Moldova, Minorities and the International Community

Renrs Danelsons

LU Akadmiskais apgds

UDK 323 Da 445 Moldova, Minorities and the International Community

Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI), University of Latvia

Author: Editor: Layout:

Renrs Danelsons Nils Muinieks Ieva Zarne

Cover design: Agris Dzilna

Latvijas Universitte, 2008 Agris Dzilna, cover design, 2008 ISBN 978-9984-825-49-6

Table of Contents
I. Introduction . ................................................................................... 5 1.1 Moldova and Latvia .................................................................... 5 1.2 Moldova: Historical Background and Current Challenges ...... 6 II. The Transnistrian Problem ......................................................... 10 III. Gagauzia ........................................................................................... 17 IV . Involvement of Kin-States in Ethnic Relations . ................... 19 4.1 Russia . ......................................................................................... 19 4.2 Ukraine ........................................................................................ 24 4.3 Romania . ..................................................................................... 28 V . The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing Ethnic Conflict .............................................................................................. 30 5.1 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ......................................................................................... 30 5.2 The European Union .................................................................. 32 5.3 The Council of Europe . .............................................................. 36 VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................ 38 About the author.................................................................................... 40

I. Introduction
1.1 Moldova and Latvia
Moldova has not been the subject of much scholarly interest in Latvia.1 However, this could change, as Latvian relations with Moldova have intensified after Latvias accession to the European Union in 2004. Latvia has identified Moldova as a priority country for development cooperation. Moreover, Latvia has participated in the EU Border Assistance Mission, provided assistance in the implementation of democratic and institutional reforms, and shared its EU integration experience. The Latvian national airline Air Baltic opened direct flights from Riga to Chisinau in March 2008. If previous experience in the region is any guide (e.g., in Azerbaijan, Georgia), one can predict that the opening of a direct flight will be followed by the opening of a Latvian embassy in Chisinau. Moreover, Latvian Foreign Minister Mris Rieksti has supported the opening of an embassy.2 For the time being, LatvianMoldovan economic cooperation is weak, as Moldova is Latvias 38th export partner and 51st import partner,3 though there are some reports of guest workers from Moldova working in Latvia. Moldova holds particular interest for Latvia for a number of reasons. For one, similar to Latvia, Moldova has had difficult relations with Russia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. For Latvia, Moldovas difficulties in Transnistria demonstrate what could have happened had the international community not assisted in facilitating the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia. Secondly, current Moldovan-Latvian cooperation has historical precedents. During the latter years of the Soviet Union, the Latvian national movement assisted Moldova in resurrecting Latin script publications by printing journals in Latvia and smuggling them into Moldova. Moreover, Moldovan democratic activists drew both
1

The exception is Andris Sprds. See his Regional Ramifications of Ukraines Orange Revolution: Transnistrian Conflict Settlement, in Atis Leji, ed., The European Unions Eastern Neighbours after the Orange Revolution (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2006), pp. 3044, and Moldovas eiropeizcijas iekpolitisk un starptautisk dimensija. Latvijas iespjas un ierobeojumi [The Domestic and International Dimensions of Moldovas Europeanization: Latvias Opportunities and Limits], in aneta Ozolia, ed., Latvijas rpolitika un robeu paplainana, Stratisks analzes komisijas Zintniski ptnieciskie raksti 1 (7)/2006 (Rga: Zintne, 2006), pp. 154176. At the conference The Contribution of the European Neighbourhood Policy to the Development of Eastern Neighbours on April 25, 2008, Rga, Latvia. http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/divpusejas-attiecibas/Moldova/.

programmatic and tactical inspiration from the Baltic movements.4 At the same time, one of the most notorious figures in Transnistria, Security Minister Vladimir Antiufeev, made his name in Riga, where he was one of the leaders of the Soviet loyalist Interior Ministry Special Forces unit (OMON) that killed five people in Latvia and wounded many more in January 1991. Finally, Moldova is one of the few places in the region (along with Georgia) that looks to Latvia for diplomatic support, assistance and Euroatlantic integration lessons. Latvia and Moldova share a similar historical background of occupation by the Soviet Union from the end of the Second World War until independence in 1991. However, Moldova is a new country, while Latvia was an independent country in the interwar period. Both countries have significant Russian-speaking minorities, a fact which has elicited Russias interest and provided it with leverage in bilateral relations. Moreover, both have been the object of interest by international and regional organizations involved in conflict prevention and the promotion of minority rights.

1.2 Moldova: Historical Background and Current Challenges

In contrast to Latvia, however, the territorial integrity of Moldova has been in question since 1990, when the so-called Transnistrian Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence. This separatist regime is still supported by Russia, while political opposition is banned in Transnistria. Although some elements of a market economy have been introduced in Transnistria, it is still primarily a planned economy. Transnistria is also known as a centre of illegal activities, such as smuggling. The Transnistrian challenge to Moldovas territorial integrity is one of the most serious problems affecting Moldovas international aspirations and domestic development. Transnistria has become a particularly interesting object of inquiry after Kosovos declaration of independence on February 17, 2008. Russia occasionally claims that the international communitys actions in Kosovo could set a possible precedent for Transnistria, as well as for the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Another new element in the equation is the uncertainty about Russias stance in the region following its withdrawal from the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Moldovas foreign policy has been inconsistent and contradictory during the past 17 years. In constitutional military terms, Moldova is a neutral country. Nevertheless, this neutrality is devoid of true meaning since foreign troops are still located in the country without the approval
4

See Nils R. Muiznieks, The Baltic Popular Movements and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union, Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 47, No. 1, 1995, 326.

of the Moldovan authorities and the size of the Transnistrian security services is three times that of the Moldovan army. The ambiguities of constitutional neutrality and the situation on the ground led the Moldovan authorities to seek to balance interests between East and West, hoping that this would enhance domestic stability and elicit foreign support in resolving the conflict in Transnistria. Deputy Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament Iurie Rosca has even claimed that Moldova will become a NATO member after Ukraines accession to this organization.5 At the same time, Moldova has occasionally expressed its willingness to become a member of the European Union (EU). The ruling Communist Party lacks a clear foreign policy vision. Prior to the 2001 general elections, the Communist Party sought to develop closer ties with Russia, and this strategy was pursued for 3 years, but this changed before the 2005 general elections, when the Communist Party changed tactics and proclaimed that it would like to develop closer ties with the EU. The situation changed again in 2006, when, during the CIS summit in Minsk, Moldova managed to persuade Russia to lift its ban on importing wine from Moldova. On 1 January 2007 Moldovas neighbour Romania became a member state of the EU. This means not only that the Romanian-Moldovan border has now become an external border of the EU, it also means that many citizens of Moldova became citizens of the EU. Because Moldova was an integral part of Romania until 1945, Moldovans are entitled to Romanian citizenship as well, and approximately 1 million Moldovans have availed themselves of this opportunity. According to the 2004 census, Moldova has 4.5 million inhabitants. Moldovans (Romanians) constitute 78%, followed by Ukrainians 8%, Russians 6% and Gagauz 4%. Some studies suggest that 1 million Moldovan citizens live abroad. Only 37% of Moldovans live in urban areas. In contrast, 84% of Russians live in urban areas. Russians have a higher share of persons with a higher education 21% versus 11% for Moldovans.6 Nevertheless only 12% of Russians speak Moldovan (Romanian), while 87% of Moldovans speak Russian.7 Among Moldovans the dominant opinion is that relations with Russia were better before attaining independence than they are now. Ethnic diversity in Moldova was formed by two large waves of immigration in 1812 and in 1945 both times after annexation by Russia

5 6

Iurie Rosca, comments to foreign experts, Chisinau, Moldova, April 7, 2008. Doru Petruti, An Empirical Model of Interethnic Relations Reflected in the Ethnobarometer, in Arcadie Barbarosie, ed., Ethnobarometer in the Republic of Moldova (Chisinau: Viorel Cibotaru, 2006), p. 183. David D. Laitin, Seccessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 34, No. 8, October 2001, p. 848.

(Soviet Union).8 According to the 1989 census, the population of Moldova consisted of 4,335,733 people, two thirds of whom were Romanian speakers, 14% were Ukrainians and 13% were Russians.9 Over the course of 30 years (19591989), the fastest growing group were the Russians (+92%), followed by the Gagauz (+60%), and only then followed by Moldovans (+48%), Ukrainians (+43%) and Bulgarians (+43%), while the number of Jews decreased by a third in those three decades. The number of Moldovans, Gagauz, Ukrainians and Bulgarians increased due to a natural rate of increase, while the number of Russians increased primarily as a result of migration processes.10 Russianization had been far reaching throughout Moldova, which was sometimes called Little Russia, and in Transnistria and Gagauzia, which were called New Russia.11 After gaining independence the Moldovan government adopted an inclusive citizenship law and granted extensive rights of cultural autonomy to all minorities. It is difficult to find a better example in the former Soviet Union of a new elite and government dominated by the titular group which was more accommodating to minorities in general and to the Russian minority in particular than the government that took power in Moldova in 1991. Citizenship was immediately granted to all, language policy was both moderate and patient, education was supported in a variety of languages, and political representation was available to all groups.12 A lack of consensus between different political groups regarding Moldovas history remains one of the thorniest disputes in the country. Moldovas ruling Communist Party has developed a concept about the statehood of Moldovan people.13 However, there are also historians who look to the historical boundaries of Moldova, with contemporary Moldova

Tamara Caraus, The Role of the Nation-State in the Resolution of Interethnic Problems in Moldova, in Arcadie Barbarosie, ed., Ethnobarometer in the Republic of Moldova (Chisinau: Viorel Cibotaru, 2006), p. 87. Liliana Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova: Does Moldovas Eastern Orientation Inhibit its European Aspirations?, (Chisinau: IPP , N.D.), p. 16. Natalia Chirtoaca, Juridical Study of the Documents Signed in the Course of the Negotiations Process on the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement, (Chisinau: IPP , 2001), available at http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/18/en/Chirtooaca_Eng.pdf. Wanda Dressler, Between Empires and Europe: The Tragic Fate of Moldova, in Diogenes, Vol. 53, 2006, p. 35. Eiki Berg and Wim van Meurs, Borders and Orders in Europe: Limits of Nationand State-Building in Estonia, Macedonia and Moldova, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2002, p. 65. See the history book by Viktor Stepanuk, Gosudarstvennostj moldavskogo naroda, (Chisinau: Tipografia Centrala, 2006).

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representing just the eastern part of the traditional Principality of Moldova.14 With the rapid pace of geopolitical change in the region, Moldova became a neighbour of NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007; Moldova is also a potential candidate to become a member of these Euro-Atlantic institutions, but only following constitutional change and a nation-wide referendum. In addition to the issue of territorial integrity, socio-economic instability and the lack of adequate public administration capacity hinder the economic and political integration of Moldova into the EU. Moldova ranks below the global average in the global Human Development Index and had a score of 0.733 in 2005.15 The primary reasons for this poor showing are bad governance, high levels of corruption16, an unfavourable investment environment and multi-dimensional poverty17 (severe differentiation of income, unemployment, labour migration, brain drain), particularly in towns and rural areas. EU restrictions on relations with third countries will not only create additional difficulties, it will also contribute to widening the gap between Moldova and the other countries of Central and Southeastern Europe.

14

See the history book by Vasile Stati, Istorija Moldovi (Chisinau: Tipografia Centrala, 2003). See the Republic of Moldova National Human Development Report, The Quality of Economic Growth and its Impact on Human Development (Chisinau: UNDP , 2006), available at http://www.undp.md/publications/2006NHDR/NHDR%20english.pdf. According to TI, the Subjective Index of Corruption for Moldova was 2.8 in 2007. Moldova was ranked 111 out of 179 places. See http://www.transparency.org/policy_ research/surveys_indices/cpi. For a recent report, see International Development Association/International Monetary Fund, Republic of Moldova Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Annual Evaluation Report on the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, April 28, 2006, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/ Moldova_JSAN-PRSP(April28-2005).pdf.

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II. The Transnistrian Problem

In the late 1980s rumours of the possible reunification of Moldova with Romania were quite intense. Russians in Moldova complained openly that they might be compelled to learn Romanian, as most did not speak the language. Russians and Ukrainians from the left bank of the Nistru river in particular opposed the idea of reunification with Romania, as they did not have any attachment to Romania, but remembered the occupation of the Romanian army during World War II. Another important fact generating tension was the Language Law of August 1989 which required proficiency in the Moldovan language by January 1, 1994.18 Even Transnistrian Moldovans did not feel themselves a part of the Romanian nation. They had never lived in Romania and were heavily Russified. Ukrainians mostly lived in rural areas of Transnistria, while Russians lived in towns. Russians were overwhelmingly of recent origin19 (like Transnistrian president Igor Smirnov, who arrived in Tiraspol in 1987). Another ethnic group which is small but prominent in towns is the Jewish community, which in 1990 numbered about 12,000.20 Transnistria21 (Transdniestria, Pridnestrovie) is a territory of 4163sqkm along the left bank of Nistru river and the town of Benderi (Tighina) on the right bank. It makes up one-eighth of Moldovas territory. According to the 2004 census its population comprises 555,000,22 while in 1989 it stood at 800,000.23 In 1989 41% of the population of Transnistria were Moldovans, 31% Ukrainians and only 22% Russians. Moldovans were a majority only in rural areas. The capital city Tiraspol had 182,000 inhabitants of whom Moldovans were only 18%. The former Romanian town of Tighina was also heavily Russified only 29% of 130,000 people were Moldovans. 24 The de facto independence of Transnistria has had a deleterious impact on Moldovas economy. Transnistria produced one third of Moldovas industrial output and more than half of its consumer goods. Moldova
18

Cristian Urse, Transnistria: Prospects for a Solution, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper Series, No. 7, January 2007, p. 4. Nicholas Dima, The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic: A Geo-Political Game, The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 1999, p.41. Ibid. Called by official Chisinau the Eastern regions of Moldova. State Viability of the PMR (Pridnestrovie) Has Been Established, International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 18, 2006, p. 108. Dima, The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic, p. 40. Ibid.

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received most of its raw materials and energy from Tiraspol. Dubossary has the largest hydroelectric power station in Southeastern Europe, Rybnitsa has the most modern steel plant in the ex-USSR, and Transnistria has the biggest cognac factory in Moldova Kvint.25 The holding company Sheriff, run by President Smirnovs elite, has an annual turnover of around USD 2 billion, which is 5 times more than the budget of Moldova and 25 times more than that of Transnistria. The sources of such wealth include money laundering, smuggling and trafficking.26 Ethnic cleansing of the Moldovan population started in Transnistria after the 1992 war. The leader of the Tiraspol branch of the Moldovan Popular Front Ilie Ilascu and several colleagues were arrested and accused of murdering two Russians. They were subjected to torture and sentenced to death in a show trial. Subsequently, this case was judged by the European Court of Human Rights.27

Kamenka

Rybnitsa

PRIDNESTROVIE

Dubossary Grigoriopol

Bender

Tiraspol
Slobozya

50 km 50 miles

Transnistria
25

Ceslav Ciobanu, NATO/EU Enlargement: Moldova and the Frozen and Forgotten Conflict in Post-Soviet States, U.S. Institute for Peace Report, 22 June 2004, p. 29. Ibid. For a summary of the case, see Registrar, European Court of Human Rights, Press release issued by the Registrar, Grand Chamber Judgement in the Case of Ilascu and others v. Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe. int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Ilascu&sessio nid=5852200&skin=hudoc-pr-en.

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In a way, Transnistria became a Soviet Union in miniature, a dream land for frustrated Russian communists, and a new hope for embittered Soviet generals.28 It was also a playground for Russian Cossacks, a lawless weapons supermarket, a neo-Bolshevik autocracy, and a hive of local, Russian and Ukrainian organized crime syndicates.29 It is difficult to evaluate the ethnic aspect of the conflict. On the one hand, it was not an ethnic conflict, as there were many Russian-speaking Moldovan policemen who fought on the Moldovan side. On the other hand, Transnistrian separatists were predominantly Russian nationalists, and the local Moldovan population of Transnistria did not support the emergence of Transnistrian de facto statehood. Neither Chisinau, nor Tiraspol characterize the conflict as ethnic, but it is difficult to agree with the thesis that the people of Transnistria do not differ in any way from the people on the right bank areas of Moldova.30 The conflict was characterized by two cleavages: a linguistic (Russian/Moldovan) chasm, which was fuelled by different interests as well as by strong symbolism on both sides which had strong economic implications; an ideological (Soviet Union/Western democracy) divide which ran almost parallel to the linguistic conflict.31 Transnistria has proclaimed three state languages: Moldovan based on the Cyrillic alphabet, Ukrainian and Russian. However, in practice, the Russian language dominates in all spheres of life. Russian is practically the only language spoken in the Transnistrian parliament and in the economy. There is just one local newspaper printed in Moldovan (Adevarul Nistrean) and one in Ukrainian (Gomin). Otherwise the Transnistrian information space is a Russian language space.32 Not much has changed in Transnistria itself during 18 years of de facto independence. In December 2006 Igor Smirnov was elected for the fourth time in a row as president. Despite using different religious calendars on each bank of the Prut, both Moldova and Transnistria share a common Orthodox religion and a common national football team which sometimes plays in Tiraspol. However, on the political level no major changes have occurred despite the fact that current president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin was born in Transnistria.
28 29

Dima, The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic, p. 42. Alex Kliment, The Transnistrian Dilemma, in SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter 2005, p. 72. Oazu Nantoi, The Plan for the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement Proposed by Ukraine- Pros and Cons (Chisinau: Institute of Public Policy, 2005), p. 2. Claus Neukirch, Transdniestria and Moldova: Cold Peace at the Dniestr, Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2001, p. 126. Promo Lex, Human Rights in Transnistrian Region of Moldova (Chisinau: SRL Libitum, 2007), p. 164.

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There is considerable free movement of persons across the Transnistrian-Moldovan border (unlike the frozen conflict in Abkhazia). However, persons under 30 are losing any allegiance they may have to a Moldovan state, since Transnistria has been de facto independent for so long.33 Many Transnistrians support the idea that the region should follow the example of Taiwan.34 Despite a lack of international recognition, Transnistria has developed a functioning government, law enforcement authorities, an army of 10,000 men, an education system, its own passports, and its own currency. Around 160,000 Transnistrian residents have become citizens of the Republic of Moldova, comprising 35% of the total number of voting age inhabitants in Transnistria.35 Meanwhile President Smirnov and his elite hold Russian citizenship. Some 90% of the population of Transnistria have another citizenship in addition to their Transnistrian passports.36 The ethnic structure of the region has changed. The official numbers that are used by the Transnistrian authorities in 1998 were: 34% Moldovans, 29% Ukrainians and 29% Russians.37 The share of Moldovans is gradually decreasing, as a 2004 Transnistrian census shows that the population of 555,000 divides into 32% Moldovans, 30% Russians and 29% Ukrainians.38 Oazu Nantoi, one of Moldovas most respected political analysts, believes that Transnistrias population can be structured into seven groups: 1) the interested or those deriving personal benefit from Trans nistrian independence; 2) the shock detachments or the so-called elite troops, Cossacks, and security services; 3) the fanatics comprised mostly of pensioners and disabled persons with nostalgia for Soviet times; 4) obedient Transnistrian citizens (homo pridnestrovicus); 5) the functionaries represented by the local bureaucracy; 6) the amorphous masses or those who are indifferent; 7) the conscious opposition.39
33

International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, Europe Report No. 175, 17August 2006, p. 18. Oazu Nantoi, About the Situation in the East Districts of the Republic of Moldova (19922000) (Chisinau: IPP , 2001), p. 8. Nantoi, The Plan for the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement, p. 2. Christopher Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova: A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, St. Johns Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-0045, p. 89. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920151. Oleh Protsyk, Moldovas Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 53, No. 4, July/August 2006, p.20. International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, Europe Report No 175, 17August 2006, p. 4. Ceslav Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States: Genesis, Political Economy and Prospects for Solution (Richmond: United States Institute of Peace & Virginia State University, 2008), p. 79.

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73% of Russians in Transnistria support the idea that Moldovan should be a required subject in schools and 79% of Russians think that Moldovan should be one of the languages of education in state schools.40 In 2004 Transnistrian authorities unsuccessfully tried to close the last six Moldovan language schools in the region, but the local Moldovan population strongly resisted this step. At the same time, Transnistrian customs authorities blocked the roads leading from some villages under the Moldovan authorities to the farmers fields under Transnistrian authorities. This suggests that the ethnic aspect in the Transnistrian conflict cannot be dismissed out of hand. In September 2006 Transnistria held a referendum on independence and possible adherence to Russia. The overwhelming majority was in favour of such an idea. The referendum was not recognized by Moldova and the international community. Nevertheless the Russian State Duma recognized the results of the referendum. Some scholars believe that Moldova has not used the opportunity to change the situation in Transnistria through the local opposition. The opposition is weak and disorganised, but there are a number of people who support the idea of a unified Moldova.41 Recently President Voronin has stated that soon the Transnistrian leaders will go back home (to Russia), since in Moldova they are only on temporary deployment.42 Voronin favours the Transnistrian opposition leader Evgeny Shevchuk, who represents the interests of the holding company Sheriff. Shevchuk became a speaker of the Transnistrian Parliament in December 2005 after the last elections. During his recent visit to Moscow, this Transnistrianborn politician didnt even rule out the option of a common state with Moldova.43 In recent years, President Voronin has proposed a number of initiatives aimed at Transnistria: demilitarization of both banks of the Nistru, cancellation of visa and travel limitations for Transnistrian leaders, a joint TV channel, accreditation of the State University of Tiraspol, developing a European corridor from Chisinau to Dubossary. However, the independence of Kosovo, Western recognition thereof, and Transnistrias and Russias reactions have put all new conflict resolution efforts on hold.

40

David D. Laitin, Seccessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 34, No. 8, October 2001, p. 852. Protsyk, Moldovas Dilemmas, p. 15. Dumitru Minzazari, The New Transnistria Initiatives of President Voronin: Breakthrough or Agony? Political & Security Statewatch, IDIS Viitorul, No. 5, October 2007, p. 12. Available at http://www.viitorul.org/public/991/en/PSS_No.5_ october2007.pdf. Pridnestrovie Parliamentary Speaker Keeps all Options Open with Moldova, Tiraspol Times & Weekly Review, 1 February 2008.

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Transnistrian leader Smirnov supports the comparison with Kosovo: Look to international law, and look to the history of this land. Transnistria has a much stronger legal and historical basis for recognized sovereignty than Kosovo.44 Some Romanian scholars draw comparisons between Transnistria and Kosovo as well, suggesting that Transnistria be made an international protectorate for a minimum period of 57 years, then, after Transnistrias demilitarization, decriminalization and democratization, organising a referendum to decide the status of the region. The proposed options would be becoming an integral part of Moldova or remaining an entity similar to Monaco or Liechtenstein which would transfer some functions to neighbouring countries (in this case, Russia and/or Ukraine).45 However official Bucharest does not recognize the independence of Kosovo and does not see any similarities between the conflicts. Just two days after Kosovos declaration of independence, the Transnistrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs came out with a statement that a new model of conflict settlement has been established. Transnistria believes that this model will be applied to similar conflict zones.46 Not surprisingly, Moldova expressed its concern after recognition of Kosovos independence. Transnistrian leaders believe that independence of the region is lawful because of the illegality of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. However, if the pact is declared illegal because it was an act of aggressive expansion, why should the construction of a Moldovan Autonomous Republic (Transnistria), which was no more than a pretext for the expansion, be viewed as legitimate?47 The leaders of Transnistria try to portray Transnistria as a small, democratic republic which respects human rights. Recently President Smirnov tabled a proposal to appoint a Transnistrian minister in charge of protecting Transnistrian citizens in the areas under Moldovas jurisdiction. If Transnistria is to ever unite with Moldova under some form of autonomy or federation, Moldova must become a much more attractive partner.48 An important obstacle to building support for reunification is that Transnistrians believe that their economic situation is better than
44

Ceslav Ceobanu, Political Economy of Frozen Conflicts in ex-Soviet States: Challenges and Prospects for the U.S. and Russia, (Chisainau: IPP , 2007), available at http://www.ipp.md/files/Publicatii/2007/Ceslav_alternative_Stewart_thought_1_. doc. We Have a Stronger Case for Statehood than Kosovo, Tiraspol Times & Weekly Review, March 6, 2007. Adrian Pop, Gabriela Pascariu, George Anglitoiu, Alexandru Purcarus, Romania and the Republic of Moldova Between the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Prospect of EU Enlargement, European Institute of Romania, Study No 5., 2006, p.87, available at http://www.ier.ro/PAIS/PAIS3/EN/St.5_EN_final.PDF. http://www.mfa-pmr.org/eng/?sub_category=5973&cat=news. Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conflict, p. 28. International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, p.12.

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that of Moldova, a belief bolstered by free gas deliveries from Russia. However, Transnistrian businessmen are a potentially strong constituency in favour of reunification, especially since March 2006, when Ukraine began to require Moldovan customs stamps on any Transnistrian goods crossing Ukraines border. Another aspect to be taken into account is the issue of personal security, because some Transnistrian government officials, starting with the Minister of Internal Security Antiufeev, are wanted by Interpol, and they are not interested in conflict settlement. Reunification of Moldova with Transnistria looks more and more unlikely. The Moldovan opposition supports the partition of the country in order to facilitate integration into the European Union. However, the future status of Benderi city (the only city under Tiraspol control on the right bank with 80,000 inhabitants) complicates such a plan. The Communist government, for its part, needs to find some sort of solution for the Transnistrian dilemma, otherwise its prospects for staying in power after the 2009 national elections are doubtful.49 Moldovan Minister of Reintegration Vasily Shova has declared that Moldova is not going to integrate into the EU without reintegration of the country.50 President Voronin recently tabled a new proposal (which is the same package deal kept secret since September 2006), namely, renouncing any plans to join NATO in exchange for Transnistrias integration into Moldova. According to this plan, Transnistria would become an autonomous region similar to Gagauzia inside a unitary Republic of Moldova. Voronin has even declared that his country could leave GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova).51 On April 8, 2008, Voronin met with Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov for the first time in seven years, suggesting a recent intensification of efforts to settle the conflict. While grim, the situation in Transnistria looks more favourable for reintegration than the other separatist frozen conflicts in the former USSR (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh), because of the ethnic structure of society and the possibility of inter-personal contacts (travel between Transnistria and the rest of Moldova). However, every year a Transnistrian identity becomes stronger, making efforts at reintegration all the more difficult.

49

Sergiu Panainte, A New Impetus to Moldovas European Hopes: Bridging the Gap, Political & Security Statewatch, IDIS Viitorul, No.5, October 2007, p. 6. During the Second Annual International Conference Settling the Transnistrian Conflict in the Context of Moldovas Europeanisation, Chisinau, March 2627, 2008. Interview in the Russian newspaper Kommersant, 13 March 2008.

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III. Gagauzia
Any discussion about national minorities in Moldova cannot ignore the Gagauz. During the 19th century, the Gagauz, an Orthodox Turkic people, were brought by Russians to the southern part of Bessarabia from Southern Dobrudga and Bulgaria, which was still under the Ottoman Empire. The Gagauz were a small ethnic group speaking a Turkic dialect, but sharing the Christian Orthodox faith. This was one of the main reasons for accepting the protection of the Russian troops. During the process of perestroika in the late Soviet era, the Gagauz started to mobilise and reassert their own identity, and in 1988 created a movement called the Gagauz People. Their demand was to create an autonomous republic in the southern part of Moldova, a demand for which they received political support from Transnistrian separatists. The Gagauz viewed with concern the prospect of reunification with Romania and advocated a federal structure for the Republic of Moldova consisting of Moldova, Transnistria and Gagauzia. In accordance with Moldovas 1994 constitution, the Gagauz achieved the right of external selfdetermination: in the event that Moldova unites with some other country (Romania), Gagauzia has the right to independence. On December 23, 1994 a special Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia was adopted by the Moldovan Parliament. The Law foresees that Gagauzia or GagauzYeri is an autonomous territorial unit within the Republic of Moldova. As can be seen in the map below, the territory is not a compact one.
UKRAINE

ROMANIA

Gagauzia
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The Gagauz from Moldova represent the largest Gagauz community in the world. Even though Turkey is the linguistic motherland, it is not the religious motherland. Until Voronins recent proposal, these considerations have been used to justify Gagauz autonomy as a special right that cannot be granted to other ethnocultural groups from Moldova.52 Gagauz make up the overwhelming majority of the 170,000 people living in the autonomous unit. The unit itself was established out of administrative areas where Gagauz are the majority and/or comprised 40%50% of the population and the local population voted in referenda for joining the autonomous unit. Gagauzia has three official languages Moldovan, Gagauz and Russian. The Moldovan government set up the first Gagauz university and pledged to print books and offered courses in the Gagauz language. A Nationalities Centre was set up to introduce Turkish classes for the Gagauz with a system of grants. However, most Gagauz living in the countryside knew the Moldovan language and did not feel the need to nurture their own language to the same degree as Ukrainians or Russians. The Moldovan central government believed that the territorial autonomy provided to Gagauzia would serve as a model for Transnistria. Instead, Transnistrians view Gagauzia as a failure and argue that Gagauzia is an example that demonstrates that the Moldovan central government cannot be trusted to provide meaningful autonomy.53 Gagauz autonomy is criticized as a failed experiment, because it did not foster the national rebirth of the Gagauz people. Moreover, Gagauz autonomy has also implied a certain isolationism from the rest of Moldovan society.54 Despite its faults, the establishment of Gagauz territorial autonomy could be described as a success in comparison with Chisinaus relations with Tiraspol. In comparing Gagauzia and Transnistria, one key difference stands out minimal interference by the kin-state, which for Gagauzia is Turkey. Turkey has primarily been interested in cultural and linguistic ties with Gagauzia, and does not have a broader political or economic agenda.

52 53

Caraus, The Role of the Nation-State, p. 88. Steven D. Roper, Federalization and Constitution-Making as an Instrument of Conflict Resolution, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 12, Issue 4, Fall 2004, p. 533. Oazu Nantoi, Transnistrian Conflict: What Could the European Union and the United States of America Do? (Chisinau: Institute of Public Policy, 2005), p. 5.

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IV. Involvement of Kin-States in Ethnic Relations

Due to historical and demographic reasons, neighbouring states have played a prominent role in affecting Moldovan ethnic policy. In the case of Moldova, one can speak of the direct involvement of three kin-states: Romania, Russia and Ukraine.

4.1 Russia
The country whose influence has been most evident in Moldova since the late 1980s is Russia. Since its first hours of independence, Moldova was dependent on Russia.55 This was the case despite a new geopolitical situation in which Moldova does not have a common border with Russia for the first time since the Middle Ages. It is important to note that the Russian government has not criticized the Republic of Moldova for discrimination against national minorities, a common charge Moscow has levelled against Latvia and Estonia. The official position of Russia is that it supports the ethnic policy of Moldova.56 The Moldovan government has provided support for a Russian Cultural Centre and for a Foundation for Slavic Culture, and its cultural and ethnic policies towards ethnic minorities are very liberal, especially towards Russians. The Russian language is a language of inter-ethnic communication (its status is close to that of an official language). It is possible to obtain education in the Russian language, including higher education, in state-financed educational establishments. 22% of pupils are attending schools with Russian as the primary language of instruction.57 The Russian language is mandatory from the second year of instruction for all pupils. Moldovan legislation has been criticized for establishing a regime in which the Russian language is the language of education at all levels for Ukrainians, Bulgarians and other national

55 56 57

Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, p. 17. Authors interview with Russian diplomats in Chisinau.on November 8, 2006. Council of Europe, Second Report Submitted by Moldova Pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Received on 14 May 2004, p. 29. Available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_ rights/minorities/2._framework_convention_%28monitoring%29/2._monitoring_ mechanism/3._state_reports_and_unmik_kosovo_report/2._second_cycle/PDF_2nd_ SR_Moldova.pdf.

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minorities, thereby promoting the assimilation of the disadvantaged and small national minorities into the Russian-speaking group.58 While Russia has not engaged in trying to influence Moldovas ethnic policy within Moldova proper, it has been the key player in Transnistria. In addition to segments of the Russian military, redbrown forces in the Russian Parliament have provided strong support for Transnistrian separatists, while Russian Presidents Yeltsin and Putin were more restrained in their public positions regarding the breakaway region. There is, however, a strong interest from the Russian side in keeping Moldova within the Russian orbit. Russia can wield several different kinds of leverage for this purpose: economic (gas, ownership of Moldovan enterprises), military (the former 14th army) and political (Transnistria).59 A contentious issue in the MoldovanRussian relationship is withdrawal of the former 14th army from Transnistria. The Russian military presence is very much a factor in maintaining the frozen conflict. Under the July 21, 1992 ceasefire agreement between Russia and Moldova, the 14th army was to serve as a peacekeeping force. But the agreement did not foresee an end date for the peacekeeping operation. The 1994 agreement between Moldova and Russia stated that withdrawal of the troops should be implemented within 3 years of the agreements entry into force. But it also had a clause envisaging that by that date, the Transnistrian conflict should be settled. While the Moldovan Parliament ratified the agreement almost immediately, the Russian Parliament failed to do so. Until 1998 OSCE member states criticized Russia for not fulfilling the 1994 agreement. In 1998 at the Oslo Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE, Russia presented a plan for withdrawal of its troops from Transnistria by 2005. The 1999 Istanbul Summit of the OSCE approved a document concerning Russian troops in Transnistria setting a deadline of the end of 2002 for complete withdrawal of troops. In April 2004 Russia proposed the Kozak Memorandum advocating an asymmetric federation as per Moldovas desires, but Voronin still insisted on immediate withdrawal of Russian troops. On July 12, 2004 at his meeting with Russian ambassadors abroad, President Putin unusually emphasized that Russia should not assume that it has the right to dominate its relations with other ex-Soviet states, but should make

58

Resource Center of Moldovan Human Rights NGOs, Shadow Report on the Implementation of the Resolution ResCMN (2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe by the Republic of Moldova, November 2004, p. 8. Available at http://www.minelres.lv/reports/moldova/PDF_Moldova_Resource_Center_HR_ NGOs.pdf. Claus Neukirch, Transdniestria and Moldova: Cold Peace at the Dniestr, Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2001, p. 134.

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Russias relations with CIS members as attractive as possible.60 The refusal of President Voronin to sign the Kozak Memorandum along with the Transnistrian economic blockade was mentioned from the Russian side as the main obstacles causing the delay of the troop withdrawal in 2004 when a special high-ranking OSCE delegation visited Tiraspol. However, it should be noted that the Kozak Memorandum foresaw the presence of Russian troops for 20 more years. After the failure of the Kozak Memorandum, Russian policy towards Moldova changed. Russia started to support the Moldovan opposition, which started to pay frequent visits to Moscow. In 2005, Moscow banned the import of Moldovan fruit and vegetables. In 2006 the ban was extended to Moldovan wines and brandy. That represented a serious blow to the economy of Moldova, as wine exports make up an important part of the countrys income.61 The sanctions hit Moldovan wineries hard, though most belong to Russians: the sanctions cost Moldova about USD 200 million in 2006.62 While Russia put economic pressure on Moldova, it also reminded Moldova of the other levers of influence at its disposal: Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov declared in 2005 that the people of Transnistria can count on the Russian troops stationed in the region.63 However, in 2005 the Moldovan Parliament insisted on the withdrawal of Russian troops, threatening to unilaterally denounce the 1992 RussianMoldovan agreement on the presence of Russian troops. The possible termination of the agreement forced Russia to allow other international actors (USA, EU) to participate in the conflict settlement process, while continuing the pressure on Moldova. In January 2006 Russia cut Moldovas gas supply for 16 days and then negotiated a 100% price increase for future supplies.64 Russia also threatened to impose visa restrictions on Moldovan citizens working in Russia. However, Russia needed to regain the initiative in negotiations and to show itself an active player in the region. Perhaps because of this, during the CIS summit in November 2006, Putin and Voronin agreed on the lifting of the ban on Moldovan wine to Russia. Subsequently, there were rumours of a possible Russian-Moldovan deal envisioning settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in exchange for Moldovas reconfirming its neutral status and unconditionally recognizing Russian property rights over Transnistrias assets. Meanwhile Russia signed a cooperation
60 61

Ciobanu, NATO/EU Enlargement, p. 11. Zurab Todua, Russia Must Regain Initiative in Moldova, Russia in Global Affairs, JanuaryMarch 2007, p. 3. Ibid, p. 4. Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conflict, p. 78. See Robert L. Larsson, Russias Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russias Reliability as an Energy Supplier (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2006), pp. 2267.

62 63 64

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protocol with Transnistrian leader Smirnov for the first time recognizing Smirnov as President of Transnistria. On May 24, 2006 negotiations were held in Brussels on transforming the present Russian peacekeeping operation into an international one. A few days later Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov declared that Russian troops would remain in Transnistria until the conflict is settled.65 Russia has been content to maintain the status quo, which allows it full control in Transnistria and important leverage to use from time to time to pressure Chisinau.66 Russia has given its passports to Transnistrian residents in great numbers, using a Liberal Democratic Party of Russia office in Tiraspol as a de facto consulate.67 Since 1995, the Russian Federal Security Service envoy has used an office in the building of the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security.68 It is difficult for Moldova to compete with Russia in the dissemination of information, because a large part of Moldovas media belongs to Russia-based companies. Russia wants to maintain a military presence in the area, portrayed by some as the gateway to the Balkans. The areas strategic location is another reason why the Russian army positioned in Transnistria is unlikely to be withdrawn anytime soon.69 In 2006 alone Russia provided the Transnistrian region with aid amounting to USD 77 million. In comparison Moldova has received financial assistance from the EU during the period of 1991-2006 of about USD 415 million.70 Russian plans for federalizing Moldova have not been abandoned. There is a different approach towards solving the Transnistrian conflict from both sides. Moldova is ready to offer extensive economic and administrative concessions in the hope of reintegrating Transnistria. Meanwhile Russia wants to build such a configuration of power in Moldova that would allow the leadership from Tiraspol to be able to control Moldovas foreign and security policy. This could be a guarantee that would not allow Moldova to join the EU and NATO.71 Transnistrias comparison with Kosovo is not in Russian interests, as Russia supports the territorial integrity of Serbia, does not want to face international criticism regarding Transnistria and does not need new tensions with Moldova. Moreover, in the long run an independent Transnistria might become less responsive to Moscows wishes. If Russia recognizes Transnistrias independence, pro-Moscow politicians
65 66 67 68 69

International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 12. Urse, Transnistria, p. 6. International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 17. Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States, p. 83 . Svetlana Gamova, Moldova: A Three-Way Split, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, No.1, January 1994, p.43. George Dura, EU Membership Gives Romania New Opportunities in its Relations with Moldova, Centre for European Policy Studies Commentary, 10 January 2007. Minzazari, The New Transnistria Initiatives of President Voronin, p. 11.

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in Chisinau will be severely weakened. Keeping the elite of Tiraspol completely dependent on Moscow seems the best strategy that Russia has so far.72 It cannot be ruled out that Russia seeks a settlement for reunification of the Republic of Moldova as soon as possible. Russia controls not only the economy of Transnistria (a debt of USD 1 billion for gas supplies), but also a large share of the Moldovan economy. With Latvia and Bulgaria as examples of EU member states where Russian capital is very influential, Russia could be keen to see reunification of Moldova and its integration into the EU. Another feature to be taken into account is the possibility that the so-called Sheriff political group in Transnistria is interested in playing its own European game without orders from Moscow. The EU has excluded speaker of the Transnistrian parliament Shevchuk from the Schengen black list. If Moldova reunites, there will be members of the Moldovan parliament from Transnistria through whom Russia could realize its interests and stop Moldovas integration into the EU. Simultaneous integration into the EU and reintegration of the country is quite unlikely. Despite the strong factors militating towards the maintenance of the status quo, new initiatives and signals continue to emerge, suggesting the possibility of some movement in the medium term. During the visit of Ukrainian President Yuschenko to Moscow on February 13, 2008, he spoke with President Putin on the necessity of speeding up bilateral consultations to better coordinate positions on the settlement of the conflict. The common positions should include the observance of Moldovas territorial integrity and a special legal status for Transnistria. During a secret visit to Chisinau and Tiraspol in March 2008, former Russian ambassador, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Yuri Zubakov convinced Tiraspol to return to the negotiating table.73 However, official Tiraspol denied that it has accepted any new conflict settlement plan74 and said that there can be no common state with Moldova, as expressed by the Transnistrian people in the referendum of 2006. President Smirnov also revealed his opinion that Transnistria would be worse off if the Kozak memorandum had been signed.75

72 73 74 75

Urse, Transnistria, p. 14. http://www.moldpress.md/default.asp?Lang=en&ID=83198. http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/1569/print. http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/1653/print.

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4.2 Ukraine
Though Ukraine shares a 452 kilometre border with Moldova and the number of Ukrainians is roughly the same as that of Russians in Moldova, Ukraine is much more restrained than Russia with regard to the situation in Moldova. Ukrainians in Moldova, who mostly came to the border villages after the Second World War, live in compact settlements: out of 350 border villages in Moldova, around 100 are entirely Ukrainian and 200 are mixed. However, few Ukrainians in Moldova have a strong sense of attachment to Ukraine; elderly Ukrainians are more oriented towards Russia. According to the 1989 census, 40% of Moldovas Ukrainians speak Russian as their mother tongue. While they do not know Ukrainian, they are also against reunification with Romania. For them the Ukrainian state is more of a myth than Russia.76 Although the Ukrainians are the largest minority in Moldova, they were very passive in reasserting their national identity after the collapse of the USSR. This stems from the fact that Ukrainians were more assimilated during Soviet times, but also because, apart from border areas, they were not very concentrated, as opposed to the Gagauz and Bulgarians situated in the southern part of Moldova. Thus, the Ukrainian minority did not pose to the central authorities in Chisinau the kind of challenges that Russians did, and this issue did not become a problem that required a solution at the interstate level.77 In 1990 there were no Ukrainian schools in Moldova. When the Moldovan national movement emerged, that realization gave rise to the introduction of a campaign to encourage the Ukrainian community to open their schools. Though Ukrainians set up their cultural organizations, they do not believe there is sufficient political will to develop Ukrainian culture in Moldova.78 The Ukrainian language is classified as a regional language and language of a national minority. Moldova was the second republic after Kazakhstan to welcome by decree an association of Ukrainians with the support of the Ukrainian state. It has allowed 86 schools to open, but they lack staff and textbooks.79 There is no bilingual or trilingual education available in Moldova. Nevertheless Ukrainian authorities complain about the disproportional number of Ukrainian schools in Moldova in comparison with Moldovan schools in Ukraine (18 schools for the Moldovan language of instruction
76 77 78

Dressler, Between Empires and Europe, p. 44. Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, p. 32. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Second Opinion on Moldova, adopted on 9 December 2004, para. 19. Available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2._framework_ convention_%28monitoring%29/2._monitoring_mechanism/5._comments_by_the_ states_concerned/2._second_cycle/PDF_2nd_comments_Moldova.pdf. Dressler, Between Empires and Europe, p. 44.

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for 240,000 Moldovans).80 This is contrary to a 1992 Agreement between Moldova and Ukraine on Good Neighbourly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation which guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities to be taught in their own language. It is important to remember that after the Second World War Ukraine acquired the Romanian territories of Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia which were densely populated by Moldovans (Romanians). Ukraine is very supportive of a withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, to a large extent because Ukraine is facing the same problem in Crimea and is not interested in the presence of Russian troops on its western border. However, Kyiv has not been supportive of other Moldovan demands. On 1 August 2004, with a view to overcome the Transnistrian schools crisis, Moldova issued a resolution which stipulated that the only Transnistrian goods which would be permitted to cross the state border, including that with Ukraine, would be those for which the relevant Transnistrian companies had paid taxes to the Moldovan budget. Kyiv rejected this Moldovan initiative. Ukraine under President Kuchma treated Transnistria as a de facto state which had the right to exist, including to conduct external economic activities independently. Kuchmas stance was that Transnistria had two problems that needed to be addressed normalization of its relationship with Chisinau and lack of international recognition. Agreements concluded by Transnistria with some Ukrainian regions required the prior agreement of the Kyiv central authorities. Ukraine has shown an increasing interest in the northern districts of Transnistria predominantly populated by Ukrainians. Vladimir Botnar, chairman of the Association of the Ukrainians of Transnistria has visited Kyiv often, trying to set up in Ukraine a lobby similar to that in Russia.81 The situation changed with the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenkos assumption of the presidency in Ukraine. While the new Ukrainian elite was not united in its stance towards Moldova, a significant subgroup was pro-European and pro-NATO. It had won the elections on an anti-corruption platform and needed the support of the Republic of Moldova to stop smuggling across the Ukraine-Transnistria border. After the Orange Revolution, the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) organizations work was reactivated. All the member countries had to deal with Russian-supported territorial separatism. On April 22, 2005 during the GUAM Summit held in Chisinau President Yushchenko presented his version of a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. It was called the Seven Steps Paper and differed from the one discussed with Moldovan authorities beforehand. Seven Steps was a modernized version of the Kozak Memorandum legalizing the Transnistrian authorities. Yushchenko proposed to hold as soon
80 81

Interviews with Ukrainian diplomats in Chisinau on November 8, 2006. Nantoi, About the Situation in the East Districts, p. 9.

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as possible free and democratic elections to the Supreme Council of Transnistria.82 This was one of the first major foreign policy initiatives of the new Ukrainian government. On May 1617, 2005 Ukraine came out with a Plan for Settlement of the Transnistrian Conflict (the Vinnitsa Plan). According to the plan, Transnistria would be a legal entity that would become a republic in the federation of Moldova. Transnistria would have the right to take part in the foreign policy of Moldova in relevant fields of interest. Transnistria would be provided with a right of self-determination in case Moldova were to lose its independence. The plan contained a clause on international monitoring of Transnistria until Moldova recognizes the elected authorities of Transnistria. The plan envisaged signing an agreement which would guarantee a law on the special legal status of the Transnistrian region in the form of a republic within the Republic of Moldova with its own constitution, symbols and three official languages (Moldovan, Ukrainian, Russian). The agreement would have to be signed by Moldova, Russia and the OSCE. The plan would be signed in the presence of the USA and the EU. The Vinnitsa Plan did not provide for any involvement of Romania or say anything about the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria. The plan was heavily criticized not only by Romania, but also by Moldovan civil society. The Yuschenko plan provoked on June 10, 2005 the declaration of the Moldovan Parliament on democratization, decriminalization and demilitarization of Transnistria. It was followed by immediate adoption of the Law on the Basic Provisions of the Special Legal Status of Settlements on the Left Bank of Nistru (Transnistria) by the Parliament on July 22, 2005. The law established a special autonomous territorial unit Transnistria. It granted legislative and representative powers to the regional Supreme Soviet, which has to be elected under the supervision of the international electoral commission created under the auspices of the OSCE. The law also required that elections should follow Moldovan legislation and be monitored by the Council of Europe.83 The law proclaimed the supremacy of Moldovan laws over Transnistrian ones. The law said that detailed legal relations between Moldova and Transnistria would be worked out in a law which would be drafted in cooperation with a new system of government in Transnistria. In reaction to Yuschenkos proposal on fair elections in Transnistria, the Moldovan government lay out its own requirements for agreeing to such elections: liquidation of the Ministry of State Security, release of political prisoners, normal activity of political parties and nongovernmental organizations, international monitoring of the elections
82 83

Nantoi, The Plan for the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement, p. 5. Oleh Protsyk, Moldovas Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 53, No. 4, July/August 2006, p.34.

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and withdrawal of Russian troops. This was unacceptable to President Smirnov and Russia. The plan was acceptable to the international community (the OSCE and the Council of Europe), whose assistance Moldova was requesting. Following the law a detailed list of social guarantees for the population of Transnistria was elaborated on July 29, 2005. On June 2, 2005 representatives of the Ukrainian president met in Tiraspol with President Smirnov and asked for a comprehensive Ukrainian presence in Transnistria, first of all broadcasting Ukrainian TV channels throughout Transnistria. This would undermine the Russian information monopoly in Transnistria.84 In January 2006 President Yuschenko got political support to his plan from President Putin in the form of joint declaration on Transnistria. In March 2006 Ukraine and Moldova agreed upon a common customs regime for the Transnistrian segment of the common border. This move was welcomed by the USA and the EU, but elicited a very negative reaction from Transnistrian leaders, who called it a blockade of Transnistria. The new rules allowed the passage of Transnistrian goods through the Ukrainian border only if they were accompanied by the proper Moldovan customs documentation. Moldova facilitated the registration of Transnistrian enterprises with the authorities in Chisinau, simultaneously renouncing its rights to tax them. On May 23, 2006 the GUAM Summit in Kyiv stated that territorial annexations and the creation of enclaves can never become legal, which was a clear reference to the frozen conflicts,85 including the one in Transnistria. While this declaration pleased Moldovas leaders, soon thereafter, the Ukrainian authorities surprised Moldova with a new initiative. In June 2006 Ukraines foreign minister Boris Tarasyuk proposed expanding the existing negotiations format regarding the conflict in Transnistria by inviting Romania. Before, Ukraine had proposed including the US and the EU in the negotiations. These proposals were heavily criticized by Transnistria and Russia, who called Tarasyuk a U.S. agent and inspirer of Ukraines anti-Transnistrian actions.86 Subsequently, the destabilization of the political situation in Ukraine decreased pro-EU and pro-NATO activities in Ukrainian foreign policy, including its initiatives concerning the situation in Transnistria. However, Ukraine remains a key player in the region and Europeanization is the strongest ambition for both Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraines policy towards Moldova reflects Kyivs desire to play the role of a regional leader in Eastern Europe. The success of the EU Border Assistance Mission lies very much in the hands of Ukraine. Ukraines new Timoshenko government should cease official bilateral relations with the leaders of
84 85 86

Ibid., p. 9. Urse, Transnistria, p. 11. Ibid, p. 15.

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Transnistria, despite the fact that many Ukrainian businessmen support the status quo in the region. Ukraine is likely to continue to support Moldovas demand for a Russian troop withdrawal from Transnistria, as this would increase Ukraines political impact in the region.

4.3 Romania
Romania was the first country to recognize Moldovan independence in 1991. However, in the beginning of the 1990s Romania did not possess the necessary military, financial and economic resources to play a major role in Moldova. Romanias role increased when its European perspective became obvious. Nevertheless relations between the two countries were uneasy, especially after Communists came to power in Moldova in 2001. Moldovan leaders refused Romanias assistance in the European integration process, meanwhile asking for equality in the international arena.87 In 2003 Romania introduced a special fund for Moldova, financing cultural and economic projects between the two countries. However, this was characterized by Moldovan leaders as interference in Moldovas affairs. Nevertheless, improving relations with Romania is the only way Moldova can become closer to the EU. Bruce Jackson, a former leader of the US Committee for NATO, has even called for Chisinau-Bucharest relations to become as intimate as Kyiv-Warsaw or Warsaw-Vilnius relations.88 However, a public opinion poll in 2004 showed that only 19% of Moldovans believe that developing relations with Romania is a priority, while 41% chose Russia.89 After joining NATO, the Romanian government started to seek a more active role in the Black Sea region and in Moldova particular. It was not by accident that new Romanian President Traian Basescu chose Chisinau as the destination of his first visit abroad following his inauguration in December 2004.90 On July 1, 2006 Traian Basescu caused a political storm when he said he had offered Moldova the option of joining the EU with Romania. President Voronin quickly ruled this out, but the Transnistrian security chief, Vladimir Antiufeev, seized on the comment as evidence of

87

Odette Tomescu-Hatto, Romanian-Moldovan Political and Economic Relations. International Conference Paper Europe and the Transition Process in the Republic of Moldova, July 23, 2004, organized by SudostEuropa-Gesellschaft in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office, p. 25. Ibid., p. 28. Social Monitor, Public Opinion Survey, Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (ISDI) Viitorul, Chisinau, October 2004, p. 81. Marius Vahl, The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conflict, Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief, No. 73 / May 2005, p. 1.

88 89

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continued Romanian claims on Moldova and called for a larger Russian military presence in Transnistria.91 Although Romanian-Moldovan relations have improved in recent years, Romania has criticized Moldova for insisting on mentioning the Moldovan language in EU documents. This was the case with the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements, which occasioned harsh statements between Moldovan and Romanian officials with Romania threatening not to recognize and sign any documents drafted in this language. The language issue could become one of the core disputes in Moldovan-Romanian relations as the Moldovan government has started to publish Moldovan-Romanian dictionaries. At the same time, collaboration in the educational field is intense, with Romania granting many scholarships for Moldovan youth to study in Romania. When Romania became an EU member state in 2007 Romanian citizenship became very attractive for Moldovans, because it opened the door to travel and work in many European Union countries. There are no statistical data regarding how many Moldovans are simultaneously Romanian citizens, but the number usually mentioned is 1 million. Romanian authorities speak only about 100,000 Moldovans who have acquired Romanian citizenship.92 Other data show that in 7% of households in Moldova at least one member holds Romanian citizenship and in 19% of households, there are members who have already applied for Romanian citizenship.93 This means that Romanias role in Moldovas internal affairs is growing. It is not difficult to obtain Romanian citizenship and the Romanian government has not placed any significant hurdles to those taking this step. All descendants of those who were Romanian citizens in 1940 can apply. This is leading to a situation in which Moldova has a shrinking base of citizens, as, in addition to a large number of Romanian citizens, a significant number of people have acquired Russian or Ukrainian citizenship. If Moldova continues to move towards the European Union, the role of Romania will only increase. Very recently Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Cioroianu declared that Moldovas accession to the European Union is a foreign policy priority for Romania.94 At the same time, Romanian President Traian Basescu has criticised the EU for not doing more to solve the Transnistrian conflict.
91 92

International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 19. Romania/Moldova: Bucharest Has Moral Duty to Help Moldovas EU Ties, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 12, 2008. Barometer of Public Opinion May 2007. Press release, (Chisinau: Institute of Public Policy, N.D.). Available at http://www.ipp.md/files/Barometru/2007/Rezumat_ de_presa_BOP_mai_2007_English.doc. Romania/Moldova: Bucharest Has Moral Duty to Help Moldovas EU Ties, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 12, 2008.

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V. The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing Ethnic Conflict

5.1 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
From the early 1990s, the most influential regional organization involved in Moldova has been the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE comprises all the major players in the region Russia, Ukraine, Romania and the United States. On February 4, 1993 the OSCE Committee of Senior Officials adopted the mandate for a mission to Moldova, which opened in April 1993 and is still operating.95 The mandate called for consolidation of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its current borders and a special status for the Transnistrian region. The Mission was also charged with facilitating an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops, observance of international obligations and commitments regarding human and minority rights and assistance in monitoring the implementation of agreements on a durable political settlement.96 It is not the task of the Mission to ascertain which of the sides was responsible for the conflict and the 1992 events. The broad wording of the mandate gave the Heads of the Mission a great deal of leeway not only in the conduct of day to day operations, but also in the choice of strategies and instruments. However, some common ground can be seen in the activities of all the Heads of the Mission respect for the territorial integrity of Moldova, an understanding that broad autonomy has to be arranged for Transnistria, and the call for the timely, complete and orderly withdrawal of Russian troops.97 During the summer of 2003 the OSCE Mission was left outside the real negotiations Russian presidential representative Dmitri Kozak led with Moldovan and Transnistrian leaders. In parallel, the 2+3 format negotiations continued. Meanwhile the Dutch 2003 OSCE Chairmanship had declared Moldova to be one of the priorities during its chairmanship. The Kozak Memorandum episode showed Russian tactics in using international organizations when they can be of benefit, but acting

95

William Hill, Making Istanbul a Reality: Moldova, Russia, and Withdrawal from Transdniestria, Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2002, p. 133. CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3, Annex 3, 4 February 1993. Neukirch, Transdniestria and Moldova, p. 127.

96 97

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independently if Russian interests can be pursued in that way. Moreover, both strategies can be used in parallel. With the failure of the Kozak Memorandum, Russia faced criticism for not living up to the obligations it had undertaken in the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit regarding the withdrawal of troops from Transnistria. The OSCE 2002 summit granted a one years delay, which meant the deadline was the end of 2003. At the time, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov spoke bitterly against the Netherlands (chair of the OSCE at that time), the United States, the OSCE and the Council of Europe: If we really want the OSCE to play a dignified role in solving problems, we cannot allow her to change into an instrument of separate states.98 In autumn 2006 the OSCE under the Belgian chairmanship came out with a new plan for settling the conflict in Transnistria. The plan was inspired by Belgian federalism and certain elements from the Kozak Memorandum. It included an OSCE mandated peacekeeping operation in Transnistria, the creation of a bicameral parliament of Moldova with an upper chamber with overrepresentation for Transnistria. The plan also envisaged the possibility of Transnistrian independence in the event that Moldova united with Romania. In general the activities of the OSCE are often criticized not only by Transnistrian leaders, but also by Moldovan society as being contrary to Moldovas interests because of the role Russia plays inside OSCE decision-making processes. On July 3, 2004 President Voronin signed a common statement of CIS presidents that the OSCE does not respect such fundamental principles as non-interference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty instead of concentrating on militarypolitical, economic, and environmental elements.99 The OSCE is blamed for introducing the concept of the federalization of Moldova, though, starting in 1993 when the Mission was established, it was always against any confederation between Moldova and Transnistria on an equal basis. Nevertheless, the OSCE has accepted the de facto statehood of Transnistria, inviting it to the negotiating table. On the other hand, the OSCE has always defended the territorial integrity of Moldova. The position of the OSCE has not changed over the years. On January 17, 2008 the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Finnish Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva called for the resumption of talks over Transnistria. He visited Moldova, including Transnistria, as part of his first trip in office.100 Until very recently, the OSCEs role in preventing ethnic conflict was the most important among various international organizations engaged
98

John Lowenhardt. The OSCE, Moldova and Russian Diplomacy in 2003,Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2004, p.110. Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States, p. 142. OSCE Chairman Calls for Transdniestria Settlement Talks to Restart, Welcomes Positive Signs from Both Sides, OSCE Mission to Moldova press release, http:// www.osce.org/moldova.

99 100

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in the region. While the OSCE Mission in Chisinau and various ad hoc commissions have engaged Moldova, so has the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who has monitored the Moldovan language teaching programme in Gagauzia. However, contrary to the situation in the Baltic states, the HCNMs involvement on the ground has been rather minimal apart from Rolf Ekeuss visit to Tiraspol in 2005 after the violent closure of Moldovan Latin-script schools . In general the OSCE Mission has not been able to mediate a political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict during 15 years of its work. But this is due to no fault of the OSCE per se, but reflects the obstruction of Russia and a lack of political will from other OSCE member states to take a more assertive stance in the conflict.

5.2 The European Union

When the Republic of Moldova gained its independence in 1991, the profile of the European Union (EU) was very different from what it is now. There was no European Union, but a European Economic Community, and there was no Common Foreign and Security Policy. Unlike the Baltic states, Moldova did not formulate its foreign policy goal as a journey back to Europe.101 It tried to implement a policy of equidistance regarding the East and the West. From the perspective of Brussels, Moldova was in the same basket as Mongolia. Moldova had no natural friends or allies in Western Europe. Moldova was too small and economically weak to be an interesting partner. It was in a completely different situation than the Baltic countries, which had their advocates among the Nordic countries. Moldova was offered a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU only in 1994. The Agreement touched the human dimension and political stability in the region (including Transnistria), but did not make any promises of possible membership in the EU. In 2003 when the European Commission announced its European Neighbourhood Policy, Moldova was put in this ring of friends. This was evidence that Moldovas chances for EU membership were weak and unclear. For its part, Moldova requested the EU to open a Commissions Delegation in Chisinau. In September 2003 Moldova submitted to the EU a Strategy for Moldovas Integration into the EU. At the end of 2003 Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen visited Chisinau and issued a tough message to Moldova that no ex-Soviet Republic would become an EU

101

Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, p. 39.

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member in the following 20 years.102 However, at the same time, in its country report in 2004, the European Commission wrote that the EU has stepped up its political engagement towards conflict resolution over past years and remains strongly committed to assisting this process.103 The integration of Cyprus into the EU gave President Voronins administration hope of joining the EU despite the breakaway region of Transnistria.104 In 2005 the EU and the USA became observers of the negotiation process within the 2+3 format. Due to the consistent efforts made by the EU, on October 5, 2005 the European Commission, Moldova and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). This breakthrough had become possible when European oriented parties came to power in Ukraine in 2004. The European Union monitors the Moldovan-Ukrainian border with a view to block the illegal traffic in arms, drugs and human beings. The mandate of the EUBAM mission has been extended until November 30, 2009. On February 22, 2005 the EU-Moldova Action Plan for the next three years was signed, setting priorities for settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and reform on a range of primarily domestic issues. After the March 6, 2005 national elections in Moldova, all the parliamentary parties signed a declaration concerning integration into the EU. The declaration also contains guarantees for national minorities. On March 23, 2005 the EU Council appointed Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged as EU Special Representative for Moldova. He previously served as the special envoy on Transnistria of the 2003 OSCE Dutch Chairman-inOffice. His tasks were to strengthen the EU contribution to settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and assist in further development of MoldovanEU relations. The next day the Moldovan parliament adopted a political declaration regarding European integration. On October 6, 2006 EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner opened the new Delegation of the European Commission in Chisinau. The European Union has been working in the field of people-to-people contacts, negotiating a visa-facilitation agreement with Moldova and opening a joint visa application centre in Chisinau in 2007. On March7, 2007 the EU Country Strategy Paper 20072013 for the Republic of Moldova was adopted by the Commission. The subsequent National Indicative Programme 20072013 does not contain settlement of the
102

Valeriu Gheorghiu, Which Role Can the EU Play to Enhance the Overall Political and Economic Situation in the Republic of Moldova?. International Conference Paper Europe and the Transition Process in the Republic of Moldova, July 23, 2004, organised by SudostEuropa-Gesellschaft in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office, p. 30. Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy. Country Report Moldova, COM (2004) 373, Brussels 2004, p. 10. Adrian Pop, Gabriela Pascariu, George Anglitoiu, Alexandru Purcarus, p. 77.

103

104

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Transnistrian conflict as a priority. However, if necessary, further specific assistance could be allocated for such an activity. On the other hand, the EU Country Strategy Paper states that the EC will continue its current strong engagement in support of a settlement of the Transnistria conflict, in full respect of Moldovas territorial integrity105 and finding a solution to the Transnistrian conflict, in full respect of Moldovas territorial integrity is a key priority of the Moldovan government.106 The EC evaluates its cooperation with the Moldovan government on all questions related to Transnistria settlement as good.107 However, EU member states cannot agree on sending an EU peace keeping force to Transnistria. Romania is very keen to be involved in peacekeeping, while Germany and France, along with High Representative Javier Solana, are not ready for this step.108 Nevertheless the European Parliament passed a resolution on the territorial integrity of Moldova, denounced the results of the Transnistrian independence referendum, and demanded Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova. EU integration has become more and more popular in Moldova. If a referendum concerning the accession of Moldova to the EU was held in summer 2007, 72% of people would have voted for accession.109 However, the leaders of the EU have on numerous occasions repeated that there is no chance for Moldova to become an EU member state, thereby reducing the leverage of the EU in Moldova. The incentives for compliance are strongest for the EU accession states and much weaker for those neighbouring CIS states granted a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement excluding the option of membership.110 The EU has been a reluctant actor in the frozen conflicts, unwilling to directly confront Russia on issues related to the former Soviet space. This has been the case even though the region is becoming the EUs immediate neighbourhood. One obvious explanation is Europes dependence on Russias energy resources. Another is the difficulty in articulating a coherent, far-reaching European foreign policy.111 During his meeting with President Putin in early April 2005, for instance, High Representative Solana stated that parts of the Kozak Memorandum

105

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Republic of Moldova. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p. 14, available at. http://ec.europa.eu/world/ enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf. Ibid, p. 5. Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2008) 399 Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007, Progress Report Moldova, p. 2, available at http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/whatsnew/pdf/moldova_clean_final.pdf. International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 5. Barometer of Public Opinion May 2007. Berg and van Meurs. Borders and Orders in Europe, p. 54. Urse, Transnistria, p. 16.

106 107

108 109 110 111

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were highly appreciated.112 For his part, EU Special Representative for Moldova Kalman Mizsei in November 2007 said that the differences between Moldova and Transnistria are not just ecomomic, but political and emotional. He warned against over-simplification of the conflict.113 However, in April 2008 the EU Presidency has noted that the Transnistrian conflict cannot be compared with the situation in Kosovo, which is sui generis.114 The role of the European Union in Moldova during the last 16 years has increased dramatically. In 1992 there was practically no involvement of the EU in Moldova and its conflict with Transnistria. The higher profile can be explained with reference to the European Neighbourhood Policy adopted in 2003 and most importantly with the enlargement of the EU. Moldova now has advocates in Brussels not only through Romania, but also through other Central and East European countries. There are various moves towards establishing a Black Sea Union or Eastern European Union, similar to the Mediterranean Union established on the initiative of France. Along with Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova could be among the New Neighbourhood states to form such a union. The EU can become the most influential international organization in Moldova, but much depends on the ability of its member states to reach a consensus. The EU has at its disposal the tools to act in the region (a travel ban on Transnistrian leaders, the EU Border Mission together with Ukraine, resources, granting market access and visa facilitation), but to enjoy leverage with Moldova, there needs to be a credible promise of EU membership sometime in the future. Such a prospect could also change the stance of the population of Transnistria towards a future in a unified Moldova. Overall the EU remains very weak in Moldova compared to Russia, which can offer market access to Moldovan wine and agricultural products, as well as energy deliveries. Nevertheless the EU doubled its assistance to Moldova to 254 million euros for the period 2007-2010, thereby making Moldova the second highest per capita beneficiary of EU aid under the European Neighbourhood Policy after the Palestinian Authority.115 Romania and other advocates of Moldova will have to work hard to have Moldova grouped together with the Western Balkan states in the Stabilization and Association Process, which have an accession perspective. Currently Moldova does not have such a perspective and, without it, Europeanization is not effective.

112 113 114 115

Vahl, The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conflict, p. 6. http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/1442/print. http://www.azi.md/news?ID=49018.

George Dura, EU Membership Gives Romania New Opportunities in its Relations with Moldova, Centre for European Policy Studies Commentary, 10 January 2007.

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5.3 The Council of Europe

The Republic of Moldova became the first CIS country to join the Council of Europe in 1995 (at the same time as Latvia). Admission was more than acceptance into the European democratic family, it actually represented further recognition on the international level of Moldovas independence and a consolidation of its statehood. Moldova ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1997. Two problems characterized Moldovas relations with the Council of Europe: recognition and legalization of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, and the case of the political prisoners in Transnistrian jails both subjects of trials at the European Court of Human Rights.116 The issue of the Metropolitan Church is related to Moldovas relations with Romania. During the Soviet era, the Metropolitan Church was under the Russian Patriarchy. After gaining independence, the authorities of Moldova refused to establish the historical authority of the Romanian Orthodox Church over the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church. Nevertheless the European Court of Human Rights established historical and legal relations between the Romanian Church and Bessarabian Church. The so called Ilascu group was arrested in 1992 in Transnistria during the fighting over the Nistru. Ilie Ilascu himself was a leader of the branch of the Moldovan Popular Front in Tiraspol. Four men including Ilascu were accused by Transnistrian authorities of terrorism. Ilascu was sentenced to death, while others were sentenced to twelve and fifteen years in prison. Because of pressure from the international community, Ilascus sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. In 1999 the Ilascu groups legal team accused Moldova and Russia of violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and submitted an application before the Strasbourg organs. Ilascu was released from prison in 2001 after President Voronin came to power in Chisinau and had an intense dialogue with Smirnov. However, on July 8, 2004 the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgement, stating that the other applicants must be immediately released and that Moldova and Russia must pay penalties for breach of the prohibition of torture and the right to liberty and security. The case was highly complicated and politically sensitive. Ilascu acquired Romanian citizenship in 2000 and was twice elected a member of the Moldovan Parliament and appointed as a member of the Moldovan Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In December 2000 after becoming a Romanian citizen, he was elected to the Romanian Parliament and appointed again as a member to the Parliamentary Assembly.
116

Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, p. 38.

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As the plaintiffs regarded the court of Transnistria which convicted them as not having proper jurisdiction, they submitted that the Moldovan authorities were responsible for the alleged violations, since Chisinau had not taken adequate measures to put a stop to them. In their submission, they blamed Russia as well, insofar as the territory of Transnistria was under Russias de facto control owing to the stationing of its troops and military equipment there and the support it gave to the separatists. The Court stated that the Moldovan government as the only legitimate government of the Republic of Moldova was responsible for the actions on its territory. Regarding Russias role, the Court declared that the 14th Russian army on behalf of Transnistrian separatist forces and Russia had therefore contributed both militarily and politically to the creation of a separatist regime on the territory of Moldova. The Court also concluded that Russian troops were still stationed in Transnistria in breach of OSCE commitments. The Court dismissed the judgements made by the Supreme Court of Transnistria, because it did not recognize its legitimacy. Although the role of the European Court of Human Rights is essential, other Council of Europe bodies have also engaged in Moldova. Moldova was monitored regarding the situation of national minorities and the Council of Europe rarely engaged itself in the Transnistrian problem. The Council of Europe nevertheless has expressed the necessity to resolve the Transnistrian problem.117 During his visit to Moldova in summer 2006 President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Rene van der Linden addressed the Transnistrian problem, encouraging the population of Transnistria to rejoin a united country. Nevertheless, the role of the Council of Europe is quite weak apart from a few court cases. This is in contrast to the situation in Estonia and Latvia, where involvement of the Council of Europe was one of the most important factors shaping ethnic policy. There are no signs that the role of the Council of Europe in Moldova could increase in the near future.

117

Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Second Opinion on Moldova, adopted on 9 December 2004, para. 19. Available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2._framework_convention_ %28monitoring%29/2._monitoring_mechanism/5._comments_by_the_states_ concerned/2._second_cycle/PDF_2nd_comments_Moldova.pdf.

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VI. Conclusion
Ethnic relations between various groups in Moldova can be described as good, while the policy towards the Gagauz must be recognized as particularly liberal. Neighbouring and kin states have not raised any significant complaints regarding Moldovas ethnic policy. The same applies to the reactions of various international organizations. Although Moldovans tend to say that there is no ethnic conflict in Transnistria, the conflict has some ethnic characteristics (language issues, the perception of history). Moldovans can employ two strategies in their efforts to reestablish the territorial integrity of the country: wait for a deterioration of Transnistrias economy; establish contacts with the opposition in Transnistria and attempt to change the regime in a peaceful manner. As noted above, however, the Transnistrian economy is in some respects more robust than that of Moldova, and Transnistria lacks a true opposition. This means that much depends on the international community. Moldova has always been a playground of different regional great powers Russia, Turkey, and Romania. Nothing has changed in the 21st century, as Moldova remains subject to the influence of the policies of bigger countries. There are no signs that Russia could decrease the pressure on Moldova, and incoming President Dmitry Medvedev will likely follow a similar line to that of his predecessor. The stability of the region depends very much on Ukraine. The future of Ukraines foreign policy goals can be the key factor in resolving the Transnistrian conflict. Without the assistance of Ukraine, the territorial integrity of Moldova is not achievable. The role of Romania has increased since it became an EU member state and began to raise issues pertaining to Moldova within the European Union. The common language factor is important in Moldovas integration hopes into the EU. In the event that the Moldovan opposition comes to power after the 2009 national elections, renewed talk and action regarding reunification with Romania are possible, which could generate additional tensions with Transnistria and even Gagauzia. The OSCE has been the most influential regional organization throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless its potential is exhausted, as it has not been able to achieve any settlement for 15 years. This is due to the composition of the OSCE, in which Russia as a member state uses the organization when it is profitable, but shows little real interest in

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its activities otherwise. The same holds true for the Council of Europe, which has not been a very active political player in Moldova. The European Union has great potential to assume a larger role with regard to Moldova. Since 2003 its role has increased dramatically with the opening of a Commission Delegation in Chisinau and the appointment of the Special Representative. Enlargement of the European Union has given its Neighbourhood Policy a new push. Central and Eastern European countries are not disinterested in what happens just across their national borders. The EU has to agree on a EU peacekeeping mission in Moldova as was done regarding a mission in Kosovo. That would be a real example of the common foreign policy, and would help Moldova to replace Russianled peacekeepers. Secondly the European Union must give Moldova the hope of possible membership, otherwise the European enthusiasm of Moldovan leaders can decrease, as has already happened in the past. This would be a sign for the Transnistrians as well. There is a prospect for a future unified Moldova in which the interests of national minorities are respected, but the key question is the identity chosen by Moldovans: as an independent country that is part of the West, as part of Romania or as part of the East with a strong Russian influence. Outside actors cannot solve the Transnistrian conflict, but they can help to find solutions and guarantee agreements. The burden is on the Moldovan government, as solutions imposed from the outside cannot be long-term.

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About the author

Renrs Danelsons holds masters degrees in European Law from Copenhagen Business School and in International Law and Political Science from the University of Latvia. Currently, he is writing a dissertation in Political Science at the University of Latvia on International Regime Theory and Prevention of Ethnic Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe. He has also worked in the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1996 and currently holds the position of counsellor in the Legal and Consular Directorate.

Moldova, Minorities and the International Community Renrs Danelsons LU Akadmiskais apgds Bazncas iela 5, Rga, LV-1010 Tlrunis 7034535 Iespiests SIA Latgales druka