Anda di halaman 1dari 101

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY.

CRISTOBAL

Chapter 1 Case Title


Joaquino v Reyes

Issue/Gist
If the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest a lottery or gift enterprise

STATCON Concept
Set forth the meaning of Construction as the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law The bill shall embrace only one subject. To prohibit duplicity in legislation. The subject should clearly state the nature, scope, and consequences of the laws or its operation (page 11- Agapalo)

Caltex v Palomar Mun.of Panganiban v Shell Co.of the Phil.,Ltd., Shell Company alleging the constitutionality of Act to provide Means for Increasing the Highway Special Fund because the title renders 2 subject matter The passage of An Act Creating the municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, wherein 9 provinces will come from lanao and 12 provinces will be from Cotabato. The capital will be Togaig, Cotabato

Title and subject matter of statute: (1) Congress is refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects (2) Title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject. Purpose of the requirement: - The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill - Compliance is imperative (necessary) because the Congress is not obligated to read during its deliberation the entire text of the bill. - Does not require the congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision to mirror fully indexed or catalogued all the contents and the minute details therein. - It suffices if the title should inform the legislators the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Test of sufficiency of the tile (Whether or not misleading) - substance rather than its form - a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, - the title did not reflect the transfer of a portion of Cotobato to Lanao Separability Clause (pg 15) - When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected - To warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, - If all could not be carried into effect - parts of the statute that are so mutually dependent and connected the whole statute - should be declared null and void.

Lidasan v COMELEC, United BF Home Insurance and Guaranty

The power to promulgate rules in implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is

1|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


Homeowner's Assn.v BF Homes, Inc. Corporation (HIGC) revised the rules of procedure set forth in PD 902-A by adding jurisdiction disputes between such association and the state. The PD-902 A only gave authority to HIGC jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the IRR Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) alleged of grave abuse of discretion by requiring China Bank to have BOTH a comprehensive provident and an employee housing plan. But PD No. 1752 required only and/or statement provided for in the legislative enactment. An administrative agency can not amend an Act of Congress (1) amend or expand statutory requirement, or (2) to embrace matters not covered by statute If discrepancy occurs between the basic law and the IRR, it is the basic law that prevails Administrative agency cant go beyond its mandate or powers vested by the legislative department. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or statute

And/or - legal meaning of the words "and/or" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., "either and or"; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs - intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably. - one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. - law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. Summary: - The power to promulgate rules in implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. - Administrative agency cant go beyond its mandate or powers vested by the legislative department. - The board exceeded its rule making power by amending the law, rendering said rules null and void, for the law obviously contemplates the existence of EITHER plans not BOTH plans to be superior than that of HDMF)

China Banking Corp. v Members of Board of Trustees, HDMF, The passage of RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Act, which requires the public officials to submit sworn statement of assets and liabilities

Morfe v Mutuc, Bayan, Karapatan, KMP v Ermita,

That only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of proprietary and common sense. That is primarily a legislative concern

Tanada v Tuvera,136 SCRA 27 [1985],

Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so

the publication of laws before become effective can not be dispensed with (required) due process of the law Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity other than 15 days from the date of publication on Official Gazette. Not the option to omit the requirement of publication There is a need for publication because omission would offend due process denying the public

2|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


published, they shall have no binding force and effect. knowledge of the laws The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of the decree and a mere supplement in official gazette CAN NOT satisfy the publication requirement. Publication must be in full otherwise deemed not published. Interpretive regulations and those merely internal in nature (regulating personnel of the administrative agency and not the public) need not be published Charter of a city must be published even though it only applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants Presidential Decree that only favored individuals or exempting a certain group of people must be published Instruction issued by an administrative agency no need to publish Municipal ordinances governed by the local government code meaning not covered to this requirement The publication must be made in Official Gazette and not elsewhere for the effectivity after 15 days if the statute provides for effectivity upon approval, said law becomes effective on the date of its approval falls under unless otherwise provided the word effective immediately therefore the said law become effective on the said date The court rules that to be effective, the circular should first be published in OG because it was not just and interpretation or internal regulation, but one which deprived government officials their allowances and additional compensation. Subsequent publication DID NOT cure the defect of lack of publication Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the abovementioned items were disallowed in audit? negative, precisely, for the reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. Will not take the RETROACTIVE effect, but apply PROSPECTIVELY

Phil.Veterans Bank Employees Union v Vega,

The liquidation of the Phil Veterans bank but a subsequent of Cory Aquino pursuant to RA 7169 which was effective immediately. There was a dimunition of salaries by removing the car loan plan pursuant to a DBM-CCC No. 10 of the Department of Budget and Management

Phil.International Trading Corp. v COA, Note: Civil Code Article 2

Effectivity of Laws (1990) After a devastating storm causing widespread destruction in four Central Luzon provinces, the executive and legislative branches of the government agreed to enact a special law appropriating P1 billion for purposes of relief and rehabilitation for the provinces. In view of the urgent nature of the legislative enactment, it is provided in its effectivity clause that it shall take effect upon approval and after completion of publication in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The law was passed by the Congress on July 1, 1990. signed into law by the President on July 3, 1990, and published in such newspaper of general circulation on July 7, 1990 and in the Official Gazette on July 10, 1990.

(a) As to the publication of said legislative enactment, is there sufficient observance or compliance with the requirements for a valid publication? Explain your answer. (b) When did the law take effect? Explain your answer.

(c) Can the executive branch start releasing and disbursing funds appropriated by the said law the day following its approval? Explain your answer. SUGGESTED ANSWER:

3|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


(a) Yes, there is sufficient compliance. The law itself prescribes the requisites of publication for its effectivity, and all requisites have been complied with. (Article 2, Civil Code) (b) The law takes effect upon compliance with all the conditions for effectivity, and the last condition was complied with on July 10, 1990. Hence, the" law became effective on that date. (c) No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by Congress on July 1, 1990 and approved by the President on July 3, 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity were not yet complete at the time.

Chapter 2 Case Title

Issue/Gist
Accused was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammmunition in an information dated 14 August 1962. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent. Appeal involves a question of law, as that it was taken to the Supreme Court. NOT ACQUITTED: overruled People vs. Macarandang Instead of the Commission conducting the corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence to be presented by applicant and oppositors, Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order dated July 14, 1949, commissioned Atty. Antonio H. Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division "to take the testimony of witnesses" The delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera to take the testimony of witnesses was illegal and contrary Prohibition of DBP to use Back pay certificate to cover the outstanding balance of the loan availed by Quijano Thus, even before the amendment of the

STATCON Concept
Law explicit, no provision made for secret agent The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, xxx Firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the AFP, the PC, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, are not covered when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. No provision is made for a secret agent. Duty of the court to apply the law; Construction if application is impossible or inadequate The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. Where the law is clear, compliance is essential Neither this court nor the commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of amending the law, and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.

People v Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164

Silva v Cabrera, 88 Phil 381

Quijano v DBP, 35 SCRA 270

No room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law. The doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, Interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible

4|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview. The Limpan Investment Corporation filed income tax returns for the years 1959 and 1960, which became the bases of two deficiency tax assessments flowing from deduction disallowed after investigation and verification by the Bureau on Internal Revenue Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lim-Pan Investment Sole issue of when payment by the Limpan Investment Corporation of the 5% monthly interest for delinquency did legally accrue. In the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, Nazario refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955. HELD: In no way may the ordinances be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. Nazario falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. The National Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances. People v. Nazario Cesario Ursua in getting some documents from the Ombudsman, used the name of his Attorneys Messenger, Oscar Perez. The Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of the statute are clear and unambigous, no interpretation is called for, and the law is applied as written, for application is the first duty of courts, and interpretation, only where literal application is impossible or inadequate. HELD: In L-28571, interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962, the date of notice and demand, at 1% per month, for 3 years, no payment having been made within thirty days from such notice and demand. The surcharge of 5% accrued on failure to pay the deficiency tax due within thirty days from notice and demand. In L-28644, interest shall be computed from April 4, 1963, the date of notice and demand. The surcharge of 5% accrued on failure to pay the deficiency tax due within thirty days from notice and demand.

What are vague statutes? A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. When can a vague statute struck down? It should be a perfectly vague statute Utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction If not perfectly vague then use Canons of Construction It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction. Doctrine of void for vagueness

Ursua v. CA

5|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


Ombudsman charged of illegal use of Alias The Chartered Bank Employees Association, complained against Chartered Bank, for the nonpayment of 10 unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from 1 November 1974. Minister of Labor dismissed the petitioners claim basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9, claiming the rule that If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays. should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. When the language is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean what is says When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. Executive construction given weight by court except when erroneous, thereby being null and void While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. An administrative interpretation, which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. All doubts construed resolved in favor of labor; Intent of legislature towards most beneficial effect Any slight doubts must be resolved in favor of the workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and affording protection to labor (Sections 6 and 9, Article II, Constitution). Article 4 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits. Any remaining doubts which may arise from the conflicting or different divisors used in the computation of overtime pay and employees absences are resolved by the manner in which work actually rendered on holidays is paid. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish The operation of a proviso is usually and properly confined to the clause or distinct portion of the enactment which immediately precedes it or to which it pertains, and does not extend to or qualify other sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly disclosed.[6]

Chartered Bank Employees v. Ople Admission of SP02 de los Reyes and SP02 de la Cruz into the Witness Protection Program was assailed because not allowed under Section 3(d) and Section 4 of RA NO. 6981 Petitioners' main contention is that Section 3 of R.A. No. 6981 lays down the basic qualifications a person must possess in order to be admitted into the Program and that Section 4 of the same statute is not an exception to Section 3 but, it simply adds requirements for witnesses before they may

Acop v. Guingona

HELD: A careful reading of Sections 3 and 4 readily shows that these are distinct and independent provisions. It is true that the proviso in Section 3(d) disqualifies law enforcement officers from being admitted into the Program when they "testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority." This is the general rule. However, Section 4 provides for a specific and separate situation where a witness testifies before a legislative investigation. An investigation by a legislative committee does not fall under the category of "any investigating authority" referred to in

6|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


become eligible for admission into the Program in case of legislative investigations. Melendres running for Barangay Chairman filed a petition/protest in the court but failed to pay a docket fee invoking that it is only a administrative requirement rather than an important jurisdiction implication Section 3. The power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. Rationale: (Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals) The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs[19] the Court stressed that executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are drafters of the law they interpret. Courts will not hesitate to disregard executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any ordinary reader. When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Thus an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law

Melendres v. Comelec In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. DAR v. Sutton Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions . However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. Fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress

7|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. Deliberation of Constitutional Commission maybe sought for to see the legislative intent It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice

The validity of the search warrant when the master copy for pirated is not presented in the lower court which was done in a later case in 20th century fox

Columbia Pictures v. CA In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable. Article VIII, section 9 of the Constitution provides that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Held: it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule.

People v. Licera

Perfecto v. Meer

Salaries of judicial officers cannot be diminished The Constitution of the United States, like ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of Judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. Various states, except Wisconsin and Missouri, provide the rule where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, it has been held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the judges of its court. Independence of the judiciary; prohibition against diminution Thus, the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations, and pervading principles of the Constitution , and to the administration of justice without respect to persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the rich.

8|P age

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL


The exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation not a gratuity or privilege The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges, personal and therefore waivable, but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore). Interpretation and application of Constitution and statutes belong to Judiciary The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may interpret in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. Legislature can not override judicial construction

Endencia v David

RA590 was enacted by Congress after the promulgation of the Courts decision in Perfecto v. Meer. Section 13 of said act provided that no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

People v. Canton Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workmans Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila.

stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and mandates not to unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. Judicial Legislation The Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

Floresca v Philex, 135 SCRA 142

CHAPTER 5
CASE Amadoravs CA G.R. 47745 15 Apr 1988 Pr: Certiorari 9|P age FACTS PablitoDaffon fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo Amadora while they were at the auditorium of their school, Colegio de San JoseRecoletos. RULING Art 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless P: Cruz imprudence and the victims parents filed a civil action for damages under Art 2180 of the Civil Statcon:reddendosingulasingulis Code. Imputed in the complaint were the rector, HS principal, dean for the boys, and physics teacher. CFI of Cebu granted petition but later reversed on appeal. Issue: Is Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos included in Art 2180 of the Civil Code, it not being a school of arts and trades but an academic institution? Cadayonavs CA G.R. 128771 3 Feb 2000 Pr: Review P: Gonzaga-Reyes Statcon: doctrine of last antecedent Ricardo Cadayona filed a Petition for review with the CA to annul CSC Resolution affirming his preventive suspension. CA dismissed the petition outright due to: 1) certificate of non-forum shopping was executed by the counsel, not the petitioner himself; 2) three annexes were mere photocopies and not certified true copies Issue: Does the Administrative Circular 1-95 also require annexes to be certified true copies?

RULING thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendosingulasingulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices. The provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate. Agpalo: reddendosingulasingulis referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place i.e. the words should be taken distributively. It requires that the antecedents and consequences should be read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately related and to which it is most applicable. Application of the doctrine of last antecedent is misleading for the proper application of the doctrine shows that the phrase certified true copies qualifies the words nearest to it i.e. such material portion of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. Sec. 6, Rule 1: Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The Court does not construe Sec. 6 of Rule 43 as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies. Only the judgments or final orders need be certified true copies. Agpalo: doctrine of last antecedent a qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. Physical injuries should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

Carandangvs Santiago and Valenton G.R. 8238 25 May 1995 10 | P a g e

Tomas Valenton was convicted of frustrated homicide committed against Cesar Carandang. Carandang filed a civil action to recover damages

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS for the bodily injuries. Valenton presented a Pr: Certiorari motion to suspend the trial of the civil case pending the resolution of the criminal case. CA P: Labrador ruled that the trial must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. Statcon: Words with technical or legal meaning Issue: Does the term physical injuries in Art 33 mean physical injuries in the RPC or any physical injury or bodily injury?

RULING Respondents argued that the term physical injuries is used to define a specific crime defined in the RPC and should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense. Wrong. Defamation and fraud in Art. 33 are used in their ordinary (generic) sense because there are no specific provisions in the RPC using these terms as means of offenses. It is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. Agpalo: words that have been used in a technical sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been previously used. DOJ has no other course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when arraignment of an accused had already taken place. When a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to. Sec 7 of the circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary. Sec 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Sec 12. Sec 7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take while Sec 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.

AdasavsAbalos G.R. 168617 19 Feb 2007 Pr: Review P: Chico-Nazario Statcon:Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions

CecilleAbalos filed two complaints of estafa against Bernadette Adasa. Iligan Prosecutor found probable cause and filed criminal cases. RTC ordered reinvestigation, same findings. After being arraigned, Adasa filed a Petition for Review with DOJ which it granted and ordered the withdrawal of the cases. CA reverses DOJ ruling. Issue: Did the DOJ err in entertaining the petition of Adasa for reinvestigation? Florentino and Zandueta filed a petition for mandamus against PNB to compel it to accept the backpay certificate to pay an indebtedness. PNB refuses to accept. Issue: Does the clause who may be willing to accept the same for settlement refer to all antecedents the Government, etc or only the

Florentino and Zanduetavs PNB G.R. 7872 28 Apr 1956 Pr: Appeal P: Jugo

Qualifying cause refers only to the last antecedent any citizen of the Philippines. To make the acceptance of backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen would render Sec 2 of RA 897 unconstitutional. Secretary of Justice held the phrase who may be willing to accept the same for settlement qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not apply to the Government or its agencies.

11 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Statcon: doctrine of last last antecedent any citizen of the Philippines? antecedent People vsDelantar SimplicioDelantar was convicted of violations of G.R. 169143 Sec 5, Art 3 of RA 7610 (child prostitution) and 2 Feb 2007 was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Pr: Appeal P: Tinga Statcon: noscitur a sociis GachonvsDevera Jr. G.R. 116695 20 Jun 1997 Pr: Review P: Panganiban Statcon: words construed in their ordinary sense Issue: May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally? Susana Guevara filed a complaint for forcible entry against Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara. Gachon failed to file an Answer promptly which led the MTCC to rule motupropio. RTC, on certiorari, affirmed MTCC ruling. Issue: Is Delantar considered the victims guardian which would warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty?

RULING

No, guardian is associated in the provision denotes a legal relationship. Noscitur a sociis: the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Sec. 31c of Ra 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the maximum penalty. Guardian, as envisioned by the law, is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. The word shall ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statue. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature these rules are regarded as mandatory. Agpalo: the words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and most obvious signification according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. - R.A. No. 6646 does not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense. Section 25 merely highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections, aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of election returns. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies the election offenses

Malinias vs. COMELEC Stat Con: Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by construction, be extended to other matters. Petitioner: SarioMalianias 12 | P a g e

Malinias a candidate for governor while Pilando a candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province in May 11, 1998 elections They filed complaint with COMELEC for violation of Sec 25 of RA 6646 and Section 232 and 261 of BP 881 against the Provincial Election Supervisor and members of the

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Provincial Board of Canvassers Respondent: COMELEC - Allegations: Ponente: J. Carpio - (1) prevented them from attending the provincial canvassing, - (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and - (3) threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. - (4)They likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez Issue: Can the petitioner file a criminal case against the Provincial Election Supervisor and members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under RA 6646 and BP 881? Held: No. Does not impose criminal offenses

RULING punishable under this law, does not include Section 25. Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years.

Concept - Under the rule of statutory construction of expressiouniusestexclusioalterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressiouniusestexclusioalterius. The rule of expressiouniusestexclusioalterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressiumfacitcessaretacitum. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other

13 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS matters. -

RULING

The rule of expressiouniusestexclusioalterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

People vs. Lopez Respondent: EusebioLopex, Associate Judhe of Second Diviison of Peoples Court Ponente: J. Perfecto Writ of Prohibition

Petitions to disqualify respondent judge from sitting and participating in any manner in the hearing and decision of the criminal cases against Benigno S. Aquino and Antonio de las Alas and other treason cases of the same nature pending before the Second Division of the People's Court. It is alleged that the petitions were filed under section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, otherwise known as the People's Court Act, in relation to section 1 Rule 124. Reason: respondent judge "again manifested his bias and prejudice in favor of political collaborators" Respondent judge did not appeal from the resolution of the majority of his division and expressed his determination to maintain his minority view and to disregard entirely the majority opinion

The authors of the judicial rules, in enacting section 1 Rule 124, did not have in mind the idea of disqualifications of judges , is shown by two conclusive evidences, one negative and the other affirmative. o Title of Rule 124 which says: "Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers." Each and everyone of the nine sections of the rule do not include nor hint the idea of disqualification o Rule 126 which is entitled: "Disqualification of Judicial officers." This rule is composed of only two sections. The disqualification case does not fall into the enumerations set forth in Rule 126 Section 1. The fact that a judge may not administer justice impartially, whether his partiality may be considered as a serious misbehavior or is a condition which may incapacitate him to discharge the duties of his office, to preclude him from causing any harm to the administration of justice, the proper procedure is not to disqualify him , but to file the complaint contemplated by Rule 129, and the procedure will certainly be more speedy and effective. Section 8 of the Civil Procedure o The Court declared that the law admits of two constructions: (1) The magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency; his decision is conclusive, and the other

14 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS - The specific provision upon which Judge Lopez is intended to be disqualified is the one expressed in the following words: "Justice shall be impartially administered." Issue: Can Judge Lopez be disqualified under Section 1 of Rule 124 under the second provision Justice shall be impartially administered? Held: No. - If there is no law, rule or legal principle upon which Judge Lopez may disqualify himself or be disqualified, it stands to logic that his colleagues in the Second Division of the People's Court, notwithstanding the fact that they constitute the majority, have no power, jurisdiction, or authority to disqualify Judge Lopez and, therefore, their decision or resolution granting the motion to disqualify the respondent judge is null and void per se. o o

RULING members of the Court have no voice in it (2) The magistrate challenged sits with the Court and the question is decided by it as a body. The first interpretation was accepted. The intervention of the court is merely advisory in nature. The challenged Justice may or may not submit the question to the court. It all depends on his discretion. If he submits the question to the court, he is free to follow or not to follow the opinion of said body. The final result will be the same whether or not he submits the question to the court, as the last word will be his.

Judge could not be disqualified under section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which are reproduced in Rule 126. If it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice.

Concept - Blacks Law: inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius is synonymous with expressiouniusestexclusioalteriusA canon of construction holding that to express or include something implies the exclusion of others or of the alternatives. The grounds thus enumerated in the Rules of Court must be deemed to exclude others under the principle we have cited and under the well-known canon of statutory construction, inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius. (J. Tuason) Although there exist a virtual unanimity of opinions that Judge Lopez in the instances under consideration acted with bias and prejudice and in favor of the political collaborators, at least, and that he has openly announced his determination to vote in favor of the latter in all future cases in which he may have to intervene, it is adduced,

15 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING nevertheless, that said bias and prejudice are not grounds for disqualification in this jurisdiction, inasmuch as the enumeration in Rule 126, section 1, Rules of Court, is exclusive. Inclusiouniusexclusioestalterius. This proposition finds no basis either in law or in judicial precedents. (J. Lim) A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means Is the "amplifier system" mean "similar" to "radio"? No

People vs. Santiago Stat Con- Nonsicitur a sociis

Isauro Santiago has committed the crime of "libel" October 5, 1959, in Manila, the accused, for the purpose of injuring the name and reputation of Arsenio H. Lacson, publicly call said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at Quiapo, thru the medium of an amplifier system and before a crowd of around a hundred persons, the following, to wit: "ArsenioHayopLacson, pinakawalanghiyangAlkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel"

Respondent: Isauro Santiago Ponente: J. Concepcion -

First: o

Radio as a means of publication is "the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver" while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system, "is not thru "electromagnetic waves" and is with the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter . . . and the receiver . . ..

Issue: Whether defamatory statements through the medium of an amplifier system constitutes oral defamation (Article 358 of RPC) or libel (Article 355 of RPC)? Held: Crime of Oral Defamation.

Second: o The word "radio" used in said Article 355, should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated "writing, printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition or cinematographical exhibition" all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication o It has been held that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel,

Concept - Noscitur a Sociis ( It is known by its associates) - The meaning of an unclear words or phrase should be determined by words immediately surrounding it. 16 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Pimentel III vs. COMELEC Petitioner: Aquilino Pimentel III Respondent: COMELEC Ponente: J. Chico Nazario Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus At the time of filing of the Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as Senators. Only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct canvass proceedings. Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. o Candidates legal counsels were not allowed to ask any questions during the canvass proceedings o PCOC did not reflect the true results of the elections because it was based on the manufactured Maguindanao MCOCs, the authenticity and due 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. Agpalo page 302.

RULING

A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas PambansaBlg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines General Rule: Elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives, pre-proclamation cases are prohibited. o As Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 was then worded, it would appear that any pre-proclamation case relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass, was prohibited in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. o The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. Exception: Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) Determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.

Who are in responsible? Congress and the Commission en banc Undeniably, the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc

17 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS execution of which had not been duly established. o Using of a copy 2 14 July 2007, Zubiri got the twelfth position

RULING A pre-proclamation case under Section 30 is allowed only as an exception to the prohibition under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. According to the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, are strictly, but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication. A maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the expressed exception or exemption excludes others. Exceptiofirmatregulim in casibus non exceptis. The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions; conversely, those which are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule. In this case, the exception applies only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies. PD 9- Unlawful for the use of bladed Weapons Alibi is worthless Although not enumerated, a bayonette is indeed a bladed weapon that is punishable under P.D no. 9 (See statcon maxim)

Issue: Can the pre-proclamation case of Pimentel be given due course by the SPBOC- Maguindanao board of canvassers? Held. No -

12. Primero vs. CA Stat Con: Expression unius est exclusion alterius [enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention appears. 13. Ramirez Vs. CA Statcon: Generalia verba sunt 18 | P a g e

The accused , armed with a deadly weapon, by means of force and intimidation performed acts of lasciviousness on a person. Accused claims that the accusation is unfounded and that it was motivated by revenge because he married someone else. Offender believes that the court was incorrect to include a bayonette to be punishable under Sec 3. Of P.D. No. 9 Civil case for damages alleging that respondned insulted and humiliated respondent in a confrontation at an office.

RA 4200 Prohibiting and penalizing wire tapping and other violations of private comm...

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS generaliter intelligent - Petitioner represents a tape recording of what happened. Respondent filed a case against petitioner for her violating Ra 4200 Petitioner claims that Ra 4200 only punishes a 3rd party but not the direct arguers. Petitioner also believes that it penalizes private communication and not private conversations. Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent judge for his decision on two civil cases. The civil cases involve respondents who are engaged in the creation and selling of FILLED MILK products

RULING Respondent is in the right. It makes it ILLEGAL for ANYONE. The law makes no distinction about a 3rd party. Communication must be given its ordinary meaning (to share or to impart) thus petition is bereft of merit.

14. Vera vs. Cuevas Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction

Appeal is granted. Sec 169 of the Tax Code DOES not apply to whole milk products because it is clear in the statute that it only refers to skimmed milk and milk associated with the removal of its fat.

Statcon: Ejusdem Generis [general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular terms they follow in the statute.]

Commissioner of Internal Revenue(1st case) required respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription from Sec 169: ...This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age... - Fair Trade Board (2nd case) required petitioner who produced evaporated milk to place the same inscription. Petitioner contends that it would be false advertising on their part if they did. -petition for certiorari for a temporary restraining order on the orders of respondent judge. -

Other milk manufacturers have not been approached with the same problem and so this is also violates the equal protection clause.

15. Villarosa vs Benito Petition for certiorari for a 19 | P a g e

-SC rules in the favour of petitioners: -it is clear that Sec 11. Has revised Sec 13 and that the person who

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS temporary restraining order -petitioner and another private respondent Statcon: Expresson unios est executed a deed of sale, wherein the respondent exclusion alterius ) would agree to develop certain parcels of land [express mention of one person for the construction of low cost housing units. or thing implies the exclusion of all others.] -petitioners filed a complaint of breach of contract against respondent for failure to comply and a SUMMONS was served upon the defendants Branch Manager Engineer. -Defendant prayed to dismiss the case because the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the summons was improperly served to an employee not under Sec 11, Rule 14. -defendant claims that the new rules should be construed strictly to general manager, corporate secretary, and excluding agents and directors.

RULING received the summons was merely an agent of the company, thus not qualified under Sec 11.

CHAPTER 6
CASE 1. BellisvsBellis G.R. 23678 6 Jun 1967 Pr: Appeal P: Bengzon Statcon: 20 | P a g e 5 Aug 1952 Bellis executed a will in the Philippines - $240,000 to first wife FACTS Amos Bellis a US citizen in the State of Texas - Mary Mallen first wife, divorced Children: Edward, George (), Henry, Alexander, Anna - Violet Kennedy second wife Children: Edwin, Walter, Dorothy - Illegitimate children in RP: Amos Jr., Maria Cristina, Miriam Palma RULING Texas law. Order of the probate court affirmed in toto. Art 16 par 2 and Art 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law if the decedent in intestate or testamentary successions with regard to four times: (a) order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; (d) the capacity to succeed. Art 16, par 2, Civil Code: Intestate and testamentary successions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Special law to prevail - P120,000 to illegitimate children i.e. P40,000 over general law each - Remainder to seven surviving children 8 Jul 1958 Bellis died in Texas - Upon death, Poples Bank and Trust Company, executor of the will, paid all bequests 8 Jan 1964 executor submitted its Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition 17 Jan 1964 illegitimate children opposed on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore compulsory heirs of the deceased 30 Apr 1964 CFI Manila overrules opposition and upholds executors final account 11 Jun 1964 Motion for reconsideration denied, thus this petition Issue: Which law should apply Texas or Philippine law?

RULING of the country wherein said property may be found. Art 1039, Civil Code: Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. Congress has deleted the phrase notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next prededing article when they incorporated Art 11 of the old Civil Code as Art 17 of the new Civil Code, whule reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art 10 of the old Civil Code as Art 16 in the new. Art 17, Civil Code: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. It must have been their purpose to make the 2nd paragraph of Art 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision under Art 1039 which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. Congress has specifically chosen to leave the amount of successional rights to the decedents national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

2. FrivaldovsComelec G.R. 120295 28 Jun 1996 Pr: Certiorari and preliminary injunction P: Panganiban 21 | P a g e

Juan Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was twice declared to be disqualified due to his alien citizenship Raul Lee second placer in the canvass, incumbent governor 20 Mar 1995 Frivaldo files CoC for Governor of Sorsogon

Frivaldo. The indomitable people of Sorsogon certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice. 1. Frivaldos repatriation was valid and legal. a. Lees argument that P.D. 725 had been effectively repealed - Memo of Cory dated 27 Mar 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of PD 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Statcon: Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose. 23 Mar 1995 Lee files petition to disqualify on citizenship grounds 1 May 1995 Comelec 2nd Division grants petition; disqualifies Frivaldo 8 May 1995 election day and Frivaldo wins; motion for reconsideration still unacted upon - Frivaldo: 73,440 vs Lee: 53,304 11 May 1995 Comelec en banc affirms Frivaldo disqualification 9 Jun 1995 Lee files petition for his proclamation with the Comelec 21 Jun 1995 Comelec en banc orders proclamation of Lee as winning governor - 30 Jun 1995, 8:30 PM Lee proclaimed 6 Jul 1995 Frivaldo files petition with the Comelec to annul Lees proclamation and for his own proclamation - 30 Jun 1995, 2 PM Frivaldo takes oath of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation was approved 19 Dec 1995 Comelec 1st Division rules that Lee proclamation was illegal because Frivaldo has reacquired his citizenship 23 Feb 1996 Comelec en banc upholds 1st Division ruling; denies Lees motion for reconsideration 26 Feb 1996 Lee files petition with SC 22 | P a g e -

RULING No express repeal was made. It did not categorically or impliedly state that PD 725 was being repealed. Repeals by implication are not favoured. Cory did not repeal PD 725 but left it to Congress to deal with the matter.

b. Lee argues that serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings when Frivaldos application was approved in just one day - Frivaldo filed on 17 Aug 1994 as confirmed by SolGen. Special Committee only reactivated on 8 Jun 1995. Frivaldo re-submitted the required form on 29 Jun 1995. It cannot be said that there was indecent haste in the processing. - Many others were processed, not only Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. - Any contest on the legality of Frivaldos repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself or in the OP if it fails, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion. c. Lee contends that citizenship must exist on the day of his election Sec 39 of Local Government Code: an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter in the province where he intends to be elected - The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age. - An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Frivaldo was therefor qualified when he re-assumed citizenship on 30 Jun 1995. - This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life, and meaning to the law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Sec 39 speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates. - Vasquez vsGiap: the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 27 Feb 1996 SC issues TRO Issue: Who should be the rightful governor of Sorsogon? 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? 2. Is the lack of citizenship a continuing disqualification? 3. Did the Comelec have jurisdiction over the petition? 4. Was the proclamation of Lee valid? 5. Is Sec 78 of Omnibus Election Code mandatory?

RULING The law intended the citizenship qualification to be a qualification distinct from being a voter. LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. Registration is the core of this qualification. It is clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province.

d. Repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of filing his application on 17 Aug 1994 - PD 725 is a curative statute it undertakes to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. - It was the legislative intent to give the statue retroactive application (allowing Filipino woman to who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship). - Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be mooted by his repatriation. - Frivaldo became stateless having renounced his American citizenship. In case of doubt, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.Frivaldo consistently took oath of allegiance when he ran in 1988, 1992, and 1995. 2. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. 3. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following proclamation. Frivaldo filed in 6. 4. Lee proclamation is not valid. - LabovsComelec: the fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will - Aquino vsComelec: Lee is a second placer, just that, a second placer. - No sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon

23 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING was fully aware in fact of Frivaldos alleged disqualification such that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots in knowing that he was ineligible. Frivalod has seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, he should be proclaimed.

5. It is merely directory as Sec 6 of RA 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. - Sec 78: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be decided not later that fifteen days before the election. - Sec 6, RA 6646: If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for, the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action and upon motion during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation. This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Frivaldo, at 81 years old, showed loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose. He sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reacquire his nationality of birth despite several legal setbacks. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favour.

3. Izonvs People G.R. 51370 31 Aug 1981 Pr: Review 24 | P a g e

Amado Izon, Jimmy Milla, and Pedro Divino were charged with Robbery with Violence Against Person in the Circuit Criminal Court, Third District, Olongapo City. 8 Sep 1977 accused stabbed Reynaldo Togorio and

Yes. Anti-Carnapping Act (R.A. 6539): Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power than muscular power using the public highways. Petitioners: the Information did not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS stole the victims motorized tricycle P: de Castro Accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to the Statcon: penalty provided in the Anti-Carnapping Act. Where the law does not distinguish Issue: Is a motorized tricycle a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the AntiCarnapping Act?

RULING was using the public highway so as to make it a motor vehicle as defined in the carnapping law. Thus, they werent informed that they were being charged with carnapping, not simple robbery as stated in the Information. Additionally, they contend that tricycles are not licensed to operate on public highways. SolGen: It is clear that a street within a town is a public highway if it is used by the public. To limit the words public highways to a national road connecting various towns, as petitioners suggest, would create a distinction which the statue itself does not make. Where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made. Highways are always public, free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a motor vehicle within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. Any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction. Petitioners complaint of not having been informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and for which they were convicted upon their plea of guilty is unfounded, legally and factually.

4. Mobil Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Services 25 | P a g e

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila

The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and was Ponente: J. Bengzon discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. April 4, 1964 - Mobil filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case

RULING proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. Bureau of printing vs. bureau of printing employees association - The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental functions. The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance o with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. o Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties o Arrastre service is a necessary incident. Arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.

Issue: Is Customs Arrastre Services immune against suits? Held. Yes even though a proprietary function, the function is only incidental to a government function of Bureau of Customs. -

Concept - It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. - Agpalo Chapter 7 page 430

5. Moreno vs. COMELEC

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that Moreno was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention

The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (1) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or

26 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Justice Tinga o sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer stating thta he was already granted probation. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. Issue: Is Moreno disqualified under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code?

RULING (2) for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convictedperson in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. This seemingly clear and unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation Baclayon vs. Mutia; grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office

Held. No

Concepts - Interpretare et concordarelegislegibusestoptimusinterpretandi - to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code - On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code . - While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation 27 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -

6. People vs. Gajo J. Montemayor

Six defendants Salvador Diama, SofronioGajo, Julio Nono, ConradoGalapin, Romeo Ambid and EmeterioZarate were charged in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo with triple murder for killing EsparanzaGarganera de Nograles and her two sons, Romeo and Augusto Nograles Killed due to following motives or reasons (1) Esperanza et al were spies for Japanese trops (2) Personal motive of Captain Ga because of a land dispute The petitioners were applying for amnesty. The benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation issued by President Roxas on September 7, 1946 was invoked for all the six appellants.

RULING Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. There would be mixed motives for the killing, namely, in furtherance of the resistance movement as well as personal The appellants would still come under the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation which excludes from its benefits crimes committed from purely personal motives. In the second place, in carrying out the order of Captain Ga, is hardly just that appellants herein be held answerable for the alleged personal motives of Captain Ga. The captain was their superior officer. They were not supposed to be aware of his personal motives.

7. Rinconada Telecom vs. Buenviaje

Petition for certiorari and mandamus is directed against the order of respondent judge dated January 23, 1978, denying petitioner's right to appeal from his previous orders dated September 16 and 29, 1977 in relation to case Rinconada Telephone Co., Inc., Plaintiff v. Iriga Telephone Co., Inc., and Francisco Imperial, Defendants - Breach of contract in relation to the deed of sale of shares of stocks The case was handled by Atty. Luciano Maggay The latest order was received for Rinconada

Concept - Liberal interpretation of Amnesty Proclamation - It was enough, under a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, and their application. The right of client to terminate his relations with his counsel is universally recognized. The authority of his counsel includes the right to make a change or substitution at any stage of the proceedings. To be valid, any such change or substitution must be made: a) upon written application; b) with written consent of the client; c) upon written consent of the attorney to be substituted; d) in case the consent of attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by the rules (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court). In this case there was no valid substitution

28 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Telephone Co., Inc. through Atty. Maggay, who has been shown in the records to be still a counsel of record for the same party on February 2, 1978 Petitioner contends that it received court processes thru Atty. Santos when the latter entered his appearance in both cases by his filing of a notice of appearance and a motion for reconsideration of the orders of dismissal which he furnished the counsel of respondent Imperial. Specifically, it mentioned the order of respondent judge sent to Atty. Benjamin Santos considering the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. It expressed amazement over the act of respondent judge in not sending to Atty. Santos a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration knowing fully well that the period to appeal therefrom would lapse without the knowledge of Atty. Santos, its new counsel. While admitting that its notice of appeal and appeal bond was filed out of time; petitioner considers such fact as the result of the collusion between respondent judge and respondent Imperial.

RULING Why? o Neither can it be said that Atty. Maggay formally withdrew as counsel for petitioner in the cases. o He continued to represent petitioner and he remained the counsel of record and was for all legal purposes, petitioners' attorney upon whom respondent court's processes may be served. o Since he was the last to appear before any application for substitution was filed, Atty. Maggay remained responsible for the conduct of petitioner's cause o Despite the filing of Atty. Santos of a motion for reconsideration, copy of which he furnished the opposing counsel, Atty. Maggay is still considered counsel of record

There are circumstances present in these cases which warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule and jurisprudence . - Why? o respondent judge recognized Atty. Santos as petitioner's new counsel. o trial court sent Atty. Santos a copy of the order considering the motion for reconsideration for resolution o when it referred to Attys. Maggay and Raneses as petitioner's former counsels and Atty. Santos as the new counsel of petitioner in its order denying reconsideration. Having acknowledged Atty. Santos as the new counsel of petitioner, there is a clear case of negligence when said lawyer was not furnished copy of the order denying reconsideration as a copy of the order considering that motion for resolution was furnished to petitioner thru said lawyer.

Concept While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice especially when such strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial court itself. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is

Issue: Is the judge correct on denying the petitioner the right to appeal because of lapse of time due to failure of the court to send the notices to the new counsel Atty Santos and not AttyMaggay? Held. No. 29 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive right of the parties Because there is no vested right in technicalities, in meritorious cases, a liberal, not literal, interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules which is the proper and just determination of litigation. Litigations, should as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.

8. Republic vs. CA Stat Con- if the law does not distinguish neither should the courts. -2 petitions for certiorari

-May 6, 1958, Pasay City Council passed an ordinance (invoked by RA 1899)for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City. -Petitioner claims that respondent has given an unintended broader meaning to the word foreshore lands in the statute. -Respondents (Pasay City Council) utilize RA 5187 (...projects and or contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation nof foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected...), which claims that existing contracts that were made prior to the filing of this case shall be respected and that the

As has been the constant rulings of this Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. . . (Fonseca v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36035, August 30, 1988; Hernandez v. Quitain, G.R. No. L48457, November 29, 1988; 168 SCRA 99). Petition Granted! Respondent court made a mistake in resorting to statutory construction when in fact the words and their means are as clean as day. Pasay City has no foreshore lands along the sea side Misuse of RA 5187 in relation to RA 1899. There is nothing that states that RA 5187 should be interpreted to broaden the scope of foreshore lands. (229) Thus, RA 5187 IS not legally binding to the case. The plain meaning of the word foreshore should be used (That part of the shore between high water and low water marks usually fixed at the line to which the ordinary means tide flows: also by extension, the beach the shore

30 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS pleadings have become moot and academic. -Respondent court utilized the ff stat con principles: 1. Construe the statute as a whole2. it does not seem logical that congress had in mind the simple 10 to 20 meters foreshore land along the coast [as defined by Webster] 3. Extrinsic aids thru the Explanatory Note of RA 1899: in order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the PH... including the creation of harbour facilities.... (obviously this cannot be done with the simple 10 to 20 meters) 4. Records of Consti Convention- Senator Cuenco said during the deliberations of the bill that the city ofManila should be deliberately excluded from the statute since these cities do not have foreshore lands. (p.225 last par) -Private respondent Davao Farms Corp brought an action in the trial court for the collection of 117,840. 46 (for petitioners purchase of broiler chicks and egg trays) -Petitioner believes that his balance should only be 48,843.68 -petitioner issued an SPA for his counsel to represent him in court, however counsel claims that he lost contact with petitioner after the pre-trial. There was no response to the subpoena of the court or his letter at his given address. 31 | P a g e

RULING near the waters edge.[p.222]

9. Tenebro vs. CA Petition for Review

-Appeal is bereft of merit. -Contrary to his contention, petitioner waived not only the right to crossexamine private respondents witnesses but also his right to present evidence as a necessary consequence of his repeated failure to appear at the hearings of his case.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -his counsel also did not show up in court, thus the court ruled in default and rendered judgment ordering petitioner to pay 103,690.46 -Petitioner then shows up and claims he was denied due process and appeals all the way up to the SC. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan. On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents. Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final determination of the petition aforementioned." Sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they investigated the real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan. On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion 32 | P a g e

RULING

10. Radiola-Toshiba v. IAC

Insurance Law Sec. 32 It shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.

Levy on attachment against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the said attachment. Petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its name. Ruling: - The provision of 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the insolvents Issue: whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

RULING In short, there is a cut off period one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.

this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their operation. properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.

Statutory Construction Concept - In construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word. - Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other 11. Aquino v. Quezon City 33 | P a g e This involves two cases on property. First case: Under Sec 65 and 73 of PD 464, the Real Property Tax Code, two sets of notices are required before a delinquent property can be sold.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS G.R. 137534 A 612 sq meter lot was previously owned by the 3 Aug 2006 Aquino spouses. Due to non-payment or real property taxes from 1975 to 1982, the QC govt Pr: Certiorari auctioned off the property to Aida Lanao. Thereafter, the original title was cancelled and a new one was P: Azcuna issued under the name of Linao. Statcon: Statute must be construed as a whole Aquino spouses opposed and charged that the QC govt sold their property without informing them of their tax default. RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaing which was later affirmed by the CA. Second case: A 407 sq meter lot was previously owned by Solomon Torrado. Torrado paid taxes on the improvements on the land from 1976 to 1982 but not on the land itself because the Treasurers Office could not locate the index card for the property. For failure to pay real property taxes, two notices were sent to Torrado at his address in Butuan City but was returned due to insufficient address. Thereafter, the lot was sold to Veronica Baluyot who then obtained a title. Baluyot mortgaged the lot to the Uy spouses but was later foreclosed. Spouses Uy then sold land to DNX Corporation. Torrado filed a complaint against Baluyot and the QC govt in the RTC but was dismissed. CA likewise dismissed the appeal. Issue: How are the notice requirements in Sec 65 and 73 of PD 464 interpreted?

RULING Sec 65: Notice of Tax Delinquency if property tax is not paid, the local government would sell the real property to satisfy the tax in arrears. Four separate measures of posting the notice: 1. at the main entrance of the city hall 2. in a public and conspicuous place in each barangay of the city 3. publication once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper 4. verbal announcement by a crier at the market place for at least 3 market days Sec 73: Notice of sale at Public Auction notifying the owner that since there was a failure to heed the first notice, the local government would now be selling his property at a public auction. It may be sent to the address in the tax rolls or property record or at his address if known to the treasurer or barrio captain. First case: 1st notice received, 2nd notice not received Second case: notices were sent but was not received due to erroneous address In both cases, QC govt is not at fault. Law does not require that it be received. QC govt: 3 methods of enforcement on tax delinquent property under PD 464 1. distraint of property Sec 65, 68, 71, 71, 72 2. sale of the property Sec 73 to 81 3. filing a case Sec 82 A rule of statutory construction is that a statute must be construed as a whole. The meaning of the law is not to be extracted from a single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses, or sentences, but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statue must be interpreted with reference to the context. The Court finds that Sec 65s notice of delinquency should be read in line with Sec 67s statement that the different tax remedies do not require a formal demand for payment but may be substituted by the notice of delinquency. QC govt has complied with the two-notice requirement. Thus, petitions are denied.

34 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 12. June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act Manila Lodge vs. CA No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension x xx at the north end not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not exceed ninety-nine years." July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled 5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE, for short) January 1963 the BPOE. petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property This petition was granted on February 15, 1963. November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase

RULING The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of "public" nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision.

Statutory Construction for Grants o Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee. One compelling reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such grant a gratuitous donation of, public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay.

Reason why it is of public dominion I. Statute would be superfluous If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside ... lease ... or sell ... given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act. Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb it authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or section," Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion ; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. If the intention of the legislature was to make the land a patrimonial property then why there is a need for giving special authorization to the

35 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS TDC was praying for the cancelation of the annotations. TDC argues likewise that there are several items of uncontradicted circumstantial evidence which may serve as aids in construing the legislative intent and which demonstrate that the subject property is patrimonial in nature, to wit: (1) National Planning Commission showing the Luneta and its vicinity, do not include the subject property as part of the Luneta Park; (2) the plan of the subject property covered by TCT No. 67488 of BPOE indicates that said property is not a public park; (3) a certified copy of Proclamation No. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 is President Magsaysay, and Proclamation Order No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967 by President Marcos, do not include the subject property in the Luneta Park-, (4) the location plan of the Luneta National Park under Proclamations Nos. 234 and 273, further confirms that the subject property is not a public park; (5) a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 in the name of the United States of America covering the land now occupied by the American Embassy, (6) when the property was bought by the petitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or park (7) the property in question was cadastrally surveyed 36 | P a g e

RULING City of Manila to dispose the property Statutory Construction : Elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or superfluous. Extension to the Luneta Park TDC, however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered an extension of the old Luneta because it is outside of the limits of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. If the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. "extension," it has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction in length, breadth, or circumstance."

II. -

III. Reclaimed area was formerly a part of the manila Bay - Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel sites. The property in this case is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. rule of expresiouniusestexlusioalterius in this case where the city is authorized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the corporation.

IV. -

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS and registered as property of the Elks Club, according to Manuel Anonuevo; (8) the property was never used as a public park, for, since the issuance of T.C.T. No. 2165 on July 17, 1911 in the name of the Manila Lodge NO. 761, the latter used it as private property, and as early as January 16, 1909 the City of Manila had already executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of the Manila Lodge No. 761

RULING V. Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.

VI. Intention of City of Manila - The petitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in order that the character of property for public use may be so attached to a plaza, the latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out No constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City, it could not be property for public use. The argument false why? o In order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient o Ignacio vs. The Director of Lands, the executive and possibly the legislation department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property, is no longer required for public use, and until such declaration is made the property must continue to form paint of the public domain.

Issue: Whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial land or of public dominion intended for public use. In relation to the issue of whether or not the sale of the portion of the reclaimed area without legislative authorization is null and void.

Held: Patrimonial Land, therefore the sales was null and void.

VII. Location plan of the Luneta National Park - It cannot be reasonably expected that this plan for development of the Luneta should show that the subject property occupied by the ElksClub is a public park, for it was made 38 years after the sale to the Elks, and after T.C.T. No. 2195 had been issued to Elks. no way proves that the subject property was originally intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila or that the sale to Elks or that the Torrens-title of the latter is valid.

Statutory Construction Concept - It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled 37 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

13. Aisporna v. CA G.R. 39419 12 Apr 1982 Pr: Certiorari P: de Castro Statcon: Every part of the statue must be interpreted with reference to the context. Noscitur a sociis

MapaladAisporna was found guilty of violation of Sec 189 of the Insurance Act and was sentenced to a fine of 500 pesos when she acted as an agent by soliciting the insurance application of Eugenio Isidro. Mapalads husband, Rodolfo, was a duly licensed insurance agent to PerlaCompania de Seguros. OSG opines that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Sec 189. Sec 189 of the Insurance Act: Par 1: No insurance company shall pay any commission to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first produced from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent. Par 2: Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section. Par 3: Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of 500 pesos. CA ruled that Aisporna is prosecuted not under par 2 but par 1 of Sec 189. Issue: Can Aisporna be held liable for violation of par 1 of Sec 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to par 2? DaniloParas is the barangay captain of Pula, Cabanatuan City elected in the regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for recall was filed against

RULING by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, - the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. No. The definition of an insurance agent as found in par 2 of Sec 189 is intended to define the word agent mentioned par 1 and par 2 of the said section. More significantly, in par 2, it is explicitly provided that the definition of a n insurance agent is within the intent of Sec 189. Par 2 of Sec 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term agent mentioned in both par 1 and par 3. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par 2 would give harmony to the three paragraphs of Sec 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The whole and every part of the statue must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. The doctrine of associated words (noscitur a sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. Considering the definition of an insurance agent, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of par 1 of Sec 189. Aisporna did not receive compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Isidro. She naturally helped his husband, a licensed agent, to do his work. No. Sec 74 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code):

14. Paras v. COMELEC G.R. 123169 38 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 4 Nov 1996 him in 1995. Pr: Certiorari P: Francisco Statcon: Every part of the statue must be interpreted with reference to the context. Statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Statute to be read according to its spirit and intent. The petition signing was held on 14 Oct 1995 with 29.3% of registered voters signing. Hence, Comelec scheduled the recall election on 13 Nov 1995. After Paras opposition, Comelec reset it to 16 Dec 1995. Thereafter, he filed a petition for injunction in the RTC. RTC issued a TRO then after a summary hearing, dismissed the petition. Comelec then rescheduled election on 13 Jan 1996. On 12 Jan 1996, SC issued a TRO at the behest of Paras. Paras argues that the recall election is prohibited since Sec 74(b) of RA 7160 prohibits any recall election to be held a year before a regular local election. He insists that the May 1996 SK election is a regular local election. Issue: Can the SK election be considered as a regular local election?

RULING Par a: Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. Par b: No recall election shall take place within 1 year from the date of the officials assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. The evident intention of Sec 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office i.e. during his 2nd year when Par A is construed with Par B. Interpreting the SK election as a regular local election will render the recall provision of the Constitution and RA 7160 inutile. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. The interpretation of Sec 74 should not be in conflict with Art 10 Sec 3 of the Constitution which mandates a system of recall. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction. Too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity. Hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. It would therefore be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of RA 7160 to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. *SC rules in the favour of the petitioner. Levy on Execution - the act by which the officer of the court appropriates the judgment debtor's property to satisfy the command of the writ. The Registration of an adverse claim (Sec 70 of PD 1529) protects the petitioner from the levy of execution: -Sc rules that the adverse claim, although past the 30 day time period, was still in effect, because the courts did not order its cancellation.

15. Sajonas vs. CA Petition for review

-Uychocde owed money to private respondent (Pilares) which he was supposed to pay by (June 1982) -Uychocde sold residential land to the petitioners through instalment and finally executed a deed of sale in September 1984. -Private Respondent was allowed to issue a levy of execution on the said property

Statcon: Constructing new words in a statute separately

39 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -RTC claims that levy of execution has no legal effect because the buyers were not notified beforehand of the litigation problem between the former owner and the current respondent -CA reversed this decision -Sec. 70. P.D. 1529: Property Registration Decreeadverse claim is meant to protect third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on it. -respondent court claims that adverse claim is only applicable for 30 days from the date of registration (under P.D. 1529) Issue: Who among the two parties has the right to the property in question? 16. Lichauco& Co. vsApostol and Corpus G.R. 19628 4 Dec 1922 Pr: Mandamus and prohibition P: Street Statcon: Doctrine of parimateria Lichauco& Co. is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals into the Philippines. It now desires to import draft cattle and bovine cattle from Pnom-Pehn for the manufacture of serum. Director of Agriculture refuses to admit the cattle except upon fulfilment of A.O. 21 which requires that the cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarcation at Pnom-Penh. Lichauco files petition to order the Bureau of Agriculture to admit the cattle under Sec 1762 of the Administrative Code. Bureau of Agriculture, on the other hand, asserts Sec 1770 of the Administrative Code and A.O. 21.

RULING Sec 70. Pd. 1529 The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of 30 days... after the lapse of the period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition by the party in interest. -Thus, the court may or may not order its cancellation. -this is one of the reasons why a hearing is held, thus allowing the claimant of the adverse claim to be heard and it is only after this hearing can the adverse claim be considered cancelled. Stat Con: conflict of the two paragraphs in Sec 70: a. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of 30 days from the date of registration. b. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition thereof by the party in interest.

No. Sec 1770 remains in full force. Sec 1762 of a general nature while Sec 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec 1762.Sec 1770 is not inconsistent with Sec 1762; it must be treated as a special qualification of Sec 1762. Sec 1762 relates generally to the subject of bringing of animals into the Philippines at any time and from any place, while Sec 1770 confers on the Department head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Sec 1762, as amended, must be construed in parimateria as harmonious parts of the law dealing with animal quarantine. Sec 1762, as amended, can be given effect only in so far as it is not restricted by Sec 1770. The general must yield to the particular.

40 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Sec 1762 of Administrative Code: Bringing of diseased animal into the Philippines forbidden. Except upon permission of the Director of Agriculture, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippines any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease. Sec 1762 as amended by Act No. 3052: Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippines. It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippines from any foreign country. Provided, however, that the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. Sec 1770 of Administrative Code: Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries. When the Department Head shall by general order declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign country, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippines any such animal unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture. Department Order No. 6, promulgated on 28 Jul 1922: rinderpest exists in HK, French Indo-China (Pnom-Penh) and British India. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly ship or bring into the Philippines any such animal from said territories unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.

RULING Repeals by implication are not favoured. Where two statues cover the same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court is to give effect to both. The intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. The Legislature in amending Sec 1762 could not possibly have entertained a design to modify Sec 1770. The Legislature could not possibly have intended to destroy the effectiveness of quarantine as regards imported animals. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N: * * *

Act No. 3052 is a complete substitute for Sec 1762. The original title of Sec 1762 is bringing of diseased animal into Philippines forbidden while when amended by Act No. 3052, it is now bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippines. Applying the doctrine of parimateria, the force and effect of Sec 1770 is founded upon Sec 1762 and that when Sec 1762 is repealed by Act No. 3052, there is nothing left upon which Sec 1770 can operate or to which it would apply. Without Sec 1762, Sec 1770 cannot be of any force or effect. Sec 1770 was enacted in 1917, and Act No. 3052 was enacted on 14 Mar 1922, five years after Sec 1770 became a law. A.O. 21 was promulgated four months after Act No. 3052 was enacted. Therefore, A.O. 21 was in direct conflict with Act No. 3052. The rules and regulations of a subordinate department cannot overthrow and destroy the express provisions of a legislative act. In all cases, it is the express duty of the Director of Agriculture to permit the bringing in or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum into the Philippines. If that part of Act No. 3052 does not mean what it says, it does not mean anything. The Legislature has said in express terms that

41 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Administrative Order No. 21 promulgated on 29 Jul 1922: Animals immunized against rinderpest, for which the importer before placing his order shall have obtained from the Director of Agriculture a written permit to import from the said territories may be allowed entrance into the Philippines. Communication from Acting Director of Agriculture to Faustino Lichauco on 31 Aug 1922: Permission to import carabaos immunized against rinderpest is granted, provided: 1) animals must be immunized before shipment, and 2) immunization must be done by a veterinarian designated by the French Government. Lichauco claims that Sec 1762 has been repealed by Act No. 3052 and sole reliance on Sec 1770 is erroneous. Issue: Is Sec 1770 impliedly repealed by Act No. 3052? Felix Matabuena owned a parcel of land. He executed a Deed of Donation in favour of Petronila Cervantes on 20 Feb 1956 when they were in a common-law relationship. The two were later married on 28 Mar 1962 and on 13 Sep 1962, Matabuena died intestate. Cornelia Matabuena, the only sister, claims the property being the nearest collateral relative of Felix. She claims that the Deed of Donation was void because it was executed during a common-law relationship. Issue: Does the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage also apply to a common-law relationship?

RULING the Director of Agriculture shall grant the permit in all cases. Sec 1770 was enacted in 1917 and Act No. 3052 in 1922, five years later. The two sections are not only inconsistent, but there is a direct conflict between them as to the importation of draft and bovine cattle, especially as to the promulgated rules and regulations. Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly declares such repeal or not. In the absence of legislative authority (Sec 1770 being repealed), the Bureau of Agriculture has no right or license to promulgate any rules and regulations for any purpose.

17. Matabuena v. Cervantes G.R. 28771 31 Mar 1971 Pr: Appeal P: Fernando Statcon: What is within the spirit is within the law

Yes. Art 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage. The dictates of morality require that the same should apply to a common-law relationship. Buenaventura vsBuenavista: the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favour of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. What is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of what is written. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It bears noting though that Matabuena and Cervantes were married. Thus, she

42 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the sister, the other half.

18. In re: Guarina

Law: Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907 The applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes. Court disclose that on a former occasion this applicant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. (71% out of 75%) it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. Further it was contended that the clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without and examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice law in the Philippine Islands without an examination." It is contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised. Issue: Can he be admitted in the practice without taking the prescribed examination.

Limiting ourselves strictly to the provisions of local law touching the admission of candidates to the bar, we might be inclined to give the statute the mandatory effect which applicant claims should be placed upon it. But we are of opinion that such a construction is precluded by the provisions of the Act of Congress enacted July 1, 1902, which confirm and secure to this court the jurisdiction theretofore conferred upon it. Section 9 of that Act is as follows: That the Supreme Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure.

The jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect.

Section 9 of the Act of Congress, placed it beyond the power of the local Legislature to deprive this court of the jurisdiction or power granted to it Act of Congress was enacted, conferred upon this court the power and jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates for the bar unless, in addition to certain other prescribed conditions, they satisfy the court that they possess the necessary learning in the law, by passing an examination prescribed by general rule. It seems clearthat the Commission, while it was undoubtedly authorized to modify the provision requiring the holding of examinations under general rules, had no authority to deprive this court of its power to deny admission to any

43 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Held. No, denied. Agpalo page 374-375

RULING candidate who fails to satisfy it that he possesses the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar of the Philippine Islands.

Statutory Construction Concept - It must be confessed that were the inquiry limited strictly to the provisions of local law touching this matter, the contentions of the applicant would have great weight . For it is well settled that in statutory interpretation the word "may" should be read "shall" where such construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator. An Act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution cannot become law , and that the courts of the United States are bound to take notice if the Constitution. In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law. In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law

44 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -

RULING Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force and effect, if this can be done without extravagance. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature , if the words of provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language employed ."

19. AsosacionAgricultores v. Talisay

On 22 June 1952, Republic Act 809 was enacted for the purpose of addressing the necessity to increase the share of planters and laborers in the income derived from the sugar industry. Said act was to regulate the relations among the persons engaged in the sugar industry.

Constitutional Provision - Declaration of Principles and State Policies in connection with Social Justice and Labor Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution of 1935, under the aegis of which the law in question was enacted, made it one of the declared principles to which the people committed themselves that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well -being and economic dc security of all the people should be the concern of the State." asserts its majesty, upon the courts to accord utmost consideration to the spirit animating the act assailed, not just for the sake of enforcing the explicit social justice provisions of the article on "Declaration of Principles and State Policies", but more fundamentally, to serve the sacred cause of human dignity, which is actually what lies at the core of those constitutional precepts as it is also the decisive element always in the determination of any controversy between capital and labor.

Pertinent Sections Section 1 thereof, it was provided that in the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the sugar cane of any sugarcane planter or planter-owner, as well as all by-products and derivative thereof, shall be divided between them as follows: 60% for the planter and 40% for the central in any district the maximum actual production of which is not more than 400,000piculs..etc. 45 | P a g e

Primary Purpose of RA 809 - The primary purpose of the law to insure that the sugar plantation workers are paid just wages Social legislation designed primarily to ameliorate the condition of the

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Section 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase in the participation granted the planters under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborer in the plantation in the following proportion: Sixty per centum of the increased participation for the laborers and forty per centum for the planters. The distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made under the supervision of the Department of Labor. The original basic complaint in this case filed as a class suit on September 23, 1954. The Association de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay Inc. and six sugarcane planters filed a petition to the Secretary of Labor, praying that the latter (1) declare the applicability to the Talisay-Silay Mill District of the sharing participation prescribed by RA 809 for every crop year statrting from 1952-1953; (2) adjudicated in favor of the planters and their laborers in the account entitled In trust for TalisaySilay Milling Co. Inc., and Department of Labor; (3) order the Central to account for any unsold quedans or the proceeds thereof which have been deposited with the PNB in the trust account; (4) order the Central to account for and pay jointly and severally to the planters and their laborers the proceeds of the sugar representing the increased 46 | P a g e

RULING laborers in the sugar plantations, and the fact that at the same time the planters would also be benefited by it does not detract from if it does not add to such basic purpose of the Act Seeks to reduce the inequality in the benefits being received by the Central and The laborers. Moran Report: The thrust of said report is that the sugar industry, a very vital element of the national economy, would collapse if no means could be to compel the centrals to increase the share of the planters in their milled sugar cane production, for without such the planters; would not be able to contain the surging unrest and imminent refusal of their laborers to work unless their demand for higher wages, which they badly need were granted.

Social Justice - Having in view its primary objective to promote the interests of labor, it can never be possible that the State would be bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind. In other words, as long as capital in industry or agriculture will not be fatally prejudiced to the extent of incurring losses as a result of its enforcement, any legislation to improve labor conditions would be valid, the assailed legislation is more or less demanded as a measure to improve the situation in which the workers and laborers are actually found And in the case at bar, there is not even a pretension that the finances of the centrals would be anywhere in the red as a result of the enforcement of Republic Act 809.

Equal Protection Clause - No unequal protection of the law - Planters in the big milling districts vs. planters in small milling districts o providing for bigger shares to the planters in the former and smaller shares to those in the latter

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS particiapation for the 1954-1955 crop year plus legal interest in favor of the planters computed on the basis of the average market price during the month within which the sugar was sold. On the other hand, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. alleged that (1) RA 809 was invalid and unconstitutional; (2) that even if it was valid, the planters had written milling contracts with the Central at the time the said act went into effect, and (3) the planters who entered into said contracts did so voluntarily and those voluntary contracts may not be altered or modified without infringing the constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts and non-impairment clause of the Constitution. (4) that the Act does not contain any expressed or implied provision invalidating the written milling contracts entered into between the CENTRAL and the owners of adherent plantations before its effective date; (5) that the Act sanctions and allows the entering into milling contracts after its effective date, and as a matter of fact a large number of the PLANTERS are also planters in the Hawaiian-Philippine milling district, (6) that the arrangement, regarding the issuance of escrow quedans and the deposit of the proceeds of the sale of the disputed increased participation of the planters was agreed to and accepted by the CENTRAL 47 | P a g e -

RULING o standard used by the legislature is the amount of production in each district, naturally, the planters adhered to the bigger centrals should be given bigger shares, considering that the more a central produces, the bigger could be its margin of profit which can be correspondingly cut for the purpose of enlarging the share of the planters. o the smaller centrals may not be able to afford to have their shares reduced substantially, which is evidently the reason why the law has not been made applicable to centrals having a production of less than 150,000 piculs a year. Laborers in Centrals vs. Laborers in Farms o The laborers in the central performs work the nature of which is entirely different from that those working in the farms, thereby requiring the application to them of other laws advatageous to labor, which upon the other hand, do not correspondingly favor plantation or purely agricultural manpower. o That because centrals, since their establishment in the 20s, had been receiving an undue proportion of the sugar processed from the planters' sugarcane, o they have always been financially able to give their laborers better wages and better employment conditions than planters could give to their laborers. o laborers of planters, with their families, are more numerous than the central laborers with their ramifies o provided or made available more benefits to central laborers. EightHour Labor Law.

How Sections I and 9 should be construed in order not to defeat the basic objective of the Act and to avoid unconstitutionality thereof. Problem in interpretation: - Under the terms of Section 1 of the Act the ratios of sharing therein specified are to be observed only in those milling districts where the majority of the planters have no written contracts with the centrals, it is pointed out that it, therefore, makes the benefits intended by it for the laborers dependent on the subjective contingency of the millers and the

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS from the Sugar Quota Administrator under duress, because said Administrator would not allow the issuance of any warehouse receipt on the share of the mill unless the CENTRAL agreed to the escrow quedans arrangement; (7) that neither are the PLANTERS entitled to increased participation as claimed by them in their second and alternative cause of action because they do not qualify as the PLANTERS (8) that the provisions of Republic Act 809 relating to the increased sharing participation of the planters would affect and alter the allocation of exportable sugar to the United States (export A sugar) among Philippine mills and plantation owners, in violation of the Trade Relations Agreement between the Philip pines and the United States, (9) that the instant case is not a proper one for a class suit. Issue: Whether RA 809 would violate the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution and infringe the Constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts if applied to tehTalisay-Silay Mill District. Statcon Issue: The correct way of construing Sec 01, and Sec 09 of RA 809 to make it constitutional. Related Topic: Agpalo page 374 - Statute construed in harmony with the Constitution

RULING planters signing or not written agreements, instead of automatically by direct legislative fiat regardless of the will of either the millers or the planters or both. Courts Dilemma - If We declare the Act unconstitutional upon the ground that it is unwarranted invasion of the freedom of contract as between the millers and the planters, the deplorable condition of the laborers in the sugar farms would remain as it was before its enactment.

if We sustain its validity but at the same time apply it literally and sanction a construction thereof that would enable the centrals and their planters to enter into agreements, under which the latter would have to be given increased participation without any obligation to share the same with their laborers, the Court would be a party to a conspiracy to virtually defraud labor of the benefits, the grant of which is precisely its sole redeeming feature to save it from unconstitutionality.

I. -

48 | P a g e

Literal Reading will make it unconstitutional For instance, applying the bare letter of the Act, if the central and the majority of the planters in any district having a production of more than one million two hundred thousand piculs should agree by contract to reduce the share of the central from 40% to 34% and to increase that of the planters from 60% to 66%, not only would the planters be greatly benefited by the increase in their shares, but the centrals would also save 4% which otherwise it would have to give to the plantersif it were not to sign contracts with the majority, and yet the laborers of the planters would get no part of the increase their planters-employers would be entitled to, since it would be argued that the clause in Section I the "absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planter., and the millers in any milling districts is the condition sine qua non of the enforceability of the whole Act, including Section 9, which is the one that provides for the increase of the share of the laborers. This literal reading of the Act manifestly inconsistent with its basic intent,

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING does render the Act unconstitutional since any legislative enactment that is deceptive by ostensibly being a social legislation to ameliorate the condition of labor so that it may hurdle constitutional obstacles as a police power or social justice measure, when in truth it is only intended to operate in favor of the employer or of capital must be stricken down as a despicable fraud which no constitution in the world can ever be covered as all the lawn under it to perpetrate upon the people. Instead of Promoting social justice, the Act would clearly be a double instrument of injustice and oppression to labor, for aside from perpetrating their wretch condition they would be the victims of a legislative deception.

II. Harmonization - Laudable intention of the law to protect the laborers is carried out in the construction and application of Sections 1 and 9 vis-a-vis each other. Correct Interpretation: The percentage for labor specified in Section 9 may be safely construed to be demandable whatever be the percentage of increase for the planters that their contracts with their centrals might provide. And inasmuch as this constitutional approach just indicated is the only one consistent with the manifest objective of the Act. We are duty bound to adopt the same in the case at bar. The spirit rather than the latently ambiguous letter of the Act must be enforced. We are not convinced that the existence of the majority of contract planters mentioned in Section 1, attained after the effectivity of the Act, would inexorably result in the inapplicability of Section 9 , such that by such majority of written contracts, the planters would be able to get by contract the increase intended for them by Section 1 without being mandatorily bound to give their laborers any portion thereof. We believe that to read Sections 1 and 9 in such manner would be contrary to the very purpose for which the Act was conceived and approved.

49 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING III. Statutory Construction Concept - The way then to remove from Republic Act 809 any taint of any furtive character is to construe it in the only manner its social justice purpose can be attained. Never should its provisions be deemed as permitting the planters to benefit from the operation thereof without their being compelled to give their laborers that without which the Act It is a familiar rule in constitutional law that when a statute is rationally capable of different constructions, that which will render it unconstitutional should be disregarded.

20. City of Naga v. Agna

StatCon Doctrine: Pari Materia- a statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts of the same subject in the absence of words. Every new statute must be construed along with similar existing statutes. Issue: Are Sec 2309 of RAC and Sec 2 of RA 2264 in conflict with each other? Thus was ordinance 360 implemented immediately or was it meant to be implemented a year after the date?

The constitutionality of a statute should not be prejudiced by applying the same in a manner that would render it unconstitutional . Laws: 1. Ra 305 (Charter of the city of Naga) ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance. 2. Ordinance 360- amending current ordinances and switching it from GRADUATED tax on quarterly gross sales to PERCENTAGE tax on gross sales. CONFLICT: a. Sec 2309 of Revised Admin Code municipal tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by ordinances passed before December 15 of any year after the succeeding year. b. Sec 2 of RA 2264- a tax ordinance shall go into effect on the 15th day after its passage (181)

Facts: 1. Petition for review wherein they were forced to pay back the taxes made by respondents under RA 305. 2. Respondents claim that RA 305 was not yet enforce at the time and that it should take effect after 1 year of its approval because of sec 2309 of the Revised Admin Code (182). 3 Petitioners claim that Sec 2309 was repealed by Sec 50 | P a g e

Sc Ruling: 1. Petitioner should return the funds back to the respondent. 2. Doctrine of Para Matria- it is clear that the two laws are not in conflict with one another thus should be construed together. 3. There is also no sign that there was an intention to repeal said law. 3. Sec. 2309 Revised Admin Code must be construed alongside Sec 2 of RA

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 2 of RA 2264. 23. People v. Martin April 5 1972, in the Bocaue and Guiguinto, Bulacan, Hermin E. Arceo and Simeona Martin, conspiring and possessing false and counterfeit science stamps worth P90,080.00 for, the purpose of using and selling the same in the payment of internal revenue tax, and in fact sold and offered for sale a part of the same, with intent of gain thus defrauding the government. Respondent judge, dismissed the case saying that this is a case of legislative omission. When Congress enacted Act 5448 it failed to punish the possession and utterance of counterfeit science stamp tax. Under the circumstances, the court mindful of the injunction that criminal statutes should be construed strictly, has no alternative but to dismiss the case.

RULING 2264. When the RA 5448 requires collection of science stamps to be in the "same manner" as documentary stamp tax, the collection of fines in the cases provided therein may already be included, such as those mentioned in Sec. 237 to 239 of the NIRC. The penalties mentioned in the phrase "subject to the same penalties" would then refer to Sec. 240 of the same Code, which are for specific offenses enumerated therein, thereby investing Republic Act 5448 with the character of completeness, not that of incompleteness which would be against all reasonable presumptions as to how the legislative body performs its functions. With the certainty in the mind of the Court that the legislative body, in enacting Republic Act 5448 and relating it to the documentary stamp tax provisions of the NIRC in the manner it did, intended to make the later law as effective and fool-proof as the earlier statute, considering their kindred aims and objectives, and therefore are in parimateria with each other. The law contains explicitly clear provision, particularly in Sec. 4 thereof, for the punishment as criminal offense of the acts charged in the information subject of the instant petition.

The respondent judge interpreted the word "penalties" in phrase "subject to the same penalties", as administrative fines, not penalties imposed for a criminal offense, by a court of justice after proper criminal proceedings. In this sense, "penalties" would have reference to fines to be imposed in cases of improper or incorrect collection of the tax with respect to the amount and to the time of payment thereof, not as penalties imposed on acts considered as criminal offenses under the law. In support of this interpretation, Sec. 9 of Republic Act 5448 is also cited with its heading: "Penal Provisions", the contention being that this is the only 51 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS provision in said Act, imposing penalties for a criminal offense after proper judicial proceedings. Issue: Is the interpretation of the word Penalties correctly construed as administrative penalties only? Held: No., the penalties should make reference with NIRC (in pari material) Statcon: Statute must be construed as a whole Laws: 1. RA 2264- June 19, 1959; allows for taxes on general and special purposes. 2. RA 399- June 18, 1949; allows for the legislative franchise for an electric light, heat and power system. 5. RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)

RULING

25. Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan

Sc Ruling: 1. Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the city to tax the franchised business. As seen in Sec 2. Paragraph (j) persons paying franchise tax. 2. Both Paragraphs J and D must be construed together! 3. Even though petitioner works under a similar standard specified by paragraph D, it is evident that it is protected by paragraph J.

Facts: 1. Petitioner claims that there is an unconstitutional violation of the RA 399 contract upon the introduction of RA 2264. 2. Petitioner claims deprivation of property without due process of law. 3. Respondents claim that under Sec. 2 Paragraph (d) electric light, heat and power, which petitioners are apart of thus they should be taxed. 26. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SC Johnson Statcon: Tax exemption must be construed against tax payer and liberally construed for tax authority. Statutory Test on Deductibility: 1. Expense must be ordinary and necessary. 2. must be paid within the taxable year. 3. must be paid in carrying on a trade or business SC Ruling: 1. Does not agree with petitioner. 2. The margin fee was imposed by the State in the exercise of its police power and not the power of taxation. 3. Margin fees are not expenses in connection with the production or earnings of petitioners income in the Philippines. Since margin fees were incurred for the remittance of funds to New York, it cannot be said that the margin fees

52 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Facts: 1. Petitioner was denied claims for refund of what they believe to be overpaid income taxes 2. Respondent court says that rose from the disallowance of the margin fees paid of ESSO to the Central Bank on its profit remittances to its New York Head Office. 3. Petitioner claims that the said margin fees are deducible from gross income either as a tax or as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 27. Esso v. Commissioner of Customs ESSO deducted from its gross income for 1959, as part of its ordinary and necessary business expenses, the amount it had spent for drilling and exploration of its petroleum concessions. This claim was disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground that the expenses should be capitalized and might be written off as a loss only when a "dry hole" should result. ESSO then filed an amended return where it asked for the refund of P323,279.00 by reason of its abandonment as dry holes of several of its oil wells. Also claimed as ordinary and necessary expenses in the same return was the amount of P340,822.04, representing margin fees it had paid to the Central Bank on its profit remittances to its New York head office. On August 5, 1964, the CIR granted a tax credit of P221,033.00 only, disallowing the claimed deduction for the margin fees paid ESSO settled this deficiency assessment on August 10, 53 | P a g e

RULING were appropriated in the development of petitioners business.

Petitioner - margin fees are taxes and cites the background and legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that R.A. 2609 was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by R.A. 601. ESSO prays that if margin fees are not taxes, they should nevertheless be considered necessary and ordinary business expenses and therefore still deductible from its gross income. The fees were paid for the remittance by ESSO as part of the profits to the head office in the Unites States. Such remittance was an expenditure necessary and proper for the conduct of its corporate affairs.

Ruling: - We conclude then that the margin fee was imposed by the State in the exercise of its police power and not the power of taxation. Section 30(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in .. The principle is recognized that when a taxpayer claims a deduction, he must point to some specific provision of the statute in which that deduction is authorized and must be able to prove that he is entitled to the deduction which the law allows.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 1964 ESSO appealed to the CTA and sought the refund of P102,246.00 for 1959, contending that the margin fees were deductible from gross income either as a tax or as an ordinary and necessary business expense. It also claimed an overpayment of its tax by P434,232.92 in 1960, for the same reason. Issue: Whether R.A. 2009, entitled An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin Over Banks' Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange, is a police measure or a revenue measure. If it is a revenue measure, the margin fees paid by the petitioner to the Central Bank on its profit remittances to its New York head office should be deductible from ESSO's gross income under Sec. 30(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

RULING Statutory test of deductibility where it is axiomatic that to be deductible as a business expense, three conditions are imposed, namely: (1) the expense must be ordinary and necessary, (2) it must be paid or incurred within the taxable year, and (3) it must be paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business. An expense will be considered 'necessary' where the expenditure is appropriate and helpful in the development of the taxpayer's business. 'ordinary' when it connotes a payment which is normal in relation to the business of the taxpayer and the surrounding circumstances . The term 'ordinary' does not require that the payments be habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often; the payment may be unique or non-recurring to the particular taxpayer affected ESSO has not shown that the remittance to the head office of part of its profits was made in furtherance of its own trade or business. The petitioner merely presumed that all corporate expenses are necessary and appropriate in the absence of a showing that they are illegal or ultra vires. Margin fees in question were incurred for the remittance of funds to petitioner's Head Office in New York, which is a separate and distinct income taxpayer from the branch in the Philippines, for its disposal abroad, it can never be said therefore that the margin fees were appropriate and helpful in the development of petitioner's business in the Philippines exclusively or were incurred for purposes proper to the conduct of the affairs of petitioner's branch in the Philippines exclusively or for the purpose of realizing a profit or of minimizing a loss in the Philippines exclusively.

Statutory Construction - Opiniong expressed in debates, actual proceedings of the legislature, steps taken in the enactment of a law, or the history of the passage of the law through the legislature, may be resorted to as an aid in the interpretation 54 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING of a statute which is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. But it is also well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become important. As a matter of fact, there may be no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and unambiguous, since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of solving doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. Tax exemptions and deductions are strictly construed against the taxpayer

28. Baas, Jr. vs. CA

Statcon: tax amnesty is much like tax exemption and must be construed against the tax payer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. (274) Facts: 1. Petitioner agree to sell land to Ayala and to be paid in installments. 2. Ayala issued one promissory note covering four equal installments. 3. Petitioner discounted the promissory note with Ayala 4. Respondent tax examiners claim that the entire profit of the sale was cash thus should be taxed. 5. Petitioner claims protection under PD 1740 and 1840 (tax amnesty decrees)

SC Ruling: 1. The mere act of filing for the amnesty decrees does not provide immunity. One must actually qualify. 2. Although petitioner claims that the payment was in installment, he did not record said earnings when he filed his tax return, thus not qualifying him for the protection of the PDs. 3. Petitioner should not have discounted the promissory note because it proved that the sale was on installment. *when income is spread over several installment payments thru the years, the taxable income goes down and the tax due decreases. When payment is in a lump sum the tax for that year increase, THUS a declaration that a sale is on installment diminishes gov taxes for the year of the initial installment as against a declaration of cash sale where taxes to the gov is larger. (277)

29. Mactan Cebu v. Marcos

Statcon: the Law frowns upon tax exemptions, thus it is a rule construe strictly against the tax payer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Laws: 1. RA 6958- creation of petitioner and originally gave tax exemption.

SC Ruling: 1. Petitioner can NOW be taxed under the New Local Gov. Code Section 133 (Par O) thus not exempting National Government, its agencies, and INSTRUMENTALITIES.

55 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 2. RA 7160- New Local Gov. Code allows petitioner to be taxed. Facts: 1. Petitioner was forced to pay taxes to respondent city. 2. paid under protest and thus this petition for review on the basis that RTC erred in allowing them to be taxed. 3. Petitioners claim that it is a gov. instrument and that it works in connection with the DOTC. 4. Respondent says that it can tax under RA 7160.

RULING

CHAPTER 7
Chapter 7 McGee Vs. Republic Appellee Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen is married to Leonardo S. Crisostomo by whom he has one child. The minors Maria and Amada, both surnamed Magpayo are Leonarda's children by her first husband Ernesto Magpayo who was killed by the Japanese during the occupation. McGee filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor step-children Maria and Amada. Issue: Can McGee adopt his step-children? Held: No. 56 | P a g e The terms of article 335 are phrased in a negative manner the following cannot be adopted, while the phraseology of article 338 Ruling: - We hold that pursuant to the provisions of article 335, paragraph 1, a step-father who already has a child may not adopt a step-child regardless of the provisions of article 338, paragraph 3 of the same Code, the latter provisions being confined and applicable to those step-fathers and stepmothers who have no children of their own. ===================================================== Statutory Construction Concept Negative Words prevail over affirmative words

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL is only affirmative the following may be adopted. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . negative - prohibitory and exclusive words or terms are indicative of the legislative intent that the statute is to be mandatory, . . . Ordinarily ... the word "may" is directory, Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, or, as it has been aptly stated, there is but one way to obey the command "thou shalt not", and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act. And this is so, even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience. Sermonia vs. CA Brehem vs. Republic

Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth, by another man filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given their consent to the adoption, not only to promote her best interest and well-being, but also to give her a legitimate status. They prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing the child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the rights pertinent thereto. Issue: Can the adoption be approved? Held: No

Statutory Construction Concept Mandatory provisions prevail over directory ones

Article 338 in connection with article 335. Art. 335 clearly states that "The following cannot adopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated On the other hand, Art. 338, Provides "the following may be adopted: (3) a step-child, by the step-father or step-mother", which is merely directory, and which can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335.

57 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL Nilo vs. CA Statutory Construction Concept Prospective Application It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect. A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights

Intention In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning.

Legislative Debates Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board, supra, we held that legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not always safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body . It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other we held that individual statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives

58 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL - they are not controlling in the interpretation of the law in question (Phil. Assn. of Government Retirees, Inc. v. GSIS, 14 SCRA 610). Some statements may be deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator (Mayon Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Com. of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 918). The Chartered Bank vs. - The Chartered Bank claiming in effect the sum of - There is no absolute formal test for determining whether a National Government Auditing P81,200.00 plus legal interest of 6% per annum statutory direction is to be considered mandatory or Office effective July 6, 1970 which represents unpaid postal directory. As with any question of statutory construction the money orders issued by the Iloilo City Post Office decisive factor is the meaning and intention of the legislature, to be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its - The amounts were not paid pursuant to unnumbered nature, its object and the consequences that would follow circular involving the installation of a new postal from construing it one way or the other (Gonzaga "Statutes money order system which requires that all and Their Construction," p. 99), commercial banks, regardless of location, must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila.

CHAPTER 6 7 (Additional Cases)


CASE Amadoravs CA G.R. 47745 15 Apr 1988 Pr: Certiorari Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence and the victims parents filed a civil action for damages under Art 2180 of the Civil Statcon:reddendosingulasingulis Code. P: Cruz Imputed in the complaint were the rector, HS principal, dean for the boys, and physics teacher. CFI of Cebu granted petition but later reversed 59 | P a g e FACTS PablitoDaffon fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo Amadora while they were at the auditorium of their school, Colegio de San JoseRecoletos. RULING Art 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendosingulasingulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices. The provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS on appeal. Issue: Is Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos included in Art 2180 of the Civil Code, it not being a school of arts and trades but an academic institution? Cadayonavs CA G.R. 128771 3 Feb 2000 Pr: Review P: Gonzaga-Reyes Statcon: doctrine of last antecedent Ricardo Cadayona filed a Petition for review with the CA to annul CSC Resolution affirming his preventive suspension. CA dismissed the petition outright due to: 1) certificate of non-forum shopping was executed by the counsel, not the petitioner himself; 2) three annexes were mere photocopies and not certified true copies Issue: Does the Administrative Circular 1-95 also require annexes to be certified true copies?

RULING Agpalo: reddendosingulasingulis referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place i.e. the words should be taken distributively. It requires that the antecedents and consequences should be read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately related and to which it is most applicable. Application of the doctrine of last antecedent is misleading for the proper application of the doctrine shows that the phrase certified true copies qualifies the words nearest to it i.e. such material portion of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. Sec. 6, Rule 1: Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The Court does not construe Sec. 6 of Rule 43 as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies. Only the judgments or final orders need be certified true copies. Agpalo: doctrine of last antecedent a qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. Physical injuries should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. Respondents argued that the term physical injuries is used to define a specific crime defined in the RPC and should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense. Wrong. Defamation and fraud in Art. 33 are used in their ordinary (generic) sense because there are no specific provisions in the RPC using these terms as means of offenses. It is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense.

Carandangvs Santiago and Valenton G.R. 8238 25 May 1995 Pr: Certiorari P: Labrador Statcon: Words with technical or legal meaning

Tomas Valenton was convicted of frustrated homicide committed against Cesar Carandang. Carandang filed a civil action to recover damages for the bodily injuries. Valenton presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case pending the resolution of the criminal case. CA ruled that the trial must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. Issue: Does the term physical injuries in Art 33 mean physical injuries in the RPC or any physical injury or bodily injury?

60 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING Agpalo: words that have been used in a technical sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been previously used. DOJ has no other course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when arraignment of an accused had already taken place. When a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to. Sec 7 of the circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary. Sec 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Sec 12. Sec 7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take while Sec 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.

AdasavsAbalos G.R. 168617 19 Feb 2007 Pr: Review P: Chico-Nazario Statcon:Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions

CecilleAbalos filed two complaints of estafa against Bernadette Adasa. Iligan Prosecutor found probable cause and filed criminal cases. RTC ordered reinvestigation, same findings. After being arraigned, Adasa filed a Petition for Review with DOJ which it granted and ordered the withdrawal of the cases. CA reverses DOJ ruling. Issue: Did the DOJ err in entertaining the petition of Adasa for reinvestigation? Florentino and Zandueta filed a petition for mandamus against PNB to compel it to accept the backpay certificate to pay an indebtedness. PNB refuses to accept. Issue: Does the clause who may be willing to accept the same for settlement refer to all antecedents the Government, etc or only the last antecedent any citizen of the Philippines? SimplicioDelantar was convicted of violations of Sec 5, Art 3 of RA 7610 (child prostitution) and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Is Delantar considered the victims guardian which would warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty?

Florentino and Zanduetavs PNB G.R. 7872 28 Apr 1956 Pr: Appeal P: Jugo Statcon: doctrine of last antecedent People vsDelantar G.R. 169143 2 Feb 2007 Pr: Appeal P: Tinga 61 | P a g e

Qualifying cause refers only to the last antecedent any citizen of the Philippines. To make the acceptance of backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen would render Sec 2 of RA 897 unconstitutional. Secretary of Justice held the phrase who may be willing to accept the same for settlement qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not apply to the Government or its agencies.

No, guardian is associated in the provision denotes a legal relationship. Noscitur a sociis: the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Sec. 31c of Ra 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Statcon: noscitur a sociis GachonvsDevera Jr. G.R. 116695 20 Jun 1997 Pr: Review P: Panganiban Statcon: words construed in their ordinary sense Issue: May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally? Susana Guevara filed a complaint for forcible entry against Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara. Gachon failed to file an Answer promptly which led the MTCC to rule motupropio. RTC, on certiorari, affirmed MTCC ruling.

RULING between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the maximum penalty. Guardian, as envisioned by the law, is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. The word shall ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statue. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature these rules are regarded as mandatory. Agpalo: the words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and most obvious signification according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. - R.A. No. 6646 does not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense. Section 25 merely highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections, aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of election returns. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies the election offenses punishable under this law, does not include Section 25. Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881.

Malinias vs. COMELEC Stat Con: Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by construction, be extended to other matters. Petitioner: SarioMalianias Respondent: COMELEC Ponente: J. Carpio

Malinias a candidate for governor while Pilando a candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province in May 11, 1998 elections They filed complaint with COMELEC for violation of Sec 25 of RA 6646 and Section 232 and 261 of BP 881 against the Provincial Election Supervisor and members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers Allegations: (1) prevented them from attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3) threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. (4)They likewise alleged that the Provincial

62 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez Issue: Can the petitioner file a criminal case against the Provincial Election Supervisor and members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under RA 6646 and BP 881? Held: No. Does not impose criminal offenses

RULING Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years.

Concept - Under the rule of statutory construction of expressiouniusestexclusioalterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressiouniusestexclusioalterius. The rule of expressiouniusestexclusioalterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressiumfacitcessaretacitum. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. The rule of expressiouniusestexclusioalterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute

63 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

People vs. Lopez Respondent: EusebioLopex, Associate Judhe of Second Diviison of Peoples Court Ponente: J. Perfecto Writ of Prohibition

Petitions to disqualify respondent judge from sitting and participating in any manner in the hearing and decision of the criminal cases against Benigno S. Aquino and Antonio de las Alas and other treason cases of the same nature pending before the Second Division of the People's Court. It is alleged that the petitions were filed under section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, otherwise known as the People's Court Act, in relation to section 1 Rule 124. Reason: respondent judge "again manifested his bias and prejudice in favor of political collaborators" Respondent judge did not appeal from the resolution of the majority of his division and expressed his determination to maintain his minority view and to disregard entirely the majority opinion The specific provision upon which Judge Lopez is intended to be disqualified is the one expressed in the following words: "Justice shall be impartially administered."

The authors of the judicial rules, in enacting section 1 Rule 124, did not have in mind the idea of disqualifications of judges , is shown by two conclusive evidences, one negative and the other affirmative. o Title of Rule 124 which says: "Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers." Each and everyone of the nine sections of the rule do not include nor hint the idea of disqualification o Rule 126 which is entitled: "Disqualification of Judicial officers." This rule is composed of only two sections. The disqualification case does not fall into the enumerations set forth in Rule 126 Section 1. The fact that a judge may not administer justice impartially, whether his partiality may be considered as a serious misbehavior or is a condition which may incapacitate him to discharge the duties of his office, to preclude him from causing any harm to the administration of justice, the proper procedure is not to disqualify him , but to file the complaint contemplated by Rule 129, and the procedure will certainly be more speedy and effective. Section 8 of the Civil Procedure o The Court declared that the law admits of two constructions: (3) The magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency; his decision is conclusive, and the other members of the Court have no voice in it (4) The magistrate challenged sits with the Court and the question is decided by it as a body. o o The first interpretation was accepted. The intervention of the court is merely advisory in nature. The challenged Justice may or may not submit the question to the court. It all depends on his discretion. If he submits the question to the court, he is free to follow or not to follow the opinion of

Issue: Can Judge Lopez be disqualified under Section 1 of Rule 124 under the second provision Justice shall be impartially administered?

64 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Held: No. - If there is no law, rule or legal principle upon which Judge Lopez may disqualify himself or be disqualified, it stands to logic that his colleagues in the Second Division of the People's Court, notwithstanding the fact that they constitute the majority, have no power, jurisdiction, or authority to disqualify Judge Lopez and, therefore, their decision or resolution granting the motion to disqualify the respondent judge is null and void per se.

RULING said body. The final result will be the same whether or not he submits the question to the court, as the last word will be his. Judge could not be disqualified under section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which are reproduced in Rule 126. If it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice.

Concept - Blacks Law: inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius is synonymous with expressiouniusestexclusioalteriusA canon of construction holding that to express or include something implies the exclusion of others or of the alternatives. The grounds thus enumerated in the Rules of Court must be deemed to exclude others under the principle we have cited and under the well-known canon of statutory construction, inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius. (J. Tuason) Although there exist a virtual unanimity of opinions that Judge Lopez in the instances under consideration acted with bias and prejudice and in favor of the political collaborators, at least, and that he has openly announced his determination to vote in favor of the latter in all future cases in which he may have to intervene, it is adduced, nevertheless, that said bias and prejudice are not grounds for disqualification in this jurisdiction, inasmuch as the enumeration in Rule 126, section 1, Rules of Court, is exclusive. Inclusiouniusexclusioestalterius. This proposition finds no basis either in law or in judicial precedents. (J. Lim) A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means

People vs. Santiago Stat Con- Nonsicitur a sociis 65 | P a g e

Isauro Santiago has committed the crime of "libel"

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS - October 5, 1959, in Manila, the accused, for Respondent: Isauro Santiago the purpose of injuring the name and reputation of Arsenio H. Lacson, Ponente: J. Concepcion - publicly call said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at Quiapo, thru the medium of an amplifier system and before a crowd of around a hundred persons, the following, to wit: "ArsenioHayopLacson, pinakawalanghiyangAlkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel"

RULING Is the "amplifier system" mean "similar" to "radio"? No

First: o

Radio as a means of publication is "the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver" while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system, "is not thru "electromagnetic waves" and is with the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter . . . and the receiver . . ..

Issue: Whether defamatory statements through the medium of an amplifier system constitutes oral defamation (Article 358 of RPC) or libel (Article 355 of RPC)? Held: Crime of Oral Defamation.

Second: o The word "radio" used in said Article 355, should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated "writing, printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition or cinematographical exhibition" all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication o It has been held that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel,

Concept - Noscitur a Sociis ( It is known by its associates) - The meaning of an unclear words or phrase should be determined by words immediately surrounding it. - Agpalo page 302. Pimentel III vs. COMELEC Petitioner: Aquilino Pimentel III Respondent: COMELEC Ponente: J. Chico Nazario 66 | P a g e At the time of filing of the Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas PambansaBlg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines General Rule: Elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives, pre-proclamation cases are prohibited.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS had taken their oaths of office as Senators. Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus - Only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct canvass proceedings. Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. o Candidates legal counsels were not allowed to ask any questions during the canvass proceedings o PCOC did not reflect the true results of the elections because it was based on the manufactured Maguindanao MCOCs, the authenticity and due execution of which had not been duly established. o Using of a copy 2 14 July 2007, Zubiri got the twelfth position Issue: Can the pre-proclamation case of Pimentel be given due course by the SPBOC- Maguindanao board of canvassers? 67 | P a g e

RULING As Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 was then worded, it would appear that any pre-proclamation case relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass, was prohibited in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts.

Exception: Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. (4) correction of manifest errors; (5) Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (6) Determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.

Who are in responsible? Congress and the Commission en banc Undeniably, the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc A pre-proclamation case under Section 30 is allowed only as an exception to the prohibition under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. According to the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, are strictly, but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS exception. Held. No -

RULING

Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication. A maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the expressed exception or exemption excludes others. Exceptiofirmatregulim in casibus non exceptis. The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions; conversely, those which are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule. In this case, the exception applies only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies. PD 9- Unlawful for the use of bladed Weapons Alibi is worthless Although not enumerated, a bayonette is indeed a bladed weapon that is punishable under P.D no. 9 (See statcon maxim)

12. Primero vs. CA Stat Con: Expression unius est exclusion alterius [enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention appears. 13. Ramirez Vs. CA Statcon: Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligent

The accused , armed with a deadly weapon, by means of force and intimidation performed acts of lasciviousness on a person. Accused claims that the accusation is unfounded and that it was motivated by revenge because he married someone else. Offender believes that the court was incorrect to include a bayonette to be punishable under Sec 3. Of P.D. No. 9 Civil case for damages alleging that respondned insulted and humiliated respondent in a confrontation at an office. Petitioner represents a tape recording of what happened. Respondent filed a case against petitioner for her violating Ra 4200 Petitioner claims that Ra 4200 only punishes a 3rd party but not the direct arguers.

RA 4200 Prohibiting and penalizing wire tapping and other violations of private comm... Respondent is in the right. It makes it ILLEGAL for ANYONE. The law makes no distinction about a 3rd party. Communication must be given its ordinary meaning (to share or to impart) thus petition is bereft of merit.

68 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Petitioner also believes that it penalizes private communication and not private conversations. Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent judge for his decision on two civil cases. The civil cases involve respondents who are engaged in the creation and selling of FILLED MILK products Commissioner of Internal Revenue(1st case) required respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription from Sec 169: ...This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age... - Fair Trade Board (2nd case) required petitioner who produced evaporated milk to place the same inscription. Petitioner contends that it would be false advertising on their part if they did. -petition for certiorari for a temporary restraining order on the orders of respondent judge. -petitioner and another private respondent executed a deed of sale, wherein the respondent would agree to develop certain parcels of land for the construction of low cost housing units. -petitioners filed a complaint of breach of contract against respondent for failure to comply and a SUMMONS was served upon the

RULING

14. Vera vs. Cuevas Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction

Appeal is granted. Sec 169 of the Tax Code DOES not apply to whole milk products because it is clear in the statute that it only refers to skimmed milk and milk associated with the removal of its fat.

Statcon: Ejusdem Generis [general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular terms they follow in the statute.]

Other milk manufacturers have not been approached with the same problem and so this is also violates the equal protection clause.

15. Villarosa vs Benito Petition for certiorari for a temporary restraining order Statcon: Expresson unios est exclusion alterius ) [express mention of one person or thing implies the exclusion of all others.]

-SC rules in the favour of petitioners: -it is clear that Sec 11. Has revised Sec 13 and that the person who received the summons was merely an agent of the company, thus not qualified under Sec 11.

69 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS defendants Branch Manager Engineer. -Defendant prayed to dismiss the case because the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the summons was improperly served to an employee not under Sec 11, Rule 14. -defendant claims that the new rules should be construed strictly to general manager, corporate secretary, and excluding agents and directors. Chap 6-7 BellisvsBellis G.R. 23678 6 Jun 1967 Pr: Appeal P: Bengzon Statcon: Special law to prevail over general law Amos Bellis a US citizen in the State of Texas - Mary Mallen first wife, divorced Children: Edward, George (), Henry, Alexander, Anna - Violet Kennedy second wife Children: Edwin, Walter, Dorothy - Illegitimate children in RP: Amos Jr., Maria Cristina, Miriam Palma 5 Aug 1952 Bellis executed a will in the Philippines - $240,000 to first wife - P120,000 to illegitimate children i.e. P40,000 each - Remainder to seven surviving children 8 Jul 1958 Bellis died in Texas - Upon death, Poples Bank and Trust Company, executor of the will, paid all bequests 8 Jan 1964 executor submitted its Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition 70 | P a g e

RULING

Texas law. Order of the probate court affirmed in toto. Art 16 par 2 and Art 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law if the decedent in intestate or testamentary successions with regard to four times: (a) order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; (d) the capacity to succeed. Art 16, par 2, Civil Code: Intestate and testamentary successions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Art 1039, Civil Code: Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. Congress has deleted the phrase notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next prededing article when they incorporated Art 11 of the old Civil Code as Art 17 of the new Civil Code, whule reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art 10 of the old Civil Code as Art 16 in the new. Art 17, Civil Code: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 17 Jan 1964 illegitimate children opposed on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore compulsory heirs of the deceased 30 Apr 1964 CFI Manila overrules opposition and upholds executors final account 11 Jun 1964 Motion for reconsideration denied, thus this petition Issue: Which law should apply Texas or Philippine law?

RULING policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. It must have been their purpose to make the 2nd paragraph of Art 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision under Art 1039 which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. Congress has specifically chosen to leave the amount of successional rights to the decedents national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

FrivaldovsComelec G.R. 120295 28 Jun 1996 Pr: Certiorari and preliminary injunction P: Panganiban Statcon: Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose.

Juan Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was twice declared to be disqualified due to his alien citizenship Raul Lee second placer in the canvass, incumbent governor 20 Mar 1995 Frivaldo files CoC for Governor of Sorsogon 23 Mar 1995 Lee files petition to disqualify on citizenship grounds 1 May 1995 Comelec 2nd Division grants petition; disqualifies Frivaldo 8 May 1995 election day and Frivaldo wins;

Frivaldo. The indomitable people of Sorsogon certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice. 1. Frivaldos repatriation was valid and legal. a. Lees argument that P.D. 725 had been effectively repealed - Memo of Cory dated 27 Mar 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of PD 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. - No express repeal was made. It did not categorically or impliedly state that PD 725 was being repealed. Repeals by implication are not favoured. - Cory did not repeal PD 725 but left it to Congress to deal with the matter. b. Lee argues that serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings when Frivaldos application was approved in just one day - Frivaldo filed on 17 Aug 1994 as confirmed by SolGen. Special

71 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS motion for reconsideration still unacted upon - Frivaldo: 73,440 vs Lee: 53,304 11 May 1995 Comelec en banc affirms Frivaldo disqualification 9 Jun 1995 Lee files petition for his proclamation with the Comelec 21 Jun 1995 Comelec en banc orders proclamation of Lee as winning governor - 30 Jun 1995, 8:30 PM Lee proclaimed 6 Jul 1995 Frivaldo files petition with the Comelec to annul Lees proclamation and for his own proclamation - 30 Jun 1995, 2 PM Frivaldo takes oath of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation was approved -

RULING Committee only reactivated on 8 Jun 1995. Frivaldo re-submitted the required form on 29 Jun 1995. It cannot be said that there was indecent haste in the processing. Many others were processed, not only Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. Any contest on the legality of Frivaldos repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself or in the OP if it fails, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion.

19 Dec 1995 Comelec 1st Division rules that Lee proclamation was illegal because Frivaldo has reacquired his citizenship 23 Feb 1996 Comelec en banc upholds 1st Division ruling; denies Lees motion for reconsideration 26 Feb 1996 Lee files petition with SC 27 Feb 1996 SC issues TRO Issue: Who should be the rightful governor of Sorsogon? 72 | P a g e

c. Lee contends that citizenship must exist on the day of his election Sec 39 of Local Government Code: an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter in the province where he intends to be elected - The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age. - An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Frivaldo was therefor qualified when he re-assumed citizenship on 30 Jun 1995. - This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life, and meaning to the law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Sec 39 speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates. - Vasquez vsGiap: the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. - The law intended the citizenship qualification to be a qualification distinct from being a voter. LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. Registration is the core of this qualification. It is clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province. d. Repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of filing his application

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? 2. Is the lack of citizenship a continuing disqualification? 3. Did the Comelec have jurisdiction over the petition? 4. Was the proclamation of Lee valid? 5. Is Sec 78 of Omnibus Election Code mandatory?

RULING on 17 Aug 1994 - PD 725 is a curative statute it undertakes to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. - It was the legislative intent to give the statue retroactive application (allowing Filipino woman to who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship). - Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be mooted by his repatriation. - Frivaldo became stateless having renounced his American citizenship. In case of doubt, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.Frivaldo consistently took oath of allegiance when he ran in 1988, 1992, and 1995. 2. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. 3. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following proclamation. Frivaldo filed in 6. 4. Lee proclamation is not valid. - LabovsComelec: the fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will - Aquino vsComelec: Lee is a second placer, just that, a second placer. - No sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was fully aware in fact of Frivaldos alleged disqualification such that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots in knowing that he was ineligible.

73 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -

RULING Frivalod has seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, he should be proclaimed.

5. It is merely directory as Sec 6 of RA 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. - Sec 78: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be decided not later that fifteen days before the election. - Sec 6, RA 6646: If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for, the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action and upon motion during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation. This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Frivaldo, at 81 years old, showed loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose. He sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reacquire his nationality of birth despite several legal setbacks. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favour. Yes. Anti-Carnapping Act (R.A. 6539): Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power than muscular power using the public highways. Petitioners: the Information did not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway so as to make it a motor vehicle as defined in the carnapping law. Thus, they werent informed that they were being charged with carnapping, not simple robbery as stated in the

Izonvs People G.R. 51370 31 Aug 1981 Pr: Review P: de Castro Statcon: 74 | P a g e

Amado Izon, Jimmy Milla, and Pedro Divino were charged with Robbery with Violence Against Person in the Circuit Criminal Court, Third District, Olongapo City. 8 Sep 1977 accused stabbed Reynaldo Togorio and stole the victims motorized tricycle Accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to the

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Where the law does not penalty provided in the Anti-Carnapping Act. distinguish Issue: Is a motorized tricycle a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act?

RULING Information. Additionally, they contend that tricycles are not licensed to operate on public highways. SolGen: It is clear that a street within a town is a public highway if it is used by the public. To limit the words public highways to a national road connecting various towns, as petitioners suggest, would create a distinction which the statue itself does not make. Where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made. Highways are always public, free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a motor vehicle within the definition gi ven the anticarnapping law. Any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction. Petitioners complaint of not having been informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and for which they were convicted upon their plea of guilty is unfounded, legally and factually.

Mobil Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Services Ponente: J. Bengzon

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of

The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable . If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its

75 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Customs then handling arrastre operations. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. April 4, 1964 - Mobil filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case Issue: Is Customs Arrastre Services immune against suits? Held. Yes even though a proprietary function, the function is only incidental to a government function of Bureau of Customs. -

RULING governmental function, there is no waiver of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. Bureau of printing vs. bureau of printing employees association - The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental functions. The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance o with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. o Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties o Arrastre service is a necessary incident. Arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.

Concept - It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. - Agpalo Chapter 7 page 430 Moreno vs. COMELEC Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that Moreno was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention o sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (3) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or (4) for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Justice Tinga

76 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer stating thta he was already granted probation. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. Issue: Is Moreno disqualified under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code? Held. No

RULING The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convictedperson in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. This seemingly clear and unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation Baclayon vs. Mutia; grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office

Concepts - Interpretare et concordarelegislegibusestoptimusinterpretandi - to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code - On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code . - While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the 77 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS

RULING Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.

People vs. Gajo J. Montemayor

Six defendants Salvador Diama, SofronioGajo, Julio Nono, ConradoGalapin, Romeo Ambid and EmeterioZarate were charged in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo with triple murder for killing EsparanzaGarganera de Nograles and her two sons, Romeo and Augusto Nograles Killed due to following motives or reasons (3) Esperanza et al were spies for Japanese trops (4) Personal motive of Captain Ga because of a land dispute The petitioners were applying for amnesty. The benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation issued by President Roxas on September 7, 1946 was invoked for all the six appellants.

There would be mixed motives for the killing, namely, in furtherance of the resistance movement as well as personal The appellants would still come under the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation which excludes from its benefits crimes committed from purely personal motives. In the second place, in carrying out the order of Captain Ga, is hardly just that appellants herein be held answerable for the alleged personal motives of Captain Ga. The captain was their superior officer.

- They were not supposed to be aware of his personal motives. Concept - Liberal interpretation of Amnesty Proclamation It was enough, under a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, and their application

Rinconada Telecom vs. Buenviaje Petition for certiorari and mandamus is directed against the order of respondent judge dated January 23, 1978, denying petitioner's right to appeal from his previous orders dated September 16 and 29, 1977 in relation to case Rinconada Telephone Co., Inc., Plaintiff v. Iriga Telephone Co., Inc., and Francisco Imperial, Defendants - Breach of contract in relation to the deed of

The right of client to terminate his relations with his counsel is universally recognized. The authority of his counsel includes the right to make a change or substitution at any stage of the proceedings. To be valid, any such change or substitution must be made: e) upon written application; f) with written consent of the client; g) upon written consent of the attorney to be substituted; h) in case the consent of attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion

78 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS sale of shares of stocks The case was handled by Atty. Luciano Maggay The latest order was received for Rinconada Telephone Co., Inc. through Atty. Maggay, who has been shown in the records to be still a counsel of record for the same party on February 2, 1978 Petitioner contends that it received court processes thru Atty. Santos when the latter entered his appearance in both cases by his filing of a notice of appearance and a motion for reconsideration of the orders of dismissal which he furnished the counsel of respondent Imperial. Specifically, it mentioned the order of respondent judge sent to Atty. Benjamin Santos considering the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. It expressed amazement over the act of respondent judge in not sending to Atty. Santos a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration knowing fully well that the period to appeal therefrom would lapse without the knowledge of Atty. Santos, its new counsel. While admitting that its notice of appeal and appeal bond was filed out of time; petitioner considers such fact as the result of the collusion between respondent judge and

RULING for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by the rules (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court). In this case there was no valid substitution Why? o Neither can it be said that Atty. Maggay formally withdrew as counsel for petitioner in the cases. o He continued to represent petitioner and he remained the counsel of record and was for all legal purposes, petitioners' attorney upon whom respondent court's processes may be served. o Since he was the last to appear before any application for substitution was filed, Atty. Maggay remained responsible for the conduct of petitioner's cause o Despite the filing of Atty. Santos of a motion for reconsideration, copy of which he furnished the opposing counsel, Atty. Maggay is still considered counsel of record

There are circumstances present in these cases which warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule and jurisprudence. - Why? o respondent judge recognized Atty. Santos as petitioner's new counsel. o trial court sent Atty. Santos a copy of the order considering the motion for reconsideration for resolution o when it referred to Attys. Maggay and Raneses as petitioner's former counsels and Atty. Santos as the new counsel of petitioner in its order denying reconsideration. Having acknowledged Atty. Santos as the new counsel of petitioner, there is a clear case of negligence when said lawyer was not furnished copy of the order denying reconsideration as a copy of the order considering that motion for resolution was furnished to petitioner thru said lawyer.

Concept

79 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS respondent Imperial. Issue: Is the judge correct on denying the petitioner the right to appeal because of lapse of time due to failure of the court to send the notices to the new counsel Atty Santos and not AttyMaggay? Held. No.

RULING While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice especially when such strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial court itself. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive right of the parties Because there is no vested right in technicalities, in meritorious cases, a liberal, not literal, interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules which is the proper and just determination of litigation. Litigations, should as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon , and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.

23. Republic vs. CA Stat Con- if the law does not distinguish neither should the courts.

-May 6, 1958, Pasay City Council passed an ordinance (invoked by RA 1899) for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City. -Petitioner claims that respondent has given an

As has been the constant rulings of this Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities . . . (Fonseca v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36035, August 30, 1988; Hernandez v. Quitain, G.R. No. L48457, November 29, 1988; 168 SCRA 99). Petition Granted! Respondent court made a mistake in resorting to statutory construction when in fact the words and their means are as clean as day.

80 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -2 petitions for certiorari unintended broader meaning to the word foreshore lands in the statute. -Respondents (Pasay City Council) utilize RA 5187 (...projects and or contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation nof foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected...), which claims that existing contracts that were made prior to the filing of this case shall be respected and that the pleadings have become moot and academic. -Respondent court utilized the ff stat con principles: 5. Construe the statute as a whole6. it does not seem logical that congress had in mind the simple 10 to 20 meters foreshore land along the coast [as defined by Webster] 7. Extrinsic aids thru the Explanatory Note of RA 1899: in order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the PH... including the creation of harbour facilities.... (obviously this cannot be done with the simple 10 to 20 meters) 8. Records of Consti Convention- Senator Cuenco said during the deliberations of the bill that the city ofManila should be deliberately excluded from the statute since these cities do not have foreshore lands. (p.225 last par)

RULING Pasay City has no foreshore lands along the sea side Misuse of RA 5187 in relation to RA 1899. There is nothing that states that RA 5187 should be interpreted to broaden the scope of foreshore lands. (229) Thus, RA 5187 IS not legally binding to the case.

The plain meaning of the word foreshore should be used (That part of the shore between high water and low water marks usually fixed at the line to which the ordinary means tide flows: also by extension, the beach the shore near the waters edge.[p.222]

81 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 24. Sajonas Vs. CA Petition for review Issue: Who among the two parties has the right to the property in question? Statcon: Constructing new words in a statute separately -Uychocde owed money to private respondent (Pilares) which he was supposed to pay by (June 1982) -Uychocde sold residential land to the petitioners through instalment and finally executed a deed of sale in September 1984. -Private Respondent was allowed to issue a levy of execution on the said property -RTC claims that levy of execution has no legal effect because the buyers were not notified beforehand of the litigation problem between the former owner and the current respondent -CA reversed this decision -Sec. 70. P.D. 1529: Property Registration Decreeadverse claim is meant to protect third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on it. -respondent court claims that adverse claim is only applicable for 30 days from the date of registration (under P.D. 1529)

RULING *SC rules in the favour of the petitioner. Levy on Execution - the act by which the officer of the court appropriates the judgment debtor's property to satisfy the command of the writ. The Registration of an adverse claim (Sec 70 of PD 1529) protects the petitioner from the levy of execution: -Sc rules that the adverse claim, although past the 30 day time period, was still in effect, because the courts did not order its cancellation. Sec 70. Pd. 1529 The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of 30 days... after the lapse of the period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition by the party in interest. -Thus, the court may or may not order its cancellation. -this is one of the reasons why a hearing is held, thus allowing the claimant of the adverse claim to be heard and it is only after this hearing can the adverse claim be considered cancelled. Stat Con: conflict of the two paragraphs in Sec 70: a. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of 30 days from the date of registration. b. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition thereof by the party in interest. -Appeal is bereft of merit. -Contrary to his contention, petitioner waived not only the right to crossexamine private respondents witnesses but also his right to present evidence as a necessary consequence of his repeated failure to appear at the hearings of his case.

25. Tenebro vs. CA Petition for Review

-Private respondent Davao Farms Corp brought an action in the trial court for the collection of 117,840. 46 (for petitioners purchase of broiler chicks and egg trays) -Petitioner believes that his balance should only

82 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS be 48,843.68 -petitioner issued an SPA for his counsel to represent him in court, however counsel claims that he lost contact with petitioner after the pretrial. There was no response to the subpoena of the court or his letter at his given address. -his counsel also did not show up in court, thus the court ruled in default and rendered judgment ordering petitioner to pay 103,690.46 -Petitioner then shows up and claims he was denied due process and appeals all the way up to the SC.

RULING

CHAPTER 8 11
CASE FACTS Chapter 8 1. 1. San Carlos Milling taxable year 1982 a total San Carlos Milling v. income tax overpayment of P781,393.00 Comm. of Internal reflected as creditable income tax in its annual Revenue final adjustment return. 228 SCRA 135 (1993) 2. The application of the amount for the 1983 tax Statcon: liabilities remained unutilized in view of petitioner's net loss for the year Usage of word may 3. May 17, 1984 letter to the respondent, petitioner signified its intention to apply the total creditable 83 | P a g e RULING Ruling: it ruled that "once a taxpayer opts for either a refund or the automatic tax credit scheme, and signified his option in accordance with the regulation, this does not ipso facto confer on him the right to avail of the same immediately. An investigation, as a matter of procedure, is necessary to enable the Commissioner to determine the correctness of the petitioner's returns, and the tax amount to be credited.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS amount of P785,863.00 against its 1984 tax dues consistent with the provision of Section 86 of the Tax Code 4. BIR disallowed the proffered automatic credit scheme but treated the request as an ordinary claim refund/tax credit under Section 292 in relation to Section 295 of the Tax Code and accordingly subjected the same for verification/investigation

RULING Prior approval by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the tax credit under then section 86 (now section 69) of the Tax Code would appear to be the most reasonable interpretation to be given to said section. An opportunity must be given the internal revenue branch of the government to investigate and confirm the veracity of the claims of the taxpayer.

Issue: whether or not prior authority from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is necessary before a corporate taxpayer can credit excess estimated quarterly income taxes paid against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the succeeding taxable year, under Section 86 (now Section 69) of the Tax Code. Held: Yes

===================================================== Statutory Construction Concept - "may" in the phrase "may be credited", implying that the availability of the remedy of tax credit a. is not absolute and mandatory; b. it does not confer an absolute right on the taxpayer to avail of the tax credit scheme if it so chooses; c. neither does it impose a duty on the part of the government to sit back and allow an important facet of tax collection to be at the sole control and discretion of the taxpayer.

2. People v. Court of Appeals 242 SCRA 645 (1995)

Laws: 1. Sec 7, Rule 112: If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been conducted, the accused may within 5 days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask a Stat Con- MAY is preliminary investigation with the same right to obligatory. adduce evidence in his favor Facts: 1. A Saudi National was detained for possession of marijuana. 84 | P a g e

Sc Ruling: 1. SC agrees with the petitioner that the word may is obligatory and that the CA erred in believing otherwise. 2. The intent of this rule is based on the need for the procedure to be simple and speedy; as well as to make sure the court was not clogged with preliminary investigations that may drag on for weeks and even months. Offender waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail for his release. 3. CA relied on Rolito Go vs. CA: however, the facts are different. In that case,

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 2. Petitioner assails the decision of the CA which granted the offender a preliminary investigation under Sec7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. CA claims that the word may is merely permissive. 3. The solicitor general claims however that the word may is obligatory and the request for preliminary investigation must be brought about within 5 days. 3. Llenares v. Valdeavella and Zoreta 46 Phil. 358 (1924) Marcela Llenares alleges that she owns two parcels of land in Wacas, Tayabas having acquired them by purchase at a sheriffs sale under a writ of execution in a case where she is the plaintiff and FelisValdeavella and her husband were the defendants. DefendantsFelisaValdeavella and Alfonso Zoretaallege that Llenares never has been in possession of the land. IrineoValdeavella is the true owner of the land. Felisa and her husband, ZacariasZabella, are tenants of Irineo. The land is now in the possession of Zoreta under an agreement made with Zabella. A lower court held that IrineoValdeavella was the true owner of the land and the sheriffs sale where Llenares claims title to was irregular and void because there had not been a sufficient levy on the land. Issue: 1. Is IreneoValdeavella the true owner of the land? 2. Is the sheriffs sale valid?

RULING the offender asked for a preliminary investigation on the very day the information was filed, thus well within the 5 day period.

1. Maybe. The in testimony in support of the claim of IrineoValdeavalla is so contradictory and inconsistent that no reliance whatever can be place thereon. 2. No. The levy of an execution is defined as the acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of a judgment debtors property. Sec 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure: a property may be attached on execution in like manner as upon writs of attachment. This provision is mandatory. No other method of effecting the levy is prescribed. Sec 429 of the Code of Civil Procedure: real property shall be attached by filing with the registrar of titles of land for the province in which the land is located, a copy of the order of attachment, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached, and by leaving a similar copy of the order, description, and notice with an occupant of the property, if there is one. In this case, it is admitted by Llenares that the notice of attachment for the execution was not filed with the registar of deeds and that there was no copy served to the defendants. It is therefore clear that the attempted levy was not made in accordance with the provisions of the statute. There having been no sufficient levy of the execution, Llenares took no title to the said land. Judgment is affirmed.

85 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 4. 1. On February 21, 1990 Alvin Clouse, a natural born Republic v. Toledano citizen of America and his wife Evelyn A Clouse, 233 SCRA 9 (1994) Filipino at birth who later became a natural citizen of the United States petition to adopt Usage of word may Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of and shall Evelyn Clouse. 2. Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner here, appealed that the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under the Philippine Law.

RULING Ruling: Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala. There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases a. he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America b. Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. c. When private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant a. She was a former Filipino citizen. b. She sought to adopt her younger brother. c. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. ===================================================== Statutory Construction Concept Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt.

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse being an alien are disqualified to adopt under the Philippine law. Held: Yes, they are disqualified

86 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -

RULING Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

5. Bunye v. Escareal 226 SCRA 332 (1993)

Laws: 1. RA 3019 Sec 13- Suspenssion and loss of benefits: Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement benefits under law Facts: 1. Petitioners are the municipal and vice mayor and incumbent councilors of the Sangguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa Metro Manila. 2. They are accused of conspiring of using their official positions by taking possession of the New Public Market in Alabang, taking up the responsibility of its operation and management, as well as impairing the markets lease contract. 3. Petitioners sought a reconsideration for the order of suspension, claiming that they have admitted to enacting the said law and that they would not interfere with the investigation against themselves. Thus there is no way for them to tamper with evidence and the admission of the above was all the evidence they needed, thus no need for suspension. 4. Petitioners also claim that without the mayor and

This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. SC Ruling: 1. The phrase shall be suspended from office is clear that it is mandatory. 2. It is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions to the act are all the evidence the prosecution needs to hold the case against them.

87 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS the rest of the accused, the local government would be paralyzed. 6. Berces, Sr. v. Guingona, Jr. 241 SCRA 539 (1995) Achilles Berces filed two administrative cases against Naomi Corral, Mayor of Tiwi, Albay. One is for abuse of authority and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due her; and for dishonesty and abuse of authority. On 1 Jul 1993, the SangguniangPanlalawigan found Corral guilty and ordered her suspension. Corral appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision citing Sec 67(b) of the Local Government Code. The OP ordered a stay of execution pending appeal is just and reasonable. Berces then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.Berces argues that A.O. 18 was repealed by Sec 530(f) of R.A. 7160. Issue: May the Office of the President order the stay of execution?

RULING

Yes, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the Mayor to the public. Sec 530(f) [repealing clause] of the Local Government Code is not an express repeal of Sec 6 of A.O. No. 18 [authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the appeal ]because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed. There is a presumption against implied repeal. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistent and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Sec 68 of R.A. 7160: appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. We find that the provisions of Sec 68 or R.A. 7160 and Sec 6 of A.O. 18 are not irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together. The term shall may be read as either mandatory or directory depending upon consideration of the entire provision. In this case, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.

Chapter 10

7. 1. On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Iloilo Palay and Corn Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Planters Assoc. v. Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Feliciano Philippines urging the immediate importation of 13 SCRA 377 (1965) 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate.

Ruling: in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is

88 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 2. December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration. 3. December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. 4. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. 5. Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzalesfiled the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano from conducting the bid scheduled, and from importation 6. Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand. 7. Petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon 89 | P a g e

RULING certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire. The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable

a. two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. b. banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program ===================================================== Statutory Construction Concept - It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts . Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex propriovigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS payment of the corresponding taxes Issue: Did Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452? Held: No. Laws: 1. Decentralized Act (RA 5185)- all other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial city or provincial funds shall be subject to civil service law and to be appointed by the PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR or CITY MAYOR upon recommendation of the office head concerned. 2. City Charter- Says that only the President has the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer. (with the consent of the Commission of Appointments) Facts: 1. Petitioner is the mayor of Manila, who directed private respondent Gloria to refrain from exercising the function of the Assistant City Treasurer because the Secretary of Finance who placed her in that position did not have the power to make such designation. 2. Petitioner then appointed Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer, however, the respondent in this case, Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved the appointment because the appointment of the Treasurers is governed by Sec 2088 of the RAC (Revised Admin Code) and NOT sec 4 of the Decentralized Law (RA 5185) 3. Petitioner believes however that he has the right under the Decentralized Act, which he claims includes the position of Assistant Treasurer because of the general word employees. 90 | P a g e

RULING repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.

8. Villegas v. Subido 41 SCRA 190 (1971) Issue: Does the Mayor have the right to appoint the City Treasurer by wielding the Decentralized Act?

Sc Ruling 1. The word officer in the RAC defines it as one whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature but to be considered performing the functions of government. Thus it can be said that the Assistant Treasurer is an officer and not a regular employee. 2. The Decentralized Act thus excludes the City Treasurers. 3. It cannot then be said that the Decentralized act repealed what was originally written in the city charter. 4. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal is made manifest. (Generalia Speciablibus non derogant) [STATCON PRINCIPLE]

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 9. Mecano v. Commission on Audit 216 SCRA 500 (1992) Antonio Mecano, Director II of the NBI, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit denying his claim for reimbursement. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from 26 Mar to 7 Apr 1990. In a letter to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, he requested for reimbursement for his expenses under Sec 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. Sec 699 of the RAC: In case of sickness cause by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees. Director Lim recommended a favourable decision to the Secretary of Justice. DOJ Secretary agreed. COA disapproved reimbursement arguing that Sec 699 has already been repealed by the issuance of a new Administrative Code of 1987 for the reason that it was not restated or re-enacted. Issue: Did the 1987 Administrative Code repeal Sec 699 of the RAC? No.

RULING

A declaration in a statute that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. Repeal of statutes by implication are not favoured. The repealing clause of the 1987 Administrative Code is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This falls under the category of an implied repeal. Before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to repeal the old one. The intent must be clear and manifest. Two categories of repeal by implication: 1. where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one 2. when the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. Also, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions are in an irreconcilable conflict. A subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statue. The Secretary of Justice opined that the 1987 Administrative Code only intended to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization, and procedure. Therefore, the 1987 Administrative Code did not repeal Sec 699 of the RAC. COA is ordered to give due course to Mecanos reimbursement. Ruling:

10. Cagayan Electric v. 91 | P a g e

1. Cagayan Electric is a holder of a legislative franchise under Republic Act 3247 where

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Commissioner of payment of 3% tax on gross earnings is in lieu of Internal Revenue all taxes and assessments upon privileges, etc. 138 SCRA 629 (1985) 2. In 1968, RA 5431 amended the franchise by Statcon: making all corporate taxpayers liable for income tax except those indicated in paragraph (c) (1) of Repeals Section 24 of the Tax Code. 3. In 1969, through RA 6020, its franchise was extended to two other towns and the tax exemption was reenacted. 4. In 1973, by reason of the amendment to section 24 of the Tax Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a demand letter dated 15 February 1973 required the company to pay deficiency income taxes for 1968 to 1971. 5. The company contested the assessments.

RULING Republic Act No. 5431, in amending section 24 of the Tax Code by subjecting to income tax all corporate taxpayers not expressly exempted therein and in section 27 of the Code, had the effect of withdrawing petitioner's exemption from income tax. The Tax Court acted correctly in holding that the exemption was restored by the subsequent enactment on August 4, 1969 of Republic Act No. 6020 which reenacted the said tax exemption. Hence, the petitioner is liable only for the income tax for the period from January 1 to August 3, 1969 when its tax exemption was modified by Republic Act No. 5431.

===================================================== Statutory Construction Concept - An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene . . . the statute," it is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way.

6. The Commissioner cancelled the assessments for 1970 and 1971 but insisted on those for 1968 and 1969. The company filed a petition for review with the Tax Court, which on 26 February 1982 held the company liable only for the income tax for the period from 1 January to 3 August 1969 or before the passage of RA 6020 which reiterated its tax exemption. Issue: Is the company liable for any tax deficiency? Held: Yes 11. Tac-an v. Court of Appeals 92 | P a g e Laws: 1. Sec 145 Contracts with Non Christians ADMIN CODE- It shall be executed before a judge of a court

Sc Ruling: 1. The notarized document was not made infront of a judge or mayor, thus it did not comply with the ADMIN code, thus it was null and void.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 129 SCRA 319 (1984) of record 2. Sec 146 of same law- all contracts or agreements in violation of Sec 145 are null and void. 3. RA 4252-

RULING 2. Sections 145-146 were in full force and effect but since they were substantive in nature [and that] the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. 3. Also, the land in question must be presumed to be conjugal in nature, thus the spouses of the Brothers would have to have consented to such a deed for it to legally be transferred to the petitioner.

Facts: 1. Petitioner is the lawyer for the brothers Acopiado, a pair of Non-Christians who are accused of frustrated murder and theft of large cattle. 2. Unable to pay for his services, the brothers decided to give him a parcel of land. 3. They wished however to terminate his services but petitioner refused and in the end all charges against the brothers were dropped. 4. The brothers however sold the land to another person, even after a prior notarized document had already been made between them and the petitioner. 5. Petitioner now wants him to be declared the owner of the said land. 6. Petitioner claims that RA 4252 repealed the Admin Code. 12. People v. Santayana 74 SCRA 25 (1976) On 19 Feb 1962, Jesus Santayana was appointed as special agent by Colonel Jose Maristela, chief of the CIS. By virtue of such, he was issued a pistol with the corresponding Memorandum Receipt and an undated certification that he was an accredited member of the CIS. On 29 Oct 1962, he was arrested in Plaza Miranda in possession of the said pistol without a license to possess. He was then charged and was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. 93 | P a g e

1. No. The offense does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction. Under Sec 44 of R.A. 296, the CFI have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than 6 months or a fine of more than P200. The offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than 1 year and 1 day or a fine of not less than P1,000. 2. Yes. Macarandang doctrine applies. There is no question that he was appointed as CIS secret agent with the

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Issue: 1. Does the municipal court have jurisdiction? 2. Does his appointment as a special agent of the CIS exempt him from securing a license to carry and possess firearms?

RULING authority to carry and possess firearms. He was also informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license because the pistol was government property and cannot be legally registered in his name. At the time of his apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is People vsMacarandang wherein the Court held that the appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent to a member of the municipal police. The case of People vsMapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on 20 Aug 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of his appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for the possession of the pistol. Ruling: Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan on 13 March 1964. Ordinance is patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). Respondent failed to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. Act Numbered 3992 as amended, and all laws, executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conflict with the provisions of this Act are repealed. By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law, appellants are in error in contending that "a later enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law." o

13. 1. Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, was Primicias v. driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta Municipality of when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police Urdaneta asked him to stop. He was told that he had 93 SCRA 462 (1979) violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a truck." 2. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964). 3. Due to the institution of the criminal case, plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance

4. Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). Issue: Is Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 valid? 94 | P a g e

- Legesposteriorespriorescontrariasabrogant. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Held: No 14. C & C Commercial v. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority 21 SCRA 984 Issue: Does the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority violate RA 912, Sec 1? Laws: 1. RA 912, Sec1- Philippine made materials and products, whenever available, practicable and usable, and will serve the purpose as equally we all as foreign made products or materials, SHALL be used in said construction or repair work, upon proper certification of the AVAILABILITY Facts: 1. Petitioner has filed several case of prohibition against respondent because they claim they violate RA 912 Sec 1. 2. Petitioners claim that they have been excluded from being selected by respondent even if they have available, practicable and usable pipes that could serve the purpose of the project at a much lower cost. 3. Respondent pleaded to the court to reconsider their restraining order on them so that they may provide adequate water supply to those cities that lack potable water, which is a risk to health and life. 4. Respondent claims that it is not an agency of the state. Chapter 11 Sc Ruling

RULING

1. Respondent is part of the term Government in Sec 2 of the RAC, which recognizes that the respondents purpose is to achieve a nationalistic purpose [by giving] preference to locally produced materials, in purchases, works or projects of the GOVERNMENT. They are thus exercising PROPRIETARY governmental functions. 2. It is found that petitioner creates pipes that are not more than 12 inches in diameter. 3. Petitioner claims that although they may not produce the pipe required by the Respondent, they can import it at any time. This is what they deem as Available. 4. SC does not believe that this was meant when the law makers considered the word Available in the statute. This definition would be straining the very meaning of the word and thus would be unfair. 5. Preliminary injunctions against respondent are thus set aside.

95 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS 15. 1. Petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim, Gold Creek Mining situated in Benguet, Mountain Province, and Corporation v. located on public lands by C. L. O'Dowd in Rodriguez accordance with the provisions of the Act of 66 Phil. 259 (1938) congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, relative to the location of mining claims. 2. prior to August 9, 1933, petitioner filed in the office of the Director of Lands an application for an order of patent survey of said claim, which survey was duly authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and performed by a mineral land surveyor in the former divisions of mines, Bureau of Science, from August 9, 1933, to April 30, 1934, at the expense of petitioner; 3. prior to November 15, 1935, petitioner filed with the mining recorder an application for patent, together with a certificate showing that more than P1,600, worth of labor and/or improvements had been expended by the petitioner upon said claim, 4. that prior to November 15, 1935, the notice of petitioner's application for patent was forwarded by the mining recorder to the division of mines,so that the latter could order the publication of said notice was made once a week for a period of sixty days in the "Philippines Herald," "El Debate," and the Official Gazette, commencing February 13, 1936; Problem: 5. Petitioner has requested the respondents, as 96 | P a g e

RULING Ruling: A determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims It is clear that the foregoing constitutional provision prohibits the alienation of natural resources with the exception of public agricultural land. It is likewise clear that term "natural resources," as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain . It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve its application for patent, and to prepare the necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof and to submit such papers for the signatures of the President of the Philippines, but the respondents have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to do so. 6. Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to the patent applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for the issuance of such patent. 7. Respondents, allege that "petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to the 'Nob Fraction' claim because the Constitution provides that 'natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated' Issue: Is the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce correct for not giving the patents to the petitioner? - Sub-issues: Is the mineral land being claimed by the petitioner part of the public domain? Held: No, the patent claim should be approved. Sub-issue: No. Laws: 1. Art 6, Sec 13, Subsection 13- No public money or property shall ever be appropriated for the use, benefit of any church (205)

RULING to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. ===================================================== Statutory Construction Concept The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. Presumption: Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption.

16. Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 Phil. 201 (1937)

Sc Ruling: 1. ACT 405 does not have a religious purpose in view. 2. The intent of the said law is purely for governmental profit and to encourage tourism. It does not seek at all to recognize or promote any religious group but merely to take advantage the Eucharistic Congress for promotional and

Issue: Does Act 405 97 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS infringe on the 2. Act 405 Act appropriating the sum of 60,000 Separation of Church pesos and making available out of any funds in the and State? treasury for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and for other purposes.

RULING economical purposes.

Facts: 1. Petitioner seeks the a prohibition to prevent the respondent from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33RD International Eucharsitic Congress because of its violation of the Separation of Church and State in the Constitution. 17. Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 152 SCRA 284 (1987) Petitioners are duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over RTC branches who seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. It may be pointed out that early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively and affirmed the Chief Justices directive to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of all members of the judiciary. Issue: Are members of the judiciary exempt from income taxes? No. The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. The Court makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and Endenciavs David when it authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Judiciary. The Court reiterates that the payment of income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Sec 6 Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which expressly exempts the salary of any public officer or employee from the payment of income tax. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. Ruling: A.

18. People v. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) 98 | P a g e

1. Feliciano Muoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified menwent out in a jeep looking for the cattle

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS rustlers. 2. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. 3. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. 4. The second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son.

RULING Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact. A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. The Constitutional Commissions debate did not give much assistance either in the case at bar.

5. The third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. 6. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be. Issue related to Statutory Construction: a. Did the constitution abolished the death penalty? b. Did the constitution changed the periods of penalty as prescribed in Article 248 of Revised Penal Code? Held: No (a,b)

B. We are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of the provision as worded. we are still not persuaded that it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the original penalty. It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication . It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning.

99 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS -

RULING We return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

19. United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma 288 SCRA 15 (1998)

Laws / Concepts: 1. Managerial employees: Both groups are employees. a. Managers- vested with powers to lay down and execute management and hire, transfer, suspend, discharge or assign and discipline employees. (examples: Route Manager (29) b. Supervisors-[Art 212] effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinely or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. 3. Art 212 RA 6715- defines managerial and supervisory employee. Supervisory Employees are those who effectively recommend such managerial actions 4. Art 3, Sec 8 of the Consti: The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abrdiged. Supporting Laws: 1. Industrial Peace Act- recognizes that the word Supervisor is understood as the subgroup of the

Any inequality caused by the construction above is already an inquiry of wisdom and not construction thus the solution is for a legislative action not a judiciary function. Sc Ruling: 1. Route Managers- are responsible for the success of the companys main line of business through management of their respective sales teams, which includes planning, direction operation and evaluation of their teams. (This is not the work of a supervisor.) 2. SC rules that the petitioners carry Managerial positions and cannot qualify under Art. 245 of the Labor Code to join or assist in a labor organization. 3. The approval by the Constitutional Commission of Lerum, one of the Commissioners, for the proposal can only mean that the Commission intended the absolute right to organize government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutional guaranteed. 4. The words effectively recommends in the definition of terms in RA 6715 clearly follows the mandate of the Constitutional Commission which was geared towards making sure that supervisors should be granted the right to form unions.

100 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo

STATCON CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES ATTY. CRISTOBAL CASE FACTS managerial employees.

RULING

Facts: 1. Petitioner is a union of SUPERVISORY employees. 2. Sec. Of Labor claims that they are not Supervisory employees BUT Route Managers who fall under the Managerial employees.

101 | P a g e

Conejos Haulo Laylo