Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy Boost?

Jancic Jan 2012

Introduction: refurbishing EU parliamentary democracy Purpose of initiative is to reinforce democratic basis of the Union by involving national parliaments of MS more closely with EU-policy making processes beyond the texts of founding treaties. Trying to remedy apparent democratic deficit Sieberson: Lisbon Treaty offers more opportunity than before for public input Commission took notice (power of legislative initiation and implementation place it at forefront of EU executive branch)

Origins of Barroso Initiative Began operation in Sept 2006

Definition and scope of Barroso initiative Barroso initiative is a broad political dialogue between commission and national parliaments on all aspects of commissions legislative agenda Monitors: 1. Subsidiarity Principle (principle doesnt apply when Union has exclusive competence to act customs union, comp policy, monetary policy for Eurozone, conservation of marine stuff, common commercial policy) 2. Proportionality (applies to all policy sectors 3. Policy of conferral - union may only act within boundaries set by other MS and only in order to attain objectives laid down in treaties) 4. Principle of political accountability in context of Barroso - duty to justify policies to national parliaments Initiative also allows national parliaments to asses any other legal and political aspects of proposed EU legislation, such as opportuneness and desirability of actions Involvement of national parliaments in process of political importance, though rudimentary element of evolving multilevel EU representative democracy

Mode of operation and purpose of the Barroso initiative 2 main modes of operation 1. In the early phase of the Commissions policy making cycle in order to impart national concerns to its draft legislative proposals Generally more advantageous Chamber can write to the commission after receive draft EU acts and send reasoned opinion Commission in practice replies RARELY would commission actually alter policy choices due to parliamentary opposition because initiative geared towards discussion and consultation rather than strict enforcement No sanction for disregarding Purpose not to circumvent purpose to create and allow dialogue more info, give opportunity for proactivity and facilitate scrutiny of own gov To provide a space that wasnt always there

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At any other time through a motley array of visits to national parliaments by Commission officials, meetings with national parliamentary committees and permanent parliamentary representative to the EU and gatherings in various inter-parliamentary forums

Barroso initiative vs. the early warning mechanism Lisbon treaty incorporated it (precursor to Barroso technically though) Operation 1. Commission sends national parls draft legislative acts 2. Invite to send reasoned opinions within 8 weeks on whether comply with subsidiarity only 3. Each MS has 2 votes usually one opinion=one vote but not always (not important) i. If votes dont reach threshold of 1/3 reasoned opinions just taken into account ii. If reached 1/3 proposal must be reviewed (yellow card) iii. If simple majority must review if proceeds, EU legislature must pass it (majority of EP/ 55% Council) orange card

(All the threshold difficulties just affect EWM utility) Difference between Barroso and early warning (View of how Barroso seen, purpose and effect) 1. 2. 3. Nature- Barroso not based on founding treaties (commission could abolish whenever), EWM is Effect Barroso depends on Commission following it Scope Barroso broader because EWM only about subsidiarity. More leeway to voice opinions. More volatile instrument for commission

IN PRACTICE Barely any difference Send same opinion No crystal clear demarcation between 2 Commission understands them as two sides of the same coin They have now blended into 2 into one hybrid procedure Basically now subsidiarity part of reasoned opinions politically enforceable through EWM but everything else isnt. need to make sure clear what youre talking about But other sections still have big impact Breaches of subsidiarity legally enforceable through ECJ

Vicissitudes of national parliamentary participation n the Barroso Initiative Differences Tendency for upper chambers to be more involved French senat German bundesrat House of lords etc Generally focus on substance of commission documents rather than subsidiarity

Similarities Mirror positions taken by their governments in the council

Examine political issues related to contents of EU proposals

Practical effects of Barroso EP and Council kept informed of dialogue EP asked national parliaments make opinions available to them same time as commissions goodwill or surreptitious institutional rivalry but has been active (exchange info and maintain contact with parls etc) Commission said in many cases opinion expressed by parl are reflected in the legislative process by either EP or council gave space and its working Barroso seemed to have raised awareness among national parliaments of issues at stake in European decision making Opinions increasing (2005-2008, 521 contacts, 2006-2011 1255 opinions) Marks change of commissions previously negative attitude towards national aprls

Cross country analysis: a varied response by domestic legislatures 1. French parliament: engaged watchdog Sizeable enthusiasm Communicates more than once on each exchange (asks for further clarification etc) Senats key conclusion about Barroso initiative 1. Subsidiarity monitoring cant have straightforward definition impossible to separate subsidiarity from proportionality to disassociate or find boundary. Eg if law too detailed is that because of choice of legal instrument (subsidiarity) or excessive legal solution (proportionality). Issues when distinguishing shared and exclusive competencies when exclusive competencies justified badly (e.g. because Union co-finances a project or measures by MS too varied used for road safety infrastructure compliance with subsidiarity debated) Senat says because of this union legislature now takes subsidiarity more seriously 2. Takes proactive approach- sends opinions when commission under no obligation to consider

2. British parliament: a self-assured inspector Commons poor in response. Probably because of close constitutional relationship with gov and a particular focus on latters accountability and less so of EU institutions so commons already involved a lot via lobbying governments Also has a committee that looks at EU stuff th th Lords active (not hugely more than others though 6 /9 ) Overall British parliament only marginally affected by Barroso initiative

3. Portuguese Parliament: ambitious newbie Most involved 2006-10 237 reasoned opinions For French and British, Barroso merely useful complement to existing scrutiny arrangement, for Portuguese it was catalyst for tacit constitutional change that had a fairly palpable impact on parliament status New source of information for MPs Barroso coincided with own European Scrutiny Act 2006 that improved scrutiny rights Since in direct communication with commission gov finds it harder to manipulate Parliament in EU negotiations

Enhances commissions negotiation powers because gov cant ab stractly invoke parliament in negotiations Makes EU decision making more transparent But rarely provides substantive comments and only then is commission likely to respond

Conclusion Helps bring EU closer to citizenry Statistical data shows national parliamentary participation has grown In political terms, custom may be in the making that would establish a routine consultation practice before draft European proposals reach EU legislature (but customs are still not that strong) Some say its window dressing because commission tying council members hands by giving national parliaments symbolic say in decision making Others say improving democratic credentials Jancic thinks will help improve democratic legitimacy but still need to wait and see