Now let's look at the relationship between economical development, and democracy by zeroing in a bit more on the human

development index. I want to first look at the relationship between poverty and democracy, one imp, implication of Lipsitz's thesis could be that, well, if you're very poor you know, forget about democracy. That however was not what Lipsitz intended to argue, because of course in the 1950s, you had a few poor countries that were democracies, like India. and Costa Rica. And India was a very poor country in the 1950s. And Lipsitz is a great comparativist, was well aware of it. So, he put the relationship in terms of probabilities. The more well to do a country, the higher probability of sustaining democracy. The less well to do a democracy. the west well to do less developed a country, the lower the probability of sustaining a democracy. If we take the most recent data for human development in 2011, and then most recent data for democracy at the end of 2012 as measured by Freedom House. We see the following, that there were 13 electoral democracies among the low-income, low human development countries of the world. The 46 that were in the lowest category, according to the UNDP. That's a 28% democracy rate. Now, what about the other groups as we move up the ladder, in terms of human development? Well, what we find as we move up the ladder is a stunning correlation, between development and democracy. Low human development 28% of the countries are at least electoral democracies, medium human development 45% are electoral democracy. High human development 70% and as I said very high 89% so take all the countries in the world. Separate them into four relatively equal numbers of countries and grade them on human development. as you move up the ladder, you have a higher probability of democracy, and I might add. that a higher probability of liberal democracy because among the very high, human development countries, they're all,

relatively liberal democracies. An here again you see this nice step pattern, moving up the ladder from low to very high human development. The probability of a country being democracy rises with each step up the ladder. This was the case in 2010 as well when the Human Development Index, divided countries into five groups. Low human development, low medium development, upper medium development and so on. but particularly as you get to the three highest categories, you see this nice step pattern. Now we can dig deeper into this by looking at the countries that in 2011, had low human development. And seeing how we classify them, in terms of the extend of democracy only two of the 13 democracies among the low human development countries. Were liberal democracies and these countries are very small countries in terms of population, Benin and Sao Tome and Principe. the other eleven countries, that are democracies with low human development are, for the most part, also small countries. Bangladesh, of course, here would be the biggest exception. and some of them are rather illiberal. a score of four on the civil liberties scale, the first score in parentheses for the Freedom House scores is political rights, the second score is civil liberties. A score of four is only at the mid point of the seven point scale. And when a country has a four on civil liberties, there are very serious problems, in terms of freedom, human rights violations, the rule of law, and so on. Moreover we see that sixteen of these low human development countries might have had democracy, had democracy at one point in time. But suffered a breakdown of democracy, in some cases like Niger and Zambia democracy returned. And in other cases like Kenya and Burundi and Madagascar, and so on it hasn't returned. I said that of the high, human development countries, 41 of the 46 are democracies. All these are liberal democracies.

Only Singapore, Brunei, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates among these 46, are not democracies. We find then, a strong correlation between development and democracy. The relationship has eroded somewhat at the lower end. That is, there are more low human development countries that are democracies now, that there would have been when Semore Martin Lipsitz was writing his formative work in the 1950s. Or even 1960s a or even 1970s the third wave of democracy has expanded. To take in many more low income countries as democracies, but as I noted in a the previous lecture. The breakdowns of democracy, have also come disproportionately among low income countries and this suggests if we go back to the precise language of Lipsitz's thesis. The more well to do a country, the greater the chances of its sustaining democracy, that in absence, Lipsitz was almost prophetic in anticipating that if democracy arrived in low income countries. Low, low development countries, it would be much more difficult to sustain, not impossible but more difficult, and we'll see why as we proceed through this lecture. For now I want to summarize some of our other findings. with some additional observations. the second point I would make, is that there's an even stronger correlation between development and freedom, than there is between development and democracy. the correlation between these holds, even if we exclude the rich western countries and look only at countries outside the advanced industrial west. In Asia, Africa, Latin America, and so on, and the correlation holds if we look within each major, what you'd call cultural zone or civilization. the only one for which that would not be true is the Islamic world, because of the presence of so many oil dependent states among the Muslim majority states of the Arab Middle East. Now, I'm going to be presenting a lot of evidence analysis. From very famous book on modernization by Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, that gives powerful new theory to explain the relationship between democracy and

development. but I want to begin by presenting some of their analysis, of the relationship between democracy and human development. Looking at their correlation coefficients among countries, a few years ago on these scales. They found that the presence of democracy, by the polity score of political regimes, was correlated with human development to a 0.59 correlation. Which means that about 35% of the variation in the extent of democracy in the world, can be explained by human development scores. If we look at the Freedom House scores of freedom in the world and correlate with those, with human development. Then we find the correlation rises to 0.64, that explains about 41% of the variance in freedom. But then they introduce something extremely interesting, what they call Effective Democracy. Now, effective democracy takes the freedom score and multiplies it by the World Bank governance score. In terms of control of corruption, so think of this as a measure of liberal democracy what they call effective democracy. The extent of freedom, with the rule of law and here we see something very striking. Not surprising, given the previous slides, but stunning. The correlation between effective democracy, a kind of measure of liberal democracy, and the human development index, is 0.77. Which means you can explain about 60% of the variation, among effective democracy in the world, by looking at the levels of human development.