Seminrio de Poltica Comparada e Relaes Internacionais (IPRIUNL e FCSH-UNL)

DRAFT: DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHOR

Between the Atlantic and the Empire: NATO as a framework for Portuguese-American relations in the early Cold War (1949-1957)
Daniel Marcos IPRI-UNL daniel.marcos@ipri.pt

Introduction After the difficult negotiations that led to the inclusion of Portugal as one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949 the American Ambassador at Lisbon, Lincoln MacVeagh, resumed this process to the Department of State saying that it [was] sometimes difficult to make a horse drink, though you have taken him to the water. And he added: the size of the horse has nothing to do with the matter. Little horses may very well be more stubborn than big ones.1 These considerations echoed the Portuguese resistance to accept the terms of the Washington Treaty. Since the beginning, Portugal understood that the reason behind its invitation was the geostrategic importance of the Azores, both for Western interests in general, and to the United States, in particular. However, this new alliance did not completely assure Lisbons foreign policy purposes, as the Portuguese authoritarian regime was not able to guarantee that its colonial territories in Africa and Asia stood within the area of action of the new defence treaty, which meant that NATO could not be called upon to defend them. This awareness is fundamental to understanding the framework that constrained US-Portuguese relations during the 1950s. The Portuguese authoritarian regime had a deeply rooted idea that the maintenance of its colonial empire in Africa

Letter from Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh to William Dunham, Department of State, April 29, 1949. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland Record Group (RG) 59, Lot File 59D108, Box 10.

and Asia was essential to ensure the independence of Portugal as a nation state in Western Europe. On the other hand, in Washington's perspective, the relationship with Portugal was crucial to protect its interests in Europe, defined in terms of the Cold War. The geostrategic position of the Portuguese Atlantic islands played a decisive role in the deployment of US forces in Europe, North Africa and Middle East while the Portuguese colonial territories were practically insignificant for US strategic interests at this time.2 In light of these contradictory realities US-Portuguese relations were constraint by the difficulty in integrating the strategic interests of both countries. While in the Atlantic, ties of alliance bound Portugal and the United States, on the colonial level the two countries had opposing views. Nevertheless, the interdependence developed since the signing of the Treaty of Washington forced the two countries to seek a modus vivendi that, in the end, guaranteed the broad interests of each country and the maintenance of unity within NATO. In this article the constraints of the US-Portuguese relations during the 1950s will be analyzed. It is intended to demonstrate how the presence of both countries in NATO was crucial to connect its interests in Europe, while Washington and Lisbon walked in opposite directions in Asia and Africa without tearing this relationship apart. Portugal, the United States and the Washington Treaty The invitation to Portugal to be a founding member of the Atlantic Pact was inextricably linked to the geostrategic importance of the Azores.3 Since 1944, following the Anglo-Portuguese Atlantic bases agreement of October 1943, the US had access to bases in the Azores (initially in the island of Santa Maria, and from 1946 onwards in Lajes, Terceira). In the early years of the Cold War US-Portuguese relations reflected a constant tension between the government of the Portuguese dictator, Oliveira Salazar, and the Truman Administration. Even allowing for the US presence in the Azores, Salazars regime showed great reluctance regarding the

For further information on the strategic importance of the Azores for the United Sates before the Cold War see Jos M. Ferreira, Os Aores nas Duas Guerras Mundiais, Boletim do Instituto Histrico da Ilha Terceira, XLV: 1987, 73-90; Antnio Telo, Os Aores e o Controlo do Atlntico (1898/1948) (Porto: Edies Asa, 1993) and Lus Rodrigues, No Corao do Atlntico. Os Estados Unidos e os Aores (1939-1948) (Lisboa, Edies Prefcio, 2005). 3 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 59 and Nuno Teixeira, From neutrality to alignment: Portugal in the foundation of the Atlantic Pact , Luso-Brazilian Review, 29:1992, 113-127.

existence of an American base in its territory.4 At the centre of this issue were different perceptions and interests. On the eve of Cold War, the United States considered the Azores, along with Greenland and Iceland, as a primary base area. The contribution of this archipelago to transatlantic security was therefore the most vital single spot in the world in terms of bases for the staging of air transport and combat aircraft. In this sense, it was essential to put an end to what the US considered an undefined status in the Azores, since the presence of US forces was only assured through a bilateral agreement signed with the Portuguese government, which established a short term period for the presence of the North-American forces in the Lajes; at the same time, the bilateral negotiations between the two governments were traditionally very difficult.5 Thus, to the Truman administration, it was necessary to promote the attainment of a stable and lasting agreement, clearly demonstrating the importance of Portuguese-American relations and the question of the Azores in the context of the Cold War.6 For Portugal, on the other hand, what was at stake was the readjustment of its international status. In geopolitical terms, the country had lived since its foundation on an unstable balance between Europe and the Atlantic. Peripheral regarding the core Europe and with a larger and more powerful Spanish neighbour, Portugal had always defined itself essentially as an Atlantic state, focused on the preservation of its colonial empire. Seeing Spain as its main threat, Portugal considered the Atlantic as a balancing factor for avoiding the countrys isolation on the westernmost part of Europe. In fact, the regimes elite saw the African and Asian Portuguese territories as the assurance of the countrys national independence, mostly because they allowed overcoming the geographical, political and economic limitations of Portugal as a European nation. Additionally, the traditional relationship with the United Kingdom, an element of continuity between the different political regimes that ruled Portugal, was essential for the international survival of Portugal, particularly in assuring the

4 5

Lus Rodrigues, No Corao do Atlntico. A report to the president by the National Security Council, November 25, 1947. Harry Truman Presidential Library (HTPL) Personal Secretary File, Subject File, Box 176. During the 1940s, US presence in the Azores was regulated by three bilateral agreements signed in 1944, 1946 and 1948. See Lus Rodrigues, No Corao do Atlntico. 6 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 31.

Atlantic vector. Consequently, the Portuguese government saw in the ancient alliance with Great Britain the main stronghold of its foreign policy.7 After World War II, the international position of Salazars regime was weakened. The Allies victory and the emergence of the United States as the main Atlantic power gradually, though not entirely, diminished the relevance of the long lasting alliance with the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, the victory of the democracies over the authoritarian regimes raised some political problems for the Estado Novo (New State). On the one hand, Italy and Germanys total defeat allowed the Soviet Union to enter in the centre of the European continent. On the other hand, the expansion of liberalism and democracy throughout Western Europe seemed to bring problems to the Iberian authoritarian regimes.8 And, as important as this, was the fact that Portugal needed to become closer to the new Atlantic power, the United Sates, in order to maintain its main foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, for Salazar, Washington seemed unfamiliar with European values, especially regarding the colonial interests of European powers. The traditional anti-colonial position of the various administrations clearly influenced the Portuguese dictators negative perception towards the United States.9 Having these constraints as background, the possibility of bringing a vehemently anti-communist Portugal to the restricted club of NATOs founding members was seen by the United States as a way of surpassing the bilateral limitations of US-Portuguese relations. The US pressed the other Brussels Pact partners in order to include a group of peripheral European countries in the future transatlantic organization. Along with Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland, it was decided in September 1948 that Portugal should be invited to join the new North Atlantic defensive agreement, even if it did not fully accept its conditions.10 The authoritarian characteristics of the Portuguese regime were criticised by some countries, in particular Canada, which pointed out the contradiction of having Portugal in an organization dedicated to the democratic spirit and the preservation of

Nuno Teixeira, Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy, in Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society and Culture (New York: SSM-Columbia University Press, 2011), 95-130. 8 Antnio Telo, Portugal e a Nato: O reencontro da tradio Atlntica (Lisboa: Edies Cosmos, 1996), 1. 9 Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD diss., ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon, 2011), 39-61. 10 Washington Paper, September 9, 1948. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, III: 240-241.

liberal institutions. Nonetheless, in the United States perspective, the fact that Portugal, despite its neutrality, was close to the Allies during the final phase of World War II and, mostly, the strong anti-communist character of the Estado Novo were sufficient reasons for an invitation to Portugal. With British support, the United States position prevailed and Portugal was for the first time approached on the possibility of being part of the future Alliance in October 1948.11 Lisbon acknowledged this first inquiry with the same apparent suspicion it received the news on the efforts for a greater European cooperation after the end of World War II. Excluded by Soviet veto from the United Nations in 1946, the Portuguese regime in 1947 sought to follow an autonomous position regarding the Marshall Plan. This led to a contradictory strategy of the Portuguese Government, which allowed Portugals participation at the Paris Conference of 1947 and the foundation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Nevertheless, Salazar initially refused to receive any financial support from the European Recovery Program (ERP) for Portugals underdeveloped economy.12 In face of this, the Portuguese government understood the need to establish some sort of transatlantic cooperation, particularly in the field of defence, which could challenge the Soviet threat in Europe13. Although Salazar had a negative perception of US power in Europe, it was already clear for the Portuguese political elite that the European defensive area should include the United States as an essential prerequisite to success. But it should also include Francos Spain, in order to preserve the strategic and geographical unity of Europe and the Iberian Peninsula.14 Besides this condition Portugal also considered that the Pact should assure the defence of the Portuguese colonies, namely through its extension into the European colonial possessions. At the same time, the Pact should not be a way for the United
11

Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 1948. The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (New York, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 172-177. 12 Despite the rhetoric, Portugal eventually received financial support from the ERP from 1948 to 1950. This change was justified by the degradation of the international financial system. For further information see Nuno Teixeira, Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy and Fernanda Rollo, Portugal e o Plano Marshall. Da rejeio solicitao da ajuda financeira norteamericana (1947-1952) (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1994). 13 US official acknowledgement that the Portuguese peripheral position at the Western end of Europe diminished the sense of threat of a military attack by the Soviet Union. This did not reflect a complete absence of reality regarding the effective threat of Moscow to Europe, but it revealed the idea that Portugal was thought to be in a position to bargain with the transatlantic partners. For further information see Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial, 129 -130. 14 Telegram Ambassador in Portugal to Secretary of State, September 8, 1948. FRUS, 1948, III: 10021005.

States to assure its long-term presence in the Azores, in more favourable conditions. Finally, the Alliance should reinforce the intergovernmental cooperation, avoiding any type of supranational integration.15 Despite Lisbons efforts, the Portuguese terms to sign the Atlantic Alliance were not considered by the Treatys negotiators (United States, Canada and th e members of the Brussels Pact) in particular what concerned the accession of Francos Spain and the inclusion of the colonial territories in the Treatys area of action.16 Salazar and the Portuguese elite had their hands tied up and, as he himself recognized during the National Assembly meeting where the Washington Treaty was ratified, Portugals presence as a founding member of the Alliance was largely due to the importance of the Atlantic islands to Europes geostrategic concerns. In short, to the Portuguese government, it seemed difficult () to be absent.17 Being pressured by its main allies, including the United States, the Portuguese government eventually gave in, more out of a necessity than by conviction. Despite the reluctance demonstrated by Lisbon, it is undeniable that Portuguese participation in the Atlantic Pact was fundamental for the international legitimation of the Portuguese authoritarian regime, highly diminishing the risk of its international isolation.18 Added to this, the invitation to Portugal was a unique opportunity to strengthen the countrys weight in the international system, bringing it closer to the Western powers and clearly distinguishing it from Francos regime in Spain. In a period of intense international adaptation, with the beginning of the Cold War, Portugal had to adapt its own foreign policy, maintaining its links with the United Kingdom while becoming closer to the United States.19
15

Nuno Teixeira, From neutrality to alignment; Pedro Oliveira, Documentos: A Adeso de Portugal NATO (1948-1949), Poltica Internacional, 19: 1999, 121-150. 16 Portugal sought to ensure that its colonial territories were included within the treaty area. Nevertheless, the results were not the same as the ones achieved by Paris, which was successful in its efforts. For more details see Carlos Gaspar Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte, In Antnio Barreto and Maria Filomena Mnica (ed.), Dicionrio de Histria de Portugal (Porto: Livraria Figueirinhas, 2000), 678-684; Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 1948, 211-212. 17 Carlos Gaspar, Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte, 678 -684; Oliveira Salazars speech in the Portuguese National Assembly, July 26, 1949. Quoted on Franco Nogueira, Salazar. O Ataque (1945-1958) (Porto: Livraria Civilizao Editora, 2000), 155. 18 As the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris put it to Oliveira Salazar in a letter where he defended the necessity of Portuguese participation in NATO, excluded from the United Nations Portugal could not miss the opportunity of strengthen the international links with the Western powers. Letter from Marcello Mathias to Oliveira Salazar, March 23, 1949. Verssimo Serro (ed.), Correspondncia Marcello Mathias/Salazar (1947/1968) (Lisboa: Difel, 1984), 127-129. 19 Lus Rodrigues, Crossroads of the Atlantic: Portugal, the Azores and the Atlantic Community (1943-1957), In Valrie Aubourg, Grard Bssuat, Giles Scott -Smith (ed.), European Community, Atlantic Community? (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 456-467; Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial:

The Portuguese presence in NATO was perceived by the Truman Administration as a crucial moment in the relationship between the two countries. It became clear that the old, traditional bond between Portugal and the United Kingdom was now hardly more than a sentimental alliance. The Atlantic Alliance emerged now as an alternative substitute to this liaison and the United States was increasing its diplomatic influence over the Portuguese government. The US was now the leading power in the Western Alliance and had the right to act as such.20 In short, with the signature of the Washington Treaty, the international situation was deeply changed and Portugal was no longer merely a friend of our friends. In this sense, the US wanted to take advantage of the Pacts multilateral spirit to renew the bilateral relation with Portugal, clearly having in mind the need for the presence of North-American forces in the Azores.21 Integrated in the transatlantic community, the Portuguese regime began a cautious inclusion in the Atlantic Alliance, with a double result. On the one hand, Salazars regime was forced to take a stand regarding the main international issues, which definitely put an end to the neutrality policy followed by the regime since World War II. If the international responsibility increased, so did the external prestige of the regime.22 On the other hand, the Portuguese Armed Forces were arguably the group on which NATO had a more profound impact.23 In return, on 6 September 1951, Portugal and the United States signed an agreement, by exchange of notes, to define the facilities conceded by Portugal to the American forces in the Azores, until the end of 1956. As the Portuguese press memorandum stated, having in mind NATOs dispositions regarding the principle of common defence and the preservation of peace and security, the United States and Portugal had signed an agreement of defence which regulated these facilities, by integrating them in the framework of the Alliances defensive procedures.24 Thus, as a member of NATO, the Portuguese government allowed the United States to immediately prepare and to
Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011), 39. 20 Letter from the US Ambassador at Lisbon to the Department of State (William Dunham), April 29, 1949. NARA RG 59, Lot 59D108, Box 10. 21 Note from the US Embassy in Lisbon to the Portuguese Government, December 7, 1949. Direco Geral Arquivos (DGARQ), Lisboa AOS/CO/NE-18-1. 22 Daniel Marcos, Portugal e a Evoluo do Sistema Defensivo Europeu. A Cimeira de Lisboa de 1952, Relaes Internacionais, 27 (2010): 65-80. 23 Antnio Telo, Portugal e a Nato: O reencontro da tradio Atlntica (Lisboa: Edies Cosmos, 1996). 24 Dirio de Notcias, September 7, 1951, 1.

maintain the facilities considered necessary, in order to have them ready in case of war.25 Portugal and the early days of NATO The deterioration of international stability in the early 1950s forced Portugal to deepen its relations with the new allies in a spirit of increasingly open cooperation. From the end of 1949 to June 1950, several events compelled the United States and its allies to reinforce their military position concerning the Soviet Union. First, the US lost the nuclear monopoly, seen as the only balancing weapon against Soviet supremacy in Europe.26 Secondly, following the victory of the Chinese Communist in Mainland China, in June 1950 the world witnessed the beginning of the Korean War.27 These events had definitive consequences to NATO and to Europes evolution during the Cold War. In Washington and the other European capitals, the need to increase the investment in European defence became evident. This process meant an increase in the military expenditure and, at the same time, a deep reform of the Alliances political structures, which transformed the Pact into a true collective defence organization.28 Yet, the way these objectives were to be achieved was not consensual among the allies. To the US, the best way to develop the collective defence effort in Europe was through NATO, with all member-states participating in it and with the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In fact, West Germany, despite belonging to the geographical area of the Treaty, was not an original member of the Pact and did not contribute to the Alliances military effort until after 1954. According to the American plans, West Germany should contribute to the wider European defensive effort, in the process of increasing the conventional capacity of the Alliance to compensate for the loss of the Wests nuclear monopoly. This evolution would force

25

Anexo I do Acordo Luso-Americano de 6 de Setembro de 1951. Arquivo da Defesa Nacional (ADN), Pao de Arcos Fundo do Secretariado-Geral de Defesa Nacional, Box 7089.2. 26 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. The Making of European Settlement (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 96-98. 27 John Gaddis, The Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 40-60. 28 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 63 ff.; Carlos Gaspar A Aliana Atlntica e o mtodo dos alargamentos, Nao e Defesa, 102 (2002), 45-63.

NATO to commit to the defence of West German territory and to develop a new relationship between the FRG and the Alliance.29 The resolution of this political process was two fold. Firstly, it consisted in the creation of an integrated command in the Alliance, in the second half of 1950, as well as the promotion of the idea that all the allies would accept the future integration of West Germany into the organization.30 Later, during the Lisbon Summit of February 1952, the Allies agreed upon the creation of the office of NATOs Secretary General and the constitution of a Permanent Council of Representatives. These actions centralized and reinforced the Alliance, which reflected on the concentration of all administrative dimensions of the Pact in a single International Secretariat.31 But most importantly, due to some allies resistance, especially France, between 1950 and 1952 several negotiations took place between the US, Great Britain, France and, in a later moment, the Federal Republic of Germany itself, in order to find an agreement regarding how and under which type of association Germany would participate in European defence. Paris refused to accept West Germany in NATO and proposed the creation of a supranational organization, similar to the model of the European Coal and Steel Community, which should integrate the German military assets in a future European Defence Community (EDC). The new organization that was formalized in the Treaty of Paris, in May 1952, received its decisive boost at NATOs meeting in Lisbon, in February 1952. During this Summit the Allies Foreign Ministers gave their approval both to the negotiations on EDC and on the political future of West Germany. Furthermore, they approved the terms of the future relationship between NATO and the EDC.32 It was envisaged that this would be done through an additional protocol to the Washington Treaty, approved by all member states, which established the mutual commitment, in terms of security and defence, between the members of both organizations. According to the final communiqu of the Summit, the Atlantic Council acknowledged that NATO and EDC had the same general objectives and considered that the obligations and relationships between the
29

OTAN, Organization du Trait de l'Atlantique Nord. Structure, Faits et Chiffres (Brussels: OTAN, 1981), 28-29. 30 James McAllister, No Exit. America and the German Problem (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 188. 31 Report 1205 from the North Atlantic Pact Service, April 7, 1953. Arquivo Histrico DiplomticoMNE (AHD-MNE), Lisboa RNP, A. 50, M. 102. 32 William Hitchcock, France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 133-168; James McAllister, No Exit. America and the German Problem, 171-244.

Communities should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and reinforcing the other.33 According to the Portuguese government, these deep changes had to be accompanied with guarantees that no ally would have its political voice diminished within NATO, even though if, in the military field, it was clear that the US had an eminence of their own.34 Although seeing it as globally positive, Portugal considered that NATOs political restructuring could bring some problems in the future. Decisions like the creation of the Permanent Council and the position of the Secretary General, despite being considered as essential and allowing faster decisions, should not be considered as definitive. The major concern of the Portuguese government was the powers of the Secretary General in particular the ability to contact an individual government without having to previously consult with the permanent representative of that country. From the Portuguese perspective, this was a dangerous prerogative, as it could transform the Secretary General into an absolute authority within the Alliance, anticipating a future supranational character to NATO.35 Concerning the EDC, Portugal was sceptical regarding any political institutions which were considered federalist and supranational. Thus, projects like the European Defence Community seemed mere inaccurate ideas only to be implemented in the long term.36 However, that did not mean that Portugal would block the French efforts to build such a Community, in particular if these efforts were conducive to a solution of German participation in European defence effort. Despite arguing that this solution should be simply achieved through German accession to NATO, Portugal was proud of being one of the first European countries to publicly sustain FRGs participation in the European defensive system and, in that sense, it did not block the other allies solutions.37 Finally, the Portuguese government was forced to accept and to endorse the first enlargement of the Alliance. The accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952 reaffirmed

33

Final Communiqu of the North Atlantic Council, Lisbon, 20-25 February 1952. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Online Library, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm (accessed October 12, 2011). 34 Franco Nogueira, Salazar. O Ataque (1945-1958) (Barcelos: Civilizao, 2000), 170-171. 35 Informao de Servio, 17 de Maro de 1952. AHD-MNE RQE, A. 51, M. 21. 36 Evoluo da NATO durante os ltimos meses: de Otawa a Roma e ao TCC, July 8, 1951. AHDMNE RNP, A. 50, M. 102. 37 Informao de Servio, March 17, 1952. AHD-MNE RQE, A. 51, M. 21

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NATOs engagement to the strategic space of the Mediterranean, initiated with the invitation to Italy as one of NATOs founding members.38 However, the accession of these two countries was not consensual. If, on the one hand, the US were clearly interested in having Turkey contributing to the collective effort of Western defence, most of the European partners had strong doubts about this.39 Nonetheless, the strategic interest of the US and NATO prevailed and the accession of Turkey and Greece was decided in Lisbon. Regarding this enlargement, Portugal considered that these two countries membership would be seen by Moscow as a provocation. Furthermore, the accession of a country such as Turkey menaced the spirit of the Alliance, which was based on the association of states with a common heritage, culture and objectives.40 Moreover, this process did not serve Portuguese interests, since Lisbon was mainly concerned with the integration of Spain into the European defensive system and not towards an area that had little strategic importance to Portugal. As Foreign Minister Paulo Cunha declared, if Portugal effusively greeted this decision, it could only avoid regretting that it had not yet been decided to close the Alliance in the West, and remove the absurd situation which is the absence of Spain in the Western defence system.41 Therefore, the first years of the Alliance allowed Salazar to enhance international recognition of his regime, while simultaneously consolidating the Portuguese position with regard to transatlantic cooperation. While any sort of supranational project seemed unattractive to the Portuguese objectives, Portugal decided not to oppose these ideas, as to do so would risk the repeal of transatlantic compromises assumed by Western allies after World War II. According to the Portuguese government, the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed its role as a fundamental organization for the maintenance of an independent Europe facing the Soviet threat. Despite the Portuguese governments traditionally sceptical rhetoric regarding the United States, the fact is that Portugal became one of the most cooperative allies.42

38 39

Carlos Gaspar, A Aliana Atlntica e o mtodo dos alargamentos, Nao e Defesa, 102 (2002), 50. James Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 29-30. 40 Memorandum of Conversation, July 13, 1951. NARA RG59, Lot File 59D108, Box 1. 41 Dirio de Notcias, February 20, 1952, 1 and 6. 42 Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011), 103-118.

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From the Atlantic to the Empire: NATO and the emergence of the colonial issues in US-Portuguese Relations The developments that occurred in NATO in the early 1950s jeopardized the established guidelines of Portuguese foreign policy. Traditionally with its back turned to Europe, Portugal was forced to deepen its relations with the United States, whether at a multilateral or at a bilateral level.43 With an impact on various aspects of Portuguese political life, the traditionally tense bilateral relationship between Portugal and the United States had been maturing since the Second World War, particularly due to the multilateral framework assured by common participation in NATO. In early 1954 the Portuguese government reassessed Portuguese-American relations in face of the new alliance system in which both countries participated. According to a memorandum prepared by Alberto Franco Nogueira, a promising diplomat from the Bureau of Political Affairs who would become Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1961, the most important issues in the relationship between the United States and Portugal would always be, from the American perspective, the Azores and, from the Portuguese point of view, the maintenance of its colonial empire. Therefore, in order to achieve this objective Portugal had to follow an integrated, firm and comprehensive policy to avoid being ignored or overlooked in all the issues that mattered to the Western powers. In light of this, it was fundamental to follow a set of principles that had been the basis of Portuguese foreign policy throughout history, especially when reassessing relations with the United States. Firstly, Portugal could not risk losing its independence by getting involved and losing a war. In this sense, it was essential that she should not take part in any coalition of forces that did not offer a "guarantee of victory in a future conflict. Independence and victory were assured with Portugal's accession to NATO in 1949 since it appeared unlikely that this Alliance would be defeated in war against the Soviet Union.44 However, the participation in NATO had made Portugals foreign policy more vulnerable regarding what the Portuguese government considered to be one of the main aspects of its external autonomy: the maintenance of the colonial empire. Since the first moment, the Portuguese government understood that its participation in the Alliance increased the risks to any Portuguese territory, without assuring its
43 44

Nuno Teixeira, Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1989, Anlise Social, 30-133 (1995), 803-818. Memorando da Repartio de Negcios Polticos para o Ministro dos Negcios Estrangeiros, January, 1954. AHD-MNE RNP, A. 59, M. 232.

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defence. Therefore, it was clear that one of the main concerns of Portuguese foreign policy was not protected. In this sense, the country was in a position in which it could not count on an Alliance or political support that would protect its vital interests outside the coalition area in which we are included.45 Having this in mind, there were two possible solutions: either a full alliance, in which case the obvious partner would be the United States, or outside of the coalition and regarding the issues which are not abridged by it, the development of a policy of independence, which would look for partial political support elsewhere. This had been the strategy adopted by Portugal when dealing with the Far East powers, where the survival of Macau and Portuguese territories in India was accounted for, among other reasons, by the fact that Portugal had always followed a different policy to that adopted by the West.46 What suggested itself was a policy of independence in Africa and in the Far East, which would not consider the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but which would unfold in different directions according to the Portuguese interests. These, in certain moments, could even be contradictory to those of the Pact. In conclusion, Nogueira stated: having in mind the need for cooperation in Europe, for Western defence; considering that it was not clearly legitimate nor convenient, to review the terms of that cooperation; being imperative for Portugal correspondingly, to help to defend the Western Civilization values and to protect the territorial integrity of the Nation it seemed that the only option would be to follow the independent policy as base for a possible global orientation of the Portuguese foreign policy towards the United States47. Thus, any possibility of a deepening of the bilateral relations with the United States was inhibited by the Portuguese need in assuring support for the maintenance of its colonial empire. As the US seemed unable to assure this, there was no alternative to Portugal but to adopt a flexible and pragmatic position: showing
45

Before World War II this foreign policy guideline was assured by the Alliance between Portugal and Great Britain. However, in the 1950s, it was already clear to Portugal that Britain was not in a position of affording support to Portuguese colonial interests. For further information see Pedro Oliveira, Os Despojos da Aliana. A Gr-Bretanha e a questo colonial portuguesa, 1945-1975 (Lisboa: Tinta-daChina Edies, 2007). 46 Historically, Portuguese Foreign policy in the Far East was based on the effort to follow an autonomous position regarding the Western Powers. This meant that the Portuguese government should analyze every particular situation independently, which could mean adopting a course that serve the interests of the regional powers, China, for example, instead of those of the European powers. Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011), 145-146. 47 Memorando da Repartio de Negcios Polticos para o Ministro dos Negcios Estrangeiros, January, 1954. AHD-MNE RNP, A. 59, M. 232.

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solidarity in the defence of Western values, as long as Portuguese interests were not endangered in the Third World. In the case of a threat to Portuguese sovereignty outside Europe, Portugal should look for partial support to other countries at the same time it assumed its autonomy regarding the Atlantic power, as a way of pressing it to safeguard Portuguese interests.48 From 1954 onwards Portugal finally had objective reasons to have suspicions regarding Washingtons support for Portuguese colonial policy. Salazar understood this when a grave crisis arose between Portugal and the United States over the Portuguese colonies in India: Goa, Damo and Diu, three small territories on the western coast of the Indian subcontinent. After independence, the Indian government revealed to Portugal that it wished to take possession of all the foreign territories which remained in India. However, Portugal refused any kind of negotiation that could lead to any transference of power in Goa. Lisbon argued that it was not possible to discuss or negotiate with a foreign government a question related to its sovereignty.49 For Salazar, it was unquestionable that Goa was culturally European, even though he agreed that geographically, socially and religiously it was Indian. And, for Portugal, the Goans were considered Portuguese citizens, members without distinction of a civilized community with many centuries of existence.50 In Salazars opinion, this showed that the Portuguese had always revealed the tendency to create a morally united motherland with territories and peoples which in time would become incorporated in the nation. On the other hand, these people demonstrated throughout history the same living solidarity with Portugal as the branches of a tree have with its trunk and roots. It was for these reasons that Portugals moral duty was to continue to govern in Goa.51 For the Indian government, the existence of Portuguese colonies in India was considered an accident of history. Indias Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, thought that the maintenance of artificial barriers that were blocking the rising tide
48

Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial; John Lewis Gaddis defines as progressive autonomy what the superpowers allies tried to achieve from the end of the 1950s onwards. In the case of the Soviet Union, the most paradigmatic example was the People Republic of China. In regard to the United States, the actions of De Gaulles France shows the increasing difficulty that the superpowers had in controlling their allies. In sum, progressively, the weakest discovered opportunities to confront the strongest. John Gaddis, The Cold War, 119-155. 49 Franco Nogueira, Salazar. O Ataque (1945-1958) (Barcelos: Civilizao, 2000), 177. 50 Misria e medo: caractersticas do momento actual. Speech by Oliveira Salazar, November 25, 1947. Oliveira Salazar, Discursos e Notas Polticas. 1943-1950 (Lisboa: Coimbra Editora, 1961), 306. 51 Oliveira Salazar, Goa and the Indian Union: the Portuguese view, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, 3 (1956), 418-431.

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of national urge for unity was impossible to sustain. The Portuguese territories were incompatible with the status of India as an independent country. Thus, those pockets of foreign territories, however small in area and however friendly the powers occupying them, should simply not exist on Indian soil.52 The argumentation used by the Indian government reflected a fundamental point of its foreign policy: the idea that India had the right and the obligation to promote the liberation of subject peoples as well as the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual. In other words, India had a duty to fight all forms of colonialism. However, even though India felt the moral duty to help the Third World free itself from European colonialism, Nehrus policy had a dilemma: morally and intellectually committed with the settlement of dispute through peaceful means, any attempt to force a reluctant colonial power to leave Indian soil could be charged with hypocrisy53. For this reason, the initial position of India, regarding Goa, was to establish political and diplomatic relations with Portugal, hoping that it could lead to future negotiations regarding its territories in India. Originally, Nehru and other Indian leaders did not attach much importance to Goas problem since for them Portuguese rule would wither away, the moment British rule come to an end in India. Nehru assumed that the Portuguese would quit Goa without any hesitation as it would be impossible for them to survive without the goodwill of Britain.54 However, facing the reluctance of the Portuguese to discuss their exit, India developed a more aggressive policy. Between 1953 and 1955, Delhi closed its Embassy in Lisbon and strengthened the support to the Goan nationalist movements.55 Since the beginning of this quarrel, the United States had adopted a neutral position to avoid any involvement in the effort developed by the Indian government to bring about through negotiation the remaining foreign enclaves in India.56 The US wished to have as little to do as possible regarding this issue so as to avoid damaging their relations both with Portugal and India.57

52

Note from the Legation of India in Lisbon, January, 14, 1953. Vinte anos de Defesa do Estado da ndia, (Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1967), 281-283. This idea of geographical contiguity as an argument to take control over Goa was contested by Portugal on the basis that from British India two countries have become independent: Pakistan and Indian Union. 53 Arthur Rubinoff, Indias use of Force in Goa (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971), 15-29. 54 P.P Shirodkar, Goas Struggle for Freedom (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1988), 40-41. 55 Maria Stocker, Xeque-Mate a Goa (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2005), 95 and P. D. Gaitonde, The Liberation of Goa: A Participants view of History (London: Hurst&Co, 1987), 71-80. 56 Department of State Policy Statement, December 1, 1950. FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, 1480. 57 Memorandum of Conversation, February 14, 1951. FRUS , 1951, Vol. VI, p.1663.

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Rhetorically, for the Portuguese government, the Goan dispute seemed one more case of Communist penetration in Asia. Consistent with the cooperation showed by Portugal in the early years of NATO, Portuguese diplomacy followed a strategy of creating an overall awareness of the future dangers that were at stake for the Alliance in case of an aggression against the Portuguese territories in Asia. Following the heroic efforts being made by the French in confronting revolutionary anti-colonial forces in Indochina, the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, Paulo Cunha, stated in the North Atlantic Council in April 1954 the need for NATO to increase vigilance throughout the world. It was time to follow a policy of firmness without provocation in order to prevent the development of Communism in Asia. Accordingly, Cunha argued that NATO should prevent any new aggression in this area such as the one which might arise in face of the efforts developed by the Indian Government towards Goa, which affected the national integrity of Portugal.58 But, behind the Portuguese rhetoric expressed in the plenary session of the NATO Council, the Goan dispute was the occasion where the Lisbon government wished that the Alliance could somehow protect its colonial interests. Assuming its loyalty towards the overall importance of the Alliance for the Western world, Portugal still tried to conciliate its interests within the Atlantic Treaty dispositions. Understanding that it not would be possible to invoke article 559 of the Atlantic Alliance, all that was left for Portugal was to call upon article 4, which stated that there might be a collective position from the Allies in the case where one of its members considered that its territorial integrity and security might be endangered. In order to achieve this objective, Portugal approached both the United Kingdom and the United States.60 In only one month, the Portuguese government tried to raise the matter to the highest level of the Department of State, calling the attention of the Deputy Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith, and Deputy Under Secretary, Robert Murphy. On both occasions, Washington argued that such consultation would result in any action by the Council or if the Council should take any action, it was doubtful that it would be effective in producing a solution and would allow Communist propaganda to arouse Indian and South Asian sensitivities

58 59

Department of State Telegram, April 24, 1954. FRUS, 1952 -1954, Vol. V, p. 516. According to this article, any attack to a NATO ally is considered to be an act of violence against all member states of this organization. 60 Portuguese approach to the United Kingdon in Pedro Oliveira, Os Despojos da Aliana, pp. 95-103.

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regarding a Western Bloc and the preservation of colonialism.61 In face of this reply, Portugal dropped its intention. The invasion of two Portuguese enclaves, Nagar Aveli e Dadr, by Goan nationalists supported by Indian police officers in July 1954 and the consequent Portuguese complaint, both in NATO and in Washington, failed to persuade Portugals allies, in particular the United States, to take action. Confronted with a formal request for help by the Portuguese government, namely a public declaration of solidarity by the United States, the State Department responded that it was not in a strong position to take any action condemning India. Washington considered that any public position was impracticable regarding the international atmosphere in Asia, since the United States had the strongest desire to become sympathetic in the eyes of Nehrus government.62 In other words, Portugal should not expect from the United States anything more than private general advice to the government of India against the use of violence.63 The Eisenhower administrations position caused great dissatisfaction in Lisbon. Aware that the United States would not allow NATOs involvement in this dispute, the Portuguese regime tried to make Goa a Cold War issue. Consequently, Lisbon put in motion a contradictory strategy of bilateral pressure that, in the end, could jeopardize the Alliances overall interests. Salazar and the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Paulo Cunha quickly understood that the American interest and commitment in the Azores could play an important role in this affair. In reaction to the US neutral position, Cunha called the American Ambassador to his office and strongly criticized his government attitude. According to Cunha, Portugal had always collaborated with US and had never asked for economic aid or other quid pro quo both in US-Portuguese multilateral and bilateral relations. However, some political collaboration in return was obviously expected. As Robert Guggenheim, the US Ambassador at Lisbon, put it, it was not possible to predict how this matter could not fail in gravely affecting such things as NATO and Azores. The tone used by Paulo Cunha, who was not a person to imply double-dealing lightly, proved that

61

Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) and to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), May 20, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. V, pp. 1742-1744. 62 Memorandum from the Foreign Ministry to the Overseas Ministry, Julho 31, 1954. Vinte anos de Defesa do Estado da ndia, Vol. II. (Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1967), 35-36. 63 Office Memo to the Secretary of State, July 30, 1954. NARA RG 59, Lot File 59D 108, Box 3.

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the Portuguese government was sincerely aroused at what they consider to be a very shabby treatment by the United States.64 It did not take much time for the US administration to start believing that its position regarding Goa might have endangered NATO and US objectives in the Azores. Even within the Department of State, especially in the Bureau that took care of US-Portuguese relations, it became clear that the Portuguese super-sensitivity over Goa was caused by Lisbons clear perception that the United Sates were more concerned in protecting their interests in India than in supporting a NATO ally.65 However, the mood was about to change. At the same time as the Goan issue intensified, the US Department of Defence was studying the possibility of expanding the facilities granted to the United States in the Azores in 1951. These plans implied a considerable increase in US military personnel as well as a request for the extension of the US presence in the Azores. For the Department of Defence, it was obvious that US diplomacy had to have in mind, when setting an attitude toward Portugal regarding Goa, the facilities we already enjoy in the Azores, but also the steady pressure for their expansion (), to say nothing of the renewal of the Azores agreement itself in 1956.66 Basically, the Department of Defence not only wanted additional facilities. They also wanted a new agreement, with an extension of the deadline. However, the Department of Defence was not the only part of the administration to support this point of view. To the US Embassy in Lisbon, the Goan issue should be seen as an opportunity to create a better atmosphere for the attainment of future US-Portuguese relations. As James Bonbright, the newly appointed US Ambassador at Lisbon insisted, helping Portugal was a refreshing position by the United States since it was normally this country that requested assistance from Portugal. Therefore, any kind of helpful motion or some moral support to Portugal would pay big dividends in US-Portuguese relations especially regarding the bases in the Azores.67

64

Telegram from the Ambassador in Portugal to the Department of State, August 9, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VI, 1744-1745. 65 Letter from the US Embassy in Lisbon to the Department of State, August 30, 1954. NARA- RG59, Lot File 59D108, Box 3. 66 Dispatch from the Embassy in Lisbon to the Department of State, November 2, 1954. FRUS, 19521954, Vol. VI, pp. 1749-1750. 67 Letter from the American Embassy in Lisbon, April 23, 1954. NARA RG 59, Lot File 59D 108, Box 3.

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With the deterioration of US relations with Portugal and in view of American interests in the Azores, the State Department was forced to produce a policy to do what it could to renew the Azores agreement.68 This position was completely connected to the Goan issue since Portugal had, according to the State Department, a strong emotional position regarding Goa that nobody seemed to control. Therefore, the least they were expecting was that the USA should stop playing a losing game with Nehru and start to give full attention to the virile small nations of the West.69 Trying to bring together the Portuguese and United States points of view, at the end of 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invited his Portuguese counterpart to make an official visit to the USA, where they could discuss the situation of USPortuguese relations, with particular focus on the Goan dispute, NATO evolution and the renewal of the Azores agreement. In a private meeting with Foster Dulles, Paulo Cunha emphasized the position which Goa holds in the heart of all Portuguese since it was constitutionally inseparable from the homeland and a part of the life-blood of the Portuguese people. There were no negotiations that could be held with the objective of transferring power in Goa to India; not even a plebiscite, as Dulles suggested, since for Cunha that would be like the United States holding a plebiscite in Alaska, Massachusetts or Florida to decide whether American citizens there want to remain Americans. Besides the Goa question, Foster Dulles and Cunha also had the opportunity to discuss the renegotiation of the Azores Agreement. For Cunha, the American request, that included the increase of US troops, raised serious political questions. To the Portuguese minister, the United States should be aware that the Portuguese people were very sensitive about their sovereignty and did not favour the presence of foreigners on their soil. Despite understanding the Portuguese position, Foster Dulles mentioned the importance of NATO maintaining a strong defensive posture as a deterrent of war.70 The Portuguese foreign minister made it clear that the evolution of USPortuguese relations in the Azores was deeply connected to the support the US might give to Portugal in its colonial policies. Portugal was not in a position to accept a long term US presence in the Azores during peacetime, especially if the US showed itself
68 69

Memorandum of Conversation, January 13, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, 439. Letter from the US Embassy in Portugal to the Portuguese Desk, September 24, 1954. NARA RG 84, US Legation in Lisbon, Box 47. 70 Memorandum of Conversation, November 30, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, pp. 445-451.

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so uncooperative with regard to Portuguese colonial interests. At the end of this visit, the Eisenhower administration was forced to assume, for the first and only time, its support for the maintenance of Portuguese colonial possessions. In a declaration that became known has the Cunha-Dulles Statement, both the US administration and the Portuguese government concluded that the two countries embrace many peoples of many races and for that reason they deplored all efforts to foment hatred between East and West and to divide people who need to feel a sense of unity and fellowship for peace and mutual welfare, in a direct reference to the Portuguese territories in India that were in dispute between Portugal and Nehrus government. Finally, both governments reinforced the idea that all these topics had in common the problems of defence within the framework of NATO, reinforcing the importance that the Azores and the harmony of US-Portuguese relations had for US interests, in particular, and the Western World in general.71 In the next year and a half Portugal and the United States carefully prepared a new Azores agreement. US clear support for Portugal in late 1955 regarding the Goan dispute obviously contributed to this process. However, it cannot be said that the relations between the two countries recovered definitely. In fact, the negotiations for the renewal of this agreement were intentionally delayed by the Portuguese government, owing to its anxiety and annoyance over American foreign policy, particularly during the Suez crisis in late 1956. In a meeting with Ambassador James Bonbright at the end of 1956, Salazar was very explicit: a series of events caused the Portuguese government to reflect on the desirability of postponing the conclusion of the new agreement. Since Portugal had interests scattered in Africa and Asia, they had to make sure that American policies were not prejudicial to those interests. For the Portuguese dictator, the hostile position adopted by the United States towards France and the UK during the Suez Crisis had completely undermined NATO, which had forced Portugal to wait to see where the US is heading before accepting the extension of US facilities in the Azores under NATO provisions.72
71

Cunha-Dulles Statement, December 2, 1955. Vinte anos de Defesa do Estado da ndia , Vol. III (Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1968), 51. The Cunha-Dulles Statement was a milestone on US-Portuguese relations. For the United States, it reflected the North-American position regarding the Bandung Conference of 1955. For the Portuguese Government, the Cunha-Dulles Statement was made at a time when the recent Portuguese accession to the United Nations anticipated a period of strong criticism to Portugals colonial policy in that institution. Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial. 72 Despatch from the US Embassy in Lisbon, January 4, 1957. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, 466471.

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In private, Salazar understood that the compromise of defending the Portuguese colonies was something beyond any American Administration. Accordingly, the only solution was to limit the duration of the agreements, forcing the United States to a constant renegotiation to maintain the facilities in the Azores.73 The agreement was finally signed in September 1957, valid for five years, until December 1962, when, once again, the colonial issue arose, at that point due to the developing colonial war in Angola.

Conclusion Behind the invitation for Portugal to become a member of NATO was the United States strategic interest in the North Atlantic area, particularly the utilization of the Lajes airfield in the Azores. As has been seen, for the Portuguese authoritarian regime the invitation to participate as a founding member of this restrictive group raised problems for Portugals foreign policy. It quickly became clear that the Alliance would not assure its colonial interests. However, the acceptance of the North-American invitation, more by necessity than by conviction, represented several gains for Salazar: the international recognition of the authoritarian Estado Novo regime and its insertion in the Western bloc. During the Alliances first years, Salazars strongly anti-communist government was a committed ally, supporting a solution for the European Defence Community, accepting the Alliances first enlargement in the Mediterranean area and the institutional reform of NATO. In all these issues, Portugal had to adjust itself in order to strengthen the Atlantic Alliances cohesion. Simultaneously, Portugals participation in the Atlantic Alliance served as a broader framework for the bilateral relations with the United States. In fact, this multilateral framework constrained the two countries to become allies. If, in the first place, the Azores were the reason behind Portugals admission into NATO, after 1949 it was the Alliance that brought together the two countries and forced them to strengthen their relationship. The United States, because it was in its interest to maintain and further develop the facilities in the Lajes airfield; Portugal, because it was aware of this interest and played the Azorean trump card to push Washington and

73

Handwritten note by Oliveira Salazar on US-Portuguese relations, November, 1955. DGARQ AOS/CO/NE-17.

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thereby, obtain leverage in the colonial issue. This strategy led to the creation of a modus vivendi in US-Portuguese relations that was based on a thin balance between the interests of both governments. The Goan dispute in the mid-1950s is a clear example of this situation. After one last effort to raise the problem in NATO, which was firmly denied by the United States, the Portuguese government felt it was essential to put the Eisenhower Administration under pressure. By delaying the renegotiation of the Azores Agreement, Salazar and his government clearly demonstrated that Lisbon expected some kind of solidarity regarding Portugals colonial problems, in exchange for her loyalty in the Atlantic Alliance. However, Portugal never went as far as jeopardizing the interests of the Alliance or even the defence of Western Europe. The interdependence of the Portuguese-US interests forced the creation of a modus vivendi between the two countries, having always NATO as the broader framework of the bilateral US-Portuguese relations. In other words, in exchange for the only public demonstration of solidarity by the United States on Portuguese colonial policy, Portugal agreed to extend the Azores facilities for five more years. As a result, until the end of the Eisenhower administration, US-Portuguese relations developed in a constrained way, though they did not break apart. In conclusion, this modus vivendi allowed Portugal to be perfectly inserted into the western bloc and in the Cold War international system, at the same time it assured the maintenance of the Azores base for the US forces. Consequently, US-Portuguese relations evolved but were always constrained between the Atlantic and the Empire.

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