ToReadHegel Part1

RobbertA.Veen@2009 Allrightsreserved

TheStructureofHegel'sPhilosophy and theIdeaofthePhenomenologyofSpirit

by RobbertVeen

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Foreword
Letmestartbysayingwhatyouwill notfindinthisvolume. Iwillnot provideyouwithanyreferencestoHegel'sbiography,historicalcircums tances or dealings with other philosophers. Not only because this has beendonebeforePinkard'sexcellentworkonHegeltreatsthephiloso phyaswellasthemanasdidRosencrantzbeforehiminhisvolumeson HegelandtheStatebutbecauseHegelhimselfwarnsusintheopening paragraphofthePrefacetothePhenomenology,thatallofthisissuper fluousinunderstandingthenatureoftheconcept.
Inthecaseofaphilosophicalworkitseemsnotonlysuperfluous,but,inview ofthenatureofphilosophy,eveninappropriateandmisleadingtobegin,aswrit ers usually do in a preface, by explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstanceswhichgaverisetothework,andtherelationinwhichthewriter takesittostandtoothertreatisesonthesamesubject,writtenbyhispredeces sorsorhiscontemporaries.

Inthisseriesunderthetitle"ToReadHegel"Iwilldoexactlythis:read Hegel and show you what I found. This first volumes of the series are devoted to the Phenomenology, especially its position within Hegel's philosophyasawhole,andIwilltrytogiveyouanunderstandingofits method. In a summary of the Phenomenology I will try to outline the whole of the work, providing a road map for what lies ahead. Much of thisworkwasalreadyavailableontheinternet,withtheexceptionofthe finalessayon SubstanceandSubjectthatwasespeciallywrittenforthis volume. R.A.Veen,September2009 Huizen,theNetherlands 5

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ToReadHegel

1.WhyDoWeStillNeedtoReadHegel?
Summary Hegel can be read in order to improve one's skills at inter pretingdifficultphilosophicaltexts,toimproveone'sownunderstanding oftheworldandtoappreciatemuchofmodernphilosophythatisindi alogwithhim.TounderstandHegeloneneedsa"voice"thatcanprovide thenecessarycontextfordecipheringHegel'ssometimesobscurewaysof thinking. APersonalResponse You can make a delicate and complex argument why it is necessary to understand Hegel's philosophy. You can write about the importance of his logic, his dialectics, to the understanding of human communication andsocialinstitutions.YoucanshowelaboratelyhowHegelwasthefirst tounderstandthenatureofmodernsociety,andconstructacriticalposi tiononcurrentissuesfromhisphilosophyofright.Andeventhoughwe havefoundHegeltobeincorrectinmanyofhispositionsonthenatural sciencesandhistoryhefoundnoroome.g.fortheconceptofbiological evolution1thewayheconstructedaphilosophyofnatureandthehistory oftheSpiritisstillexemplaryinmanyways. EvenifyoucannotacceptHegel'sapproachandfindings,it'sstillagood thingtoknowabouthimanyway,becausesomanycontemporaryphilo sophershavetakenhisinsightsasastartingpoint.Slavojiekiscertain
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Apparentlyhoweverhedidunderstandthenecessary"reflective"characterof chemicalprocesseslongbeforethesewerediscoveredtobeessentialforthe understandingofbiology,inwhatwenowknowasthecapacityofDNAmole culestoreplicatethemselves.

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lythebestknownoftheminthepresenthecomparedhisrelationshipto Hegel,withthatofMartinLuthertoSt.Paulbutyoucouldalsomen tionJacquesDerrida,VitorioHssleandmanyothers. TheComplexityofHegelisFascinating What makes Hegel so fascinating? I am not ashamed to say that I be came obsessed with Hegel because it takes so much time and effort to understandhim.Itwouldseemthatthecomplexityofhisworkandsome timeseventheobscuritycanbefascinatingonapersonallevel,butthatin itself is not very inviting. To me personally however it was and still is quitetrue.Theartofinterpretingaphilosophicaltextreachesitshighest levelinthecaseofHegel'swritings. AllofthelaborthatyouneedtoputintounderstandingHegelhashow everalsoasolidrevenue.UnderstandingHegelisalwaysaccompaniedby animprovedunderstandingoftheworld,ourcultureandourselves.One might disagree with him in every respect, but you get the feeling that nothingisoverlooked.It'sdazzling.Everythingisthere.Thereishardly anyoriginalthoughtthatwehave,thatHegeldidnotanticipate,formulate andshowedtobeinadequate.Somepeople,especiallyintheDutchtradi tion of neoHegelianism, didn't even try to be original. Philosophy to them meant rewriting and editing Hegel, applying the system to new problems."UnderstandingHegelmeansunderstandingthathecannotbe surpassed,"saidGermanphilosopherRichardKronerinthe1920s.That goesevenbeyondthefamousdictumthattheentirehistoryofphilosophy consistsofnothingbutfootnotestoPlato. It doesn't mean that Hegel is the only philosopher one should read. I havereadPlato,Aristotle,ThomasandKantextensively,andItrytokeep upwithcontemporaryphilosophyaswell.Ialwayshadaspecialinterest in theJewish philosophy of Martin Buber, Immanuel Lvinas and Emil Fackenheim. I like reading Heidegger, Derrida, Badiou, Agamben and iek.AndlatelyIhadarenewedinterestinEnglishphilosophy:Locke, 8

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HumebutalsoRawlsandothers.Iamindebtedtoallofthem.Butnone of them have pages that are so delightfully complex, so cramped with obscurebrillianceasHegel's. UnderstandingtheWorldBetter Alloftheseargumentshoweverremainrathersuperficial.Ifphilosophyis about understanding the world, then the only good reason for reading Hegelmustbethathemakesusunderstandtheworldbetterthananybody else.Ultimatelythereisnofunininterpretingtextsjustfortheheckofit. Now does he do that? I think there are at least three basic principlesin Hegel'sphilosophythatweneedinourcontemporaryefforts. First of all, though mostly misunderstood, we need to understand He gel's thesis about the identity of the concept and its reality. It is badly misunderstood if we just take that as a statement of principle by itself. Thatis,ifwemeanbythat,thatthesubjectiveideathatwehaveisiden ticaltothematerialrealityoutthere.Hegelneversaidthat.Understand ingwhathedidsayturnsouttobeaveryprosperousenterprise. Letmetrybrieflytosketchitouttogiveyouapreliminaryidea.Atleast youcansaythatourmodesofthinkingandtherealitythatweliveinare notfullydivergent.Ourwayofthinkingandknowingispartoftheworld weknow.Youcanapproachthatfrommanyperspectives:asaspecimen ofnaturewefindwithinourselvesagrowingunderstandingoftheworld, that is in some way a product of the world itself. Nature comes to self understandingwithinus.HegelhimselfstressedtheideathattheAbsolute isSpirit,andthatthisAbsoluteSpiritisinvolvedinaprocessinwhichit realizes itself both in nature and in the historical cultures of humanity. (HereHegelmighthavebeentemptedtounderstand"nature"initsown specifichistoricity,asnaturalselectionandbiological evolution,butun fortunatelyforhimaswellasforus,Darwincametoolate.)Butthereare manyotherwaystoapproachthis. Second,andtomequiteimportant,isHegel'sanalysisofEuropeancul 9

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ture,society,religion,andhistory.Allofthesehave"objective"characte ristics,andyettheyarederivedfromanddependentonhumanthought. Atleasthereitissafetosaythatthoughtandrealityareinidentity. That is not without consequences! Especially because the concept in Hegelisnotjustajustificationofthingsastheyare.Theconceptforin stanceofpropertyisnotsimplyanexpressionofthestatusquo,butitis alsoabasisfor critique.Critiqueofthewaywethink,actandlivewithin our contemporary social institutions. Critique of current ideologies (in cluding the socalled neoliberalism that Fukuyama ascribed to Hegel), critiqueoftheillusionsofourmodernpoliticalculture.Thiscriticalas pect of Hegel socialphilosophy and ethicsis not immediately apparent, butitisrequiredbytheverynatureof Begriff,theconcept.Andbythe way, this explains why Hegel could say that whenever the concept dif feredfromreality,itwastoobadforreality.Thatwasnotanexpression of subjective idealism, but a strong affirmation of the normative value inherentinthepureconcept. Mythirdpointisthemostpersonal.Ofcoursephilosophyisandshould beascience.Assuchitsaimsandcontentsgobeyondthepurelyperson al.Neverthelessphilosophyremainsasearchfor wisdom,anditattracts many people beyond the pale of academic pursuits precisely because it expresses the universal human quest for truth, goodness and beauty. Of courseHegelwarnsagainstanyphilosophythattriestobereassuringor comforting or entertaining. Not because those aims are unworthy, but because comfort can only be found in the truth, and truth can only be foundinthehardlaboroftheconcept.IfoundthatunderstandingHegel alsomeantunderstandingmyownlife.Ofcoursenotinitspsychological andsocialparticulars,butinitsuniversalityasasocialbeing,asaproduct ofEuropeanculture,asaspiritualbeing. Thatiswhy,ultimately,Hegelisworththeeffort.Andthereisasimple dialectical argument to prove that, even if you're not convinced by my threepreviousarguments.TheysaythatHegelisthemostimportantphi 10

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losopher that ever lived. He is certainly the most difficult to refute. So thereyouhaveit:preciselybyarguingwithandagainstHegel,youcan developyourownpositiontoitshighestpossiblelevel.Hegelisthebest sparringpartneryoucanimagine.Heisthemostcriticalinterrogatoryou can ever hope to find. If you really understand why you need to differ fromHegel,chancesarethatyouhavestumbleduponameaningfultruth forthepresent. HowtoStudyHegel? HowbesttostudyHegel?Justreadinghimwouldbeanicestart.Butthat is an awesome task. The 500 odd pages of the Phenomenology alone, withitsoftenobscurestyleandcondensedandsometimesmystifying referencestocontemporaryhistory,mightturnyouawayfromHegelfor good. Nevertheless, with some stamina it can be done, say, in a year. You couldrewrite paragraphs in your own style, you couldtry to write downtheflowofhisarguments,youcouldmakesmalllistsofthevarious meaningsofHegel'sterminology,youcouldreadseriesofintroductions tothePhenomenology.Yournotebookswouldsoonbefilledwithalotof questionmarks. IremembersittingdownwithafriendwhenIjuststartedreadingphi losophyattheUniversityofAmsterdam.Wetriedtoreadtheprefaceto the Phenomenologytogether.Wecouldn'tunderstandwhatHegelmeant afterthefifthorsixthparagraphofthatpreface.Soweskippedthatpart, and tried the introduction. We couldn't understand the first paragraph. Then we decided to go straight for the first chapter on consciousness. Andthenofcoursewefoundthatwecouldn'tagreewithanythingHegel said. It did not fit in with what we thought we had learned from Kant, WittgensteinandHeidegger,whowerepopularatthetimeinAmsterdam. Butatleastwethoughtthatnowwehadsomeunderstandingofwhathe wastryingtosay.Butthechapterwassocomplexthatwewantedtodrop ittooandthenwelookedatthetableofcontentstofindsomethingalittle 11

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easiertoread.We discoveredthatHegelhadwrittenachapteron phre nology. We began to laugh at the silliness of this 19th century philoso pherwhobelievedinthescienceofmeasuringskullstoreachapsycho logical understanding of human nature. Needless to say that after just threesessionswedecidedtoskipHegel. Fortunately we had a wonderful teacher in our second year whose classeswerecompulsorywhoshoweduswherewewentwrong.Whenhe explainedtheprefaceandintroductionandthesectiononconsciousness, itwasasifHegelhimselfwasamongus.Hegelneededavoice!Tothis day I have found no better way to understand Hegel than by becoming "initiated" by someone who went before us, but it also holds for Plato, Aristotle, Thomas or Kant for that matter. Classical texts of such com plexityrequiretheknowledgeofabodyofliterature,acontextinwhich youcanunderstandwhatisgoingon.Hegelneedsapersonalguide.Ihad the good fortune to be taught Hegel by two of the cleverest minds I've everencountered: professorsofModernPhilosophy attheUniversityof AmsterdamJanHollakandKeesJanBrons. I will end this chapter on a personal and contingent note. I have been teachingclassesonHegelontheinternetsincemay2009.Theexperience describedaboveiswhatpromptedmetodoso.Formeitisaprivilegeto teach(orrather readtogetherwithothers)Hegelinthismanner. WiZiQ, Sclipo, Edufire and othereducational facilities onthe Web gave me the opportunitytoreachouttopeopleintheworldthatalreadyhavegained some access to Hegel, but now search for a living dialogue to advance theirunderstanding.InteachingHegelandsharingideaswithsuchadi verseandselectcompany,everythingbecomesnewagain. TheWorldWideWebmaybeoneoftheobjectiverealizationsofwhat Hegelcalledtheworldspirit.19thcenturythoughtand21stcenturytech nologycometogether.Weliveinafascinatingage.Nowitisuptousto reallyunderstandit.

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2.AndNowtoMoveOn
ARecentPerspectiveinUnderstandingHegel Summary ThestructureofHegel'sphilosophyasawholecannotsimply bedescribedfromHegel'sownstatements.Hegelwasstillwrestlingwith thegeneraloutlineofhisworkwhenhedied. InHollak'sthesisof1962 thematterthoughdealtwithbyothersbeforehimlikeRichardKroner, Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Busse the issue was resolved. Hegel's Systemasawholeconsistsofthreeparts:Phenomenology,Encyclopedia andthePhilosophyofHistory. InthecurrentstageofreflectiononthemeaningofHegel'sphilosophy,it isnolongernecessarytofocusontheunderstandingoftheprocessand methodofspeculativedialecticsassuch.IntheworkofKroner,Lasson andHyppoliteandmanyotherswecansafelysaythatthegenerallawsof Hegel'sdialecticsandsystemarefairlywellknown. ThenextstageofreflectionwasopenedupbyNicolaiHartmann'sques tionin1935,concerningthe innerstructureofthewholeofHegel'ssys tematic works. Hartmann contended that although each of the various disciplinesofphilosophywasclearlyunderstoodbyHegelhimselftheir methods and objects being sharply defined and distinguished from each otherthewholesystemofHegel'sthoughtwasstill"initself"andnot "foritself".FromtheexternalshapeofHegel'sdialectics,weneededto turn to the inner dialectics at work between the various "sciences" that makeupHegel'sphilosophyasawhole. ThisinnerdialecticstructureofHegel'sphilosophybecamethethemeof the1962thesisofaDutch(then)assistantprofessorofphilosophycalled JanHollak(19152003),whotaughtHistoryofModernPhilosophyatthe University of Amsterdam and the Catholic University of Nijmegen. In 13

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histhesisentitled TheStructureofHegel'sPhilosophy(DeStructuurvan Hegels Wijsbegeerte) Hollak for the first time went beyond what he called the onesided responses to Hegel's philosophy, present in the worksofSartre,MerleauPonty,KierkegaardandMarx.Theyapproached Hegel'ssystemnotfromwithin,butfromwithoutbyassessingitwithan external yardstick a procedure that according to Hegel was the handi workoffinitereason.EventhoughHegel'ssystemwasadmiredgreatly inthe1960sespeciallyhisPhenomenologywaspresentinmostphilo sophicaldebatesinEuropefrom1920uptothe1970swithoutanade quate understanding of the structure of Hegel's dialectics, it would be impossible to make any significant connection between Hegel's thought andtheproblemsofourcontemporaryphilosophicalreality. What came outofthe Hegelrenaissancein France and Germany were forthemostpartstraightforwarddenialsofsinglepropositionsthatwere represented as Hegel's views on particular issues, without examining structureandmethodofthesystemtheywerederivedfrom.Thestifling resultwasthatHegelbecameaphilosophicalmilestoneofthepast.But that of course made Hegel at the same time irrelevant and contradicted oneofhismajortheses,thatincontemporaryphilosophyaswellasinthe historyofphilosophywedonotdealwiththepastassuch,butwiththe present. Wecannotsaythathisthesiseffectivelychangedtheparadigmofcon temporary understanding of Hegel. The work done by Hollak on Hegel remainedmostlyunknownevenintheNetherlands,whereonlyahandful ofhisstudentsexaminedandappliedhisfindings.Onesidedresponses toHegelremainedwithus,fromtheinterpretationofdialecticsbyneo Marxist humanism in the 50s, through attempts to reinterpret Hegel's dialectics as a theory of intersubjectivity and communication under the influenceofHabermas(Theunissenandothers),toSlavoj iek'sreinter pretationofHegelwithatheoryofconcretesubjectivityasfoundinLa can.InbetweenthereweremanyattemptstouseHegelincontemporary 14

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reflection:eitherdealingwiththeactualityofHegel'sphilosophyofna ture (Vitorio Hssle) or to turn Hegel into the institutionalized foe: the need for a straw man produced the wellknown image of Hegel as the championofabstractidentityandsystematictotalitarianism.2 Isitpossiblenowtoenterathirdstage?Orrather,doweseethedawn ofanewstageintheinterpretationofHegel?Inthisstagewewouldno longer look for a critical response to Hegel from a fixed standpoint or principle,norwouldweneedagaintodealwithquestionsconcerningthe innerdialecticstructureofHegel'swork.Itwouldrequireustoacceptat least these two principles as adequately established foundations for any reflectiononHegel: 1. The whole of Hegel's philosophy consists of the dialectic unity of threebasicshapesoftheidea.Thefirstofthem,andnottobeconsidered justtheextrinsicintroductiontothesystem,wouldbethePhenomenolo gyofSpiritthatdealswiththeappearingconcept,theexperienceofthe Spiritcomingtoitself,arrivingatanunderstandingofitself.Secondly, theEncyclopediacontainsthepurelogicasitrealizesitselfinnatureand spirit,andfinally,thesynthesisoftheseboth,wehavethephilosophyof history in which logic and consciousness come together as the under standingofthehistoryoftheworld. 2.Hegel'sphilosophy,thoughaclosedsystemlikeanyotherconsistent effortatunderstandingtheworld,isinprinciplenotonlyopentotheap pearance off a new stage in the history or humanity, about as such its
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DerridaorLvinascanbementionedhere.Butnotethatitisnotsomuchin theseresponsesassuchthatHegelhasbeenmisunderstood,butbytheattemptto deliverareconstructionofHegelthatgroundedtheresponse.Arguingagainsta possibilityofthoughtthatderivesfromHegelisnotthesameasarguingagainst Hegel.

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announcement.PreciselythefinalitywithwhichHegelmanagedtophi losophically understand the history and principle of the Germanic Christian world (i.e. Europe), announces a new principle without either prophesying it nor demanding it to be realized in practice (as in Marx ism),signifiestheemergenceofanewera.Tous,forwhomthiserahas already appeared in political history, art, science and technology, the understandingofthisnewprincipleallowsforsomethingotherthanab andoningHegelasbeingoutdated. In this series I will try to present Hegel's Phenomenology from this perspective. Diverging from Hollak, I will try to raise alsosome objec tionstoHegel'sposition.ButtocontradictHegelisnomeantask.Mostof whatissaidagainstHegelissimplyirrelevantanddoesn'tgettotheissue. AtruecontradictiontoHegelisadialecticachievementofthefirstorder. ButtophrasethematterindistinctiontoKroner: tounderstandHegelis to(truly)contradicthim. That qualifies my position as standing within the large realm of so calledleftHegelianism.I'mnotanorthodoxneoHegelian,certainlynot inthehonorabletraditionofDutchHegelianismthatmerelytriedtopa raphrase the Master. In many respects I side with Theodor Adorno and Slavoj iek who emphasized the concreteness of Hegel's critical and negativedialectics.UltimatelyIwillhavetomakeclearwhatmyposition isregardingHegelasawhole.Butisitreallyrelevant?Maybeitisim portantfirstandforemosttotryandunderstandHegel.AndtothatendI have to make clear how important Hollak's thesis is for this endeavor. How then must the structure of Hegel's philosophy be understood and whydoesitmatter? HowNottoConstructHegel'sSystem The usual structure of Hegel's philosophy as taught in Universities all overtheworld,issometimesatleastbasedona(flawed)readingofthe last paragraph ofthe Encyclopedia.There wefindthe three logical syl 16

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logismsofphilosophy.
(Par.575)Thesystematictreatmentofthenatureoftheconceptultimatelyde velopsintotheideaofphilosophicalsciencesandtherebyaffirmsthebeginning: thecircleiscomplete. Thisconceptofphilosophyistheselfthinkingidea,truth aware of itself or logic with the significance that it is generality preserved in concrete content. Inthisway sciencereturnstoitsbeginning,withlogicasthe result. Thepresuppositionofitsconcept,ortheimmediacyofitsbeginningand theaspectofitsappearanceatthatmoment,aresuspended.

Now, does this paragraph deal with the separate Phenomenology, as many have argued? Or isit about the specific concept of philosophy as contained in the Encyclopedia? Or is it about philosophy in a general sense?Iwouldchoosethesecondoption.WhatHegelseemstoberefer ring to is the circular movement of the encyclopedic system. The "self thinking idea" is boththestart of science and the end result of science. Theconceptispartofasyllogismasisobviousfromthebasicstructure oftheSystem,startingwiththeLogic,movingthroughnaturetoSpirit but also its mean and its result, its other extreme. The three possible movementswithintheSystemshowthatandtheseareexpressedassyl logisms.Eachofthemexpressesthewholewithadifferentemphasis. These are then thethree logical syllogisms of the System (Encyclope dia),andtheyexpressphilosophyas(1)subjectiveknowledge,(2)objec tivity,andtheirsynthesisas(3)completeselfknowledge(=philosophy). MostoftenhoweverthesecondsyllogismisinterpretedasthePhenom enologyofSpirit,thefirstiscorrectlyidentifiedwiththeEncyclopediaas awhole,andthethirdisthoughttobethesummaryofaphilosophyof AbsoluteSpiritthatHegelneverwrote. Let'stakealookateachinturn.
575Thisinitialappearanceisformedbythesyllogism,whichhaslogicbasi callyasitsstartingpoint,withnatureforthemiddletermandislinkedultimately tospirit. Logicbecomesnature,andnaturebecomesspirit.Nature,whichstands

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RobbertVeen between the spirit and its essence, divides itself though not to the extremes of finiteabstraction.Forthesyllogismisintheideaandnatureisessentiallydeter minedasatransitionpointandnegativemoment.Butthemediationofthecon cepthastheexternalformoftransition,andsciencetakestheformofbeing.

SoinessencewehaveherethewholeofthemovementoftheEncyclo pedia, starting from the Logic, going through the philosophy of nature andendingwiththeconceptofabsoluteSpiritasitisbeingexpressedin theconceptofphilosophyastheselfunderstandingoftheAbsoluteSpi rit.
576Inthesecondsyllogismthisappearanceissuspended,forthespiritisthe mediatingfactor.Thisisasyllogismwhichisalreadythestandpointofthespirit itself,presupposesnatureandjoinsitwithlogic.Itisthesyllogismofreflection ontheideascienceappearsassubjectivecognition.

Sonowwestartwithnature(theSpiritpresupposesnature),gothrough Spirit and then end with the Logic. This is the same as the Systenm or Encyclopedia,onlynowthesyllogisticstructureofthewholeisdifferent: Spiritistheintermediate,andlogictheconclusion. Andfinally:
577 These appearances are suspended in the idea of philosophy, which has selfknowing reason, the absolutely general (the logic), for its middle term a middlewhichdividesitselfintospiritandnature,withtheformerasitspresup position (spirit), and the latter as its general extreme (nature). Thus immediate natureisonlyapositedentity,asspiritisinitselfnotapresupposition,butrather totalityreturningintoitself.Inthiswaythe middleterm,theselfknowingcon cept,hasasitsrealityprimarilyconceptualmomentsandexistsinitsdetermina cyasgeneralknowledge,persistingimmediatelybyitself.

SointhiscasewestartwiththeSpirit,gothroughthelogicofthe(self knowing)conceptwhichisnowthemiddletermandendwithnature. 18

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WhytheSystemisNottheWhole ThesystemofHegel'sphilosophyasawholecannotbeidentifiedhowev erwiththesystemthatisexpressedinandastheEncyclopediaofPhi losophical Sciences. Hegel's entire philosophy should beseen asthedi alecticunityofthreemajordisciplines: theseparatePhenomenologyofSpirit, theSystemofPhilosophyorEncyclopedia, thePhilosophyofHistory AllthreeofthesedisciplineshavethenotionoftheIdeaincommon.But ineachtheIdeaistreateddifferently,insuchawaythatthesethreeagain formasinglesyllogism: 1.InthePhenomenologytheideamovesfromitsimmediateshapeas substance(immediacyforandofconsciousness)toselfreflectingsub jectivity and produces the notion of pure science. (The selfthinking idea.) 2.IntheSystemtheideaisexpressedasscience,assystematicknow ledge, i.e. as the pure concept, moving from the subjectivity of the conceptinlogic,throughtheexternalizedobjectivityoftheconceptin nature to the complete and absolute selfexpression of the Absolute Spiritas(theconceptof)Philosophy. 3.InthePhilosophyofHistoryhowever,theIdeaisunderstoodasab soluteSpiritandshowntobeactivelyrealizingitselfwithinandasthe historyofhumanityandtheworld,inthecourseofwhichitalsodevel opsitsselfunderstandingasthehistoryofphilosophy. StartingfromtheappearanceoftheSpiritasconsciousness (Phenome nologyofSpirit)wemovethroughthemiddletermofphilosophyascon

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ceptual science (Encyclopedia the "System") to its other extreme: the absoluteSpiritrealizingitselfascomingtoitsselfunderstandingthrough its own real history (Philosophy of History and the History of Philoso phy). Onlyinthatperspectivethewholeofrealityisexpressedwithoutleav ing out any essential perspective. That is why Hegels philosophy as a whole should be seen as an attempt to understand the Idea as History (selfrealizingSpirit). That is also why the separate Phenomenology of Spirit is so different from the sectionon the Phenomenology of Spirit within the Encyclope dia. In the separate Phenomenology the totality of all reality is conscious ness, and the independent shapes of the idea are present as constantly changingobjects.Inthesedifferentobjectswefindareflectionofapre supposed subjectivity. In a continuous process of the selfcorrection of consciousness, the dialectic identity of the consciousness and its object appears. ThesystematicPhenomenologyontheotherhandmerelydiscussesthe logical elements of the Phenomenology. That is why it only deals with three separate categories: consciousness as such, selfconsciousness and reason. TheseparatePhenomenologythencontinuesbeyondreasonwithamore "substantial"notionofreason,i.e.immediateSpirit.Here consciousness is seen as embedded in the life of a people. Only by remembering the shapeofconsciousnessasitexistedinGreekcivilizationbutstillonly byrememberingitasitispresentincontemporaryculturei.e.aspartof contemporary Bildung, as cultural awareness or education it begins to understandthatconsciousnessisnotapropertyofanindividual,butbasi callyacollectiveawarenessmediatedwithinanhistoricalsociety. In the following chapters Roman culture, the Renaissance, the Enligh tenmentandtheFrenchRevolutionareusedtoprovidethehistoricalpa 20

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radigmsinwhichtheinnerstructuresofconsciousnesscanbeexpressed. Eventhoughthesehistoricalstagesarealsotobeunderstoodasstagesin whichthistypeofconsciousnesswasproduced,theyarenotdealtwithas such.Theyarerememberedorimmanenthistory,nothistoryunderstood inaconceptualmode.ThatislefttothePhilosophyofHistory. ItstandstoreasonthatinthesocalledsyllogismsoftheSystem,atthe endoftheEncyclopedia,onlytheconceptofphilosophyassuchisdealt with. Philosophy is the method of understanding that is presupposed at the beginning of the Logic and has to move on toward understanding itselfwhichisidenticaltotheconstructionofthewholeofphilosophy. (Thatis,itisnotanintroductiontobutanintegralpartofphilosophy.)At least in the sense that the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences presentsthemainconceptsofphilosophyintheirintrinsicorderandim manentrelationships. Obviously, one cannot identify the separate Phenomenology with any one of these syllogisms at the end of the System. The meaning of the syllogismsistoshow,howtheSystemofSpeculativephilosophymustbe Encyclopedic:onecanstartfromthelogicgoingthroughnatureandend ing up with Spirit. One can also start with the external concept, nature, thendevelopaphilosophyofSpiritandfinallyendupwiththeconcepts ofthesubjectivescienceoflogic.Andequallywecanstartwiththepure conceptoftheSpirit,thendeveloptheformalconceptsofthelogicand thenfinallyreachnatureastheexternalrealizationofthoseconcepts. The system of Hegel's philosophy however is not complete if we just considerthePhenomenologythatproducesthenotionofconsciousnessas science,norifweidentifyphilosophywiththe systemofphilosophy,i.e. theEncyclopedia.InbothcasestheconceptoftheabsoluteSpiritispart oftheanalysisyet assuchitisnotdeveloped.Wewouldbeleftwiththe idea that Hegel worked towards the notion of Absolute Spirit without ever reaching it. The Absolute within the other parts of philosophy is fragmentedtosaytheleast. 21

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In the separate Phenomenology e.g. a whole chapter is devoted to the demonstrationofhowallthepreviousmodesofconsciousness,i.e.con sciousness, selfconsciousness, reason and Spirit, should be understood through the medium of the absolute,in thiscasetheabsoluteas it is in andforconsciousness,as religion.LikewiseintheSystem,thenotionof theabsoluteSpiritispresentwhenHegeldiscussesobjectivespiritinits highest shape, i.e. the State and the political history of states. Remem beredhistoryaseducationandthepoliticalhistoryoftheobjectiveSpirit howeverdonotexhausttheinfinityofabsoluteSpirit. Only in the Philosophy of History does Hegel deal with the absolute Spirit(theEternalSpiritdevelopingitselfthroughtimetoitspresentand openingupafuture)realizingitselfasworldhistory.Onlyinworldhisto ry we have the reality of the Spirit in its totality, both subjectively and objectivelyincludingtheperspectivethatwasworkedoutseparatelyas thephilosophyof(thehistoryof)religion. The system of Philosophy as a whole is therefore for Hegel a triad of threedifferentdisciplines: TheIdeainitsappearanceasconsciousness:Phenomenology TheIdeainitspureconceptualformasphilosophy:Encyclopedia (orSystemofPhilosophicalSciences.) TheIdeainitshistoricalrealization:thephilosophyofHistory. Inthesethreebooks,thebasictopicistheideainitsdevelopment,and all three of them develop the whole of philosophy in a specific aspect. "History"ispresentineachofthem. 1.Theseparate PhenomenologyofSpiritdealswiththehistoryofcon sciousness,butgivesalineardevelopment.WhattheSpiritexperienced inseparatestagesisnowrememberedassucceedingmomentswithinone

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movementofthought. 2.The Encyclopaedia treatshistoryasalogicalconceptoftheinterac tionbetweenstates(withinthetransitionofobjectivetoabsoluteSpirit). ThebasicviewpointoftheSystemisstatic:theconceptsaresetintheir orderandremainforthemselves.(TheseparateScienceofLogicshows thatthereisaninnerdialectictoitthatcanbeexpressedassuch.Asep aratephilosophyofnatureoraphilosophyofSpiritneverreachedma turity.) 3. And finally the Philosophy of History deals with the spirit as the wholeofthedevelopingrealityofhumanityandtheworld,i.e.withhis toryasawholeandassuch. Theotherworkscanthenbeunderstoodfromthisbasicconceptassepa rateorminorphilosophicaldisciplines,focusedonasingleelementofthe systemasawhole. *TheScienceofLogic.ThefirstsectionoftheEncyclopediagetsasep aratetreatmentinthe ScienceofLogic.Nowthedialecticaldeductionis presentedthatwasnotworkedoutintheEncyclopedia. * The Philosophy ofthe Fine Arts deals withthenotion andreality of FineArtinvariousways.Itsstartingpointandpremiseisnotthenotion ofArtasitispresentintheEncyclopedia!Thestatusofthisworkisnot completelyclear. * The Philosophy of Right develops the idea of Objective Spirit al ready scrutinized in the third section of the Encyclopedia. History is presentastherelationshipbetweenStatesandtheWorldJudgment. * The Philosophy of Religion does the same with the second stage of AbsoluteSpirit,Religion,whichismentionedbothinthePhenomenol ogy(astheantithesistoConsciousness Spirit)andintheEncyclope dia.Historyispresentinthesensethatthereisanorderinwhichvarious shapesofreligionultimatelycometofullexpressionintherevealedRe 23

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ligionofChristianity. * The History of Philosophy deals with the historical process, part of world history, in which the selfunderstanding of the Absolute Spirit realizesitself.Inawayitisthe"subjective"modeofthePhilosophyof History. IthinkthisoverallpictureofHegelswholephilosophicalenterpriseis crucialinunderstandingitselements.

3.TheMethodofthePhenomenology
As I have stated elsewhere, the Phenomenology analyzes the "expe rience" of the Spirit in its appearance to itself, as it develops into self understandingandapproachesthisexperienceasadialecticmovementof consciousness. That already implies that the Phenomenology is not just an introduction to the System as J. Hyppolite and R. Kroner thought it was. TheprimaryobjectofthePhenomenologyistheimmediateknowledge of the Spirit. The Spirit in its appearance for short. The greek word phainomenonmeans"appearance"sothatexplainsthetitle: Phenomeno logy,scienceoftheappearance.Butyoumightwonderifitdoesn'talso mean:theappearanceofscience.Thelogypartofcoursereferto"logos" in Greek meaning "science of." We have therefore a science of the ap pearance,andtheappearanceofscience.Sowhatdowehave? ThePhe nomenologyisthescienceoftheappearanceof(orbecomingof)science toitself. Toknowalwaysmeanstoknowatthesametimetheactofknowingit self.Therecanbenounconsciousknowingadimawarenessofapres

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encemaybe,butnounconscious knowledge.Allknowledgemustexpress itself as "I know this or that and I know that I know this." You cannot say: "I know this table is white, but I don't know that I know it." That presuppositionisdistantlyrelatedtooneofDescartes'greatdiscoveries: percipere est se percipere. In a free translation: knowledge always im pliesknowledgeoftheknower.Inotherwords:allknowledgeis reflec tive.UltimatelyitisPlatothatinhis Theaetetusdevelopedthisideafor thefirsttime. Butwhatdoesitmeantosaythat scienceappearstoitself?Itappearsto itself in the sense that every instance of knowing that we have implies someawarenessofwhat knowledge shouldbe.Wearenotjustawareof ouractofknowledge,butwearealsoawareoftherequirementsofknow ledge when we claim something to be true. So when we talk about sciencewearetalkingaboutamethodinwhichourknowledgeisjusti fiedwithreferencetoitsoriginandtheprocessinwhichwereachedit.If itwerenotso,wewouldnotinoureverydaylivesknowwhatitmeansto beinerrorandcorrectmistakesorunderstandthatwesometimesdonot know. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of things in which explicitly we know about our act of knowing it. We have an explicit method by which to arrive at the truth, an explicit criterion of truth with which to measure the truth of statements and principles. The 'selfawareness' of knowledgeisthebasisforitsclaimtotruth. In the Phenomenology this "science" appears as "consciousness". We mustmakeanimportantdistinctionrightattheoutset.Wearenottalking aboutthe"mind"hereassome"thing"thatisconsciousofsomething.It's not about "a" conscious individual or one of its mental faculties. Con sciousnessistoHegelacompleteideaofknowledge,astructuredsubject object relationship expressed in words and offered as a truthful under standingofourknowledgeandtheworld. Thisinclusionofthe'world',ofan ontologicaldimension,isimportant aswell.HegelunderstoodthePhenomenologytobetheexplanationofa 25

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reality. It is confusing to speak about these modes of consciousness as "epistemologies"unlessoneunderstandsthatHegelfocusedontheonto logicalimplicationsofsuchepistemologiesatthesametime.Conscious nessinthePhenomenologystandsforthetotalityofthe realityofSpirit, thatappearsinseparate,seeminglyindependentmodesofconsciousness. BecauseitisconsciousnessthatfunctionsinthePhenomenologyasthe primarymodeofknowledge,andnottheconceptandnotthehistorical realityassucheachofitsformsalwaysappearswithanemphasisonthe (everchanging) object. Every form of consciousness, every specific claim of a subjectobject relationship, posits its truth as residing in its object.Ithasaconceptofitsobjectandofitselfascorrelatedtothat.It appearsastheexpressionofthetotalityofthesubjectaswellasitsob ject.Itsclaimisaclaimaboutthe totalityoftheknowerandtheknown. Every consciousness says: this is what knowledge in general really is, because this is what the knowing subject essentially is (e.g. immediate sensuousawareness)andthatiswhattheknownobjectessentiallyis(e.g. theimmediategivenhereandnow). Testingconsciousness Ihavesaidthateveryoneofthesemodesofconsciousnessappeartosay it all. They seem to be independent and exclude one another. Precisely this independencehoweverofeveryspecificconsciousness,i.e.ofevery claimofaparticularconsciousnesstoexpressthetotalityofknowledge, isbeing testedateverystage.Notbyanypresupposedandexternalstan dardorcriterion,becausethatwouldmeanwealreadyhavejumpedtoa conclusionaboutwhatknowledgereallyis,beforeweexaminethevari ousclaimstoknowledge,butbyitsown claimedstandard.Theexamina tionofmodesofconsciousnessresemblesaninterrogationinaphilosoph icaldialogue:Someoneclaims"X"asastandardandwhenaskeditoffers proofbydemonstratingitinaformofknowledge,"Y".IfIcanshowthat consciousnessactuallydoes"Z"andnot"Y"thenitfollowsthattheclaim 26

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"X" is in error. Sensuous certainty e.g. claims "immediate knowledge" andshowsthatwiththeaidofitsunderstandingoftheobject:"itises sentially always here and now." If I can show that its actual object is somethingthatismediatedbyasubjectiveactivity,inthiscasetheactual pointingtoanobjectinthehereandnow,"Z",thenthisclaimofimme diacyisshowntobeinerror.Its claimedobjectisnotunderstoodproper ly.ThenImoveontothenextconsciousness,thatsolvestheformerprob lembyclaiminganewstandard"X2"thatconsistsof"X"andtheresult oftheobjection,"Z"andoffersproofintheformof"Y2".AndthenIcan showthatitactuallydoessomethingelse"Z2"andsoon. TheresemblancetoPlato'sdialogueswhereSocratesmovesthediscus sionforwardbyasking questions,isnotaccidental.TheSocraticdialec ticsisalsoareal(oridealized)conversationandofcoursethatishighly formalizedinthePhenomenology.ButHegelwouldagreewithPlatoon theintersubjectivenatureofallthought,evenwhenitisnotexecutedin theformofarealdialogue.Therearenoisolatedthinkers. Maybe for Plato the real (Socratic) dialogue is essential to method eventhoughmetaphysicalinsightisnotconstruedasdialogical,because itisthelonelyinsightofthephilosopherwhohasgonebeyondthecon finesoftheCave. Ifanywhere,dialogueistobefoundsuperficiallyin therhetoricoftheSophistswhoexplaintheshadowimagestoaliterally captiveaudience.InHegelsPhenomenology,thechangesinconscious nesscomefromthecontradictionsintheconceptoftheobjectitself,not fromanydialogueoftruthassuch.Thatis,therealdialogueisthedevel opmentovertimeofaselfconsciousnessthatincludesothersinitselfand istrulyuniversal.Theparticipantsinsuchadialoguewouldbethehistor icalagentsthroughwhichtheSpiritspeakstoitself. The various shapes of consciousness are but moments of the self conscious Spirit, and in that sense they are not independent historical periodsorcompletephilosophicalsystemsbuttheybelongtothewhole asabstractelements.Aspartofthewholetheyarethelogicalconditions 27

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ordeterminationsofphilosophyasascience,oroftheselfunderstanding oftheSpiritinthepresent.Butthatisnothowtheyappear. That appearance or "substance" as Hegel calls their being in itself to consciousnessneedstobeexaminedtoarriveattheessencethatHegel calls"subjectivity",whatthey"really"are foritself.Ineverystageitis shownintheanalysisthatconsciousnesshasaclaimedobjectivityanda realobjectivity.Mostofthetimeyoucaneasilyseethattheclaimedob jectpresupposessomethingelsethatisnotyetpartofthedefinitionofthe object.Whenconfrontedwiththatfact,consciousnessexpandsitsdefini tion of the object and creates thereby a new subjectobject relationship. Every new structure that consciousness accomplishes by means of the newdefinitionofitsobject,isagaintakenassomethingindependent,as anexpressionofthetotalityofknowledgeinsteadofanappearing"mo ment" of the Spirit as absolute knowledge. Of course, in the form of a claimitalwaysdoesexpressthattotality.Butitdoesnotdosoadequate ly.ThereisaniceLatinphraseforthat:totum,sednontotaliter:thetotal ity,butnottotally.Thatmeanssomethinglike:thewhole,butnotinits fullness. The limits of the object of any consciousness are correlated with the limits of that consciousness itself. Any concept of objectivity implies a correspondingconceptoftheknowingsubject.Initself,everyconceived formofobjectivityisareferencetotherealworldinitstotality.InSense Certaintye.g.,theconceptof beingthatisusedtoexpresstheimmediacy oftheobjectinthehereandnow,onitsowndoesrefertothistotality. TheExampleof'Being' Wecanshowthateasilybyexaminingtheconceptfromalogicalpointof view.Itistheleastyoucansayabouttheworldasawhole,butyoucan sayittruthfully: everythingthatis,is.There is nothingbeyondoroutside being.(Butthedialecticalcounterargumentwillbe:thereisindeed noth ing,i.e.theactofnegativity,thepowerofabstractionthatproducesthis 28

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concept,beyondbeing.) As a category 'being' seems at first to be merely positive. It includes everything.Italsoexcludesanylimitationordifference,andinthatsense it already expresses the identity of subject and object. But this positive universalisnotagivenbutaresult.Itincludeseverythingby excluding nothing.Thisexclusionisincontradictiontoits claimedabsoluteposi tivenature.Exclusionisalogicalactivitythatisnotproperlyexpressedin theconceptofbeingitself,thatsimplysayswhatis,is.Being meansthe positiveuniversal,but wecanonlymeanthat,bydoingsomethingthatis not includedin the category. Being turns out to be based ona negation (theexclusionoflimitations)thatisitselfnegated(becausewestateitas a pure positive). The claim of immediacy is in contradiction with the mediationofthoughtrequiredherebythisdoublenegation.Thenegation ofthenegativityoftheexclusionturnsouttobetheconditionoftheposi tivenatureoftheconceptofbeing.Thereisnosuchthingasanabsolute immediate category, because we need mediationto getthere in thefirst place. Evenifweacceptitspurepositivenature,thecategoryisalsodeficient in another, more "metaphysical" sense. We could run into this counter argument: "being" does say "everything" so every determination is a determination of being. All other categories could be said to express modesofbeing.Sowhydoweneedtomovebeyondit?Theanswerlies inthepurecontentofthecategorythatisunabletoexpresswhatitmeans. Being saysitallbutitdoessoinalimitedormerelyabstractfashion.It sayseverything,butdoesnotexpresseverythinginitsfullness:totum,sed nontotaliter.Itleavesoutthenegativenatureofthoughtwhichisacon ditionofitsbeingthought.WhichisshownwithregardtobeinginHe gel'sLogicbythefactithastoexclude"nothing"tobethoughtandthat exclusion isnot expressedin the meaning of "being"which is pure im mediacyandpositivity. Thisnotionofexpressivityisvital.Anotionthatreferstothetotalityis 29

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justa'name'.Whatweneedisacategorythatexpressesthattotalityinits inner development, including all its previous stages. In such a category thetotalitywouldbecomeexplicit. This does not mean that the notion of being is completely set aside. Therecannotbeanyconceptwithouthavingthischaracterofimmediacy anduniversalityandthisclaimtoexpressapositivetotality.Everycon ceptpresupposesandincludes"being"asanelementofitsowndetermi nacy.Wecanevensayingeneralthateveryclaimedconceptofobjectivi ty, including "being" and "thing" and "force" or whichever concept we arelookingatinthePhenomenology,hassometruthtoitthattruthwill beanalyzedassuchintheLogicthatfollowsthePhenomenology.Not becauseitreallyexpressesthattotality,butbecauseitreferstothetotality that it (a) belongs toas one ofitsdeterminations and (b)from whichit derivesitsownlimitedmeaning. Thedevelopmentofconsciousnessisreflectedinthedevelopmentofthe conceptofanobject,i.e.inthechangingclaimstotruth.Intheendcon sciousnessreachestheidentityofselfconsciousnessanditsobject,what Hegel called absolute knowledge. The Phenomenology is at the same time a description of that development, and in that sense an historical description, andan analysisofconsciousness,andinthatsenseasyste maticorphilosophicalexposition. The division between subject matter and form, or between subjectand object has been sublated here. That is why we are not dealing with a science or philosophy of conscious experience that would deal withthe empiricalcontentsofconsciousness.ThatisthedifferencebetweenHe gel'sPhenomenologyandthetranscendentalPhenomenologyofHusserl.

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4.TheMovementofConsciousness
A.Consciousness In the first movement of the Phenomenology, calledConsciousness, the opposition between the abstract singular consciousness of the abstract singularobjectisovercome.Bychangingitsobjectfromtheimmediate given,movingthroughtheobjectas"thing"totheconceptoftheworldof laws,consciousnessindirectlydevelopsitself:itchangesfromimmediate certainty,goesthroughperceptiontoreflectivereasoning.Everytimethe objectchanges,consciousnesschangesitsownrelationshiptoitsobject, andtherebychangesitselftobecomeanewformofknowledge. Whenconsciousnessrealizesthatitsobjectisnotasingularobject,buta universal,itseesitsownnaturereflectedinitsobject.Whatitdoesfinal ly as consciousness, is to differentiate the universal of the objective world,(thephysicalrealityofforce),andtheuniversalastheawareness of universal laws. Consciousness comes to realize that it only has a worldthatitcanunderstand,preciselybythisactivityofmakingadiffer encebetweenrealityandsubjectivityandrelatingthemtoeachother.To understand the world scientifically must mean to discover the universal within appearing reality on the one hand, and to apply the universal to given appearances on the other hand, or rather to do both at the same time. Sotherelationshipbetweenthesubjectandtheobjecthasnowbecomea correlation, subject and object determining each other and this correla tionisthetruthofconsciousness.Butthatcorrelationthatisnowthetruth ofconsciousness,isassuchmerelysubjective.Ortoputitdifferently:the realoreffectiveobjectnowturnsoutbethesubjectitself.Understanding the world implies a subject understanding its ways of thinking and its experiencesormoretothepoint itselfasa(physical)world,thoughthis isapositionthatwillonlybefullyunderstoodwithintherealmofExist 31

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ingSpirit. B.Selfconsciousness In the final movement of consciousness as Explaining Reason a new modeofbeingofthespiritappears:selfconsciousness. Althoughselfconsciousnessunderstandsthatitisthetruth,itappearsat the start simply as Sensuous Desire. As Sensuous Desire the object of consciousnessisnolongeraseparateandindependentworld,butrather somethingthatisrelativetoitsowndesiring.Consciousnessisawareof itsownlackinitsobject,andtherebyitisawareofitself.Byconsuming andusingtheobject,itgivesitselfactivelyanimmediateselfcertainty.It experiencesitselfintheprocessofnegatingtheobject.(Inthesensuous certaintyitexperiences theobject passively bynegatingitselfassubject, soherewehavereachedtheopposite.) However, precisely because it consumes its object when it satisfies its desires,itrenewsitselfalso.Nofulfillmentofadesireisfinal.This bad infinite movement is interrupted when it experiences that the external objectcanbelifeandconsciousnessthatappearsasaselfconsciousness initself.Nowitseesitselffullyreflectedinitsobjectassuch,this"oth er"subject,whichhoweveralsomeansthatitisalienatedfromitself.Itis nolongerindependent.Whenitdesiresthisotherobjectthatisinreality itselfasubject,selfconsciousnessexperiencesthatitalsohasbecomethe objectfor another subject. Consciousness now experiencesitselfasthe objectforanotherconsciousnessand theimmediatesocialrelationshipis reached. The alienation that occurs here is crucial: by understanding someone elsetobeanothersubject,Iseemyselfreflected.Thatreinforcesmyun derstandingofmyownsubjectivity.Butthefactthatthisothersubjectis also Sensuous Desire like myself implies that I am at the same time something that is desired. That is the opposite of being a subject and makes me understand that I am also an object to this other self 32

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consciousness.Thisdualityisthereforeatthesametimerecognitionand alienation(opposition). Selfconsciousnessnowhastwoshapesthatappeartooneanother,and whathasbeenasingleselfconsciousnessisnowadoublesubject.(Not "two"subjectsassuch,buta singleselfconsciousnessdoubledinitself. Rememberwearetalkingstructures,notindividuals.)Oneandthesame true selfconsciousness appears to itself as a relationship between two appearingselfconsciousnesses. Atfirstitunderstandsthismovementmetaphoricallyasthestrugglefor recognitionthatisastruggletothedeath.Thatmovementisonlyhalted intherelationshipbetweenLordandSlave,ultimatelyhoweverthetwo movements of Lord and Slave are separate shapes of one self consciousness, they are in truth the one movement in which self consciousnessrecognizesitselfinitsownotherness. And notin someone who is an other.The metaphorof the struggle to thedeathispreciselythat,ametaphor.SometimesitisclaimedthatHegel refersheretosomeprimordialstageinhumanhistoryinwhichpeopledid strugglelikethis,oritisreadasanexplanationoftheoriginsofslavery. Wefind thate.g. inthe lectureson the Phenomenology by Kojve. But thepassageisnotmeanttoexpressanykindofrealhistoricalevent.The closestexampleofthiswayofthinkingisLocke'sabstractthoughtexpe rimentwhenhetalksabouthumanshavingtodefendthemselvesagainst all others in a war of survival. That wasn't meant historically either. It was a reconstruction of what is fundamental to human behavior in a processofimaginativeabstraction.AndthatisthecasewithHegel'stext too. Within thisnew single consciousnessthat has overcome the duality of LordandSlave,thecontradictionofthetwomovementscontinues. InStoicismandSkepticismandfinallywithinUnhappyConsciousness thereisaninneroppositionatworkbetweenthechangeablesingularcon sciousness and the unchangeable universal consciousness, that is now 33

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projectedoutwardastheTrueEssence. C.FreeConcreteReason This secondary opposition must be overcome to reach the truth of self consciousnesswhichisthecertaintythat ititselfisthewholeofreality. ThatisthestageofReason. As reason, selfconsciousness is the singular subject that now has reached the concrete universal, it is like the "I" in Fichte's Doctrine of Science or the Synthetic Unity of Apperception in Kant's Critique of PureReason. ConcreteuniversalselfconsciousnessinitsimmediateformisReason. Itishoweveratthisstageonlyopinionandawareness.Sothemovement ofconsciousnessandselfconsciousnessisnowrepeated.Reasonascon sciousness is present in Observing Reason. Reason tries to describe na ture as its universalobject. Butit does soselfcritically. Sensuous cer tainty,observation(perception)andreflectivereasoningarenowthetop icsofinquiry. Observingreasonassumesthatitisonlyinterestedinobjectsofpercep tion,butactuallyitsearchesforthe universal,essential,withinthefacts of organic and inorganic nature in order to find itself. Its experience is however, that the concrete universal subject cannot be simply found in nature. Nature has exceptions and defies our categories and though in biologyobservingreasoncanunderstanditselfasbeingtherationalfacul tyofanorganicbeingcalledhuman,itdoesnotsucceedinunderstanding itsownobjectivitylikethat.Ittriestodosobyexplainingitselfthrough atheoryoflogicalandpsychologicallaws.Butbecausethedescription alwaysremainsexternal,theinnermeaningoftheselawsremainsprob lematic.Suchdescriptionsofsubjectivitydonotexplaintheprocessof observationandreasoningitself. In a second stage reason understands itself as active, corresponding to thepreviousmomentinselfconsciousnessasdesire.Asrealizingitselfit 34

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isreasonableselfconsciousnessthattriestobethewholeofrealitybyits ownaction. Reasonthenfinallycomestotheunderstandingthatitisthecertaintyof beingallreality,thoughthecarrierofthatcertaintystillremainstheab stract individual. Universal is not yet understood as conscious of itself. Only the collective culture of a people can be said to express the self consciousnessoftheUniversal. Reasoninitshighestshapeisindividualitythatisinitselfandforitself real. It understands itself to be a real, it realizes itself, and understands itselfinboththeseshapes.ButpreciselybecauseitremainsIndividuality, itisstillmerelya consciousnessoftheconcreteuniversal.OnlyasSpirit canitnowintruthbeseenastheidentityofconsciousnessanditssub stanceorobject.Itisthereforenecessarytotranscendeventheperspec tiveofreason. D.(BB,VI)Spirit The ethical community of a people is the adequate shape of conscious nessfortheconcreteuniversal,becauseitisinitselfauniversalmodeof consciousness.Inotherwords,ifweunderstandthetotalityofbeingasa spiritualentitythatisitselfandforitselfe.g.ifwestatethattheuniver salSpiritistheSpiritofacultureorpeople,westillpositsomethingthat is substance, not yet consciousness of itself. Hegel defines what Spirit actuallyisbypositingthattheSpiritactuallycomestoselfunderstanding andselfconsciousnesswithinacommunityofpeople:theessencethatis initselfandforitselfisrealasaconsciousnessandhasconsciousnessof itself(thoughatfirstonlyintheformofrepresentations)andthatiscalled theSpirit.(p.314Hofmeisteredition.) Thetruthofthedialecticselfmovementofthespiritasconsciousnessis reachedinthischapterontheexistingspirit,butstillonlyintheformof the in itself. (By the way, it is not right to talk about objective spirit here.)thisisaconcreteanduniversalformofconsciousnessthathasits 35

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fullrealityinthelifeofapeople.Withinthatconcreteuniversallifealso thetruthofindividualconsciousnessisdiscovered,implyingthatnowfor thefirsttimewefindthenotionofahistoryofconsciousnessthatisatthe same time the history that is remembered as such, because it is now a historyoftheconsciousnessofapeople.Amovementthroughstagesas forinstanceintheorganicdevelopment,isnotyethistory.Inotherwords, onlyifwereachadialecticrelationshipbetweentheincarnatetruthofthe universalspiritinapeopleinoppositiontothepositionofanindividual, do we have something that can be seen as immediate history. History afterallpresupposesthefactsthataretoldandinterpretedwithinthecon sciousness of people by an individual that reflects on them and passes judgment.Withoutthisdifferencebetweeneventsastheyunfoldinthe perspective of an observer or participant that consciously aspires to achievesomething,thereisnosuchthingashistory. Though in this existing spirit we again have the basic shape of con sciousnessyettheworldanditshistoryareseenastheimmediateobjects of understanding. At the same time there is more than we had before, where individual reason remained secluded in its abstract individual energy. Now consciousness is aware of itself as the world and under standstheworldasitself.AlthoughtheSpiritistreatedinalaterstageof thedevelopmentofthePhenomenology,goingbeyondtheabstractindi vidualityandequallyabstractuniversalthatwehadbefore,wehavenow reachedtherealgroundandsubstanceofthepreviousstages. Wecannowsaythatconsciousness,selfconsciousnessandreasonare theabstractionsofthetruthoftheSpiritasincarnateinthecultureofa people. E.Religion At the end ofthe chapteron Reason we still have adifference between individual concrete reason, and the universal substance. Then in the 36

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chapterontheSpirit,Reasondiscoversthatherowntruthliesintheuni versal consciousness of the ethical world. The Spirit therefore, as the concrete existing spirit of a people, is still only the truth in itself. The shapeofconsciousnessinwhichtheSpiritnowcomestoselfunderstand ingorselfconsciousnessisReligion.Thespiritthatknowsitselffindsits adequate form of selfconsciousness in religion, because there we have theuniversalsubjectandtheconcreteuniversalsubstanceunited. In Religiontheabsolutebecomesconsciousofitselfinallitsprevious manifestations. Itwasalreadypresentinthechapteronfinitereasonandunder standing.Unhappyconsciousnessaspiredtowardtheabsolutebutdidnot recognizeitasitself. Reason overlooked the Absolute because it found itself only in whatwasimmediatelybeforeitself. IntheethicalordertheAbsolutewasanimpersonalFateinwhich noonecouldrecognizehimself. The religion of the Enlightenment had only an empty absolute, whichstressedtheinterestithadinthepresent. Finally,thereligiousaspectofmoralityandconscienceledtothe acceptanceoftheinner universal self,butnowalldifferentiationandall actualityexistedmerelyoutsideofitself. In all of these religious moments, the Spirit was just a part of a finite object. Now in Religion Spirit sees itself objectively as the Universal Spiritthatisexpressedinanobjectivenaturalshape,thatistransparentto itsownessence.Theimmediatenatureofreligionhowever,impliesonly apartialconnectiontotheuniversalsubstance,orinotherwordsreligion inpartremainspositivist.Itdoesnotunderstandtheworldlyexpression ofitsessencetobespirititself.Thatmeansthatallthepreviousshapesof consciousness, selfconsciousness,reason,andspiritmust berealizedin

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succession,eventhoughassuchReligioncontainsalloftheminunity. The religious spirit is at first selfconscious in an immediate manner. The movements of its concrete shapes isdriven by the attempt tounify itselfwithitscontent.Thatmovementagainisamovementfromcertain tytotruth.Ultimatelythattruthisattainedintheselfconsciousnessof religion. NaturalreligionisthewayinwhichabsoluteSpiritappearstoitselfin the manner of sensecertainty, perception and understanding. Hegel re ferstobePersianreligionoflightanddarkness,asthefirstofthese.Per ceptionispresentintheIndianreligionswheretheabsoluteappearsina varietyofindependentvegetableandanimalforms.Asunderstandingthe SpiritappearsintheEgyptianreligion,thatultimatelyexpressesaninner dualityintheSphinxwhichispartanimalandparthumanandasawhole divine. In Egyptian religion the role of the artisanis crucial, but not for itself yet. When Religion reaches the level ofselfconsciousness, it becomes theReligionofArtinwhichtheartisanistheessentialselfconsciousness atwork.Asaproductoffreespirit,Artistheimmediateforminwhicha society thatis simply built on customs and traditions, that hasa culture thatistreatedasnature,isbrokenup.Ultimatelytheartistwantstoex presshimself.Theexternalworkofartisbasicallyaformwithoutcolor that is how it is remembered because its color was lost! in which the individualexpresseshisowncontent. TheReligionofArtthengoesthroughtheseparatestagesoftheabstract work of art, the living work of art, and the spiritual work of art. Ulti mately selfconsciousness is reached in a shape that corresponds to the endofthechapteronIndividualReason.ThetruthofComedyistheself awarenessoftheindividualinhisownaccidentalindividuality.Thereli gioussenseofthatistheselfknowledgeoftheabsolutewithinit.The absoluteissubjectivityastheidentityoftheindividualtohimselfwithin theworldofpassionsandtheaccidental. 38

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InComedytheindividualconsciousnessnowappearstobethebasisof the absolute essence,judging and mocking it. Instead of theindividual beingthemanifestationoftheabsolute,wenowhavethereversalofthat. In that sense we find ourselves now in the opposite corner of unhappy consciousness. When we analyze the structure of Comedy, we can see however that it contains not one but two shapes of selfconsciousness. Ontheonehandwehaveselfconsciousnessjudgingtheabsolute,onthe other hand we have the absolute still being defined as a self consciousnessitself,albeitinanegativeformwhenseenfromthefirst. We have therefore two equal sides of selfconsciousness operating in bothUnhappyConsciousnessandComicConsciousness. That is why as the basis of Revealed Religion we must picture a dual movement.Ontheonehandwehaveasubstancegoingoutofitselfand becoming selfconsciousness, on the other hand we have a self consciousnessgoingoutofitselfandproducingtheAbsoluteSpirit.Re vealed Religion contains the selfconsciousness of God within human selfconsciousness.Itcombinesthereforebothperspectives.AstheFa therwehavetheessenceorbeinginitselfofabsoluteselfconsciousness. Atthesametimeitisbeingforitselfforthatessence.Thatisthemoment oftheSon.Andfinallywehavethebeingforitselfwhichknowsitselfin theother,theHolySpirit.UltimatelythisSpirit,ismostessentiallyitself inthereligiouscommunityorCongregationwheretheunityoftheabso luteselfconsciousnessandtheindividualselfconsciousnessofChristis transformed into a collective self, a universal selfconsciousness of the UniversalSpirit. Onlyasacommunitycanwesaythattheselfconsciousnessoftheabso luteisrealizedinitsother.Andonlyasacommunitycanwesaythatwe actuallyknowthisabsoluteasselfconsciousness. Inreligiontherefore,eventhoughitcanneverfullyidentifyitselfwith the object of its consciousness, and has to use narrative and images of that unity or use projections of that unity for the indefinite future, the 39

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social shape of knowledge that is the absolute condition of science is finallyreached.Inthatsenseonecansaythatthescientificcommunityis ofnecessityareligiouscommunity. F.AbsoluteKnowledge InReligiontherestillisadistinctionbetweentheobjectiveformofnarra tive and image, and the contents of absolute selfconsciousness. Again AbsoluteKnowingmusttranscendthisdistinctionandbecomeawareof itselfinallformsithassuccessivelygonethrough.Onlyifthecontentof religionisunderstoodastheactionoftheself,onlyifreligionisseenas expressingastageofitsowninteriordevelopment,canconceptualknow ledgetranscendit. Systematic science can only appear when selfconsciousness has any conceptual understanding of itself and is able to see all objectivity as somethingconceptual.Onlythenwehavethenecessaryunityofsubject and object within the concept that is essential to both. Therefore sub stance,whatseemstobesolidlyoutthereinitself,mustbetransformed intotheconceptualandinthatsensebecomesubjective.TheEncyclope diaorSystemwillachievethatconceptualunderstanding. Ultimately,systematicsciencecannotremainingsimplyconceptual,be causeitneedstounderstandtheexternalizationoftheSpiritinnatureand politicalsocietyaswellasinhumanhistory.Itsultimategoalistheun derstandingofSpiritdevelopingitselfthroughalongprocessionofhis torical culturesand individuals, producing its selfunderstanding as phi losophy.

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5.WhySubstanceHastoBecomeSubject
towardanegativedialectics
Summary. HegelsprojectinthePhenomenologyis determined assubstance needs to be expressed also as subject. In the Preface, par. 17 and 18, this is explained as both an epistemological and an ontological principle. Substance meanstheimmediacyofthe objectand ofconsciousness, butitalso meansthe living substance, i.e. reality as absolute. But what if the Subject that is the TruthandgoalofSubstanceisnotunderstoodasdivineandinfinite?Whatifthis Divine Subject is a way of expressing the excess in human subjectivity? Sub stancethatshouldalsobe expressedassubjectthencomesto mean thesethree things:1.Being is only present within human discourse about being. 2. Being speaksaboutitselfinthehumandiscourseaboutbeing.3.Beingiscontinuously falsifiedbyasubjectivitythatisfiniteandfalseorrathermad,i.e.positsitselfin anexclusiveparticularity.Withoutthe ontotheologicalpresumptionofHegels system the idea that religion teaches us that the absolute is divine to which Hegelremainedfettered wecandiscoverthefullcriticalandnegativepoten tialofHegelsdialecticsagain.

AccordingtotheprefaceofHegel'sPhenomenology ofSpirittheTrue shouldnotonlybeconceivedandexpressedasSubstancebutequallyas Subject.Nowwhatdoesthatmean? IfwestartfromthepositionofImmanuelKantwecanultimatelyfind threedistinctmeaningsofthisthesis. To summarize the philosophy of Kant we can say: there is no reality withoutactivitybythehumansubject.TowhichHegelwouldreply:quite true, but the human subject is not a neutral and universal agency, what Kant called transcendental selfconsciousness, that constitutes reality directly. According to Hegel, human subjectivity is in itself finite and imbalanced, limited and confused. (Verstand) Precisely for that reason the human subject tends to see reality as something that is completely 41

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externaltohim,apositionthatisstillrelevanttoKantinasfarashepo sits at least the notion of absolute (and distinct, external) reality as the Thing in Itself. In other words, human subjectivity is divided in itself betweenaconsciousnessthatispronetoacceptwhateveritisimmediate ly given as positive reality and a transcendental reflective subjectivity, that understands the world as being constituted by itself. Nevertheless, despitetheinsightthatrealityisconstitutedbythesubject,wesomehow need the concept of the thing in itself to prevent us from thinking that humancognitionisproductive.(Thisdualityofconsciousnessisbasically whatHegel'schapteronLordshipandBondageisallabout.) The first meaning ofthe thesis is therefore epistemological: what con sciousness accepts as reality as such (substance in the metaphysical sense) is actually merely formal, i. e. it is the fact of the object being giventoconsciousness,inparticularthe immediacy ofwhatispresentto consciousness.(Becauseconsciousnessknowsitsobjecttobeotherthan itself,thedifferencebetweenobjectiverealityandconsciousnessbecomes anobsession!)Thisepistemologicalreadingofthethesisrepeatsthemain Kantianthesisbutalsopreparesforitsdestruction.Ifthepresupposition of the duality of object and subject can itself become questionable, at leastinsofaraswebegintodoubtthedeductionofametaphysicalprop osition from a phenomenological observation, we can move to another levelofquestions. What ifthere is no such duality? What ifthisduality is merely an ap pearance?Whatifthepresuppositionofthisdualityisnotvitaltomain tainingthemeaningfulnessofhumancognition?Andbeyondthat,whatif thedualitybetweenthethinginitselfandtherealityasconstitutedbythe subject is in itself a part of reality? That would lead to an ontological transformation of the thesis. Substance as such must be expressed as Subject because it truly issubjectivity in itself, and subjectivity is truly Substance. But that would somehow combine Kantian subjectivity with Spinoza'ssubstanceandwoulddrawoninsightsderivedfromtheChris 42

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tian tradition. If we take a look at the preface we can see how Hegel movesforwardfromthefirsttothesecondmeaningofhistheses. Inparagraph17hesays:
Inmyview,whichcanbejustifiedonlybytheexpositionofthesystemitself, everythingturnsongraspingandexpressingtheTrue,notonlyat Substance,but equallyas Subject. Atthesametime,itistobeobservedthatsubstantialityem bracestheuniversal,orthe immediacyofknowledge itself,aswellasthatwhich isbeingorimmediacyforknowledge.

In these sentences Substance is reduced to something formal, both the objectforconsciousness,andtheconsciousnessforwhichitistheobject, arenowcalledsubstantial.Thereisnosubstance,i.e.noimmediateob jectforconsciousness,withouttheactivityofconsciousness,i.e.whatin its repressed or abstract form is the immediacy of consciousness. Both beingandconsciousnessofbeingintheirseparatenessaswellasintheir unificationareimmediate,i.e.positive,expressedwithouttheconditions oftheirpossibility. In paragraph 18 Hegel goes beyond this epistemological and Kantian interpretationtogiveanontologicaltwisttohisthesis.Nowboththeim mediate separateness and unity of being and consciousness is inscribed intothefabricofrealityitself.Hegelwrites:
Further,thelivingSubstanceisbeingwhichisintruth Subject,or,whatisthe same,isintruthactualonlyinsofarasitisthemovementofpositingitself,oris themediationofitsselfotheringwithitself.

WhatHegelherecallsthe livingSubstance isreality,absolutebeing.It isthissubstancethatpositsitsselfinlanguage,asconcept,assubject.In humanlanguagebeingspeaksaboutitself.Itisactualinsofarasitreach estruthbecausewithoutitissimplynotthere,anditistruebecausewhat isexpressedisindeedactual.Butitspeaksinsuchawaythattheappear

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anceiscreatedthatitisjustmanspeakingaboutbeing.Thisappearance however is part of the reality, it is an element of the way that being speaksaboutitself.Thealienationofbeinginitsother,thatcreatesthis appearance,isvitaltoitsowndynamics.ThatiswhyHegelcouldsaythat weshouldexpressthetrue notonlyassubstancebut equallyassubject. Thatdoesnotconstituteacompletedenialofthepossibilitytoexpressthe true assubstance. Moreover, the phenomenology of Spiritisactualevi dencethathumanityhastospeakabouttheworldinvariouswaysofim mediacy.Immediacyisnotsomethingthatcanbediscardedorsurpassed. Or in other words, philosophy can never divest itself from all traces of humansubjectivitynorshouldittrytodoso. Howcantherebeathirdmeaningtothisthesis?Suchathirdmeaning wouldhavetobeaboutthenatureofsubjectivity.Let'ssummarizewhat wehavesofar.WehavetheKantianthesisthatbeingisonlymeaningful becausethehumansubjectspeaksofbeing.Thereisnorealitywithout theactivityofthesubject.WethenhavetheHegelianturn,thatpointsto thedualitycontainedintheKantianthesisofbeingontheonehandand consciousnessontheother,ultimatelymaintainedbytheemptygestureof thethinginitself.Nowthedualityisinscribedintorealityitself.Sub stancetrulyisexpressingitselfassubject.Theabsolutesubstanceisdi vinesubjectivity.Butwhatdoesthatsayaboutthehumansubject? To Hegel this second meaning of the sentence was the ultimate thesis thatopenedupthepossibilityofhisphilosophy.Iwouldsuggestthatjust asinKantianismanemptygesture(thenotionofthethinginitself)pro tectedthesystemfromfallingintoanonesidedsubjectivism,theempty gestureofthedivineabsolutepreventsHegelianismfromdoingthesame. Let's consider this argument. What can prevent us from repeating the question as tothe groundin reality ofthe thesis? The ontologicalinter pretationofthethesismerely positsthathumansubjectivityisthewayin which substance, i.e. absolute reality, comes to self understanding. It promisesthatthesystemasawholeprovidesfortheevidence.Itguaran 44

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tees that human subjectivity is constitutive of reality without becoming subjectivist,becausethatsubjectivityisitselfconstitutedbytheabsolute. Butthisismerelyacontention,evenafterthesystematic Darstellunghas run its course. The notion that human subjectivity is ultimately consti tuted by the absolute itself, is itself a subjective idea. It remains in es sence analogous to the Cartesianargument, that a finite human being is unabletoconceiveofanabsolutebeingbecausethefinitecannotbethe cause of the infinite and that thereby the objective reality of such a beingisguaranteedbythepresenceofsuchaconceptitself.Hegelhim selfpointedtothefactthatthiscouldbeconstruedasanillusionprecisely becausetheideaofabsolutenessherewasabstract,i.e.reachedbysimple negation. The weakness of the theological presumption must therefore necessarilybringusbacktothefirstmeaningofthethesis. Hegelcanonlypreventthissubjectivistoutcomebyarguingthattheab solutesubstancethatconstitutesusandrealityisinitselfsubjective,i.e. Spiritandthathumansubjectivityisthefragmentedwayinwhichitap pears to itself. The revolutionary thesis of Christianity, that God has become human, is thereby exploited to the full. In the way his entire systembecomesanalogoustotheontologicalargumentfortheexistence ofGodaswaspresentedbyAnselm.Thetotalityofrealitythatsurpasses humansubjectivity,isnotdependentuponhumancognitiontobethere. Theincarnationisarepresentationofthatfact.Humansubjectivityisthe embodimentofthedivine.Thecommonoriginofsubstanceandsubjec tivity in the divine substance that is in itself subjectivity guarantees the possibility of speculative philosophy itself. By identifying reality with thedivinesubstance,HegelcanevadeKantianskepticism. What however if the thesis in both its meanings does not refer to a process that has an ending, but to a continuous movement? Substance, i.e.immediatereality,iscontinuouslybeingsublatedbyanewshapeof subjectivitythattriestoposititselfinitsexclusiveparticularityandthe rebyfalsifiesbothitsobjectanditself.Butthisexclusiveparticularityis 45

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preciselyitsuntruth.Everymodeofconsciousnessandeveryhumanact of cognition is therefore both true and false at the same time. And the samegoesforthepresumedobjectofhumanconsciousness.Byinscrib inghumansubjectivityintoreality,realityassuchbecomesuntrue.The impossibilityofcognitionisnolongerafailureofhumansubjectivitynor a weakness of reality, but precisely a precondition of knowledge. We know because we don't know. Without the guarantee of divine subjec tivity,Hegelsystemboilsdowntothemostdamningcritiqueofallpre tendedknowledge.ThenegativeforceofHegelssystemneedsonlybe turnedagainstitstheologicalpresuppositions,tobecomethisfullynega tivedialectic. YoumightsaythatwetrytomoveawayfromboththePlatonicandthe AristotelianpresuppositionsofHegelianphilosophy.Adaringbutnever theless intriguing prospect! The Aristotelian connection between scien tificknowledgeandthedivineabsoluteisintrinsictohisdefinitionofthe objects of metaphysics. Being as being defines the perspective of the gods that philosophy can achieve. Plato beforethatdefinedthe idea or conceptasthe inner essence ofreality, by which the latter is measured. Theimmortalityanduniversalityofthesoulwasamarkofadivinelega cyandoriginaswellasapreconditionofmathematicalandphilosophical insight.Hegel'sdialecticalphilosophyreachesitsapexwhereitcriticizes theontologicalandepistemologicalrootsofWesternphilosophy,andin thatsensemovedbeyonditsGreekroots.Hegel'scritiqueofessentialism in thesecondpartofthescienceoflogicdeconstructsboththePlatonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. The analysis of the Greek city state as immediate Spirit in the Phenomenology of Spirit, shows it to be self contradictory. Of course Hegel never renounced on the importance of Greek philosophy as a constituent part of its methods and tradition and neitherdowe.Butitisimportanttostresstheradicalrenewalofphiloso phy that came to light within German idealism instead of allowing the

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gravity of history to confuse the revolution of Hegel's project with its failedexecution. CanwethenproduceanHegelianismthatmovesbeyondAristotle?It wouldrequireustoreinterpretthenotionofdivinesubstanceasasocial construct,thatderivesitsrealityfromsocialandpoliticalmechanisms.In hisPhilosophyofHistoryHegelcomesveryclosetoexpressingtheview thatthenotionofGodisexpressiveoftheselfunderstandingofapeople or a community. In his early work he considered Christianity to be a religion of the people, inwhich statehood, i.e. thelegitimacy of power, and social morality were firmly rooted. In Hegel's philosophy religion was the representational form of the collective awareness of historical truthinaparticularpeople.Nowheredowefindanyrealisticaffirma tionofatranscendentdivinebeing. Andwhynotalsoepistemologically?IfweaccepttheHegelianthesis, that being is only expressed through its other or rather its becoming its other,weareonestepawayfromacceptingthatothernessordifferenceis crucialtobeingasbeing.Wecansaythatbeingcanonlybeexpressedas itsother,i.e.theconcept,withoutatthesametimearguingthatitmagi callyreturnstoitsownidentityintheconcept.Therelationshipbetween being and its concepts must be maintained as dialectical itself, which signifies that at the same time the concept or human cognition remains other,i.e.thealienatedornegatedformofbeing.Thediscardingofthe momentofothernessasifitwerealadderthatwecandisposeofwhen reachingahigherlevel,relegatesnegativitytothestatusofaprovisionary instrument.Whatifthisnegativitytrulyistheessence? Theideathatsubstancehastobecomesubject,wouldultimatelymean thatthehumanendeavortounderstandtheworldisacontinuoustransi tionbetweensubstanceandsubject.Amovementthatcannevercometo rest, and is therefore marked by an unsurpassable historicity. Substance inevitablyhastobecomesubject,notjustbecausethenaloneitrealizesits truth,butalsotheopposite.Onlythenegativityofthesubjectproduces 47

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the untruth of substance. And of course the opposite of both would be thatsubjectivitythatrealizesitselfas social substancecanneverbefully trueeither. Huizen,theNetherlands,MayJuly2009

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Contents

Foreword.........................................................................................5 1.WhyDoWeStillNeedtoReadHegel?...........................................7 APersonalResponse................................................................7 TheComplexityofHegelisFascinating..................................8 UnderstandingtheWorldBetter...............................................9 HowtoStudyHegel?..............................................................11 2.AndNowtoMoveOn.................................................................13 HowNottoConstructHegel'sSystem...................................16 WhytheSystemisNottheWhole..........................................19 3.TheMethodofthePhenomenology............................................24 TestingConsciousness............................................................26 TheExampleof'Being' ...........................................................28 4.TheMovementofConsciousness................................................31 A.Consciousness....................................................................31 B.Selfconsciousness.............................................................32 C.FreeConcreteReason........................................................34

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D.(BB,VI)Spirit...................................................................35 E.Religion..............................................................................36 F.AbsoluteKnowledge..........................................................40 5.WhySubstanceHastoBecomeSubject.......................................41

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Stilltocome: PrefacingaPhilosophyToReadHegelpart2 AnalysisofthePrefaceofthePhenomenology. Abouttheauthor: RobbertAdrianVeenwasborninAmsterdamin1956.Afterhisstudies inphilosophy,theologyandSemiticLanguageshebecameaministerfor theliberalMennoniteChurchintheNetherlands.Afterteachingphiloso phy for many years as a fellow of the Dutch Philosophical Society, he receivedhisdoctorateintheHumanitiesin2001onadissertationcalled: TheLawofChrist,ChristianethicsfromaMennoniteperspective.Inthat same year he was appointed assistant professor in Christian dogmatics andethicsattheFreeUniversityofAmsterdam,apositionfromwhichhe resignedinaugust2008.Sincethenhehasworkedasafreelanceauthor andteacherofphilosophyandtheology,for Philosophy.organdthe Ol terterper Kring in Friesland, and recently also on the internet (www.WiZiQ.com). Besides his studies in Hegel and Barth he is also working on his third novel,thefirsttobepublishedinEnglish.

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