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 [Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Marty Fournier QA support specialist

802011 accident package experience preparation.

Currently op sup area c ZNY for almost a year assigned position in November 2002.
Prior to that was one of the Q&A support specialist. Several duties main focus to insure
quality of air traffic at facility. Minimum requirements maintained provided briefings to
specific air craft functions. Air craft accidents pilot error, preparing incident file and
package. Held that position at ZNY January 1999. Used to ATC and last four years there
as tm specialist at Oakland center since 1986. First with FAA June 24, 1986.

9/11 serving as Q&A support specialist. Office on second floor at the training wing
adjacent to Q&A, east side of building. No access to radar scopes there. Job
responsibilities vividly remembers in tape room investigating a pilot incident. Listening
to voice tapes. Terry Kirk (?) office assistant told him Kevin Delaney wanted him to go
and watch CNN since an aircraft had hit the towers. Under impression it was a small
aircraft. Not sure what wording was. Started watching CNN live in cafeteria. Started
filling up. More people down there than normal. Showing building that had already been
hit. Watching second aircraft go behind. It looked fake for some reason. Speed of aircraft
5 or 600 mph - they just don't fly that fast under 10k. Had hand held phone with him and
in communication with boss Delaney. Called down to conference room and realized there
was a serious problem. Until second hit still thought 1st was a small airplane. Don't have
live data upstairs.
At time saw second impact live still believed first impact small aircraft. Heard that
directly from terry Kurk (?) she said CNN, some aircraft. News wasn't sure what it was.
Just speculation. Things started rolling.

After second impact Kevin at air traffic managers conference room. Knew first mode as
Q&A specialist was to start pulling tapes. People being pulled off area b. trying to gather
information. Many of those people just wanted to leave. Went down to conf room and a
telcon was ongoing. Open microphone with maybe command center maybe headquarters.
Reports of possible missing airplanes, doesn't know where that information came from.
Definitely mike McCormack and Kevin Delaney down there.

Just assisting where could. Grounding airplanes but reports of planes missing.

Area b gathering. Paul Thumser, supervisor. CIC on duty at time though not sure who.
Paul was concerned for there well being. Approached him to find out what happened.
What they knew. Jim B r, ATC area b. several, with concurrence from union
president, got old ops manager room to talk to them to find out what happened. Bob Ott.
Possibly one of the support managers, mark Depalma. George Tracy (QA). Mark Merced,
controller area b. Dave Bitinglia. Anthony Paulmiera. Names in support package. Evanna
Dowis. Christopher tucker. Lorraine Barret. List in "BOX", accident file.
Learned: tried to put them at ease best as could. Difficult situation. They were repeating
the event. Went through the process. Advised that personal statements would be required.
Don't remember if everyone in that room did provide statement. Would be people who
talked to aircraft or were operationally involved, "worked the airplane".

AA11 - learned first of, not sure without looking at package. Conversation from huntress,
OMIC. Don't know which sector was called first, could be area b. don't know who
picked up call. Knows there was a call from Boston to area b but not sure if that was first
without looking at timeline.

Situational awareness regarding AA11 impact: knows coordination Boston to New York.
Knows huntress and OMIC. Knows call sign AA11 came up. Knows Boston said
believed possible....hijack or not knows....but informed of lost beacon and primary
target only. Thought maybe still at fl 290. Tape may indicate they aren't aware if that's
him or not. Know area b asked UAL 175 to id AA11 on type and altitude. Didn't confirm
whether or not American. Didn't seem to be 100% as it crossed the boundary.

After second impact and leave cafeteria any discussion on what type of aircraft created
impact 1? Not known specifically. Discussion to decide what it was? Can't remember.

After second impact discussion on what type of aircraft hit south tower? People
recounted what saw on scope and filling in wholes. Thing remember Jim Bouliber saying
he observed second going down and concluding probably heading towards Manhattan
and as it was descending. Know memory that people identified UAL 175 as impact 2.
Pentagon hit: doesn't remember. UA93: knows they were looking for a "missing" Delta.
Was mention of aircraft missing or off course. Nothing specific in memory on ua93.

Aftermath of second crash uncertainty over which aircraft had impacted north or south
towers? Don't again remember. Only remembers his investigation.

After investigation conclusion on awareness of impacts (which aircraft hit which)?

Looking a from of mind of ATCs working aircraft. Desire at ZNY to distinguish one
airplane from another?

Telcon was with nationwide facilities and monitoring to insure that they were remaining
on course etc. but specifically with AA11 and UAL 175 right after not sure when
determined they specifically were gone. Effort to figure out what aircraft hit towers?
UAL 175 had code change but was on course. Extreme amount of attention on AA11.
Upsets the system. Doesn't know all the other distractions in the areas as trying to work
other traffic. Problem with code changing, target went to coast, Dave Bittiglia realized
UAL 175 had strange course. Some question of whether or not it might have been
UAL 175 headed far off course. Are steps to verify planes that have headed off course.

AA11 did learn after that Boston called to coordinate with ZNY. Told them primary
target only and f!290. Doesn't know if ATC or OMIC known yet. Went into mode of who
was at f!290. Assumption that it was American 11. Not on frequency, etc.

Doesn't remember communication with company. But thinks there was since company
was going to call ZNY with information. Effort to see if airborne, crash or on ground?
AA11 -just doesn't know what exact steps taken. Doesn't recall if there was an effort to
find out what happened. Who responsible for finding out about AA11? Not sure. Not sure
if it's a requirement. Determined/confirmed that company missing aircraft quickly. But
doesn't know what steps made to validate that.

Efforts to determine what happened to UAL 175? Doesn't remember.

Efforts to determine what hit the towers? Coordination between TMU unit and at least
Newark tower. That discussion of aircraft and problems. Believes call signs stated. In
conjunction with those conversations the second aircraft hit building.

After seeing second aircraft live. Was safe to assume commercial aircraft - probably not.
Just considered a large target. Agrees that when second plane could say definitely a fast
moving commercial jet. Replied in slow motion. Once figured commercial jet, and trade
center in ZNY - would have been normal procedure to figure that out.

Stepping back even further from picture. In history of hijacks there are set procedures.
100% of air traffic workers would say a hijack is not a terrorist suicide mission. 8000 in
air right now. Very vigilant watching for that. But two years of hindsight. Problem with
911 was Boston center having a possible problem AA11, think this is him - planted seed
of uncertainty. ATCs NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE MISTAKES. UAL 175 heard
questionable communications of "everyone remain seated" from ground, or from
departure - with hijacks you clear airspace and "let them do whatever they want - block
his way from everyone else." never heard of such a scenario. Easter airlines was always a
hijack target. Worked a hijack out there.

Any hijack exercises? Received briefings and refresher training - requirements and
procedures with handling hijack and what to do if they need to be intercepted. Did an
intercept out west years ago. Procedures in place prior to 911. It's in the books. It gives
the procedures. In the event of hijack military fighter intercepts on a different frequency.
Never would have expected 911 events.

Was there a reluctance to think that it was a commercial aircraft that hit towers. Did that
understanding of hijacks have an effect on the mental processes on accepting that it was
commercial aircraft that impacted WTC. Certainly.

Don't think there's anything that can be done from ATC perspective to stop an aircraft
from hitting something. In my opinion, doesn't think things could have been handled
differently even if awareness was different. Higher awareness today, but doesn't know if
anything could be done.

Prior to 911 an off course aircraft is always going to get special attention. People did all
they could and gave attention because of being drastically off course. Traditionally
hijacked aircraft land.

At some point is was accepted that it was UAL175 and AA11 by common sense.

Conversations with companies etc.

In conference room with area b controllers. Were they trying to figure it out? Yeah
probably. Not sure. When the aircraft veers of course certain procedures followed. Not
knowing what a target was going to do. Very leery of trusting what's not known. Go with
best information at time. And make judgments based off that. When not talking to
airplane in different mode. Altitude was questionable. Primary only, going off last known
altitude.

Where to go after reports of WTC hits for best information? OMIC.

Recommendations:

Vault cockpit. Make it impenetrable. FAM trips - vault it up even before 911. 99.9% of
pilots territorial about cockpit. Thin door up to 911. Common sense. Familiarization trip
training tool for ATCs to observe flight control from pilot end.

OMIC -1 didn't go to OMIC person - went to OMIC area to track down call signs of
suspected problem aircrafts. Everyone in mode of ascertaining what was going on.
Controller in charge (CIC) can't consul an employee. Terms are interchangeable. Either
can be in charge of area. It's labor relations law. Area supervisor is official supervisor
and is excluded from bargaining unit. Every supervisor takes two week course.

UAL 175 and code change. When aircraft on assigned beacon code correlated - won't see
code. When not in sync. Will see four digit code, and tag will stop tracking. Visually
know when aircraft not on right code. If got one airplane in communication will pick up
quicker than multiple planes. What is seen is another code. But shouldn't see a separate
target. Depends on altitude. Depends on filters selected. Times when have "bad mode c" -
beacon may broadcast wrong altitude.

If shuts of transponder: aircraft above 18k everybody required to have one, so when alt
filters limits set do not press primary only. In case of generic aircraft at flight level that
shut off transponder would not detect anything.
If beacon code changes in same environment - computer would not recognize associated
data tag with that aircraft the beacon would continue but the data tag itself would go into
(CST) coast mode. Limited data block would change and beacon code that was original
continues it comes up in a different code, but coast mode continue to track with limited
data clock the says alt. Data tag associated with target, when it changes, data tag stops in
spot where no longer picks up tag but actually beacon continues - - net result is one
unknown with two different pieces of data. Still associated with proper aircraft,
immediately ask why code change. Steps would be taken by controller of attempting to
reestablish and verify contact. Would call UAL 175 "reset transponder squawk "-
couldn't do that part with UAL 175.

Full Data block gives aircraft call sign, alt, varies-gives computer id, airspeed, whether
aircraft in hand off status- after beacon changes, freezes in coast mode -airspeed will
change to coast mode. When loose mode c info looses alt.