Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No.

L -47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since it is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of\ such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct? HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978 FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction. HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

TOLENTINO V. SEC

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the EVAT Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the HoR as required by Sec 24, Art 6 of the CONST. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the SW&M Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as SB 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a HB and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and copetitioner Roco even signed the said SB. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
TOLENTINO The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear

analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

ASTORGA FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the S e n a t e . Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their s i g n a t u r e s t h e r e i n , t h e c o u r t d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e b i l l w a s n o t d u l y e n a c t e d a n d therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.

Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run, the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. HELD: No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. Petitioners claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. The w o r d s o f members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioners claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO

League of Cities in the Philippines v. COMELEC November 18, 2008 Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. Held: 1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. 2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion

mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Oliva vs. Lamadrid, G.R. No. L-23196, October 31, 1967

Aids in Interpretation and Construction: Extrinsic Aids Legislative History of Statutes

Facts: Plaintiff Laureano Oliva owns a parcel of land in Camarines Norte. He mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Daet as security for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of his obligation, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the property sold at public auction, to the Bank, as the sole bidder, on February 4, 1961. The certificate of sale, issued by the sheriff stated that the property could be redeemed within two (2) years from and after the date of the sale, or until February 4, 1963. No redemption having been made within said period, the corresponding deed of sale was executed in favor of the Bank, on February 27, 1963. Prior to May 31, 1963, plaintiff offered to repurchase the property but the offer was turned down. He claimed that, as holder of a free patent and a torrens title, he is entitled to redeem the property within five (5) years from the date of the auction sale, pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Upon the other hand, defendants alleged in their answer that the right of redemption expired on February 4, 1963, under the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, which, they maintain, is controlling. Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 * Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670* Owners of lands covered by a homestead or free patent are entitled to redeem their property within five (5) years from the date of sale. The period of two (2) years granted for the redemption of property foreclosed refers to lands not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent, or to owners of lands without torrens titles, who can show five years or more of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance of titles but already approved, or of lands pending homestead or free patent titles. *Not the actual wordings Issue: Whether the period of redemption is governed by Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as asserted by the plaintiff, or by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended, as contended by the defendants Held:

The plaintiff herein has the right to repurchase the property in question within five (5) years from the date of the conveyance or foreclosure sale or up to February 4, 1966, and that having exercised such right and tendered payment long before the date last mentioned, defendants herein are bound to reconvey said property to him. Ratio: The legislative history of the bills which later became said Republic Act No. 2670, amending Republic Act No. 720, shows that the original proposal was to give homesteaders or free patent holders a period of ten (10) years within which to redeem their property foreclosed by rural banks; that this proposal was eventually found to be unwise, because its effect would have been to dissuade rural banks from granting loans to homesteaders or free patent holders which were sought to be liberalized said period of redemption being too long, from the viewpoint of said banks; and that, consequently, the proposal was given up, with the specific intent and understanding that homesteaders or holders of free patent would retain the right to redeem within five (5) years from the conveyance of their properties, as provided in the general law, that is to say the Public Land Act, or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act, they should be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the times.

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): CHINA BANKING CORP vs. Ortega

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973 Facts: Petitioner refuses to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405. Held: No. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.

ARANETA V DINGLASAN

Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of CA No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased. HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

Araneta v. Dinglasan FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (EmergencyPowers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Conventionof 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted duringthe time of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations were also terminated

Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan. Herelinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provisionsof Act No. 3899. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under the vetoed Sec. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peace togratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-Generalby claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence, was not subject toitem-veto. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. 7 was valid. HELD: Yes. It is clear from reading Sec. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. Hence, the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. Furthermore, the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, but when two co-equal branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes, they must be given great respect. Also, this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality.