[Second Draft]

Regional Security and Integration in South America:

What UNASUR could learn from the OSCE and the Shanghai Organization experiences?

Marco Cepik 1

The Brazilian proposal to create a regional Security and Defense Council in South America was the most controversial issue related with the Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which was signed by the twelve South American Heads of State and Government attending the summit held in Brasilia in May 2008. The main concern and initial refusal to participate came from Colombia, worried about the how its neighboring countries would treat the illegal armed group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Colombia also had expressed concerns about the exact procedures to reach decisions in such a council. During the visit of the Brazilian President Lula da Silva to Colombia in July 2008, both concerns were addressed and the Colombian President Alvaro Uribe declared that Colombia would be a partner in the security institutional building of the UNASUR. With the main political obstacles solved, the real conceptual work shall begin. In order to contribute to this debate regarding the institutional design, operations and strategic rationale of the UNASUR Security and Defense Council, this text will start the examination of two different contemporary experiences of institutionalized security cooperation, namely those of OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in order to evaluate how useful and applicable those experiences would be for South America. Since the UNASUR was conceived to absorb and transcend previous regional organizations such as the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (CAN), it has potential security roles in addressing common regional ills like drug trafficking, organized crime, militarized interstate disputes and high rates of interpersonal violence. A more institutionalized regional order is also supposed to provide more room of maneuver for the 2 South Americans facing the current U.S. primacy push and neoliberal globalization.
1

Dr. Cepik is an Adjunct Professor of International Security and Comparative Politics at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil (http://lattes.cnpq.br/3923697331385475). Paper presented at the Second Global International Studies Conference, Ljubljiana, Slovenia, 23-26 July. This research was supported by the National Scientific Research Council of Brazil (CNPq). The author wishes to express his appreciation for the research contributions made to this work by Helena Jornada, Luiza Schneider, Paula Lazzari, Christiano Ambros, Thabita Abrahim, Lucas Sangalli and Felipe Machado, research assistants at the Strategic and International Relations Center (NERINT www.ufrgs.br/nerint). As one can read in the Preamble of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR: CERTAIN that integration is a decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the rule of law in international relations
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As pointed by Kelly (2007:212-215), a normative desire for regional integration still drives most of the academic and political debate concerned with security in the so called non-critical regions like Africa or South America. Assuming explicitly a normative desire for a robust UNASUR to be built in South America, in this paper I have tried to examine the usefulness of two alternative models of security cooperation and integration in rather realist terms (Mares, 2001; Buzan & Weaver, 2003). The general line of reasoning is organized as follows: The first section contains a very brief account of what are the main security threats in South America nowadays. Then, in section II the recently constituted South Americas Union is presented, including the somewhat controversial proposal of a South Americas Security and Defense Council. In the following two sections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are discussed in order to evaluate in the concluding section - how useful and applicable those experiences would be for South America.

I South America: unanswered threats and security concerns

South America is a violent region in the contemporary world, although it is also recognized by the low incidence of interstate warfare or even overt civil war. It has experienced just one conventional war since the end of Cold War (between Peru and Equator in 1995) and a total of three wars since the II World War. Colombias complex internal armed conflict is a big one for all accounts, but is rarely described as a civil war in the same way many contemporary African and Asian violent conflicts are. However, by no means South America can be considered a peaceful zone or a sort of security community 3 (Adler & Barnett, 1998). At least four types of threats and risks to the security of the region can be identified by any birds eye view of the region. As David Mares (2001:29-51) has pointed out, the apparent paradox requires a proper conceptual toolkit to explain this region. He uses the term "violent peace", i.e., "officially sanctioned use of military violence across national boundaries when war is not the intended result" (Mares, 2001:07). The war might happen, as the result of a dynamic often unwanted by actors, originated from a miscalculation that escapes their control. The decision to use military force must be understood more as a bargaining tool for the states constituencies than just as the desire to resolve a dispute through interstate war. Violent peace among countries remains a pervasive feature of South Americas security equation as far as territorial disputes and other structural induced concerns about relative gains are present in the recent history of the region. The South American countries also faces important internal threats as well, related to narcotics trafficking, transnational crime, localized urban and rural violence, The region
in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and just world, in which the sovereign equality of States and a culture of peace prevail and in a world free of nuclear weapons and of weapons of mass destruction, the Union is not designed as a tool for balancing, but has balance and justice as core values.
3

For further elaboration, see Herz (2008).

was ranked as the second most violent in the world due to the increase of crime rates in the mid 1990s. Countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela have crime rates three times higher than the world average, and high levels of violence related to street crime, car accidents, drug trafficking, social clashes and organized crime. 4 The incapacity to deal with real and present internal security and safety threats, increased by the persistence of developing problems, which can be exasperated by increasing levels of inequality of income distribution in many countries, may lead to further erosion of the state legitimacy among citizens with raising expectations regarding their social and economic welfare. All of this amounts for a third type of risk to the security of the whole region (Rojas, 2008:36). A fourth type of risk is related with the regional role of United States after 2001 and the commercial and diplomatic presence of other great powers in South America. There is no serious competition for military presence or security leverage in the region between Russia, China and United States, but the growing assertiveness of these three countries as they defend their respective interests across the world cannot be dismissed as totally unrelated to the security status of South America. Therefore, great power politics is part of the equation, whether we like it or not. Taking the four types of risks and threats as context, the recent crisis started by the Colombian attack to a FARC camp inside Ecuadors territory brought additional turbulence for the South American integration project. As the militarized dispute between Colombia and Ecuador-Venezuela passes its peak (reached in March 2008), and the possibility of an armed conflict in Bolivia being less severe than it seems to be just a few months ago, a moderate optimism arises in the region. However, the two potential conflicts are still serious enough to be dismissed by any actor or observer. The tensions between Venezuela and Colombia go all way back to the Chavez opposition to the Colombian counterinsurgency strategies supported by the U.S. The Colombian government led by President Uribe and the average Colombian public opinion have been very critical towards Venezuelas government led by President Hugo Chavez. The anti-imperialist discourse from Chavez also reaches fiercely the Colombias alliance with President Bush in Washington. The Colombian offensive against the FARC in Ecuadors territory resulting in the killing of Raul Reyes (FARCs spokesman and secondin-command) prompted President Hugo Chavez to mobilize troops to the Colombian frontier. The March crisis has been diplomatically solved, but the Colombian internal security problem, mainly related to the FARC and the Paramilitaries, still poses significant problems to the whole region (Villa, 2005 and 2007). By its turn, Bolivia is currently the crisis core and the place where the future of South America integration process is being decided (Cepik, 2008:10). The eastern departments (where are located the main resources, as mineral and energy reserves) are struggling for greater autonomy, what could generate an escalation of the tension and even turn out in a civil conflict (Malamud, 2008). Even if that extreme outcome is avoided, the tensions posed by the popular referendum in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the other departments clearly expose social antagonisms and institutional dilemmas of fundamental importance not only to Bolivia, but also to South American integration future. In the end of the day, if an armed civil conflict unleashes in Bolivia, it would be hardly carried out without
4

According to the Health Ministry of Brazil, for instance, out of 125,816 deaths by external causes in 2005, 37.1% were caused by homicides, 28.4% by car accidents, and 6.8% by suicides. Cf. www.saude.gov.br.

the covert or otherwise overt involvement of opposing South American governments and social groups (Sebben, 2007). In this sense, a strong institutional and socio-economic alternative has to be developed inside Bolivia, with strong support from countries like Brazil and Argentina. Considering the four structural risks and these two big recent crises, the South American governments seem in need not only of an integrated strategy, but also of the basic institutional and operational means to face those problems effectively and with legitimacy (Estevez, 2001:08). Therefore, the necessity of a greater coordination and cooperation in the security and defense issues is not only associated with the new transnational threats posed by non-state actors, but also may be related to the possibility of interstate conflicts. In this way, the UNASUR, as the newest integration program in South America, has to develop mechanisms of peaceful resolution of conflicts and much greater and stronger security coordination.

II South Americas Union and the Security and Defense Sectors

The creation of a South American Defense Council, proposed by the Brazilian president, even though rejected in a moment by Colombia, turns out to be a real attempt to fulfill the institutional emptiness. Nevertheless, it is necessary to go even further than the Security and Defense Council itself, deepening the coordination mechanisms, implementing public policies in a huge variety of areas, applying distributive justice and building effective democratic controls. Paradoxically in light of what was mentioned in the previous section, just a few lines have been devoted to address the security challenges of the region in all institutional arrangements so far designed to advance the integration process, from Mercosur and CAN to the OTCA and UNASUR. The Union of South American Nations is characterized by a strong intergovernmental process, as UNASUR tries to converge and transcend the two main blocks of the South American subcontinent (the CAN and MERCOSUR) as well as the singular experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, in a much more robust solution without necessarily repeat all the steps and features of the European Union.. The origins of UNASUR go back to the South American Presidential Summits, in progress since 2000 in Brazil, where the Presidents reaffirmed their commitment whit the integration of South America. The South American Community of Nations (CASA) was born in the third Presidential Summit, held in Peru in 2004, through the Declarations of Ayacucho and Cusco, its fundamental documents. CASA aimed at the convergence of South America in a single block, strengthening the regional countries and increasing the bargaining power and international capacity to resist foreign pressures. CASAs intentions were wide, from political and diplomatic coordination to physical integration through new transport routes, energy exchange energy and communications improvement. Above all, it aimed at the creation of a free trade area, with a common currency and a regional parliament (Taunay Filho, 2008:11-32). The name of this new institutional framework changed from CASA to UNASUR with the agreement of all member states during the first day of meeting at the South American Energy Summit held at Isla Margarita, Venezuela, in 2007. That meeting was important as it hosted significant additional agreements, including the creation of the Energy Council of

South America (based on the principle that energy integration is an essential tool for the regions economic and social development). On 23 May 2008, it was formalized as the Union of South American Nations, UNASUR, by a Constitutive Treaty signed in Brasilia. The treaty resulted in the creation of an entity with international juridical character, based on the statements of Cusco (2004), Brasilia (2005) and Cochabamba (2006). The countries stated that South American integration should be achieved through an innovative process, which would include the progress achieved so far by the MERCOSUR and CAN processes, as well as the experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, going beyond the convergence among them. Topics as energy integration and development of an interconnection infrastructure of the region are highlighted in UNASURs goals, using the economic and commercial motivations as a reason for regional integration. The security aspects of the integration are dealt with in the treatys three final objectives establishing measures for coordination among the member states specialized agencies in order to strengthen the fight against narcotics, corruption, human trafficking, small and light weapons trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime and other threats. It aims at, for this matter, the promotion of cooperation among the judicial authorities of the Member States, the exchange of information and experiences in matters of defense and the cooperation for the strengthening of civilian security. The highest organ of UNASUR is the Council of Heads of State and Government that meets annually. The Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR will be held successively by each of the Member States, in alphabetical order, for one year periods. UNASUR has two other mechanisms of regular meetings: the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which meets every six months, and the Council of Delegates, with bimonthly meetings. The Working Groups are set up by the Council of Ministers and coordinated by the Council of Delegates. The General Secretariat is currently the only permanent organ of the organization, with headquarters in Quito, Equator. The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council of Heads of State and Government, following a proposal by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for a term of two years, renewable only once. The Institutional Development is characterized by the Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, and meetings of the Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and other institutional levels may be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to fulfill the mandates and recommendations of the competent bodies. These bodies will report on their activities through the Council of Delegates, which will present its findings to the Council of Heads of State and Government or to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as appropriate. All the norms of UNASUR will be adopted by consensus. However, any Member State may completely or partially refrain from implementing an approved policy, be it for a period defined beforehand, or for an indefinite period, without preventing it from later joining the total or partial implementation of that policy. In the case of institutions, organizations or programs which are created, any Member State may participate as an observer, or refrain from participating fully or partially for a definite or indefinite period. There is no specialized body for border dispute settlements, so any dispute that may emerge between the Member States will be settled through direct negotiations in case of no solution, the dispute will be submitted to the consideration of the Council of Delegates and, in the case of no settlement; the dispute will be taken by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The treaty underlines that one of the main objectives of UNASUR is the development of political, social and economical coordination among the regions different countries. Notwithstanding the deepening levels of interaction between those countries over the last few years, a significant number of challenges remain even in the economic and social fields. The economic asymmetry is a real problem. Brazil alone has a GDP of nearly half of the entire UNASUR, but hardly could afford to finance all of the investments required to elevate the per capita income in South America and drastically reduce poverty and inequality. 5 Besides, the infrastructural integration, the strengthening of productive chains and the establishment of trade regulations are issues that must be solved. All three have important security implications. As a matter of fact, Brazil and Venezuela are both trying to convert the defense policies and the defense industrial basis in a more propellant engine for the entire regional integration process (Malamud, 2008:04). The proposed Security and Defense Council would promote joint military training, improved defense bases, and military industrial cooperation in order to ensure the supply of the necessary elements for defense. Dissuasive defense would be the aim, mainly through the exchange of information, joint training for peace-keeping, the holding of joint military exercises and the participation in peace operations of the United Nations. 6 There were already some attempts to develop effective mechanisms for security coordination in South America, although not fully institutionalized. The peace mission in Haiti, for example, shows that interoperability and joint action are possible. Despite the fact that it has encountered some difficulties, the mission helped in advancing policy coordination and cooperation through a 2x9 scheme, i.e., through the conduction of the Ministers of Defense and of Foreign Affairs of the countries involved (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay). Other important steps were taken in the Southern Cone, between Argentina and Brazil and mainly between Argentina and Chile. The work of the Standing Committee of Argentine-Chilean Security (Comperseg) is an example of measures that build confidence in the region, as the creation of a combined peace force (Rojas, 2008:41). Important as those experiences are, government officials, researchers and citizens should discuss more explicitly in both normative and analytical ways the role of security and defense in the current and future South America integration process. To address these questions thinking outside the EU model box, in the next two sections one shall find some preliminary work on two specialized regional arrangements (OSCE and SCO) designed to address contemporary security issues.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reported that the GDP of the twelve South American countries $2.5 trillion in 2006. Brazil alone had a GDP of $1.06 trillion in 2006 and $1.3 trillion in 2007.

Cf. www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/04/080415_jobimvenezuela_cj_ac.shtml

III The OSCE comprehensive approach towards security

The Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has its roots on the Helsinki Process of the 1970s, which gave birth to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe created a new dynamic to the security cooperation in the European continent, and the basic agreements made on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were improved on the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed in 1990. Only in 1995, though, the CSCE would be renamed as OSCE and gain a new institutional framework. Today, it counts 56 members from Europe, North-America and Asia. 7 The highest-level bodies of the Organization are the Ministerial Council, which meets every year, and the Permanent Council, meeting weekly at the Secretariat in Vienna, and the Forum for Security Co-operation. Summits with the presence of heads of State may also be scheduled, but do not happen regularly. In addition to that the OSCE has a Secretariat and a Parliamentary Assembly, with the intention of facilitating interparliamentary dialogue. This Assembly should further discuss the subjects dealt during the Ministerial meetings and assess the functioning of the Organization by issuing resolutions and recommendations. The OSCE has a comprehensive approach on security, dealing with it in three dimensions: the politico-military, the economic and environmental and the human. Within the politico-military dimension, the OSCE deals with classic security issues, such as arms and border controls, but also with conflict prevention, terrorism, combat of illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and all other kinds of transnational criminal activities. The economic and environmental dimension, in which the OSCE works in close cooperation with other international organizations, includes combating corruption and money laundering, as well as the management of natural resources. The human dimension of the OSCE works on fields as democratization, education, electoral activities, minority rights and even free media, tolerance and non-discrimination, elections, environmental activities, gender equality. In order to successfully deal with all those issues, aside of the organs referred before, the Organization counts with a High-Commissioner on National Minorities, a Representative on Freedom of the Media and an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Also, it counts with several missions and field activities throughout Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, to monitor stressful situations, facilitating early warning and conflict managing. The OSCE is a landmark regional security organization, as it was the first one to deal with security problems in a multidimensional approach, as afore-mentioned, and as it is the most comprehensive regional security organization, both in scope and membership from different continents. This Organization has achieved, through its predecessor institution the CSCE an alternative way of treating security problems by not staying restricted only to politico-military questions, so present during the Cold War, and being able to see through the problems that reached the European continent during the 1990s in a more global way.

For a list of member states, cf. Table 1.

In the context of the end of the Cold War, the CSCE was the first Organization to understand the necessity of systemic and institutional cooperation for the combat and the prevention of threats and to develop mechanisms to deal with it more adequately, going from informal mechanisms to treaties and other institutionalized ways of doing so. A good example of these mechanisms is the creation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). CBMs are aimed at assuring a more transparent relation between countries especially when concerning military activities, and although they are not a formal treaty and do not imply judicial constrains, they have a relevant pedagogical effect, being an important tool to enhance cooperation among countries and to establish the fundamental stones for further security cooperation (Haas, 2007b). The CBMs are designed to help controlling military activity and to provide early warnings when any country starts to develop different military activities. Some simple examples of CBMs that proved to be effective would be: annual defense ministers meetings; exchange of defense information; publication of Defense White Papers; prior notification of major military maneuvers; exchange of observers; exchange, by invitation, of military personnel including visits by foreign delegations; information on existing forces including structure, deployment, peacetime authorized strength and major weapons and equipment systems down to brigade/regiment level; information about the planned deployment of major weapons and equipment systems and publication of annual military budgets, among others. Although the later development of the OSCE and the European context in general led to the establishment of the concept of comprehensive security, which states that the management of security issues should not be restricted to the politico-military dimension but also include the economic, environmental and human dimension, the basis for the OSCE is the establishment of better military and political relations, as it regularly is for every existent security organization. Due to that, the OSCE is a pioneer organization and a model to be followed by other countries wishing to have the same reach and breath. However, exactly because of the wide range of aspects and activities proposed by the OSCE, and mainly because of the vast number of countries that participate on the Organization, it has seeing its scope of action and the very effectiveness of its actions diminished. First of all, there are other organizations that deal with the same sort of subjects addressed by the OSCE in Europe competing with the OSCE. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most important of them, even if does not work the same way or follows the same principles that OSCE. For Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the European Union has the Council of Europe with its charter. The first signs of failure and weakness of the OSCE can be traced back to the late nineties, during Yugoslavian wars, where the Organization was overshadowed by those structures aforementioned. Besides, as the OSCE is formed by 56 countries, with the rise of new security problems, it is getting harder to reach a common ground between countries that participate in specific regional structures such as those from Central Asia (Hopmann, 2008). Although the OSCE is an important model for other regions wishing to establish similar structures, the European experience has to be adapted to suit other continents. Although it is important to expand the dimensions of security as made by the OSCE, for the South American continent this could be a very delicate matter, especially when related to democratic control, because imposing a political agenda to South American political leaders could lead to the disintegration of this initiative. The complexity of the OSCE structure is another point that has to be viewed with some criticism, although some

important aspects, such as the creation of different branches of activities, could be adapted to South America. The same caveat is obviously valid to the next organization to be considered here.

IV - The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its security focus

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a permanent intergovernmental organism established in 2001 by Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its current institutional design evolved from the Shanghai Five established in 1996, an initiative comprised by five of the aforementioned countries, except Uzbekistan. According to Marcel de Haas (2007a:07-10), the institutional development of the SCO could be divided in three phases: 1o) Confidence and security building measures (1996-2001), when the basic objectives were related to increase trust in the border regions and reduce military forces in border regions of countries that were used to be hostile to each other (China versus former Soviet Union) throughout most of the Cold War. 2o) Regional security against terrorism, separatism and extremism (2001-2004), when the Shanghai convention was signed, the first cross-border anti-terrorist exercises were conducted, and the two permanent organs of the OCS were established, a Secretariat (in Shanghai) and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 3o) Comprehensive international organization (2004-present). During the third phase, SCO transformed itself into an organization pursuing international recognition and cooperation with similar organizations (Memoranda of Understanding with UN, ASEAN, OCSE, CIS etc). Likewise, its observers were raised from one admitted during the previous phase (Mongolia) to four (India, Pakistan and Iran) and the organization developed military exercises almost yearly since then, including the 2005 Russian-Chinese Peace Mission, the 2006 East Antiterror, and the 2007 Issik-Kul Antiterror conducted in the northern Kyrgyzstan. In general terms, SCOs institutional design is organized in the form of two basic mechanisms of interactions: one of periodic meetings, and a permanent structure. The first mechanism comprises the meetings of the Council of Heads of States, and the Council of Heads of Governments (Prime-Ministers), as well as meetings carried on by the official representatives of other sectors Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Culture, Economy, Defense, Transportation, and the Council of National Coordinators. 8

There are some areas of cooperation and disagreement between SCO and OSCE, as well as between SCO and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), or even between SCO and NATO, but this is not the focus here. For a preliminary assessment, see: HAAS (2007a).

Figure 1 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Main Structures

Source: http://www.sectsco.org/html/00027.html

As for more descriptive information on this system of periodic meetings, SCOs Council of Heads of States is the higher decision-making body in the Organization, followed by the Council of the Heads of Government, which annually discusses multilateral cooperation in Central Asia. The latter is responsible as well for approving the Organizations annual budget. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs also holds regular meetings as to discuss the present international situation and the interactions between SCO and other international organizations. Finally, the Council of National Coordinators co-ordinates the multilateral cooperation of the member states under the scope of SCOs chart. The second mechanism of interaction, namely the permanent structure, is composed by the two permanent bodies of the Organization the Secretariat, established in 2004 and located in Shanghai (China), and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS), created in 2002 and located in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). SCOs Secretariat is the main executive body of the Organization. It implements organizational decisions, projects and

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documents (such as statements and agenda), functioning as the documental depositary of the Organization and managing all the activities addressed by SCO. Through the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) the SCO member countries also take part in the Shanghai Convention on terrorism, separatism and extremism. Bearing in mind the objectives and principles of the United Nations related to peace and international security, good relations with neighbor countries and cooperation among states, as well as perceiving that terrorism, separatism and extremism are a threat to peace and security of nations, Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan decided to create a mechanism of joint control. Therefore, convinced of the necessity of coordinating actions of common interest as to provide territorial integrity, security and stability, and to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism, RATS was established. This structure has been successful in acquiring the capacity to deal with groups that oppose to the governments of the member states. Moreover, SCO contributes to stability in the vast Central Asian region, which comprises not only natural resources reserves, but also areas of conflict. A common strategy among great powers is to carefully include new actors as minor partners, either for the purpose of tactical convenience or due to the necessity of reflecting new power realities, decurrently from the international dynamics. As a part of the Chinese-Russian strategy of co-opting the neighbor countries to their sphere of influence, China and Russia intend to bring economic growth and cooperation to their regional partners in that sense, a Chinese credit fund was established to facilitate the SCO members access to financing. Furthermore, one could also mention the cooperation between China, Russia and Kazakhstan in the energy field, as well as the economic and commercial cooperation 9 among SCOs members. On the subject of the security field, SCO promotes stability to the governments of the member state, combating domestic and foreign insurgent groups that contest the central governments authority. Security is the key issue in SCO, since the main problem faced in the region is the low level of control in border relations, as well as the presence of alleged terrorist or extremist groups in their territories. For that reason, SCO has adopted very precise and rigid definitions for terrorism, separatism and extremism which are somewhat rare among international organizations. In practical terms, SCO nations seek to contend terrorism by combating separatism and religious (Islamic) extremism. The regions emphasis in security matters is, therefore, the search for guaranteeing the territorial integrity of each country, as well as the maintenance of secular regimes in Central Asia. Another growing security concern for SCO is the rising in the production of poppy in Afghanistan and the illegal commerce of heroin which originates there. On that matter, SCOs members signed in 2004 an Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illegal Turnover of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and the Precursors Thereof. Despite SCOs tradition in addressing matters of security, it has been pointed out that the future of the organization depends on its members ability to cooperate in the economic field as well. Since the region is extremely rich in resources that are increasingly
9

The only Central Asian country that is not a SCO member is Turkmenistan, although its president Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov did attend the SCO Bishkek Summit (August 2007) and might be interested in joining the so called SCO Energy Club. Cf. HAAS (2007a:10)

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necessary, but tend to scarceness, the absence of cooperation in economic affairs could induce a level of competition that would obliterate any integration initiative. Formally, the organization already works toward that type of cooperation, although the approved projects have yet to come to full implementation. In short, the Shanghai Spirit symbolizes a new type of international security cooperation model, less bureaucratic, less comprehensive and much more practical for countries that are not among the richest ones. On the less brilliant side, the authoritarian nature of the political regimes involved in the SCO process hardly could inspire blind confidence in this model in South America, where one of the biggest challenges in the security field reform is exactly try hard to find balance between state effectiveness in providing safety and security to all citizens and strong legitimacy achieved by accountability and democratic control of institutions.

V Conclusion
As one compares even briefly the institutional design, types of operations and the strategic rationales of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a couple of recommendations can be made for South America. From the OSCE experience, it should be avoided the too broad defined mission based upon a comprehensive concept of human security. It was important for OSCE at some point in order to focus on citizens instead of states as well as to provide a common agenda for very different types of states and regional security contexts. This type of missions, with a relatively low profile, have played a central role in managing all of the conflicts that have emerged in the broad European regions following the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the large multinational states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Hopmann, 2008:03). With the renewed conflicts between secessionists and central governments, civil wars and militarized interstate disputes in different parts east of Vienna over the last fifteen years, the very same comprehensiveness that was so useful in the beginning became dysfunctional and the OSCE lost appeal for most stakeholders, including Russia, United States, and European Union. In contrast, the areas where OSCE is still making a difference with its current agenda (namely border control cooperation, education programs, and law enforcement assistance) are largely complementary or compatible with the less soft security agenda of SCO. Created to lesser the tensions between China and former soviet republics bordering it, the SCO structures and raison dtre changed dramatically after 2001. Building upon a strong base of confidence measures in border issues and counterterrorism, the SCO is slowly expanding its cooperation agenda towards more conventional defense and military themes as well as economic ones, energy, and general state capacity building.

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Although UNASUR is still a fledgling organization, there are theoretical and political 10 reasons to avoid modeling it exclusively after the European Union security institutions. Theoretically, most of the critics of the SCO model wrongly assume that from state weakness flows the internal security dilemma and from that, in turn, the sovereigntyreinforcing international organizations (Kelly, 2007:218). The link between weakness or strength of a state apparatus and its alliance pattern seems to be just the opposite, not to mention the inherent problems with the concept of weak state. Politically, the same sort of criticism just assumes naively that the European Union ought to be superior for some hidden moral reason. The thinking goes like this: Regional security organizations do not pool sovereignty so much as amass it for joint, coordinated repression. Weak-state regional international organizations are mutual sovereignty reinforcement coalitions, not integrationist regional bodies like the European Union. The joint strategy regionalizes not sovereignty but domestic conflict and elite pushback (Kelly, 2007:219). It just doesnt seem necessary that regional security organizations in the Third World will inevitably work that way. Even taking these somehow displaced caveats in full consideration, it does not exempt us of at least think about alternatives to the European Union model, which are costly, heavily bureaucratic and regulated. As for the Defense or Security Council now in study in South America, a sort of combination between a thin and broad normative basis similar to the spirit of the OSCE pre-2001 (focusing on the civil rights of the citizens and confidence building measures) and the effectiveness and priority (SCO style) rendered to the actual security threats of the region (in opposition to a generic Global War on Terrorism type of agenda) might prove worth of trying. Hopefully this text will help to foster the debate about the options and timing.

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The under balancing behavior here can and should be explained in realist terms as well. For a first attempt, see: SCHWELLER (2006).

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Table 1 Comparing UNASUR, OSCE, and SCO

UNASUR Year of Formation Year of Previous Initiative Region Number of Member States 2008 2004 South America 12 SCO 2001 1996 Asia 06 OSCE 1995 1973 Europe-Asia-North America 56

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, State Members Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Vatican China, Kazakhstan, City, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Tajikistan and Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Uzbekistan Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand.

Observers/Part ners

Panama and Mexico attended the

NONE Nuclear Powers as State Tlatelolco Treaty for the Members or Prohibition of Nuclear observers/partn Weapons in Latin America ers and the Caribbean Related Organizations UN, OAS, CAN, MERCOSUR, OTCA

Russia and China; Pakistan and India

USA, Russia, France, United Kingdom

UN, CIS, CSTO

UN, EU, NATO, CIS

Primary Focus

Economic Integration

State Security Cooperation

Comprehensive Security Dialogue

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Equitable social and human development, the eradication of illiteracy, the Strengthening mutual universal access to quality trust, friendship and education and the regional good neighborliness; recognition of courses and enhancement of titles; energy integration; military security by infrastructure for the promoting dialogue, interconnection of the transparency, coregion; financial integration; operation and protection of biodiversity, commitments on water resources and military conduct; ecosystems; cooperation in disarmament and arms the prevention of control; border security catastrophes; consolidation and management; Anti-trafficking, arms control, border of a South American police and other law management, combat terrorism, identity; universal access to enforcement assistance democratization, economic growth, social security and health programs; conflict education programs, election services; migratory prevention; combating assistance projects, environmental regularization and terrorism; combating activities, gender equality, human Objectives and harmonization of policies; transnational organized rights, media freedom, military reduction of poverty; Activities crime such as drugs, reform, conflict prevention, minority industrial and productive human beings rights, policing and police reform, as integration; cooperative and arms trafficking; well as promotion of the rule of law, research and technological supporting economic tolerance and non-discrimination development; promotion of growth and based upon racism, xenophobia, cultural diversity; fight cooperation; education anti-Semitism and so on. against corruption, the interchanges; global drug problem, counteracting trafficking in persons, separatism and trafficking in small and light extremism; weapons, terrorism, counteracting illegal transnational organized immigration; regional crime and other threats; cooperation in culture, non-proliferation of weapons sports, tourism, science of mass destruction; and technology, trade, cooperation among the energy, transport, judicial authorities of the Member States of UNASUR, credit, finance and health care. and the exchange of information and experiences in matters of defense. Source: Adapted from Haas (2007:259) and complemented with http://www.sectsco.org; http://www.osce.org and http://www.mre.gov.br. information obtained at

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Table 2 Armed Forces in South America

Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela Total 72,700 33,500 293,500 81,000 210,300 457,000 1,630 18,600 110,000 3,140 23,500 79,000 Army 42,500 25,000 195,000 45,000 180,000 47,000 1,500 14,900 70,000 2,800 14,500 34,000 Air Force 13,200 4,000 50,000 13,000 7,300 4,000 100 1,700 14,500 100 3,000 7,000 Navy 17,000 4,500 48,500 23,000 23,000 6,500 30 2,000 25,500 240 6,000 15,000

Notes: 1. Reserves not included. 2. Including National Guard.

Table 3 - Defence Expenditure in South America

Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela Defence expenditure (USD Per cent of billions) GDP 1.53 0.12 16.43 1.44 4.0 0. 7 0.017 0.52 0.9 0.03 0.17 1.2
1

Per head of population (USD) 40.2 15 87.4 92 95.23 51 23.1 15 33.6 15.0 50.45 50
1

Per member of armed forces (USD) 21,309 3,700 56,000 17,777 10,816 12,174 5,766 4,166 8,181 9,790 6,824 15,227
1

1.04 1.6 1.7 1.75 3.9 1.7 2.2 1.2 1.35 2.0 1.5 1.8
1

Note: 1 - Latest available figure.

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Table 4 - Economic Indicators

Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela GDP (USD billions) 153 8.7 794 115.3 122.3 30.3 0.79 7. 3 79.4 1.1 16.7 138.8 GDP Growth (annual per cent) 8. 9 3.6 2.3 6.3 0 5 6.9 -0.65 3.0 6.4 4.6 6.6 9. 33 GDP per capita (ppp USD) 7,482 1,036 3,596 5,747 7,304 1,459 951 1,361 2,650 2,369 4, 653 4,939

Note: All figures from World Development Indicators.

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Table 5 - Social Indicators

Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela Population(millions) 38.7 9. 0 183.9 16. 1 44.9 13. 0 0.75 6. 0 27. 6 0.4 3.4 26. 3 Population growth (average annual) 1. 1 2.1 1. 5 1. 3 1. 7 1. 5 0. 3 2.5 1. 6 0. 8 0.7 2. 0 2005 UN Human Development Index ranking 34 113 63 37 69 82 107 88 79 86 46 75

Notes: World Health Organisation figures. Ranked out of 177 countries (1-575: high human development; 58145: medium human development; 146-177: low human development). Source: 2007 Jane's Information Group

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Abbreviations:
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CAN Comunidad Andina de Naciones / Andean Nations Community CASA Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones / South American Community of Nations CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization of the CIS EU European Uniion MERCOSUR Common Market of South / Mercado Comum Del Sur NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OAS Organization of American States OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe OTCA Organizacin del Tratado de Cooperacin Amaznica / Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization RATS Regional Antiterrorist Structure of SCO SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization UN United Nations UNASUR Unin de Naciones Suramericanas / Union of South American Nations

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SOUTH AMERICAN UNION OF NATIONS CONSTITUTIVE TREATY The Republic of Argentina, the Republic of Bolivia, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Ecuador, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Paraguay, the Republic of Peru, the Republic of Suriname, the Oriental Republic of Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. PREAMBLE BASED on the shared history and solidarity of our multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural nations, which have fought for the emancipation and unity of South America, honouring the vision of those who forged our independence and freedom in favour of that union and the building of a common future; INSPIRED by the Cusco Declaration (December 8th, 2004), the Brasilia Declaration (September 30th, 2005) and the Cochabamba Declaration (December 9th, 2006); AFFIRMING their determination to build a South American identity and citizenship and to develop an integrated regional space in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy and infrastructure dimensions, for the strengthening of Latin America and Caribbean unity; CONVINCED that the South American integration and South American unity are necessary to promote the sustainable development and wellbeing of our peoples, and to contribute to the solution of the problems which still affect our region, such as persistent poverty, social exclusion and inequality; CERTAIN that integration is a decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the rule of law in international relations in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and just world, in which the sovereign equality of States and a culture of peace prevail and in a world free of nuclear weapons and of weapons of mass destruction; CONFIRMING that both South American integration and the South American union are based on the guiding principles of: unlimited respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of States; selfdetermination of the peoples; solidarity; cooperation; peace; democracy, citizen participation and pluralism; universal, interdependent and indivisible human rights; reduction of asymmetries and harmony with nature for a sustainable development; UNDERSTANDING that South American integration should be achieved through an innovative process, which would include the progress achieved so far by the MERCOSUR and CAN processes, as well as the experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, and which goes beyond the convergence among them; CONSCIOUS that the process of building a South American integration and union is ambitious in its strategic objectives and will be flexible and gradual in its implementation, ensuring that each State honour its commitments according to its own reality; RATIFYING that fully functioning democratic institutions and the unrestricted respect for human rights are essential conditions for building a common future of peace, economic and social prosperity and for the development of integration processes among the Member States; AGREE: Article 1 - Constitution of UNASUR The States Party to this Treaty decide to constitute the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as an entity with international juridical character. Article 2 - Objective The objective of the South American Union of Nations is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socioeconomic inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion and participation of civil society, to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States. Article 3 - Specific Objectives The South American Union of Nations has the following objectives:

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a) The strengthening of the political dialogue among Member States to guarantee a space for consultation in order to reinforce South American integration and the participation of UNASUR in the international arena; b) The inclusive and equitable social and human development in order to eradicate poverty and overcome inequalities in the region; c) The eradication of illiteracy, the universal access to quality education and the regional recognition of courses and titles; d) Energy integration for the integral and sustainable use of the resources of the region, in a spirit of solidarity; e) The development of an infrastructure for the interconnection of the region and among our peoples, based on sustainable social and economic development criteria; f) Financial integration through the adoption of mechanisms compatible with the economic and fiscal policies of Member States; g) The protection of biodiversity, water resources and ecosystems, as well as cooperation in the prevention of catastrophes and in combating the causes and effects of climate change; h) The development of concrete and effective mechanisms to overcome asymmetries, thus achieving an equitable integration; i) The consolidation of a South American identity through the progressive recognition of the rights of nationals of a Member State resident in any of the other Member States, with the aim of attaining a South American citizenship; j) Universal access to social security and health services; k) Cooperation on issues of migration with a holistic approach, based on an unrestricted respect for human and labour rights, for migratory regularisation and harmonisation of policies; l) Economic and commercial cooperation to achieve progress and consolidation of an innovative, dynamic, transparent, equitable and balanced process focused on an effective access, promoting economic growth and development to overcome asymmetries by means of the complementarities of the economies of the countries of South America, as well as the promotion of the wellbeing of all sectors of the population and the reduction of poverty; m) Industrial and productive integration, focusing especially on the important role that small and medium size enterprises, cooperatives, networks and other forms of productive organisation may play; n) The definition and implementation of common or complementary policies and projects of research, innovation, technological transfer and technological production, aimed at enhancing the regions own capacity, sustainability and technological development; o) The promotion of cultural diversity and the expression of the traditions and knowledge of the peoples of the region, in order to strengthen their sense of identity; p) Citizen participation through mechanisms for interaction and dialogue between UNASUR and the various social actors in the formulation of South American integration policies; q) Coordination among specialised bodies of the Member States, taking into account international norms, in order to strengthen the fight against corruption, the global drug problem, trafficking in persons, trafficking in small and light weapons, terrorism, transnational organised crime and other threats as well as for disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and elimination of landmines; r) The promotion of cooperation among the judicial authorities of the Member States of UNASUR. s) The exchange of information and experiences in matters of defence; t) Cooperation for the strengthening of citizen security; u) Sectoral cooperation as a mechanism to deepen South American integration, through the exchange of information, experiences and capacity building. Article 4 - Bodies The Bodies of UNASUR are: 1. The Council of Heads of State and Government 2. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 3. The Council of Delegates 4. The General Secretariat Article 5 - Institutional Development Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, and meetings of the Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and other institutional levels may be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to fulfil the mandates and recommendations of the competent bodies. These bodies will report on their activities

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through the Council of Delegates, which will present its findings to the Council of Heads of State and Government or to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as appropriate. The agreements adopted by the Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and other institutional levels will be submitted for consideration by the competent body which has summoned or created them. The Energy Council of South America, created by the Declaration of Margarita (April 17th, 2007), is part of UNASUR. Article 6 - The Council of Heads of State and Government The Council of Heads of State and Government is the highest organ of UNASUR. Its responsibilities are: a) To establish policy guidelines, plans of action, programmes and projects of the South American integration process and to decide on the priorities to be implemented; b) To summon Sectoral Ministerial Meetings and to create Councils at Ministerial level; c) To decide on the proposals presented by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; d) To adopt the political guidelines for relation with third parties; The ordinary meetings of the Council of Heads of State and Government will be held annually. Upon the request of a Member State, extraordinary meetings may be summoned through the Pro Tempore Presidency, subject to the consensus of all Member States of UNASUR. Article 7 - The Pro Tempore Presidency The Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR will be held successively by each of the Member States, in alphabetical order, for periods of one year. Its responsibilities are: a) To prepare, summon and preside over the meetings of the bodies of UNASUR; b) To present to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and to the Council of Delegates the annual program of activities of UNASUR, with dates, venues and agenda of the meetings of its bodies in coordination with the General Secretariat; c) To represent UNASUR in international events, with the prior authorization of the Member States; d) To undertake commitments and to sign Declarations with third parties, with prior consent of the appropriate bodies of UNASUR. Article 8 - The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has the following functions: a) To adopt Resolutions in order to implement the Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government; b) To propose draft Decisions and prepare the meetings of the Council of Heads of State and Government; c) To coordinate positions on central themes of South American integration; d) To develop and promote political dialogue and coordination on themes of regional and international interest; e) To oversee and evaluate the integration process as a whole; f) To approve the annual Programme of activities and the annual working budget of UNASUR; g) To approve the financing of the common initiatives of UNASUR; h) To implement the policy guidelines for relations with third parties; i) To approve resolutions and regulations of an institutional nature or on other themes falling within its jurisdiction; j) To create Working Groups based on the priorities established by the Council of Heads of State and Government.

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The ordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs will be held every semester and may be convened by the Pro Tempore Presidency on an extraordinary basis at the request of half of the Member States. Article 9 - The Council of Delegates The Council of Delegates has the following functions: a) To implement, through the adoption of the appropriate Provisions, the Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, and the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the support of the Pro Tempore Presidency and the General Secretariat; b) To prepare the meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; c) To prepare draft Decisions, Resolutions and Regulations for the consideration of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; d) To ensure the compatibility and to coordinate the initiatives of UNASUR with other existing regional and subregional integration processes in order to promote the complementarity of efforts; e) To establish, coordinate and oversee the Working Groups; f) To oversee the political dialogue and consultation and coordination on issues of regional and international interest; g) To encourage the opportunities for dialogue so as to facilitate citizen participation in the South American integration process; h) To propose to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for its consideration and approval, the draft ordinary annual working budget. The Council of Delegates is composed of one accredited representative of each Member State. It will meet preferably every two months, in the territory of the State which occupies the Pro Tempore Presidency or another agreed venue. Article 10 - The General Secretariat The General Secretariat is the body that, under the leadership of the Secretary General, executes the mandates conferred upon it by the organs of UNASUR and represents them accordingly. Its headquarters shall be the city of Quito, Ecuador. Its responsibilities shall be: a) To support the Council of Heads of States and Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Delegates and the Pro Tempore Presidency in the fulfilment of their duties; b) To propose initiatives and to oversee the implementation of the directives of the organs of UNASUR; c) To participate with the right to speak and to perform the role of secretary in the meetings of the organs of UNASUR; d) To prepare and submit the Annual Report and the respective reports to the corresponding organs of UNASUR; e) To serve as depository of the Agreements in the framework of UNASUR and to arrange for their respective publication; f) To prepare the draft Annual Budget for the consideration of the Council of Delegates and to adopt the necessary measures for its proper management and execution; g) To prepare the draft Regulations for the functioning of the General Secretariat and to submit them for the consideration and approval of the corresponding organs; h) To coordinate with other integration and cooperation entities of Latin America and the Caribbean with a view to developing those activities requested by the bodies of UNASUR; i) To execute, according to the regulations, all the legal acts necessary for the proper administration and management of the General Secretariat; The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council of Heads of State and Government, following a proposal by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for a term of two years, renewable only once. The Secretary General shall not be succeeded by a person of the same nationality.

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During the exercise of his or her functions, the Secretary General and the staff of the General Secretariat shall be exclusively dedicated to UNASUR and will not request, neither accept, instructions from any Government nor any authority other than UNASUR, and will refrain from acting in a manner inconsistent with their status as international civil servants with sole responsibility to this international organisation. The Secretary General shall be the legal representative of the General Secretariat. In the selection of the employees of the General Secretariat, an equitable representation for each Member State will be guaranteed, taking into account, as far as possible, criteria of gender, language, ethnicity and others. Article 11 - Juridical Sources The juridical sources of UNASUR are the following: 1. The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR and other additional instruments; 2. The Agreements concluded by the Member States of UNASUR as a consequence of the instruments mentioned in the item above; 3. The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government; 4. The Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; 5. The Provisions of the Council of Delegates. Article 12 - Approval of the Legislative Measures All the norms of UNASUR will be adopted by consensus. The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Provisions of the Council of Delegates may be adopted with the presence of at least three quarters (3/4) of the Member States. The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted without the presence of all Member States, shall be forwarded by the Secretary General to the absent States, which shall make known their position within thirty (30) days after receipt of the document in the appropriate language. In the case of the Council of Delegates, that deadline shall be fifteen (15) days. The Working Groups shall hold sessions and make proposals as long as they have a quorum of half plus one of the Member States. The legislative measures emanating from the organs of UNASUR will be binding on the Member States once they have been incorporated into each Member States domestic law, according to its respective internal procedures. Article 13 - Adoption of Policies and Creation of Institutions, Organizations and Programmes One or more Member States may submit for the consideration of the Council of Delegates a proposal for adoption of policies, creation of common institutions, organisations and programmes which will be adopted in a consensual manner, on the basis of a flexible and gradual criteria of implementation according to the objectives of UNASUR and the provisions of Articles 5 and 12 of this Treaty. Programmes, institutions and organisations in which Member States participate prior to the entry into force of this Treaty may be considered as UNASUR programmes, institutions or organisations, in accordance with the procedures outlined in this article and in accordance with the objectives of this Treaty. The proposals will be submitted to the Council of Delegates. Once approved by consensus, they will be forwarded to the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and, subsequently, to the Council of Heads of State and Government, for approval by consensus. When a proposal has not obtained consensus, it may only be submitted to the Council of Delegates six months after its last inclusion in the agenda. Once a proposal is approved by the highest body of UNASUR, three or more Member States may begin to implement it, provided that the possibility of inclusion of other Member States in such a common initiative is guaranteed and periodical reports of its implementation are presented to the Council of Delegates. Any Member State may completely or partially refrain from implementing an approved policy, be it for a period defined beforehand, or for an indefinite period, without preventing it from later joining the total or

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partial implementation of that policy. In the case of institutions, organisations or programmes which are created, any Member State may participate as an observer, or refrain from participating fully or partially for a definite or indefinite period. The adoption of policies and the creation of institutions, organisations and programmes will be regulated by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, following a proposal by the Council of Delegates. Article 14 - Political Dialogue The political consultation and coordination among the Member States of UNASUR will be based on harmony and mutual respect, strengthening regional stability and supporting the preservation of democratic values and the promotion of human rights. Member States will reinforce the practice of consensus-building on the central themes on the international agenda and will promote initiatives that affirm the identity of the region as a dynamic factor in international relations. Article 15 - Relationship with Third Parties UNASUR will promote initiatives for dialogue on themes of regional or international interest and will seek to strengthen cooperation mechanisms with other regional groups, States and other entities with international legal character, focusing on projects in the areas of energy, financing, infrastructure, social policies, education and others to be identified. The Council of Delegates with the support of the Pro Tempore Presidency and the General Secretariat is responsible for overseeing the implementation of activities. For the purpose of achieving proper coordination, the Council of Delegates shall be informed of and consider the positions that UNASUR will adopt in its relationship with third parties. Article 16 - Financing The Council of Delegates will propose to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for consideration and approval, the draft Annual Ordinary Budget for the functioning of the General Secretariat. The financing of the ordinary budget for the functioning of the General Secretariat will be based on differentiated contribution quotas of the Member States to be determined by a Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, following a proposal by the Council of Delegates, taking into account the economic capacity of the Member States, shared responsibility and the principle of equity. Article 17 - Parliament The creation of a South American Parliament, whose seat shall be the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia, will be the subject of an Additional Protocol to the present Treaty. Article 18 - Citizen Participation Full citizen participation in the process of South American integration and union will be promoted by means of dialogue and interaction in a broad, democratic, transparent, pluralistic, diverse and independent manner with the various social actors, establishing effective channels of information, consultation and supervision in the different bodies of UNASUR. The Member States and organs of UNASUR will promote innovative mechanisms and spaces to encourage discussion of various issues ensuring that the proposals submitted by civil society receive adequate consideration and response. Article 19 - Associate States Other Latin American and Caribbean States that request participation as Associate States of UNASUR may be admitted with the approval of the Council of Heads of State and Government. The rights and obligations of the Associate States will be regulated by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Article 20 - Accession of New Members After the fifth year of the entry into force of the present Treaty and taking into account the aim of strengthening Latin American and Caribbean unity, the Council of Heads of State and Government may consider requests for accession as Members States by Associate States, that have held such a status for four years, by means of a consensual recommendation by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The

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respective Protocols of Accession will enter into force 30 days after the completion of the ratification process by all Members States and the acceding State. Article 21 - Dispute Settlement Any dispute that may emerge between States Parties regarding the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Constitutive Treaty will be settled through direct negotiations. In the case where a solution is not reached through direct negotiation, the Member States involved will submit the dispute for the consideration of the Council of Delegates, which will formulate within 60 days, the appropriate recommendations for the settlement of the dispute. If a solution is not reached by the Council of Delegates, the dispute will be taken to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which will consider it at its next meeting. Article 22 - Privileges and Immunities UNASUR shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Member States, the privileges and immunities necessary for the fulfilment of its functions. The representatives of the Member States of UNASUR and the international employees of UNASUR will therefore benefit from the privileges and immunities necessary for the independent exercise of their functions with relation to this Treaty. UNASUR shall establish with the Republic of Ecuador the corresponding Headquarters Agreement which will establish the specific privileges and immunities. Article 23 - Languages The official languages of the Union of South American Nations will be English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch. Article 24 - Validity and Denunciation This treaty will have an indefinite validity. It may be denounced by any of the Member States by means of a written notification to the Depositary, which shall communicate such notification to the other Member States. The denunciation will have effect six (6) months after the date in which the notification is received by the Depositary. The notification of the denunciation shall not exempt the Member State of the obligation to pay outstanding ordinary contributions. Article 25 - Amendments Any Member State may propose amendments to this Constitutive Treaty. The proposed amendments will be communicated to the General Secretariat which shall notify the other Member States for its consideration by the bodies of UNASUR. The amendments approved by the Council of Heads of State and Government will follow the procedure established in article 26 for entry into force. Article 26 - Entry Into Force The present Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations will enter into force thirty days after the date of receipt of the 9th instrument of ratification. The instruments of ratification will be deposited before the Government of the Republic of Ecuador, which will communicate the date of deposit to the other States, as well as the date of entry into force of this Constitutive Treaty. For the Member State which ratifies the Constitutive Treaty after the deposit of the 9th instrument of ratification, the Treaty will enter into force 30 days after the date in which that State deposits its instrument of ratification. Article 27 - Registration This Constitutive Treaty and its amendments will be registered at the United Nations Secretariat. Transitory Article

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The Parties agree to appoint a Special Commission, coordinated by the Council of Delegates and composed of representatives of the National, Regional and Subregional Parliaments, with the objective of preparing a draft of an Additional Protocol which will be considered in the IV Summit of Heads of State and Government. This Commission will meet in the city of Cochabamba. Such an Additional Protocol will determine the composition, attributions and functioning of the South American Parliament. Done in the city of Brasilia, Brazil, on the 23rd day of the month of May of the year 2008, in original copies in the English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch languages, the four texts being equally authentic.

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Abstract As pointed by Kelly (2007:212-215), a normative desire for regional integration still drives most of the academic and political debate concerned with the newly created Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The main goal of this paper is to compare the institutional design, operations and strategic rationales of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in order to evaluate how useful and applicable those experiences would be for South America. Since the UNASUR was conceived to absorb and transcend previous regional organizations such as the Mercosur and the Andean Community, it has potential security roles in addressing common regional ills like organized crime and high rates of interpersonal violence. A more institutionalized regional order is also supposed to provide more room of maneuver for the South Americans facing global centripetal forces such as the current U.S. primacy push and neoliberal globalization. Although UNASUR is still a fledgling supranational / intergovernmental union, there are theoretical and political reasons to avoid modeling it exclusively after the European Union security institutions. Assuming a normative desire for a robust UNASUR to be built in South America, this paper examines in rather realist terms the usefulness of two other models of security cooperation and integration (Mares, 2001; Buzan & Weaver, 2003).

Key words: Europe-South America-Integration-Cooperation-Security-Regional-RegionOrganization

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