Gonzales v. Macaraig Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J. Facts: 12/16/1988: Congress passed H.B.

. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. It eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget of the President. It was presented to the Chief Executive for approval afterwards. 12/29/1988: The President signed the bill into law and declared it as R.A. 6688, while vetoing seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a General Provision. 2/2/1989: the Senate, in Resolution no. 381 (Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriations Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes), declared the veto of the President as unconstitutional and without any force and effect. Hence, Section 55 remains. 4/11/1989: Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus was filed by members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and as substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this case., with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing primarily the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of Sec. 55 and the 7 Special Provisions, as well as seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing R.A. 6688. No restraining order was issued. 12/12/1989: Petitioners filed their Memorandum, though they filed a Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplemental Petition on 1/19/1990, basically raising the same issue, this time questioning the Presidents veto of certain provisions, particularly Sec. 16 of H.B. 26934, or the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1990, which the President declared to have become R.A. No. 6831. The Vetoed Provisions and Reasons Therefor o Sec. 55 Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation (see page 459 for full text) 1. Reason for veto: It violates Sec. 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. It would also nullify not only the constitutional and statutory of the President, but also that of the Pres. Of the Senate, Speaker of the HoR, C.J. of the SC and the Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Furthermore, it is inconsistent with Sec. 12 and other similar provisions in the GAA. o Sec. 16 (GAB of 1990) similar to sec. 55 of the GAB of 1989. The Use of Savings see page 459-460 for full text) was in Sec. 12 in the GAB of 1989 and aprt from Sec. 55, but was commingled in the GAB of 1990 in Sec. 16, with the vetoed provision made to appear as a condition or restriction.

1. Reason for veto: Same reason given for the veto of Sec. 55. Petitioners arguments: 1. Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provisions. Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are both provisions, therefore, the President exceeded her authority. 2. The President can only veto the entire bill if she objects to a provision of an appropriation, not her item-veto power. 3. The item-veto power does not allow the President to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, violating the Separation of Powers. 4. The power of augmentation in Art. VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. Respondents arguments: 1. It is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. 2. Petitioners had a political remedy, which was to override the veto, 3. Sec. 55 is a rider because it is extraneous to the Appropriat ions Act and, therefore, warrants the Presidents veto. 4. Power of the President to augment items has been provided for by the Budget Law, specifically Sec. 44 and 45 of the P.D. 1177, as amended by R.A. No. 6670. 5. The President is empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other distinct and severable parts of an Appropriations Bill.

ISSUE: WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of 1989 Appropriations Bill and subsequently of its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill, is unconstitutional and without effect. o SUB-ISSUE 1: WON there is an actual case/controversy and WON the issue is a political question. o SUB-ISSUE 2: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. o SUB-ISSUE 3: won Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are provisions and are, therefore, beyond the scope of the Presidents item -veto power. o SUB-ISSUE 4: WON the Legislatures imposition of conditions/restrictions was proper. o SUB-ISSUE 5: WON the power of augmentation is valid o SUB-ISSUE 6:WON the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional.

HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes, there is a justiciable controversy, and no, the issue is not a political question. With the Senate maintaining that the veto is unconstitutional, and that charge being controverted, there is an actual case/controversy between the Senate and the Executive. Also, with regard to the respondents claim that the issue is a political question, said doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of rival

claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. 2. No, she did not. Petitioners: Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are provisions and not items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the item-veto power of the President. Court: o The veto power of the President is expressed in Art. VI, Sec. 27 of the Constitution. Paragraph (1) is the general veto power, which would result in the veto of the entire bill if used. (2) is the item-veto power or the line-veto power. As specified in the Article, the President may not veto less than all of an item of any Appropriations Bill. o Notwithstanding the elimination of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the veto powers of the President has not changed since the 1935 Constitution. o The eliminated proviso merely pronounces the principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill, that is, an item, may be the subject of a separate veto. o Item particulars, details, the distinct and the severable parts of the bill; a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. 3. No, they are not provisions. Article VI, Sec. 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution states that no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. o Provision should relate to some particular appropriation therein. o The challenged provisions fall short of this requirement. i. They do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation ii. The disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill iii. The vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect to augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation iv. Consequently, these provisions are actually inappropriate provisions, and can therefore be vetoed by the President. 4. No, it was not. Petitioners: Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto pwer does not carry with it the power to strike them out. In other words, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are conditions/restrictions and are thus beyond the veto power. Court: The Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. Furthermore, as was the ruling in Bolinao, the veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effect. However, for the rule to apply, the restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. o Sec. 16 and 55 are inappropriate conditions. They are actally general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. o Neither of them show the necessary connecton with a schedule of expenditures, for the items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face

of the enrolled bill or appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected by looking at the original budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, the sections themselves provide that an item shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act. o Bolinaodoes not apply, as the vetoed condition was inherently attached to the appropriation. o Sec. 55 and 16 partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings, in other words, a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill. 5. Yes, it is, however it should be made the subject of separate legislation. Sec. 55 and 16 were vetoed because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law, as guaranteed by Article VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution (see page 470). Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law, not to mention that the validity of the power to augment has been upheld in a previous case (Demetria v. Alba). o The 1973 Constitution contained an identical authority to augment (Art. VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the 1973 Constitution). o The statutory authority of the President to augment any appropriation of the Executive department in the General Appropriations Act from savings is specifically provided for in Sec. 44 of P.D. 1177, as amended, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. (See page 471). Even the use of the savings to cover deficits is specifically authorized by the same decree. A more recent grant is found in Sec. 12 o the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the text of which is repeated in the first paragraph of Sec. 16. i. There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has been granted. Once given, the President and the heads of the different branches of government and constitutional commissions are afforded considerable flexibility. ii. The power to augment should by no means be construed as the power to rewrite the budget, as contended by the petitioners. The exercise of such authority is limited as it only allows for transfers within the branch or department concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings. iii. As it is a special power, it should be made the subject of separate legislation. A General Appropriations Bill is one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public treasury. iv. Sec. 55 and 16, in prohibiting augmentation, impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President and the different heads of the branches of government. Furthermore, as it is a special power, it should be made the subject of separate legislation, not simply inserted in a General Appropriations Bill, whose primary and specific aim is to make appropriation of money from the public treasure. v. Petitioners contention that Sec. 55 and 16 were meant to repeal/amend P.D. 1177 supports the Courts belief that it should be the subject of separate legislation. Since it is the well-settled rule that implied repeals

are not to be favored, the allegation that P.D. 1177 has been revoked is untenable. 6. Yes, it has. A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1)). Congress made no attempt to override the veto. The contention that the veto is ineffectual so that there is not hing to override is untenable. It has lost force as the validity of the veto has been upheld by the Court. Petition Dismissed Gutierrez, J.: Dissenting Opinion The traditional ower of Congress over the public purse is negated if functions or offices it has abolished are restored through the grant of carte blanche authority to shift savings from one department to another. It is no longer augmentation within the purview of the Constitution, but rather fund juggling against the express command of Congress. The Court is, in effect, allowing a modified lump sum appropriation for the Executive Branch. The Constitution does not grant fiscal autonomy to the Executive. The Constitution grants the power to veto items but not provisions. The Court is rewriting the Constitution to restore what the framers have eliminated when the difference between an item and a provision is ignored.