Lec 14

Multiagent Systems
Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation
Multiagent Systems
P.B. Sujit
April 2, 2013
1 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Homework issue Swarm model reading assignment Clarication on the strategy for the project
2 / 21
Multiagent Systems
This class
Rubeinsteins Alternating Oers model Monotonic Concession Protocol The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step protocol
3 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Strategic solution concept

In the previous class we saw axiomatic solution concept We will not look at strategic solution concept that tries to model the actual bargaining process assuming rational agents and determine the equilibrium strategies For formally analyzing the bargaining process we need to capture all the behaviors of a human during bargaining Too many parameters to capture the process We need a simple protocol that can be formally analyzed and still allows the agents to use most of its moves Rubeinsteins alternating oer model
4 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Alternating oer model

The bargaining process is carried out in time steps over the time Two agents try to arrive at an agreement One agent oers, the other agent can either accept the oer or reject it If accepted, the solution is reached If second agent rejects, then we move to the next time step when the second agent proposes a new oer Once a deal is rejected, it cannot be accepted again and the deal is void But the can again proposal the same deal later in time The agents are always free to propose a new deal or accept or reject any deal as they wish
5 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO model
The AO model does not have dominant strategy
6 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO model
The AO model does not have dominant strategy Say, two agents bargain over how to divide a pie
6 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO model
Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol
The AO model does not have dominant strategy Say, two agents bargain over how to divide a pie Under AO model, the best strategy is to keep the pie to themselves
Argumentation based Negotiation
This process can go on forever
6 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO model
Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol
The AO model does not have dominant strategy Say, two agents bargain over how to divide a pie Under AO model, the best strategy is to keep the pie to themselves
Argumentation based Negotiation
This process can go on forever What if the object is not pie but ice-cream?
6 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO model
When time is precious, agents utility reduces with time. agent i utility at time t for deal is t i ui ( ) where t i is the discount at time t for agent i Similarly for aj the utility is t j uj ( ) The utility monotonically decreases with increase in time When t i = 0?
7 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO model
When time is precious, agents utility reduces with time. agent i utility at time t for deal is t i ui ( ) where t i is the discount at time t for agent i Similarly for aj the utility is t j uj ( ) The utility monotonically decreases with increase in time When t i = 0? then agents must agree at time t = 0 When t i = 1?
7 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO model
When time is precious, agents utility reduces with time. agent i utility at time t for deal is t i ui ( ) where t i is the discount at time t for agent i Similarly for aj the utility is t j uj ( ) The utility monotonically decreases with increase in time When t i = 0? then agents must agree at time t = 0 When t i = 1?agents bargaining over innite time
7 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO bargaining strategy
Assume that the utilities are linear and complementary Assume that a deal is a number between [0 1] If ui ( ) = then u2 ( ) = 1 It can be shown that a unique sub-perfect equilibrium strategy exists Alternating Oers Bargaining Theorem
8 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
Theorem (Alternating Oers Bargaining Strategy)
The Rubinsteins alternating oers game where the agents have complementary linear utilities has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy where agent i proposes a deal i = 1 j 1 i j (1)
and accepts the oer j from j only if ui (j ) ui (j ) agent j proposes a deal j = 1 i 1 i j (2)
9 / 21
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
What does the theorem mean?
j and accepts the oer j from j only if ui (j ) ui (j ) agent i proposes a deal i = 1 i j i agent j proposes a deal j = 1 and accepts the oer i from i only if uj (i ) uj (i ) i j 1 1
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
Both agents have utilities that reduce with time. When the is best to arrive at an equilibrium?
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
Both agents have utilities that reduce with time. When the is best to arrive at an equilibrium? First step.
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
Both agents have utilities that reduce with time. When the is best to arrive at an equilibrium? First step. What does mean?
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
) such that uj (i ) = j uj (j i must propose a deal j
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
Otherwise what will happen?
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
Otherwise what will happen? Can i propose a deal where j will get higher utility than him?
Multiagent Systems
AO theorem
Otherwise what will happen? Can i propose a deal where j will get higher utility than him?
Similarly, j proposes a j = i ui (i ) What is the actual j ?
10 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Oer
ui ( ) = , uj ( ) = 1 replacing the utilities with values for the condition uj (i ) = j uj (j ) 1 i = j (1 j ) Similarly for agent j j = i i
11 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Conclusions
Similar techniques are used with dierent types of discount factors In general the techniques used to solve these bargaining problems is the same Formalize bargaining as a Rubinsteins alternating oers game Generate extended-form game Determine equilibrium strategy for this game
12 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Strategy
In this protocol, the agent agrees to make a counter oer that is slightly better for the other agent than its previous oer for every oer Protocol is designed in the following way Agent i makes a deal i arg max ui ( ) Propose i and receive proposal j if ui (j ) ui (i ) then accept deltaj Otherwise propose i uj (j ) + uj (i ) and ui (i ) ui ( )
13 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Issues with the protocol
Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol
Though the protocol is simple, it has several drawbacks Not guaranteed to arrive at the axiomatic solution
The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation
14 / 21
Multiagent Systems
The convergence time is long
14 / 21
Multiagent Systems
The convergence time is long If the other agent utility function is unknown then it cannot be implemented
14 / 21
Multiagent Systems
The convergence time is long If the other agent utility function is unknown then it cannot be implemented Simultaneous oer where each agent wants the others oer in the previous step.
14 / 21
Multiagent Systems
The convergence time is long If the other agent utility function is unknown then it cannot be implemented Simultaneous oer where each agent wants the others oer in the previous step. Taking turns is not possible as none of them would like to participate rst
14 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Strategy
If an agent uses monotonic concession then the other agent may choose to not concede at all.
15 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Strategy
If an agent uses monotonic concession then the other agent may choose to not concede at all. This can result in breaking the negotiation.
15 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Strategy
If an agent uses monotonic concession then the other agent may choose to not concede at all. This can result in breaking the negotiation. Rather the agent will concede in proportion to how much the opponent is conceding by examination.
15 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Strategy
If an agent uses monotonic concession then the other agent may choose to not concede at all. This can result in breaking the negotiation. Rather the agent will concede in proportion to how much the opponent is conceding by examination. Dene the willingness to risk a negotiation breakdown riski = ui (i ) ui (j ) ui (i ) (3)
The agent can calculate the risk for both the agents The agents with the smallest risk should concede just enough so that it does not have to concede again in the next time step
15 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Algorithm
Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation i select best ui ( ) Propose i and receive j if ui (j ) ui (i ) then accept i riski riskj
ui (i )ui (j ) ui (i ) uj (j )uj (i ) uj (j )
if riski < riskj i i such that riski (i ) > riskj (j ), goto Propose i else goto receive j
16 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Conclusions
The Zeuthen strategy is guaranteed to terminate
17 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Conclusions
The Zeuthen strategy is guaranteed to terminate The resulting solution is guaranteed to be individually rational and Pareto Optimal It has been shown that two agents using the Zeuthen strategy will converge to Nash bargaining solution
17 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Conclusions
The Zeuthen strategy is guaranteed to terminate The resulting solution is guaranteed to be individually rational and Pareto Optimal It has been shown that two agents using the Zeuthen strategy will converge to Nash bargaining solution Any Issue?
17 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Conclusions
The Zeuthen strategy is guaranteed to terminate The resulting solution is guaranteed to be individually rational and Pareto Optimal It has been shown that two agents using the Zeuthen strategy will converge to Nash bargaining solution Any Issue? If both the agents have same risk then?
17 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Conclusions
The Zeuthen strategy is guaranteed to terminate The resulting solution is guaranteed to be individually rational and Pareto Optimal It has been shown that two agents using the Zeuthen strategy will converge to Nash bargaining solution Any Issue? If both the agents have same risk then? Each one knows that in the next move the oer will be accepted and hence both of them will wait indenitely to allow the other person to make the move.
17 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Conclusions
The Zeuthen strategy is guaranteed to terminate The resulting solution is guaranteed to be individually rational and Pareto Optimal It has been shown that two agents using the Zeuthen strategy will converge to Nash bargaining solution Any Issue? If both the agents have same risk then? Each one knows that in the next move the oer will be accepted and hence both of them will wait indenitely to allow the other person to make the move. If one agent selects Zeuthen strategy then what will the other player select?
17 / 21
Multiagent Systems
One-step protocol
Why do we need so many steps to reach a particular solution?
18 / 21
Multiagent Systems
One-step protocol
Why do we need so many steps to reach a particular solution? Can we skip all these steps and reach a solution?
18 / 21
Multiagent Systems
One-step protocol
Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation E { | ui ( )uj ( ) ui ( )uj ( )} i best deal from E Propose i and receive j if ui (j )uj (j ) < ui (i )uj (i ) then Report error, j is not following strategy Coordinate with j to choose randomly between i and j
Why do we need so many steps to reach a particular solution? Can we skip all these steps and reach a solution?
18 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Prelims
So far we have seen single entity deals. What happens in multi-entity deals?
19 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Prelims
So far we have seen single entity deals. What happens in multi-entity deals? Explosion on deal space.
19 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Prelims
So far we have seen single entity deals. What happens in multi-entity deals? Explosion on deal space. Can we be bit more expressive in providing a deal?
19 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Prelims
So far we have seen single entity deals. What happens in multi-entity deals? Explosion on deal space. Can we be bit more expressive in providing a deal? Argumentation based Negotiation where arguments are passed along with the deals in the hope that these arguments will play a role in the way negotiation solution is approached.
19 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Prelims
So far we have seen single entity deals. What happens in multi-entity deals? Explosion on deal space. Can we be bit more expressive in providing a deal? Argumentation based Negotiation where arguments are passed along with the deals in the hope that these arguments will play a role in the way negotiation solution is approached. Very close to how humans conduct negotiation.
19 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
What kind of arguments will work? Critique
Critiques provide the agents with information about others utility functions Example i : I propose that you provide me with x1 = 10 under conditions x2 < 20 and delivery x3 < 20061025 J : I am happy with the price of x2 < 20 but the delivery date x3 is too late
20 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
Counter-Proposal: Agents can send counter proposal. Ex: j : I propose that you provide me with x1 = 10 under conditions x2 < 30 and delivery x3 20061025
20 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
Counter-Proposal: Agents can send counter proposal. Ex: j : I propose that you provide me with x1 = 10 under conditions x2 < 30 and delivery x3 20061025 Justication: i : My warehouses is being renovated and it will be impossible to deliver anything before the end of the
20 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
Persuade: Another form of providing additional information.
21 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
Persuade: Another form of providing additional information. Ex: i : Service x1 = 9 is much better than you think, look at this report
21 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
Persuade: Another form of providing additional information. Ex: i : Service x1 = 9 is much better than you think, look at this report Can also use threats, rewards and appeals to convince other agents to accept the proposal
21 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
Persuade: Another form of providing additional information. Ex: i : Service x1 = 9 is much better than you think, look at this report Can also use threats, rewards and appeals to convince other agents to accept the proposal Whats the problem?
21 / 21
Multiagent Systems
Arguments
Persuade: Another form of providing additional information. Ex: i : Service x1 = 9 is much better than you think, look at this report Can also use threats, rewards and appeals to convince other agents to accept the proposal Whats the problem? Hard to build agents that can understand the complex negotiation languages.
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Lec 14

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Lec 14

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Multiagent Systems

Strategic solution concept

Alternating oer model

The AO model does not have dominant strategy

Argumentation based Negotiation

This process can go on forever

Argumentation based Negotiation

Otherwise what will happen?

Issues with the protocol

Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol

The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation

Issues with the protocol

Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol

The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation

The convergence time is long

Issues with the protocol

Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol

The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation

Issues with the protocol

Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol

The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation

Issues with the protocol

Alternating oers Monotonic Concession Protocol

The Zeuthen Strategy One-Step Protocol Argumentation based Negotiation

Why do we need so many steps to reach a particular solution?

Persuade: Another form of providing additional information.

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