Neutral Monism

I Sense data An assumption of a lot of discussions of perception is that there are sense-data. This is particularly the case when empiricists discuss the problem of perception. But what are sense-data? These are thought of as atoms of perception. If we think of colours, then they would be tiny little blobs of colour little dots, that together make up a perceptual object. Russell introduces his version of the argument from illusion in terms of sense-data From The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known. Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be? It will help us in considering these questions to have a few simple terms of which the meaning is definite and clear. Let us give the name of sense-data to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, harnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name sensation to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is plain that if we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc. which we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which have been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data, or even that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing that there is such a thing. Hume has an ingenious argument in favour of the existence of atoms of experience. He calls these sense impressions, but we tend to call them sense data. He imagines that he is looking at a coloured object, rather like the target in an archery contest. To visualist this, suppose the target is red. Then imagine stepping backwards from this object. As you step backwards the object gets smaller and smaller. At some point,

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Hume argues, if you step backwards one more time, the object will simply disappear. It is the point just before you step backwards that reveals the atom of perception the smallest blob of colour that can be seen.

II Entrapment within subjectivity when objects are in the mind The problem posed by the entrapment within subjectivity is the claim that it selfevidently true that every object presented to consciousness depends on consciousness. It is often convenient to express this doctrine by the statement all objects of consciousness are in the mind; however, this can lead to confusions. In fact, it has led Russell to propose an ingenious but arguably very confused solution to this argument. Russell argues in The Problems of Philosophy that the term in the mind is an incorrect description of the relationship between objects of perception and consciousness. He argues that the objects of perception should be described as being before the mind. He replaces the term in by before. Having done so he claims that the objects of perception exist independently of the mind, and hence there is no entrapment within subjectivity. Taking the word idea in Berkeleys sense, there are two quite distinct things to be considered whenever an idea is before the mind. There is on the one hand the thing of which we are aware say the colour of my table and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act of apprehending the thing. The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental? Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the minds power of knowing things. If we say that the things known must be in the mind, we are either unduly limiting the minds power of knowing, or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if we mean by in the mind the same as by before the mind. However, this is confused and diverts attention away from the fundamental issue of the status of any object of consciousness. The term in when we use the phrase in the mind is only a metaphor. There is no spatial relationship of one object contained within another that can logically apply to the relationship between objects of consciousness and the mind. It is a category mistake to interpret it literally. Objects of consciousness (such as a perception of a blue blob) are not literally in the mind. The phrase in the mind means only this: if I was not conscious of the blue blob, then the blue blob would not be an object of my consciousness. All perceptual objects

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depend on consciousness. The switch from the term in to the term before does not alter this fact which is claimed to be self-evidently true. An object may be before my mind, but that does not mean that I know it without being consciousness of it. The phrase before the mind means exactly the same thing as the phrase in the mind. Hence Russells solution to the problem is mistaken.

III Neutral Monism Russell introduced in The Problems of Philosophy a new form of realism. This realism dispenses with the traditional realist belief in a transcendental world, to which we have no direct access through consciousness. His realism concerns the status of sense-data. 1. 2. 3. 4. The constituents of reality are sense-data. Sense-data are physical objects. Sense-data are publicly observable. Sense-data are directly present to each observer. acquaintance with sense-data. Sense-data exist independently of the mind. Each observer has direct

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It can, of course, be argued that this is not a consistent set of beliefs.

Additionally, many philosophers who are sympathetic to realism have found the claim that sense-data are physical objects questionable. This queasiness over the status of sense-data has led them to adopt a modified view of this form or realism, called neutral monism . A.J. Ayer adopts neutral monism in Language, Truth and Logic. It was first advanced by William James. Neural monism asserts that the ultimate constituents of reality, which are sense-data, are neither mental nor physical entities, but neutral between them. When sense-data are used in this sense that is as neutral objects that are neither mental nor physical but are before the mind the are also called qualia. So minds and physical objects alike are composed of sense-data, which form the primitive stuff of the universe. In this way, the dualism of mind and matter is supposed to be exposed to be apparent, since both mental and physical events are composites of the same stuff.

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There are some indications that Russell is in a state of confusion in The Problems of Philosophy regarding the status of sense-data, and it is possible to argue that his treatment of physical objects in that book is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. In 1921 he adopted the neutral monist position in his book, The Analysis of Mind. Neutral monism is an attempt to reconcile the epistemological priority of sense-data with the metaphysical belief in a physical reality. In practice, and as A.J. Ayer illustrates, the neutral monists have a very physicalist conception of what sense-data are. In practice they interpret them as some form of brain state, and thus recoil from the strictly neutral monist position to the view that sense-data are physical objects. Historically, the arguments of Russell and his American acolytes succeeded in routing the idealists. Whether their arguments were good enough to deserve this is a matter of debate. The spirit of the age turned against idealism, and the arguments of Berkely, Hume and Kant that gave it its impetus. Russells claim that the world is made of sense-data and that sense-data were before the mind were sufficient to convince the bulk of philosophers to reject idealism.

IV Is the whole the sum of its parts? The existence of atoms of perception (sense data) can be questioned. When we say that sense data exist, we are also claiming that all objects of perception are made up of sense data. A large object (we call it a macro-object ) is made of small atoms of perception. For example, my perception of a book will be made of all the individual small sense-data that together comprise the book. What this effectively says is that the whole book is the sum total of the parts of the book. The whole is a composite of the parts. Kant disagrees with this doctrine, and argues that we see whole objects first and then abstract to the existence of its parts. In other words, the whole object is not the sum total of the parts. He uses the term totum (Latin for whole) to denote the perception of a whole object. He argues that all objects are given in relation to a larger space that envelopes it, and that without the perception of the whole of space, the perception of a part would not be possible. This takes us into the philosophy of space and time as w ell. There is an obvious reply to Humes argument about stepping back from the bulls-eye. This is, why should we regard a single step backwards as representing the threshold between seeing the bullseye and not seeing it? Why not half a step, or half of half a step? In other words, there could be a continuous movement backwards, and if this is the case, then the

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bulls-eye will not be visible at one moment and invisible the next, it will simply fade gradually and continuously out of consciousness. So in fact, Humes argument presupposes that space is not continuous. In other words, that space is also made up of atoms of space. In this case we would say that space is discrete. In reply, Kant claims that space (and time) are continuous. He says that every space is comprised of spaces that are smaller than it, so it is not possible to reach a space that does not contain parts. No portion of space can exist on its own without all space being given. Outside a given bounded space must exist other spaces. There is not boundary between what is in space and what is not in space. Atoms of perception therefore do not exist in experience, and our experience always involves an experience of the whole of space, as given to our consciousness. To further support this view, Kant argues that consciousness itself does not exist in only two states that is, either you are conscious or you are not conscious. He argues that consciousness comes in degrees of consciousness. You can be more or less conscious of an object. He says that consciousness has an intensive quality. By this he means that consciousness comes in degrees of intensity. To illustrate this idea, imagine moving your hand slowly from in front of your eyes to the side and round the back of your head. Keep your eyes fixed before you. At first you are fully aware of your hand, but at some point your hand will not longer remain in your field of consciousness. Your hand has disappeared from your field of consciousness. But this disappearance is not an on/off thing. It is not the case that you are at one moment aware of your hand and at another not aware of it. There is not boundary between what you are conscious of and what you are not conscious of. All there is a slow fading away of consciousness so that at the margin it is not possible to perceive the boundary. So this is Kants reply to Humes argument about the bulls-eye. The boundary between what you can see (the sense-datum of the smallest red blob) and what you cannot see, does not exist, and consequently, there is no sense-datum.

V Phenomenalism Nonetheless, the idea that there are sense-data has led some philosophers to further conclusions about physical objects. This is the case in the philosophy of phenomenalism advanced by A.J. Ayer. Ayer adopted this philosophy from Bertrand Russell who discovered it half way through writing The Problems of Philosophy. Both Russell and Ayer maintain that perceptions are comprised of sense-data and that sense-data exist before the mind, rather than in the mind. We have already examined this idea of a distinction between being before and in the mind, and it is questionable

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whether this distinction is real. However, they suppose that it is, and they suppose that the distinction makes sense-data in some sense independent of consciousness. The sense-data can therefore act as the primary raw material out of which to construct all other objects. Phenomenalists argue that all physical objects are nothing but sense-data and constructions out of sense-data. The sense-data are the primary, raw building blocks of objects of all kinds. Macro physical objects and composites of sense-data. They claim that this solves the problem of external reality; since (a) we are directly acquainted with sense data, so we know that they exist: (b) since sense data are before the mind, they exist independently of the mind. Hence we know of the existence of a reality existing independently of the mind. We would argue that this doctrine is an attempt to have your cake and eat it ! The reality that could exist if it were made of sense-data is still very far short of the reality that is called into question by the problem of perception. To see this, consider the question, has this philosophy solved the problem of other minds? A nd whose sensedata do we see when we see any sense-data? In short, the sense data are still private to the subjective consciousness that has them. Therefore we cannot construct a public realty, common to all perceivers out of sense-data. It may be that the sense-datum I see when I look at a red bulls-eye is the same as the sense datum you see when also looking at it, but I have to believe this to be the case, since I do not look at it with your eyes. In other words, if the reality made of sense-data is public then I am not acquainted with it; if I am acquainted with sense-data, then they cannot be used to construct a public reality. Furthermore, the existence of sense-data can also be called into question.

VI The philosophy of logical atomism This is a form of phenomenalism, for example, similar to the philosophy advocated by A.J. Ayer and discussed above. The philosophy of logical atomism was advanced by Bertrand Russell, also as a solution simultaneously to problems of perception and to problems of the theory of knowledge. This doctrine depends on the logical analysis of sentences and consequently can only be outlined here, since the formal logical theory required to describe it in full is extensive. Basically, he argues that some senses are compound of other sentences. For example, Russell is professor of philosophy and Russell has a cat is a compound sentence

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made of two sentences (Russell is professor, Russell has a cat) and the conjunction and. The basic sentences that cannot be analysed any further into smaller sentences are called atomic sentences. However, sentences that appear to be atomic, such as Russell has a cat, are in fact disguised compound sentences. This is because both Russell and the cat are composites of sense data. So, logically, the sentence Russell has a cat should be analysed into its logically atomic parts, which would be statements about the individual sense-data that make up Russell and the cat. There are lots of difficulties with this philosophy, but the above description makes it clear that it is a form of phenomenalism through the medium of an analysis of logical sentence structure. It is highly representative of the modern tendency to tackle philosophy through the medium of language, and heralds the dawn of the age of linguistic philosophy. However, if phenomenalism is false, so too will be this philosophy of logical atomism. There is also a considerable further problem with this philosophy of logical atomism. There are, in addition to atomic and compound sentences, sentences that are called complex sentences. These complex sentences express attitudes. For instance, Russell believes his cat is a nice cat attributes an attitude of belief to Russell. Complex sentences involve a sentence within a sentence. Here the sentence his cat is a nice cat is contained within the sentence, Russell believes. Such sentences within sentences are called in logic intensional contexts. Sentences about sense-data provide extensional contexts. Here we will simply assert that no one has yet been able to give a wholly satisfactory account of intensional contexts in terms of extensional contexts. This provides a further technical difficulty in pursuing the philosophy of logical atomism. Since then, there has been a tendency for a reversion to a more nave form of realism in fact, the very type of realism against which Berkeley, Hume and Kant argued. This realism can be characterized by the following doctrines. 1. Physical objects are just given. Doubt of their existence is ill-founded. The assumption that there is a physical reality underpins scientific enquiry. In any discussion of realism the distinction between a transcendental reality and a reality of phenomena that are just presented to the mind is either consciously and deliberate rejected, or is ignored. It is still believed that empirical, scientific observation yields objective knowledge of physical reality. The existence of mental phenomena, as distinct from physical phenomena, is regarded as questionable. There is a tendency to regard conscious states as either non-existence, or as a type of material event.

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Whenever identity is discussed, the identity of physical objects is not called into question. That physical processes are real and exist independently of the mind, that is, independently of perception, is not called into question.

It is in this context that the modern discussion of human identity proceeds. Clearly, with such a strong commitment to realism, empiricism and materialism, the notion of human identity is going to be subject to sceptical questioning. In other words, that there is a human identity will be exposed either as a myth, or subject to some form of redefinition.

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