Tom Kamenec Legal analysis of selected factors in the Slovak Republic

MEDIA FREEDOM IN DANGER?

Tom Kamenec Legal analysis of selected factors in the Slovak Republic

Fair-play Alliance Bratislava, April 2013 This analysis has been kindly supported by the Embassy of Canada in the Slovak Republic

MEDIA FREEDOM IN DANGER?

Introduction

In this paper I intend to analyze some aspects of guarantees forthe right of freedom of expression. The purpose of this exercise is not to comprehensively assess all the circumstances related to the issue of protection of this fundamental right in the Slovak Republic. The purpose of this analysis is to describe certain factors from the viewpoint of a legal representative of the media that restrict effective protection of the right of expression and to some extent jeopardize a free and unhindered execution of this right. It is not the ambition of this analysis to be a monograph on the topic of protection of freedom of expression.The reviewed aspects of protection of the right to freedom of expression and potential threats to it will be evaluated only with regards to specific application in practice. The supporting documents inthis analysis are legal provisions applicable and effective in the Slovak Republic,in particular the following laws and international agreements: The Constitution(No. 460/1992, Coll.) of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended in Protocols No. 3, 5 and 8, Communication No. 209/1992 Coll. (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), Act No. 40/1964, Coll.,Civil Code (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Code) Act No. 99/1963, Coll., Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code of Civil Procedure), Act No. 300/2005, Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code of Criminal Procedure) Act No. 428/2002 on the Protection of Personal Data In addition to these sources, accessible case law of Slovakias general courts, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the CC) and the European Court for Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ECHR) were also used. I grounded the interpretation and application of the above-mentioned legal norms on an existing doctrine. I eventually narrowed the scope of the analysis to proceedings for protection of privacy rights according to Section 11 of the Civil Code, and related proceedings. I selected three examples of bad practice which, however, could be supported by more examples than those described below. In each of these cases, I will attempt to emphasize certain aspects which in my view constitute a challenge and restrict guarantees to this fundamental right and/or directly represent a threat to it.
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General legal framework

Under the provisions of Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution, the Slovak Republic is a democratic state with the rule of law. Constitutional principles of the rule of law shall, in the above context, prohibit arbitrariness in the actions of state authorities and include the proportionality principle (PL (CC, 52/99)) as well as the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (e.g.PL CC, 12/05). Based on the rulings of the Constitutional Court, it is possible in relation to Article1, Section 1 of the Constitution to differentiate between formal and substantive understanding of the rule of law. Formal understanding of the rule of law provides that constitutional principles shall be applied only within the limitations of the constitutional text interpreted and applied on the basis of grammatical, formal and logical methods identifying the content of legal provisions. Such an approach means, for example, that unless stated explicitly in the constitutional text that certain rights are inviolable, any state interventions to these rights can be legitimized.Substantive understanding of the rule of law excludessuch an approach.When taking decisions, the Constitutional Court emphasizes the requirement of the substantive understanding of the rule of law (IV. CC 1/07, IV.CC 75/08, I. CC 57/07, I. CC 82/07). It is the concept of substantive understanding of the rule of law that allows for the conclusion that Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution shall guarantee justice. Under the rule of law (where substantive understanding is applied), it is the duty of all public authorities, including courts, to secure an actual and efficient opportunity to apply the rights acknowledged by the law. The right of freedom of expression is specifically guaranteed by Article 26 of the Constitution. Under this provision, everyone has the right to express their views in speech, in writing, in print, in a picture, or by other means, as well as the right to freely seek out, receive, and impart information without regard to state borders (Article 26, Section 2 of the Constitution). Article 26, Section 4 of the Constitution regulates the possibility to restrict freedom of speech and the right to seek and impart information.Such restriction, if any, shall be applied only on the basis of law and it shall be proven that such restriction is necessary in order to protect the rights and freedoms of othersin a democratic society, state security, public order, public health and morals.Such restriction shall be strictly proportionate to the protected interest and it shall not be made preventive or to a greater extent than absolutely necessary. Otherwise, a situation absolutely unacceptable to society could arise in which no free distribution of views or information would occur not because of a lack of interest in a particularissue but because of fear from possible repercussions for expressing ones view and/or distributing a piece of information, fear from difficulties
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related to doing so, and costs incurred to defend oneself. Under Article 13 of the Constitution as well as in line with established judicial practice, when curbing constitutional rights it is necessary to proceed in a cautious way and apply restrictions only to the extent absolutely necessary. In line with the concept of the substantive rule of law, Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that when restricting fundamental rights and freedoms, their quintessence and meaning shall be given due regard.Such restrictions may be applied only for a given purpose. Under Article 152, Section 4 of the Constitution, interpretation and application of constitutional provisions, laws and other generally binding legal regulations shall be in accordance with the Constitution.Thus, the courts when applying laws must proceed strictly according to the Constitution and any restrictions of fundamental rights must be subject to the constitutional compliance test. Pursuant to Article 154, item C of the Constitution, the Convention is part of the Slovak legal system. This international agreement on fundamental rights has priority before the national laws and the courts are obliged to apply its provisions in the judicial process.If the stipulation of a right or a freedom guaranteed by the Convention for a specific situation arises from standard international application of the Convention, the Slovak Republic shall be bound by it (II.CC 28/96).Neither the Constitution nor any other legal norm may be interpreted in a way that constitutes a breach of the international obligations of the state (PL CC, 5/83, II.CC 48/97). The Convention stipulates freedom of expression in Article 10 and the wording of this provision issimilar to the text of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.The Convention, as well, does not stipulate freedom of expression as an absolute right, however; Article 10, Section 2 lists the conditions under which this right may be restricted. Constitutional guarantees to the right of freedom of expression are implemented via several specific legal provisionsby statutes.Their purpose is, in specific cases, to regulate particular relations. For the purpose of this analysis we consider as essential the regulation of the protection of privacy as provided for by the Civil Code.The provisions of Section 11 and the following sections of the Civil Code lawfully implement rights to privacy and human dignity, as defined in the Constitution. Within the activities of the media, the right to privacy and human dignity sometimes clash with the constitutional right of freedom of expression. Resolving such conflict requires interpreting and applying the law solely in conformity with the Constitution while attempting to satisfy to the greatest extent possible the mutually conflicting rights. In practice, however, it is necessary to resolve a conflict of rights by adopting a decision that one of the rights will be given priority over the other. When a claim is made to require restriction of a fundamental right in order to protect another right, it is always necessary to compare these rights in a just way and draw a conclusion as to which of the rights will be given priority in a democratic state with the rule of law. Such balancing of rights may not be executed in a strictly formal way. Even when anapplicable law stipulates the criteria that should be applied, one of the basic tasks of adjudicating bodies is to identify the values that are protected in a democratic state with the rule of law and to take the public interest into account, and only then to draw the
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conclusion as to which right in aparticular case will be given greater weight. To put it simply, by applying values that are characteristic of a democratic state with the rule of law, a court must find a just balance between the rights under scrutiny and to do so by providing answers to questions such as: Who is being criticized? Who is doing the criticizing? What is being criticized? Where is it taking place? When and how is it criticized? Using the above-described legal context, it is possible to illustrate through several examples what limitations and threats to the right of freedom of expression exist in the decision-making process of the courts in the Slovak Republic.

Proceedings regarding protection of privacy according to Section 11 and the following provisions of the Civil Code, and related proceedings.
The provisions of Section 11 through Section 17 of the Civil Code lay down the protection of privacy and define potential claims that can be made by physical persons if they believe their privacy rights have been breached.The quintessence of this statutory law has been part of the Civil Code since 1964 and its subsequent amendments have only made the concept more specific without actually changing the essence of the norm.Given the wide span of ECHRs case law as well as the unchanged position of Slovak statutory law, an impression could be formed that we are describing a legal institute whose interpretation and application is decided by the courts without great difficulty. Even though I am convinced that it is not a general phenomenon, we can still point to cases in which the application of norms protecting privacy deviated significantly from the defined standards.These examples can be broken down into several groups.

1.a Applying values what is absolutely required in a democratic society?

In some cases, an issue in point is how sitting courts have definedthe values they applied when assessing the clash of the right to privacy with the right to freedom of expression. According to ECHR case law as well as that of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, freedom of expression constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic society, one of the elementary prerequisites for its development and for self-fulfillment of individuals. Freedom of expression is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favorably received or regarded as in offensive or indifferent, but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb the state or any sector of the population.These are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is nodemocratic society. (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Application No.5493/72, Judgment of December 7, 1976, Section 49). There are situations, however, when freedom of expression must give way.The limiting clauses of Article 26, Section 4 of the Constitution and Article 10, Section 2 of the Convention explicitly specify the grounds on which freedom of expression can be restricted and these restrictions must always correspond to the democratic nature of the society (measures that are necessary for a democratic society).A reason for such a restriction may also be the protection of rights and freedoms of others, that is, inter alia, also protecting the guarantee arising from the scope of the fundamental right to privacy protection under Article 19 of the Constitution, and specifically expressed in Section 11 of the Civil Code and its following sections that protect private individuals against
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unjustifiable interventions by other private individuals or the state. The following example of FZ v. PP is an illustration of an incorrect judicial assessment of the essential need of a democratic society. The publisher PP published a series of articles in daily newspapersX and Y (hereinafter referred to as the articles) reporting on a visit by FZto an erotic club on August 26, 2005. His visit to the club became known to the general public via a video recording shot by the police on the evening of a particular date, showing FZ as a person recorded on the video.In November 2006 the video recording was published on the internet by an unknown person, at www.youtube.com, and subsequently was viewed by more than 80,000 people. At the time of his visit to the erotic club, FZ was member of a city council, a member of a conservative political party, the deputy chairman of the civil association KM, and the principal of a secondary grammar school. FZ filed a complaint before the District Court of Bratislava I asserting protection of privacy against PP and claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of SKK 2 million. On 28 November 2009 the Bratislava I District Court issued a ruling in case 11C 241/06 which ordered PP to pay damages in the amount of 33,193.92 (SKK 1 million). PP appealed against the judgment on December 30, 2009. By issuing judgment in case 7Co 204/2010, the Bratislava Regional Court upheld the decision in principle1. The exemplified decision of these two general courts illustrate an incorrect evaluation of the prerequisites that need to be in place in order to restrict the right to freedom of expression in a way that conforms with the Constitution. The reasoning of the courts in this case specifically what is required for a democratic society cannot be supported. The published articles in no way crossed the constitutional margins of freedom of expression and are clearly a materialization of freedom of expression.The courts did not demonstrate an urgent need on the part of society to apply measures for protection of FZs rights and freedoms. As a public figure, FZ must acknowledge there is a greater interest in him and he must respect that the general public voters havea legitimate interest in his activities.As the principal of a secondary grammar school, he also must be aware of the fact that the title of his position implies that he should act as a moral authority in relation to his pupils. In a democratic society in which there is free competition among political powers it is necessary that the press informs the public about public officials. In order to make informed decisions, voters need information that helps create a portrait of the public officials who are their representatives, be it their past deeds, values, ethical principles, personal qualities or opinions.In a democratic state the press represents public opinion and is a counterbalance to state power. As such, it is entitled to publish facts about the private
1 The judgment of the Bratislava Regional Court was overruled by the finding of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Catalogue No. II, CC 558/2012 of 28 February 2013.

lives of public figures. Pursuant to ECHR case law (Castells v. Spain, Carolina von Hannover v. Germany), the public has the right to be informed, and under certain circumstances this right may apply to aspects of the private lives of public figures, in particular, politicians. If the media are discouraged from coveringan issue of public interest by inappropriate penalization it is not in accord with the guarantees of the substantive understanding of the rule of law; neither it is in accord with constitutional prerequisites that must be present in order to restrict a fundamental law. As a politician and a public figure, FZ must tolerate the above-described publicity since by visiting an erotic club he exposed himself to potential criticism. In this case, the courts failed not because of the issue of the formal truth but because their assessment of protected values in the context of two clashing rights was totally wrong. A free and democratic society must allow for discussion and/or polemic debate on an issue such as described in the articles.It is not in the interest of a democratic society, let alone an urgent need (necessity) of society, to adopt a ruling restricting the freedom of expression in theabove-described case.

Summary 1.a
With regard to the above-stated example Iam of the opinion that often one of the limits to protection of freedom of expression in the Slovak Republic is the value system applied by individual courts in deciding particular cases. The criteria that should be decisive in determining pressing social need in ademocratic state with the rule of law are frequently overlooked. Often, the courts give priority to the social need to protect public figures over the indispensable need for public debate, while the definition of real indispensability must result from the demands of society itself. In order to overcome this barrier it is this very society that must perceive and underline the value of free discussion of public matters. Indispensability in a democratic society cannot be understood only as an objectively identifiable category, it is rather an expression of the subjective needs of aparticular society. If Slovak society is to progress, itis important for the courts to pay greater attention to the positive aspects of an open exchange of opinion and the opportunity to criticize public figures. Acknowledging these processes is vital for a democratic and free society.

1.b Formalistic decision-making by the courts

When it comes to cases dealing with the right to privacy, the courts decisions are frequently driven by a formalistic approach rather than by a quest for real justice and striking a balance between conflicting rights. Such decisions have resulted in sanctioning of the media for statements taken out of the context of theentire article, such as theheadline of an article,while disregarding its actual content or overlooking the substance and meaning of the text that was the subject of the conflict over protection of
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the right to privacy. The same weakness of this formalistic approach can be equally observed in some of the court decisions in cases dealing with a past legacy, such as court cases from the time of the government of Vladimir Meiar, as well as those related to the history of some judges. An example of court formalism is thedecision of aBratislava V District Court of 6 December 2007 in case No. 7C 239/2007,in conjunction with the ruling of the Regional Bratislava Court in case No.6Co 64/2008 of 11 December 2008. The subject of the proceedings was an article published in newspaper daily X titled Harabin chrni vrahov (Harabin protects murderers). The article discussedamendments to the Penal Code prepared by the Ministry of Justice, at that time led by tefan Harabin.Based on a lawsuit initiated by Harabin, serving at that time as Minister of Justice, the courts decided that daily X published by the defendant, published an article titled Harabin protects murderers, issue No. 122, year 2, page 2 on May 29, 2007. This false statement unlawfully infringed on his personal rights, damaging his dignity, respect and honor to the extent that qualifies for legal requirements stipulated in Section 13, par. 2 of the Civil Code on awarding non-pecuniary damages. The concept of protection of freedom of expression is clearly evident from case law of the Constitutional Court of Slovakia and the ECHR. Thus, it is striking that in such a legal setting the general courts considered the title of this article as afactual statement and decided upon its truthfulness within the civil court proceedings while disregarding the context of the published information. It is absurd when the courts slide to such alevel of formalistic interpretation as they evidently did in thiscase when they decided about limiting basic rights and freedoms. It must have been crystal clear to any ordinary reader that the title of the article could not be taken literally, word for word, without examining the context of the full article. This fact was completely overlooked only by the courts in deciding the case, which is alarming. It also sheds bad light on the courts willingness to effectively protect freedom of expression. Iam of the opinion that the Slovak Constitutional Court reviewed the quality of the quoted Regional Court decision per se, in its finding in case No. II CC 340/2009 of September 18, 2012. The Constitutional Court overturned the Regional Court decision with the following reasoning: From the above it may be concluded that the Regional Court in its challenged decisionin the case of the applicants appeal against the decision of the District Court, case No.7 C 239/2007111 of 6 December 2007, that imposed on her (the applicant), inter alia, the obligation to provide pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary damage due to inacceptable infringement of his privacy rights; in a conflict between her basic right to search for and disseminate information and freedom of expression;and the basic right of the plaintiff to protection of privacy; gave priority to the personality rights of the plaintiff.The Regional Court decided so In spite of the fact that the applicant enjoys aprivileged position (increased protection) in line with the standing case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); while this case law provides abaseline for the decisions of the Constitutional Court in comparable matters;
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 In spite of the fact that the plaintiff was at that time amember of government Minister of Justice (a political official) who, in line with the standing case law of ECHR, must bare ahigher (the highest) level of criticism compared with other natural persons; Also due to the fact it was reviewing the given headline in isolation, even though it should have had considered its organic connection to the particular article and only on such basis it should have stipulated the legal conclusions; In spite of the fact that the particular article was dealing with issues of public interest (legislative action on an amendment to the Penal Code for which the plaintiff, as theMinister of Justice, was politically responsible); e.g. matters that journalists are not only entitled, but are obliged to inform the public about; In spite of the fact that the particular article was written prevalently in theform of value judgements of its author regarding the prepared amendment to the Penal Code (albeit simplified, partially inaccurate and challengeable from a professional point of view). Under these circumstances the Constitutional Court considers the legal conclusion of the Regional Court expressed in the challenged decision, pursuant to which the appellant unacceptably interfered with the personality rights of the plaintiff as unacceptable and unsustainable. Decision No. 25 C 218/2007 of 29 April 29 of Bratislava IV District Court can be discussed on similar grounds. This decision, in connection with the decision of the Bratislava Regional Court, case No. 7 Co 163/2009 of 16 November 2012 bound the publisher of aweekly Z to apologize to the prime minister for calling him a thief of future pensions in connection with a published commentary on changes to the pension system.These quoted decisions are based purely on formalistic application of the law. The sustainability of such decisions in the context of guarantees of freedom of expression as defined by the ECHR is seriously questionable.

Summary 1.b
Slovak courts demonstrate a certain tendency to opt for purely formalistic interpretation and implementation of the law. When reviewing two conflicting rights (right to freedom of expression and privacy rights protection of dignity and privacy), such an approach is not in line with the principles ofastate with substantive understanding of the rule of law and represents adirect threat to the free media. In lawsuits dealing with privacy rights, where a challenged statement was made in adebate on an issue of public interest, it is not only desirable, but furthermore essential that a court focuses on the substantive aspects of justice. Freedom of expression, representing one of the basic rights, is not only important for an individual but has indisputable importance for the whole democratic society. Society can be truly free and democratic only with undisturbed exercise of this right (while respecting the rights of all parties involved). The absence of free discussion and opinion exchange does not permiteffective progressby any society. If the media are to be awatchdog of democracy and confirm their irrefutablerole in a democratic
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society, they need to operate in an environment in which the legislative, judicial and administrative branches are truly committed to implementing the substantive aspects of justice. Otherwise, judicial protection of basic rights is amere illusion and has no practical impact,as is demanded by the Constitution as one of the attributes of a democratic state with the rule of law.

1.c Amount of awarded compensation for non-pecuniary damage

Aserious threat to the right to freedom of expression is the practice of courts to award enormous pecuniary compensation for infringement of privacy rights in cases involving their protection. This practice in Slovak courts collides with the limits defined by the ECHR and the limits resulting from adue interpretation of legal norms in accordance with the Constitution (Article 152, par. 4). In Slovakia, it has already become nearly established practice, with no evident or reasonable justification, that public figures are awarded pecuniary compensation not in thousands, but in tens of thousands of euros in proceedings regarding their privacy rights. This trend, originally initiated by the plaintiffs by demanding arounded amount, was accepted by the courts as anorm, while most of the reasoning of awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage in dozen of thousands euro is unsustainable, considering the guarantees of a fair trial. The courts often thoughtlessly accept the plaintiffsclaims for pecuniary compensation of damage without adue review of whether the legal prerequisites for awarding such compensation had been minimally met2 .Equally, due consideration of the amount of compensation awarded by the court is missing. Section 13 par. 3 of the Civil Code stipulates the amount of pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It is to be set by a court upon consideration of the scope of the damage incurred and the circumstances under which the privacy rights were infringed. Hence, the Civil Code does not provide for discretion by judges in such cases the courts consideration is limited by the criteria explicitly set forth by the Civil Code,together with Article 152, par. 4 and Article 13 par. 4 of the Constitution, which require conformity of a decision with the Slovak Constitution. Ultimately, the interpretation of the Convention by the ECHR in its case law is also imperative for the courts. Thus, decisions of the courts conflicting with these precedents represent aserious threat to the right of freedom of expression. Awarding extremely high pecuniary compensation in cases of non-pecuniary damage for verbal intrusions into privacy rights represents an existential threat for the free media and is afactor deterring them from discussing issues of public interest. We also need to point out the practice of various Slovak courts in awarding high pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary damage to figures of paramount public interest in spite of the fact that pursuant to ECHR case law the privacy rights of such individuals are limited, which also must have an impact, if applied, on their claims for pecuniary compensation for damage. Iam convinced that such practice is inappropriate and contradictory to the
2 Pursuant to Section 13 par. 2 of the Civil Code, pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary damage may be awarded provided that moral satisfaction seems insufficient, primarily due to the fact that the dignity or social image of anatural person has been seriously damaged.

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Constitution. One of the most absurd examples of such practice is enforcement of right to protection of the good reputation of alegal entity pursuant to Section 19b of the Civil Code by state bodies, where pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary damage is requested within the proceedings. Itis striking that these outlined trends are diametrically different to those applied in similar proceedings in the Czech Republic. The decision of aDistrict Court in Spisk Nov Ves in case No. 9 C/99/2009 of 29 October 2009 in conjunction with the decision of the Regional Court in Koice No. 3 Co/37/2010, 3 Co/38/2010 of 11 May 2010 is an equally interesting example of the described practice. The court approved the lawsuit of J.K. concerning privacy rights and ruled that the defendant (a publisher) must provide, inter alia, pecuniary compensation of 25,000 for non-pecuniary damage. This decision was upheld by decision of the appellate court. The finding of the Constitutional Court in case No.IVCC 302/2010 overturned the decision of the appellate court upon an appeal by the applicant (publisher) on the inappropriate amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage, with reasoning as follows: In line with the aforementioned, the Constitutional Court points to the case law of the ECHR pursuant to which compensation for non-pecuniary damage must be reasonably appropriate to the damage on reputation suffered (e.g.TolstoyMiloslavsky v. Great Britain), when setting the amount of compensation, the evidence supporting the scope of damage must be considered (e.g. Flux v. Moldavia Steel and Morris v. Great Britain). The statement of the Regional Court that It isnot possible that the court reviews the cases of awarded compensation for nonpecuniary damage in other cases for comparative purposes when setting the amount of compensation also does not correspond with ECHR case law. The Constitutional Court hereby points out the legal opinion of the ECHR in the case Pblico-Comunicaco Social, S. A. v. Portugal pursuant to which the amount of compensation in a particular case must consider the amount of the compensation awarded by national courts in other cases of infringement of good reputation.On top of that, in the perspective of setting the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage the Constitutional Court points out another legal opinion of the ECHR expressed, e.g. in the case of Iltalehti and Karhuvaara v. Finland. Pursuant to this opinion, when setting the compensation for violation of privacy rights, the amount of compensation awarded in cases of physical rights or to victims of violent crimes must be taken into consideration; while the compensation for violation of personal rights should not exceed the maximum amount of compensation for physical injuries or violent crimes, unless serious and sufficient reasons exist. The Constitutional Court considersit important to point out the above facts since it considers the amount of pecuniary compensation of 25,000 to the applicant (plaintiff) under the circumstances of the given caseto be inappropriately high, even without considering its own conclusion regarding the merits of the given case, i.e. its conclusion that the Regional Court interfered unacceptably with the right of the applicant to freedom of expression and free dissemination of information. In this context, it is important to note that pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Act No. 215/2006 on compensating persons who suffered from violent crimes, the total amount of compensation awarded to such individuals may notexceed a multiple of fifty times the minimum salary. Pursuant to the above provision and Section 1 of governmental
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regulation No. 326/2011 that sets the amount of minimum salary for 2013, the total amount of compensation may not exceed 50 x 337.70, i.e. 16,885. Therefore, if the state specifies the maximum amount of compensation to victims of violent crimes in the amount of 16,885 even though this is the most serious violation of a persons rights (since physical integrity is an integral part of personal rights), awarding multiplyhigher compensation than this amount for verbal violations of such rights, that are proportionately of much lower intensity, contradicts the Convention.

Summary 1.c
The practice of Slovak courts to award large pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary damage seriously jeopardizes the right to freedom of expression in the Slovak Republic. Since the law provides only framework criteria for awarding pecuniary compensation, the courts need to make their considerations and reviews through the prism of the constitutional guarantee of rights. However, the courts have not done so in all cases related to public officials. In some cases, arbitrariness in setting pecuniary compensation for nonpecuniary damage caneven be identified. Insufficient, unreviewable reasoning of courts in awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage represent a serious limitation to the guarantee of freedom of expression. If it impossible to learn from a courts decision what its grounds were for awarding pecuniary compensation for violation of privacy rights, it makes the decision-making of the courts unpredictable and contradictory to the principles of a democratic state with the rule of law.

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Conclusion

The stated list of limitations and threats to the right to freedom of expression is not complete. Undoubtedly, there are also other exemplary cases that may represent a serious obstacle to the work of the media. This analysis is meant to provide a minor contribution to improving the quality of the legal environment in the Slovak Republic and an effort to achieve a shift in decision-making practice on such sensitive issues that limitations on the right to freedom of expression definitely represent. The good news is that many examples of bad practice have been remedied by the rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. On the other hand, it is essential to effectively transpose these concepts related to the right to freedom of expression as defined by the Constitutional Court to the decision-making of the general courts as well. I do believe that discussion about this analysis will also contribute to that process.

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