only of the justice that ought to govern friendly conversations (consider especially 461c14). Moreover, Polus is very concerned not only that rhetoric be adequately described but also that its nobility be vindicated; nobility is a standard of great signicance to Polus (see

2. Much less is known of Polus the aptly named colt (see 463e12) than of the much more famous Gorgias. Polus did, however, produce at least one writing on rhetoric. See Dodds, Gorgias, 1112. Beyond his appearance in the Gorgias, Polus is mentioned (mockingly) in the Phaedrus (see 267b10 c3), and Aristotle refers to his view of the relationship between experience and art (Metaphysics 981a15). For an extensive discussion of Aristotles reference to Polus, arguing that it pertains to the historical Polus, not to Polus statement at 448c47 of the Gorgias, see Renehan, Polus, Plato, and Aristotle, 6872.

Socrates Description of Rhetoric

43

462c10d2, 463d3, 466a910).3 For his part, Socrates shows his new willingness to engage Polus by proposing that they have a conversation (461c5d4). But that does not mean that Socrates is warm and welcoming towards Polus. To the contrary, he seems to make every effort to be as rude and provocative as possible, insulting Polus at every turn and even suggesting that he could barely endure listening if Polus should give a long speech (see, e.g., 461e1462a1, 462c10d2, 463d4e2, 466a48). Since Socrates behavior is such a marked departure from the politeness he showed toward Gorgias, we will have to consider how his harsher tone contributes to his aims in conversing with Polus.4

SOCRATES DESCRIPTION OF RHETORIC (462b3466a3)

Socrates harshness toward Polus ensures that their conversation will have the spirit of a battle rather than a friendly discussion. But that is despite the fact that Polus opening question to Socrates is an honest and understandable one: What do you think rhetoric is? (462b35; see also 461b34). Although Polus is angry when he enters the conversation, his desire to know what Socrates thinks about rhetoric seems genuine. Fairness requires that we acknowledge that it is Socrates who seems more intent on picking a ght. And Socrates provokes Polus rst with personal insults and then with the answer he gives to Polus

3. We also should recall that, in his brief exchange with Chaerephon at the beginning of the dialogue, Polus was eager to defend rhetoric as the noblest of the arts (see again 448c89 and e5). That Socrates opens his present exchange with Polus by addressing him as noblest Polus and by telling him you are just (461c5, d2) may be an indication of more than Socratic irony. Cf. Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 138; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 31. 4. On Socrates rudeness towards Polus, see Michelini, Rudeness and Irony in Platos Gorgias, 5059; see also Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 204; Shorey, What Plato Said, 137; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:321.

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Polus and the Dispute about Justice

question. Socrates description of rhetoric, which takes up most of the rst stage of his conversation with Polus, is one that he can be sure will elicit a protest from Polus, who repeatedly expresses his desire to see the nobility of rhetoric recognized. While Socrates description of rhetoric is colored by his desire to provoke Polus and thereby to draw him into a quarrel, Socrates also shows a concern not to offend Gorgias too deeply. Before giving his extended description of rhetoric, Socrates mentions his fear that Gorgias might take him to be mocking his pursuit (462e68). He also softens the coming blow by remarking that the rhetoric he will describe may not be the kind of rhetoric that Gorgias pursues (462e8463a1). Yet the more important purpose of this last remark may be to suggest that Gorgias ought to change his ways and pursue a different kind of rhetoric. For the rhetoric that Socrates describes in such critical terms seems to be exactly the kind of rhetoric that Gorgias pursues. In fact, Socrates description of rhetoric owes a considerable debt to his conversation with Gorgias. It is best understood as a serious description of Gorgian rhetoric, albeit a description tailored both to provoke Polus and to shake Gorgias satisfaction with his own ways.5
5. It is worth noticing that, when Socrates begins his account of rhetoric, he addresses it as much to Gorgias as to Polus (463a6), and Gorgias shows his interest by urging Socrates to explain his initial claims more fully (463d6e4). Friedlander, Plato, 2:253, remarks: That Gorgias is drawn anew into the discussion is not only a device to show, all the more insistently, how helpless Polus is. It is also a structural symbol indicating that the level of the rst conversation here penetrates the second stage. A suggestion similar to mine is offered by Black, Platos View of Rhetoric, 3656. Rejecting the common view that the present passage should be read as a wholesale condemnation of rhetoric, Black suggests that Platos attack is limited only to a particular practice of rhetoric, namely, that which Gorgias has attempted to dene. Black points to Socrates suggestion that Gorgias might pursue another kind of rhetoric as evidence that the rhetoric under discussion is not all rhetoric (the emphasis is Blacks). For a contrasting interpretation, see Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 100. In support of my contention that the present account of rhetoric owes a debt to Gorgias claims, consider Laws 937d6938a4.

Socrates Description of Rhetoric

45

The most important point in Socrates description of rhetoric is rst made in an exchange with Polus that precedes the longer account that Socrates gives to elaborate his basic claims about rhetoric (see 462b3e4, 463a6466a3). After prompting Polus to ask him what art he thinks rhetoric is, Socrates denies that rhetoric is an art at all (462b69). This is not entirely new. We noticed earlier that at a certain point in his discussion with Gorgias, Socrates stopped speaking of rhetoric as an art. But Socrates now makes his refusal to call rhetoric an art explicit.6 Rather than an art, he now says, rhetoric is a certain experience in the production of grace and pleasure (462b6c7). Rhetoric, Socrates explains, resembles cookery, since cookery, too, ought not to be called an art and yet it also produces grace and pleasure. According to Socrates, rhetoric and cookery are two parts of the same pursuit, a pursuit that rests not on artistic expertise but on the experience of souls that are skilled at guesswork, courageous, and naturally gifted at associating with human beings (462d8463b5). Since Socrates identies the chief aim of this pursuit as attery, we may refer to the pursuit itself as attery (see 463a8b1). In addition to rhetoric and cookery, Socrates also includes sophistry and cosmetics as parts of attery (463b46). Socrates division of attery into four parts allows him to sketch a schema in which the parts of attery are presented as phantoms of four corresponding genuine arts. The four genuine arts Socrates identies are medicine, gymnastics, justice, and legislation. These arts are paired with the various attering-phantoms in accordance with the distinction between the body and the soul: Socrates calls the care of the soul politics, while leaving the care of the body nameless (464a1b8). Socrates then makes a division within these two spheres (politics and care of the body) on the basis of a further principle that distinguishes

6. For a helpful discussion of the meaning of the term art (techne ), see Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1301. The most important aspect of Jaegers discussion is his emphasis on the importance of knowledge in the Greek conception of techne , a point that risks obfuscation by the translation art.

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Polus and the Dispute about Justice

medicine from gymnastics, and justice from legislation. Although Socrates gives only a vague statement of this further principle they differ somehow from one another (464c3) we can gure out on our own that the difference is that between seeking the correction of an ill condition (medicine/justice) and the pursuit of further development beyond a basic state of health (gymnastics/legislation). If Socrates vagueness about this difference is due to his reluctance to call attention to what it implies about justice namely, that justice serves merely to remedy a awed situation nevertheless, the difference would seem to establish a hierarchy in which gymnastics deserves a higher place than medicine, and legislation a higher place than justice. Socrates divisions thus produce this schema:

Soul (Politics) Development Genuine Art: Phantom: Correction Genuine Art: Phantom: Legislation Sophistry Justice Rhetoric

Body (Care of the Body) Gymnastics Cosmetics Medicine Cookery

The general suggestion conveyed by this schema is clear enough: for each genuine art, there is a part of attery that has slipped under it, pretending to be the genuine art; rhetoric, in particular, is the phantom of justice (see 464c3d1, 465b1c5, 465d8e1). But the most important questions concern the divisions between the genuine arts and the phantoms. What does Socrates mean by referring to the parts of attery as phantoms? And why are they not arts? The most obvious distinction Socrates draws between the genuine arts and the phantoms rests on his argument that the genuine arts are directed to the good of their objects (bodies or souls), whereas the phantoms hunt only after pleasure (464c3465a2). But the matter is more complicated than that, since the phantoms, as the name implies

Socrates Description of Rhetoric

47

and as Socrates repeatedly suggests, use deception to convince people that they are the genuine arts, and they do not openly acknowledge that their aim is not the good. Moreover, it is not clear why the concern for pleasure rather than the good should deprive the phantoms of the status of arts. Couldnt there be arts of pleasure-seeking and pleasureproviding? But Socrates gives a further reason beyond the distinction between the good and the pleasant for depriving the phantoms of the designation arts. None of the phantoms, he claims, has an account (logon) of the things to which it administers or of the things that it administers (465a35).7 In fact, it is this claim that Socrates most directly uses to explain his refusal to call the phantoms arts.8 Yet, while this claim seems to give a better reason for refusing to call the phantoms arts, it is not clear why the claim should be accepted. Why couldnt the phantoms possess accounts, even if their aim is merely to provide pleasure for bodies or souls? To see what Socrates is driving at, we have to put the pieces of his presentation together and also return to his conversation with Gorgias. For the crucial evidence for Socrates claim that none of the phantoms has an account, and thus that rhetoric is not an art, can be found in Gorgias view that knowledge of justice is not a prerequisite of rhetoric. Only by reecting on that view together with Socrates current presentation can we uncover the aspects of Gorgian rhetoric that justify Socrates criticism of it. To begin with the most basic point, Gorgias view, especially when coupled with his bold celebration of the power of rhetoric, revealed that justice is not of great concern to Gorgias himself or to any other rhetorician of the Gorgian sort. But that does not mean that such rhetoricians do not often speak, as they practice their rhetoric, about
prospherei 7. I am following Doddss insertion of the conjunction e between hoi and ha prospherei in line 465a4. See Dodds, Gorgias, 22930, for a defense of this reading. 8. Consider all of 464e2465a6, with attention to hoti at 465a3. Cf. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 2723; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:131; Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 116.

48

Polus and the Dispute about Justice

justice (see again 451d78, 452e14, 454b57). Indeed, the prevalence and importance of speech about justice is essential to understanding why Socrates calls rhetoric a phantom of justice. But what kind of speech is likely to come from a Gorgian rhetorician? In the rst place, it will be speech coming from someone who has no qualms about deception and manipulation, and who, more generally, has the sense that justice is not a matter of the greatest signicance. Just as important, however, is the tendency of such speech to convey something of that sense to the audience. If we follow Socrates suggestions, the aim of rhetoric is to please, that is, to satisfy the audiences desire for pleasure. Any appeals to justice, then, will be appeals that seek to bring justice and pleasure into harmony, or to give justications of actions or ends to which the audience is already drawn by their desires. This tendency can help us to grasp what Socrates has in mind when he speaks of the deceptive character of rhetoric and of its efforts to blur the distinction between the pleasant and the good by disguising the pleasant in the garb of the good. It also helps to explain what Socrates means by comparing rhetoric to cookery and by calling it a form of attery: Gorgian rhetoric is attery in the sense that it convinces people that they can fulll their desires with a good conscience; it convinces them that what they want to do coincides with what justice demands, and thus that they can be both satised and good. Such rhetoric, Socrates suggests, depends on nothing more than an acquaintance with human desires and a knack for telling people what they want to hear (consider again 463a6b1). It does not require, as Gorgias himself afrmed, any deep reection on justice. Yet, since appeals to justice are nonetheless a crucial part of Gorgian rhetoric, such rhetoric fails to reect sufciently on its own doings and on the basis of its success. Such is the meaning of Socrates claim that it lacks an account.9
9. Compare Phaedrus 259e1262c3, 266d1274b4, 277a9279c6, Republic 493a6d9. See also Taylor, Plato, 111.

Socrates Description of Rhetoric

49

Of course, this line of criticism would probably be dismissed by a Gorgian rhetorician, who might respond by pointing to his success as a reason not to be troubled by his lack of an account (consider again, e.g., 456a7c7, 459c35). But Socrates might respond in turn by arguing that Gorgian rhetoric is not quite as successful as its practitioners tend to think. We saw in the Gorgias section, at any rate, that Gorgias himself could not deny that rhetoric remains suspect in the eyes of the city. And Socrates may be pointing to the same problem near the end of his description of rhetoric when, after stressing the similarity between sophists and rhetoricians, he says that such men dont know what use to make of themselves, nor do other human beings know what use to make of them (465c58). While the city can be charmed and beguiled by a rhetoric that entices people toward pleasure, such rhetoric, Socrates remark suggests, is not simply welcomed by the city, which will never lose its sense that it is being manipulated and corrupted. If this is what Socrates means by his remark, his elaboration of the remark may be intended to offer a further indication as to why there can never be complete harmony between Gorgian rhetoric and the city. For Socrates follows his remark about sophists and rhetoricians by saying that if the soul were not set over the body, but instead the body measured its own gratications, Anaxagoras saying all things mixed together a saying that points to a state without any fundamental distinctions would carry much greater weight, and the division between genuine arts and phantoms would disappear (465c8d7).10 With this cryptic statement, Socrates may be suggesting that, given the character of the human soul, especially its capacity to

10. Socrates quotes the same saying, homou panta chre mata, in the Phaedo (72c45). According to Dodds, Gorgias, 2312, this saying can be traced back to the opening line of a work of Anaxagoras, homou panta chre mata e n, which Anaxagoras used to describe the chaos that existed before the intervention of nous, but that became proverbial for any state in which distinctions are obliterated, like Hegels night in which all cows are black.

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Polus and the Dispute about Justice

contemplate and judge (see 466d1), human beings inevitably draw a distinction between the pleasant and the good, and thus can never fully embrace a practice that aims to entice them towards mere pleasure. This suggestion, at any rate, would be in keeping with Socrates more straightforward efforts to suggest to Gorgias that his rhetoric rests on an insufcient appreciation of those human concerns that run deeper than the hedonistic desires to which his rhetoric caters.

ARE RHETORICIANS POWERFUL? (466a4468e9)

Socrates criticism of rhetoric provokes a protest from Polus, as Socrates easily could have foreseen and surely intended. After all, if the deepest purpose of Socrates suggestion that rhetoric lacks an account and thus does not deserve to be called an art is to point to Gorgias failings and to shake his self-satisfaction (see especially 463a6b1), Socrates has also made every effort to make rhetoric appear as ignoble as possible. These efforts, as he himself indicates, have been directed primarily at Polus (see especially 464e2465a2). The protest they provoke initiates the extended quarrel between Socrates and Polus that now takes over the conversation, at rst as a dispute over Socrates suggestion that rhetoricians are lowly atterers. Polus objects by pointing to the esteem and power rhetoricians enjoy in the cities: Are rhetoricians really regarded as mere atterers? Dont they have great power in the cities? Rhetoricians are so powerful, Polus argues, that, like tyrants, they kill whomever they want, seize other peoples possessions, and expel from the cities whomever it seems good to them to expel (466a9c2). Far more openly than Gorgias ever did, Polus calls attention to the capacity of rhetoric for injustice. Whereas he had earlier suggested that rhetoric is noble because it is able to gratify human beings (see 462c89), he now makes its capacity for serving the most tyrannical desires of the rhetorician himself the basis of its nobility. We may assume that Socrates wished to push Polus in a direction that will cast the quarrel between them as a dispute over the

Are Rhetoricians Powerful?

51

importance of justice. But especially if we make this assumption, Socrates initial response to Polus celebration of the tyrannical power of rhetoricians is surprising. For Socrates does not begin with the moral condemnation of the actions of Polus rhetorician-tyrants that we are expecting at this point. Rather, he begins by simply denying that such men are truly powerful. Socrates even goes so far as to claim that rhetoricians are the least powerful men in any city (466b910, d68). To defend this paradoxical claim, Socrates argues that, while rhetoricians and tyrants can do what seems best to them in the cities, they do not do what they truly wish and thus they are not truly powerful (466c3e2). Polus is astounded and perplexed by the initial formulation of Socrates argument. Socrates is thus forced to give a fuller explanation. He does so by beginning from a point Polus is willing to grant: true power must be good for the one who possesses it (466b68, e48). Socrates then connects this point with the crucial distinction he has drawn between doing what seems best and doing what one wishes (see 466c6e2, 467a1b9). As Socrates explains to Polus, the mere capacity of a man to do what seems best to him does not yet mean that he does what he wishes, for the deepest wish of anyone who acts in a given situation is not simply to perform whatever actions he performs but rather to be beneted by his actions. It follows that actions that prove harmful to oneself ought to be regarded as failures to do what one wishes that display ones folly rather than ones power (see especially 466e911, 467a110). Since Polus continues to have difculty grasping this argument, Socrates spells out at greater length a general view of human actions according to which every action, or at least every action that is for the sake of something, should be regarded as a mere means to some end that is the true object of the actors striving.11 According to the view

11. Socrates introduces the qualication that he is speaking of actions that are for the sake of something at 467d67. While he leaves open the possibility that his argument does not apply to all actions, Socrates does not call this possible limitation to Polus attention, and he at times gives the impression

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Socrates presents, whenever someone acts for the sake of something (e.g., when a man takes medicine for the sake of health, or labors for the sake of wealth), he does not act out of a wish to perform the actions themselves, but rather he acts only because he is seeking some end. This is true, according to Socrates, of all human actions that have purposes beyond the actions themselves: whenever someone does something for the sake of something, he does not wish for the thing he does, but for that for the sake of which he does it (467d6e1). By this view, any particular action be it walking, running, sailing, killing, stealing, or anything else is neither good nor bad but rather what Socrates calls an intermediate (metaxu) that gains its value only by its service to various ends (467e1468b1). Furthermore, the various ends that any given person pursues can be reduced from a multiplicity (wisdom, health, wealth, etc.) to a single end, since what each of us is really seeking through such ends is the good, or, as Socrates species it, the benecial, that is, ones own benet (468b1c5). Accordingly, actions should be judged not by any intrinsic value they might appear to possess but solely by whether they prove to be benecial to the actor; any actions that prove harmful to the actor ought not to be regarded as actions the actor truly wished to perform or as marks of true power (468d1e5). Socrates delivers this argument to support the conclusion that Polus rhetorician-tyrants, who perform all sorts of spectacular actions such as killing, stealing, and exiling their enemies, may not do what they truly wish since they may not be beneted by these actions. The power of such men may not be true power at all. Of course, Socrates argument genuinely supports only the conclusion that it is possible that Polus rhetorician-tyrants fail to do what they wish and thus lack true power. The argument does not show that this is necessarily the case. And Socrates acknowledges this limitation of his argument in his own formulation of the arguments conclusion (see
that he is speaking about all human actions (see, e.g., hekastote at 467c6 and at 467d6). d3 and panton

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especially 468d56, e35).12 It is true that Socrates also acts, in the course of making the argument, as if the burden of proof were on Polus to show that rhetorician-tyrants who do what seems best to them also do what they wish (consider especially 466e13467b9). But this is puzzling. Why should the burden of proof be on Polus, who thinks that it is obvious that such men do both what seems best to them and what they wish? Polus, as we have seen, has a hard time grasping Socrates argument because he has a hard time grasping that there could ever be a divergence between these two principles; hence he remains unpersuaded by Socrates argument even as he is forced to accept the logic of its movement (see 466e3467b10 together with 468c2e5). Polus resistance, however, should not be attributed to mere obtuseness on his part. In fact, his resistance reveals the deepest limitation of Socrates argument. For his resistance shows that Socrates argument could never be persuasive to someone who thinks that there is rarely a significant gap between what seems best to people that is, the objects of the most manifest human desires and the true good that people wish for. And yet, isnt that the view of everyone who thinks that the elements of the human good are fairly obvious? Polus assumes, as many do, that it is not hard to discern what is good. Our desires direct us toward ruling in the city, enjoying wealth, and indulging in various other pleasures. Polus thinks that one could hardly make a drastic mistake in pursuing such things; the only mistakes, he assumes, come in failing to attain the objects of our desires, not in seeking them in the rst place. Against such an assumption one that Socrates will later acknowledge is far from rare (consider 472a2b3) Socrates argument carries no real force. Socrates argument leads to a dead end, and Polus revolt at the end of the argument is hardly surprising (see 468e69).13

12. Socrates acknowledgment of this limitation of his argument is often missed or at least not reproduced when commentators paraphrase the argument. See, e.g., Jaeger, Paideia, 2:135; Friedlander, Plato, 2:255. Better in this respect is Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 117. 13. Cf. Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:3312.

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Polus and the Dispute about Justice

But if Socrates argument is so poorly designed for convincing Polus and its failure is so predictable, why does Socrates bother to make this argument? This question can be answered, I think, by connecting the failure of the argument with the most striking feature of the argument as a whole: its complete silence about considerations of justice. We have already observed that Socrates does not begin with a moral condemnation of Polus rhetorician-tyrants. And not only does Socrates say nothing in his argument about the injustice of tyrannical actions, but the argument itself is remarkably amoral: it presents a view of human actions that looks at actions even such actions as killing and stealing (see 468b46, d14) as intrinsically neither good nor bad. All actions, or at least all actions that are for the sake of something, are presented as mere means that should be measured only by whether they conduce to the benet of the actor; in themselves, they have no more value than rocks or wood (467e6468a3).14 Given such a view of human actions, with its apparent approval of a hard-boiled concern for self-interest, it could be hard to see why one would question the wisdom of those who seek to gain enough sway in the city to do what seems best to them. Although Polus must acknowledge that it is possible that doing what seems best in such cases may lead to misery rather than happiness, it is not so unreasonable of him, even or precisely if he accepts the outlook of Socrates argument, to regard this possibility as a remote one that need not be taken very seriously. To be more deeply impressed by this possibility, Polus would have to have genuine doubts that the elements of the human good are as obvious as he thinks they are. Socrates opening argument about the power of rhetorician-tyrants can thus be understood in this way: it is meant more to reveal than truly to shake Polus conviction that the

14. The amoral character of Socrates argument is often obscured in accounts that too quickly merge this argument with the argument Socrates will make in the next section of the dialogue. See, e.g., Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 1389, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 11314; Friedlander, Plato, 2:255; Santas, Socrates, 2237.

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elements of the human good are obvious, and also to show that an argument that appeals only to prudence could never really shake that conviction.15

THE TURN TO JUSTICE AND THE SOCRATIC THESIS (468e6470c3)

The failure of Socrates argument to make any meaningful impression on Polus can help us make sense of what would otherwise be the perplexing turn the conversation now takes. On the heels of an argument that neglects and even excludes moral considerations, Socrates turns abruptly to the question of justice. His turn to the question of justice, moreover, involves a dramatic departure from the view that the worth of actions should be measured only by their service to other ends. Socrates now turns to the view that everything, so to speak, is riding on whether actions are performed justly or unjustly, that is, on the character of the actions themselves (see 468e10469b6). The most immediate cause of this turn is Polus effort to reject the preceding argument by appealing to Socrates own experience: As if you, Socrates, would not welcome the chance to do whatever seems best to you in the city, rather than not, or feel envy if you were to see someone killing whomever it seemed good to him or depriving him of his possessions or fettering him (468e69). By rebelling against Socrates argument in this way, Polus forces Socrates to express his own view. No longer able simply to elicit Polus views through his questioning, Socrates replies by arguing that one must consider the justice of the actions to which Polus points: if the actions are performed unjustly, they could never be enviable (468e10469b11; consider also 470b9c3). Socrates thus takes a position that unjust actions are

15. For a line of argument bearing some important similarities to the one just considered, see Second Alcibiades 138b6141b8. On that line of argument and Alcibiades reaction to it, which resembles Polus reaction here, see Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 4043.

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never enviable because injustice is the greatest of all evils (see especially 469b89) that he will defend throughout the rest of the dialogue. Indeed, this position will play such a large role in Socrates arguments from here on that it may be called, for the sake of simplicity, the Socratic thesis.16 Socrates turn to justice and to the Socratic thesis, however, cannot be explained entirely by the fact that he has now been put on the spot. It is also important that this turn occurs immediately after the failure of Socrates preceding argument to move Polus from his conviction that the elements of the human good are obvious. For it makes sense that, in the wake of showing that an appeal to prudence carries little power to shake that conviction, Socrates would turn to justice in order to reveal that Polus views are more complex than they seem. After all, isnt it through the concern for justice, or, in other words, through ones moral experience, that one can rst be awakened to the thought that there are restrictions on the pursuit of goods such as rule, wealth, and pleasure? And isnt this thought connected to the further thought that ones truest good may lie in something beyond the enjoyment of these more obvious goods?17 Socrates turn to justice is the best way of revealing that Polus is not as simple as his reaction to Socrates opening argument made him seem. Furthermore, given that Polus reaction was based on a commonly held view, Socrates can thus teach through Polus a more general lesson about the complexity of human concerns and the depth of the human attachment to justice.

16. Another reason for giving it this title is that the same thesis, or at least a position very similar to it, plays an important role in other dialogues. See, e.g., Crito 48b349e3, Apology 28b330d5, and Cleitophon 407a5e2. What I refer to as the Socratic thesis is sometimes referred to by other titles. For example, McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 35, calls it the Socratic Axiom; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 8586, and Santas, Socrates, 18394, refer to it, as many others do, as a Socratic paradox. 17. Compare Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 4243; see also 2730.

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Of course, if these are Socrates aims, he has a long road ahead of him. Polus is hardly ready to acknowledge any concern for justice. His rst reaction to Socrates assertion of the Socratic thesis is disbelief that anyone could really think such a thing (see 469b8c3). And Socrates would seem not to have made matters any easier by choosing to defend such an extreme position. Socrates chooses to defend the view, to repeat, that doing injustice is the greatest of all evils, greater, in particular, than suffering injustice. The extremism of this view is revealed most clearly by an important consequence that Socrates stresses in the present context: that one ought to pity wrongdoers. Socrates argues to Polus that, while those who kill justly should not be regarded as wretched and pitiable, those who kill unjustly should be pitied for having made themselves wretched (468e10469b6). Socrates presents this view as a necessary conclusion from the principle that injustice is the greatest of all evils; the intransigent insistence on that principle leads to the paradoxical conclusion that wrongdoers have harmed themselves and thus deserve pity (see especially 469b711).18 Yet this view, paradoxical as it is, is rejected not only by Polus but by almost all people, including those of more obvious decency than Polus. Most people hardly regard pity as the tting response to injustice. The far more typical response is anger and the desire to punish. Still, we should not conclude from this that the Socratic thesis and its consequences are so extreme as to express a simple or complete transcendence of the ordinary view. For if the ordinary response to injustice reveals a rejection of the conclusion Socrates draws and thus some doubt of the principle that leads to that conclusion, neither does it go over entirely to the other side; if it did, injustice would elicit, not anger and the desire to punish, but unambiguous admiration and the desire to emulate. Anger and the desire to punish reect ambivalence about

18. Compare Laws 731c1d3, Apology 25c526a7, Cleitophon 407d2e2, Republic 336e2337a2. See also Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2379; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:33637.

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whether the unjust are already suffering from their injustice, but that by no means amounts to a complete abandonment of the concern for justice or of the belief that justice is superior to injustice. By thinking about the difference between the Socratic and the ordinary response to injustice, then, we are led almost immediately to wonder whether the extremism of the Socratic thesis is not a result of its more rigorous attention to the demands of consistency even or especially where the ordinary view wavers and lacks complete clarity as to its principles.19 Yet, to repeat, Socrates extremism broadens the divide between himself and Polus, who rejects Socrates argument even more vehemently than most people would. There has been little evidence so far that Polus has any concern for justice, much less a concern strong enough to lead him to accept the Socratic thesis. To say that there has been little evidence, however, is not to say that there has been none (see again 461b3c4) and Socrates has only begun his discussion of justice with Polus.

POLUS REFUTATION OF SOCRATES (470c4471e1)

The conversation now concentrates on the question of the truth of the Socratic thesis, with Socrates defending the thesis and Polus attacking it. Although Polus has already expressed his admiration of tyranny, he is willing to admit that it is not always benecial to kill, steal, and do other such things; such actions are obviously harmful when one gets caught and punished (469c8470a8). But if Polus grants this much, he resists, to put it mildly, Socrates further efforts to draw the line between benecial and harmful actions on the basis of whether actions

19. It is worth noticing, in this connection, another difference between Socrates position in this section and the ordinary view: Socrates does not express any admiration or envy of those who punish justly. Although he denies that such men are wretched and pitiable, he also denies that they are enviable (469a9 b2). Here, too, he shows none of the zeal for punishing characteristic of the ordinary moral outlook and visible in Polus.

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are performed justly or unjustly (see 470b9c3). Polus is unwilling to agree, in other words, that injustice is always harmful to the one who does it, or that harm follows necessarily from the fact of injustice. Polus is so far from accepting this view that he is incredulous that anyone could hold it, and he declares that even a child could refute it (470c4 5). At Socrates urging, Polus will go rst in attempting a refutation of the Socratic thesis, after which Socrates will try to refute Polus view that injustice often pays. Polus refutation if refutation is the appropriate word for it consists simply of an example taken from the political affairs of the day. To show that many human beings who do injustice are happy, Polus gives the example of Archelaus, a man who, as Polus reminds Socrates, has been ruling Macedonia since the death of his father Perdiccas (470d26).20 Polus thinks that the mere mention of Archelaus name should sufce to show that it is possible for an unjust man to be happy. But he is led to describe Archelaus unscrupulous rise to power by what appears to him as Socrates obstinate refusal to grant the obvious. While acknowledging that he has heard of Archelaus exploits, Socrates refuses to pass judgment on his happiness since he has not spent time with the man (470d9e3). To Polus annoyed reply that by this standard Socrates would not even concede that the king of Persia is happy, Socrates afrms that that is true: for I dont know how he stands with respect to education and justice (470e67). Although Polus nds this response ridiculous and puzzling, we should pay close attention to the complexity of what Socrates says in this exchange. For one thing, Socrates statements suggest that he regards justice as something harder to determine than we ordinarily suppose; it is not sufcient, according to Socrates, to hear of a mans actions, but one must spend time with a man to know whether or not he is just. And if this makes the Socratic thesis seem less straightforward than it rst appeared, we also should note the modication in that thesis as Socrates now presents

20. Archelaus came to power in Macedonia in 413 B.C.

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it: it is not only justice but also education that is essential to the virtue upon which happiness and misery depend (consider paideias at 470e6 in the context of 470e411). Might Socrates be indicating here that he thinks that there are elements of virtue other than justice, elements that might even be higher in the same way that legislation was earlier presented as a higher art than justice? In any case, this line of thought is not pursued, because Socrates quickly returns to the view that justice is the sole determinant of happiness. He says that he would regard Archelaus as unhappy if in fact he is unjust (compare 471a13 with 470e611). But what about the injustice of Archelaus? Polus thinks, to repeat, that it is obvious. How could a man who has lived Archelaus life not be unjust? Growing ever more frustrated and incredulous, Polus delivers his longest speech of the dialogue, describing the injustices that paved Archelaus path to power (471a4d2). According to Polus vivid account, delivered with a blend of venom and sarcasm, Archelaus had no right to the throne of Macedonia. Born of a woman who was a slave of his uncle Alcetas (Perdiccas brother), Archelaus in accordance with the just should have lived as a slave of Alcetas. While such a life, Polus says to Socrates, would have made Archelaus happy according to your argument, he chose instead to make himself miserable by doing the greatest injustices. After the death of his father, Polus reports, Archelaus began his rise to power by rst eliminating his uncle and his uncles son, his own cousin. Deceiving these men by promising them that he would help them seize power, he got them drunk at a feast, threw them into a wagon, dragged them into the night, and slit their throats. Once Archelaus had committed these crimes, Polus continues, he failed to notice that he was making himself most wretched, and so, rather than repenting, he next trained his sights on his seven-year-old brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas and the rightful heir to the throne. Not wishing to make himself happy by following the just course of rearing this young boy and then turning power over to him, he chose instead to throw him into

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a well, and, after drowning him, he reported to the childs mother, the queen Cleopatra, that the boy had fallen into the well and died while chasing a goose. Since he has done all of these injustices on his way to power injustices surpassing any done by the rest of the Macedonians Archelaus, by Socrates standards, should be the most miserable of all the Macedonians, not the happiest. And perhaps, Polus concludes with a nal swipe at Socrates, there is someone among the Athenians, beginning with you, who would prefer to be anyone else among the Macedonians other than Archelaus. Polus account of the life of Archelaus is meant to establish beyond a shadow of a doubt that Archelaus is an unjust man, one whose life even Socrates would have to grant is enviable. Yet, despite Polus intentions, perhaps the most signicant thing about the speech is what it reveals about Polus own views. It is striking how adamant and unquestioning Polus is about the injustice of Archelaus. Is it really as clear as Polus insists that Archelaus should be regarded as the paradigm of an unjust man? Archelaus lineage, after all, was not that of a typical slave. Nor does Polus provide any evidence to prove a set of accusations that would be hard to verify. Thucydides report of Archelaus accession, by contrast, makes no mention of the crimes described by Polus but focuses instead on the great benets that Archelaus brought to Macedonia.21 Polus says nothing about the character of Archelaus rule after his rise to power.22 And only by an unquestioning application of the standards of legal justice, one that refuses to consider the complex circumstances on which a case to exculpate

21. See Thucydides 2.100. 22. See Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 147: Polus ignores those activities of Archelaus which strengthened the status of Mace` donia vis-a-vis the cities of Greece, his success in expanding Macedonian trade, in increasing Macedonias allies, and in Hellenizing the barbarian state. As part of his effort at Hellenizing the barbarian state, Archelaus played host to a number of the leading lights of Athenian intellectual life, including Euripides and Agathon (Dodds, Gorgias, 241).

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Archelaus might be mounted, can Polus claim without further argument that Archelaus is clearly unjust (consider especially 471a48 and c14).23 That Polus does not entertain any doubts about Archelaus guilt, but instead describes his actions with so much emphasis on their wickedness, should prompt us to raise a surprising question about Polus attitude towards Archelaus. Is it free of anger or indignation? Doesnt Polus reveal that he is disturbed by the spectacle of such blatant and successful injustice? Against this suggestion, one might object that Polus clearly envies Archelaus, and, since he says as much himself, to attribute indignation to him is to ignore the explicit meaning of his speech. Yet this objection is not as powerful as it might seem, because envy is not necessarily inconsistent with indignation and may even be a necessary precondition of it (consider again 468e6469c2). Indeed, it reveals something of the complexity of Polus and of indignation itself that Archelaus is both the hero and the villain of Polus speech. To be sure, it is more obvious that Archelaus is the hero. But his role as the villain is brought out most simply by the vehemence of Polus insistence on his injustice.24
23. It is worth noticing that even in Polus own description of Archelaus plot against his uncle and cousin, Polus speaks of Archelaus using the ruse that he was intending to give back rule of Macedonia (see 471b2). Although it may be true that Perdiccas had taken the throne from Alcetas (see 471b23), the indication that the throne at least in some sense belonged to Archelaus even before the actions described by Polus suggests that the situation in the wake of Perdiccas death was more complicated and Archelaus claim to the throne possibly more legitimate than Polus suggests by insisting that justice clearly demanded that Archelaus live as a slave of Alcetas. On Polus simplication of a possibly more complicated situation, see also Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 44. 24. We should recall here the zeal for punishing that Polus displayed earlier in his conversation with Socrates (see again 468e6469a10). Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 139, also suggests that Polus displays anger at the apparent prosperity of the unjust; he describes Polus account of Archelaus as a prosecutors speech of accusation overlaid with the cynical intellectuals bitter revelation of the rewards for injustice. See

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Yet Socrates, as we have seen, is unwilling to concede to Polus that Archelaus is unjust. Once Polus has completed his speech, Socrates makes an important remark that reafrms the position he took before the speech. After striking back at Polus by scofng at his speech, Socrates tells Polus that he agrees with him on none of the things that you are saying (471d89). This remark refers most directly to Polus claim that the life of Archelaus shows that an unjust man can be happy (consider 471d78). But if the remark is taken strictly (on none of the things, ouden), it extends also to the more basic claim that Archelaus is obviously an unjust man. For the burden of Polus speech was at least as much to establish the injustice of Archelaus as to emphasize his happiness. Socrates, then, distances himself once again from Polus position on the issue of Archelaus injustice. And by doing so, Socrates also points to the question that would have to be raised in order to settle this issue. To settle the issue of Archelaus injustice, one would ultimately have to raise the more fundamental question, What is justice? Does justice always consist, for instance, in obedience to the law, or are its demands sometimes more complicated? However, if Socrates remark points to the need to raise this question, it stops short of raising it explicitly. In fact, we can see here a crucial limit of the discussion between Socrates and Polus. While Socrates and Polus have been arguing and will continue to argue about the goodness of justice, nowhere do they examine what would seem to be the prior question of what justice is.25 Since this is a violation of Socrates own principle of dialectics namely, that one must say what something is before praising or blaming it (see 448d8e4) we must

also Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 44; Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 1467. For contrasting interpretations, which stress only Polus admiration of Archelaus and his attraction to injustice, see Voegelin, Plato, 2628, and Santas, Socrates, 2389. 25. Compare Republic 354a12c3. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 6, makes a similar observation, calling attention to a limit not just of Socrater conversation with Polus but of the dialogue as a whole. See also Newell, Ruling Passion, 38; Santas, Socrates, 21920.

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conclude that Socrates discussion of justice with Polus is not a dialectical examination of justice in the fullest or deepest sense of Socratic dialectics. To state this another way, although the discussion proceeds for the most part through conversational exchanges, the purpose of these exchanges is not to reveal the true character of justice, but rather to accomplish something more limited.

SOCRATES REFUTATION OF POLUS (471e2481b5)

That Socrates does not engage Polus in an examination of the fundamental question, What is justice? does not mean that his aim in speaking with him is an unimportant one. Socrates primary aim, I have suggested, is to reveal that Polus concerns are more complex than they initially seem and, through this, to show something more general about the depth of the human concern for justice. Our condence in attributing this aim to Socrates should be strengthened by the speech he now delivers a speech that includes both a promise to bring out Polus agreement with his position and an important statement on the views most people hold about justice. These features of Socrates speech emerge in the course of his discussion of the speechs main theme. Serving as a bridge between Polus attempt at refutation and his own, Socrates speech is a reection on the difference between Polus method of refutation and the one he will soon employ. According to Socrates, Polus has been following the method typical of those who argue in law courts, since such men make their cases by bringing in as many witnesses as they can to support their side (471e2472a2). Now, the witnesses to whom Socrates is referring in the case of Polus are presumably all of the Athenians, who Polus insisted would choose the life of Archelaus over that of any other Macedonian (see again 471c8d1). But if this is fairly straightforward, much more surprising is the step Socrates takes next. He grants and even bolsters Polus point by afrming that all Athenians and foreigners, except a few, would say the same things as Polus and could serve as his witnesses. Socrates even provides names, including

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some of the most respected names in Athens: his list, which spans the Athenian political spectrum, includes Nicias and his brothers as well as the whole house of Pericles (472a2b3).26 Socrates acknowledgment that these men could be brought as witnesses by Polus is surprising because it suggests that the human concern for justice is in fact not so deep; it suggests that even decent men including the most pious have grave doubts about whether injustice is always the worst path. In other words, Socrates seems to place himself, as an advocate of the Socratic thesis, in a minority, not to say in a minority of one (consider 472b34, c12).27 And yet his speech is not as simple as this suggests. For although Socrates grants that these witnesses could be brought to testify in support of Polus view that the unjust are sometimes happy, he also says that, in offering this testimony, they would be false witnesses (see 472a12, b46). By this, Socrates means more than that they would be wrong; he also means that they would be lying or giving their support to a claim they do not really believe.28 Socrates thus seems puzzlingly to move within the same speech between conceding and denying that most people agree with Polus rather than with him. It is possible, however, to make sense of this wavering. For
26. On Socrates selection of gures from the different political factions in Athens, see Dodds, Gorgias, 244; Nichols, Gorgias and Phaedrus, 57n. Nicias was, in the words of Dodds, an old-fashioned conservative; the house of Pericles refers to the leaders of the democrats. Socrates also mentions Aristocrates, a member of the oligarchic party. 27. Compare Republic 619b7d3, Laws 660d11662a8. Socrates stresses the piety of some of the gures mentioned in the present passage by speaking of the offerings to the gods brought by Nicias and his brothers and by Aristocrates (see 472a5b1). By stressing their piety in this context, Socrates leads one to wonder whether the very hope for divine support for justice is not itself an indication of doubts about the intrinsic goodness of justice. On this question, consider Adeimantus complaint about the typical praises of justice in his speech in Book Two of the Republic (362e1367e5). 28. This stronger meaning is suggested by Socrates use of the word pseudomarturas (false witnesses or perjurers) and is conrmed by a remark Socrates will make shortly after this speech (see 474b25). Cf. Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 7680.

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it can be understood as a reection of a wavering within the souls of the people Socrates is talking about, that is, within the souls of nearly everyone. In other words, Socrates is suggesting that nearly everyone is of two minds about justice: if beneath ordinary decency there lurk great doubts about whether it is always wise to be just, there also lurks, beneath those doubts, a deeper belief in the goodness of justice. Yet, if such dividedness about justice is so common as to be nearly universal, it is far from obvious. Unless given some display or demonstration, Socrates suggestions in his speech on Polus witnesses cannot be taken for more than assertions. But Socrates does promise to give a display of the dividedness about justice to which he points in at least one case. Socrates explains that his form of refutation, unlike the courtroom-style rhetoric of Polus, aims to make a witness out of his very opponent; and in the present instance, this means that he will try to show that even Polus himself can be brought to agree with the Socratic thesis (see 472b6c6, 472e4473a3, and 474a5b8). Socrates thus stresses that his method is directed at convincing a single individual: his interlocutor. But he also calls attention to the broader signicance of what he aims to show in Polus case and suggests that this case should not be seen as unusual. Socrates indicates the broader signicance of his coming refutation of Polus in a statement that initially seems to point in the opposite direction. Denying that he knows how to convince large bodies of people, and admitting that he does not even speak with the many, Socrates says that he will direct his refutation at Polus alone (473e6474b5). Yet, if Polus is his sole concern, why does Socrates even raise here the issue of the many? One reason he does so is to call attention to an important limit on what he can accomplish: Socrates one-on-one refutations are not political in the sense that they cannot reach large crowds or inuence the many (consider in particular 473e6474b1). Another reason that Socrates raises the issue of the many, however, is to urge his audience and we should think here especially of Gorgias to reect on the broader implications of his coming refutation of Polus. For Socrates not only denies that he speaks with the many, but he also goes out of his way

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to make a point about what they believe. Reafrming what he had suggested by calling Polus witnesses false witnesses, Socrates concludes his statement about the many by telling Polus: For I suppose that I and you and the rest of humanity believe that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and not paying the just penalty worse than paying it (474b25, emphasis added; see also the repetition at 474b8, and consider 475d13).29 This last statement completes the prelude to Socrates refutation of Polus. In it, we can also see that Socrates has expanded the position he is defending. No longer arguing only that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, Socrates has expanded his thesis to include the claim that those who do injustice are better off if they pay the penalty than if they escape unpunished. Socrates went out of his way to make this addition in the interlude between his speech on Polus witnesses and his statement about the many (472d6473e3). After reconrming Polus view that it is possible for an unjust man to be happy, and reasserting his own position that that is impossible, Socrates asked Polus about punishment: Will the man who does injustice be happy even if he receives the just penalty and punishment? Polus predictable reply not at all, since in that case he would be most miserable merely

29. For a similar interpretation of the signicance of Socrates statement about the many, see McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 3637. McKim shares my emphasis on Socrates effort to reveal the character of the human concern for justice. But he presents that concern, in my view, as simpler than it is by suggesting that, deep down, we are sure that the harm injustice does to the soul far outweigh[s] any material gains it may bring (4748). Also, he goes too far in suggesting that Plato believed that Socratic morality is grounded so deeply within us that its truth is beyond argument (48). Socrates will go on to make arguments for Socratic morality, both against Polus and against Callicles; McKim downplays too much the importance of the question of whether Socrates arguments are sound. My analysis also should be compared with Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 7482. Although Brickhouse and Smith, too, emphasize Socrates effort to reveal what people really believe about justice, their analysis is closer to McKims than to mine.

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reconrmed a position he took earlier (compare 472d19 with 470a1 8). By eliciting this reply, however, Socrates enabled himself to respond by asserting the opposed view that unpunished injustice makes one even more miserable than injustice that receives its due punishment (472e47). Of course, by extending his position in this way, Socrates would seem to have made his task in convincing Polus all the more difcult and this at the very moment that he is promising to try to win Polus over to his position (see 473a23, 474b2c3). For his part, Polus can hardly believe his ears: Does Socrates really think that an unjust man who gets caught, tortured on the rack, castrated, burned, and is forced to watch his family suffer as he endures further torments, is a happier man than the one who gets away with his crimes and becomes a tyrant (473b12d2)? Polus is so incredulous that he breaks into laughter at Socrates claims. He expresses his amused curiosity to hear how Socrates will defend his ludicrous position (see 473e25, 474c23). Yet, for all this, Polus is swayed by Socrates refutation. He is led to accept, at least in some manner, the very position he mocks so contemptuously. To understand this remarkable result, and also to judge the true extent of Socrates success in convincing Polus, we must turn rst to the beginning of the argument by which Socrates refutes Polus and try to follow the argument in detail. Socrates argument, which marks a kind of new beginning to the conversation between Socrates and Polus (consider hosper an ei ex arche s at 474c4), begins from a set of questions intended to bring out Polus views on justice, benet, and nobility. Socrates succeeds in getting Polus to acknowledge that while he regards doing injustice as better than suffering it, he also regards it as more shameful. Socrates accomplishes this in the crucial opening exchange of the argument:
SOCRATES: Tell me . . . which do you believe to be worse, doing injustice or suffering it? POLUS: Suffering it at least that is what I think.

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SOCRATES: But what about this? Which is more shameful, doing injustice or suffering it? Answer ! POLUS: Doing it. SOCRATES: So, then, is it also worse, if indeed it is more shameful? POLUS: Far from it. (474c49)

Polus view, as it emerges from this exchange, grants the shamefulness of doing injustice without yet conceding far from it that this speaks decisively to the question of whether injustice is benecial or harmful. His view thus implies a divide between the shameful and the bad, on the one hand, and between the noble and the good, on the other (see 474c9d2).30 And it is on this divide that Socrates trains his sights. Having directed Polus attention to considerations of nobility that is, to a standard for which Polus himself has already displayed a concern (see again, e.g., 448c89, 462c89, 463d3) Socrates turns to an analysis of the noble (to kalon) or of the character of all noble or beautiful things (ta panta kala).31 Socrates asks Polus whether all noble things are not seen as such because one looks away to something beyond the noble thing itself. He gives the examples of noble bodies, colors, shapes, sounds, and practices. Do you call these things noble, he asks, looking away to nothing? For example, dont you say that noble bodies [ta somata ta kala] are noble either in reference to some use, that is, with a view to something for which they are useful, or in reference to some pleasure, if they make those who behold them delight in the beholding?

30. Compare Laws 661d6662a8, 689a1c3, Republic 348a8e9. 31. The crucial Greek term kalos has a broad meaning that no English term fully captures. Noble-beautiful might be the best translation, if it were not so awkward. In my treatment of Socrates argument, I will translate kalos as noble since the purpose of Socrates argument is to apply his analysis of to kalon to the case of justice. It better captures the moral signicance of the term to speak of the nobility of justice than of its beauty. But it is important to bear in mind the range of the term Socrates is analyzing, especially since his analysis will traverse all of that range.

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Or do you have anything beyond these things to say about the nobility of the body? (474d3e1). When Polus says that he does not have anything beyond use or pleasure to account for the nobility of bodies, Socrates then applies this view to all other noble things, replacing the term use with benet such that nobility appears to rest either on pleasure or on benet or on a combination of the two. He mentions again the examples of shapes, colors, and sounds, and then turns to laws and practices: Also indeed for things pertaining to laws and practices, that is, the noble ones, surely there isnt anything beyond these namely, their being either benecial or pleasant or both (474e17). Socrates nal example is the nobility of learnings or sciences, which Polus readily agrees should be understood along the same lines (475a12). Socrates analysis leads to the view that the noble must always be understood in terms of pleasure or benet, and the shameful always in terms of pain or harm. According to this view, whenever one of two things is nobler than the other, its greater nobility must be explained by the greater pleasure it brings or the greater benet, or by both; and, similarly, the greater shamefulness of one of two things must be due to the greater pain it brings or the greater harm, or to both (475a5b2). It is at this point that Socrates reminds Polus of his position regarding doing injustice and suffering it. For while Polus has argued that suffering injustice is worse than doing it, he has also conceded that doing injustice is more shameful. But that concession now means given the analysis of the noble and the shameful that Polus has accepted that doing injustice must exceed suffering injustice either in pain or in harm or in both (475b58). Yet it can hardly be claimed that those who do injustice endure more pain than those who suffer it; and if doing injustice does not exceed in pain, it obviously cannot exceed both in pain and in harm (475b8c5). There remains only one alternative: doing injustice must exceed suffering injustice in harm (475c68). Yet what exceeds in harm is more harmful that is to say, worse than what it exceeds, and no one would choose for himself what is worse

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rather than what is better (475d4e3). Polus, then, did not know what he was saying when he claimed that suffering injustice is worse than doing it and when he attributed this view to the vast majority of human beings. For it turns out that Socrates was right to claim that neither I nor you nor any other human being would prefer to do injustice than to suffer it, since it proves to be worse (475e36). Socrates argument is a remarkable display of his powers. That is not to say, however, that there are no objections that could be raised against it. The most important problems concern the central claim of the argument that the nobility of noble things can be understood only ) to some pleasure or some benet, or by looking away (apoblepon to both. For while it may be true that nobility cannot be understood without looking away to something (see again 474d35), one could object to the view that it has to be pleasure or benet or a combination of these to which one looks. Couldnt one argue that, when we regard something as noble, we are looking precisely to its nobility itself, a quality that has a being of its own that is not reducible to pleasure or benet? Or, alternatively, even if one grants that it is necessary to look to pleasure or benet, doesnt that still leave open the question of whose pleasure and benet must be served? In Socrates own rst example the nobility of bodies the pleasure mentioned was said to belong to those beholding the noble bodies, not to those possessing them (see 474d89). Couldnt one suggest something similar about noble men and their actions, that is, that they come to be regarded as noble because of the pleasure and benet they bring to others?32 Or, to

32. This is the objection most frequently discussed by other commentators, especially after it was raised in a well-known article by Gregory Vlastos. See Vlastos, Was Polus Refuted? 45460. Vlastoss article should be compared with a number of other accounts, which vary in the extent of their agreement with Vlastos. See Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2414; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 8892; Santas, Socrates, 233 40; Irwin, Gorgias, 1578; McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 2414. See also Vlastoss restatement of his argument in Socrates, Ironist

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approach the issue in another way, one might ask whether the nobility of things such as bodies, colors, shapes, and sounds really provides a good model for understanding the nobility of human beings and their actions. Socrates exploits the range of the term noble (kalos) by suggesting that it means the same thing regardless of what it modies; and he makes his case easier by turning to practices and laws, and then to doing and suffering injustice, only after rst establishing a certain view of nobility through the examples of bodies, colors, shapes, and sounds. But doesnt the nobility of human beings and their actions have a special character that makes it more resistant to explanation in terms of benet or pleasure?33 These objections are sufcient to cast doubt on Socrates argument. But Polus does not raise any of them. He goes along with the argument. And we can understand why he does not object by considering the character of the objections just raised. For they have the tenor of what one might call moral objections to Socrates analysis of nobility in terms of pleasure and benet. That is, they are objections to what one

and Moral Philosopher, 13948. Earlier interpretations tend to be less critical of Socrates argument. See, e.g., Friedlander, Plato, 2:2567; Taylor, Plato, 11314; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 267. Although Vlastos is right to criticize such interpretations for their unquestioning acceptance of Socrates argument, he goes too far in suggesting that no one before him had raised any doubts about the soundness of Socrates argument (Was Polus Refuted? 454). See Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:3345; Dodds, Gorgias, 249. 33. See note 31 above on the range of the term kalos. While I explain in note 31 my reason for translating kalos as noble, the inability of any single English term to capture the range of kalos can be seen in the strangeness of referring to such things as bodies, colors, shapes, and sounds as noble. It would have been more appropriate to use the term beautiful in those cases, although shifting between two terms would have created inconsistency and obscured the crucial fact that the term is the same in Greek. Oddly, the difculty of nding a single English term to apply to all of Socrates examples can help one to see the dubiousness of his procedure. It is no accident that practices comes last on Socrates initial list of examples; the order of that initial list sets up the order or movement of the argument (see 474d34).

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could well take to be an analysis that tarnishes nobility by reducing it to the pleasant and the benecial.34 Such an analysis, however, would be appealing to Polus, who is eager to present himself as a toughminded realist (consider especially 475a24). Yet, if Polus acceptance of Socrates analysis of the noble is not hard to explain, his acceptance of the argument as a whole is much more surprising. More specifically, what is most surprising is that even after Polus agrees to the view of nobility and shamefulness that makes pleasure or benet the basis of nobility, and pain or harm the basis of shamefulness, he does not retract his agreement that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. In other words, one would have expected Polus to revise his understanding of what belongs to the classes of the noble and shameful things once he has accepted a view of these classes that insists upon a necessary connection between nobility and pleasure or benet, and between shamefulness and pain or harm (consider 475a2c9 together with 474c7d2). Such a revision would have allowed him to accept Socrates hard-boiled view of nobility while easily escaping Socrates conclusion about the goodness of justice. But Polus never makes this simple revision.35
34. See, e.g., the protest of Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 93 94, against Socrates reliance on a supercial analysis of to kalon, which has the effect of reducing the moral sense [of the term] (the emphasis is Kahns). See also Friedlander, Plato, 2:2567. 35. Polus failure to object to Socrates argument is not given sufcient attention by those who emphasize the weaknesses of the argument. See, e.g., Vlastos, Was Polus Refuted? 45460, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 13948; Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2414; Santas, Socrates, 23340. Although McKim goes too far, in my view, in the other direction by downplaying too much the logical problems with Socrates argument, his analysis has the virtue of stressing the dramatic signicance of Polus agreement and what it reveals about Polus concerns (see especially Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 4647). Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 9495 also discusses Polus agreement, but he explains it merely as the result of his deference and attachment to public opinion. My own analysis will differ in important ways from McKims, but it is closer to McKims than to Kahns.

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Perhaps Polus missed his opportunity out of mere slowness. Yet, even if he is not the sharpest of all interlocutors, neither is Polus a fool. The more plausible explanation is that Polus failure to deny the shamefulness of doing injustice reects an unwillingness to deny it, an unwillingness that stems from the fact that he truly believes that doing injustice is shameful. And perhaps we should not be so surprised that he stands by this belief even when it entails accepting the view that injustice must be harmful. After all, didnt Polus earlier display a sense of indignation at Archelaus and his successful injustice?36 Insofar as Polus is angered by injustice and nds it shameful that is, insofar as he disapproves of it wouldnt he at least yearn for it also to be harmful? If so, then Socrates argument allows Polus to accept a view that he already on some level wants to accept and thus in some sense already does accept. In other words, Socrates argument does succeed in revealing in Polus a buried concern for justice. To repeat, Polus commitment to the view that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, a commitment that does not falter when Socrates suggests that it implies an acceptance of the goodness of justice, is at least some indication that Polus does in fact care about justice. Socrates has thus kept his promise to bring out Polus attachment to justice.37 We must be careful, though, not to overstate the extent of Socrates success. The most that can reasonably be said is that Socrates has shown that Polus does in fact have a concern for justice and that he can be brought to acknowledge that concern by the right kind of argument. But does such an argument carry the power to move Polus away from his attraction to injustice and his doubts about the goodness of justice? Socrates himself poses this same question in another form through an

36. See again 470d5471d2; recall also his earlier anger at Socrates at 461b3c4. 37. Compare McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 4447. My argument in the present paragraph is similar to McKims. The next paragraph, however, will bring out my disagreement with McKim who, in my view, presents Socrates success as more complete than it is.

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analogy he offers as he is stating the conclusion of his argument. By urging Polus to submit nobly to the argument just as to a doctor (475d67), Socrates uses an analogy that recalls his earlier schema of arts and thus leads to the suggestion that his argument should be seen as an example of that art justice which seeks to return the soul to a state of basic health. Yet, aside from remembering that such an art was not presented as the highest (a designation that was given to legislation), we must ask about the power of this medical art of the soul. If Polus soul is ailing because he is drawn to injustice out of doubts about the goodness of justice, how much of a cure does Socrates argument really offer?38 To be sure, Socrates has some success with Polus. But the limits of that success become increasingly visible as Socrates goes on to make a further argument, taking up the second main issue over which he and Polus are divided: the issue of punishment. Socrates further argument, in which he contends that unjust men are better off if they receive punishment than if they escape unpunished, is an extension of the argument we have just considered. It relies for its crucial premises on agreements reached in the prior argument (see especially 476e3 477a2), and it completes Socrates refutation of Polus position and his defense of the Socratic thesis in its fullest form (see especially 479c8e6). Most important for our present purposes, however, is Polus response. Although Polus goes along with even the most radical claims that Socrates puts forward in this argument, he does so with something considerably less than full conviction. Polus reservations are conveyed most clearly by the frequency with which he replies to Socrates questions asking for his afrmation of various steps with phrases such as it appears so or it is likely (see, e.g., 477a3, e2, e6, 478b2, e2, e5, 479a4, d13, d6, e9; and even in the prior argument, see 475c7, d4, e23, e6). It is true that there are also moments when Polus responses reconrm the concern for justice revealed by Socrates earlier argument (see, e.g., 478b35, 476b13, e34). But these moments are fairly rare,
38. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 5051.

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and so little did even Socrates prior argument stick that at a crucial juncture Polus has to be reminded of its central principle (see 477c45). One gets the sense that Polus is willing to go along with Socrates argument to the extent that he is willing more because he is committed to following out a line of reasoning to its conclusion than because he is genuinely persuaded (see especially 475e23, 480e12).39 There are, as it turns out, good reasons not to be persuaded by Socrates argument about punishment. Without going into the details of this intricate and lengthy argument, it is possible to give a brief summary of its main steps.40 Socrates argument begins with a defense of the principle that whenever an action occurs, the one who suffers that action has an experience, in his suffering, of the same sort or quality as the experience of the doer, in his doing. Thus, for instance, if a hard and swift striking occurs, the one who is struck is struck hard and swiftly, just as the striker strikes hard and swiftly (476b7c3). The purpose of establishing this principle is that it enables Socrates to argue that just punishment involves not only the performing of a just action by the punisher, but also the suffering of one by the person who is punished (476d5e3). This, in turn, enables Socrates to return to the agreements already reached in the preceding argument. By recalling those agreements, he can get Polus to concede that just things are noble things and hence also good things, and, therefore, that the recipient of punishment, as a sufferer of just things, must suffer or experience good things (476e2477a4). Of course, Socrates reliance here on the earlier

39. Contrast McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 4647. For evaluations of the extent of Socrates success with Polus closer to my own, see Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 97, 106; Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 205; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 5051. 40. For a more thorough analysis of this argument and its weaknesses, see Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 1804. Compare also Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 5357; Santas, Socrates, 2406; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:336.

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agreements depends on the assumptions that all just things are noble and, as noble, good for everyone involved, assumptions that one might well question in the case of punishment (see 476b12 together with 476e2477a4).41 But the more important difculties with Socrates argument arise as he goes on to try to articulate the great benet that one receives from being punished. Socrates argues that punishment improves the unjust soul by releasing it from the evils that plague it. And he argues that, just as poverty is the evil of possessions, and sickness is the evil of the body, the evil of the soul is injustice. Or, rather, Socrates argues this in some places, whereas in others he presents injustice as just one of a set of evils of the soul that also includes intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance.42 Socrates mention of these other evils or vices raises several questions about his argument. Does punishment release one from all of the evils of the soul? Or does it release one from only one of them? And for that matter, how exactly does it release one from any of them? If it is extremely hard to see how punishment might release one, for example, from ignorance, it is not obvious how it releases one even from injustice. Yet Socrates argument depends decisively on the view that punishment releases one from a great harm and an amazing evil, because only if that is true would an unjust man be better off seeking out punishment despite the undeniable pain it entails (see 477d1e6). Socrates, however, does not make a complete and convincing case that punishment cures the soul of injustice. Nor does he answer the prior question of exactly why injustice is such a great harm and an amazing evil to have in the soul in the rst place.43

41. It is worth recalling, in this connection, Socrates own earlier unwillingness to express any admiration or envy for punishers (see again 469a4b2). See also Laws 860b17. 42. Compare the formulations at 477b68, c2, c34, c9d1, d45, e46, 478b1, and d67; for a similar wavering in the case of the body, compare 477b35, c2, and e8. 43. On this last point, see Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 51; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:3368.

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The last of these problems with Socrates argument is the most signicant, because it reveals the largest gap in the argument and the deepest reason for Polus reluctance to embrace it fully. To appreciate the importance of this gap, though, we must rst give due weight to Socrates argument and be careful not to be too dismissive of it. Since it culminates in strange claims such as that the best way to get revenge against an enemy is to help him escape the benets of being punished (see 480e5481b1), it is tempting to regard this argument as simply ridiculous and ironic.44 But there are several reasons why that temptation should be resisted. Socrates argument sketches out what may be called, with some justication, a Socratic theory of punishment. According to this theory, punishment improves the unjust soul by releasing it from the evils that plague it. Perhaps most important in this connection is that Socrates makes no mention of what are commonly thought to be the two most important aims of punishment: deterrence and retribution. In fact, it is Socrates silence about these aims, as much as anything else, that makes his argument seem so strange and unrealistic. Yet, strange as it is, Socrates argument captures something that may at times be hard to discern but is no less present in our beliefs about punishment than the concern to deter future crimes and to get revenge for past ones. Dont we also believe that punishment can rehabilitate the unjust soul or provide the path to redemption? While not always on the surface, it is not entirely foreign to the ordinary outlook on punishment to believe that the suffering involved in punishment is a suffering that puries and restores. And if that belief is at odds with the belief that punishment should also cause deserved harm, that tension reveals not so much a aw in Socrates presentation as a kind of quandary in our beliefs about punishment a quandary that consists in our belief that punishment should be at once something harmful and something benecial. Socrates theory of punishment, then, can have the virtue of awakening us to this quandary and calling attention to the hopes buried even in
44. See Dodds, Gorgias, 2579; Thompson, Gorgias, 70.

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79

our convictions about punishment. Indeed, the evidence for Socrates argument, such as it is, consists precisely in the willingness of people to grant the premises that lead to the extreme conclusions that Socrates draws out.45 Yet, while Socrates argument may have the power to awaken thought, its power to convince is more limited. To return to Polus, although he grants the crucial premise (see again 476e2477a4), he goes along with the argument half-heartedly at best. Socrates argument may succeed in revealing convictions he never realized he had, but Polus reluctance to embrace the argument raises doubts about whether his views have been permanently transformed. His reluctance itself, furthermore, can be seen as related to the question of punishment and its restorative power. That is, not only is Polus reluctant to accept Socrates argument about punishment, but his reluctance itself can be seen as a reluctance to welcome a kind of punishment that he is receiving. After all, isnt the refutation to which Socrates subjects Polus a kind of punishment in its own right? We have already considered Socrates comparison of his earlier argument to a doctor. And it is surely no mere coincidence that the analogy of the medical art also plays a prominent role in his argument about punishment. Indeed, Socrates draws out this analogy at length, comparing the effect of punishment on the soul to the effect of medical treatments on the body (see 477e7479c6). Socrates emphasis on this analogy, especially when taken together with the earlier analogy between his own argument and a doctor, encourages us to regard his refutation of Polus as an act of punishment for the benet of Polus soul. Yet, even more pointedly than before, this line of thought compels us to ask whether Polus has been given more than a temporary remedy. Certainly, it would be overly optimistic to expect the transformation in his views to endure for long. Moreover, if Polus should rebel against the position to which he has been led, as he surely will, his rebellion would not be entirely unjustied. For Socrates has appealed to and relied on Polus attachment
45. Compare Republic 335b2d13.

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Polus and the Dispute about Justice

to justice to try to restore his commitment to justice, but he has not backed up these efforts with a truly convincing defense of the goodness of justice. We cannot avoid the conclusion, it seems, that the problem lies not just with Polus as the recipient of punishment but also with Socrates as the deliverer of it. Socrates appears to be like a doctor who is better at diagnosing an illness and indicating the need for treatment than he is at providing a genuine cure. If Socrates refutation of Polus can be seen as an act of punishment, it also can be seen as an act of rhetoric, although not of the kind of rhetoric that Socrates criticized earlier. At the end of his conversation with Polus, Socrates returns to the issue of rhetoric and makes a suggestion about the proper uses of rhetoric. He argues that rhetoric should not be used to make defense speeches in cases of ones own injustices or those of ones family, friends, or fatherland; rather, it should be used to accuse oneself and ones family and friends of any injustices that merit punishment (480a6d7). In other words, Socrates rejects the most common but morally questionable use of rhetoric and replaces it with a novel and just use. Now, Socrates surely intends his concluding remarks about rhetoric for the ears of Gorgias as much as for those of Polus. And we may thus say that he ends his conversation with Polus by suggesting to Gorgias a better and more just use for his powers. Rather than using rhetoric as a tool of exploitation, Gorgias ought to use it to help himself and others by accusing himself and those close to him whenever they stray from the path of justice. Such a suggestion, furthermore, is in keeping with what Socrates has done before Gorgias eyes with Polus. Socrates has brought out Polus temptation toward injustice, and then he also has shown that, despite this temptation, Polus has a buried concern for justice that could provide the ground for reform. If Socrates has been unable to fully complete that reform, might that be a job for Gorgias? Has Socrates been preparing Gorgias for a new task by revealing to him the true concerns and needs of men such as Polus?

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These questions must remain open questions for now. For we are left at the end of Socrates conversation with Polus still wondering precisely what Socrates is after. And while the suggestion conveyed by these questions is a plausible one, a couple of considerations should make us hesitant to take it as the last word. One reason for doubt is Socrates limited success with Polus, which we have been forced to acknowledge. Would it be possible for Gorgias to do better? Even if Socrates can show Gorgias the complexity of Polus concerns, could even the master rhetorician provide a cure for Polus sickness? Beyond this, it is also worth noticing that Socrates concluding statement on rhetoric offers an incomplete enumeration of the uses to which rhetoric might be put. Socrates rejects the use of rhetoric for selfdefense when one is in the wrong, and he embraces its use for selfaccusation in the same situation. But what about self-defense when one is not in the wrong, that is, when one is unjustly accused? Didnt our earlier thoughts about Socrates interest in rhetoric lead us in that direction? It is true that Socrates silence about this use of rhetoric can be explained by the fact that he is defending the position that justice should always be ones foremost concern. It would not be in keeping with the spirit of this position to express a concern for self-protection, and Socrates stresses more than once that his statement about rhetoric is governed by the position he is taking about justice (see 480a14, b3, and e3). Yet Socrates silence about self-protection is not complete, since he adds, in a surprising remark, that one must take care not to suffer injustice at the hands of ones enemies (see 480e67). And the very connection between the issue of self-protection and Socrates position on justice leaves us at this point with unresolved questions. What might Socrates evaluation of the uses of rhetoric be if his position concerning justice should prove to be questionable? Would there be a stronger case for a rhetoric of self-defense? And what might such rhetoric look like?

3 The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

orgias must be impressed by Socrates success in at least taming Polus and by what Socrates has shown about Polus concerns.

Yet doubts might reasonably linger about whether Socrates success

with Polus, even as limited as it is, could be duplicated with a more demanding interlocutor. And Gorgias also might wonder whether the attachment to justice that Socrates has revealed in Polus is really a sign of a deep concern in the human soul rather than a reection of Polus susceptibility to bouts of shame. If these are Gorgias thoughts at this stage of the dialogue, he will welcome the entry of Callicles. As soon as Callicles enters the conversation, the tone becomes more serious and demanding. This change can be felt from the moment Callicles speaks up to ask whether Socrates is really being serious in defending the position he has been defending, and then exclaims: For if you are being serious and these things that you are saying are really true, wouldnt that mean that our lives as human beings are now turned upside down, and that everything we do is the opposite of what we should do? (481c14). Unlike Polus, who displayed a willingness halfheartedly to follow arguments wherever they might lead, Callicles has a much sharper sense of the gravity of the conclusions of Socrates arguments. In this respect at least, he rst comes to sight as the most impressive of Socrates interlocutors. Callicles also will raise the most profound challenge to Socrates. He will waste little time in delivering an attack on Socrates very way of life. The divide between Socrates and Callicles will prove to be as
82

The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

83

deep as any in Platos dialogues; nowhere else does Plato allow a critic of the philosophic life to speak so forcefully.1 Moreover, the divide between Socrates and Callicles will prove to be unbridgeable. Whereas Socrates has been able in some manner to come to a meeting of the minds with Gorgias and Polus, Callicles will remain resistant to the end both to Socrates charms and to his arguments. The reasons for Callicles recalcitrance, however, are far from simple and clear; and while it is easy to observe the divide between Socrates and Callicles, it is much harder to understand it. Our task, then, is to try to follow the often confusing twists and turns of the conversation between Socrates and Callicles in an effort to uncover what truly divides these two very different men. Some initial help in understanding the divide between Socrates and Callicles is given by the opening speech that Socrates delivers in response to Callicles opening question. Socrates treats Callicles from the beginning as someone with whom he is already familiar, and it is Socrates who initiates the hostilities with a long speech describing both what he and Callicles have in common and what divides them.2 By Socrates account, he and Callicles are both lovers, that is, they share that intense experience of the soul that is called eros.3 But if the experience of love is a common ground between them, they differ

1. Many commentators have stressed the depth of the divide between Socrates and Callicles and the power of Callicles challenge to the Socratic way of life. See, for example, Taylor, Plato, 106, 122; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1367; Voegelin, Plato, 2832; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 156; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 134; Euben, Corrupting Youth, 217; Newell, Ruling Passion, 1011. 2. Socrates is now talking to a fellow Athenian, although one of whom nothing is known beyond his role in the Gorgias. Some have speculated that Callicles is a ctional character, others that he is a mask for some other gure. But these are mere speculations, and dubious ones at that, as Dodds, Gorgias, 1213, argues. Consider also Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 156; Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, 69; Taylor, Plato, 116. 3. To better understand the signicance of Socrates use of the term ero nte at 481d3, see Symposium 205a5209e4. See also Newell, Ruling Passion, 1113.

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

in the rst place in the objects of their love. Socrates describes himself as a lover of Alcibiades and of philosophy, and he attributes to Callicles a love of the Athenian de mos and of a young man named Demos (481d25). Now, in light of many things Callicles will go on to say, we will have to wonder what Socrates has in mind in speaking of Callicles as a lover of the de mos and as an erotic man more generally. But for now we should merely observe a further difference between Socrates and Callicles that Socrates calls to our attention. For Socrates not only points out that he and Callicles love different things, but he also indicates that he differs from Callicles in his ability to oppose one of his beloveds. Whereas Callicles, according to Socrates, is forever turning with the whims and opinions of his beloveds, Socrates claims to stand rmly with the speeches of philosophy and blames his other beloved, Alcibiades, for his unsteadiness (481d5482b1). Socrates greater consistency is due, he claims, to the consistency of philosophy and its unwavering speeches. Responding to Callicles question about whether he really believes the Socratic thesis, Socrates makes the most important statement of his opening reply to Callicles:
Dont be amazed that I say such things, but stop philosophy, my beloved, from saying them. For, my dear comrade, it always says what you now hear from me and is not nearly so unsteady as the other beloved. For this son of Cleinias [Alcibiades] holds different views at different times, but philosophy always holds the same ones, and it says what you are now amazed at; and you yourself were present when these things were being said. Therefore, either refute that one, just as I said a while ago, by showing that doing injustice and not paying the penalty when one does injustice are not the most extreme of all evils; or else, if you let this remain unrefuted, then, by the dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will go through all of life in disagreement. (482a3b6)

With this statement, Socrates sets the stage for his quarrel with Callicles. But he does so in a complicated way. Perhaps most important, he makes here a crucial addition to his presentation of the Socratic thesis: he now presents this thesis, as he has not done up to this point, as the view of philosophy. Socrates thus brings philosophy

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to the fore as an issue in the conversation, and he associates the philosophic life with great devotion to justice. But he also sets a kind of challenge for Callicles: if Callicles is ever to be consistent, he must refute the view that Socrates here attributes to philosophy. This is a striking and perhaps surprising thing to say, since it implies that on some level Callicles himself holds this view. Socrates statement, in other words, reafrms in the case of Callicles what he suggested in his speech on Polus witnesses, namely, that nearly everyone is divided about the goodness of justice. But what is the basis for Socrates apparent judgment that Callicles even Callicles somehow believes in the view expressed by the Socratic thesis?

CALLICLES OPENING SPEECH (482c4486d1)

That Callicles views are complicated in the way suggested by Socrates statement could appear to be belied by Callicles famous attack on the Socratic thesis. Callicles attack on this view is the primary purpose of the rst part of his long opening speech, a remarkable speech that also includes his attack on philosophy and on Socrates in particular. Callicles begins his speech, however, by complaining about the demagogic arguments by which Socrates was able to sway Gorgias and then Polus. After relying on Gorgias shame before the custom of human beings in order to compel him to claim to be a teacher of justice and thus to contradict himself, Socrates won a similar victory over Polus, who ultimately gave in to the very shame for which he blamed Gorgias (482c4d6). Callicles analysis of the second of these two victories, the victory over Polus, is longer and more revealing than his analysis of the rst. In Callicles view, Polus was right to take the step of reducing nobility and shamefulness to considerations of pleasure and benet. But if one takes this step, Callicles objects, one should not continue to hold that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it: Polus was too ashamed to break entirely with what is held to be noble and shameful that is, with the noble and shameful

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

by convention and it was by exploiting this shame that Socrates was able to work his evil in arguments (482d7483a7). While one could quarrel with Callicles claim that it was mere shame that led to Polus concession to Socrates, Callicles does correctly pinpoint Polus crucial mistake by locating it in his never-revoked agreement that it is more shameful to do injustice than to suffer it (see especially 482d78). But more important, Callicles explanation of Polus downfall leads him to give what would appear to be a clear and blunt statement of his own view. For he insists that one can avoid the contradictions in which Socrates ensnared Polus if one simply abandons convention and sticks to the straightforward standard of nature: by nature, everything is more shameful that is also worse, especially suffering injustice, but by convention doing injustice is more shameful (483a78). Judging by this bold statement, Callicles appears to believe that the only genuine, natural standard is benet or advantage. Nobility, if it means anything at all, should be determined entirely by that prior standard, and justice is not to be taken seriously because it is not advantageous. Yet Callicles continues to speak in terms of nobility and even in terms of justice. As his speech develops, we see that he means not exactly to argue for the abandonment of all considerations of nobility and justice on the grounds that the only meaningful standard is advantage but rather to make the case for a certain understanding of genuine nobility and justice.4 And while it would seem at rst glance that Callicles view makes nobility in particular entirely derivative from advantage again, by nature, everything is more shameful that is also worse a closer look at his speech reveals that he does not consistently stick to this view. The most immediate alternative to advantage as the basis of nobility in Callicles eyes would seem to be manliness, a quality that certainly includes the strength needed to gain what is advantageous for oneself
4. Cf. Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 142; Dodds, Gorgias, 15, 2667, 390; Taylor, Plato, 11617.

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but whose value may not be limited in Callicles estimation to a mere means to that end. The issue raised by Callicles emphasis on manliness can be stated simply. Callicles speech quickly becomes a praise of real men (see 483a8b2). But is the crucial difference between real men and others merely the greater ability and success of real men in securing their own advantage? The answer to this question might appear at rst to be yes. Callicles argues that it is merely by convention, by a self-serving conspiracy of the weak, that people are taught to believe that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it and to accept that even strong, powerful types real men ought to respect the laws of the many that tell them to take no more than an equal share (483b1c9). But nature herself reveals, says Callicles, that true justice consists in the better having more than the worse and the more powerful having more than the less powerful (483c9-d2). As for the basis of this natural justice, Callicles argues that he is merely describing a situation that prevails throughout the world: the ways of animals, as well as of cities and tribes of human beings, and especially of great imperialists like the Persian kings Xerxes and Darius, show that the strong dominate the weak (483d23). Callicles gives, then, what may be called a harshly realistic defense of the strong in their universal oppression of the weak.5 But there are difculties with this argument that raise doubts as to whether harsh realism best describes Callicles true view. First, there is the question of why it should follow from the fact that the strong oppress the weak that it is just that they do so. The most striking difference between Callicles and others who make similar arguments about imbalances of power in the world is that Callicles does not draw the conclusion that such imbalances render justice meaningless; rather, he insists that they are in accordance with true justice.6 But does such

5. See Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1389; Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 67. 6. Compare 483c7484c3 with Republic 338c1339a4, Laws 888e4890c8, and Thucydides 5.85105. Unlike most ancient conventionalists, Callicles does not reject justice altogether but opposes conventional justice with a

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

a conclusion make sense simply on realistic grounds? Does it make sense, in other words, to continue to speak of justice if its only foundation is power? That Callicles does continue to speak of justice suggests that he is guided by more than a realistic appreciation of the importance of power. A further difculty with Callicles argument is that the fact on which it rests is not as simple as the argument requires. According to Callicles own account, after all, the stronger do not always win out. Callicles himself describes a situation in which the weak succeed in overcoming and subduing the strong: such is the case wherever conventional justice prevails, as it does in Callicles own democratic Athens, where the strongest natures have been subdued and reduced to slavery like tamed lions (see 483b4c6, 483e4484a2). This difculty leads to a movement in Callicles speech that can be regarded as both a retreat and an ascent. For within only a few lines, Callicles moves from an argument about the prevailing ways of the world based on the assertion that the domination by the strong is simply an evident fact, to a beautiful expression of a view that looks forward to the success of the strong the day when the great man nally throws off his chains and the justice of nature shines forth with something like hopeful expectation (484a2b1).7 But this movement suggests that Callicles admiration of the real men he praises is based not only on their success, which cannot truly be counted on, but also on something else.
doctrine of natural justice. This difference has been discussed by a number of other commentators. See Burnet, Greek Philosophy, 121; Friedlander, Plato, 2:2601; Taylor, Plato, 116; Barker, Greek Political Theory, 7172; Dodds, Gorgias, 2668; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 120, 124, 1589; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 99100; Newell, Ruling Passion, 11, 16. 7. Cf. Dodds, Gorgias, 2667. Dodds notes that Callicles vision of the great man overcoming his oppression by the weak even leads him to use words suggestive of a religious revelation. On the movement in a more idealistic direction in Callicles speech, see also Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 99100; Newell, Ruling Passion, 13; Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 157.

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In keeping with this, Callicles speaks at several points in his speech of the men he admires not only as the more powerful or the stronger but also as the better (see 483d1, e4, 484c2). There is reason to believe, moreover, that even Callicles vision of the men who deserve to be tyrants nally breaking through their chains and overthrowing the weak cannot be taken as the nal word about the true objects of his admiration. The heroes of Callicles speech are men like Xerxes, Darius, and Heracles, who took what they wanted by force and imposed their will on the weak (see especially 483d6 e4, 484b1c3). Later in the dialogue, however, Callicles will display a deeper admiration of Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles that is, of famous Athenians who not only asserted their strength but also served democratic Athens well, at least by Callicles standards (see 503a2c3, 515c5517b1). And even within his present speech, Callicles moves from praising the violent overthrow of ones city to praising political activity within it. This shift comes with the crucial transition in his speech, as Callicles moves from his criticism of conventional justice to his criticism of philosophy and his exhortation of Socrates to abandon philosophy in favor of a more public life (484c4486d1).8 Callicles attack on philosophy was all but invited by Socrates challenge to Callicles to refute his beloved (see again 482a4b6). Socrates familiarity with Callicles, as Socrates will later reveal (487c1d2), includes an awareness of Callicles hostility to philosophy a hostility he has encouraged him to express. To begin to understand this hostility, however, we must give due weight to the fact that Callicles

8. The clearest indication of the difference between the view of nobility expressed in Callicles criticism of philosophy and the view he expressed when attacking conventional justice is the much higher view of law and civic life taken in the later section of Callicles speech (compare, e.g., 484d25 and 486a13 with 483b4c9 and 483e4484a2). The shift in Callicles speech is discussed also by Newell, Ruling Passion, 1415, Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 6467, and Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 15962.

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

is not so thoroughly hostile to philosophy as to have turned his back on it as utterly unworthy of his attention. Just as Socrates has some familiarity with Callicles, so too is Callicles familiar with Socrates and his pursuits. He is not witnessing his rst Socratic conversation. Among his several statements that report his impressions at observing philosophic discussions, Callicles makes a remark that suggests that he has watched Socrates make one or more of the politicians appear ridiculous (see 484e13 together with 482e2483a4). Moreover, in his own account of justice, Callicles himself used a philosophic distinction in drawing a line between nature and convention: although he accused Socrates of exploiting that distinction to work his evil in arguments, Callicles relied on it himself to defend natural justice.9 Yet, even if his view of natural justice depends on a philosophic distinction, Callicles suggests that philosophy is somehow incapable of grasping the truth of that view (see 484c45). And more generally, he argues that philosophy not only keeps one from grasping the truth about justice but also draws one away from what is most important in life. Callicles declares that philosophy is appropriate in measured amounts for developing grace and sophistication in the young, but it ought to be abandoned when one is old enough to turn to the affairs of the city and to accomplish something truly noble and good (484c4485e2). If pursued beyond a certain age, philosophy ceases to be a means of education and becomes a source of corruption:
Whenever I see someone who is older still philosophizing and not abandoning it, this man, Socrates, seems to me to need a beating. For, as I just said, it falls to this man, even if he has a very good nature, to become unmanly by eeing the centers of the city and the agora, in which the poet says men become highly distinguished, and by lowering himself into spending the rest of his life whispering with three or four boys in a corner, never to utter anything free, great, or sufcient. (485d1e2)

9. Cf. Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1389; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 1559.

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Callicles offers this criticism, addressed to Socrates by name, not only as a general complaint about philosophers but also as a more pointed warning. And he goes on to extend the warning by telling Socrates that his shameful pursuit which keeps him from performing any actions worthy of respect also makes him vulnerable to attack by anyone who might wish to accuse or assault him. Socrates could be dragged dizzy and gaping into court and could even be killed if an accuser should decide to demand the death penalty (486a6b4). Callicles claims to be offering this criticism of Socrates as a friendly warning. Alluding to Euripides Antiope, he casts himself in the role of a young character named Zethus exhorting his brother Amphion not to waste his noble soul by spending his time in childish pursuits to the neglect of politics (see 485e4486a3).10 Callicles even declares his goodwill towards Socrates (see 485e3, 486a4). And he displays his sympathy by describing the man who might demand Socrates death as lowly and vicious (see 486b23). Yet, despite Callicles pretensions to friendliness, which may not be entirely feigned, his attack on philosophy reveals a hostility that runs deeper than perhaps even he knows. This hostility can be seen, for instance, in his expression of the view that philosophy is corruption (484c78), and in his willingness to say that men who continue on in philosophy not only risk a beating but even need and deserve one (485c2, d2). Callicles attack on philosophy is at its most impressive because it is at its most honest when Callicles reports what he experiences when looking at philosophic men and especially at Socrates (see 485b7e2, 486b4d1). Yet, while these expressions of contempt and hostility belie his claims of goodwill toward Socrates, they do not fully disclose the grounds of
10. Euripides Antiope has been lost, but from what is known of the play it is generally agreed that the most important scene depicted a dispute between the brothers Zethus and Amphion over the best way of life. Zethus argued for the active political life against his more philosophic brother. For an extensive and helpful discussion of the Antiope and its role in the Gorgias, see Nightingale, Platos Gorgias and Euripides Antiope, 12141. See also Dodds, Gorgias, 2756; Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 2001.

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

Callicles hostility. One reason for the obscurity is that Callicles seems to waver over the precise character of his objection to philosophy. Or, perhaps better, he judges philosophy by a standard of nobility that lacks clarity as to its central principle. Nobility appears, in the section of Callicles speech in which he attacks philosophy, to consist in the Periclean ability and willingness to devote oneself to political affairs and to gain a great reputation through service to the city, thereby making oneself invulnerable to attack by ones inferiors. But this formulation contains a question or an ambiguity. Is Callicles defense of the active life of involvement in the affairs of the city based on the thought that only such a life makes possible truly noble action (see 484c8d2, 485c6e2)? Or is it based on the thought that only such a life provides one with safety and protection from attack (see 486a3c3)? His argument, it seems, is based on both of these grounds, or rather it shifts between the two grounds. Of course, the two grounds are connected, since preeminence in the city generally brings with it the power to protect oneself, and Callicles presents self-protection as a responsibility that it is not only dangerous but also shameful to neglect. Still, the two grounds are not the same, and they may even at times be at odds. After all, is stepping to the fore of the turbulent struggle to lead the city always the least risky course of action? Did Pericles, for example, lead the safest life in Athens? That Callicles criticism of philosophy lacks perfect clarity or consistency should make us wonder whether Callicles himself fully grasps his deepest objection to philosophy. Is it possible that Callicles feels a hostility whose deepest source he cannot quite articulate? Does he feel in his bones, in other words, something that he cannot adequately express in speech?

SOCRATES EXAMINATION OF CALLICLES VIEW OF JUSTICE (486d2491d4)

The confusions or wavering discernable in Callicles speech will continue throughout his conversation with Socrates. In fact, Socrates primary aim in the ensuing discussion is to bring out more fully

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and clearly the contradictory strands in Callicles beliefs and to show which of these strands is most important to him. In doing so, however, Socrates will allow Callicles attack on philosophy to recede temporarily into the background. That Socrates initially directs the conversation away from this attack is surprising given his immediate response to Callicles speech. Socrates immediate response to Callicles speech is to express his delight at having found in Callicles a touchstone with which he can test whether his own soul is golden (486d27). He then elaborates by telling Callicles that he possesses the qualities necessary for an adequate search for the truth, indeed for such a search as would make further searching unnecessary: Your and my agreement will at last be the attainment of the truth (486e5488b1, especially 487e67). Socrates suggests, in other words, that his conversation with Callicles will be of the greatest importance, since it will aim at settling, once and for all, the most important question of how one should live (see especially 487e7488a2). But there is an obvious problem with this suggestion, because Socrates argument that Callicles possesses the qualities or qualications necessary for a genuine pursuit of the truth is hardly convincing. The qualities that Socrates identies are knowledge, goodwill, and outspokenness. While it may be reasonable to take Callicles speech as evidence of his outspokenness, Socrates proof that Callicles possesses knowledge for you have been sufciently educated, as many of the Athenians would attest (487b67) is difcult to accept as much of a proof, especially coming from Socrates. And the weakness of this proof is matched by Socrates argument that Callicles must be of goodwill to him because he heard Callicles and three of his friends giving each other the same advice that Callicles gave Socrates in his speech (487b7d4). Dont people often say the same things to different people for very different reasons or out of very different motives? The aws in Socrates proof of Callicles qualications are so clear that they make one suspect that the true meaning of this supposed proof is the opposite of its surface meaning. That is, Socrates may mean to indicate by his proof that Callicles does not possess the qualities

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

necessary to pursue the truth to its attainment, and thus that the truth will not come fully to light in their conversation.11 That Socrates and Callicles will be unable to reach the truth together in a complete meeting of the minds was to some extent already suggested by Socrates statement that he has found in Callicles a touchstone with which he can test whether his own soul is golden. After all, while a touchstone may be used to test gold, it is not transformed into gold in the process.12 But there may be a further meaning of this analogy, one that can help us better understand the character and limits of the coming discussion. For the analogy suggests that in some sense Callicles soul will be the guiding standard for the discussion between Socrates and Callicles, and in particular the standard against which Socrates soul is to be tested. More precisely, Callicles soul will be used to test not so much the nature of Socrates soul as whether Socrates soul has been nobly cared for (kalo s tetherapeusthai, 486d5 . . . zos e 6) and whether it lives correctly (orthos s, 487a12). Now, since the care that Socrates soul has received is above all the care provided by philosophy, and since the life it lives is the philosophic life, we may take this suggestion to mean that philosophy and the philosophic life are somehow going to be brought, in what follows, to the touchstone of Callicles soul and its concerns. But hasnt Callicles already given us reason to think that this test is likely to be failed? Or is Socrates optimistic that it could be passed, that the philosophic life could come to sight as golden, if the philosophic life were seen for what it is and not as it appeared in Callicles attack on it? These thoughts lead us to expect at this point a defense of the philosophic life against Callicles attack on it. And Socrates further
11. On the irony of Socrates praise of Callicles, see Jaeger, Paideia, 2:140; Shorey, What Plato Said, 144; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 62; McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 40; Michelini, Rudeness and Irony in Platos Gorgias, 56. Contrast Irwin, Platos Ethics, 102. 12. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 62, 6869.

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encourages this expectation by indicating that the true divide between himself and Callicles is over the question of how one ought to live and especially over the goodness of Socrates way of life (see 487e7488a2). Yet, although Socrates encourages the expectation that he will come to the defense of his way of life, he does not gratify this expectation right away. Instead of turning immediately to a defense of philosophy, he turns, as we have already noted, to a further examination of Callicles views. Moreover, he turns not, as he again encourages us for a moment to expect, to that aspect of Callicles position that speaks directly against the philosophic life in favor of a different life (see 488a2b1), but to an examination of Callicles view of justice (see 488b26). Socrates procedure here rst pointing to what he calls the noblest question that lies at the heart of his dispute with Callicles, only then to turn to what could seem a secondary matter is strange.13 But perhaps this strange procedure can be explained by the following considerations. First, if Callicles soul is the touchstone against which philosophy is to be tested, it would seem to be necessary that his soul and its concerns be adequately understood. And perhaps Socrates thinks that one can best understand the concerns of Callicles soul by beginning, not from Callicles direct attack on philosophy, but from what we may call his moral views. Indeed, Callicles speech has already given us reason to believe that there is a connection between Callicles moral views and his hostility to philosophy. Given this connection, moreover, Socrates procedure may have the further advantage of allowing the grounds of Callicles hostility to philosophy to be brought to light while keeping the target of that hostility behind the scenes. And nally, since that target will eventually be brought back to the foreground of the discussion, Socrates ensures that philosophy will make its return in the wake of the results of his examination of Callicles moral

13. Compare the more straightforward procedure Socrates follows in the Apology in responding to an objection to his life very similar to the one raised by Callicles (28b331c3).

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views results that, as we will see, will not only provide a better understanding of Callicles concerns but also cast those concerns in a certain light. In his own account of justice, Callicles left us with a number of unresolved questions about the true character of his concerns or convictions. Socrates begins his examination of Callicles with a series of questions that return to some of the tensions or ambiguities that were already visible but not fully worked out in Callicles speech.14 The rst of these questions returns to Callicles claim that natural justice consists in the superior imposing their will on the inferior. Socrates says that he was puzzled about whether Callicles meant to claim that superiority is a matter of nothing more than greater strength. Is that what Callicles meant, or, in calling the men who deserve to triumph better, did he mean to suggest that they are distinguished by something beyond strength? Since Callicles wavered regarding this point in his speech, Socrates insists that Callicles dene more clearly whether he simply equates superiority with greater strength (488b8d3). Socrates states this demand, however, in such a way that he can be condent that Callicles will initially take the position that reduces superiority to mere strength. For to accept the other alternative, as Socrates points out, would mean to accepting the possibility that some better men are weaker, and some stronger men more vicious (see especially 488c78). By calling Callicles attention to this
14. Some support for the suggestion that Socrates thinks Callicles concerns can best be understood by beginning from his moral views can perhaps be found in the way Socrates begins his examination of those views. As a preface to his opening question about Callicles view of justice, Socrates exhorts Callicles to pick it back up for me from the beginning (ex arche s, 488b2). Although this remark refers most obviously to the early section of Callicles speech in which Callicles gave his account of natural justice, Socrates may mean to indicate that the order of Callicles speech somehow reected accurately the true order of his concerns. That is, the beginning to which Socrates refers may be at once the beginning of Callicles speech and the beginning for Callicles in a deeper sense.

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implication, Socrates confronts Callicles with thepossibility of a divide between virtue and success, or, in other words, with the possibility that the truly deserving do not always prevail in the world. Although Callicles was ultimately forced to acknowledge such a situation in his speech, he tried his best to deny its existence. He does so here, too, by taking the position that superiority is simply a matter of greater strength (488d4). But there is a problem lurking in this direction as well, one that Socrates proceeds to spell out. Having encouraged Callicles to equate superiority with strength, Socrates argues that this view collapses the distinction that Callicles drew between natural and conventional justice, and at least in some cases even vindicates the democratic justice that Callicles claims to despise. For if superiority consists in nothing but greater strength, Socrates explains, then the many, who may be individually quite weak but are collectively stronger than any individual, ought to be regarded as superior. And if the laws and pronouncements by which the superior subdue the inferior are naturally noble and just, doesnt that mean that the laws and pronouncements of the many, when the many win out, are naturally noble and just (488d5 e5)? But the many believe that it is just for each to have an equal share and that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it (488e7 489a6). It would seem to follow, then, that these principles are just by nature and not merely by convention (489e8b6). There are reasons to be skeptical about Socrates argument as a vindication of the many and their democratic view of justice. For one thing, Socrates argument succeeds only by foisting on Callicles a view that he did not quite put forward in his speech the view, namely, that not only is the rule of the superior in accordance with natural justice but so are the laws the superior lay down and even the beliefs they hold.15 But the more important difculty with Socrates argument

15. Callicles did not mention any laws set down by the superior, at least not by the superior understood as the group he praised as opposed to the one he criticized (consider 483b47, c79, e45, 484b5). Even if one takes the justice

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concerns the basis or grounds on which it apparently supports democratic justice. For although Socrates argument initially comes across as a defense of the democratic understanding of justice, it is a defense on grounds that no true proponent of democratic justice would be willing to accept. If the vindication of the democratic (or any other) view of justice rests simply on its having won out, doesnt that reduce justice to the crude principle might makes right? Of course, Socrates has a good excuse for pursuing such a line of argument, since he is merely working out the implications of one strand of Callicles own argument the strand that holds that nature herself demonstrates the truth about justice through the success of the strong (see 483c9e1 together with 488c37). Socrates is therefore justied in pointing out that, insofar as that is the basis of Callicles position, he should at least get his facts straight: the many often dominate the few. But Callicles already displayed an awareness of this point in his speech, and it also was evident that he did not really mean, at least not in every part of his speech, simply to equate superiority with brute force or greater strength. Moreover, when Callicles nally rebels at the conclusion of Socrates argument and retracts his agreement that he thinks brute strength is all there is to superiority, Socrates admits that he knew all along that this was not Callicles deepest view (489c1d5). Socrates provocative argument thus serves the purpose of forcing Callicles to open up further and, in particular, of driving him away from a position that would equate superiority with mere strength or reduce virtue to success. Socrates wants Callicles to reveal more of that side of his position, or that aspect of what he believes, that regards virtue as something higher than strength alone (consider especially 489d13).16
of their laws as implied by the view that the rule of the superior is just, the extension from their laws to their beliefs is questionable. Socrates is able to obscure the dubiousness of this further extension by moving with apparent seamlessness from the nouns nomous (laws, 488d6) and nomima (lawful usages, 488d9, e4) to the verb nomizousin (believe, 488e7, 489a2). Cf. Santas, Socrates, 2634. 16. Cf. Shorey, What Plato Said, 1445; Friedlander, Plato, 2:262; Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 127; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 99100. Compare Laws 625c9627c2.

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Callicles responds to Socrates argument by insisting that he never meant to suggest that superiority can be reduced to mere bodily might. rather than dening superiority by strength, he wants to maintain that true strength must be dened by superiority (see 489c17). But he has difculty articulating what exactly superiority consists in beyond bodily might. The only answer he is initially able to muster to Socrates question about who he regards as the better in effect, the better are the better (see 489e35) is less than fully illuminating.17 But Socrates pushes him for greater clarity, offering the suggestion that by the better and the stronger Callicles means the more prudent, a suggestion that Callicles eagerly accepts (489e69). And shortly after accepting Socrates suggestion, Callicles goes on to claim, without any prompting from Socrates, that he has in mind not only the prudent but also the courageous (491a7b3).18 Before Callicles adds courage to prudence, however, Socrates uses his agreement that the superior men who deserve to rule are the more prudent to launch a new line of questioning. In this second phase of his examination of Callicles view of justice, Socrates does not challenge the view that truly superior men, understood as the more prudent, deserve to rule. He grants this point, and asks instead about the character of the rule of prudent men, in particular about whether they ought to use their rule to take more for themselves. Socrates gives several examples (490b1e8). His rst is of a doctor who nds himself in a throng of people in need of an
17. On the other hand, it does reveal, something about Callicles that he does not have a perfectly clear grasp of who he thinks the better are or in what he thinks virtue consists. See Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 143: The greatest weakness associated with [Callicles] position is that, though he perhaps divines, he cannot yet clearly and coherently articulate in what superiority consists. Nichols also speaks of Callicles inability to articulate the nobler and more demanding goals to which he is nonetheless somehow drawn (143). 18. Callicles addition of courage at 491a7b3 is prepared by his statement at 490a7 in which he speaks of the better and the more prudent. In this earlier statement, we can already see that prudence is not all there is to superiority in Callicles eyes.

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appropriate distribution of food and drink. Should the doctor, because he is superior in prudence, feast himself by consuming a greater share of the food and drink? Or should he use his superior prudence to distribute the food and drink in accordance with the needs of each, taking for himself only what is appropriate to his own body? Socrates other examples also come from the arts. Should the weaver, who knows the most about his art, walk around draped in the biggest and most beautiful cloaks? Should the cobbler have the biggest shoes and walk around wearing more shoes than anyone else? Should the skilled farmer take the most seeds and plant as many as possible on his land? Socrates line of questioning here is meant, of course, to be provocative; and it succeeds in arousing the ire of Callicles, who becomes progressively angrier as Socrates goes through his examples (for Callicles reactions, see 490c8d1, d6, d10, e4, 490e9491a3).19 But if Socrates intends to provoke this anger, what is his aim in doing so? What does Callicles anger reveal? To begin from the surface, Callicles nds Socrates questions ridiculous and beneath the dignity of the issue they are discussing. But this reveals something about how Callicles regards the issue at hand. From a certain perspective, after all, Socrates apparently ridiculous questions are quite sensible: Why would one want more food than one needs for ones body or shoes that are too big for ones feet? Wouldnt such excess amount to paying a penalty (see 490c4)? In his questions, Socrates looks at human needs with the eyes of a sensible artisan, and he expresses a view of justice and benet in keeping with an artisans outlook. But in Callicles view, to approach the question of justice and benet in this manner is to drag the high and serious through the mud of the lowly and ridiculous. What bothers him is not only the silliness of Socrates questions, but that they make a mockery out of something deserving of respect the question of the true good that is sought and deserved by the men he most admires. And if Callicles cannot quite articulate who these men are and what that good is, he provides us some sense of what
19. On Callicles anger here, compare Newell, Ruling Passion, 1920.

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he has in mind by declaring so clearly and emphatically what he does not have in mind: You [Socrates] are talking about food and drink and doctors and drivel; but that is not what I mean. . . . By the gods, you simply never stop talking about cobblers, weavers, cooks, and doctors, as if our argument were about these people! (490c8d1; 491a13). Callicles does manage, however, to give more than a negative expression of his convictions. In fact, Socrates argument together with some further prodding (see 491a46) prompts Callicles to make one of his most important statements about the kind of virtue he admires: First, by the stronger, I mean neither cobblers nor cooks, but those who are prudent in the affairs of the city, and who can determine in what way they will be well managed and not only prudent but also courageous, being capable of accomplishing what they intend and not inching through softness of soul (491a7b4). Callicles declares that it is such men those who are prudent in the affairs of the city and courageous who deserve to rule the city and who ought to have more than others (491c6d3). Callicles addition here of courage and his indication that the prudence he admires is directed to managing well the affairs of the city are as revealing as anything he has said so far. We can see with particular clarity here that Callicles is not simply a debunker of justice and virtue but that he believes in a kind of justice based on a certain view of virtue. And Socrates underlines the importance of what has just been revealed about Callicles by calling attention to Callicles addition of courage and by asking Callicles to repeat his position as it now stands (see 491b5c5).20 Yet, although Socrates calls attention to what has now been revealed about Callicles views, he responds to this development in a surprising

20. The signicance of this moment is stressed also by Newell, Ruling Passion, 20; Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 143; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 102. To see the character of Callicles view that prudent leaders are rightly concerned that the affairs of the city be well managed, contrast Protagoras 319a12.

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way. No sooner has Callicles offered his most direct and revealing statements about justice, claiming that the superior as he has now dened them deserve to rule and to have more than others, than Socrates abruptly turns the discussion away from justice. Instead of pursuing the still incomplete examination of Callicles view of justice, he asks Callicles whether the superior as he understands them should also be rulers over themselves, that is, over their pleasures and desires (491d4e1). Socrates thus changes the topic from justice to moderation and self-control.

MODERATION VERSUS IMMODERATION, AND THE QUESTION OF HEDONISM (491d4499d8)

Socrates procedure here is one of the most puzzling features of his entire conversation with Collicles.21 Why does Socrates begin an examination of justice only to abort it so quickly in favor of a discussion of moderation and self-control? This turn is all the more perplexing because it comes at the very moment that it has become clearer than ever before that Callicles is attached to a certain understanding of justice. Why not pursue the question of justice further by challenging Callicles view of justice and pressing to see whether Callicles really knows what justice is? What accounts for Socrates abrupt and perplexing turn away from the question of justice? Rather than try to answer this question at this point, let us postpone it. For we still need to learn more about Callicles beliefs, and we also need to see where Socrates leads the conversation after his turn away from the question of justice. Now, once Socrates has turned away from justice, the immediate effect of his question about whether the superior are rulers over themselves is to prompt a long and passionate

21. On the suddenness with which Socrates changes the topic of the conversation, see Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 1023; Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 127; Gentzler, The Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias, 36.

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outburst from Callicles. Although it takes him a moment to understand Socrates question (see 491d410), Callicles responds, as soon as he learns that Socrates, just like the many, is speaking about moderation and self-control, or about ruling over ones pleasures and desires (see 491d11e1), by expressing his contempt for what he regards as Socrates na vet e and foolishness. In his longest outburst since his opening speech, Callicles attacks restraints of all kinds and praises freedom and the unleashing of intense passions. As we can see in his outburst, Callicles is hardly concerned or even aware that Socrates has changed the topic away from justice. He attacks moderation and justice as belonging to a single class of restraints for which he declares his disdain. Telling Socrates that he is now going to speak to him outspokenly, Callicles proclaims that justice and moderation are mere words used by the weak to hide their inability to satisfy their desires and to prevent the strong from doing so at their expense (492a3b8). Those who are strong enough to break free from these hypocritical pretenses of the weak should liberate themselves. Such men, he argues, would lead wretched lives if they were to restrain themselves, because true virtue and happiness require the full ourishing of ones desires and the use of ones courage and prudence to get what one wants:
This is the noble and just according to nature, which Im now telling you outspokenly: the man who will live correctly must let his own desires be as great as possible and not restrain them, and, when they are as great as possible, he must be capable of serving them through courage and prudence and of lling them up with the things for which desire at any given time arises. . . . In truth, Socrates, which you claim to pursue, this is how it is: luxury, intemperance, and freedom, if they have support that is virtue and happiness; but those other things, the embellishments, the agreements of human beings that are contrary to nature, those are drivel and worth nothing. (491e6492a3, 492c38)

It is striking that, even as he defends the unleashing of passion and the indulgence of desire, Callicles continues to speak of virtue and

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to describe the life he is praising as the most virtuous.22 Yet, even if he continues to speak of virtue, he displays in this speech his most extreme movement away from any ordinary or conventional understanding of the character of virtue. Praising intense pleasure as the aim of a truly superior life, Callicles presents even the virtues of courage and prudence as means to the satisfaction of the greatest possible desires. Callicles self-proclaimed outspokenness in this speech, then, consists above all in his open expression of an extreme view that is at least one aspect of his thought or one direction in which he is strongly tempted. According to this view, a man of sufcient abilities should allow his desires to grow as great as possible and then spend his life indulging these desires as vigorously as he can. Socrates suggests that this is a view to which not only Callicles but many others are tempted: Callicles is saying clearly what the others think but are unwilling to say (492d13).23 After praising Callicles for his outspokenness, Socrates turns to respond to his speech. In doing so, however, he leaves aside Callicles criticism of justice and limits himself to Callicles rejection of selfrestraint and his praise of immoderation. Socrates thus completes the turn initiated by his earlier question about the self-rule of the superior. Whether or not Callicles is aware of this development, Socrates has now left behind the question of justice. The ensuing discussion has two themes: the contest between moderation and immoderation, and the question of hedonism. There is an obvious connection between these two themes. But there is also a subtle difference, since it is not quite the same thing to argue against the immoderate pursuit of pleasure as it is to argue against the view that pleasure is the only good worth
22. Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:344; Newell, Ruling Passion, 2122. 23. By the others at 492d2 Socrates may be referring only to Gorgias and Polus, who were unwilling to state the view expressed in Callicles speech. But Socrates remark also admits of a broader reading, and such a reading is suggested by his use of the present tense at 492d3: dianoountai men legein de ethelousin. On this point, consider Laws 660d11662a8.

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pursuing.24 Moderation readily lends itself to a defense on prudential or utilitarian grounds, most simply because it enables one to avoid the needless pain and suffering that come with immoderation. As it turns out, Socrates goes on to give just such a defense of moderation: he presents Callicles with two images of the immoderate life as a toilsome struggle continually to rell a leaky jar or set of jars (492e7494a5). Socrates arguments against hedonism, by contrast, rise above such utilitarian considerations and appeal to considerations of shame and nobility. And importantly, it is on this latter front that Socrates is able to make more headway with Callicles, who proves less able to sustain his feigned unconcern with nobility than his rejection of moderation. Since Socrates critique of hedonism is more effective than his defense of moderation, we should examine that critique in detail. Before we do so, however, we should take at least a brief look at Socrates defense of moderation and consider why it is less successful. Socrates defense of moderation begins with an enigmatic suggestion. Perhaps Euripides spoke the truth when he said, Who knows whether to live is to be dead, and to be dead is to live?, for perhaps we are in fact dead (492e8493a1). What Socrates means by this becomes clearer when he adds that he once heard a wise man say that we are now dead and that the body is our tomb (493a13).25 Socrates defense of moderation begins, in short, from the premise that our lives as we now experience them are not our only or even our truest lives, that we will live on and even live better once our souls are freed from our bodies. Or rather this is the premise of the rst part of Socrates defense of moderation, a defense that consists, as already noted, of two images. Although the two images are similar inasmuch as they each use an analogy involving jars, the most important difference between

24. Cf. Gentzler, The Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias, 3738; Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 12834. 25. The word body (soma ) is very similar in Greek to the word tomb (se ma). For the possible Pythagorean or Heraclitean origin of the saying that brings these words together, see Dodds, Gorgias, 298300.

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them is that the rst image relies on an account of the afterlife, whereas the second does not go beyond this world. The account of the afterlife on which the rst image relies comes not from Socrates himself but from some clever myth-telling man, probably some Sicilian or Italian (493a56). According to this mans account, which seems to have been crafted out of a love of wordplay, the part of the soul in which the desires reside, because it is persuadable ( pithanon) and persuasive ( peistikon) ought to be called a jar ( pithon); the thoughtless (anoe tous) ought to be called the unitiated (amue tous); and the jar in an uninitiated mans soul since his desires are intemperate and insatiable ought to be regarded as perforated or leaky (493a6b3). If this much could suggest that the thoughtless or uninitiated suffer for their intemperance even during their lives on earth, the heart of the myth-tellers account is his further suggestion that in Hades the uninitiated are miserable because they are compelled to carry water to their leaky jars in other leaky things. These other leaky things are sieves, which, as Socrates learned from the man who explained the mythtellers account to him, represent mens souls regarded as wholes, or at least the souls of the thoughtless, which are unable to retain anything due to their unreliability and forgetfulness (493b3c3).26

26. Especially when one tries to put its parts together, the account Socrates relates has a number of puzzling features. For instance, the soul is presented as a sieve in which water is carried to a jar that itself is presented as a part of the soul. Should the sieve be seen as the soul in a different sense or in a different aspect from that of the jar? And what should one make of the suggestion that the desires that reside in the soul would persist (unchanged?) even after the soul is separated from the body? There also is the question of Socrates sources, which move from Euripides, to an anonymous wise man, to some clever myth-telling man whose account (so the story goes) was explained to Socrates by the anonymous wise man (on these sources, see Dodds, Gorgias, 297300). Without trying to resolve the various riddles posed by this patchwork account (e.g., Is the wise mans interpretation true to the original meaning of the myth?), let me suggest that Socrates may mean to convey an important thought by indicating that the desires of the thoughtless are somehow more insatiable than those of

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After presenting this image of suffering souls in Hades, Socrates acknowledges that there is something strange about it (493c45; atopa can also mean absurd). But he nonetheless asks Callicles whether he has been persuaded by the image to change his mind and to accept the view that the orderly are happier than the intemperate (493c7d2). Or even if I tell myths about many other such things, will you still not change at all? (493d23). That Callicles chooses this latter alternative declaring, in effect, that he is not persuaded comes as no surprise. In fact, Callicles response is so predictable that Socrates question about whether Callicles is convinced can have no other purpose than to call attention to the fact that an image such as the one Socrates presents could never persuade Callicles. After all, Socrates himself calls the image a myth, and his presentation of it includes a large element of playfulness or obvious absurdity. But there may be a serious purpose behind this playfulness, for it at least raises important questions. Could Socrates ever seriously deliver and Callicles ever seriously accept an account of the afterlife? Moreover, if the most fundamental reason that Callicles is not persuaded by Socrates image is that he nds it difcult to believe in an afterlife, can this help us to understand what draws him toward a life of immoderate pleasureseeking? If Socrates rst image fails to persuade Callicles because it relies on a premise that Callicles does not accept, his second image avoids at least this problem. The second image, according to Socrates, is from the same school as the rst (493d56); and it resembles the rst in its use of jars as an analogy. But the second image does not involve

the thoughtful, and that this makes the souls of the thoughtless somehow more ckle and persuadable. According to the suggestion conveyed by the interpretation of the myth offered by Socrates anonymous wise man, the souls of the thoughtless seem to be dominated by the part of the soul in which the desires reside, and, perhaps for that reason, they are less reliable, more given to changing up and down, and more prone to forgetfulness. The full meaning of this suggestion, however, cannot be drawn out of the present passage, which at most provides a few provocative hints.

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

Hades. It rests on a simpler consideration regarding life in this world. Socrates asks Callicles to picture the lives of two men, each with many jars that hold wine, honey, milk, and many other goods that are scarce and require toil to acquire. In the case of one man, Socrates says, Callicles should imagine that his jars are healthy and full and that he expends no further effort carrying supplies to his jars but as regards these he is at rest (493e36). As for the other man, while his jars, too, can be lled, they are leaky and decayed, and thus he is compelled to spend day and night struggling to rell his jars lest he suffer the greatest pains (493e6494a1). Such being the life of each, Socrates asks Callicles, do you claim that the life of the intemperate man is happier than the life of the orderly man? Do I somehow persuade you, by saying these things, to concede that the orderly life is better than the intemperate one, or do I not persuade you? (494a25). By speaking again of his effort to persuade Callicles, Socrates again calls attention to the predictable failure of that effort. Socrates second image, although it does not rely on a premise incredible to Callicles, still offers merely a utilitarian reason to avoid self-indulgence, and it offers advice that Socrates can be sure Callicles will reject. For Socrates gives Callicles no good reason to doubt the view that one should live for pleasure, and, on hedonistic grounds, Callicles has a powerful response to Socrates image.27 Callicles explains that he is not persuaded because the life of the man who rests content with full jars, while it may be free of pain, is a stonelike life devoid of pleasure but to live pleasantly consists in keeping as much as possible owing in (494a6b2). With his claim that the pleasant life requires keeping as much as possible owing in, Callicles has taken a position that is closer to indiscriminate hedonism than even his recent outspoken statements about enlarging and satisfying ones desires. And perhaps Socrates meant to push Callicles in this direction by presenting him with images of ascetic self-restraint that he knew Callicles would vehemently reject.
27. Cf. Newell, Ruling Passion, 2324.

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Certainly, Socrates now foists on Callicles an interpretation of his position according to which pleasure should be pursued not only immoderately but also indiscriminately, that is, without regard to any higher standard by which one could judge various pleasures and distinguish good pleasures from bad ones (see especially 494e9495a4). Socrates thus moves the conversation from the question of moderation to the question of hedonism, setting up his coming critique of hedonism and ensuring that the hedonism he will be critiquing is hedonism of the lowest sort (consider 495b26).28 Socrates is able to do this because Callicles thinks that he must defend the indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure in order to maintain the consistency of his position (see 495a26).29 But we can see from even the brief exchange by which Socrates leads Callicles to accept the view that the pleasant is the same as the good, and that there are no pleasures that are not good, that Callicles heart is not fully in his defense of this view. Not only does he himself stress that he is accepting this view in order to be consistent, but he also displays a sense of shame that is incompatible with

28. Socrates took an earlier step in this direction with his initial response to Callicles speech about the unleashing of desire: And tell me: Do you assert that one must not chasten the desires, if one is to be such as one ought, but let them be as great as possible and prepare satisfaction for them from any place whatsoever, and that this is virtue? (492d5e1). Although Callicles went along with this, Socrates formulation pushed him to a view that he did not quite assert in his speech. In fact, Callicles probably had in mind specic desires (the most intense) and specic sources of satisfaction (the most attractive) when he praised the unleashing of desire. On this issue, see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 144; Newell, Ruling Passion, 23. 29. That unrestricted hedonism is not, in fact, necessary to a defense of immoderation is pointed out by Gentzler, The Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias, 3638, and Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 12834. Gentzler provides a helpful discussion of Socrates tactics in driving Callicles toward a defense of unrestricted hedonism. Her argument should be contrasted with Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 120, 124 5, Platos Ethics, 1046. See also Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 1034; Newell, Ruling Passion, 24.

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thoroughgoing hedonism. Callicles is bothered by Socrates shameless examples of great pleasure-pursuers, who keep pleasure continually owing in and out. Socrates three examples of would-be or should-be heroes of a consistent and thoroughgoing hedonist are a bird called the stone-curlew which eats and excretes at the same time (494b67), a man who spends his life scratching himself without being so prudish as to conne his scratching to his head (494c6e1), and, at the peak of such things, the catamite (494e34). Callicles sense of shame at even discussing such topics a sense of shame apparently not shared by Socrates reveals a reservation at abandoning all standards other than pleasure.30 Nevertheless, Callicles does come to the defense of hedonism, and Socrates prepares to argue against hedonism as if it were the view that Callicles truly held (see 495b3c3). Before he does so, however, Socrates pauses for a second brief exchange that completes the preparation for his critique of hedonism. In this exchange, which is even briefer than the exchange in which he leads Callicles to defend indiscriminate hedonism, Socrates asks for a clarication of Callicles position before he begins his argument against it. But Socrates does more than call attention to the hedonistic view Callicles has just accepted. He also makes a point of returning to Callicles understanding of virtue. He asks Callicles whether he thinks there is such a thing as knowledge; whether, in addition to knowledge, there is such as thing as courage; and, perhaps most important, whether he thinks courage is something different from knowledge (495c37). Callicles answers in the afrmative to all of these questions,

30. Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 136, is wrong to claim that Callicles has no shame; see also Barker, Greek Political Theory, 139: Callicles is . . . willing to urge as frankly as possible the gospel of hedonism. Among those who notice Callicles sense of shame are Olympiodorus, Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lecture 30; Friedlander, Plato, 2:263; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 1056, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 13642; Newell, Ruling Passion, 2426. McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 3448, places the greatest weight on Callicles sense of shame.

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expressing particularly strong conviction in response to the last of them, the one that suggests that courage is not reducible to knowledge (see sphodra ge at 495c7). Socrates then gets Callicles to agree that since knowledge and courage are each different from pleasure, and since he maintains that pleasure is the good, he must hold that knowledge and courage are different both from one another and from the good (495c8d7). Callicles accepts each of these steps and takes the view they outline to be his own as he awaits Socrates arguments against hedonism. Yet Socrates nal statement in this exchange suggests that Callicles view, as it is presented here, cannot be taken as his nal word. Socrates says that Callicles will not really hold this view when he looks at himself correctly (495e12). What Socrates means by this, as we can gather from the context, is that when Callicles considers what is implied in his admiration of knowledge and in his even deeper admiration of a form of courage that differs both from knowledge and from pleasure, he will see that he believes in a good beyond mere pleasure. And as it turns out, Socrates refutation of hedonism proves to be less a refutation of hedonism as such than an effort to reveal what has already been indicated by Callicles agreements in this brief exchange. Socrates returns to Callicles admiration of knowledge and especially of courage in the second of the two main arguments that constitute his critique of hedonism. His rst argument, however, concerns the character of the good. Socrates opens this argument by asking Callicles whether he believes that those who are doing well have suffered an experience opposite to the experience of those who are doing badly (495e24). After Callicles says that he believes they have, Socrates then compares doing well and doing badly, or happiness and misery, with other opposites, which, he argues, are never present together nor ever found departing at the same time. Socrates gives the examples of health and sickness, strength and weakness, and swiftness and slowness. As opposites, the members of each of these pairs cannot coexist and never depart simultaneously (495e6496b4). And so too with

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

happiness and misery, or the good and the bad: they cannot coexist, and it is impossible for a human being to have them or to be released from them at the same time (496b5c3). Once he has gotten Callicles to agree that the good and the bad must have this character, Socrates then argues that pleasure and pain have a different relationship to one another. Pleasure and pain are necessarily joined, since any particular pleasure depends on the experience of a particular pain and is always experienced together with that pain. The pleasures of eating and drinking, for instance, depend on the pains of hunger and thirst, and these pleasures persist only insofar as those pains have not completely vanished (496c6e8). What is true of the painful desires for food and drink, Socrates suggests, is true of all other desires and pleasures, for every lack and desire is painful (496d4; see also 497c68). Now, Socrates argument is ostensibly meant to show that pleasure cannot be the good since it lacks the unmixed character of the good (see 496e9497a5, 497c6d7). But this argument is not an impressive refutation of hedonism. For one thing, it is not true that the opposites that Socrates uses as his examples health and sickness, strength and weakness, and swiftness and slowness cannot coexist. After all, any human being could be described as both healthy and sick to various degrees at any given time of his life, at least until his death, at which point health and sickness depart simultaneously. And strength and weakness, like swiftness and slowness and many other opposites, are relative qualities, such that any strong being could also be said to be weak just as any swift being could also be said to be slow depending on what it is being compared to. In addition to these difculties with Socrates examples, one could also raise objections to his analysis of pleasure. Does every pleasure really depend on the presence of pain? Arent there some pleasures for instance, the pleasure of a beautiful sight, or the smell of a rose, or perhaps even the joy of an insight that are free of pain?31 More important than this objection, however, is the
31. Compare Philebus 50e552b8, Republic 584b1c2. See also Friedlander, Plato, 2:265; Newell, Ruling Passion, 27.

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question of whether Socrates argument does not judge even mixed pleasures by an unrealistic standard of a perfect good unmixed with evils. For the greatest problem with Socrates argument is that it fails to show that such a good exists. It is not sufcient merely to say that the good and the bad are opposites, since, apart from the difculties already mentioned with Socrates examples of opposites, pleasure and pain are surely opposites, too, and hence they more obviously belie the suggestion that opposites cannot coexist. Might one not plausibly argue that while the good and the bad are opposites in some sense, there is no good that is entirely free of the bad, and that by speaking of happiness as a condition unmixed with evils, Socrates is describing an impossible dream?32 Yet what is most striking about Callicles response to Socrates argument is that he never makes such an objection. It is true that Callicles is not really convinced by the conclusion of Socrates argument and objects that he has merely been ensnared by Socratic sophistry (see 497a6c2, d8e1). But although he is not persuaded by the argument as a whole, Callicles does express agreement in fact, emphatic agreement with the view that the good must be entirely free of the bad. I do agree, extraordinarily so is his response when asked by Socrates whether he agrees that any pair of things that a human being experiences together and is released from at the same time cannot be the good and the bad; and he gives this response after Socrates has urged him to think deeply before answering (see 496c15). It appears that the vision of the good as unmixed with the bad, or of happiness as a condition entirely free of evils, appeals to Callicles. We see here that he believes in such a vision. Even if Socrates argument hardly puts a dent in hedonism itself, then, it does begin to show why a man like Callicles could never be more than a half-hearted hedonist or what
32. Consider Lysis 220b7d7, Theaetetus 176a59, Protagoras 345b2c3. For more thorough examinations of the aws in Socrates rst argument against hedonism, see Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:1207; Friedlander, Plato, 2:2656; Santas, Socrates, 26770. Consider also Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 121, Platos Ethics, 107.

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

hopes stand in the way of his acceptance of a view as depressing as the view that the good is nothing more than mere pleasure. If Callicles has stronger hopes for a good unmixed with evils than perhaps he himself ever realized, he also has a greater commitment to virtue. We have already seen several indications of this, but it is brought out even more clearly by the second argument Socrates makes against hedonism, an argument that proves to be even more ad hominem than the rst. In his second argument, Socrates attempts to show Callicles that his admiration of courageous and prudent men is inconsistent with the view that all pleasures are good regardless of their source or the character of those who experience them. Socrates begins from Callicles acceptance of the view that those to whom the good is present are good, just as those to whom beauty is present are beautiful (497e13). If pleasure is the good, he argues, then cowards and fools ought to be regarded as good men just as much as those who are courageous and prudent, because cowards and fools experience roughly the same amount of pleasure as the courageous and prudent (497e6498c8). Socrates gives several examples of people who Callicles must admit experience pleasure, including children and thoughtless men. But his most important example is of cowards in war, who are pained by the advance of the enemy and rejoice upon his retreat at least as much as the courageous (498a5c1). If Callicles agrees that those to whom the good is present are good, while holding that pleasure is the good, wouldnt he have to accept that the coward who is overjoyed as the enemy retreats is a good man? Yet he wants to insist that only the courageous and prudent are good, whereas the cowardly and foolish are bad (see 498e26, 499a14). Callicles thus seems to be reduced to the absurdity of maintaining that the bad are as good as the good, and sometimes even better (see 498c68, 499a7b3). The serious point behind this absurd conclusion is that Callicles cannot account for his admiration of virtuous men, the courageous and the prudent, simply in terms of pleasure. Callicles could escape Socrates argument by arguing that courage and prudence should not be seen as good in themselves but only as useful means to pleasure,

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and that, contrary to Socrates argument, courageous and prudent men tend to be somewhat more successful in attaining pleasure. Or he could go a step further and deny that it makes sense to speak of good and bad men at all: if pleasure is the only thing that ultimately matters, virtue loses its meaning.33 Yet, while such a response might save hedonism from Socrates critique, Callicles never retracts his agreement that the courageous and the prudent, as such, are good. And his nal reaction to Socrates argument is to claim that neither he nor anyone else would ever truly deny that some pleasures are better and others worse, thus conrming that he believes in a standard beyond pleasure and that he will abandon his hedonism before abandoning his view of virtue.34 When we put together the results of Socrates two arguments against hedonism, not only do we see that Callicles is not a thoroughgoing hedonist, but we also see what beliefs are more important to him than his attempt to defend the indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure. That attempt, never entirely sincere (see again 495a56), is revealed as a cover concealing his deeper beliefs. And his deeper beliefs are that true happiness is a condition entirely free of evils and that virtue, or at least a certain understanding of virtue, is the highest standard by which human worth should be measured. It is probably no mere coincidence that each of these two beliefs is given its clearest display in such close proximity to the other. That they appear alongside one another gives us reason to think that they are connected, that is, that Callicles belief in a pure happiness and his concern for virtue go hand in hand and may even sustain one another. By bringing out these two beliefs through his two arguments against hedonism, then, Socrates has provided the fullest view thus far of what may be called Callicles
33. Compare Philebus 13a7c5, 55a9c3. 34. Several commentators have stressed the importance of Callicles reaction to Socrates argument. Compare McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 4243; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 250, 272; Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 121, Platos Ethics, 107; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 108 10, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 137; Newell, Ruling Passion, 2728.

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

moral seriousness or his attachment to morality. It is true that this view of Callicles deepest convictions is not yet complete. Later passages of the dialogue will expand it even further. For instance, we will soon come to a section in which Callicles defends men who he claims devoted themselves to the city men such as Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles, who Callicles will insist cared for the citizens they served (see 503a2c3). Callicles defense of service to the common good in that section is important for any attempt to put together a complete picture of his views, as are other arguments he will go on to make in the remainder of the dialogue. But these later passages will serve primarily to conrm and elaborate what has already been revealed by what we have considered. We are already in a position to draw the general conclusion that, although his moral seriousness may at times be hard to see since it is hidden behind his hedonism, Callicles ultimately has a deeper attachment to virtue than to pleasure. The discovery that Callicles hedonism is not an expression of his deepest concerns, however, leaves a couple of questions still to be considered. For why, if Callicles is not really a hedonist, did he argue as one in the rst place? And why has Socrates guided the discussion so as to focus on the question of pleasure? To begin with the rst of these questions, we have already received a partial answer: Callicles argued as a hedonist because he thought he had to in order to be consistent and to avoid refutation by Socrates. But that is not a complete explanation. For it fails to explain why Callicles took an initial step toward hedonism, and why he at times expresses a serious commitment to hedonism (see again especially 491e5492e2, 494a6b2, 495b2d7). While Callicles hedonism is not entirely sincere, neither is it simply insincere, and it would be a mistake to dismiss it as merely a false and completely misleading fa cade. Callicles hedonism is better seen as part of a serious effort by Callicles to deny, even to himself, that he is concerned with any kind of virtue and any form of happiness beyond the enjoyment of pleasure. Yet, since we have seen that Callicles is concerned with precisely these things, we have to try to understand why

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he would take a position that hides or buries his concerns. Why would Callicles try to conceal his deepest convictions even from himself? This question can be extended beyond the narrow one of why Callicles defended hedonism, since hedonism is only the most extreme of the positions Callicles has taken that would seem to reject all ordinary notions of virtue. If the conversation up to this point has shown us that Callicles is morally serious or attached to virtue, we have also seen Callicles make a number of arguments that express what would appear to be an extremely cynical point of view. In addition to defending hedonism, he has argued, for instance, that nobility has no genuine meaning beyond what is advantageous, and that it is simply a manifest fact that should not be lamented that the strong dominate the weak (see again especially 483a7e1, 488d1e6, 491e5492c8). Thus far, Socrates has had to make considerable efforts to strip away these covers and bring to the surface what Callicles really believes. But what is the source of Callicles reluctance to acknowledge what are in fact his own deeper views? The reasons for this reluctance run deeper than his desire to avoid appearing na ve or to win a victory over Socrates and his moralistic arguments. To understand the deeper reasons, we must consider the painful thoughts that come with acknowledging the concerns that Callicles hides. For to admit that one is concerned with virtue, and that one has a deep desire to see virtue triumph, is to open oneself to sorrow and anger when virtue fails or is defeated by vice. That this problem troubles Callicles can be seen most clearly in an important exchange in a later section of the dialogue. There, Socrates and Callicles will discuss a possible situation in which a just man who runs the risk of refusing to assimilate to an unjust regime is destroyed by a more self-protective man who has assimilated (see 510d4511a7). In response to Socrates effort to remind him that this prospect would involve a base man killing one who is noble and good, Callicles will exclaim, Isnt that exactly the infuriating thing? a response that reveals both his continued attachment to virtue and also the problem that leads him to bury that attachment (511b16). The heart of the

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

problem, as Callicles response shows, is the painful indignation and fear that arise with the thought that the virtuous do not always receive the fate they deserve or that justice has little power in the world. In keeping with his desire to escape this problem, we earlier saw Callicles display his reluctance to acknowledge a gap between virtue and success (see again 483c9e1, 488b8d4, 498e23). And although Socrates was able to draw Callicles toward a position that would make such a gap possible by appealing to Callicles concern for virtue to pull him away from a simple reduction of virtue to strength and success, we can understand why it required an effort to get Callicles to take that step (see especially 488d5489d5). Even when he did take it, moreover, he tried to keep it as small as possible by emphasizing virtues prudence and courage that can be viewed as expressions of strength and selfassertion rather than self-sacrice (see especially 491a7d3). Nothing is so characteristic of Callicles as his uctuation between opposed positions, with his movement in one direction getting not only checked but also colored by the concerns that lead him in the other. But what moves him is never simple cynicism. If his attachment to virtue always draws him back from positions that would ultimately deprive virtue of any meaning or destroy the virtuous character of virtue, he is driven toward such positions by his unwillingness to embrace a view that would leave virtue exposed and vulnerable. His wavering can thus be understood as a series of responses to an infuriating problem, none of which Callicles can nd satisfactory since none of them fully solves that problem. By looking at his dilemma from this perspective, we can make sense both of his earlier statements about justice, in which he uctuated between afrming and denying that the superior who deserve to rule are simply the stronger, and also of his hedonism, which is the most extreme of his swings toward a view that would reject all ordinary standards of judgment that leave virtue exposed to the problem that troubles him.35
35. That Callicles dilemma is not idiosyncratic to him but troubles even people of more conventional decency can be seen by considering Laws 625c9627c2

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It may be more, however, than indignation at the prospect of virtue failing to succeed that keeps Callicles from fully acknowledging his deeper beliefs. For one might respond to the problem of the vulnerability of virtue by declaring that, even in the midst of suffering at the hands of the wicked, the virtuous man will attain a more perfect good, a truer happiness, than the base gratication enjoyed by his enemies.36 This would seem, at any rate, to be the promise that virtue holds out, a promise that we have been given reason to believe Callicles is not untouched by. Yet, as powerful and alluring as this promise is, Callicles is unable to give himself fully to it. Although he is moved by it, he is troubled by his doubts about whether virtue can really deliver on its promise. And these doubts are surely strengthened by his inability to accept the clearest answer that can be given to the question of how virtue leads to happiness even if the virtuous are harmed by the wicked. If we look ahead for a moment to the very end of the dialogue, Socrates conversation with Callicles will conclude with a myth about the afterlife describing Zeus system of punishing those human beings who have lived unjustly and rewarding the virtuous with an existence free of evils (522e1527a4). This myth can be seen as a more serious version of a step already irted with in Socrates earlier image of intemperate men in Hades carrying water to their leaky jars with their leaky sieves (see again 492e7493d3). Yet, if that earlier image failed to persuade Callicles, is he any more likely to be convinced by the myth at the end of the dialogue? Socrates acknowledges that Callicles will almost surely dismiss this myth, too, as nothing more than an old wives tale (see 523a12, 527a56). That does not mean, as Socrates also indicates, that there do not remain in Callicles attachments that will always pull him in such a direction (see 527a8b2). But Socrates predicts that Callicles will resist looking at the hopes that linger inside
and 661d6662a8 (cf. 689a1c3). What sets Callicles apart from the likes of Kleinias and Megillus in the Laws is his keener sense of the problem that they also experience and his greater effort to overcome the internal division it produces. 36. Consider Republic 357a2362c8.

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of him, perhaps because acknowledging those hopes would require him to confront his longing for an ultimate salvation from evils, and thus to face the fact that he yearns for something he fears is impossible. Rather than acknowledge his deepest hopes and accept the fears that come with them, Callicles would rather try to convince himself that happiness can be found in the continual satisfaction of intense desires and distract himself with a stream of intense pleasures. These considerations can help us understand the complexity of Callicles soul and why he would argue as a hedonist. Still, he may never have been led to express his hedonism and certainly would never have expressed it as vehemently as he did unless he had been pushed in that direction by Socrates. We still need to address the question, then, of why Socrates pushed Callicles to defend hedonism. And this question is really only a more developed version of a question that we raised earlier but left unanswered: Why did Socrates turn the discussion away from the question of justice? For it was on the heels of his examination of the question of justice, or rather on the heels of his abrupt abandonment of that examination, that Socrates turned the discussion to a set of questions that culminated in the dispute over hedonism. When Socrates rst turned away from the question of justice, we were perplexed as to why he would so abruptly abandon his incomplete examination of that question. Since we have now considered the section that follows that turn, we should be in a better position to explain it by addressing what can now be put as the question of why Socrates would prefer to argue over the question of hedonism than over the question of justice. To address this question, it may help to remember that Socrates and Callicles are not the only men present. We should not forget that Gorgias is watching Socrates conversation with Callicles. In fact, Gorgias, as if to remind us of his presence, has even intervened to keep the conversation going. In the midst of the rst of Socrates two main arguments against hedonism, at a moment when Callicles annoyance with Socrates sophistic manner of refutation had become so great that he came close to breaking off the conversation, Gorgias stepped

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in to urge Callicles not to abandon the argument before it had reached its end and to submit to Socrates refutation (see 497a6c2). Gorgias intervention is a sign that Socrates has succeeded in capturing his interest. But what has Gorgias seen or learned up to this point? Most important, he has witnessed the uncovering of Callicles attachment to virtue or his concern for morality. But he also has seen Socrates direct the conversation to hedonism and away from justice. Now, Gorgias or anyone else witnessing the conversation might be tempted to explain Socrates turn away from justice on the grounds that Callicles concern for justice is too shallow for a truly fruitful discussion of that topic. Perhaps, in turning to the topic of pleasure, Socrates has turned to what really moves and concerns Callicles. Socrates himself even encourages this impression (see 492d1e1, 495b8c2). But it is a false impression, as Socrates also has helped the more discerning among his audience to see. Gorgias, in particular, has surely been brought to see that Callicles cares deeply about virtue, and that he even yearns for justice to prevail by the virtuous receiving their due. Given this yearning, which has been buried and transformed but not destroyed by Callicles struggle with the problem of the vulnerability of virtue, Socrates turn away from the question of justice cannot rightly be explained as a turn to what is deeper for Callicles. In fact, the opposite is closer to the truth. That is, Socrates turn away from the question of justice is better explained by his caution about critiquing in too thoroughgoing a manner what truly is dearest to Callicles. We should recall, in this connection, that even the few questions that Socrates did raise about Callicles view of justice provoked an angry response (see again 490b1491a3). And we must remember that lurking in the background of Socrates entire conversation with Callicles is Callicles hostility to philosophy, a hostility whose deepest source may be Callicles moral attachments together with his vague sense that philosophic questioning threatens to undermine what he cares most deeply about without offering anything genuinely worthy in return. As Socrates exchanges with Callicles have helped us to see more clearly, Callicles moral attachments shape his judgments his judgments of everything and thus even of Socrates

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The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles

himself and of philosophy. By directing the discussion to the question of hedonism, however, Socrates has been able to cast the divide between himself and Callicles in such a way that he is standing on the high ground, so to speak, against Callicles half-serious arguments on behalf of the life of pleasure-seeking. Socrates success in seizing this high ground, which prepares his coming return to the question of the goodness of the philosophic life, is a crucial part, I suggest, of his education of Gorgias in a nobler form of rhetoric, a form of rhetoric whose ultimate purpose is the defense of philosophy against its critics and potential enemies.

4 Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

he Gorgias reveals much about Callicles. It gives us a view into the soul of a young man who Socrates thinks could never truly

join him in his search for the truth, and who is willing to be an outspoken critic of the philosophic life. It would seem tting that the dialogue should also reveal much about Socrates, that we should see a presentation or defense of Socrates philosophic life in response to Callicles attack on it. And Socrates does return, on the heels of his critique of hedonism, to the question that he earlier let fade into the background. He reminds Callicles that the most important question at issue in their conversation is the most important of all human questions How ought one to live? and he returns to Callicles exhortation of him to abandon philosophy and to turn to a more political life (500c18). Yet, although Socrates returns to the question of whether his life is truly choiceworthy, he seems to raise this question only to let it fade again into the background. It takes quite some time in the remainder of the dialogue before Socrates speaks directly about his own life; and when he does, his statements are quite brief (see 521a2522e6; cf. 508c4 513c3). Also dampening our expectations that Socrates will be particularly open about his own life in the last part of the dialogue is his return, in the same section that immediately follows his critique of Callicles hedonism, to the issue of rhetoric. This return to what could seem at this point to be a distraction from the more important issue of the best life adds to our puzzlement. What is Socrates main

123

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purpose after his critique of Callicles hedonism? Is it to give an adequate response to Callicles attack on the philosophic life by revealing the truth about that life? What we wish to see is what Socrates will soon call, in reference to Callicles earlier allusion to Euripides Antiope, the speech of Amphion in exchange for the speech of Zethus that is, the defense of the private, philosophic life in response to the case against it. But is that what we will see? This question becomes murkier the more we come to doubt what rst appears to be the straightforward answer to it. To repeat, Socrates follows his critique of Callicles hedonism with a return to the question of the best life. His initial approach gives the impression that he is now prepared to answer that question since he has gotten Callicles to renounce his hedonism and thus to accept the crucial standard for judging the rival lives. According to Socrates, since Callicles has agreed that some pleasures are good while others are bad, he must acknowledge a standard higher than pleasure that makes this distinction intelligible, that is, he must acknowledge the superiority of the good to pleasure and its status as the true end of all human actions (499c4500a3). Since it follows from this position that all pleasant things ought to be done for the sake of good things rather than the reverse, Socrates insists that there is need of an expert (or, literally, an artist, a technikos man) to discern which pleasant things are good and which are bad. Socrates then reminds Callicles of the earlier distinction that was drawn between pursuits that aim at pleasure alone and those genuine arts that know what is good and bad (500a7 b5). At this point, Socrates returns to the question of the best way of life, posed now as a dispute between the political life championed by Callicles and the life spent in philosophy (500c18). The surface impression conveyed by this approach to the question of the best way of life is that the question can be settled simply, by referring to the distinction between the pleasant and the good: unlike the political life praised by Callicles, the philosophic life is guided by the good rather than by pleasure. Yet, surprisingly, Socrates does not quite draw

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this conclusion.1 Instead, he presents the question of the true difference between the two lives and the question of which life should be chosen as questions that still remain open (500c8d4). Beyond this, he even suggests that it remains a question whether they are really two distinct lives (consider 500d23). Socrates hesitancy here indicates that he does not think the preceeding discussion has sufced to resolve these crucial issues. One might expect, then, that Socrates would resolve these issues immediately in what follows. But another reason to doubt that Socrates purposes are as straightforward as they rst appear is his renewed interest, which we have already noted, in rhetoric. It would seem that rhetoric reemerges in the discussion as an aspect of the political life that is to be contrasted with the philosophic life, or, in other words, as something that belongs to what we anticipate will be the losing side in the contest (see 500c47). But since rhetoric was already criticized earlier in the dialogue, why would there be a need to heap further abuse on it? And more important, although Socrates repeats in the present section his earlier critique of rhetoric as a form of attery directed toward pleasure, we can also discern a subtle change in his attitude towards rhetoric. It is true that Socrates once again seems to spare no disdain for those (nonartistic) pursuits that aim at providing pleasure, now with the apparent purpose of convincing Callicles to share his contempt (see, in particular, 500d6 501c6, 502d29). Yet Socrates proves in this section not to be overly concerned with what Callicles really thinks (see 501c7e3; compare 495a79, 496c14, 500b5c1). And Callicles may miss the less obvious but more important indications that, for all the disdain in Socrates tone, something different is now in the air. The rst indication of a change is that Socrates returns to an issue that rst arose in his discussion with Gorgias, before his critique of
1. Contrast Jaeger, Paideia, 2:144; Friedlander, Plato, 2:2667; Dodds, Gorgias, 23; Newell, Ruling Passion, 28.

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rhetoric at the beginning of the Polus section. By asking Callicles, as they are discussing pursuits that provide pleasure while neglecting what is best, whether such gratication is possible not only with one soul but also with two or many or even in crowds, Socrates returns to the issue of what can realistically be accomplished with large crowds (501d15). We should recall that this consideration earlier pointed to an important necessity governing and at least to some extent excusing the way rhetoric operates (see again 454e3455a7). Second, we should notice that, although Socrates returns in the present context to the schema by which he criticized rhetoric at the beginning of the Polus section, his analogies of attering pursuits that aim at pleasure are no longer cosmetics and cookery but now become music and poetry (compare 501e5502d3 with 463a6465e1). To be sure, Socrates is criticizing music and poetry, by arguing that they do not strive to improve the souls of the audience. Nevertheless, it is one thing for a rhetorician to be compared to a cook or a cosmetician and quite another to be compared to a tragic poet, a practitioner of that august and wondrous nonart, as Socrates puts it perhaps only half sarcastically (502b12). The difference in the analogies is not a matter of mere pretension: the kind of pleasure supplied by music and poetry is of a different and more complex sort, just as the skill necessary to produce such pleasure is harder to come by. The rhetorician now appears as a gure equal to the great tragic poets, or even superior to them insofar as his audience is made up solely of free men whereas theirs includes women, children, and slaves (502d5e2).2 The nal and most important sign of a change in Socrates attitude towards rhetoric is that he now allows that there could be such a thing as noble rhetoric. No longer condemning rhetoric in its entirety or in all of its forms, Socrates holds out the possibility of a noble form of rhetoric, although he suggests that such rhetoric has never been seen (503a5b1).3 If such rhetoric has never been seen, we must wonder
2. For a different interpretation of the message conveyed by Socrates analogies in this section, see Jaeger, Paideia, 2:144. 3. Cf. Black, Platos View of Rhetoric, 3667; Newell, Ruling Passion, 28.

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what Socrates has in mind by speaking of it. Is Socrates calling for its creation? If Socrates has returned to the question of rhetoric for the sake of Gorgias as much as for the sake of Callicles (see again 500a7 b5, 501c7d2), is Socrates pointing to a better use that could be made of Gorgias powers? And might Socrates even have wanted to send a certain message to Gorgias by weaving his return to the theme of rhetoric together with his reminder of Callicles attack on philosophy? These questions are difcult to answer at this point, since we have not learned much about the character of noble rhetoric or why it might be needed. But we can say that we have seen the rst steps in a restoration or rehabilitation of rhetoric and we may wonder whether this does not bring us closer to Socrates unacknowledged but true purpose in the remainder of the dialogue.

NOBLE RHETORIC, THE ORDER OF THE SOUL, AND THE SOCRATIC THESIS (502d10508c3)

In laying out the criticism of rhetoric that led to the suggestion that rhetoric is double, with a shameful form and a noble form (see again 503a5b1), Socrates based his argument and thus this distinction on the difference between aiming at pleasure and struggling to make the souls of the citizens as good as possible. He complicated matters, however, by adding the further objection that ordinary rhetoricians act for the sake of their own private interest, giving little thought to the common good (502e67). In other words, Socrates criticism highlighted not only the lowness of what ordinary rhetoricians provide but also the selshness of their motives. This is important because it is the latter point more than the former that provokes a protest from Callicles that leads to the next stage of the conversation. Callicles is bothered less by the thought that ordinary rhetoricians provide mere pleasure than by the suggestion that they are simply out for themselves (consider 503a24). He does not think that is true in all cases. He insists that it is not true of the great Athenian statesmen Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles (503c13).

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In Callicles protest here we can see something about Callicles character and convictions that was visible but perhaps not fully clear earlier. Callicles deepest admiration is reserved for men who, in his view, performed great acts of public service for Athens. Great Athenians such as Pericles hold a higher place in his esteem than foreign tyrants of the likes of Xerxes (consider again 483c7484c3). And insofar as the political gures he admires were rhetoricians, he speaks up on their behalf against Socrates criticism, insisting that they should be regarded as noble rhetoricians, unlike those of the current generation (503b4c3).4 Callicles protest here sounds almost as if it could come from a patriotic young American looking back with reverence to the time of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams. It is true that, in defending especially Pericles but also Themistocles and Cimon, he is defending the architects of Athenian imperialism, who built Athens into a great power at the expense of the freedom of other Greek cities. But Callicles can tell himself that, in building and asserting Athenian strength, these leaders were acting in accordance with the justice of nature that dictates that the strong ought to dominate the weak. In fact, not only is

4. It is important to know the most famous accomplishments of the men whom Callicles praises. Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles were all celebrated leaders of Athens whose careers collectively spanned the period of Athens rise to great power. Miltiades, the earliest of the great four, led the Athenians in their famous victory against the invading forces of the Persian king Darius at Marathon in 490 B.C. Themistocles helped, roughly ten years later, to defeat the second Persian invasion, led by Xerxes. Themistocles defeated the Persian navy in a crucial battle at Salamis, and he contributed to the rise of the Athenian empire by building up the Athenian navy. Cimon carried Themistocles work further by dealing a nal defeat to the Persian navy and by leading Athens during much of the period in which it transformed itself from one of the leading cities in the Greek alliance against Persia into an imperial power in its own right. Pericles, of course, is the most famous of all Athenian leaders of this period. He led the Athenians at the peak of their strength and helped lead them into the Peloponnesian War. For more extensive discussions of the careers of these four men, see, in addition to the accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides, Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 23, and Dodds, Gorgias, 3256, 3569.

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Callicles patriotism compatible with his earlier argument about justice, but his admiration of the architects of Athenian imperialism even suggests that a patriotic concern to vindicate Athens may have played a role in leading him to defend a view of justice according to which Athenian imperialism would be an example of natural justice, not a violation of right.5 Callicles protest against Socrates present suggestion is guided, to repeat, more by the belief that his heroes served Athens than by a conviction that their service consisted in improving the souls of the Athenians. It is only by combining these standards such that their difference becomes blurred that Socrates is able to provoke Callicles into defending his heroes as noble rhetoricians. But Callicles response then allows Socrates to turn to the question of the true task of noble rhetoric and to sketch out what its aim should be (consider 504c4e1). Socrates procedure here may serve several purposes at once. Most obviously, Socrates intends to establish a standard by which Callicles heroes can be criticized (see 503d56). In addition, and as an extension of the same effort, Socrates will press Callicles himself to turn his attention away from the simple fact that his heroes served Athens and to focus instead on the character of their service. Callicles position, as it appears here, has the mixed or ambiguous character of patriotism, which puts service to the city above all else without being too morally strict about the end that the city itself serves.6 In pressing Callicles, Socrates will challenge the adequacy of this position a position that in a way afrms the primacy of virtue (as service of the individual to the common good) but in another way fails to (as the end to which the city should be devoted). Since any defender of such a view, precisely as a
5. In support of this suggestion, consider Callicles opening remark at 481b10 c4, where Callicles speaks in defense of the present order of things, and expresses his concern that Socrates extreme arguments about justice would turn everything upside down. 6. It is worth comparing, in this connection, a famous passage from the foremost of Callicles heroes. See 2.4143 of Pericles Funeral Oration in Thucydides.

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devotee of virtue and the city, would nd it hard to concede that the city should be devoted to low ends, Socrates is justied in pressing Callicles toward greater rigor and consistency. Finally, Socrates procedure will also allow him to begin to sketch something of the character of noble rhetoric and its aims. Socrates begins his description of the noble rhetorician the good man, who speaks with a view to the best by comparing him to the other craftsmen, who do not perform their tasks at random but instead look away to something, namely, to whatever their work (ergon) happens to be and to the form (eidos) into which they are trying to mold whatever they are working on (503e15). (The important Platonic term form eidos makes its appearance here as an image or pattern that would seem to exist in the minds eye of a craftsman and then later in the result of his work.) Socrates gives the examples of painters, house builders, and shipwrights, all of whom are typical craftsmen in the sense that they put the materials of their work into a certain order until they have formed an arranged and ordered whole (503e5504a2). The same is true, according to Socrates, even of gymnastic trainers and doctors, who work on the body (504a35). As for the character and goodness of the nal order aimed at by each of the craftsmen, that would seem to be established by the use to which the craftsmans work is to be put. For instance, the order of a ship is dictated and vindicated, so to speak, by the needs of sailing, just as the order of a house is dictated and vindicated by the needs of daily life. It is hard to deny that an ordered ship, an ordered house, or even an ordered body is preferable to a disordered one (504a8b3). So far so good. But what about the soul? Is it true in that case, too, that arrangement and order render it useful, whereas disorder has the opposite effect? Socrates puts this question to Callicles, and Callicles assumes, in the wake of the preceding examples, that it is also necessary to agree to this (see 504b36). And perhaps it does make sense to assume that an ordered soul, even if its order is more complicated than that of a ship or a house, is more useful than a disordered one. But a more questionable step comes next. For after reminding

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Callicles that there is a name or a couple of names for that which comes about in the body through arrangement and order namely, health and strength Socrates asks about that which comes to be in the soul from arrangement and order (504c13). Callicles unwillingness to respond Why dont you say it yourself, Socrates? (504c4) enables Socrates to declare that the names of the arrangement and order of the soul are the lawful and the law. From these, he claims, souls become lawful and orderly; and lawfulness and orderliness in the soul are justice and moderation (504d13). Callicles response at this point Let it be (504d4) indicates that he senses a problem with Socrates argument. But what problem does Callicles sense? What is questionable here? To begin with the structure of the argument, Socrates does not work in the case of the soul, as he did in the preceding analogies of the products of the craftsmen, from the notions of work or use. His statement about the soul seems closer in this respect to the analogy of the body (consider 504b4c3). Yet it is much less disputable to claim that the end or product of the proper arrangement and order of the body is health and strength, and therefore that the order itself should be called the healthy (see 504c78), than it is to claim that the arrangement and order of the soul ought to be called the lawful and law, and then to conclude that from these arise lawfulness and orderliness, which in turn ought to be called justice and moderation (compare 504b7 c8 with 504d13). What is the basis for calling the arrangement and order of the soul the lawful and law? And how do we know that the lawful and the law produce states of lawfulness and orderliness that truly deserve the names of the virtues justice and moderation? Perhaps we do in some sense know this, insofar as the law is commonly held to be the source of lawfulness and orderliness, and such lawfulness and orderliness are commonly taken to be justice and moderation. Looked at in this way, however, Socrates argument does little more than appeal to a common opinion without providing a genuine defense of that opinion. Or, to be more precise, Socrates argument gives the impression of demonstrating that the lawful and law have a

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rationality that is as straightforward as that found in the works of the craftsmen, and a goodness that is as unquestionable as that of bodily health and strength. But this impression of demonstrating that there is a perfect harmony between law, virtue, and rationality serves to cover over the problem that the argument really rests on a mere assertion an assertion, moreover, that avoids the difcult questions that would be involved in a truly serious effort to discover the arrangement and order of the soul. After a series of initial steps that give the appearance of perfect soundness and clarity, Socrates reaches his conclusion by a nimble and well disguised leap.7 That Socrates does not offer a sound argument here should make us wonder whether we are not seeing a rhetorical presentation of the task of rhetoric. According to Socrates account, the rhetorician that is, the artistic and good one will look when he speaks and acts to the inculcation of justice, moderation, and the rest of virtue in the souls of his fellow citizens, and to the removal of injustice, intemperance, and the rest of vice (504d5e4). This will benet the citizens, since, just as it is of no benet according to the just speech to give a sick and corrupted body all sorts of food and drink, so must a thoughtless, intemperate, unjust, and impious soul be kept away from the objects of its desires and directed toward those things from which it will be made better (504e5505b7). Such restriction involves a certain kind of punishment, namely, the punishment of keeping the sick soul away from the objects of its desires. But to be punished, Socrates insists, is better for the soul than to remain immoderate. And Socrates urges Callicles, who objects to this suggestion, to endure the benet he himself is receiving by submitting to the punishment he is getting (504b9c4).

7. The aw in Socrates argument is missed by some commentators. See, e.g., Jaeger, Paideia, 2:145; Friedlander, Plato, 2:26869. For other commentators who raise objections to Socrates argument, see Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:37575; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 2734; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 1424; Newell, Ruling Passion, 31, 7.

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As this last remark to Callicles indicates, Socrates is not only describing a kind of punishment in this section but also practicing it on Callicles. This ts with the suggestion that he is not only describing a certain sort of rhetoric but also practicing it. But rhetoric of what sort? As it appears here, the rhetoric that Socrates is at once describing and practicing combines exhortation and a kind of chastisement that can plausibly be called punishment, although this punishment involves no physical violence and would seem to work together with the inspiring effects of exhortation. It may be worth noticing, in this connection, that Socrates compares what he is doing in this section to the telling of myths (see 505c10d3). Is Socrates exhorting Callicles to a view that somehow has the character of a myth? This question cannot yet be answered, since, as Socrates puts it, the argument still does not have a head (505d23).8 Let it sufce for now to say that Socrates is presenting what appears to be a doctrine of virtue, a doctrine to the truth of which he does not quite attest (consider 506a15), but one that he is willing to spell out at least in part because Gorgias steps in to express his wish to hear Socrates go through the remaining things (see 506a8b3). The exchange in which Gorgias urges Socrates to continue even as Callicles withdraws from the discussion leads to the strange spectacle of Socrates speaking for an extended section in a mode that combines dialectical questioning and extended monologue. That is, Socrates accepts Callicles temporary withdrawal and proceeds on his own, but he continues to speak as if he were engaged in a back and forth exchange, taking on the roles of both questioner and respondent (see 506b4ff.). Socrates argument thus becomes, in its very form or method, a blend of Socratic dialectics and a kind of rhetoric. And this form may give us a clue to the character of the content of Socrates extended monologue. In keeping with this, Socrates also suggests that
8. On this odd expression and Socrates use of the word muthos in this passage, see Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 60.

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his monologue is replacing a more strictly dialectical attempt to give to Callicles the speech of Amphion in response to the speech of Zethus (506b4c1).9 This indication that Socrates is no longer arguing in the strictest dialectical manner, even as he preserves something of the form of dialectics, suggests that whatever we may see in Socrates monologue, it will not be the truest or deepest response to Callicles attack on his way of life. Instead, Socrates is completing what he calls the speech (ton logon) or the just speech (ton dikaion logon), a speech or an account that he has already given us reason to suspect may have something of the character of a myth. With an exhortation of his audience to listen, Socrates returns to take up the speech from the beginning (506c5). The beginning, apparently, is the distinction between the pleasant and the good, and Callicles agreement as to the superiority of the good (506c69). But after repeating these steps, Socrates now says more than he did earlier about the character of the good. Just as the pleasant is that through which, by its presence, we are pleased, so the good is that through which, by its presence, we are good (506c9d2). But we are good when some virtue is present (506d24). With these steps, Socrates turns the acknowledgment of the superiority of the good into a case for virtue, or, in other words, he brings out the implication that virtue should be our highest concern. Next, he describes virtue in such a way that arrangement and order, the principles he has been emphasizing, are its distinguishing marks and even its sources (see 506d5e2). Once again, Socrates does not speak in the case of virtue, as he did earlier when speaking of the products of the craftsmen, of any use or end from which the arrangement and order in question take their bearings.10 Instead, he speaks simply of an order that, when present, makes a given being good; and he claims that, when this being is the soul, the orderly soul is better than the disorderly one (506e26).

9. This phrase refers, of course, to Callicles earlier allusion to Euripides Antiope. See footnote 10 in Chapter 3. 10. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 85.

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As Socrates spells out his account of virtue, we begin to see the signicance of his emphasis on order: moderation comes to sight as the highest virtue. Socrates argues that since the orderly soul is moderate, the moderate soul is good, and the soul that experiences the opposite to the moderate is bad (506e6507a7). The soul that experiences the opposite to the moderate, according to Socrates, is the foolish and te kai akolastos at 507a67). By menintemperate soul (see he aphron tioning two opposites of moderation foolishness in addition to intemperance Socrates suggests that at least one meaning of moderation here is a kind of sensibleness or even a kind of wisdom.11 This, in turn, can help us to grasp the most remarkable feature of Socrates present account of virtue: at least at the beginning of this account, he presents all of the other virtues as derivative from moderation (507a5c7).12 For this to make sense, it would seem that moderation must incorporate a kind of wisdom that is able to discern the tting things, since it is out of his concern to do the tting things that the moderate man as Socrates here describes him can be relied on to do the just things toward human beings, to act piously toward the gods, and to be courageous (see 507b15). The virtuous man, because he does the deeds of justice, piety, and courage, can be said to be just, pious, and courageous; but the spirit of his actions would seem to be that of a sensible concern not to make foolish mistakes (consider 507b5c5). By presenting virtue in this way, Socrates makes it easy to defend virtue as conducive to the happiness of the moderate man and he even adds that he himself is convinced that moderation is the path to happiness (see 507b8d1). But one could wonder how closely the virtue

11. On the two opposites of moderation, see Dodds, Gorgias, 336. As Dodds points out, the more common opposition is sophr on-akolastos (moderate intemperate). But for the opposition sophron-aphron (moderate-foolish) and the broader meaning of moderation implied by that opposition, see Protagoras 332a4335b5; Laws 710a38; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.16, 1.3.9. 12. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 61: Moderation becomes the single virtue into which even justice is absorbed. See also 85, 90.

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that Socrates is describing and defending here resembles the kind of virtue that most people admire and would like to see defended. What, for instance, is its relationship to the lawfulness that Socrates spoke of just moments ago? Would such virtue merit the name the lawful? Or is it closer to the kind of virtue that Socrates speaks of, for example, in Book Four of the Republic, where he denes justice as the proper order of the soul? That denition of justice, like Socrates current description of moderation, makes virtue appear to be something that would clearly be good for an individual to possess, but it departs quite far from any ordinary notion of virtue.13 If Socrates description transforms virtue into something that most people would nd hard to recognize, he does not continue very far down this path before turning back toward a view that does not give such pride of place to moderation. Socrates retreat begins when he returns to the theme of punishment punishment not just of oneself but also of ones own and when he speaks of the city (see 507d46). Once the primary object of concern ceases to be ones own soul, as it seemed to be while Socrates was praising moderation, justice returns to reclaim at least equal status with moderation. In the second half of Socrates account of virtue, justice is no longer presented as a subordinate and derivative virtue (compare 507d4508b2 with 507a5d3). It also is striking that the reemergence of justice from subordinate to at least equal status with moderation brings with it a transformation in the character of Socrates case for the goodness of virtue. On the one hand, the straightforward case for the goodness of virtue that was presented in the section that elevated moderation casts its glow, so to speak, over Socrates whole account of virtue, especially since Socrates does not call attention to the important shift in the account. But, on the

13. See, in particular, Republic 443b7444a2. On the difference between Socratic temperance and Socratic justice, on the one hand, and commonly recognized temperance and commonly recognized justice, on the other, see Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 1256. Compare Santas, Socrates, 295 301.

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other hand, Socrates now moves away from the view that the sensible actions of the moderate man produce benets that ow directly from the actions themselves by suggesting, instead, that moderation and justice are good because they enable the virtuous to unite in friendship and community with other human beings and with the gods (see 507d6e6). Socrates speech culminates in a vision of the cosmos of heaven, earth, gods, and men bound together by the ties of community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice (507e6508a2). This is why, he tells Callicles, they call this whole a cosmos, not disordered or intemperate.14 Socrates tells Callicles that he fails to see the cosmic power of geometrical equality: You seem to me not to apply your mind to these things, and, wise though you are about them, you do not realize that geometrical equality has great power among gods and human beings, but you think that one must practice taking more, since you neglect geometry (508a38).15 Now, Socrates seems to be serious here in urging Callicles to embrace the view that he sets forth. He certainly addresses him directly by name (see 507c1, e6, 508b4). And if we recall our earlier suggestion that Callicles is troubled by doubts about whether the virtuous receive
14. The Greek word kosmos (translated above as cosmos) is the same word that I have been translating as order. To call this whole a kosmos is to claim that it is orderly. As for who they are who call this whole a kosmos, that may refer either to people in general or to the wise mentioned by Socrates at 507e6. 15. Geometrical equality refers to what is more often called proportional equality, the equality of ratios in a geometrical progression. This is the kind of equality that provides the standard for Aristotles famous account of distributive justice (see Nicomachean Ethics 1131a10b22). Socrates suggestion here that such equality somehow has force throughout the universe may have Pythagorean origins (see Dodds, Gorgias, 3389; see also Olympiodorus, Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lecture 35). Whether or not it has such origins, the vision Socrates here holds out of an ordered whole, supportive of virtue, has drawn the attention of many commentators, some of whom place considerable weight on this passage. See, e.g., Friedlander, Plato, 2:269; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1467; Voegelin, Plato, 3637; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 96, 119; Newell, Ruling Passion, 32, 38.

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the happiness they deserve, Socrates speech here in praise of virtue can be seen as an effort to help Callicles by assuaging his doubts. We see Socrates here in the role of an exhorter, punisher, and helper. Or, to use an earlier analogy that will reappear before the conversation is nished, Socrates seems to be acting like a doctor giving Callicles soul the medicine that it needs. But does that mean that we should accept what Socrates says in his account of virtue also as an expression of his own deepest views? A number of difculties stand in the way of drawing that conclusion. First, Socrates has not given a completely sound defense of virtue. In fact, his speech, by moving from an (unconventional) understanding of virtue as a kind of wise moderation to a (more conventional) understanding of it as justice and moderation, even raises a troubling question about the unity of virtue and the harmony between wisdom and justice. To be sure, the surface of Socrates speech afrms the unity of virtue and the harmony of its parts. But that surface is not supported by an adequate argument.16 Perhaps as an acknowledgment of this, immediately after delivering his speech, Socrates presents its results in a way that quietly undercuts the conviction with which he seemed to be speaking: Either this argument [logos], then, must be refuted by us by showing that it is not by the possession of justice and moderation that the happy are happy, and by the possession of vice that the miserable are miserable or else, if this argument is true, we must consider what follows (508a8b3). Why does Socrates hold out, even if only as one of two alternatives, the possibility of a refutation of his argument? Since Socrates goes on at once to connect his defense of virtue with the Socratic thesis about justice that he has been defending since the beginning of his discussion with Polus, it may seem mistaken to raise doubts about his conviction (see 508b3e6). But after referring back to the Socratic thesis, Socrates then goes on to speak directly

16. Compare the similar objection of Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 1256, 12930. Irwins critical analysis should be contrasted with Friedlander, Plato, 2:269; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:146; Voegelin, Plato, 36.

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about that thesis, and what he says forces us to confront an even more far-reaching question about the true character of his views. For Socrates says unobtrusively but clearly that even his defense of the Socratic thesis should be understood, not as a defense of a view that he knows to be true, but only as a defense of a view that no one he encounters can deny without becoming ridiculous. Speaking of that thesis, he says to Callicles:
These things that came to sight for us up there in the earlier speeches, are, as I say, held down and bound if I may put it in a rather rude way by iron and adamantine arguments [logois], as it would seem at any rate. And if you or someone younger than you does not loosen them, it will be impossible for anyone saying something different from what Im now saying to speak nobly. For to me at least, the speech [logos] is always the same that I do not know how these things stand, but of those I meet up with, as now, no one who says something different is able to avoid being ridiculous. (508e6509a7)

In this statement, Socrates suggests that in defending the Socratic thesis he is giving voice to a view that has greater power in peoples souls than many realize. But he stops short of afrming that he himself is convinced of the truth of this view, and he even suggests that the iron and adamantine arguments holding this view in place, as it would seem at any rate, might be loosened by Callicles or by someone younger than him (see also 506a15, 508a8b3). We should be reminded in this connection of another important statement that we considered earlier in which Socrates made a similar suggestion. For Socrates virtually began his exchange with Callicles by telling him that he will never attain consistency that he will go through life in disagreement with himself unless he refutes the Socratic thesis (see again 482a4b6). The most surprising aspect of that statement, especially since it came immediately after Socrates defense of the Socratic thesis in the Polus section, is one that I did not call attention to earlier: Wouldnt one have expected Socrates to say that Callicles must accept the Socratic thesis as the only way to achieve genuine consistency?

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Does Socrates mean to indicate that he thinks this view is refutable? To be sure, his statements suggest that a refutation of this view would be far more difcult than people like Callicles think. In fact, it would be so difcult that Socrates is able to claim never to have encountered anyone who was able to avoid becoming ridiculous when arguing against the Socratic thesis. But does the great difculty of refuting this view amount to an impossibility? Would it be possible for someone of sufcient strength to achieve consistency by loosening the iron and adamantine bonds?17

SOCRATES SITUATION, THE QUESTION OF ASSIMILATION, AND THE ISSUE OF SELF-PROTECTION (508c4513d1)

Whatever indications Socrates gives that he may have doubts about the position he is defending, they do not prevent him from urging
17. On this last question, consider Socrates statement about himself at 482b7 c3 in light of his preceding remark about Callicles. On the general question of this paragraph, while Socrates statements that he does not know whether the Socratic thesis is true are sometimes noted by other commentators, these statements are usually not taken very seriously. See, for instance, Jaegers claim, after noting what looks like the logical indecision of [Socrates] conversations, that nonetheless there glows the relentless moral conviction of his life, sure of its ultimate aim, and therefore possessing that hotly sought for knowledge which renders any faltering of will impossible (Paideia, 2:150; see also 1467). Or consider Kahns claim: There is no doubt that Socrates regards the doctrine of the paradoxes as established by the refutations of Polus and Callicles (Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 110, the emphasis is Kahns; see also 11113, 11819; in his quotation on page 111 of Socrates crucial statement at 508e6509a7, Kahn omits Socrates claim that he does not know whether his thesis is true). Similar to Kahns insistence that there is no doubt that Socrates thinks his thesis has been established is McKims insistence that Socrates of course believes in the position he defends, a position whose truth, according to McKim, is beyond argument (see Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 47, 48; see also 3946). Consider also Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 45, 21432; Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 3041, 1278. Somewhat closer to my own analysis is Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 97.

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Callicles to reconsider his criticism of Socrates own life in light of that position (see 508c45: These things being so, let us examine what it is for which you reproach me . . . ; see also the transition at 509b1 5). This makes sense, since, as Socrates insists, absent a refutation of the Socratic thesis, consistency demands a consideration of the conclusions that follow from it (see 508a8c3). The conclusions that Socrates urges Callicles to consider concern whether he was right to blame Socrates for his inability to defend himself and his friends and family (508c5d4). Now, before we turn to Socrates response to this reproach, we should take a moment to remember that this was not all there was to Callicles criticism of Socrates. To simplify somewhat for the sake of clarity, Callicles attacked the Socratic life not only for being defenseless or weak but also for being useless and even worthless due to its neglect of the affairs of the city.18 It is true that Callicles did not draw a clear distinction between these two criticisms, which may not have been entirely separate in his mind. Nevertheless, we should notice that, by focusing only on the question of his defenselessness, Socrates makes it easier to present his own life as one that conforms to the Socratic thesis.19 According to Socrates restatement of Callicles criticism, it is shameful indeed the most shameful of all things (see 508d4) to be incapable of defending oneself.20 Since Callicles criticism, especially when stated in this way, expresses a concern with shamefulness and nobility, Socrates is able to make that his theme and to raise the stakes, so to speak, by asking what kind of incapacity is truly the most shameful. It is to address this question that Socrates now relies on the view that he has been defending throughout the dialogue. He argues that the shamefulness of different incapacities must be measured by the
18. Compare Republic 487b1d5. 19. It is worth noticing the absence of any mention of the city in Socrates restatement of Callicles criticism at 508c58. Also, it is worth mentioning in advance that Socrates will drop the issue of family and friends as he goes on to focus exclusively on self-protection. 20. Compare Apology 28b35.

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magnitude of the harm they leave one unable to ward off (509b1c3). By this principle, whenever one is forced to accept one incapacity as the price of avoiding another, the nobler choice would be to avoid suffering the greatest harm. And the greatest harm, Socrates once again claims, is doing injustice rather than suffering it (509c67). Of course, one would wish to be able to avoid both doing injustice and suffering it. But this wish, according to Socrates, must remain a mere wish, since one can develop the capacity to avoid one of these evils only by leaving oneself vulnerable to the other.21 Socrates develops his argument by focusing initially on the capacity whose importance Callicles is far more willing to grant: the capacity to avoid suffering injustice. Callicles shows little interest in Socrates suggestion that it might be necessary to develop a certain capacity and art to avoid doing injustice, a capacity and art that would enable one to fulll what Socrates claims is everyones wish never to do injustice. Callicles is much more receptive to Socrates suggestion that the art that enables one to suffer no injustice or as little as possible consists either in ruling in the city perhaps even becoming a tyrant or in making oneself a comrade of the regime in power (compare 509d7 510a5 with 510a6b1). Socrates is able to use Callicles eager embrace of this suggestion, however, to lay out an argument that emphasizes the divide between the path one must follow to protect oneself from suffering injustice and the path that keeps one from doing injustice. Dropping the possibility that one might rule the city oneself, Socrates concentrates on what it takes to gain the favor of the regime in power. According to Socrates, the ancient and wise principle of attraction like to like governs, especially since tyrants fear their superiors and despise their inferiors. True friendship to any regime, including a tyranny, requires that one assimilate to the regime by giving oneself the same character as the regime, by praising and blaming the same things, and by submitting to those in power (510b2d9). Socrates
21. The word dunamin, which I translate as capacity, also carries the sense of power.

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presents this as a line of reection that might occupy the mind of a young man deliberating about how he might become powerful enough to avoid ever suffering an injustice (see 510d49). And Callicles, for his part, agrees with each step of the argument, giving far more positive responses than he has for some time. Callicles may even see in this argument an articulation of a line of thought that has played a role in his own life without his being fully conscious of it. But having held out to Callicles this vision of a path to security from suffering injustice, Socrates then pulls the rug out from under him by turning back to the question of doing injustice oneself. He argues that at least in cities in which the regime in power is unjust, assimilation means assimilation to injustice, and it also provides one with the power to get away with ones injustices (510e48). Now, it may be surprising or perhaps it should not be by this point that Callicles reaction to this turn in the argument is not simply to dismiss the problem Socrates raises. Even before Socrates goes on to claim that imitating a despot entails maiming ones soul and taking into it the greatest of evils, Callicles shows that he is bothered by the prospect of becoming unjust by imitating an unjust regime (see it appears at 510e9). Callicles would like to have it both ways. That is, he would like for the path to security from suffering injustice also to allow one to remain just. But Socrates argument splits apart these two ends that he would like to keep together. Callicles reaction initially makes it difcult to see the complexity of his concerns: I dont know how you turn the arguments up and down each time, Socrates. Or dont you know that this man who imitates [an unjust regime] will kill that one who doesnt imitate, if he wishes, and take away his possessions? (511a47). Despite rst appearances, however, Callicles is not simply on the side of the unjust assimilator against the just man who refuses to assimilate. The complexity of his concerns comes out in his response to Socrates reminder that the scenario he speaks of would involve a base man killing one who is noble and good (511b15). Callicles exclaims in return, Isnt that exactly the infuriating thing? (511b6).

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This important response, which we considered in an earlier context, shows that Callicles is far from indifferent to the fate of the virtuous. Of his many revealing responses to Socrates arguments, none reveals more clearly his continued attachment to justice.22 But Callicles response, as I suggested earlier, can also help us to understand what leads him down paths that promise to solve or to remove the problem that troubles him. We considered earlier the paths down which Callicles is led in his thought to assert, for instance, a right of the stronger that would remove any gap between virtue and success, and even to come to the defense of hedonism. But the present section can help us to see more clearly the solution to which Callicles clings in practice. That solution is to assimilate to a powerful regime which, even if its justice may be questionable, holds out the promise that it is possible to be virtuous without being left too vulnerable. In Callicles own life, this means allegiance to Athens and to the regime that rules there. And that can help to explain why, despite his willingness in his most radical moments to criticize the Athenian regime, his deepest admiration is reserved for the men whom he regards as the greatest servants of his city. By assimilating himself to Athens and submitting to its authority, while burying any doubts about the justice of the Athenian regime that may continue to trouble him, Callicles has found a solution that would seem to shield him from the anger and pain that he would have to confront if he embraced a purer notion of virtue that left the good more exposed to suffering at the hands of the wicked. As Callicles expression of indignation indicates, however, this solution does not fully solve the problem. Callicles anger is a sign that he remains troubled by lingering doubts and pains that he would rather Socrates not stir up. Since Callicles response Isnt that exactly the infuriating thing? betrays a continued concern for justice, Socrates is justied in urging

22. Even Shorey, who presents Callicles as the uncompromising immoralist, grants that we see Callicles here perhaps momentarily falling out of [that] role (What Plato Said, 149).

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Callicles to listen to that concern and not to bury or distort it as he has been led to do. In other words, Socrates has a certain right to take a step that is in another respect unfair to Callicles views: he acts as if Callicles eagerness to embrace the principle of assimilation is driven entirely by a concern for safety from danger and by a desire to live as long as possible. Socrates acts as if these concerns are also the true source of Callicles exhortation of him to practice the kind of rhetoric that provides one with safety in law courts (511b7c2). Yet Callicles never, in so many words, gave such advice. Socrates is characterizing a position that is motivated in large part by a concern to have the power to ght for what is right especially but not only in ones own case as if it were driven merely by a cowardly concern for safety.23 By characterizing Callicles position in this way, Socrates is able to compare the art of courtroom rhetoric, which he prompts Callicles to defend (see 511c3), with other saving arts and thereby to diminish its nobility. The arts with which Socrates compares rhetoric are swimming, ship-piloting, and engineering, all of which save people from dangers. The spirit of Socrates argument about these saving arts comes out most clearly in his discussion of ship-piloting, which receives the longest treatment of the three arts Socrates discusses. Although the ship-pilot saves people and their possessions from the greatest dangers, he is kept humble, according to Socrates, by his awareness that he cannot be sure which of the people sailing with him he benets when he keeps them from being drowned. The pilot knows, Socrates says, that he does not improve the souls of those on his ship, and he is aware that it is not better for a wretched human being to live, since he necessarily lives badly (511d1512b2). In the outlook of this imaginary ship-pilot, we can see a reection of Socrates demotion of the concern for mere life. And by pressing such an extreme view of the lowness of the concern for mere life after having reduced Callicles position to a concern for mere life Socrates is able to attack the lofty view that Callicles takes of courtroom rhetoric. The rhetorician
23. Compare Apology 28b39.

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is left without any grounds for his disdain for what he regards as the lowly arts of his inferiors. Any notion that there is a difference between rhetoric and the other saving arts or at any rate one that reects well on rhetoric is made to appear as unjustied snobbery on the part of the rhetorician and his advocates such as Callicles (see 512b3d6). But the main point of this argument is not to chastise Callicles for his snobbery. Rather, it is to exhort him to embrace a notion of virtue that does not give so much weight to protection:
Consider, you blessed man, whether the noble and the good are really nothing more than saving and being saved. For the true man, at least, must give up his concern to live for some specic length of time, and he must not cling to life. Instead, turning over what concerns such things to the god and trusting in the womens saying that no one can escape his fate, he must examine what lies beyond that: In what way may he who is going to live for a time live best? Will it be by assimilating himself to that regime in which he lives, and should you, then, now become as similar as possible to the Athenian de mos, if you are going to be dear to it and to have great power in the city? Consider whether this is protable for you and for me, so that, you demonic man, we shall not suffer what they say the Thessalian women who draw down the moon suffer: our choice of this power in the city will come at the cost of what is dearest to us. (512d6513a7)

After this statement, Socrates continues his exhortation of Callicles to abandon the path of assimilation by stressing the impossibility of gaining power through merely partial assimilation (513a7c2). Concluding by addressing Callicles with the odd but intimate appellation dear head, he presents his exhortation as a friendly attempt to urge Callicles to reevaluate the way he looks at both his own life and Socrates life. Socrates exhortation is not without an impact on Callicles. In a moment in which he displays none of his usual bitterness, Callicles replies with an honest and even poignant line: In some way, I dont know what, Socrates, you seem to me to speak well, but I suffer the experience of the many I am not altogether persuaded by

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you (513c46).24 That Callicles is moved by Socrates exhortation is understandable in light of the concern for justice and nobility that we have seen in him. That he is not altogether persuaded is explained by Socrates: The love of the de mos, Callicles, which is in your soul, opposes me (513c78). What Socrates means by this striking remark is hard to say. But the remark is probably best understood by considering how Callicles has chosen to live his life and the effects of that choice. In their discussion of assimilation, Socrates and Callicles are speaking less about a future decision confronting Callicles though Socrates at times presents it that way than about a road Callicles has already traveled. Although his life has been shaped by concerns more complicated than a simple desire for protection, Callicles has assimilated to the regime in power, which in Athens means the Athenian de mos. And despite his occasional expressions of contempt for the Athenian de mos, his greatest aspiration is still to follow in the footsteps of those Athenian statesmen who he thinks served the Athenian de mos well. Callicles has thus, without being fully aware of it, formed an attachment to the de mos that can even be characterized as a form of love. Yet, while this attachment cannot be understood without seeing its connection to Callicles attachment to justice and his struggle with the problem of the vulnerability of virtue, it has nevertheless become a further obstacle to his willingness to embrace any understanding of virtue that would challenge and threaten his love.25
24. Contrast the suggestion of Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 93, that Callicles praises Socrates speech, but his feelings are not behind it. This suggestion, in my view, misjudges the tone of Callicles response and the dramatic signicance of this moment in the dialogue. 25. Socrates statement about Callicles love of the de mos poses a problem for those commentators who portray Callicles as an aristocrat who simply despises the Athenian people. See, for instance, Barker, Greek Political Theory, 7172; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 120, 158 61; Dodds, Gorgias, 1314; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 1012. Of these commentators, only Dodds mentions Socrates statement; and he attempts to explain it away with the remark that Callicles love of the de mos

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As for Socrates himself whose life is also a subject of this section (see 509c4d4, 511b7c2, 513a37) he appears here as a noble and heroic gure who looks down with disdain on the concern for mere self-protection.26 But are we to conclude that we nally have in this section a straightforward expression of Socrates own convictions? Is the view to which he exhorts Callicles also the basis of his own life? Certainly, Socrates life cannot be regarded as a model of assimilation. And certainly, too, Socrates did not consider safety at all costs to be the guiding principle of a good life. As his own account of his life in the Apology attests, he ran considerable risks in the way he lived his life.27 Yet, as his account in the Apology also attests, Socrates was not as disparaging of the concern for self-protection as he sometimes suggests.28 And in the present section of the Gorgias, there are reasons to hesitate in taking what Socrates says as his last word. Perhaps most important, Socrates urges Callicles, in delivering the statement that is the heart of his exhortation, to put his faith in the god and in a piece of old wives folk wisdom (see again 512e24).29 Are we to think that these are the soundest sources of guidance in Socrates eyes? Or rather, should our earlier doubts about Socrates own acceptance of the Socratic thesis also lead us to doubt that he truly takes self-protection

26.

27. 28. 29.

is in fact love of power (352). For a more balanced account, see Newell, Ruling Passion, 1213, 3537. Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 96, is moved by this section to speak of Socrates fearlessly risking and nally giving up his life in the cause of justice and loyalty to moral principle. He argues: The dialectical invulnerability to contradiction which Socrates claims for his basic thesis that arete is what we really want, our true good and happiness is matched by the dramatic appeal of the portrait of Socrates as the embodiment of this very thesis (113). For similar expressions of admiration of Socrates as he portrays himself in this section, see Friedlander, Plato, 2:2701, and Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1478. See, e.g., Apology 23b724b2, 28d629a1, 37c4e2. Compare Apology 28b530c1 with 32e233a1; see also 31c432c3. Cf. Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 57.

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as lightly as he seems to here? Connected with this question, it is also worth wondering whether Socrates present condemnation of forensic rhetoric is really as thoroughgoing a condemnation as its tone makes it seem. If we do not allow ourselves to be swept away by its harsh tone, doesnt Socrates argument lead to the suggestion that forensic rhetoric should be regarded as low but necessary? To be sure, Socrates suggests that virtue is a higher consideration than the mere protection of life and thus that there is nothing exalted about those arts that protect life. But his argument allows that life should carry some weight, at least for those who are virtuous and have good lives to lose. This may help to explain why Socrates is willing to refer to the arts that protect life as genuine arts.

CALLICLES AND HIS HEROES, TRUE RHETORIC, AND SOCRATES TRUE POLITICAL ART (513d1522c3)

To the extent that the preceding section of the dialogue offered a portrait of Socrates life, which was at least one of its aims, that life came to sight as one opposed to assimilation and guided by a concern to live well rather than to live long. Whatever may be the advantages of such a presentation, it makes the philosophic life appear as a life at odds with the city. And for this reason it would meet with at least some resistance from those who place great weight on service to the city, as it did from Callicles. In this connection, it is worth recalling that Socrates has taken up only part of Callicles charge against philosophy: the reproach of vulnerability rather than that of uselessness. Socrates never explicitly addresses the latter part of the charge. But he may address it implicitly. The section of the dialogue to which we have now come will culminate in Socrates famous claim that he practices the true political art. We will have to consider, however, the precise meaning of that claim, and to see whether the true purpose of this section is to show that, when each is seen in the proper light, there is a harmony between philosophy and the city.

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The new section is actually a return to an earlier line of argument. Socrates returns to the division between pursuits that aim to gratify by providing pleasure and those that struggle toward the best (513d4 5). He does so in order to prepare his return to his critique of Callicles heroes, or to recover a line of argument that temporarily disappeared behind his account of virtue and his exhortation of Callicles to place virtue before protection. That Socrates is returning to an earlier line of argument is brought out most clearly by his reliance on earlier agreements (see, e.g., 513d18, 513e5514a3). But it also can be seen in his movement away from the question of how best to preserve the purity of ones own soul and back to the question of the proper task of politics. Socrates suggests, once again, that the task of politics should be the improvement of ones fellow citizens. It is in light of this task that Socrates will now pass judgment on Callicles heroes. Before he does so, however, Socrates directs an attack at Callicles himself. Socrates attack on Callicles takes the form of a test that Socrates proposes. In the arts, he points out, no one would undertake grand public tasks before practicing in private and displaying his mastery on that smaller scale. Any competent artisan, before undertaking public projects, should be able to point to many private accomplishments, be they buildings constructed or sick bodies made healthy (514a5e10). The same principle should apply to political expertise. That is, anyone intending to enter politics should be able, according to Socrates, to point to individual citizens whose souls he has improved. Socrates therefore applies the test to the politically ambitious Callicles: Shall we not examine each other? Come then: Has Callicles already made anyone of the citizens better? Is there anyone who was previously base unjust, intemperate, and imprudent but then, through Callicles, became noble and good, whether he be a foreigner or a townsman, slave or free? (515a47). Just as an architect could display the private houses he has designed, Callicles, if he is truly qualied to enter politics, should be able to point to souls that he has transformed in private life. But this is of course something that Callicles must admit he cannot do (515a7b5).

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Socrates argument here suggests that the public realm, or the city as city, is higher and more important than the private realm in which people are treated as individuals: the latter appears as a mere training ground for the former. Yet Socrates argument also should lead us to ask whether equivalent things can be accomplished in each realm. Might it not be the case, especially when it comes to improving peoples souls, that narrower but deeper results can be achieved in private? If the main purpose of Socrates present argument is to pour cold water on Callicles political ambitions, his argument also points to a certain question. This is a question that arose earlier in another form, when Socrates raised the issue of the size of public audiences and of what can truly be accomplished by public speech (see again 454c7455a7). By making another argument that leads us to reect on the same issue, Socrates may be urging his audience to keep that issue in mind during his present treatment of Callicles and his heroes. Also, we should bear in mind that it is not only the political ambitions of Callicles and the political activity of his heroes that are at issue, but also the political activity or lack thereof of Socrates himself. On this point, it is worth noticing that Socrates does not apply to himself the test that he applies to Callicles, although he leads us to think for a moment that he is about to do so (see 514a5b3, 515a14). By pointing to such a step and then backing away from it, Socrates makes us wonder how he would be judged. In his case, however, the troubling prospect is not so much that he himself might fail the test that Callicles fails. Rather, it is closer to the opposite: if Socrates could pass the test by pointing to souls that he has improved in private, the question would then arise of why he has not taken the further step of using his abilities in public life.30 This is a question that Socrates will eventually allow to come to the surface and address explicitly. Before that moment comes, however, he may supply some less conspicuous indications of considerations that should affect how we receive his explicit answer.

30. Compare Apology 31c47.

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However this may be, Socrates testing of Callicles is only a brief prelude to his longer and more important critique of Callicles heroes Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles. It makes sense that Socrates should turn to these heroes, since the failings of Callicles himself hardly settle the issue of the character of political excellence and who its true exemplars are. Socrates prepares his critique of Callicles heroes by reasserting that the true task of politics is to make the citizens better. Indeed, according to Socrates, making the citizens better should be the only concern of a political man (see 515b8c3). But what exactly does Socrates mean by making the citizens better? What sort of virtue should political men try to instill? Socrates trains his sights rst and foremost on Pericles, the greatest leader of imperial Athens and the leader Callicles most admires. The issue Socrates raises is whether the Athenians were better when Pericles ended his career than when he rst came to power. Callicles predictably comes to the defense of Pericles against Socrates, who seems to take the side of the traditionalists who claim that Pericles brought about a decline in Athenian virtue.31 After repeating the reproaches of Pericles that he has heard from others, Socrates then speaks in his own name about Pericles career. Early in his career, according to Socrates, Pericles enjoyed a great reputation among the Athenians. But near the end of his life after he had supposedly made the Athenians noble and good he was accused of theft and almost put to death
31. To Socrates claim that he has heard the charge that Pericles made the Athenians lazy, cowardly, overly talkative, and greedy, Callicles responds that Socrates must have been listening to those with cauliower ears (515e4 9, following Doddss suggested translation). This odd expression refers to those traditionalists in Athens who retained Spartan tastes for simplicity, and for manly activities such as boxing and wrestling (thus the crushed or cauliower ears) and who were critical of the Periclean movement toward luxury and the liberation of desire. For a colorful depiction of this political divide, see the dispute between the Just Speech and the Unjust Speech in Aristophanes Clouds. See also Protagoras 342b6c3; Kagan, The Great Dialogue, 75, 131; Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 67; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 95.

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(515e10516a4). Leaving out any mention of Pericles later restoration to ofce, and ignoring the circumstances, including a terrible plague, that contributed to his troubles,32 Socrates compares Pericles to a caretaker of animals whose ock or herd has become wilder and more unruly, even toward the caretaker himself (516a5d3). Socrates then extends this comparison to include Callicles other heroes: Cimon was ostracized by the Athenians; Themistocles was ostracized and exiled; and Miltiades was almost thrown into the pit by the Athenians (516d5 e2). And yet, these men, Socrates tells Callicles, if they were good men, as you claim, would never have suffered these things. It cannot be that good charioteers in the beginning do not fall from their chariots, but that when they have trained their horses and have themselves become better charioteers, they then fall out (516e36). Socrates argument here hardly seems fair or sufcient to justify the conclusion that Pericles, Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades were not good men. The very short account that Socrates gives of the careers of Callicles heroes omits much relevant and exculpatory information.33 Furthermore, the standard by which Socrates judges these careers to be failures would seem to be unreasonable. His argument does not

32. Cf. Thucydides 2.4765. 33. Socrates says very little about the achievements of Callicles heroes, without which Athens would never have risen to prominence and power, or perhaps even have survived. He also speaks of the troubles of these men without discussing the complex wartime circumstances that contributed to the sometimes unpopular measures they took. For instance, without mentioning the great victories that Miltiades and Cimon won for Athens against the Persians, Socrates focuses only on subsequent difculties they faced, and he exaggerates the Athenian hostility to them. He does not mention that Cimon was recalled from his exile by the Athenians before he had been gone the normal ten years, or that Miltiades was merely ned fty talents. Irwin, Gorgias, 235, calls Socrates account a perversion of the historical conditions as far as we know them; Dodds, Gorgias, 3559, also stresses that Socrates account is highly selective and designed to put the conduct of the Athenians in the worst possible light. See also the helpful discussion of Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 25.

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take account of the role fortune plays in political affairs. Nor does it acknowledge the limits of human nature, which restrict the improvement that any political leader can achieve in his efforts to reshape the human beings under his rule. Or does Socrates show some recognition of the limits of what can be achieved in politics by restricting the improvement of which he speaks to the instilling of a kind of justice that seems to consist in mere gentleness (consider 516b7c4)? Does Socrates use of the analogy of the taming of animals by caretakers and charioteers suggest that the civilizing effect of good political rule is not so different from a kind of taming? If Socrates restriction of the virtue achievable in politics to mere gentleness suggests that his argument is not simply unrealistic but blends idealism and realism in a complex mixture, the same can be said of the remarkable conclusion of his argument. In fact, the most important and surprising thing about the argument is how Socrates ends it:
So the earlier arguments [logoi] were true, as it seems that we know of no one in this city who has become a good man in political matters. You [Callicles] agree that there is no one among the current gures, and from among the earlier ones, you pick out these men. But they have been shown to be about equal to the current ones, so that, if these men were rhetoricians, they used neither true rhetoric for then they would not have fallen nor the attering kind. (516e9517a6)

Several things are important and surprising in this conclusion, especially what Socrates says in the last few lines. For one thing, Socrates indicates here that his deepest criticism of Callicles heroes is not that they were atterers. He even denies that they practiced the attering kind of rhetoric. Yet that is puzzling, since surely some of them Pericles, in particular practiced the kind of rhetoric that Socrates earlier described as attery.34 What, then, does Socrates have in mind by

34. Socrates will later refer to the characteristic activity of Callicles heroes as attery. See 521b1.

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denying that they were atterers? He would seem to be pointing here to a kind of attery different from that characteristic of the rhetoric that he criticized earlier in the dialogue, a kind for which he does not show the same disdain. Socrates apparent openness here to some form of attery should also help us to notice that he is no longer denigrating the concern for self-protection either. Without according self-protection some importance, Socrates argument would not make sense, since he is stressing the trouble that Callicles heroes brought upon themselves. And Socrates goes beyond even what his argument would require to suggest that self-protection is the end or at least one of the ends of true rhetoric, the practice of which, he says, would have kept Callicles heroes from falling. In fact, in a formulation so jarring that some editors wish to emend the text to do away with it, Socrates suggests that true rhetoric shares at least one end with the rhetoric that operates through attery: both true rhetoric and the attering kind should keep their practitioners from falling.35 If we put this suggestion together with Socrates indications about the proper aim of good statesmen, the fuller suggestion that emerges is that true rhetoric aims at taming the citizens or making them gentler, and that at least one reason for doing so is to provide safety for its practitioners. This suggestion represents an important acknowledgment of the importance of self-protection, and it also acknowledges the usefulness of a kind of rhetoric that can serve that end, perhaps even by drawing on a form of attery. We are thus led to ask: Is the true purpose of the present section which would otherwise seem a blatantly unfair criticism of four impressive political gures to advance Socrates effort to sketch out the case for a certain kind of rhetoric? That we are seeing here any restoration or rehabilitation of rhetoric would seem to be belied by Socrates repetition of the schema he used

35. This suggestion would be lost if one followed Meisers suggestion to ll a supposed lacuna before te kolakike at 517a6. For a discussion of this suggestion, see Dodds, Gorgias, 360. Dodds himself is tempted by Meisers suggestion, but he does not follow it.

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earlier to criticize rhetoric. Socrates repeats this schema in a long speech that he delivers in response to Callicles renewed protest on behalf of his heroes (see 517a7b1). Yet, although Socrates introduces his repetition of this schema as if he were annoyed by the tediousness of having to return to a point that should have been clear by now the whole time we have been talking, we havent stopped always being brought back around to the same thing (517c56) he in fact makes some signicant changes in the schema. The schema in question, of course, is the one that divides pursuits that pertain to the soul from those that pertain to the body, and then further subdivides each of these into good and bad pursuits. Socrates present version of this schema differs from his earlier one in the rst place by identifying the bad pursuits not so much by their deceptive use of attery as by their skill at serving desires (see 517c7d5). Since the desires that Socrates mentions, however, are for such things as food, drink, and clothing that is, for things that address important human needs it becomes unclear just how much he is really condemning such pursuits.36 To be sure, pursuits such as cooking, shoemaking, weaving, and their equivalents in serving the desires of the soul can be given too much emphasis; they can come to appear as the highest or sole forms of care for the body or the soul (517d6 518a1). But Socrates point is not that there is no good place for such pursuits. Rather, he argues that they are rightly subordinate to master arts that know what is good for the body or the soul (518a17). If this argument implies the lowness of the serving arts, it also implies or acknowledges their necessity.37 And thus we should not be surprised that Socrates now openly refers to them as arts something he refused to do when rst presenting his schema (compare 517e47 with 464e2 465a6). Such arts may be slavish, servile, and unfree, but they are still arts (see 518a13). They have a place in Socrates vision of the

36. Notable for its absence from Socrates list is his earlier example of cosmetics. 37. See Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 104. Kastely also stresses the broader movement in this passage towards a greater openness to rhetoric.

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proper hierarchy, in which the serving arts would act as assistants to the master art or set of arts that directs them (518a35). Applying this suggestion to rhetoric, as Socrates urges us to do (see 518a56), the criticism of rhetoric that emerges is a criticism only of its tendency to break out of this order and to claim to be autonomous or sovereign. Properly directed, rhetoric would seem to accomplish something valuable and even necessary. It is true that a form of rhetoric that would accept such guidance would be different from rhetoric as it is usually practiced.38 Perhaps, then, it is best to take Socrates suggestion as a kind of proposal of a better order, or as a proposal of an alliance of sorts between rhetoric and the master art that knows what is good for the soul. Socrates does not say much about the character of the master art that would be the superior partner in such an alliance. His primary aim at this point seems to be simply to indicate that rhetoric has an important, if subordinate, role to play. If Socrates is rehabilitating rhetoric, however, he is embedding that rehabilitation in a continuing critique of Callicles heroes, who are presented as servants who have taken as their master art, not the art that knows the good of the soul, but the most destructive desires of the citizens. Socrates presents especially the heroes of imperial Athens as men who feasted the city sumptuously on the things it desired, leaving it swollen and festering with hidden sores (518b2519a7).39 The sins of the fathers of Athenian imperialism, Socrates predicts, will be blamed on the sons, since the evils set in motion by men like Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles will become manifest in the generation that includes Alcibiades and Callicles himself (see especially 519a7 b2). After issuing a warning to Callicles that his generation is in particular danger, Socrates then makes a strange transition to register a

38. Cf. Black, Platos View of Rhetoric, 366. 39. Socrates emphasis here on Athenian imperialism is underscored by his exemption of Miltiades from his present criticism (see 519a56). Unlike Callicles other heroes, who each played a role in the rise of the Athenian empire, Miltiades belonged to an earlier, pre-imperial generation.

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complaint about all political men, past and present. On the heels of a suggestion that would seem to suggest that the blame likely to come to the current generation of Athenian leaders is misplaced, Socrates says that it is ridiculous of political leaders to complain, as they often do, that they are mistreated by the city they have served. Such men claim that they are unjustly treated by the very city for which they have done so much good. But the whole business is a lie, Socrates argues, for no leader of a city would ever be unjustly brought down by the very same city that he leads (519b8c2). The complaint of indignant political leaders, according to Socrates, resembles that of the sophists, who claim to be teachers of virtue only to turn around and complain when they are mistreated by their students. Neither political leaders nor sophists can accuse their students of mistreating them without thereby undercutting their claims to be teachers of virtue (519c2520b8). Socrates line of argument here includes a serious critique of Athenian imperialism, especially of those leaders such as Pericles who created or at least exacerbated a feverish sickness in Athens by inaming the passions of the Athenians. To this extent, Socrates argument may be regarded as a genuine, if very brief and blunt, criticism of the politics that fueled Athens rise to great power and set it up for a fall.40 Nevertheless, it is hard to swallow his claim that the complaints of all mistreated political leaders are the height of irrationality (see especially 519b34, d15). The standards to which

40. On Socrates critique of Athenian imperialism, see Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 24; Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 1657; Dodds, Gorgias, 3233; Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1467; Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 34. Socrates critique of Pericles in particular should be compared with the much fuller and subtler critique found in Thucydides. Consider, for instance, Thucydides assessment of Pericles (2.65) in light of his account of Pericles career. That Socrates harsh criticism of Pericles in the Gorgias is not his last word on the matter is conrmed by Meno 93a294b8.

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he is holding political leaders in general and Callicles heroes in particular have become even more extreme than they were earlier. To accept Socrates argument, one would have to believe not only that education to virtue is possible but also that it is foolproof, and that political leaders can provide the entire populace of a city with an education comparable to the education provided to private individuals by the sophists. What is the purpose of this attack on political leaders, the most fundamental premise of which namely, that it is possible to make others good Socrates himself admits is questionable (see 520d67)? 41 The very extremism of Socrates attack may be intended, in part, to make us question whether that attack is really sound and thus to consider whether political leadership can reasonably be expected to accomplish what Socrates demands of it here. That is, by pushing his argument to such an extreme, Socrates may mean to raise doubts in at least some minds about the position he seems to be defending. To focus on a specic issue just raised by Socrates analogy between political leaders and sophists: Can political activity, while broader in scope than sophistry, have as profound an effect on its students as private educational efforts? Or has Socrates gone out of his way to compare political leaders with sophists and to point to a difference even as he obscures it (see 520a3b3) as a way of encouraging reection on the limits to
41. For examples of passages in which Socrates offers a more sober assessment of what can be accomplished in politics, see Republic 487e7489a2, Apology 31d633a1. Too many commentators, in my view, fail to raise the question of the adequacy of Socrates argument about political leadership in their admiring accounts of this argument. See, e.g., Barker, Greek Political Theory, 13943; Taylor, Plato, 1257; Shorey, What Plato Said, 14652; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:14950; Friedlander, Plato, 2:2701; Voegelin, Plato, 38; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 131. Those who do question Socrates argument include Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 199; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 1023; Vickers, In Defense of Rhetoric, 8990. Vickers criticism is a case in which a critic of Socrates is more perceptive than his admirers.

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which any political activity, including even true rhetoric, would have to bow? We should be reminded here of our earlier question about whether the taming that political leaders might achieve, while surely something to be appreciated, is the same as instilling genuine virtue, and also of the questions raised by Socrates earlier acknowledgment of the problem posed by the sheer number of people to whom a political leader must speak. Might the thread that runs throughout Socrates seemingly ever more unreasonable condemnation of political leaders be an indirect and well-disguised reection on the limits of politics? If so, this reection should be brought together with the rehabilitation of rhetoric that also runs throughout this same section. For not only are the limits of politics important to understanding the need for rhetoric, but they also would have a necessary inuence on the character of even true or noble rhetoric. Could any rhetoric even the true rhetoric to which Socrates points dispense entirely with all forms of attery and with all service to desires, including the attery that consists in praising a kind of virtue that may not be true virtue and the service to desires that may not be entirely reasonable? These considerations, furthermore, may also help us to come to a deeper understanding of why Socrates himself stayed out of politics and why his recommendation of a new kind of rhetoric is not accompanied by a willingness to take it up himself. Since Socrates own avoidance of politics is one of the underlying issues of this section of the dialogue, it makes sense that he would want to provide at least some indications of the reasons for that choice.42 There are reasons, however, that Socrates would not want to make these considerations too clear or prominent. For one thing, there is a danger that his avoidance of politics, if explained by pointing to the limits of politics, might appear to some as a shameful abandonment

42. In his explicit account of his own life to which he is about to turn, Socrates will say, in a comment on pleasures that the Athenians regard as benefactions and benets, I envy neither those who provide them nor those to whom they are provided (522b6).

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of his duty to accomplish the limited good that can be accomplished in political life.43 Socrates has placed himself in a delicate position with his critique of Callicles heroes and of political leaders in general. On the surface, Socrates argument would seem to lead to the conclusion that one should go into politics but strive to practice the virtuous form of politics that aims at the improvement of the citizenry; and it might well seem to anyone moved by this conclusion that, even if one comes to doubt that perfection is possible, one should not abandon the attempt to do what one can. Socrates, then, can hardly afford at this point to call too much attention to the fact that his own life is a private life, not a political one. Indeed, more than simply keeping quiet about that fact, Socrates is about to return explicitly to the question of his own situation and to raise the claim that, unlike the men he has criticized, he himself practices the true political art. To prepare the way for that remarkable claim is the most obvious purpose of his critique of Callicles heroes. For that critique enables him to approach the question of his own situation and his own activity against the backdrop of what has been presented as the failure of the greatest Athenians to practice politics as it ought to be practiced. In keeping with this approach, when he puts to Callicles the question that leads the conversation back to the question of his own life, the crucial issue is no longer posed as a contest between the private philosophic life and the political life, but rather as one between two versions of the political life: Dene for me, then, to which kind of care of the city you

43. At 520e25, Socrates calls attention to the common or conventional belief ) (see nenomistai at e4) that, when it comes to the question or matter (praxeos of how one would be as good as possible and how ones family and city would best be governed, it is shameful to refuse to give counsel unless one is paid for it. That Socrates calls attention to this belief is more signicant than his explanation of it is persuasive (see 520e710). With this passage, compare Republic 346e7347d8. On the same issue, consider Callicles expression of contempt for private sophists at 520a12, a remark that should be viewed in light of its broader context and Callicles earlier criticism of philosophy. Also worth considering are Republic 420b3421c6, 487b1d5, and 519b7520d4.

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are exhorting me: Is it that of struggling with the Athenians so that they will be the best they can be, as a doctor would, or should I act as a servant and direct my association with them toward gratication? (521a25). Socrates critique of Callicles heroes, I have suggested, displays a delicate attempt simultaneously to reveal and to conceal. The same is true of Socrates description of his own activity. After putting to Callicles the stark choice of recommending either that he struggle to improve the Athenians or that he serve their desires, Socrates is then able to insult Callicles predictable recommendation of service: You are urging me to practice attery, noblest man (521b1). Callicles further objection, which Socrates completes by putting words in Callicles mouth (see 521b24), then enables Socrates to direct attention back to the issue of safety and danger:
Dont say [Callicles] what you have said many times, that [if I dont do what you encourage me to] anyone who wishes will kill me, lest I, in turn, say that it will be a base man killing a good one. And dont say that he will seize anything I have, lest I, in turn, say that whatever things he seizes he will not know how to use, but rather, just as he seized them from me unjustly, so too, once he has them, he will use them unjustly, and if unjustly, shamefully, and if shamefully, badly. . . . This I know well: if I am called before a law court in a case involving one of these dangers of which you speak, my accuser will be someone base for no decent man would accuse a human being who doesnt do injustice and it would be nothing strange if I should die. Do you want me to tell you why I expect these things? (521b4c2, c9d4)

Socrates seems, once again, to disparage the danger he is in. But he certainly does not deny it. Nor does he deny that this danger has something to do with his unwillingness to practice attering rhetoric. Furthermore, it would seem to follow from Socrates own earlier argument that he does not practice true rhetoric either; if he did, he would not be in danger (see 517a56). What he does practice, he says, is the true political art, which should not be confused with true rhetoric. Unlike

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such rhetoric, Socrates true political art is the source of the danger he is in rather than a path to safety. Socrates stresses that it is because of his practice of this art that he will nd himself helpless in a law court. In a famous statement that predicts his ultimate fate, he compares his hopeless situation in court to that of a doctor brought before a jury of children to be accused by a cook of harming and corrupting the children with his painful procedures, deprivations, and bitter medicines:
I suppose that together with a few Athenians so that I dont claim to be alone I take up the true political art, and I alone of those alive today do the political things. Since, then, it is not toward gratication that I direct the speeches I give on each occasion, but rather toward the best instead of the most pleasant, and since I am unwilling to do what you exhort me to do these rened things I will not have anything to say in the law court. The account that I gave to Polus applies to my own case for I will be judged as a doctor accused by a cook would be judged among children. Consider what such a person, caught in such circumstances, would say in his defense, if someone accused him by saying, Children, this man has done you yourselves many evils; and he corrupts the youngest of you by cutting and burning; and, by reducing and choking you, he causes you to be at a loss, giving you the bitterest potions and compelling hunger and thirst unlike me, who feasts you with many pleasant dishes of all sorts. What do you suppose a doctor caught in this bind would have to say? Or if he told the truth that I did all these things, children, for the sake of health how great do you think the disturbance would be from the judges? Wouldnt it be huge? (521d6522a7)

By comparing himself to a doctor, Socrates suggests that there is something medical about his activity. But what exactly he has in mind by that analogy in this context is hard to discern, since his statement about his own activity is so brief. What does he mean by calling his activity the true political art and by comparing himself to a doctor? On the surface, by calling his activity the true political art, Socrates characterizes his activity or at least the part of it that he is concerned

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with here44 as a form of service to the city that seeks to improve the city by improving its citizens. But according to his further account of what he actually does, as opposed to the impressive lead-up he gives (compare 522b49 with 521d6e1), Socrates accomplishments are fairly limited. By his own description, or at any rate according to a charge that he does not deny (see 522b79 and 521e6522a3), Socrates does not seem to lead his fellow citizens all the way to virtue. Rather, he does two perhaps interconnected things: he produces perplexity (aporia) in the young, and he abuses those who are older by making bitter speeches in public and in private (522b79). The speeches that Socrates directs against those who are older would seem to be his bitter potions, which may serve not so much to remedy the illnesses of the adults themselves as to contribute to his effort to produce perplexity in the young by shaking their admiration of the most prominent models and authorities.45 Considered in light of these indications, however, Socrates activity, while in some sense directed to the improvement of the young, cannot be regarded as an effort to inculcate virtue in any ordinary sense of the term.46 Could the deeper meaning,

44. The reason I add this qualication is that, not only because of its brevity but also because of its character and purpose, Socrates account of his activity here may not speak to all of its aspects. Socrates may be referring only to that aspect that can with some plausibility be called political. Despite his efforts in some places (especially in the Apology) to give the impression that this aspect is the whole of his activity, Socrates also indicates that that impression is misleading: consider Apology 38a16 and Phaedo 96a6 100a8. 45. Consider Apology 21b923a2 together with 23c2d1 and 33b9c4. Also worth considering in this connection are Republic 331c1332c3, 515c4516d7, 537e1539c3. In speaking in the present passage of the Gorgias of the younger and the older, Socrates may have in mind not only age but also attitude and openness. 46. Some commentators go too far, in my view, in ascribing such an aim to Socrates true political art. See, e.g., Jaegers discussion of Socratic paideia as a complete system that provides the moral education that fullls the states true mission as a moral teacher (Paideia 2:14959). See also Friedlander, Plato, 2:2702; Barker, Greek Political Theory, 1414;

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then, of his claim that he alone practices the true political art be that he provides the true education that the leaders of the city only claim to provide? And might not that education consist, in large measure, in a kind of deeducation, or in a stripping away of the convictions that the young have already received from their primary education at the hands of the city?47 This suggestion would help to explain what Socrates means by indicating here that his activity is medical. It would also help to explain why, as Socrates gently indicates, the city is not likely to see him merely as a pain-inducing surgeon working towards health, but will grasp and sympathize with the charge that he is a corrupter (see the use of diaphtheirein at 522b7 and the otherwise strange use of diaphtheirei at 521e8). Bringing the young into a state of perplexity may well appear to the city to be an act of corruption; and Socrates, I suggest, is trying in this very brief account of his predicament to provide some indication of the source of the citys anger against him, without making matters worse by saying too much.48 To spell out a bit more fully the character and necessity of Socrates delicate account of his situation, Socrates is far from denying that he is in danger and that he would have a hard time defending his life before the city. In fact, if anything, he exaggerates the danger he is in and his own helplessness (see 522a9b1). This exaggeration contributes to his self-presentation as a man who is above considerations of safety. But it also serves a further purpose for those in his audience who would be likely to doubt the sincerity of that aspect of his self-presentation. For such listeners, Socrates account of the danger he faces carries a different message. Socrates, I suggest, is trying to indicate at least the
Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 13741. Consider the more complex account of Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 1516, 2728, 3641. 47. Consider Republic 515c4516d7, 537e1539a1. 48. A sign of Socrates reserve in this passage is that, while he predicts his later indictment for corrupting the young, he makes no mention of impiety as part of the charge that could be and of course later was brought against him. Compare Apology 18a7c3, 23c2d7, 24b8c1.

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outlines of a predicament he is in and thus to call attention to his need for assistance. In other words, he is trying to show that his situation in the city is in fact a problem a problem of which his true political art is the cause, not the solution. That Socrates also wants to give an account of his situation that does not exacerbate the problem and therefore that his different purposes here are not in perfect harmony dictates that he reveal something of the predicament he is in while providing only a slight and partial indication of its source. Yet Socrates cannot simply avoid the matter altogether, if one of his aims is to call the problem to the attention of someone who could possibly provide him with help. If Socrates account is intended largely for the sake of such a person, his restraint can even be seen as a lesson to him in prudence and reserve. The person who most ts the description of such a listener is Gorgias, who, by my suggestion, is the target of Socrates account of his predicament at least as much as Callicles. It is worth wondering what impression this account makes on Gorgias, who is also the listener most likely to have noticed Socrates preceding rehabilitation of rhetoric, as well as his quiet indications that he is not as unconcerned with self-protection as he explicitly suggests. If Gorgias has been wondering why Socrates is interested in a new form of rhetoric, he nally receives an answare. The answer is a simple one, although Socrates has done much to obscure it: Socrates is interested in a new form of rhetoric, above all, because he is interested in somehow mitigating the danger he is in or in nding a way out of the predicament in which he nds himself. Gorgias can thus understand and so can we why Socrates rehabilitation of rhetoric has been followed by a description of his own situation, or what the connection is between these themes. Indeed, Socrates description of his own situation, and especially his presentation of it as an unsolved problem, is in a way the tting conclusion of the dialogue as a whole. Although an important section still remains, the crucial answer to the guiding question of the dialogue is conveyed here. From the beginning, we have been asking why Socrates is so interested in rhetoric, and why he made

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an effort to seek out Gorgias and grab his attention. But only in this passage near the end does Socrates speak directly enough, if still very briey, about his own life to provide us with the answer. The answer is conveyed by Socrates indication of the predicament caused by his true political art, an art that required that he direct his own efforts above all to producing perplexity in the young. Socrates may have regarded the practice of this art, and in particular its emphasis on bitter speeches designed to produce perplexity in the young, as incompatible with devoting his own energies to the more attering art of rhetoric. The predicament caused by this art, however, explains Socrates need for an ally with great rhetorical powers and a sympathetic view of his activity and situation. Yet, even at this point, several questions remain: How exactly could Gorgias help Socrates? How seriously are we to take the possibility of a Gorgias-Socrates alliance? And more generally, does Socrates really present in the Gorgias an adequate solution to the problem he reveals? Let us return to these questions, however, after rst considering the nal section of the dialogue.

THE LOGOS ABOUT THE AFTERLIFE (522c4527e7)

Without an understanding of what led Socrates to practice his true political art, it could well seem as if his way of life entails running a senseless risk that leaves him exposed to attack within the city. Socrates has not really met that objection of Callicles. Nor could he meet it adequately without an account of the end or the good that could make running such a risk worthwhile.49 Yet that account is not really present in the Gorgias. And there is reason to doubt that someone like Callicles would nd the genuine account persuasive in any case.50 It is thus tting, in a sense, that Callicles responds to Socrates account of his situation by repeating his basic objection: Do you regard as noble, Socrates, a human being who nds himself in such a situation
49. Compare Apology 20c423d2. 50. Consider Apology 37e338a8.

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in the city, and who is unable to come to his own aid? (522c46). Socrates may have emphasized the danger he faces in order to call it to the attention of Gorgias, but, by doing so, he elicits this predictable objection from Callicles. Socrates, however, would not want this objection to be the last word, in part because there may be others in the audience who are troubled by the same concerns as Callicles, even if they are more sympathetic to Socrates. Socrates basic response to Callicles objection is to return, one last time, to the Socratic thesis and to argue that the most important way in which one can come to ones own aid is to keep oneself free of injustice (522c7e3). But he now adds to this position a further reection on justice and death that moves in a direction in which he took only small steps earlier (compare 492e7493d3, 507d6508a8, 512d6 513a7). Far more prominently than he has up to this nal moment of the dialogue, Socrates now seems to rest his condence in choosing to lead a dangerous life on thoughts about the gods and the afterlife. He tells Callicles that the most extreme of all evils is to arrive in Hades with ones soul full of injustices, and he offers to give an account to support this claim (522e36). The most striking thing about the account Socrates gives is simply that he calls it an account, a logos, rather than a myth (see 522e5 6, 523a12).51 What he means by this, however, is unclear. The most straightforward explanation, of course, would be that Socrates thinks the account is true, and that calling it a logos is his way of expressing his own conviction of its truth. That is certainly the explanation that Socrates offers to Callicles (see 523a13, 524a8b1, 526d35).52 But

51. For a helpful general discussion of the distinction between muthos and logos as Plato uses the terms, see Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 712. Brisson discusses the logos of the Gorgias on pages 1089. 52. It is also the explanation accepted by some commentators. See, for instance, Shorey, What Plato Said, 1524; Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 2056; Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, 17086; Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2359; Olympiodorus, Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lecture 47. Consider also the symbolic readings of Voegelin, Plato, 3945, and

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there are difculties with this explanation. The most obvious is that the logos Socrates gives depends for its crucial premises on tales about the gods that Socrates says he has heard from Homer and others, including some of the very same tales he vehemently criticizes in other settings (see 523a35, 524a8b2).53 Beyond this difculty, the logos, as we will see, presents a view or a doctrine that is not entirely in harmony with the position that Socrates has defended throughout the dialogue. And nally, after delivering the logos, Socrates will all but retract his claim that he thinks it is true (consider 527a58). In the same context, however, Socrates will also make a remark that may give us a clue to what he means by calling the account he gives a logos rather than a myth. Exhorting Callicles to look toward the ultimate happiness that awaits the just in the afterlife, Socrates tells him that the account should be accepted as your logos indicates (527c56).54 Perhaps what Socrates means by calling the account he gives a logos rather than a myth is that such an account follows in a sense from a certain kind of view, namely, from the view of someone who believes in virtue but is not convinced that the virtuous always receive the happiness they deserve in this world. Such a view, as Socrates remark suggests and as earlier passages in the dialogue have shown, belongs more to Callicles than to Socrates. However this may be, the logos, as Socrates presents it, has two main parts: Socrates rst presents a set of tales that he claims to have heard, and then he draws a series of conclusions from these tales (see

Dodds, Gorgias, 3767. According to Dodds, the Gorgias myth is called a logos because it expresses in imaginative terms a truth of religion (377). Voegelin makes a similar suggestion in his attempt to interpret the logos by translat[ing] the symbols into the experiences of the soul which they articulate (41). 53. Compare Euthyphro 5e56c4, Republic 377e6378e3; consider also Apology 29b26, 40c49. 54. I am following the most reliable manuscripts, which have ho sos logos (your logos) at 527c6. Dodds follows manuscript F, which omits sos and reads simply ho logos (the argument). See Dodds, Gorgias, 3856. Compare 477e2.

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the transition at 524a8b2).55 The tales begin with Homers account of the passing of rule among the gods from Cronos to his sons, a transition that led to the ascendance of Zeus.56 The movement from the age of Cronos to the age of Zeus eventually brought a partial change in the system by which the gods decide the fate of human beings.57 Even in the age of Cronos, there was a law, which always existed and still now exists, that human beings who have lived justly and piously are sent after their deaths to live in perfect happiness on the Isles of the Blessed, while the unjust and impious go to receive their punishment in the prison called Tartarus. Although Zeus preserved this law, he changed the way in which the judgments of human beings are made. In the time of Cronos reign and in the rst days after Zeus rise, men were judged while they were still alive on the day they were to die, and the judgments were made by judges who were themselves living. After learning that this system was producing bad decisions, Zeus concluded that the sources of the problem were that both those being judged and those judging were clothed that is, their souls were covered by bodies, ancestry, and wealth and that the defendants could bring many biased witnesses to speak in their defense. Zeus therefore instituted

55. On the importance of this division, see Alexandra Fussi, The Myth of the Last Judgment in the Gorgias, 52930; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 98. 56. See Iliad 15.18793; cf. Hesiod, Theogony 453506, 617819. Although Socrates begins from a Homeric tale, he adds to this tale or extends it in directions not found in Homer. He claims that he has heard the further tales he reports, without indicating from whom he has heard them. This has led to much speculation on Socrates (or Platos) sources in this part of the logos. For a helpful summary and analysis of the different views, see Dodds, Gorgias, 3736; see also Fussi, The Myth of the Last Judgment in the Gorgias, 540. Also worth considering is Olympiodorus contention that the logos should be read as a philosophical myth, as distinguished from a poetic one (see Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lectures 47 and 48). 57. The whole account of this change and of Zeus new system runs from 523a3 to 524a7.

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two reforms. First, he told Prometheus to deprive men of their foreknowledge of death.58 And second, he decreed that the judgments must be made naked that is, they must be made of the dead and by the dead, so that a soul stripped of the body could be judged by another soul stripped of the body. To effect this second change, Zeus set up three of his sons as judges in the meadow where the road forks, with one path leading to the Isles of the Blessed and the other to Tartarus. At this fork in the road, Rhadamanthus, Aeacus, and Minos make their decisions about the journey for human beings. The primary result of Zeus reforms seems to have been a general advance in justice. But the reforms also, and perhaps more importantly, indicate a movement toward a certain understanding of justice according to which what matters most is not ones record of particular deeds or other external factors such as ones position in the city or the standing of ones family but the internal quality of ones soul. In this respect, the account Socrates gives pulls the traditional view of divine justice in a Socratic direction. But Socrates is also conceding some ground, so to speak, to the view he is pulling toward his own. His account can be seen as a compromise between two somewhat opposed outlooks. The character of this compromise and of what Socrates concedes can be seen more clearly in the second part of the account, where he draws his conclusions from the tales he was supposedly merely reporting in the rst part (see again 524a8b2).

58. The most likely meaning of Zeus order to Prometheus is that he was to prevent people from knowing when they will die, and the most likely purpose of this order would be to obstruct deathbed conversions. See Dodds, Gorgias, 378. Another possible meaning, however, is that Zeus intended for Prometheus to stop all foreknowledge of death, including even human beings awareness of their mortality. This interpretation has the problem, however, that it would seem to require the further suggestion that Prometheus did not carry out the order. Or is there some sense in which human beings are not aware of death? Compare Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 24853.

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The second part begins with the claim that death is merely the separation of the body and the soul, after which each retains its character at least for some time (524b2d4). According to Socrates, far from dying when it is stripped naked of the body, the soul then displays itself more clearly, since its natural traits and the effects of the experiences it has endured from its different pursuits can be seen more clearly when the screen of the body is removed (524d37). This would seem to be in keeping with Socrates earlier description of Zeus system, which requires such nakedness for the judges to do their judging well. But Socrates explanation in this part of the account also raises questions about that system: Is it entirely just for souls to be judged and sometimes punished for qualities that they have received at least in part from nature (see 524d56; consider also 524b67 and c1)? And shouldnt the circumstances in which one lived ones life have at least some bearing on the judgment of ones ultimate fate (consider 524d7 525a8, 525d2526b3)? More broadly, can the eternal punishments of which Socrates speaks (see, e.g., 525c6, e1) ever be truly warranted as retribution for the brief lives lived by embodied souls?59 We should also recall Socrates suggestions earlier in the dialogue that pity is due to the unjust, since they are already suffering from the greatest evil, and that punishment is a benet to the unjust which one should wish upon ones unjust friends but not upon ones unjust enemies (see again 468e6469b11 and 479d7481b1). Can those earlier suggestions, which were presented as conclusions following from a rigorous adherence to the Socratic thesis, be squared with Socrates present account? If Socrates raises questions like these, however, he does so quietly. The main impression conveyed by his account is that the unjust will receive what Socrates speaks of as the tting sufferings a phrase that reects Socrates allowance of the retributive spirit into the account (525a67; see also 526b8c1 and consider the formulation at 523b24).
59. For a line of reection that raises similar questions, see Fussi, The Myth of the Last Judgment in the Gorgias, 5435.

The Logos about the Afterlife

173

While some of the details may call the reasonableness of that spirit into question, the more obvious thrust of the account is to make room for it.60 Yet Socrates does make some efforts to hide or disguise the fact that he is allowing a place for retribution. He claims that it is tting for all who are punished either to become better and thereby to be beneted or else to serve as useful paradigms for others (525b1 4). In other words, he suggests that the only legitimate purposes of punishment are rehabilitation and deterrence. But Socrates description of the punishments in Hades strays from this suggestion. In his description of the souls in Hades, Socrates speaks of two groups who receive punishment. Those who benet from the punishments they receive are the curables, who can be released from injustice by enduring pain and grief (525b4c1). But those souls that arrive in Hades having done the most extreme injustices are incurable. These latter souls cannot themselves be beneted by punishment because they are beyond rehabilitation. Their eternal punishment, Socrates says, serves as a warning to other souls as they arrive in Hades and witness the spectacle of eternal suffering (525c18). There is a problem, however, with this suggestion about the deterrent effect of the punishment of the incurables. Havent the souls for whom they are supposedly to provide deterrent examples already lived their mortal lives, such that they will witness the punishment of the incurables only after they have already made their crucial choices? The punishment of the incurables is hard to explain as an effective deterrent. Their punishment, which would seem on Socratic grounds to be pointless, makes more sense as a concession to non-Socratic grounds, or, more specically, to the view that calls for eternal punishment as tting even in cases in which it benets no one. Perhaps indicating his attitude toward the concession he is making, Socrates speaks
60. Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2339, stresses this feature of what she calls the retributive eschatology of the Gorgias.

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of the souls of the incurables hung up crudely (atechno s) in Hades (525c67).61 But if Socrates makes this concession to a non-Socratic outlook, he pulls back in the other direction by suggesting that it is easier for a man who lives a private, philosophic life to save himself from the sufferings in Hades. According to Socrates account, it is extremely rare for a political man to make it to the Isles of the Blessed. Aristides better known as Aristides the Just is one of the few political men to escape vice and therefore punishment (526a5b4). But he is the exception that proves the rule. Hades, according to Socrates, is full of the souls of tyrants, kings, and other powerful men who abused their power to commit the greatest injustices (525d1 526a5). While the powerful suffer in Hades, another fate awaits the philosophic:
Sometimes, when [Rhadamanthus] sees a soul that has lived piously and with truth the soul of a private man or of someone else, but above all, as I at least claim, Callicles, the soul of a philosopher who has minded his own business and not been a busybody in his life he admires it and sends it off to the Isles of the Blessed. And Aeacus, too, does these same things each of them holding a staff. But Minos sits supervising, he alone holding

61. One possible way of explaining the punishment of incurables as a deterrent is to suppose a doctrine of reincarnation, at least for the curables. Yet, while Dodds, Gorgias, 375, 381, nds such a doctrine implicit in Socrates account, Socrates certainly does not mention it, and his account seems to move in the other direction (consider 523a9b4, 524a17, 524b24, 525c48, 525d7e2, 526e14; contrast with Republic 614b2621b7). Another conceivable way out of the problem one more in keeping with Socrates explicit account would be to suppose that the curable souls, while not to be reincarnated, still have important lives to live and choices to make in Hades. This might help to explain what Socrates means by calling them curable. Yet, even in the case of the curables, it is striking that Socrates goes out of his way to stress the pain and grief they have to endure before they are cured (see 525b6c1). That suggests that, even in their case, Socrates is making a place for the retributive desire to ensure that the unjust suffer. See Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2379.

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the golden scepter, as Homers Odysseus says he saw him: holding the golden specter, passing his judgments on the dead. (526c1d2)

In accord with the general character of the logos, Socrates here weaves a Homeric passage together with a view of the afterlife that casts a favorable light on the philosophic life. In this presentation, the philosophic life also comes to sight as directed toward death. It is the life that is guided, more than any other, by the need to prepare for the ultimate judgment that will be passed by gods rather than by men (526d3527a3). Socrates presents philosophy, in other words, as a way of life whose goodness lies above all in another, far greater world. And in keeping with this presentation, he exhorts not only Callicles but all other human beings as well to follow the path that leads towards this life and this contest (526e13). Once he has completed his account of the afterlife, Socrates predicts that Callicles will probably regard the account he has just heard as a myth and despise it as he would an old wives tale (527a56). Socrates then says, more surprisingly, that it would be nothing amazing to despise these things, if we were able, by searching somewhere, to nd better and truer things (527a68). In addition, Socrates, in a striking and important remark, offers as evidence in support of the account he has just delivered the fact that his interlocutors have not been able to show that one ought to live a life other than the one that appears to be benecial in Hades (see 527a8b2). So long as the Socratic thesis remains unrefuted, he suggests, one ought to acknowledge it and live by its principles (see 527b2c4). Socrates even gives Callicles a nal command: Having been persuaded, then, follow me to the place where, having arrived, you will be happy both when you are alive and when you have come to your end, as your logos indicates (527c5 6). Socrates exhorts Callicles to live by the implications of the logos, which would seem to mean here to live by the implications of his unacknowledged but nonetheless deep attachment to the view expressed by the Socratic thesis. Yet Socrates also points toward an alternative that remains open to some, if not to Callicles. This alternative is to

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follow the logos in another sense, namely, by examining the matter further. Socrates points to this alternative by reminding his audience of the lack of certainty that has beset the entire conversation and that remains even at the end. He suggests that the question of the best way of life has hardly been resolved, and that the conversation has led only to deeper confusion and perplexity: To such lack of education have we come! (527d5e1). By ending in this way, Socrates encourages at least some in his audience to take his nal exhortation to follow the logos as an exhortation to continue thinking through the questions that remain unanswered even at the end of the conversation.

Conclusion: A Final Reection on Noble Rhetoric

specially if it is right to have doubts that Socrates himself is genuinely convinced of the truth of the account of the afterlife

that he presents to Callicles, his presentation of that account may be regarded as an example of noble rhetoric. Certainly, one of the virtues of the account is that it portrays the philosophic life in a light that, were the account to be believed, would lessen peoples anger toward that life and win it respect. But how believable is Socrates account? Socrates himself says that he is not very optimistic that Callicles will believe it. And he may not have had high hopes that Callicles would believe even his claim that he believes it himself (consider again 523a1 3, 527a59). If Callicles silence at the end of the dialogue reects this likely skepticism, he would not be unlike many readers of the Gorgias, who do not hesitate to refer to Socrates account as a myth, despite his insistence that it should be regarded as a logos.1 Socrates account,

I would suggest, is not meant to be at least not in any simple or direct way the primary model of the kind of noble rhetoric to which Socrates is pointing in the Gorgias. But if the account at the end of the dialogue is not the primary model of noble rhetoric, and yet Socrates is nonetheless calling for a new kind of rhetoric, what would be the character of such rhetoric?
1. See, e.g., Friedlander, Plato, 2:272; Taylor, Plato, 128; Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 108, 143; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 99; Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 202; Nightingale, Platos Gorgias and Euripides Antiope, 1323.
177

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Conclusion

This question is difcult to answer since, according to an earlier suggestion of Socrates, noble rhetoric has never been seen (see again 503a5b1, 516e9518a7). Socrates earlier remarks are best understood as a call for the creation of something new, not as a defense of something already in existence. And I have suggested that he is asking for Gorgias help in the creation of this new kind of rhetoric. But hasnt Socrates provided Gorgias with at least an outline, if only to guide him in the work that he would want him to do? While the account of the afterlife at the end of the dialogue may not be intended as a straightforward model of the kind of noble rhetoric Socrates envisions, we can nd more revealing indications of what he has in mind in other passages, even if they remain somewhat incomplete. Most important and more instructive than the account of the afterlife is Socrates presentation of a doctrine of virtue that unites the virtues of wisdom, moderation, and justice, and that proclaims that these virtues are in harmony with a cosmic order bound together by the power of geometrical equality (see again 506c5508c3).2 Socrates defense of such a doctrine should be considered together with his description of his own activity as the true political art, as well as with his efforts to rebuke Polus and Callicles for their attraction to injustice and to exhort them to greater devotion to virtue. These efforts, even if not entirely successful in swaying Polus and Callicles, at least succeed in giving an important impression of Socrates own views. The combined impact of Socrates speeches and arguments is to present his views, or more broadly the views and character of philosophy, as critical of ordinary politics and of the city as it usually operates and yet ultimately supportive of the highest aspirations and deepest yearnings of ordinary citizens. In this sense, Socrates speeches and arguments

2. That Socrates doctrine of virtue and his account of order make a deeper impact than the account of the afterlife can be seen by considering Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1467; Shorey, What Plato Said, 148; Voegelin, Plato, 367; Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 312; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 1407, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 11621.

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179

combine a form of accusation and exhortation with something that could even be called attery. More generally, while acknowledging and even in a way stressing that there is some tension between philosophy and the city, Socrates presents his views in such a way that philosophy comes to sight as something like the moral conscience of the city, and as a pursuit that seeks wisdom about an orderly cosmos that is in harmony with human virtue. Such a presentation of philosophy in general, and of Socrates life in particular, I suggest, is the heart of the noble rhetoric that Socrates is urging Gorgias to practice in the Gorgias.3 To be sure, the successful practice of such rhetoric would have implications at once limited and profound. A city inuenced by it would not thereby become philosophic, nor would it even come fully to understand the true character of Socratic philosophy. But the philosophic life would become an object of admiration and respect rather than contempt and hostility. Unlike the more ambitious modern philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, who aimed at a more complete enlightenment of political life and a much more radical transformation of the relationship between philosophy and politics, Socrates may have thought that the more limited achievements possible through noble rhetoric were all that could reasonably be expected, at least without paying a heavy price in damage both to political life and to philosophy. To pursue the question of the reservations Socrates might have had if he were confronted with the modern solution to the problem of the tension between philosophy and the city would require that we go well beyond the Gorgias. It would require a thorough study of dialogues such as the Republic, the Laws, and the Symposium, as well as a comparison of these works with the great foundational works of modern thought. But we can get at least a sense of the objections Socrates might have raised by thinking about the concerns that he has brought to light in Callicles. Could an erotic man such as Callicles ever be satised with the way of life that has come to dominate
3. Compare Apology 29c631c3, Republic 499d10501a1.

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Conclusion

modern political communities? Would the doctrines of modern philosophy enable him to understand his deepest concerns, and could he ever fully embrace the outlook these doctrines encourage? Or would the troubles, confusions, and dissatisfactions we have seen in Callicles only be deeper and more prevalent in a world shaped by an attempt to rationalize politics? Socrates may have argued against the moderns that, rather than seeking a thorough transformation of political life, it would be wiser to limit the aims of philosophy, or of rhetoric in the service of philosophy, to calming the sort of anger toward philosophy that Callicles expresses and to winning for philosophy a place of respect in the eyes of the city. But could even as much as I have just suggested be expected? How realistic was Socrates hope to nd in Gorgias an ally who could successfully carry out the rhetorical project to which he points in the Gorgias? There are reasons to conclude that Socrates attempt to recruit Gorgias was not fully serious, or at least that Gorgias was at best a long shot for Socrates. For one thing, it is hard to see why the wealthy, cosmopolitan, and self-satised Gorgias would want to take up a task largely intended to protect a pursuit that was not his own and to which Socrates gives him only an introduction in the Gorgias. And these doubts about Gorgias eagerness to ally himself with Socrates are conrmed in Platos Meno, where Socrates, speaking some years later, indicates that his relationship with Gorgias never developed beyond their initial encounter. In the Meno, Socrates claims not even to remember clearly what he thought of Gorgias.4 Do we have to accept, then, the disappointing conclusion that the Gorgias presents a problem without offering an adequate solution? That is, by offering a solution that never had a good chance of success and that Plato allows us to see did not succeed, does the dialogue leave us simply with a deeper appreciation of an unsolved problem? The answer to this question, at least in one way, is yes. And yet, in another way, the problem did ultimately get solved, not by Gorgias but by an even greater master of
4. See Meno 71c5d2; consider also Apology 18c48.

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rhetoric with much closer ties to Socrates and a much deeper appreciation of his life and activity. For didnt Plato himself accomplish what Socrates had in mind? It is true that Plato did not protect Socrates while he was alive, and thus he did not accomplish the most basic task that Gorgias might have been able to accomplish. But Plato certainly succeeded indeed he succeeded tremendously in winning a place of place of high esteem for Socrates and for Socratic philosophy in the hearts and minds of future generations. It is primarily through the writings of Plato, through his presentation of a Socrates who has become beautiful and young,5 that Socrates has come down to us as one of the heroes of Western civilization, and as a man whose life has long inspired respect and reverence. One of the signs of Platos success is the difculty many readers of his dialogues have in even grasping why Socrates was ever the target of contempt and hostility. The Gorgias, then, can provide a window on the aims of Platos literary-rhetorical project as a whole. In a word, Gorgias gives us reason to believe that Plato in fact had a literary-rhetorical project in his presentation of Socratic philosophy, a project that was guided by his appreciation of the problem that the Gorgias the brings to light. After all, it is Plato, the author of the Gorgias, who helps us to understand the need for rhetoric, and who, by presenting Socrates unsuccessful pursuit of a solution to his dilemma, points to the need for a better solution. In this sense, the very failure presented in the Gorgias may be seen as Platos way of revealing the problem to which his writings respond and of indicating the role he plays in defending Socratic philosophy. In keeping with this suggestion, we can nd in Platos corpus a picture of the philosophic life and of the views of philosophy that expands and completes the picture he has Socrates merely begin to sketch in the Gorgias. Platos dialogues are famous for their many beautiful passages defending the unity of virtue, describing the orderliness of nature and the divine, and praising the high aspirations and noble resolve of the philosophic life. The Gorgias, however, gives us
5. See again Second Letter 314c24.

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Conclusion

reason to wonder, as we turn to Platos other dialogues, whether some of the most famous and moving features of Platos works belong to a rhetorical project designed to inspire admiration of Socratic philosophy and to assuage the hostility of its critics. That is not to say, of course, that Plato did not also want to point his readers to the truth about Socrates and the philosophic life. But the Gorgias suggests that those who want to understand the philosophic life as Socrates lived it must make an effort to distinguish what is genuinely admirable about that life from what may belong to Platos rhetorical project of embellishment. To understand and appreciate the aims of that project is not at odds with, but can even contribute to, an effort to discover the truth behind the rhetoric. Such an effort, however, must proceed with great caution and care. For it would be a mistake, in considering any passage in Platos dialogues, to jump quickly to rhetoric as an explanation of difcult or initially unpersuasive arguments or doctrines. The only sure way to proceed is through a close, painstaking, and open-minded reading of each of Platos dialogues.

Bibliography

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Index

Achilles, 11 Adeimantus, 65 Adkins, A. W. H., 47, 72, 115, 132 Aeschylus, 171 Agathon, 61 Ahrensdorf, Peter, 7 Alcibiades, 55, 84, 157 Alfarabi, 7 Anaxagoras, 49 Archelaus, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 74 Arieti, James, 43, 76, 91, 159, 177 Aristides, 174 Aristocrates, 65 Aristophanes, 19, 152 Aristotle, 3, 42, 137 Barker, Ernest, 29, 88, 110, 147, 159, 164 Benardete, Seth, 5, 17, 26, 28, 32, 33, 36, 43, 62, 63, 75, 76, 77, 89, 94, 134, 135, 147, 152, 170 Black, Edwin, 29, 44, 126, 157 Bolotin, David, 7, 28 Brickhouse, Thomas, 65, 67, 140, 165, 168 Brisson, Luc, 133, 148, 168, 177 Bruell, Christopher, 18, 55, 56 Burnet, John, 14, 88

Caskey, Elizabeth, 9 Cimon, 89, 116, 127, 128, 152, 153, 157 Consigny, Scott, 16 Darius, 87, 89, 128 Derrida, Jacques, 1 Dilman, Ilham, 5, 29, 168 Diodotus, 28 Dodds, E. R., 3, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, 30, 37, 42, 47, 49, 61, 65, 72, 78, 83, 86, 88, 91, 105, 106, 125, 128, 135, 137, 147, 152, 153, 155, 158, 169, 170, 171, 174 Euben, Peter, 83 Euripides, 61, 91, 105, 106, 124, 134, 177 Friedlander, Paul, 15, 29, 37, 44, 53, 54, 72, 73, 88, 98, 110, 112, 113, 125, 132, 137, 138, 148, 159, 164, 177 Fussi, Alessandra, 17, 38, 170, 172 Gentzler, Jyl, 102, 105, 109 Grote, George, 3, 29, 43, 53, 57, 72, 76, 77, 104, 113, 132
189

190
Harrison, E. L., 16 Hegel, G. W. F., 49 Heracles, 89 Heraclitus, 105 Hermann, Karl Friedrich, 8 Herodotus, 128 Hesiod, 170 Hobbes, Thomas, 1, 179 Homer, 16, 169, 170, 175 Irwin, Terence, 4, 5, 8, 29, 36, 47, 53, 71, 94, 109, 113, 115, 136, 138, 153 Jaeger, Werner, 3, 4, 15, 29, 37, 45, 47, 53, 83, 87, 90, 94, 125, 126, 132, 137, 138, 140, 148, 159, 164, 178 Kagan, Donald, 3, 152 Kahn, Charles, 3, 4, 8, 15, 33, 35, 36, 54, 56, 71, 73, 83, 88, 98, 101, 102, 109, 110, 115, 132, 137, 140, 148, 159, 178 Kastely, James, 27, 29, 37, 44, 76, 140, 147, 156, 159, 177 Kerferd, G. B., 16 Klein, Jacob, 7 Kleinias, 119 Klosko, George, 98, 102, 105, 109, 110 Lewis, Thomas J., 26, 37 Locke, John, 179 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 1 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 4 Mackenzie, Mary, 36, 57, 71, 73, 76, 168, 173, 174 McKim, Richard, 56, 67, 71, 73, 74, 76, 94, 110, 115, 140 Megillus, 119

Index
Meiser, K., 155 Michelini, Ann, 43, 94 Miltiades, 89, 116, 127, 128, 152, 153, 157 Montesquieu, 179 Morrow, Glenn, 9 Murray, John, 27, 33 Newell, Waller, 3, 63, 83, 88, 89, 100, 101, 104, 108, 109, 110, 112, 115, 125, 126, 132, 137, 148 Nichols, James Jr., 14, 20, 26, 27, 29, 33, 35, 38, 43, 62, 65, 86, 99, 101, 158 Nicias, 65 Nightingale, Andrea Wilson, 91, 177 Nussbaum, Martha, 109 Olympiodorus, 110, 137, 168, 170 Orwin, Clifford, 28 Perdiccas, 59, 60, 62 Pericles, 30, 65, 89, 92, 116, 127, 128, 129, 152, 153, 154, 157, 158 Philostratus, 16 Plato, Works Apology of Socrates, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 24, 28, 38, 56, 57, 90, 95, 141, 145, 148, 151, 159, 164, 165, 167, 169, 179, 180 Cleitophon, 56, 57 Crito, 56 Euthyphro, 169 Greater Hippias, 16 Laws, 7, 29, 44, 57, 65, 69, 77, 87, 98, 104, 118, 119, 135, 179 Lysis, 113 Meno, 7, 16, 35, 158, 180 Phaedo, 18, 49, 164 Phaedrus, 18, 23, 29, 41, 42, 48, 65 Philebus, 16, 112, 115

Index
Protagoras, 16, 21, 23, 32, 38, 39, 101, 113, 135, 152 Republic, 26, 29, 48, 57, 63, 65, 69, 79, 87, 112, 119, 136, 141, 159, 161, 164, 165, 169, 174, 179 Second Alcibiades, 55 Second Letter, 9, 181 Seventh Letter, 9 Statesman, 29 Symposium, 9, 83, 179 Theaetetus, 113 Plochmann, George, 5 Protagoras, 16, 32, 38 Pythagoras, 105, 137 Rankin, H. D., 16, 27, 83 Renehan, R., 42 Robinson, Franklin, 5 Romilly, Jacqueline de, 4, 16, 23, 24, 27, 29, 33, 37, 83, 88, 90, 147 Rorty, Richard, 1 Rosen, Stanley, 9 Sallis, John, 7 Santas, Gerasimos, 4, 54, 56, 63, 71, 73, 76, 98, 113, 136 Saxonhouse, Arlene, 17, 18, 28, 61, 63, 88, 89, 158 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 7, 8

191
Seung, T. K., 4, 18, 87, 128, 152, 153, 158, 178 Shorey, Paul, 3, 4, 33, 36, 38, 43, 94, 98, 144, 159, 168, 178 Smith, Nicholas, 65, 67, 140, 165, 168 Strauss, Leo, 7, 13 Taylor, A. E., 3, 4, 15, 17, 48, 72, 83, 86, 88, 159, 177 Themistius, 3 Themistocles, 30, 89, 116, 127, 128, 152, 153, 157 Thompson, W. H., 78 Thucydides, 28, 61, 87, 128, 129, 153, 158 Vickers, Brian, 159 Villa, Dana, 158, 165 Vlastos, Gregory, 8, 71, 72, 73, 140 Voegelin, Eric, 4, 15, 63, 83, 137, 138, 159, 168, 169, 178 Weiss, Roslyn, 27, 29, 32, 38 Williams, Bernard, 3 Xenophon, 18, 135 Xerxes, 87, 89, 128