Branton Li

Branton Li Gownboys JCT Chinafrica: Is China good for Africa? 5609 words

Branton Li

Chinafrica: Is China good for Africa?

Branton Li (G)

Branton Li

China's exploits in Africa have been widely publicised in the past few years, and most of them have been focused on their need to secure essential raw materials for China. As of 2008, Africa accounts for 30% of China's oil imports, with Angola, Sudan and Congo being its three biggest African oil importers, supplying 13%, 7% and 4.4% 1 respectively and in return, China helps build infrastructure for the African nations. There have been major criticisms of Chinese companies in Africa though, ranging from neo-colonialism, corruption, government transparency to imported labour, underbidding and violation of human rights. On the other hand, people point out that China is actually building infrastructure, providing research facilities and actually listening to African leaders rather than telling them what to do, while others say China's presence allows dictatorships to remain and undercuts the local economy. It's a highly contentious topic, but this paper will endeavour to reveal China's involvement in Africa, and show whether it is good for Africa or not. For decades, China has been the workshop of the world, supplying cheap products for every continent in the world, and Africa has been no exception. In fact, these cheap Chinese produce affects Africa more than the Western world, partly due to the dominance of service industries in the West and the fragility of manufacturing industries in Africa. Trade between China and Africa has ballooned from $10 billion in 2000 to $91 billion in 20092, but it's not all good news. Even though Africa is a poor continent, production cost is high because of poor infrastructure, and this leads to lower competitiveness against Chinese products. For example, Nigerian non-oil

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exporters are unable to use the US's African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) because of regular power failures (10-30% electricity supply in Nigeria), bad roads, and ignorance of opportunities such as AGOA. Indeed, the World Bank estimates that Nigeria loses N66 billion (USD43 million)3 per year due to intermittent power supply. The transport system is no better. Even though truckers are paid $3,937 a month in Germany, and $160 in Zambia, it still costs more to send a container from Lusaka, Zambia, to Lesotho than from Berlin to Barcelona4. This high cost of poor infrastructure, coupled with some tinkering in the Chinese renmenbi and a state controlled trade union, means that Chinese goods have no problem out competing locally produced goods. The flood of Chinese produced goods also coincided with the ending of Multi-Fibre Agreement in 2005, which restricted the amount of garments developing countries could export to developed countries. Western countries used the MFA to try and encourage African textile industries to develop, but the end of it brought Chinese products in competition with African ones. According to Andre Kriel, general secretary of the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union, from 2003 to 2006, the South African clothing, textile and footwear industry lost 64,744 jobs, and this was directly linked to China's rise as a competitor5. However, others, like Phil Alves, an economist at the South African Institute for International affairs, point out that despite tariffs of 30 to 40 percent, South Africa's textile industry has already been in decline for 15 years or more since the 1980s, which is prior to China's arrival on the import market6. He also gives three several key reasons why South Africa was ill prepared for international competition: 1) low investment levels, 2) lower productivity, and 3) the rand's strength. The first two shows the difficulty in improving the quality of South African products, the last reason helps explain the poor balance of trade, and all of them combined gives Chinese products the comparative advantage in textile manufacture. Given that South Africa was China's largest African export market, they could not afford to damage its economy, and so in 2006 offered a 'grant of RMB 250 million [$31 million] for skill-building in the South African textile industry.to promote joint ventures and provide preferential loans to helpmodernize their textile industry'7. This came with a 2 year voluntary export restraint programme with China, including quotas on 31 categories of textile and apparel export products. However, an 18-month review of the quota system found that even though the Chinese share of South Africa's import market had dropped slightly, it merely encouraged importers to find other countries to import from8. The most successful were Mauritius, Malaysia and Bangladesh, recording import growth of at least 150 million rand, and grew 345%, 680%, and 2076% respectively. Even during the quota period, there was a stabilisation in the import market, but nothing to suggest that the local industry had actually taken steps to use the quotas to restructure and

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improve. With a month left of the quota period, the South African government finally took steps to upgrade the textile industry by launching a new productivity-linked incentive programme in place of the old, inefficient export-based Duty Credit Certificate Scheme9. However, not all African countries suffer equally under increased Chinese competition. Mauritius is a predominantly a service-based economy, constituting 70.5% of its GDP, but industry still accounts for a healthy 24.9%. It did suffer from a loss of over 25,000 jobs between 2001 and 2005, in anticipation of the end of the MFA, and export values dropped by 22.7% from $1,062 million to $821 million from 2003 to 2005. But unlike South Africa, where the industry stagnated during the quota period, the Mauritian clothing sector experienced 19.6% growth to $982 million by 2007 until the global economic crisis came into effect10. Dr. Vinaye Ancharaz, Head of Economics at the University of Mauritius, says that the quality and reliability of Mauritian firms entices companies that originally moved to China to move back to Mauritius. Also, the clothing industry has relocated many of the factories to Madagascar, where wages are as low as a third of Mauritian wages. As mentioned above, Mauritius was one of the most successful countries in increasing its export value to South Africa during the quota period. Furthermore, the Mauritian clothing industry diversified by increasing exports to the EU by 23% from 2005 to 2007. There are other examples of successful recoveries from the ending of the MFA. In Madagascar, output from the textile industry jumped by nearly 30% in 2007, and in Kenya, the domestic market has kept the clothing manufacturing industry on a steady growth rate. In Ethiopia, Chinese imports had gained over 80% of the local shoe market11, but research of 96 local firms (all of them small-medium enterprises and microenterprises) showed that after several years, 82% of the local companies were now competitive against the cheap Chinese imports, and the most common response was to through increased quality and improved design. The countries listed above (Mauritius, South Africa, Kenya, Madagascar, Ethiopia) consist of a range of African countries in terms of GDP per capital, with the highest being Mauritius at 6th (out of 52) and the lowest being Ethiopia at 44th. But we've only looked in detail about two countries that are quite well-off in Africa, namely Mauritius and South Africa. How do China's products affect the poorer African nations? One example is Lesotho, which ranks 31st out of 52 African countries12, and it's notable for being able to fend off the arrival of Chinese goods quite effectively, despite having a GDP per capita of $642. Lesotho actually faced two problems regarding the export market. The first one was that the Loti (Lesotho's currency)

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appreciated massively against the US dollar13, which posed a huge problem as almost all Lesothian garment exports went to the US. The US dollar went from 11.44 loti per USD in 2002 to a low of 5.58 loti in December 2004. The other problem was of course the ending of the MFA and China's entry to the clothing market. These factors meant that between July 2004 and July 2005, the number of workers employed went from 53,087 to 40,364, a drop of nearly 24%. However, a Business Day article notes that 'Sub-Saharan countrieshave fared dismally since the Chinese invasion, with, surprisingly, only Lesotho bucking that trend'14. A FESa report on Lesotho's garment and textile industry refers to innovative policies that the Lesothian government has implemented to combat the challenges, including bi-weekly meetings between the Minister of Trade & Industry and industrial players, a trip to the USA to meet with major textile brands (Gap, Levis Strauss) and members of the US government, and a restructured incentive programme13. The firms themselves have undergone a series of reinvestments in their respective companies, with some companies increasing firm output by 35%. The industrialists even have the Minister of Trade's personal mobile phone number, and '"If a container gets delayed at the border post, they phone him."14 Good government policies and high levels of investment within firms means that despite the currency and competition problems, Lesotho continues to be the biggest African exporter of apparel clothing to the US, accounting for around 30% ($457 million) of total sub-Saharan textile exports to the US. While Chinese imports have certainly had an effect on the African market, it's hardly the only economic impact China has on Africa. The Chinese government has been involved in the continent since the early 1960s, and has fought diplomatic battles with Taiwan to secure African votes in the UN. This strategy has worked, with only 4 small African nations recognising Taiwan: Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Swaziland, and Sao Tome and Principe15. In return of the recognition, China gives low interest loans and in a policy known as 'Going Global', the government encourages Chinese companies to move overseas. In November 2009, President Hu Jintao pledged $10 billion for Africa in concessional loans, cancellation of debt by heavily-indebted poor countries to China, and the construction of 30 medical centres and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres16. According to a chinadaily.com article, the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) has supported 259 projects in 36 African countries, and 79% of them are infrastructure projects, including 'the Benguela Railway of Angola, Merowe Dam of Sudan, and the thermal power plant of Nigeria'17. However, the contracts can extend beyond the simple construction of aid projects, in some cases the Chinese are asked to stay on the help maintain the projects. In The White Man's
a

FES stands for Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation

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Burden, William Easterly wrote that Western donor's were unwilling to take responsibility of former aid projects, often insisting that governments take over them, assuming this would improve sustainability18. However, on average, one out of every six turn-key projects (projects that are supposed to be turned over to the recipient in a ready-to-use condition) required a Chinese team to come back, either to advice or continue training the staff. In Mali, a Chinese aid loan had financed the construction of a sugar factory, which was immediately given to the Malian government. A decade later, Chinese experts were appointed as general manager and heads of all departments, which subsequently raised output by almost 100%. China has also announced the setting up of 6 special economics zones in Africa (Mauritius, 2 in Nigeria and Zambia each and Ethiopia)19, where the goal is to foster greater export-orientated production, greater competitiveness, and promote wider economic reform. This is a part of China's 'Going Global' policy, and the zones are designed so that the firms will still have a great profit motive, even if they are state or provincial owned companies. The image that China is in Africa only for the natural resources is inaccurate, as there are numerous examples of Chinese firms being encouraged by the government to go to Africa for purely business and trade reasons. Indeed, the majority of the Lesotho textile firms mentioned earlier are actually owned by Asian investors. It would be natural to assume that more Chinese investment would mean more employment for the local people. But there are examples of contracts where a certain percentage of labour must be Chinese. Angola negotiated a credit line worth $2 billion dollars from China's Eximbank, but one of the few conditions was that 70% of the work must be contracted to Chinese firms20. But why do companies bother importing labour? It's expensive, since one has to pay for the costs of accommodation, plane tickets, and even the upper management are not allowed to bring family with them. One reason is the ease of communication, and Chinese workers are considered more skilled and more productive than African workers. "Chinese people can stand very hard work. This is a cultural difference. Chinese people work until they finish and then rest. Here they are like the British, they work according to a plan. They have tea breaks and a lot of days off. For our construction company that means it costs a lot more," says Liu Ping, general manager in Lusaka, Zambia for China National Overseas Engineering Corporation21. He points out that despite the cultural difference, he employs 15 Zambians for every Chinese. The famous TAZARA railway which links Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, was built with 25,000 Chinese and 50,000 Tanzanians. A Chinese water aid project, managed by Pascal Hamuli, who is Tanzanian himself, says that his project employs 50 Chinese engineers and other skilled workers, and about 500 local workers22. In reality, the ratio of local-to-Chinese

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labour varies on 3 important issues: amount of skilled local labour available, the government's policy on work permits (especially foreign work permits) and the length of time a company has been in Africa. For instance, a New School research paper has shown that 'Chinese companies resident for five years had halved their ratio of Chinese employees compared with newly arrived Chinese firms'23. In Kenya, 96% of employment in Chinese firms is local. But it is an undeniable fact that there are a lot more Chinese workers in Africa than ever before. According to Chinese statistics, in the year 2007 there were officially 114,000 Chinese working in the whole of Africa, and estimates of anything between 300,000 to 700,000 Chinese workers have worked in Africa since 1990. It's become so obvious that in some places, African children would point at any pale-skinned foreigner and shout, 'Chinese!' instead of 'White man!'24 China is voluntarily training workers though, pledging to train 20,000 personnel in Africa, which will include 1,500 teachers, 2,000 agricultural technology personnel, and 3,000 nurses and doctors, with most of the training focused on 'economic development and trade, agriculture, education, public health, environment protection, science and technology'16. In the end though, it's up to the individual governments to ensure that the costs of importing Chinese labour it too high to be commercially viable, which will force Chinese companies to use local labour and therefore help capacity. For instance, in 2000, the Tanzanian Immigration Department only approved 239 work permits for Chinese nationals25, and Liu Yulin, an economic counselor in Tanzania says, 'It's more expensive now to bring people from ChinaIt costs a thousand dollars a month for a Chinese worker now. This is ten or twenty times what it costs for local salaries. Localisation is the only way.'26 There are other examples of both government and companies keeping Chinese workers on a short leash. A South African company landed 2 construction contracts with the Zambian government, and it would subcontract them to Chinese companies, but one of the conditions was that after the project, the workers would go back to China. Similarly, Angola 'requires all employers to have at least 70 percent Angolan staff' and in a multibillion dollar infrastructure and mining project with China, the Democratic Republic of Congo placed a condition that 'at least 80 percent of the workersmust be Congolese'.26 However, even if a majority of the workers are local, the conditions they work in are appalling. A World Bank report1 on Chinese investments in Africa shows that while the laws in African countries were well constructed and designed to ensure workers' rights were protected, Chinese companies often ignore the law, usually out of ignorance or sheer non-compliance. This situation does vary, but there is only the odd exception to the norm. For example, in the construction industry there is a minimum

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wage of USD $0.84 per hour for a general labourer. The Chinese companies argued that since the workers did not reach the daily target, they were not entitled to the minimum wage, but trade unions accused the management of fabricating claims, and pointed out that the company did not even pay out pensions, paid leave and little overtime pay. In Namibia, Chinese companies only pay a third of the minimum wage, and worker-manager relationships are low. 'Chinese are worse than other foreign employers. The working conditions at Chinese companies are terrible. You cannot compare them with any other companies in Namibia. At Chinese companies you will be dismissed if you don't want to work overtime. The big problem is that they pretend not to understand English at all,' says Namibian Food and Allied Workers Union organizer Wilma Angula. In 2005, 50 workers died in an explosion while working in a Chinese-owned mine in Zambia, and in 2007, President Hu Jintao cancelled a visit to Zambia's copper mines over fears of protests from workers over low pay and poor working conditions27. There are reports of Chinese firms that haven't signed any employee to formal contracts and only utilizing casual workers, even if they've been working for 6 months or more (Angolan labour law dictates that a casual worker who has been working for 6 months automatically becomes a permanent worker). The World Bank report1 does acknowledge that 'The attitude of Chinese firms differs across sectors and from company to company, therefore it would be wrong to generally conclude that Chinese firms are generally good or bad employers, but warns that there is a trend for Chinese companies to disregard local labour laws, workers' rights and conditions. This raises concerns about Chinese companies' practices in African countries, but one must also note that even though 'Chinese firms did not fare so well in terms of respect for labour standards, payment of workers' salariesHowever, a significant number of non-Chinese firms were also found to fair (sic) poorly.' The report compared Chinese companies and other foreign companies operating in the area, and one example of Israeli-owned Nairda Corporation in Nigeria showed that the company was 3 months behind on the local workers' pay, and yet the management had full pay plus allowances. In general, there is a lack of compliance with local labour laws in Africa, and this holds true for the majority of the firms but Chinese companies have a tendency to perform even worse than other foreign companies. Greater trade unionisation for almost all sectors will benefit all the workers as that the interests of the worker can be properly represented. On the whole, the main human rights concern with regard to China in Africa is not the exploitation of workers, but that China's no strings attached policy will threaten the movement towards democratization and more transparent governance in Africa. These fears aren't without their supporters and their evidence. In 2009, China International

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Fund, a Hong Kong based company with no clear ownership, signed a $7 billion deal with the military junta of Guinea to secure bauxite ores, in return for 215,000 housing units, restoring 1000 miles of highway, 1665 of railroad and a new international airport at Luanda, Guinea's capital. A month previously, the same government had killed 157 protestors in the streets of Conakry28. Another notable example is Zimbabwe. Already shunned by most of the international community, when the sanctions came, Robert Mugabe said, 'We have turned East, where the suns rises, and given our backs to the West, where the sun sets'29, and established a 'Look East' policy as a way of turning his nose at Western powers and the gain Chinese political and economic support. China has sold over $200 million in Chinese trainer jets and conventional arms to Zimbabwe, and in 2008, a Chinese cargo ship was turned away at South African ports when the dockers refused to unload the cargo, which contained ammunition and rocket-propelled grenades for Zimbabwe30. While China is still a relatively small arms dealer in Africa, accounting for 6-7% of total arms imports to Africa, this is hardly the sign of the responsible stakeholder that China needs to be if Africa is to develop as a continent. In addition, China has been criticized over its involvement in Sudan. When Western companies pulled out due to negative publicity and UN sanctions, Chinese companies quickly filled the void, and by 2008, 60% of all oil produced in Sudan is exported to China31. There are reports that China actually prefers the status quo of war, as it enables Chinese companies to gain a solid foothold in Sudan and to dominate the oil industry there. A USA Today article charges that between 2004 and 2006, China has supplied 90% of small arms to Khartoum32. Chinese officials defend their actions, saying that 'Business is business', and that their arms deal still abide by the UN embargo. This is consistent with China's few strings attached policy, especially non-interference, which many African leaders welcome as an alternative to the patronizing Western aid loans. In the past 3 to 4 years however, China appears to have relented to international pressure, especially to Sudan and the Darfur crisis. While making no public comment, President Hu did discuss the Darfur crisis with President Omar al-Bashir in private, and Chinese ambassador to Sudan, Wang Guangya noted that, 'Usually China doesn't send messages, but this time they didIt was a clear strong message that the proposal from Kofi Annan is a good one and Sudan has to accept it'33, and a week later, President Bashir allowed a UN peacekeeping force of 3,500 to enter Darfur. It marks a rare break from the policy of non-interference China has held for over 50 years, and even the US acknowledges that China's subtle persuasion complemented US's sanctions-based policy, almost in a good cop-bad cop sense34, 35. It could even be argued that due to China's heavy involvement in Sudan's economy, only China had the

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political and economic leverage to influence Sudanese policy. Others, both within and without China, believe that China was a scapegoat over Darfur. 'China has been vilified over Sudan on the basis of inflated expectations about what they could do. Russia is in fact more significant in terms of being an aggressive ally', says Alex de Waal, a Harvard researcher and director at the Social Science Research Council36. Whatever the truth is, China was undoubtedly slow to act in the Darfur crisis, even though they clearly had influence over the government, but it finally acted, both from international pressure and the spotlight on the Beijing Olympics. On the other hand, by focusing attention on China, it drew pressure away from other nations like the US, France, UK to continue and consolidate the campaign for the Darfur crisis. As for the other infamous African example, Zimbabwe has recently been getting the cold shoulder from the Chinese government, although for economic, rather than altruistic reasons. A Feb. 2010 article on Afrik-new.com quotes Zimbabwe's Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara saying that 'China has stopped working with us. The Chinese, though comrades, are not giving us any money until we clear our debts'37. Indeed, in 2009 when China Eximbank wanted to do a resource-backed credit for Zimbabwe, they were 'struggling to convince skeptics in Beijing that the new Zimbabwe government could now overcome its long history of defaults on Chinese loans'38. While China's involvement in Zimbabwe is criticized, it's important to note that other foreign companies are still active there as well. Anglo-American invested $400 million for a platinum mine in 2008, the largest foreign investment ever for Zimbabwe39. A South African mining company gave Zimbabwe a $100 million loan, also for a platinum investment. From 2005 to 2007, Ukraine sold $12 million worth of arms to Zimbabwe. The point is that even though China is being opportunistic and takes advantage of dictatorships, it is still done on a commercial basis, and the moment the venture becomes unprofitable, China will cease its loans. It can definitely do a lot more, especially in the case of Darfur, to influence policy and help prevent crises, but China is slowly learning to deal with both the commercial and moral aspects of international business. Another legitimate criticism of Chinese presence is that it enables African governments to maintain a degree of opaqueness in their dealings, both domestic and with China. An interesting case study is Angola, where a well publicised, oil-for-infrastructure deal between the Chinese and Angolan government, amounting to $2 billion took place in 2004. A little history is needed though. Angola was already going through a civil war that lasted from 1975 to 2002, and ended with over 500,000 dead. Its oil reserves were being used to finance the war effort, in the form of oil-backed loans with various Western banks. From 1995 to 2004, the IMF negotiated

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4 reformation programmes with Angola, but every one of them failed, as the Angolan government could not stick to the rules40. As a result, the IMF refused to give any more loans to Angola until they successfully reformed their oil management. But then China came in with a $2 billion oil-for-infrastructure loan, with none of the IMF requirements, and the Angolan government took it. At first glance, it seems that the Chinese government was helping Angola cover up its books and to prevent transparency. After all, the IMF was withholding all potential loans until Angola had reformed, but China's loan meant that not only could Angola turn its back on the IMF, it got the much needed infrastructure to replace or improve the systems that had been severely damaged during the civil war. After the civil war, an increase in Angolan oil production and soaring oil prices meant that the GDP of Angola grew tenfold from a mere $7.8 billion in 1997 to $83.4 billion in 2008. Interestingly, despite no legal requirements from the IMF, the Angolan government started to increase transparency to its books, including regularly updated publication of oil revenues, audits of Sonangol, the state-owned oil company, and public condemnation of government corruption41. There is still a long way to go for Angola, as it still ranks 162 out of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. Let's pause here though, because China is not the only player in dealing with Angolan oil. Only months after the initial $2 billion Chinese loan, a group of Western banks, including Standard Chartered, Barclays and RBS, negotiated a $2.35 billion loan to Angola42. Another deal in 2005 with Credit Agricole (Calyon) netted another $2 billion for Angola. It's important to realise that China and the IMF are not the only players in Angola; oil production means hefty profits for banks in terms of oil-backed loans. Despite accusations of obstructing reforms for greater transparency and accountability, China is hardly the sole culprit. Of course, that's not to say China shouldn't press for greater transparency, but it would set a double standard to hold just China accountable, and ignore everybody else. But there's one thing to consider here. 50 years ago, China was in a similar, if not worse state than Africa. It was a country scarred by a civil war, a world war, and Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward, only to be caught up in diplomatic tug-of-war between the US and the USSR as well. But thanks to good policy management, a bit of luck and aid packages from Japan, China harnessed the power of its people and has grown into the second largest economy in the world. It's almost fair to say that, as a developing country that has suffered its share from foreign invaders, but managed to pick itself up, China knows exactly how and why African leaders act in their pursuit for growth for their own countries, and how to cater to it.

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In the end, it would be nave to suggest that China is in Africa purely for altruistic reasons. China has done much to pursue its own interests in Africa, yet that is not to say there are no benefits for the Africans. On the contrary, there is a myriad of them, ranging from the latest multi-billion dollar oil-for-infrastructure deals to training centres for African doctors and nurses. China has shown that it understands what African countries need and want, and can provide them on a level that's beneficial to both parties. There are negative effects too, such as the continuation of regimes like Zimbabwe, poor working conditions and the ethnic tensions that come with it. Some countries, like Lesotho and Mauritius, have weathered cheap Chinese exports with excellent government policies, and others, like South Africa, have instead stagnated. But out of all the countries that have benefited from China's investment, Mauritius, Sudan, Nigeria, Zambia etc, they all have 3 key common factors: a stable investment environment (be it a democracy or a dictatorship), good infrastructure, and peace. China is working with African countries on the 2nd factor, but for the other two, it will depend greatly on how the African countries work together, whether bilaterally or through the AU. After all, what will work better; 53 countries with their own resources, each negotiating individually with the Chinese government, or a continent of 1 billion people bargaining as a bloc, with all the natural resources Africa has to offer? The African Union is the perfect instrument for them to do that. It has recently flexed its military muscles, sending peacekeepers to Darfur, Somalia and Anjouan and during the Copenhagen conference, the AU negotiated as a bloc for the first time on the international stage, even led a walkout over perception that Denmark was trying to sideline negotiations on emission cuts43. It is up to the Africans to exploit the Chinese interest in them, rather than vice versa, and the best way to do that would be for all 53 of them to work together.

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Sources: 1. World Bank, 'China Africa Report 2009' http://sask-fi-bin.directo.fi/@Bin/a719da56a3165826ad12d637fc7c9944/1280723069/ application/pdf/298928/China-Africa%20Report%202009-final.pdf 2. allafrica, 'Trade with China hits $91 billion' http://allafrica.com/stories/201005130116.html 3. Online Nigeria, 'Nigeria loses N66 bn yearly through power failure' http://nm.onlinenigeria.com/templates/?a=293&z=12 4. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p. 230 5. Lawrence Edwards, Mike Morris, 'An Evaluation of Employment trends in the Clothing and Textile industry' http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/sites/cssr.uct.ac.za/files/pubs/prism_evaluation-of-employm ent-trends.pdf 6. Phil Alves, 'It's time to stop blaming China alone over textiles' http://www.saiia.org.za/economic-diplomacy-opinion/it-s-time-to-stop-blaming-chinaalone-over-textiles.html 7. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' (hardback) p. 221 8. Johann van Eeden and Taku Fundira 'South African quotas on Chinese clothing and textile: an 18 month review' http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/WP200808VEedenClothingTextile18 mnth20081111.pdf 9. Mathabo Le Roux 'State plan to beef up clothing and textiles' http://allafrica.com/stories/200808110082.html 10. Dr. Vinaye Ancharaz, The China Monitor, 'Mauritius: Benefiting from China's rise' p. 4-10

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http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/china-monitor-april-2009.pdf 11. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p.214 12. Wikipedia, List of African countries by GDP (nominal and per capita) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_African_countries_by_GDP_(nominal) 13. FES report on Lesotho's Textile and Garment industry http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03796/12lesotho.pdf 14. Business Day, South Africa 'Lesotho shows textile woes are about more than China' http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zt/thirdeye/t261793.htm 15. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p. 68 16. Interpretations of China-Africa forum and pledges made there http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hxxd/t696509.htm 17. Chinadaily.com, 'China-Africa Cooperation Pushing Africa's Economic Development' http://www.focac.org/eng/jlydh/t712157.htm 18. William Easterly, 'The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much ill and So Little Good' p. 189-190 19. World Bank Economic Premise, China's Investment in African Special Economic Zones http://www.scribd.com/doc/30513841/China's-Investment-in-African-Special-Econom ic-Zones-Prospects-Challenges-and-Opportunities-Deborah-Brautigam-Thomas-Farol e-and-Tang-Xiaoyang 20. Afrodad Fact Sheet, Chinese development assistance in Angola http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/publications/Angola%20Factsheet.pdf

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21. The Economist, Labouring in Chinafrica http://www.economist.com.hk/blogs/freeexchange/2007/07/chinafrica 22. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p. 156

23. New School for Social Research, Bulldozer or Locomotive? The Impact of Chinese Enterprises on the Local Employment in Angola and the DRC http://jas.sagepub.com/content/45/3/350 24. Comments on African children pointing at foreigners http://chrisblattman.com/2008/08/17/yanked-from-comments-the-end-of-the-internati onal-white-man-alert/ 25. Wikipedia, Chinese people in Tanzania http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_people_in_Tanzania 26. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p. 157 27. Christian Science Monitor, Chinese leader's almost triumphant trip to Africa http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0209/p01s04-woaf.html 28. United Press International 'China cranks up Africa resources drive' http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/04/30/China-cranks-up-Afri ca-resources-drive/UPI-44521272647744/ 29. Daily Mail, 'How China's taking over Africa, and why the West should be VERY worried' http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1036105/How-Chinas-taking-Afr ica-West-VERY-worried.html 30. The Times, Dockers refuse to unload China arms shipment for Zimbabwe http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article3772113.ece 31. Council on Foreign Relations, China, Africa, and Oil http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/china_africa_and_oil.html 32. USA Today, China supplies most small arms to Sudan

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http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-03-13-china-sudan_N.htm 33. UN Missions, p. 4, 'China told Sudan to adopt UN's Darfur plan' http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/2007Docs/mmr-feb07.pdf 34. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p.283 35. Christian Science Monitor 'How China's support of Sudan shields a regime called 'genocidal'' http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0626/p01s08-woaf.html/%28page%29/4 36. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p.284 37. Afrik-news 'China warns Zimbabwe: We are not friends!' http://www.afrik-news.com/article16998.html 38. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p. 292 39. The Times online 'Outrage over 200m UK investment in Zimbabwe' http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article4207971.ece 40. Deborah Brautigam, 'The Dragon's Gift; The Real story of China in Africa' p. 274-275 41. Human Rights Watch, Transparency and Accountability in Angola, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/04/13/transparency-and-accountability-angola-0 42. Mail and Guardian, Angola: Standard Chartered draws fire http://www.mg.co.za/article/2005-06-08-angola-standard-chartered-draws-fire 43. allafrica.com 'Climate Change - Negotiations Suspended As African Leaders Stage Boycott http://allafrica.com/stories/200912150539.html

Front page news article sources:

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The Daily Mail, 'How China's taking over Africa, and why the West should be VERY worried' http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1036105/How-Chinas-taking-Afr ica-West-VERY-worried.html CBS news, 'China's Africa Play' http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/18/opinion/main6114041.shtml The Economist, 'Labouring in Chinafrica'

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