Americanhttp://abs.sagepub.

com/ Behavioral Scientist

The Polarized American : Views on Humanity and the Sources of Hyper-Partisanship

Karl Kaltenthaler and William J. Miller American Behavioral Scientist 2012 56: 1718 originally published online 19 October 2012 DOI: 10.1177/0002764212463357 The online version of this article can be found at: http://abs.sagepub.com/content/56/12/1718

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for American Behavioral Scientist can be found at: Email Alerts: http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://abs.sagepub.com/content/56/12/1718.refs.html

>> Version of Record - Nov 5, 2012 OnlineFirst Version of Record - Oct 19, 2012 What is This?

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

ABS46335 7
ABS561210.1177/0002764212463357American Behavioral ScientistKaltenthaler and Miller 2012 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Article

The Polarized American:Views on Humanity and the Sources of Hyper-Partisanship

Karl Kaltenthaler1 and William J. Miller2

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12) 17181734 2012 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0002764212463357 http://abs.sagepub.com

Abstract In recent years, many possible explanations have been offered for why America has become a more polarized country. In this article, we introduce a new variable to the discussion. Rather than focusing on specific policy beliefs or political attitudes, we instead suggest that social trust can be an important explanatory factor in predicting which Americans are most likely to be polarized. Through the analysis of ANES data, we find that individuals who are strong trusters of others are more likely to identify as Strong Democrats while those less likely to do so are more likely to self-identify as Strong Republicans. The article concludes by looking at how considering social trust as a predictor of polarization impacts our understanding of American politics. Keywords social trust, polarization, public opinion, citizen attitudes

One of the most debated issues in the study of American politics centers on the alleged polarization of the electorate. Some scholars argue that the American electorate is becoming increasingly polarized (e.g., Koch, 1994; McDonald & Popkin, 2001; Olson, 2008). Others contend that American voters are not becoming more polarized (Hetherington, 2009). Still others have maintained that it is not the electorate that has become increasingly polarized but rather the political elite in the United States, particularly in the U.S. Congress (Bond & Fleisher, 2000; Carmines & Stimson, 1989;
1 2

The University of Akron and Case Western Reserve University, Akron, OH, USA Flagler College, St. Augustine, FL, USA

Corresponding Author: Karl Kaltenthaler, Department of Political Science, The University of Akron, Akron, OH 44325-1904, USA Email: kck@uakron.edu

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller

1719

Dixit & Weibull, 2007; Jones, 2001; Layman, 2001; Layman & Carsey, 2002a; Mann, 2006; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2009; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984; Rohde, 1991). This article does not seek to weigh in on the debate about whether the electorate or the Congress has become more polarized over time; instead, it explores those individuals who think of themselves at the polar extremes of the mainstream American party spectrum. In other words, this article develops an argument about why some Americans view themselves as strong partisans, either of Republican or Democratic leanings. Thus, we hope to explain what individual-level factors make one think of oneself as a strong Republican or a strong Democrat. Our argument is that a crucial factor in determining whether one is a hyperpartisan is how an individual views humanity. We contend that the more negative a view of humanity a person has, the more likely she is to self-identify as a strong Republican. Conversely, the more positive someone is toward the nature of humanity, the more likely one is to self-identify as a strong Democrat. When an individual thinks of herself as a strong Democrat or Republican, she is thinking of herself as being either a strong liberal Democrat or a strong conservative Republican. A strong conservative Republican is likely to view the social world from a pessimistic basis, believing that people are, generally, not trustworthy. A strong liberal Democrat is likely to have a more positive view of humanity. Thus, it is the social psychology of the individual that shapes a large part of the ideological predisposition that culminates in a particular partisan identity. This study will first explore what others have argued about the sources of polarization among the American electorate. The section to follow develops an argument about how views of humanity shape partisan worldviews. From this, a set of hypotheses are derived that are then tested in a regression analysis employing data from the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES). The article concludes with what the findings tell us about the nature of polarized partisanship in the United States.

Definitions of Political Polarization

What do we mean when we refer to political polarization within the electorate? Esteban and Ray (1991, 1994) have argued that polarization is the process whereby individuals feel alienated from each other. They identify with a particular group, say a political party or an ideological movement, and they believe themselves to be at odds with the out-group. They call this an identification-alienation framework. In a polarized situation, by identifying with one group, an individual feels alienated from another group. DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) have created a definition of polarization that is often used in the literature. They posit that polarization in the electorate is the movement toward the poles of the Left-Right distribution of voters. Thus, if the electorate is polarized, voters are clustered on the ideological Left and Right extremes, with the middle being relatively empty. What is important for purposes of this study is who the people at the polar ends of the distribution of the electorate are and why they are there.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1720

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

Common Explanations of Elite and Voter Political Polarization

There has been a large amount of literature generated on the issue of political polarization in the United States in recent decades. The literature tends to focus on political elite polarization, voter polarization, or the nexus between the two. Some have argued that the institutional changes of the past several decades in the United States should have reduced political elite polarization because measures to promote openness in government should logically have reduced distrust among elites and thus reduced a sense of us versus them (see Stasavage, 2007). But Stasavage (2007) has argued that the opposite has happened. He and others have pointed to the political parties convention delegates, candidates, and members of Congress as all having grown increasingly polarized on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues (Bond & Fleisher, 2000; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Layman, 2001; Layman & Carsey, 2002a; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984; Rohde, 1991; Stasavage, 2007; Stone, Rapoport, & Abramowitz, 1990). Some have argued that when the leadership of the parties polarizes, it can pull the whole party system in a centripetal pattern. (Layman & Carsey, 2002b, p. 200). Some of the explanations offered for this elite polarization are gerrymandering (Wolfson, 2006) and ones location in the electoral calendar (Nicholson, 2003). This elite polarization may seem to make voters more polarized because the parties have offered them polarized candidates. The voters positions on the issues may be moderate, even if their choices in the voting booth are not (McGhee & Krimm, 2009, p. 348). Layman and Carsey (2002b, p. 227) argue that elite polarization is indeed having an impact on voter polarization in a concrete way: Our evidence confirms that this is part of the partisan change process. However, we also clearly show that some individuals respond to increases in elite-level polarization not by changing their party ties but by changing their issue attitudes in response to those ties. When Democratic and Republican elites are clearly differentiated on an issue and citizens recognize that difference, then a significant number of party identifiers will bring their attitudes on the issue closer into line with the stance of their partys leaders. When party elites are polarized on more than one issue agenda, the process of party identifiers converting their positions on issues toward the dominant stand of their parties means that issue dimensions, such as social welfare and culture, that were once orthogonal to each other will not remain so over time. Layman and Carsey (2002b, p. 228) also argue that party politics exerts a strong influence on political values and issue attitudes among the electorate. Those individuals who are most attached to a particular political party are likely to be most influenced by the cues that they get from the party leadership on issues (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Claassen & Highton, 2009, p. 546; Kam, 2005; Nie, 1976; Zaller, 1992). But it is not just partisan attachment; it is also awareness of politics that will play a role in

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller

1721

shaping how elite behavior and cues affect the electorate. Thus, the most politically sophisticated and aware people are most likely to be affected by relative positions of political elites (see Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Zaller, 1992). The above arguments about the process of elite and voter polarization, by no means, represent a consensus view. Several scholars have argued that the data do not bear out the argument that the American electorate in becoming more polarized. Hetherington (2001, 2009) has shown that if one uses the definition of polarization as a growing bi-modality of American voters at the extremes, then there is little evidence of polarization. The distribution of American voters is not clearing out the middle as the polarization hypothesis would suggest. McGhee and Krimm (2009) are also prominent critics of the polarization thesis. They point to the growth in independent registration among voters. This would indicate less partisan attachment and not more. It might make the electorate appear more polarized, however, because the voters who are left with partisan registrationswho then vote in the primaries (particularly closed primaries)are the most ardent partisans and most ideological voters, thus creating the appearance of a more polarized electorate.

The Focus of This Study

This study does not seek to answer the question of whether there is indeed a growing process of polarization in the American electorate or what has or has not driven that process. This study is not interested in change in partisanship over time but rather explores the extremes of the partisan distribution in the United States in a crosssectional snap-shot. This study focuses on explaining what individual-level factors put voters at the extreme ends of the Democrat-Republican distribution of voters. The studys dependent variable is self-identification as a strong Democrat or a strong Republican. Thus, we seek to identify the individual-level factors that would account for why an individual would think of himself or herself as a strong Democrat or strong Republican. It is common for models meant to predict partisanship to include ideology as an explanatory variable (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998, 2006; Alvarez & Garcia Bedolla, 2003; Carmines & Berkman, 1994; Carmines & Stanley, 1992; Franklin & Jackson, 1983). We have chosen to do the same despite acknowledging that they are so closely linked in a persons mind that there may be a high degree of endogeneity in a model with both variables included. This is because a person who views herself as a strong partisan is also very likely to view herself as a strong ideologue, leaning toward one or the other end of the ideological distribution. To control for this possibility, we will present results demonstrating the inclusion and exclusion of ideology as an explanatory variable.

Views on Humanity and Ideological Self-Identification

We contend that a persons view on the basic nature of humanity will play a large role in shaping her general ideological worldview. A persons basic view of human nature

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1722

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

refers to whether a person believes that other people can be thought of as being inherently good or inherently bad. If an individual thinks of human nature as inherently bad, that person will be less willing to trust other people in general. If, on the other hand, a person views human nature as being inherently good, this person is more likely to trust others in general than the person who has a negative view of basic human nature. This propensity to trust or not trust others has profound implications toward how one views politics (Binning, 2007; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002; Brewer, Gross, Aday, & Wilnat, 2004; Citrin & Sides, 2008; Herreros & Criado, 2009; Inglehart, 1997; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Torgler, 2007; Uslaner, 2000-2001). While much research has focused on how social trust affects a whole range of attitudes toward political phenomena, there has been very little research on how social trust affects basic partisan self-identification. We contend that this is an important oversight as social trust forms a crucial part of the psychological basis for an individuals general ideological worldview. Let us first address what we mean by ideology. Ideology is a coherent set of ideas meant to generally explain political phenomena that a person confronts as well as offer a general set of remedies to political issues that arise. Scholars have looked at political ideology as being a set of ideas that sit along two basic dimensions. The classical ideological dimension that has been referred to for a very long time is the traditional LeftRight dimension (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). This dimension was characterized by how an individual viewed the proper role of the state in managing the economy and distributing wealth in a society. People who were on the Left side of the ideological spectrum were likely more in favor of the state playing an activist role in the economy and redistributing wealth from the more fortunate (wealthy) to the less fortunate (the poor). This view was premised on the argument that the wealthy achieved their wealth in a system that was largely stacked in their favor. Thus, it was only fair that the state play a redistributive role and manage the market in order to aid those who were losers from the outcomes of the economic and political system. The traditional Right, on the other hand, largely opposed a large redistributive and economic management role for the state, as the wealthy were assumed to have achieved their economic gains through hard work and perseverance and therefore a large, redistributive, and economic activist state was not fair to the wealthy. Thus, the Left and the Right both couched their general arguments about the state in terms of fairness. Political science viewed the political bases of support for these Left and Right positions as a function of a persons class background (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Thus, a person who was born into the working class was likely to be more supportive of the Left, because of her identification with those who looked to the state for redress of social and economic inequality. Conversely, those who were born into the middle and upper classes would tend to support the Right because they would want the state to play a minimal role in redistributing wealth to those who had lower incomes as funds for that redistribution would come from the wealthy through taxation and other means. Therefore, a persons placement on the Left-Right ideological space was viewed as a function of economic self-interest.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller

1723

But there has been another ideological dimension that has been identified by political scientists more recently that is meaningful: the Right authoritarian-Left libertarian dimension (Kitschelt, 1995). This ideological dimension does not center on economic issues as the traditional Left-Right dimension does but rather is concerned with the amount of freedom or constraint the state should create in society for its citizens. A person who is viewed as being more on the Right authoritarian end of the dimension would believe that the state should play a larger law and order role in society as well as play some role in preserving traditional moral values. An individual who is seen as more towards the Left libertarian end of the dimension would believe that the state should try to maximize individual freedom of expression and democratic participation and place less emphasis on law and order and the state playing a role in defending traditional moral values. The Right authoritarian has a view of society as needing a Leviathan, and the Left libertarian view is that man is best served by allowing people the maximum input into governance without being threatened by a state that infringes on their personal rights. Inglehart (1977, 1997) has argued that the Right authoritarianLeft libertarian dimension of politics1 has grown more important in many advanced industrial democracies as basic needs have been met by economic growth and the creation of welfare states.2 Thus, political parties in such states have tended to add authoritarianlibertarian issues to their platforms as these issues have resonated more with their publics. Right parties have tended to take authoritarian stances, arguing for the need for law and order measures in society, whereas Left parties have tended to take more libertarian stances in this New Politics.3 When the two dimensions of ideology are combined, we are presented with a schema that looks like the following: When we apply this schema to American politics, we find that because of the nature of the electoral system and its tendency to punish small parties, the two main parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, have absorbed New Politics issues into their platforms alongside the traditional stances on economic distributional issues. The Republican Party has maintained its traditional stance as being the party less inclined to support economic redistribution in the American party system. The Democratic Party has maintained its traditional platform of being the major American political party more inclined to support economic redistribution and an economically activist state to aid the economically less advantaged.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1724

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

In terms of the New Politics issues, the Republican Party has also taken on the mantle of being the party home for Right authoritarian votersthat is, those who are more in favor of law and order politics and the state playing a role in preserving traditional moral values. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, has become the major party home for Left libertarian voters who want the polity to increase inclusion in the political process, protect minority rights, and keep the state from trying to protect conservative, traditional morality. Thus, most Republican and Democratic voters can be thought of as situated along the diagonal axis that bisects traditional Left-Right politics as well as the New Politics. Thus, voters for the two major parties are a mix of materialists and those who vote along New Politicsthat is, authoritarian-libertarian lines. We posit that the degree to which one trusts others will play a very important role in determining the leanings of the highly partisan American. We hypothesize that the more social trust an individual says she has, the more likely she is to self-identify as a strong Democrat. Conversely, the less social trust an individual says he has, the more likely that person is to self-identify as a strong Republican. Social trust will condition attitudes toward both traditional Left-Right politics, as well as New Politics. A person with a higher relative degree of social trust will have a more positive attitude toward redistributive policies because that person will be more positive toward other people, in general, and believe that the recipients of aid from the government are deserving of such help. Thus, the social truster will be more likely to identify with the Left than the Right. Such a person would more likely be a Democrat than a Republican. Conversely, a person who is less trusting of other people, relative to others, will be less willing to have the state redistribute wealth to others because that person would not be positively inclined toward others, in general, and would thus not favor such policies. This person would identify more with the Right and thus would more likely think of herself as a Republican. When it comes to New Politics, a persons relative propensity to trust others will also influence her identification with the Right and the Left. A social truster will likely identify with the Left on New Politics issues because such a person would not look to the state to constrain others through law and order policies because such a person would feel less threatened by others. This identification with the Left on New Politics issues would more likely make the person think of herself as a Democrat than as a Republican. Those who are relatively less trusting of others would be more likely to identify with the Right on New Politics issues. The person who is relatively less trusting of others would be more likely to want the state to play a more constrained role in society in terms of law and order because of the more generalized lack of trust in others. Because of this identification with the Right on New Politics issues, the less trusting individual is more likely to be a Republican in the American context.

Data, Measures, and Methods

We employ ordered logistic regression analyses given the dependent variable is binomial and ordinal in nature. As mentioned earlier, we employ data from the 2008 American National Election Survey. The number of respondents in this sample was 2,203. Our final models include 518 respondents who responded to all questions

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller

1725

employed as variables in our study. Most respondents are excluded for not responding to questions regarding their ideology or income. Based on diagnostics, there are no clear patterns in the excluded cases.

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this model is strong partisan beliefs. The ANES asks respondents to identify the political party they most closely identify with and are able to break down respondents into a 7-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican. In order to examine our question of what individual-level factors determine whether someone is a strong Democrat or strong Republican, we create a binary variable for each. Respondents who identify as strong Democrats are coded 1, with all other respondents as 0. Then, all respondents who identify as strong Republicans (7 on the 7-point scale) are coded 1, with all other respondents as 0. By doing so, we end up with two dependent variables.

A Picture of Polarization
The breakdown of the dependent variables find that 25.0% of respondents label themselves as strong Democrats, while 9.9% declare to be strong Republicans. While it is unclear we there are so many fewer strong Republicans compared to strong Democrats, it could be that many of the strong conservatives have come to label themselves Independents rather than strong Republicans. We can go further in a descriptive analysis by looking at demographic differences between strong Democrats, strong Republicans, nonpolarized individuals, and all respondents. By doing so, we can get a picture of the typical polarized Democrats and Republicans. When we look at the demographics (as seen in Table 1), we find that there are many splits that follow widely known partisan trends. Strong Democrats, for example, appear to have relatively lower incomes, while strong Republicans report relatively higher incomes. Likewise, strong Republicans are more likely to be married than the average respondent to the ANES, while the typical strong Democrat is less likely to be married. The characteristic racial divide emergeswith strong Republicans more likely to be White than the average respondent and strong Democrats more likely to be members of a minority group. Lastly, we see a gender gap in terms of polarization with women more likely to be strong Democrats and men strong Republicans than their corresponding average respondents. None of these findings are particularly unexpected and confirm previous findings and beliefs. Where we find more unique results are when looking at region and age. First, we can see that the Northeast and Southern Census regions have clear polarization patterns. Individuals living in the Northeast are considerably less likely to be polarized, while those in the South are more likely to be politically polarized than nonpolarized. It is, by far, the most polarized region in the country. The South is a region where strong Republicans outnumber strong Democrats, but not by a large margin. The North Central region has less polarization and there is a slightly greater likelihood of strong

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1726

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

Democrats than Republicans and the West shows the same for strong Republicans outnumbering strong Democrats. This suggests that there are some marked regional considerations related to polarization in the United States. A pattern emerges with age as well, with older respondents being more likely to be polarized (regardless of party) than their younger counterparts. As individuals age, they appear to move toward the poles when considering their levels of partisanship.

The Independent Variables

Below are the questions that we use to test the predictive power of our argument about the role of social trust contributing to polarization in the United States. We also test a set of alternative hypotheses to determine relative predictive power of the most common arguments about what drives said polarization. We include a very common measure of relative social trust in the model to test our primary hypothesis. The question asks, Can people be trusted? The respondent has the choice of answering that either you cant be too careful or most people can be trusted. We argue that those individuals who believe people can be trusted will be more likely to be strong Democrats and that those who do not believe people can be trusted will be more likely to be strong Republican identifiers. Given the links often discussed between religious beliefs and religiosity and partisanship, we include two religious measures (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006; Carmines & Stanley, 1992; Franklin & Jackson, 1983). First, the variable examining religiosity asks, Would you say you religion provides some guidance in your day-to-day living, quite a bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance in your day-to-day life? Respondents are coded for not believing religion is important, religion provides some guidance, religion provides quite a bit of guidance, and religion provides a great deal of guidance. The religious beliefs measure asks, Which of the these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? Respondents are asked to choose from the following: 1 = The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word; 2 = The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word; and 3 = The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God. We use a 7-point scale of ideology to measure where respondents place themselves in terms of political beliefs (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998, 2006; Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003; Carmines & Berkman, 1994; Carmines & Stanley, 1992; Franklin & Jackson, 1983). The scale runs from 1, indicating strong liberal, to 7, indicating strong conservative. Strong liberals are predicted to be strong Democrats, and strong conservatives are most likely to be strong Republicans. As touched on above, there are concerns regarding endogeneity when utilizing ideology to predict partisanship. As a result, we will present our models showing results both with and without ideology included. We also include a measure of race. Our variable is dummy coded, with all non-White respondents coded as 1 and White respondents coded 0. Previous literature has demonstrated that race needs to be considered when examining partisanship and polarization (Avery, 2007; Hutchings & Valentino, 2004; McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). As with typical party identification, White

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller

Table 1. Demographic Breakdown All Respondents Lowest 25% income 25%-50% income 50%-75% income Highest 25% income Married Not married White Not White Northeast North Central South West Male Female Lowest 25% age 25%-50% age 50%-75% age Highest 25% age 22.8 26 29.5 21.7 42.2 57.8 51.4 48.6 10.9 17.1 47.3 24.7 43 57 25.6 24.2 25.3 24.9 Strong Democrat 27.1 30.1 24.7 18.1 36.7 63.3 27.4 72.6 10.2 17.4 50.3 22.1 39 61 18.4 22.4 29.5 29.7 Strong Republican 10.2 19.7 32.5 37.6 61.4 38.6 82.1 17.9 5.7 13.5 55.7 25.2 46.7 53.3 13.3 24 28 34.7

1727

Nonpolarized 23.4 25.6 30.7 20.3 41.5 58.5 55.9 44.1 12 17.5 44.9 25.6 43.9 56.1 30.3 24.9 23.2 21.6

respondents are predicted to more likely be strong Republicans, and non-White respondents are predicted to be more likely strong Democrats. We also include a number of control variables for gender, age, education, and income as these are very common controls in studies of public attitudes toward polarization in the United States. We also include a measure of job security as a way to control for the economic insecurity of the respondent. We include this measure because it is possible that the respondents economic insecurity can affect the responses given in the survey.

Results of the Analyses

The ordered logistic regression analysis results for our model are presented in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 examine predictors of strong Democrats. Model 1 includes ideology as an explanatory variable, while Model 2 removes ideology given possible concerns of multicollinearity from having it explain party identification (a variable it is closely linked with). We find relative consistency between both models in terms of predictions. However, our variable of most interest theoreticallysocial trustis not significant when ideology is included. When ideology is excluded, however, we find that the more individuals trust others, the more likely they are to

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1728

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

Table 2. Logistic Regression Model Results: Dependent VariableStrong Partisanship

Model 1: Strong Democrat Independent variables Coef. SE First Diff. Model 2: Strong Democrat Coef. SE First Diff. Model 3: Strong Republican Coef. SE First Diff. Model 3: Strong Republican Coef. -.669** .442** .556** SE First Diff.

Social trust .289 Religion guide life -.206 Biblical literalism -.047 Ideology -.389*** Non-White 1.327*** Age .019* Education .055 Household income -.037 Gender .239 Worry lose job .114 Pseudo R2 .1357 Log likelihood -235.52 Log likelihood 2 73.94 N 516

.244 .155 .206 .085 .375 .267 .202 .009 .184 .051 .124 .184 .148

-.721** .358 .281 .852*** 1.534*** .220 .251 -1.109*** .020** .008 .225 -.007 .083 .045 -.064 -.111 .100 .167 .141 .148 -.137 .118 .114 -.167 .1042 .2626 -357.93 -169.05 83.26 120.38 713 516 .505** .197 .085 -.090 .123 -.147 .164

.308 .053 .196 .272 .131 .454 .335 .083 .012 .072 .166 .219 .212

.269 .051 .170 .062 .236 .070 -1.596*** .296 .134 .001 .010 -.028 .065 .261 .142 -.200 .170 -.272 .185 .1509 -227.89 81.01 713

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

identify as strong Democrats (significant at the .05 level). Ideology, as would be expected, is significant at the .01 level when included in the model, with strong liberals showing as being more disposed to being strong Democrats. Being nonWhite proves to be a strong predictor (.01 level) in both models in the assumed direction. When ideology is excluded, age becomes the only other significant predictor (at the .05 level). Being older is linked with individuals being more likely to be strong Democrats. No other variables produce significant relationships, including religion or other demographics. For the strong Republican modelsthree and fourwe find similar results. When we account for ideology, it is significant at the .01 level and demonstrates that strong conservatives are more likely to be strong Republicans. In the same model, social trust is significant at the .05 level. Unlike in the Democrat model, however, the relationship is negative (as hypothesized) and suggests that social distrusters are more likely to be strong Republicans. When ideology is removed from the model, we again see congruity with the Democratic model. Social trust remains significant at the .05 level in the negative direction. Non-White racial statusas it does in the Democratic model without ideologyremains as a significant predictor (at the .01 level) and demonstrates that White respondents are more likely to be strong Republicans. Unlike in the Democratic models, however, in our Republican model that excludes ideology, we find both religious variables to be significant predictors. At the .05 level, individuals who believe the Bible to be the literal word of God and who claim to use religion to guide their life are shown to be more likely to be strong

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller

1729

Republicans. This finding aligns with the belief that conservative Christians are more likely to be strong Republicans. When we consider the impact played by ideology in both models, we find that the inclusion of ideology does far more in explaining strong Republican identification compared to strong Democrats. If we look at the pseudo-R2 values for the models, we find that the inclusion of ideology leads to the strong Democrat model explaining approximately 3.5% more of the variance in our dependent variable, whereas its inclusion leads to an increase in model explanatory power of just over 10% when looking at the strong Republican model. Given that we use logit, the coefficients reported in Table 2 do not represent the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables. As a result, we report the first differences of our significant independent variables in Table 2 as well. The first difference reported measures the probability of the dependent variable, signifying identification as a strong partisan, when the independent variable of interest is moving from its minimum to its maximum value, while all remaining independent variables are held at their appropriate measures of central tendency. This allows us to consider the substantive significance of each independent variable to explaining variation in the dependent variable. When looking at the strong Democrat models, we find that ideology has the largest first difference value.375. This value tells us that taking an individual from strong liberal to strong conservative makes them 37.5% more likely to be a strong Democrat when all other variables are held constant at their central tendency. Non-White racial status is the second most substantive predictor (.202) followed by age (.184). With ideology removed, however, we see social trust having a significant impact in the model with a value of .085, yet it still has less substantive impact than non-White racial status (.251) and age (.225). Both Republican models present similar results. In Model 3, ideology has a first difference of .454, while social trust is only at .053. Non-White racial status splits the two with a first difference value of .083. When ideology is removed in Model 4, being non-White has the largest first difference value (.134) while biblical literalism, religion guide life, and social trust and all increase the likelihood of someone being a strong Republican by between 5.1% and 7.0% when moved from their minimum to maximum values. In short, our results demonstrate that while social trust is an important predictor that must be considered when discussing the increased polarization of the American electorate, previous research on partisan identity has ignored this important social psychological factor.

Conclusion
This article has examined what factors lead Americans to identify as polarized partisans. Moreover, we have attempted to test congruency in explanatory factors between strong Democrats and strong Republicans. Most importantly, we introduced the

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1730

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

concept of social trust into Americas understanding of political polarization. We argued that Americans general predispositions toward others will impact the likelihood of their declaring to be strong partisans. For Democrats, we posited that being social trusters would increase the chances of an individual identifying as a strong partisan, while for Republicans we hypothesized that being a distruster would increase the odds of identifying as a strong partisan. Much of the current polarization research focuses on the role of varying ideological and demographic characteristics, including ideology, age, income, and religious beliefs and behavior. In this article, however, we demonstrate how social trust conditions the psychological basis for an individuals general ideological worldview including their propensity to be hyper-partisans. By including social trust, the discussion about polarization begins to see a shift in interpretation. First, it moves the decision away from any easily traced demographic basis. While variables such as race, income, or education can be gleaned from national census data, there is no similar measure of individual-level social trust available. Without being able to fully account for what has been shown to be a meaningful predictor, it makes the process of predicting the future of polarization more difficult. It is especially important to note this when we remember that social trust still proves to be significant even when ideology is included within the model. It comes as little surprise that strong liberals would be strong Democrats or strong conservatives would be strong Republicans given the long observed relationship between ideology and partisanship in the United States. This only goes further to explain why it is important to consider the potential role played by social trust in shaping political attitudes. If hyper-partisanship is impacted by individual social trust, it makes it significantly more difficult to be optimistic regarding hope for more bipartisan political beliefs, attitudes, and policies in the United States. When polarization is based on politics or demographic characteristics, we can change policies or alter the discourse to bring people back to the middle. If it is caused by social psychologythat is, general predispositions towards othershowever, it will require a more fundamental shift in citizen attitudes, which would be far more difficult to achieve. One of the key questions that arise from this research is, What does the relationship between social trust and polarized partisanship indicate for the future of partisan relations in the United States? There is reason to expect that polarized partisanship is likely to increase in the near to medium term. The reason for this is that the economic crisis that befell the United States in 2008 has left in its wake a weakened economy and bleak prospects for many younger Americans. As we know that an individuals pessimism about his or her future tends to make a person less trusting of others, this means that the proportion of people who have a dim view of humanity will grow in this country. This will increase the ranks of the hyper-partisan Right, as will also likely increase the ranks of the partisan Left who look to the government to protect and aid them from economic circumstances. Thus, this research does not offer much room for optimism that the highly partisan nature of American politics will diminish in the near future.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller Declaration of Conflicting Interests

1731

The authors declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes
1. These issues are often referred to as New Politics issues. 2. Ingelhart referred to postmaterialist values as values that stressed helping others achieve a voice in politics and society and placed emphasis on things like environmental problems. He viewed this as a new dimension of the Left. They developed in societies where basic needs were met and the more economically secure could focus on matters beyond their own pocketbooks. In multiparty systems, postmaterialists would often join Green parties. In party systems given to two-party dominance, the postmaterialists would likely join the left-leaning party in the system. This would be the case in the United States. 3. This libertarianism should not be confused with the specific American brand of libertarianism, which is more focused on economic freedom from state action, although it does include an element of social freedom as well. American libertarianism is a more conservative form of libertarianism, which focuses more on reducing the states role in society overall, whereas the brand of libertarian politics referred to by scholars such as Inglehart (1977, 1997) envisions a positive and even activist role for the state to play in society by bringing people into the political process and intervening in societal processes to ensure that individuals are free from oppression from others.

References
Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (1998). Ideological realignment and the U.S. electorate. The Journal of Politics, 60, 634-652. Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (2006). Partisanship in the American electorate: Social identity vs. ideology. Political Research Quarterly, 59, 175-187. Alvarez, M., & Bedolla, L. G. (2003). The foundations of Latino voter partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 election. Journal of Politics, 65, 31-49. Avery, J. M. (2007). Race, partisanship, and political trust following Bush versus Gore (2000). Political Behavior, 29, 327-342. Binning, K. (2007). Its us against the world: How distrust in Americans versus people-ingeneral shapes competitive foreign policy preferences. Political Psychology, 28, 777-799. Bond, J. R., & Fleisher, R. (2000). Polarized politics: Congress and the President in a partisan era. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Brewer, P., Gross, K., Aday, S., & Willnat, L. (2004). International trust and public opinion about world affairs. American Journal of Political Science, 46, 93-109. Brewer, P., & Steenbergen, M. (2002). All against all: How beliefs about human nature shape foreign policy options. Political Psychology, 23, 39-58.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1732

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

Citrin, J., & Sides, J. (2008). Immigration and the imagined community in Europe and the United States. Political Studies, 56, 33-56. Carmines, E., & Berkman, M. (1994). Ethos, ideology, and partisanship: Exploring the paradox of conservative Democrats. Political Behavior, 16, 203-218. Carmines, E., & Stanley, H. (1992). The transformation of the New Deal party system: Social groups, political ideology, and changing partisanship among Northern whites, 1972-1988. Political Behavior, 14, 213-237. Carmines, E., & Stimson, J. (1989). Issue evolution: Race and the transformation of American politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Claassen, R. L., & Highton, B. (2009). Policy polarization among party elites and the significance of political awareness in the mass public. Political Research Quarterly, 62, 538-551. DiMaggio, P., Evans, J., & Bryson, B. (1996). Have Americans social attitudes become more polarized? American Journal of Sociology, 102(3), 690-755. Dixit, A. K., & Weibull, J. W. (2007). Political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104, 7351. Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (1991). On the measurement of polarization (Institute for Economic Development Discussion Paper 18). Boston: Institute for Economic Development. Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (1994). On the measurement of polarization. Econometrica, 62, 819-851. Franklin, C., & Jackson, J. (1983). The dynamics of party identification. The American Political Science Review, 77, 957-973. Herreros, F., & Criado, H. (2009). Social trust, social capital, and perceptions of immigration. Political Studies, 57, 337-355. Hetherington, M. J. (2001). Resurgent mass partisanship: The role of elite polarization. American Political Science Review, 95, 619-632. Hetherington, M. J. (2009). Review article: Putting polarization in perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 39, 413-448. Hutchings, V. L., & Valentino, N. A. (2004). The centrality of race in American politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 383-408. Inglehart, R. (1977). The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jones, D. R. (2001). Party polarization and legislative gridlock. Political Research Quarterly, 54, 125-141. Kam, C. D. (2005). Who toes the party line? Cues, values, and individual differences. Political Behavior, 27, 163-182. Kitschelt, H. (1995). The Radical right in Western Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Koch, J. W. (1994). Group identification in political context. Political Psychology, 15, 687-698. Layman, G. (2001). The great divide: Religious and cultural conflict in American party politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Layman, G. C., & Carsey, T. M. (2002a). Party polarization and conflict extension in the American electorate. American Journal of Political Science, 46, 786-802.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

Kaltenthaler and Miller

1733

Layman, G. C., & Carsey, T. M. (2002b). Party polarization and party structuring of policy attitudes: A comparison of three NES panel studies. Political Behavior, 24, 199-236. Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives (International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research, Volume 7). New York: The Free Press. Mann, T. E. (2006). Polarizing the House of Representatives: How much does gerrymandering matter? Red and Blue Nation, 263-283. McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2009). Does gerrymandering cause polarization? American Journal of Political Science, 53, 666-680. McDaniel, E. L., & Ellison, C. G. (2008). Gods party? Race, religion, and partisanship over time. Political Research Quarterly, 61, 180-191. McDonald, M. P., & Popkin, S. L. (2001). The myth of the vanishing voter. American Political Science Review, 95, 963-974. McGhee, E., & Krimm, D. (2009). Party registration and the geography of party polarization. Polity, 41, 345-367. Nicholson, S. P. (2003). The political environment and ballot proposition awareness. American Journal of Political Science, 47, 403-410. Nie, N. (1976). The changing American voter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Olson, J. (2008). Whiteness and the polarization of American politics. Political Research Quarterly, 61, 704-718. Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1984). The polarization of American politics. The Journal of Politics, 46, 1061-1079. Rohde, D. (1991). Parties and leaders in the postreform House. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. World Politics, 58, 41-72. Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., & Tetlock, P. E. (1991). Reasoning and choice: Explorations in political psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Stasavage, D. (2007). Polarization and publicity: Rethinking the benefits of deliberative democracy. Journal of Politics, 69, 59-72. Stone, W., Rapoport, R., & Abramowitz, A. (1990). Sex and the caucus participant: The gender gap in 1984 and 1988. American Journal of Political Science, 34, 725-740. Torgler, B. (2007). Trust in international organizations: An empirical investigation focusing on the United Nations (Working Paper 2006-20). Basel, Switzerland: Center for Research in Economics, Management, and the Arts. Uslaner, E. (2000-2001). Producing and consuming trust. Political Science Quarterly, 115, 569-590. Wolfson, A. (2006). Red and blue nation? Causes, consequences, and correction of Americas polarized politics. Issues in Governance Studies, Number 1. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012

1734 Bios

American Behavioral Scientist 56(12)

Karl Kaltenthaler is the director of research at the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics and a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Akron. He is also on the faculty in the Department of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. He is the author of several articles and books on public opinion, political economy, and political extremism. His current research centers on the role that social psychology plays in shaping attitudes toward politics. William J. Miller is an assistant professor of public administration at Flagler College. He is the author of several articles and books on the Tea Party movement, campaign strategy, public opinion, political extremism, and the pedagogy of political science and public administration. His current research examines how social psychology (particularly social trust) impacts citizen attitudes toward various policies and functions of government.

Downloaded from abs.sagepub.com by guest on December 3, 2012