IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA GENERAL JURISDICTION

DIVISION CASE NO. 11 20527 CA 21

LTA LOGISTICS, INC. LESTER TRIMINO, etal,

THE

ORDINAL

FILED ON'-

Enrique Varona, Defendant,

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE THE DEFENDANT, Enrique Varona, a living human being who is

not a straw-man or corporate fiction, who is Sui Juris acting Pro-se in this action, pursuant to Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.33(d)(l), hereby files the following Motion to Disqualify the Honorable Antonio Arzola from presiding over any future motions filed in this case, and as grounds therefore, states as follows: PRIOR MOTION TO DISQUALIFY Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.330(c) requires the Defendant to inform that on March 4th, 2013 the petitioner filed a motion to disqualify this court. The motion was denied by Judge Antonio Arzola.

FACTS 1. Defendant Enrique Varona has been sued by LTA LOGISTICS, alleging tortious interference, seeking an

INC. and its owners

injunction against the defendant, and money damages. The Plaintiff lawsuit was served on June 2011. The Defendant has countersued the Plaintiff for two counts of tortious interference, fraud, civil conspiracy. 2. For two years the Defendant has been seeking relevant evidence

from the Plaintiff which are necessary to establish the facts of the case and needed by the Defendant for his defense. The requested documents were in full compliance with the Fl Rules of Civil Procedures and not objected to by the Plaintiff. 3. On May 4, 2013 the Plaintiff attorney entered certain documents

into the record as requested from the court order to compel, amongst them was the signed employment "contract" between the Plaintiff and Defendant dated June 9th, 2009. 4. On page 3, section 10, of the contract it required a "mandatory"

and "exclusive" choice of law and forum selection in Virginia and not Florida. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and scheduled a

hearing on April 11, 2013 to coincide with Plaintiff attorney "motion to withdraw as counsel" seeking a court ruling on his motion to dismiss for

lack of personal & subject matter jurisdiction due to improper choice of law and venue. 5. In the April 11, 2013 hearing, Judge Arzola refused to hear the

Defendant's motion to dismiss and issued a stay for 30 days so the plaintiff could hire new counsel. 6. On May 30, 2013 the Defendant scheduled a hearing on his motion counsel, Warren Gammill &

to dismiss to coincide with the new

Associates on their scheduled hearing on their "motion to amend the complaint". However, this time the new attorneys for the plaintiff entered a different contract that the one entered by the previous attorney into the record, The "new" contract is one dated November 5th , 2009 which is a fraud. The Defendant at all times has objected to this

contract being entered into the record, has informed the court about this fraudulent document complaint. 7. At the May 30, 2013 hearing Judge Arzola did not allowed the to present his motion to dismiss for wrong choice of law and objected to the filing of an amended

Defendant

and forum selection. The Defendant pointed out that even using the fraudulent contract dated November 5th, 2009 which the "new counsel" entered without an affidavit in support of the contract, without the

consent & agreement of the defendant, and testified regarding the circumstances around this contract without having firsthand knowledge of any facts. Ironically the fraudulent November 5th contract calls for a "mandatory" and "exclusive" forum selection in Broward County and not this court. 8. Neither the June 9th 2009 or the November 5th 2009 "contracts"

allows this court to be the lawful venue and/or forum to litigate this action. Therefore, this court has no subject matter or personal

jurisdiction to pursue this action in this court. Judge Arzola has denied the Defendant access to the court and due process by preventing him to present his motions to dismiss twice, but has proceeded to order the Defendant to answer the amended complaint being fully aware that this court has no jurisdiction to proceed to trial on the plaintiff complaint based on the wrong choice of venue and law as per BOTH contracts and Florida case law precedent.

ARGUMENT 9. There is no question that "every litigant is entitled to nothing less

than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of the Courts to scrupulously guard this right and to refrain from attempting to

exercise jurisdiction in any matter where his qualification to do so is seriously brought in question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration of justice."

Crosby v . State,97 So.2dl 81, 184 (Fla. 1957) quoting Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939). This Defendant who is Pro-se is entitled to a fair and impartial Judge, See State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566,179 So.695 (1938). "The question of disqualification focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the judge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially." Livinsston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1985). "A party seeking to disqualify a judge need only show 'a well grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. It is not a question of how the judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's mind and the basis for such feeling. Id. At 1086, quotins State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 14p4 179 So. at 697698. See also Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So.2d 190, 191 (Fla. 1983) ;Michaud-Bergerv . Hurley, 607 So.2d 441, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). 10. The Defendant submits that the facts in this case demonstrate that

the Defendant, has a well-grounded fear that the Honorable Antonio Arzola will not be fair and impartial to him in future hearings or trial.

exercise jurisdiction in any matter where his qualification to do so is seriously brought in question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration of justice."

Crosby v . State,97 So.2dl 81, 184 (Fla. 1957) quoting Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939). This Defendant who is Pro-se is entitled to a fair and impartial Judge, See State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566,179 So.695 (1938). "The question of disqualification focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the judge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially." Livinsston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1985). "A party seeking to disqualify a judge need only show 'a well grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. It is not a question of how the judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's mind and the basis for such feeling.'" Id. At 1086, quotins State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 14p4 179 So. at 697698. See also Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So.2d 190, 191 (Fla. 1983) ;Michaud-Bergerv . Hurley, 607 So.2d 441, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). 10. The Defendant submits that the facts in this case demonstrate that

the Defendant, has a well-grounded fear that the Honorable Antonio Arzola will not be fair and impartial to him in future hearings or trial.

First, Judge Arzola, at the withdraw hearing of the Plaintiff previous counsel on April 11, 2013 engaged the Defendant in silly unconsequential arguments of whether or not this was an administrative court or not, and exhibiting an open hostility towards the Defendant. Judge Arzola did not allowed Defendant to read his motion and cut him off several times, the defendant argued that regardless of whether or not the Plaintiff secured counsel in the future it was clear that this court did not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction to proceed and that the retention of a future counsel could not change that fact (well they tried by switching contracts) but still no version of any of the "contracts" presented to this court allows for this cause to be brought in Miami-Dade County. 11. Although a judge's tone and demeanor towards the party may be

enough by itself to require disqualification of a judge, see Brofrnan v. Florida Hearing Care Center. Inc., 703 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (joke by judge which led party to believe that judge thought his allegations in his complaint to be trifling), when it is combined with other factors which demonstrated trial court's bias against the attorneys or party, recusal is required. See .e .g., Jimenez v. Ratine,954 So.2d 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Franco v. State,777 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA

2001); Rucks v. State, 692 So.2d 976 (Fla.2dDCA 1997); Rollins v. Baker, 683 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The judge's behavior

towards the Defendant at these past hearings clearly demonstrate that he would have a problem fairly listening to him, be it as witness in any motions or at trial, or if there is a sentencing. 12. As such, based on all of the above, the Defendant reasonably

believes that it has a well grounded fear that it will not receive a fair hearing or trial before the Honorable Antonio Arzola. Wherefore, based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully

requests that this Court enter an order disqualifying itself from further consideration of the proceeding in the above styled case.

\Resp4 Resp^ctfullyjSubmitted by,

Varona, Sui Juris L48&3vS.W. 125 Court Miami, Florida 33 186 enriquevarona@ymail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forgoing was mailed by US and email on June GAMILL & ASSOCIATES, P. A. at L ,2013 to WARREN

Suite 1050, Courthouse Tower 44

West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130. ctfully ^ubmitted by, inrique Varona, Sui Juris acting Pro-se 1482&S.W. 125 Court Miami, Florida 33186 enriquevarona@ymail.com