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David J.

Satnarine Journalism Ethics and First Amendment Law MLA Format Monday 6:20pm Spring 2009 Libel Law Equilibrium

When Edmund Burke referred to the Fourth Estate in 1789, he emphasized the pertinent role it plays in a thriving democracy. According to Burke, the Fourth Estate comprises of the Press who endeavor to constantly check the powers of government and maintain the equilibrium of democracy. In shaping the Libel laws of a democratic nation, adequate protection of the Press must be incorporated into its laws in order to sustain sufficient checks and balances. As a direct tool of the people, the press should enjoy protection from frivolous suits and actions that may discourage vital, vigilant, and objective reporting. Under current definitions of Libel, it is classified as written defamation. Moreover, according to the Oxford dictionary, defamation is a derivative of the word defame which means damage the good reputation of, or originally in Latin, to spread evil report.1 When applying this definition of libel to a legal statute, the essential component of libel is a written publication that intends to malevolently discredit the reputation of a person or entity.

"Defamation." AskOxford. 2009. Oxford University Press. 1 Feb. 2009 <http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/defame?view=uk>. Satnarine 1

Undoubtedly, libel is a vehicle that threatens tremendous damage upon its victims. Given the constant flux of public opinion, libel can dramatically affect the perception of an entity in an adverse manner. Therefore, a progressive statute defining libel, must balance the interests of both the citizen and the government versus the interests of the Press. In relation to libel matters, when an alleged libel publication is not of a significant public interest, the plaintiff must show a substantial cause in order recover monetary damages, and the government must equally ascertain this fact in order to impose criminal penalties. Legal definitions of a significant public interest and substantial cause must be provided in order to consistently apply libel laws. In order to stray away from a European Civil Law constructionalist view of the law, common law judges must apply a living document approach to these terms. Judges could loosely interpret a significant public interest as a matter that bears importance to the common well-being or general welfare of the public. Alleged libels concerning health, government conduct, industry regulations and abuse, etc are examples of issues where judges may require plaintiffs to show a substantial cause in order to recover damages. Moreover, a substantial cause must not only carry the derogatory nature of defamation, but it must also consist of a malicious intent to knowingly publish false information and proof of a substantive hardship due to the publication. With these definitions in place, the Press is protected from incidental negligence of citing incorrect sources when acting in good faith in its publications. Journalists are able to freely pursue cases of upmost importance to public welfare

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without fear of legal suppression from the courts. The requirements specified under this prosecution of libel are integral assurances to the press due to the Stare Decisis doctrine. In a case where a plaintiff shows that a publication 1.) defamed an entity, 2.) and provide a substantive hardship due to defamation, but does not provide a case for malicious intent, damages may not be recovered. According to the Stare Decisis doctrine, all components of libel must be present in order to follow precedent. Therefore, if the precedent is applied properly, all components of libel must be in present in order to recover damages and retract a publication. Lastly, when a publication is found liable of libel, the courts may impose certain penalties pending on the severity of extent of the negligence used. Specifically, public figures such as celebrities or politicians may seek stricter penalties and fines against publications that are liable. Because of their inherent dependence upon public opinion, a mere retraction does not serve as a sufficient deterrent to prevent publications from libeling public figures for mere profit. Strict penalties and fines must be employed in order to curb abuse of the protections the press enjoys from the courts. Maintaining equilibrium between the interests of the people versus the interests of the press is a complex juggle the courts must undertake with caution. In order to successfully adjudicate the many issues that arise of libel cases against the press, a concise statute such as the above must be enacted in order to maintain a consistent application of fairness. The above statute is flexible enough to allow for interpretation where necessary, but not flux enough to allow judges to dramatically delineate from its intent. Indeed, the Fourth Estate deserves these protections.

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