Emaline Friedman PSYC 8008 Foundations of Humanistic Psychology December 7, 2012 University of West Georgia

Dont Pathologize My Project(ion): an investigation into the natural affinities between Psychoanalysis and Humanistic psychology. Youre No Scientist! (You could say something ironic, within the paradigm of dualism: that the differences arent really in the two theories, but are just psychological mistakes. But the essay isnt ironic. The tone of the paper is generally denigrating to the scientific paradigm, and so in a sense imperative or commanding, like the title above, and at the same time its an attempt at a re-formation, re-consideration) Play around with the words project/projection transference scientism

Abstract The rise of Humanistic and Phenomenological Psychotherapies in the latter half of the 20th century inaugurated, simultaneously, a rupture between this (which one, are those mentioned above one movement?) view and the principles and methods of its direct predecessor, psychoanalysis. This decisive differentiation was articulated not by its critics, but by the humanistic psychologists themselves. Why? This paper will examine the causes and social climate during the moment of this bifurcation with special focus on a particular question: Was this split necessary for the development of a then-nascent humanist psychology, representing a more damning tension between early humanistic thought and psychoanalytic principles? Or, instead, was it mistakenly seen as necessary due to psychoanalysis' confounding interaction with modern natural scientism? If other

factors beyond real theoretical incompatibility contributed to the two psychological approaches' refusal to interact, then perhaps a re-opening of dialogue between them (especially through more contemporary approaches to psychoanalysis) would be beneficial. Gains wrought by reconsidering the similarities between humanistic and psychoanalytic thought include methodological improvements, greater contextualization of the historical development of each field, and a reinvigorated, rich picture of their respective philosophical underpinnings.

Indeed, the wave of humanistic thought that percolated through the latter half of the 20 century in the United States came directly as a response to the clinical as opposed to research side of psychology. Insofar as clinical psychology around this time was dominated by psychoanalytic practice, it was precisely those psychotherapists, those whose theoretical orientation was based upon clinical interactions, who edged away from psychoanalytic thought in favor of a humanistic viewpoint. It comes quite naturally to speculate about the split between psychoanalytic thought and humanistic thought in terms of the way movement and progress begins to stir within any field. Countless historical examples attest to the notion that any paradigmatic shift or ideological change requires some sort of impetus or already working force to which it may respond rebelliously. But, the fact that humanistic thought was in some way born out of psychoanalysis or was preceded by it in Western psychological lineage is not enough to reduce it to psychoanalytic thought, or even to advocate for their two fields continued dialogue. If we instead trace the effects of psychoanalysis forced entrenchment in natural scientific procedure, its underlying convictions about the importance of human interconnectivity and potentiality will be exposed as intimately related to those of the humanistic lens. These deeper similarities will serve as an even louder call for meaningful exchange between the two. (I think you can divide this first paragraph, and put it into the abstract and next paragraph. Some of its a bit unnecessary.) The climate of academic and intellectual research in the early twentieth century is well documented as having fostered, as its sole gateway to legitimacy, strict adherence to
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the natural science paradigm dominant in Western culture. Although we need not trace the snowballing obsession with the procedures and metaphysical commitments of natural science here, it will be helpful to understand the pressure exerted on the budding field of psychology to follow suit (for a historical critique of the modern natural-scientific attitude, see Romanyshyn, 1985 Toulmin, 1990, Wallace, 2009). Suffice it to say that natural scientisms principles of concrete objectivity, measurability, and internal-external dualism governed with an iron fist. It is precisely the sway of the scientific attitude that led behaviorism, the prominent alternative to psychoanalysis available in the early twentieth century, to completely dispose of concepts like mind and consciousness (Watson, 1945). Behaviorism serves as a very extreme example of the degree to which natural science was held to be the only science with any real importance. Through a deluge of success on behalf of the natural sciences and Western cultures increasingly dogmatic appreciation of its findings, it was implied that if purported knowledge was to be considered knowledge at all, it would need, at the very least, to masquerade as a natural science. Humanistic thought, as it emerged in twentieth century America, stressed defining principles which were assumed to distinguish it from psychoanalysis. Indeed, it was the humanistic thinkers dissatisfaction with psychoanalysis as the dominant form of psychology that motivated the bold assertion of their principles. Although they will only be given elaboration enough to proceed with the thesis of this paper, the overarching and entangled themes of humanistic thought, center around (1) the deep relational connection between person and world, (2) the recovery of experience in its direct and primal immediacy, (3) and (switch around?) the capacity for man to enjoy a meaningful existence propelled by basic forward motion. The connection (New P.) between person and world, inseparable from the prioritization of human life as experienced (not sure what this means) , speaks to a metaphysics of holism. Taking its cues from Greek and Heideggerian thought, humanistic thought aims to emphasize the being implied in human being as the eternal process of becoming. In deeply considering the dynamic state of being, humanistic thought intuitively leads to a high valuation of human potential and positing of forward motion as human stasis (or, really, non-stasis!) Casting human existence as one force in a world of vibrant presences, (no comma needd) makes immanent the notion of interrelatedness between man and world. Further, the implication of human agency as just as important an interactive force as any obviates the legitimacy of human experiences, feelings, and intuitions as such. With a pathetically brief outline of humanistic ideas, we can already see the grave discordance with, at the very least, the way psychoanalysis as a branch of natural science appeared in its theoretical formulations. Among many of the classic formulations of humanistic/phenomenological psychology, van den Bergs Different Existence exemplifies the emergence of humanistic thought through its distinction from and rejection of psychoanalysis. Specifically, we will take his assessment of projection as it appears in psychoanalytic thought. Projection as understood by Van den Berg is the mistake whereby a part of the self, often something painful or distressing, is split off and directed toward an object where it is (in which) this feeling resides or outs for the subject. However, Van den Berg attests to the primacy of

experience by noting that projection is incorrect in presupposing the establishment of a feeling prior to seeing an object. Rather, he insists that the contrary is happening: one sees an object and establishes the feeling evoked by it, marking a genuine change in the object for the subject. This counter-interpretation of the relationship between man and world of material objects serves as an important echo of the humanistic prioritization of narrative truth as opposed to natural scientisms sharp distinctions between causes and effects. On this (psychoanalytic ?) interpretation, it certainly seems that projection presupposes a strong duality between inner and outer, a lack of mutually-affective interaction between the material of the psyche and that of the world outside. It is yet to be seen whether or not this (the difference in interpretation) is a rift between psychoanalysis and humanistic psychologys holistic spirit, or rather a rift between the latter and the natural scientific format of theorizing thrust forcefully upon psychoanalytic thought. As we have seen, the pressure exerted upon psychoanalysis to take up this format as the sole means for gaining legitimacy as an area of study is not to be underestimated. (has shaped the presentation of psychoanalysis theoretical insights) A closer examination of the genesis and intended meaning of projection will yield a clearer picture of how its meaning becomes distorted when placed in a natural scientific physiognomy. Freuds writings on the idea of projection firmly mark its occurrence as completely non-pathological. He even went as far as to say that it that projection pervades natural development and, in being so inevitable, plays a formative role in our attitude toward the external world (Freud, 1922). This is a crucial note insofar as projection, among other psychoanalytic concepts, has been filed away (by who? by Freud?) among a collection of other mechanisms which obscure our ability to see the perceive the true, objective external world. The conformation (conformation means shape, perhaps conforming) of projection to the classificatory and metaphysically dichotomous world of the natural sciences, in concert with its reception and integration into this world, wards off ontological suggestions latent in the idea of projection. Freuds insistence on projection as a natural way that a subject interacts with his world hints at a more interactive view of self and world which, in a natural scientific paradigm, would seem extremely radical. Instead of the colloquially understood meaning of projection as a subjects error, seeing the internal as external, we may take projection as one of many processes by which the subject and his world inform each other mutually, thereby creating a new form of truth. A narrative truth suggested by the concept of projection is one which psychoanalysis tends toward in practice, but, with its theoretical constructs implanted in a natural scientific template (comma, it is) unable to do them justice (and), has very little formal support. As echoed in Rollo Mays critique of the climate out of which psychoanalysis arose, the compartmentalized and alienated position of the subject of Western natural science was a cultural affectation that barred the successes of psychoanalytic praxis from forming correlates in their abstracted conceptualizations (May, 1983). To return to van den Bergs critique of the concept of projection, which we may view as exemplary of that about psychoanalysis which humanistic thought rejected most

adamantly, projection appears as begging for application based on the scientific worldview which it entertains. Namely, as an explanation in the psychoanalytic toolbox begs to be brushed off and used according to the psychotherapists judgment of a patients behavior (a bit awkard). The mere employment of a tool seems to lead the psychotherapist to value his preexisting notions of psychological life over the patients experiences as they are expressed. The very possibility that the patients experiences and agency in the formation of his world are eschewed in the name of consistency with pre-established psychological concepts flies in the face of humanistic psychologys basic principle of remaining true to experience. What van den Berg is really criticizing is the tendency of this natural scientific, de-humanizing mode of analysis, rather than anything intrinsic to the notion of projection as it was originally intended. Whether or not one considers psychoanalysis entanglement with the vocabulary and procedures of the natural sciences part of psychoanalysis itself is only a question of semantics. It is a mistake to confound psychoanalysis pressure to and subsequent conformation to a natural scientific paradigm with its conceptual values and ideals. Therefore, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the content of some psychoanalytic concepts may resonate deeply with the majority of what we have to understand as the main ideas of humanistic and phenomenologically grounded psychology. However, one may rightly be concerned as to whether or not psychoanalysis adoption of a natural scientific methodology reflexively led it astray from its original commitments. Perhaps, one may imagine, psychoanalysis slowly began to adopt the troubling metaphysical underpinnings of the natural scientific attitude in conjunction with its vocabulary and format of presenting ideas. However, following the concepts of projection all the way to its present stage of evolution, we will see that quite the contrary is true. Not only has this idea assumed a less concrete, objective mode of presentation, but its original spirit, much in line with humanistic principles, is just as present as before the emergence of a human science alternative. Modern Lacanian interpretations of Freuds original psychoanalytic notions are a testament to psychoanalysis having merely donned the costume of the natural sciences without taking up their ideals. Unfortunately, we have seen that this point has been missed by many of the formative thinkers of humanistic psychology, as they have pitted themselves and their principles against psychoanalytic thought. The use of projection in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory promotes an exploration of the projective ways which the analysand engages with the others in his life. Projection is considered thoughtfully (not sure what this means) and even encouraged on the basis that, in analysis, Lacan understood the subject as the subject supposed to know (Fink, 1997). This refers to the tendency of the analysand to presume that knowledge of what ails him resides within the analyst rather than in himself. Therefore, projection yields great insight into the ways in which the analysand will eventually come to greet knowledge and revelations that ultimately reside in their personal system of meaning-making. The idea underlying projection as a fruitful source of coming to know the analysands qualities and particularities is one that frames projection, the way Freud emphasized, as non-pathological. Projection is accepted rather than disputed or corrected because it illuminates the analysand as a unique individual who cannot be understood

through the fact that he is projecting but rather in the way that he projects. When we allow the projecting person back into projection (poetic, but a bit vague, or abstract), the latter becomes a broad mode of relating that allows insight into the lived world of the analysand. The shift from projection as a one-dimensional act to a mode through which one relates to his world also increases the value placed on welcoming the meanings he configures for himself and subsequently lives out. Though not typically parsed out with respect to the humanistic ideas implied in such shifts, Lacanian psychoanalysis has reconfigured a number of other psychoanalytic concepts in addition to projection (transference, counter-transference, interpretive techniques) to accommodate and prioritize individuality. Given the similarities between Freuds classic notion and Lacans, the true shift taking place in the use of a concept like projection is not a radical reinterpretation of it, but rather a return to it imposed (necessitated) by having been distortedly framed by the natural scientific attitude. As it turns out, modern psychoanalysts seem to be taking pains to eradicate the objectifying standardization of analysands, effected through these distorted concepts, much in the same vain as the leaders of the humanistic movement! The (current) divergence of humanistic thought and psychoanalysis where they are currently is undoubtedly more a product of their respective methodologies and historical lineages than the spirit of their approaches. The fact that the two fields of psychology, as they are strictly and nominally divided, often suggest very similar ideas about the ways that the human subject relates to his world and the others who inhabit it is not sufficiently explored. Having closed off the possibility of a mutually beneficial interaction between humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis, we have even further submitted to a natural scientific paradigm of rigidly divisive demarcation of theories! Although the advantages to a dialogue between humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis are many and varied, the humanistic psychologist should be persuaded to open this avenue, if for no other reason, (delete comma) than to uphold its tradition of criticality toward natural sciences paradigmatic authority. Even the staunch critics of psychoanalytic concepts attribute the undeniable successes of psychoanalysis to its ability to transcend these concepts in its therapeutic praxis (May, 1953). To purport a difference between concepts and praxis suggests the likelihood of an external factor forming a gulf between them, lest the practice of psychoanalysis arose magically out of thin air. The apparent differences between psychoanalytic praxis and concepts, as noted by its humanistic dissidents, illuminate the often-veiled similarities between humanistic thought and psychoanalytic concepts. Humanists like Rollo May point to psychotherapys most prosperous moments as those in which grand personal revelations wrought through the deconstruction of the psyche deliver to the patient that which humanistic psychology most values. The most important of these are elucidation of the relationship between self and world and acceptance of ones experiences as they are experienced as endowed with meaning. While the methods by which humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis have historically encouraged these revelations in their patients have differed significantly, the value they place on this clarity of understanding oneself as a subject is roughly commensurate. Similarly, the implication of this coming-to-realize experience as simultaneously a

marker of and pathway to psychological well-being hints at common goals and principles. We can take, as a too-brief look into how humanistic and psychoanalytic concepts may fruitfully interact, the well-developed ideas from a relationship-centered therapeutic environment as a supplement helpful to Lacanian theorists and analysts in making sense of the very precariously held ideas of transference. Transference is both one of the oldest ideas in psychoanalytic theory and, in its modern form, the idea with the least consensus among different camps of psychoanalytic practitioners (Fink, 2007). Though largely misunderstood (and consequently misapplied therapeutically), transference is the formal name for the web of relations experienced between analyst and analysand with no inherent sense of pathology whatsoever. It is in this wider sense of transference, evoking the fundamentality of life experience rooted in relationships, that Freud conceived of transference. In stark contrast to the understanding implied by current analysts eagerness to apprehend their analysands through the abstract concept of transference, Freud suggested that we do not attempt to neutralize or dissipate the relational energy that amounts to transference (Freud, 1913/1958). This lends credence to the primal importance Freud placed on what he recognized as the intricately contextualized, unique relationships which make analysis possible. We may surmise that the availability of transference as a tool in the box of concepts-to-be-applied, as a natural scientific approach might have it, contributed to the distortion of its meaning. Either way, it is a mistake to ignore Freuds writings on transference as (since they are) a clue-in to psychoanalysis emphasis on the human relationship. Developing his ideas on transference in the therapeutic setting, Freud claimed that transference should only be problematized or applied conceptually to an analystanalysand relationship when it obstructs the analysands ability to communicate and thus to continue analysis effectively. Here, Freuds intended use for the concept of transference is shown to be no more than to name the red flag indicating the inevitable and unique way that the analyst and the analysand relate has become a hindrance to the analytic process. He notes that this phenomenon need not be common and in fact may only occur infrequently (Fink, 2007). Recalling Freuds writings on transference, Lacan conjectured that transference stresses the polyvalence of the patients way of relating, not just in the therapeutic context, but in their lives more generally (Lacan, 1988a). From this notion, we can see both psychoanalytic thought and humanistic psychology converging upon the importance of relational styles and possibilities. As we have seen the discussion of roadblocks to selfactualization, meaningful lived relationships are understood as tantamount to well-being, from the humanistic perspective (see Rogers, 1961, Maslow, 1999, Becker, 1992, Boss, 1988). Where these styles and tendencies are tacitly acknowledged in psychoanalysis as a source of analytic fodder, client-centered therapy and techniques used by early humanistic and phenomenological psychotherapists took the therapeutic setting as an opportunity to imagine, jointly with their clients, new potentials for relating with the world and others. While the manifestations and uses of the human-to-human connection are rather different in these two branches of psychology, they are each underscored with the same emphatic spirit. A consideration of humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis

in concert, granted their similarities, abounds with possibilities for mutually-beneficial research. Having now looked at both the dogmatic, uncompromising reign of the natural scientific paradigm at the time of psychoanalysis development, we might think twice about neglecting to consider a synthesis between psychoanalytic and humanistic ideas and methods. An exploration of psychoanalytic ideas as they appear stripped of natural scientific influence could be enlightening for psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology alike. The close, if not unified, relationship between subject and world hinted at in Freudian text and elaborated by Lacanian psychoanalytic theory serves as a reminder of the intimate connection between psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology. As they may be able to emerge together in opposition to the oppressive regime of the natural scientific paradigm in the study of the psyche, it would be irresponsible to preclude the opening of their dialogue.

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