John D. Eisenhut Vice President Derrick W. Wyman Chief of Staff Col. Arnold J. Kampe, USAF Ret. Military Liaison Angela M. DOrazio Editor US Aircraft Corporation 1535 Exeter Road Akron, OH 44306 P: 330-455-1181 F: 330-455-0823 E-mail: info@usaircraftcorp.com Website: usaircraftcorp.com
US Aircraft Corporation Advisory Committee Brig. Gen. Charles Skip Jones, USAF Ret. Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, USAF Ret., special operations
Maj. Gen. David Tanzi, USAF Ret., operations and logistics Brig. Gen. Bill Lawson, USAF Ret., tactics and training Lt. Col. Jerry Kemp, USAF Ret., flight test and training Lt. Col. Robert Shaw, USAF Ret., human factors and displays Maj. Ron Shoulars, USAF Ret., flight test Edward Luttwak, Center for Strategic International Studies
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By Angela DOrazio
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By Angela DOrazio
With the development of the A-67, US Aircraft Corporation is creating the only aircraft in the world that is specifically and uniquely designed for Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. The A-67s range, short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability, ruggedness, and endurance make it uniquely capable of executing COIN/ISR missions, especially in areas most vulnerable to insurgent uprising and ground fire. According to Raymond Williams, founder and president of US Aircraft Corporation, every design decision that has been made in the development of the A-67 ensures an effective COIN/ISR aircraft and supports features such as survivability, maintainability, and durability. Survivability is especially significant, according to Dr. Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a consultant to the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The advanced survivability of the A-67 differentiates it from trainers, planes which have been used for COIN missions because of their fixedwing, turboprop engine, and considerable range. However, the problem with trainers, Luttwak said, is that they are unable to withstand attack, making them unsuitable for COIN missions in high-threat areas. Though attempts have been made to enhance the survivability of such trainers, Luttwak believes that they can never be adequately fitted for combat. The need for an aircraft designed specifically for COIN missions rather than retrofitted for these types of missions after the fact comes on the heels of the long-overdue realization that airpower has the potential to play a critical role in countering insurgents. Airpower can play a decisive role in counterinsurgency in terms of strike, ISR, lift, communications, and psychological operations, and yet it has been neglected, said Dr. Wray Johnson, a retired U.S Air Force colonel and author of the book Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists. According to Robyn Read, a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel and current research analyst at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, the essentials of each COIN mission are entirely dependent on the unique local circumstances that govern each insurgency. However, he said that the ability of airpower to affect ground operations is important in conflicts against insurgents regardless of the terrain or nature of the conflict. According to Read, it may take the form of presence, ISR, airlift or strike, but the range and speed inherent in airpower can provide options vital to an embattled government. Airpower is particularly relevant in countries with large segments of ungoverned or undergoverned space. Counterinsurgency, a subset of irregular warfare, according to Read, characterizes many of the active military operations today missions in which airpower plays a critical role.
Counterinsurgency has to be tailored to the conditions that spawned the insurgency which makes each conflict unique, Read said. But airpower, its mere presence, changes the equation on the ground. Over the years, the nature of warfare has fundamentally changed from a more conventional combat against a peer competitor to combat on the lower end of the spectrum, or conflict against insurgents or guerrilla groups, according to Major Kenneth Beebe of the U.S. Air Force in his article The Air Forces Missing Doctrine: How the U.S. Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency, which was published last year in Air and Space Power Journal, the professional journal of the U.S. Air Force. The A-67 is designed to respond to the increasing COIN/ISR need, of both the U.S. Air Force and foreign partner nations, for an aircraft to fight the wars of today, wars that typically involve low-intensity conflict against insurgents. The Changing Nature of War According to Major General Richard Comer, U.S. Air Force Ret., irregular warfare is a term coined to describe fighters or insurgents who dont wear uniforms and so are difficult to identify but are nonetheless combatant. Today, however, Comer said that the term has come to mean warfare
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waged to win people away from allegiance to the legitimate government or the relevant political authority in an area. This irregular warfare, according to many experts in the aerospace and defense industry, is becoming the warfare of today and the next several decades. At one pointit was classical war and classical invasion, said Christopher Danan, the CEO of Octagon Defense and Security, a consulting firm for the research and development of military aircraft. But now, 15 or 16 years later, there are terrorist groups who are creating a third force and are infiltrating the porous borders of nations. Luttwak agrees and argues that today there is very little traditional warfare in which one country engages in a classical military operation against another country. With fewer and fewer conventional enemies, it has become more common for countries, particularly developing countries where the political infrastructure is weak, to find themselves in battle against insurgents who attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the government. The more pronounced presence of insurgencies has demanded a different kind of strategy and military equipment for engaging in these conflicts. According to Luttwak, low-intensity conflict, which characterizes COIN missions, involves the need to detect low-contrast targets, or targets that are difficult to identify. In conventional warfare, high-contrast targets such as military bases or enemy tanks are easily detectable by bombers; however, such aircraft are unsuitable to detect and attack the low-contrast targets in todays wars against insurgents. We dont have air power to fight the wars we are fighting today in Afghanistan and Iraq, Luttwak said. The solution, Luttwak said, is a piece of flying equipment that can fly slowly enough to detect low-contrast targets but is not a helicopter, which is highly vulnerable to attack. A COIN aircraft should also have a fixed wing so that it can zip in and out of high-threat areas, carry two pilots so that one can fly the plane while the other identifies targets, and have an enhanced loiter capability. The development of the A-67 is the result of this recent shift in the nature of warfare and is compatible with all of the capabilities necessary for a plane designed to counter insurgent operations. Danan sees the A-67 as
No aircraft in the world can begin to compete with [the A-67]. -Dr. Edward Luttwak
inextricably linked to the need to address the increasing presence of lowintensity conflict today. The A-67 is a natural response to the change of war, Danan said. The A-67 One of the most important considerations in the development and construction of an aircraft specifically designed for COIN/ISR missions is the need to identify the market for this type of plane. According to Read, virtually none of the nations most vulnerable to insurgent uprising is in the high-tech market. He said that high-tech systems are not the most important aspect of a COIN plane. Rather, practicality is the critical factor. The sophistication of the airplane has to be balanced with the ruggedness and serviceability of the airplane, Read said. A COIN platform of choice needs to be one that is consistent with a countrys infrastructure, their technology base, and their ability to sustain and maintain the aircraft. According to Johnson, countries that face the highest internal threat of insurgency do not have the funding or resources for high-tech equipment. These countries require what Johnson calls alternative technology, which is not a low-tech aircraft, but rather something that is more applicable and effective in countering insurgency in developing countries, something that is easy to fly and maintain. Highly advanced countries, those which do not face a high risk of internal conflict anyhow, may rely on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to search for potential threats. However, according to Luttwak, only a handful of countries are so advanced that they can use UAVs. Given the current change in the nature of warfare, which has rendered traditional aircraft ineffective, and the inability of developing countries to afford and use advanced aircraft suitable for COIN and ISR missions, nations that face the highest risk of insurgency are left without an effective and affordable aircraft for countering insurgents. According to Danan, the A-67 offers a solution for these countries. The A-67 is filling the gap between the classical interceptor, or bomber, and the UAV, Danan said. ... Cont on Pg 7
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A-67 built from the ground-up for a more effective COIN/ISR aircraft
By Angela DOrazio
The emerging realization that airpower plays an instrumental role in countering insurgents has resulted in numerous attempts to modify existing training aircraft to be capable of Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) missions. In the absence of an aircraft designed specifically for COIN and ISR missions, trainers which have been modified for COIN/ISR are the Embraer Super Tucano, Beechcraft T-6B and AT-6, and the Pilatus PC-21. Trainers and modified general aviation aircraft may look like and even have some features of a COIN/ISR plane such as durability, simplistic design, and a turboprop engine. Their inability to withstand attack, however, makes them fundamentally unsuitable for COIN missions, which are often combative. According to Dr. Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a consultant to the National Security Council, the U.S. The A-67s survivability, maintainability, and durability make Department of State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Office of the it especially suitable for COIN/ISR missions in second and Secretary of Defense, despite additions of armament made to enhance the survivability of the aircraft, trainers will never be suitable for COIN missions. Luttwak said that third-world countries. Modified aircraft such as trainers are the survivability of an aircraft is not only determined by external armor on the plane, not sufficient for resisting ground fire. but rather begins with the internal design of the aircraft. People have tried to make trainers more survivable, but you must make detailed provisions to the actual engineering of the plane to ensure survivability, Luttwak said. Because the A-67 was designed with COIN and ISR missions in mind, the plane is suitable for these types of missions in ways that trainers are not. In addition to the advanced survivability of the A-67, it can carry about 3,600 pounds of external load, weight which would easily overwhelm the wings of most trainers. According to Jim Kampe, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel and mechanical engineer with over 40 years of aircraft maintenance experience, the design of an aircraft should be determined by its anticipated missions. The wings and fuselage of an aircraft built from the ground-up for COIN and ISR missions are designed very differently than the wings and fuselage of a training aircraft. Because the build of an aircraft is a key factor in how appropriate it is for COIN/ISR missions, Kampe said that converting a trainer into an aircraft suitable for these types of missions is kind of like turning a school bus into a motor home. On a superficial level, the aircraft can be converted, but the design and internal workings of the plane will never be appropriate for COIN/ISR missions unless it is built specifically for this purpose. If you want to do it right, youve got to start from scratch, Kampe said. Robyn Read, a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel and current research analyst at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, said that attempts to convert trainers into aircraft suitable for COIN/ISR missions are not totally futile and that modifications can result in an effective COIN/ISR airplane. However, Read said that changes made to an existing aircraft are typically limited only to external modifications, such as the addition of armament. After the fact, the types of modifications that need to be made are fundamentally going to be external, Read said. External modifications, while feasible, do not address many of the important design considerations for a COIN/ISR aircraft, like STOL capability. Read said that the ability to take off and land on unimproved runways is not a concern during the design process of a trainer but certainly would be in the design of a COIN/ISR aircraft. Besides the build of the wings and fuselage of the aircraft, other features of an effective COIN aircraft, such as higher payload capacity and internal gun placement, cannot be easily modified on an existing aircraft. Like Kampe, Read believes that building a plane with a specific mission in mind will guide its construction and ultimately result in a more effective design. If a pure design is available, that would obviously be the optimal choice, Read said. Attempts to modify existing aircraft to be suitable for some other purpose than the one for which it was specifically designed have been made throughout the history of How the A-67 compares to Competitors the air force. According to Luttwak, World War II fighter planes were ... Cont on Pg 7
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... Cont from Pg 5 The features of the A-67, including its rugged survivability, ease of maintenance, and low-cost structure, have ensured that it will be an effective COIN/ISR plane in second and third-world ally countries that face the highest internal threat of insurgency. According to Danan, the A-67 embodies an entire system of air defense in one plane. What used to require three different planes, he said, can now be accomplished with one plane: the A-67. The A-67 is the perfect multi-mission airplane, Danan said. It carries electronic cameras and delivers ordnance to the designated target. The flexibility will replace at least three pieces of flying equipment. The first being the reconnaissance plane, the second being the attack plane, and the third being the mission assessment plane. In addition to cost-effectiveness, provisions for aircraft survivability have been a top priority in the development of the A-67. According to Jim Kampe, the military liaison for US Aircraft Corporation and a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, hardening the plane during the design phase will allow for affordable survivability features to be incorporated into the A-67 to optimize their cost and effectiveness. In addition to adding armament around key areas of the plane such as the cockpit and the engine, Kampe said that wiring, fuel lines, and critical components can also be routed/mounted in such a way as to promote the planes survivability. These provisions, however, must be made in the engineering of the plane; in many cases, retrofitting such features after fielding can be radically expensive. These provisions for survivability are significant and have been critical to the A-67 program. The advanced survivability of the A-67 is what differentiates it from other aircraft that could be used for COIN/ISR missions, such as trainers like the Embraer Tucano or Beechcraft AT-6. The A-67 is also designed for ease of maintenance, an important feature of a COIN/ISR airplane due to the limited technology of the areas most likely to benefit from this type of aircraft. ISR and COIN airplanes, by their mission, are going to operate out of forward, unimproved areas where support footprints should be minimized, Kampe said. Maintainability is very important for the A-67. The A-67 also includes sensors to gather intelligence from the air and a communication system to relay that sensory information to the ground. The aircraft will offer ejection seats as an option, but also includes a Ballistic Recovery System (BRS), which will deploy a parachute to lower the entire plane to safety. The A-67 is a plane that has been designed and developed for a very specific purpose and for a very specific customer. What it amounts to is an aircraft that is unmatched by any other in existence. No aircraft in the world can begin to compete with [the A-67], Luttwak said.
Customer Identification for the A-67 Many of the planes most important features, including its STOL capability, low maintainability requirements, simplistic flying mechanisms, and low cost structure, have been added in anticipation of the market for this type of aircraft. Though the plane is geared toward developing countries, it is important that the U.S. Air Force also have the A-67 in its inventory when it is engaged in second and third-world ally countries or supporting the training of those countries. According to Johnson, although the A-67 is more suited for a country like the Philippines because it is less expensive, more rugged, and easy to fly, countries such as the Philippines will look to the U. S. Air Force, which serves as a sort of mentor to foreign air forces. Johnson believes the A-67 represents a suitable platform for countries facing internal threats. For counterinsurgency the A-67 is an appropriate platform, especially for countries in the developing world, Johnson said. Danan agrees, seeing the A-67 as a cost-effective solution to many of the problems plaguing developing countries. The A-67 is the perfect response for countries who want to combine their assets of defense on one expense.
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modified and used to counter insurgents during the Vietnam War. These propeller fighters were effective for COIN/ISR missions because they were highly survivable, could fly slowly, and could loiter for extended periods of time. However, Luttwak said that these types of fighters dont exist anymore. The A-67 would be of little value in the 1960s when you could turn to propeller fighters, Luttwak said. However, the A-67 has all the virtues of
a propeller fighter, plus it is much more efficient. The key virtues of a COIN plane, Luttwak said, are flight endurance, low stall speed, and, most importantly, the ability to resist attack, none of which are captured by todays fighters or modified training aircraft. Luttwak believes that trainers do not offer any real competition to the A-67. No aircraft in the world exists today that has a low stall speed that was designed to withstand attack, and that has the range of the A-67.
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