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Emma Singer Foundations of Civic Engagement February, 2012 CSPL201

A Definition of Equality and an Analysis of Its Feasibility in a Democratic Society

Alexis de Tocqueville believed that the American taste for equality is ardent, insatiable, eternal, and invincible. However, he was concerned that this drive for equality might cause Americans to be impatient with distinctions that naturally evolve and run to the state for correction (Pateman 22-23) According to Tocqueville, this would cause extreme ill to fall upon American civil society and civic institutions by loosening social cohesion. However, Pateman does not provide a precise definition of what it means to be equal in a democratic society, nor does she evaluate the means by which equality could be implemented, if at all. Without a clear and concise definition, there is no reasonable way to proceed with an analysis of the feasibility of equality. However, once defined, it becomes very clear that the ideal of equality (economic, social, etc.) in a democratic society is not feasible, at least, not without tremendous amounts of government interference and regulation in the marketplace and in the daily lives of its citizens. To begin this analysis, it is necessary to establish an unambiguous and allencompassing definition of equality in a democracy. Political theorists and commentators present contrary definitions of this term, yet essential aspects of their

definitions can be reconciled into a singular characterization of equality. John Plamenatz, in his Democracy and Illusion, asserts that equality cannot be defined as the sharing of control over governmental decisions in such a way that no citizens preferences count for more than the others (Plamenatz 181), unless it is assumed that it is possible for each citizen to assert equal influence in the political sphere. However, the essential problem with this definition of equality is that it only applies to political equality in terms of duty, not in terms of the something else to which [it is] means (Plamenatz 181). However, if combined with A. Przeworskis implications of equality, it becomes slightly more complete. A combination of the two theories of equality yields the idea that equality is (in an ideal democratic society) the ability of citizens to assert equal influence in the political sphere and maintain a degree of social and economic equality. (Przeworski 19) Although almost complete, this definition fails to define clearly the phrase social and economic equality. To create a fully comprehensive description of equality, it becomes necessary to insert John Rawls ideas of equality into this definition. In his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls states that [Citizens] are regarded as equal in that they are all regarded as having to the essential minimum degree the moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation over a complete life and to take part in society as equal citizens (Rawls 18). In his Comments on Equality, Rawls describes methods that can be used to regulate inequalities. From these methods, Rawls essential ideas of equality can be determined. It becomes evident Rawls believes that economic equality is necessary to the extent that it prevent[s] one society from dominating the rest (Rawls 131), and that equality requires the use of fair procedures (Rawls 131). Rawls continues, and writes, As equal citizens we are all to have fair

access to the fair procedures on which the basic structure relies citizens are to recognize and view one another as equals This equal relation favors a social minimum based on the idea of reciprocity (Rawls 132). These remarks provide the clarification necessary to establish the definition of equality to be used in this discussion. A combination of the ideas of Plamenatz, Przeworski, and Rawls provides a singular and final definition of equality in a democratic society as being: the ability and right of citizens to assert equal influence in the political sphere and to maintain a degree of social and economic fairness, where each citizen has at least the minimum resources and moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation and political selfdetermination; each is granted the same basic rights and required to fulfill the same basic duties. From this conclusive definition of democracy, it is possible to begin an analysis of the feasibility of equality in a democratic society. This analysis can be approached from two major avenues: economic and social. It is necessary to first evaluate each of these aspects separately in order to address both facets of equality. Once the components have been analyzed, it will then be appropriate to combine them and create a final evaluation of the achievability of equality (as previously defined) in a democratic society. Using this definition of equality, by no means can economic equality be assumed to implicate that every citizen has an equal amount of wealth or income. Carole Pateman cites an acceptable explanation of economic equality, where economic equality, according to Rousseau, does not require absolute equality as is often implied, but rather

than the differences that do exist should not lead to political inequality, (Pateman 22) and that there is no disruptive division between the rich and the poor (Pateman 27). Pateman asserts that if this situation can be established, then economic equality will have been achieved. However, it becomes clear that this concept of economic equality is hyper-idealized, and is not possible in the democratic sphere for a multitude of reasons. First, on a practical note, it is not possible to evaluate whether economic equality has been achieved, as there is no way to measure an individual citizens influence on the political sphere. Although it is known that each vote in a democracy is equally weighted, the voting box is not the sole form of political influence. Political influence extends to various levels of politics, including, but not limited to, the extent to which politicians cater to the beliefs of a specific group and the ability of a group or an individual to successfully lobby for policy change or establishment. Undeniably, the successes of these ventures are intrinsically linked to the amount of money a group or individual is willing to spend to forward their cause or candidate, yet it is not possible to precisely equate their economic contributions to their influence, as there is usually no physical or measurable evidence of political influence. This impossibility can also be seen in the tension between economic equality and the free market structure (as suggested by Rawls as the economic system most coherent with democracy and democratic principles (Rawls 239). According to Rawls, this system provides for equality of opportunity in the market, and free choice for citizens and businesses (Rawls 241). This idea of a lasseiz-faire free market structure cannot be reconciled with many aspects of economic equality. For one, Pateman states that there

should be no disruptive difference between the rich and the poor. However, unless there were to be a direct, government-run interference in the market (directly violating the principles of lasseiz-faire), there would be no way to ensure that a disruptive difference would not emerge. In this sense, economic equality, as defined by Pateman, is not feasible in a democratic society. Social equality can be equated with equality of opportunity; defined by Rawls as a system in which positions and offices are granted based upon merit, and that all citizens have an equal opportunity to acquire the skills upon which the judgment of merit will be made. However, many factors prevent social equality and equality of opportunity from manifesting itself in a democratic society. However, it is evident that equality of opportunity is violated by the institution and tradition of familial inheritance. This system of familial inheritance provides certain individuals with a significant financial advantage, as it can be assumed that not all citizens provide their children with an equal inheritance. This financial advantage gives certain citizens an unfair advantage, allowing them to provide their children with more expensive forms of education, creating a blatant inequality of opportunity. This is self-perpetuating: as each generation of citizens with this financial advantage is provided with more opportunities, they are able to provide the same monetary inheritance to their children, and the cycle continues. The only way in which a government could end this cycle would be to confiscate wealth and property after the death of the owner; however, this directly violates the principles of Rawls Justice is Fairness.

It becomes clear that the implementation and sustainment of a society with equality of opportunity would require extreme amounts of government involvement. The government would be forced to have an invasive influence in familial life in order to ensure that children were being provided with equal education and socialization. The government would also be required to strictly regulate schools and curriculum, monitor teacher performance, abolish private schooling, and create a system of identical and equal public schools. When evaluating equality, defined previously as the ability and right of citizens to assert equal influence in the political sphere and to maintain a degree of social and economic fairness, where each citizen has at least the minimum resources and moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation and political self-determination; each is granted the same basic rights and required to fulfill the same basic duties, it becomes clear that there is only a marginal potential to achieve true equality in a fully democratic society. However, it becomes clear that to attempt to fulfill this goal, the government would be required to submit its citizens to extreme levels of government regulation and supervision: in the marketplace, associational society, and in individual homes. Even if such regulation were implemented, success would not be guaranteed, and, even so, the level of success would be impossible to measure in a reasonable manner.

Bibliography

Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge University Press, 1975. Print. Plamenatz, John. Democracy and Illusion: An Examination of Certain Aspects of Modern Democratic Theory. Prentice Hall Press, 1977. Print. Przeworski, A.. "Minimalist Conceptions of Democracy: A Defense." Democracys Value. Ed. Ian Shapiro and Ed. Casiano Hacker-Cordon. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Print. Rawls, John. "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited." Collected Papers. Ed. Samuel Freeman. Harvard University Press, 2001. Print.