[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.] RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.

SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath and assumed office. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC be declared null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Monsods past work experiences satisfy t he constitutional requirement of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years (as a qualification for the position of COMELEC Chairman). RULING: The petition is DISMISSED. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court stated: "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients. It also embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal principles and technique, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Furthermore, the Court stated that appointment is an essentially discretionary power and it is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. The judgment rendered by the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, there is no abuse that has been clearly shown; therefore there is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power.

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANANET AL., petitioners. Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners. Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent. FACTS: The issue have aroused when the Congress passed the Republic Act No. 972 known as the BAR FLUNKERS Act of 1953. In accordance with this the court only passed those candidates who obtained a general average of 72 percent was raised to 75 percent. Unsuccessful candidate who obtained a few percentage lower than those who were admitted, filed petition for reconsideration and secured the passage of Senate Bill No. 12, invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. The President requested the views of the court on this bill and seven members of the court submitted a written comment adverse to this act and shortly the President vetoed it. The Congress did not override the veto instead they approved the Senate Bill No. 371 with some changes on it. Even if the court reiterated their unfavourable views, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 972 is constitutional. HELD: The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision is a judicial function and responsibility. The Congress may repel, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by the court but the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to the Court. That (a) the portion of Art. 1 of RA 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of the Art. 2 of said law are unconstitutional and therefore, void and without force and effect.

In the Matter if the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant Al C. Argosino July 13, 1995 Facts: A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with 13 other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. Raul Camaligan died from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of hazing conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court, passing a judgment that each of the 14 accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Less than a month after a probation granted by the lower court to Mr. Argosino and his colleagues, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. Although he was allowed to take the bar, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath of office. On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorneys oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar. Issue: Whether or not applicant Mr. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character required of a lawyer, and whether or not he should be allowed to take the lawyers oath of office as a result of such. Held: The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect. In Re Farmer: xxx xxx xxx This upright character prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicants right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. it is something more than an absence of bad character. it is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite

often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong xxx xxx xxx And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counselor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every mans fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is sworn officer of the Court whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice xxx xxx xxx It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment. Good moral character must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to th e bar and to take the attorneys oath of office. The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our peoples confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. Mr. Argosinos participation in the deplorable hazing activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character, indicating an evident rejection of the moral duty to take care of deceased Raul Camaligans life entrusted in their hands. Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan, within 10 days from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

B.M. No. 712 . July 13, 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. FACTS: Argosino, along with 13 other individuals, was convicted of the crime of homicide in connection with the death of Raul Camaligan. His death stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of hazing conducted as [art of uni versity fraternity initiation rites. Thereafter, Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court which was granted. Less than a month later, He filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations, wherein he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. Petition was granted. He passed said bar exam however he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath of office. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that his probation period had been terminated. ISSUE: Whether or not Argosino is allowed to take the lawyers oath and be admitted to the practice of law. RULING: The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect. It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment. The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. Argosino must submit to the Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law. ***Canon 1 Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING Facts: On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations. In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court of Cotabato City which arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. In his Answer, believing in good faith that the case would be settled Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated. As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk. Issue: Whether or not Haron S. Melin should be disqualified from taking the Bar. Held: The reasons of Meling for not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are absurd. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant. The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

CASE DIGEST OF IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, VS. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner. FACTS: Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the bar. After two years, Severino charged him with having falsely represented in his application for the bar examination that he had the required academic qualifications. According to the report conducted, Diao had not completed the required pre-legal education before taking up his law subjects, specifically he did not complete his high school and he never attended Quisumbing College and never obtained A.A. Diploma. He contended that he left high school to enter the service of U.S. Army where he passed the General Classification Test which is equivalent to a high school diploma. With the second issue, he asserted that there was confusion, that he obtained A. A. Diploma from Arellano University in April 1949 and not from Quisumbing College. Issue: Whether or not Diao should be removed from the roll of attorneys. Held: Yes. It was held that the explanation was not acceptable and the said confusion was obviously of his own making. Even if Diao was able to obtain A.A. Diploma from Arellano in April, 1949, it was inferred that he started his law studies six months before obtaining the degree. Therefore, he was not qualified to take the bar and due to false representation, he was allowed to and able to pass. He failed to comply with Section 6, Rule 138 of the rules of court, in which an applicant to the bar examination, before he began the study of law, had satisfactorily completed a four-year high school course and the course of study for a bachelors degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and economics. It is an essential requirement to take the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner. Thus, Diao was removed from the roll of attorneys.

Basic Legal Ethics Case Title: Citation: Petitioner: Ponente: FACTS: Juan T. Publico filed three petitions for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys (1) by Juan T. Publico himself dated on May 28, 1979 (2) by the President and twelve members of the faculty of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Manila, where Juan T. Publico is also a faculty member filed on June 1, 1979 and (3) by the San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro Manila through its President, Vice-President and Directors on April 23, 1979. In 1960 Juan T. Publico took the 1960 Bar examination, passed it, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys. However records disclose that Juan Tapel Publico filed a petition to take the Bar Examination in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar examination. His uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was sixteen (16) years of age, that he was eligible for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by utilizing the school records of his cousin and namesake, Juan M. Publico when, in actual fact, petitioner had not completed Grade VI of his elementary schooling, much less, First and Second Year High School. When required to file a formal Complaint, Dulcisimo Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school records or credentials. February 23, 1962, the name of Juan T. Publico was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. on June 28, 1973, Juan T. Publico filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys until March 1969, when after taking his oath of office as Municipal Judge of Gigmoto, Catanduanes, he was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him; that he was shocked and humiliated upon learning of the said Resolution; that he resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to Manila. He then prayed that the Court allow his reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he received, which were incorporated in the Petition, and particularly, for the sake of his children. The Court denied the Petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration claiming that he had been sufficiently punished already, but again this was denied by the Court for lack of merit. On April 17, 1974, Juan T. Publico filed his second Petition for Reinstatement but the court but the Court denied his petition in its resolution of April 23, 1974. On November 17, 1975, Juan T. Publico wrote to the Chief Justice imploring his assistance that he may be given another opportunity to enjoy the privileges of a lawyer, and requesting that a hearing be held where he could personally plead for his reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. Again the Court denied IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, JUNA T. PUBLICO, PETITIONER FEBRUARY 20, 1981 RENATO L. CAYETANO MELENCIO-HERRERA J.

the aforesaid letter-petition. On July 8, 1976 petitioner filed a fourth petition for reinstatement however the Court denied the petition with finality. On June 1, 1979 petitioner filed its fifth reinstatement petitioner also submitted evidence purporting to show his honesty and integrity and other manifestations of his good moral character, particularly, the Resolution dated March 30, 1979 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Catanduanes Chapter (Annex A); the Resolution dated April 16, 1979 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel, Catanduanes (Annex B); the letter of the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Alejandro T. Tatel addressed to the late Chief Justice Castro dated April 17, 1979 (Annex B-1), all attesting to his good character and standing in the community and his capability as a lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not Juan T. Publico is eligible to be reinstated in the roll of Attorneys satisfying the requirements that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper person to practice law. HELD: The evidences submitted purporting to show his honesty and integrity and other manifestations of his good moral character, particularly, the Resolution dated March 30, 1979 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Catanduanes Chapter (Annex A); the Resolution dated April 16, 1979 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel, Catanduanes (Annex B); the letter of the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Alejandro T. Tatel addressed to the late Chief Justice Castro dated April 17, 1979 (Annex B-1), all attesting to his good character and standing in the community and his capability as a lawyer. Further submitted are certifications issued by the different government offices Court of First Instance of Catanduanes (Annex C); Catanduanes Integrated National Police Command (Annex F should be D); Office of the Provincial Fiscal at Virac, Catanduanes (Annex F), and First Municipal Circuit Court, Bato-San Miguel, Bato, Catanduanes (Annex E), certifying that petitioner has not been accused nor convicted of any crime. The petition filed by the President and Faculty of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines reiterated the same circumstances as those stated by Juan T. Publico in his own Petition and further professed that Atty. Publico is a competent and proficient teacher; that his moral integrity and honesty are beyond reproach; that to require him to comply with what he missed in the steps of the educational ladder would be meaningless and without any value as it is not intended to benefit him nor the system of education; and that non-formal education has already been recognized and given its equivalence in the scheme of formal education. The petition also mentioned the names of some great men who had been school dropouts, but who did not let this fact deter them from attaining success in their respective fields. The petition filed by the San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro Manila is substantially of the same tenor and added that petitioner was re-elected President of that Association for four years from 1972 to 1975 inclusive. The evidence submitted by petitioner, particularly, the testimonials presented on his behalf, as listed heretofore, his good conduct and honorable dealings subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations, render him fit to be restored to membership in the Bar, and that petitioner has

been sufficiently punished and disciplined. Petitioner Juan T. Publico is reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. RELATED PROVISIONS: RULE 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics. Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance . The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 1. A Lawyer shall uphold the Constitution obey the laws of the land and Promote Respect for law of and legal process. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7. A Lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. Rule 7.01 A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.

BAR MATTER NO. 702 May 12, 1994 In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court Judges to Appoint Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public Facts: Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of Notre Dame University who was admitted to the Philippine Shari'a Bar filed the instant petition praying that the court after due notice and hearing, issue an order authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as notaries public within their respective jurisdictions.

On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with the regular Regional Trial Courts in the hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial System, petitioner claims that by analogy, Shari'a District Court Judges may be authorized to appoint the members of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Being a special member of the Philippine Bar and a practicing Shari'a lawyer, notarial work is indispensable and imperative in the exercise of his profession; therefore, he is qualified to be appointed as notary public by Shari'a District Judge. Issue: Whether or not the Sharia Court Judges may be authorized to appoint the members of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Held: The petition is denied. Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial system of the Philippines. The fact that judges thereof are required by law to possess the same qualifications as those of Regional Trial Courts does not signify that the Shari'a Court is a regular court like the Regional Trial

Court. The latter is a court of general jurisdiction. A Shari'a District Court, is a court of limited jurisdiction, a Shari'a District Court is not a regular court exercising general jurisdiction.

As a general rule, a Shari'a Lawyer is not possessed of the basic requisite of "practice of law" in order to be appointed as a notary public under Section 233 of the Notarial Law in relation to Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. A person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination, who is not a lawyer, is not qualified to practice law before the regular courts because he has not passed the requisite examinations for admission as a member of the Philippine Bar. Considering, therefore that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a fullfledged member thereof even if he holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree, he is not qualified to practice to qualified to practice law before the regular courts.

In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to Allow Shari'a Lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts," this Court categorically stated that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof even if he is a Bachelor of Laws degree holder. As such, he is authorized to practice only in the Shari'a courts.

Only a person duly admitted as members of the Philippine Bar in accordance with the Rules of Court are entitled to practice law before the regular courts. Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

PAFLU G.R. No. L-23959 FACTS: Respondent Quintin Muning was a non-lawyer who performed legal representation in the Court of Industrial Relations, in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al.. The respondent represented the complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. The outcome of the case was the reinstatement of the complainants to their former positions with their backwages. The Court of Industrial Relations granted 25% of those backwages as attorney's lien, with the following portions: Attorney's Cipriano Cid & Associates received 10%, Quintin Muning received 10% and Attorney Atanacio Pacis received 5%. Attorney Pacis was employed by the above mentioned firm. ISSUE: Can a non-lawyer receive attorney's fees for legal services rendered? HELD: A non-lawyer cannot receive payment for illegally acting as a lawyer. WHEREFORE, respondent is to be excluded from payment in the orders under review. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent. RATIO: In the case of, Amalgamated Laborer's Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L 23467, 27 March 1968, it was held that an agreement to divide attorney's fees with the inclusion of a non-lawyer union president amongst the recipients, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics. There is no justification for a non-lawyer to practice legal representation in the Court of Industrial Relations under Section 5(b) of RA 875, which reads, In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel.. There is no justification because the same sections adds, it shall be the duty of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.. Thus this clearly explains that such representation is to be performed by members of the bar. An exception to this cannot be justified with reference to the special jurisdiction status of the Court of Industrial Relations. Therefore, a non-lawyer illegally acting as a representative cannot receive attorney's fees. This cannot be circumvented by trying to rece ive such fees as an agent, when the services were purely legal services. Even if the client gave permission for the non-lawyer to represent, appear or defend in that Court, this would not entitle him to attorney's fees because Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, require an attorney-client relationship in order to receive attorney's fees. A non-member of the bar cannot form an attorney-client relationship and is therefore unqualified to receive attorney's fees.

Office of the court Administrator vs. Atty. Misael M. Ladaga A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001 Facts: Ladaga, respondent, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court who appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin without prior permission from the Court. He was charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. And a similar provision under Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court also prohibits certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. In his defense, 1)He was the only lawyer in the family, 2) It was for a humanitarian purpose. 3) He did not prejudice his office or interest. And 4)That the presiding judge was aware of his appearance as counsel. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice Held: No. there was no private practice of law. Private practice does not pertain to an isolated court appearance. It contemplates succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. (People v. Villanueva) Thus, when he appeared as a pro bono counsel it does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law. However, he is liable under Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, failure to obtain permission from his head of department in which he was assigned. The decision of the court was reprimanded with stern warning that any repetition of the act would be dealt with more severely. **Canon 2 of Code of Professional Responsibility: A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES
AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVE-NESS OF THE PROFESSION. **

OCA vs. Ladaga

350 SCRA 326 [2001]

Facts: Atty. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. An administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without permission from the Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? Held: NO. Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.

Jovito S. Olazo, complainant, vs. Justice Dante O. Tinga (Retired), respondent A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC. December 7, 2010 Ponente: Brion, J. Facts: The case herein settles upon the alleged violation of respondent of Rule 6.02, 6.03 and 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Retired Justice Tinga was a member of the Committee on Awards whose duty involved the evaluation and disposition of land. The land in this case is situated in the Municipality of Taguig. The complainant herein assails that the respondent violated the said Rules 6.02, and 6.03 for using his public position to facilitate the transactions in his favour, because of his interest in the private land in discussion. He went on to exercise influence over the complainants father who in turn transferred rights to one J. Rodriquez, the respondents nephew -in-law. As for Rule 1.01, the respondent is allegedly to have committed foul because he knew that his nephew is not qualified for the award of land. Also, he performed private legal practice when he appeared as a lawyer for his nephew, which is prohibited of government officials. Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Rules in question. Held: No. For the case of Rule 6.02, there is the absence of proof that the respondent used his official position to satisfy his private interests. The complainants father and the respondent, being cousins, merely stipulated the transactions to mutually favour both sides. As for 6.03, there is no evidence to support the alleged intervention of the respondent on the land in question, because the said land was not subject to his office when he was still working for the government. And finally, for Rule 1.01, it was found that the nephew of the respondent was indeed qualified for the transfer of rights, thus disabling the allegation. Thus, all complaints for violation dismissed.

Legal Ethics In Re: Benjamin M. Dacanay, Petitioner Facts: This matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law. Petitioner was admitted to bar in March 1960, he practiced law until migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He applied for Canadian citizenship to avail Canadas free medical aid program. The application was approved in May 2004 wherein he became a Canadian citizen. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to RA 9225 the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, Petitioner reacquire his citizenship. He took his allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to Philippines and intends to resume his law practice. Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost his membership in the Philippine Bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Held: Section 2 Rule 138 provides the requirements for all applicants for the admission to the Bar is that, every applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines. . . Applying the provision, the office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by the virtue of the petitioners reacquisition of Philippine citizenship in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the Bar. Filipino lawyers who acquires citizenship of other country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. It may automatically resume his right to practice law.

In Re: Suspension from the practice of law in the territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera B.M. No. 793 July 30, 2004

Facts: On August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed the Supreme Court that Atty. Leon G. Maquera has been suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of Guam dated May 7, 1996. In the abovementioned decision, the Superior Court of Guam found Atty. Maquera guilty of misconduct as provided by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which is in force in Guam. The Court found him liable for misconduct for accepting payment of legal fees much higher than his standard fees. This case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The IBP found out that Atty. Maquera was accepted to the Bar on February 28, 1958 and that he has not been able to pay his annual dues to the IBP since 1977.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law in the Philippines on the same ground of his suspension in Guam.

Ruling: Atty. Maquera was suspended from the practice of law in the Philippines. It was held that the respondents failure to pay the annual dues to the IBP was sufficient for his name to be removed from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court. Furthermore, it was held that notwithstanding the respondents suspension from the practice of law in Guam, he may not be suspended in Philippine jurisdiction for that reason alone as any decision by a foreign court serves only as prima facie evidence for the grounds of suspension, as stated by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In Re: Telesforo A. Diao AC no. 224 29 March 1963 In 1953, Diao was admitted to the bar. Two years later, Severino Martinez charged him of falsely representing himself in his application for the Bar Examination. The charge was investigated, and was found that Diao failed to complete the requiquisite academic qualifications for the members of the Bar, specifically. (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao did not obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) diploma from Quisimbing College in 1941. Diao admitted the first charge, explaining that he lef thigh school in his third year, but entered the service of the U.S. Army. He passed the General Classification Test, which he claimed to be equivalent to a high school diploma. He failed to produce any certification of his claim, the court finding it dubious. In furtherance, the second charged was clearly meritorious. Diao asserted that he obtained his AA diploma from Arellano University in April 1949. In his application for the Bar Examination, he stated that he started his legal education in the 2nd semester of academic year 1948-1949. In view of his claims, Diao obtained hid AA diploma subsequent to the commencement of his legal studies. he would not have been permitted to take the Bar Examination; our laws providing. "That PREVIOUS to the study of Law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal eduacation (AA in this case) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education. Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar examination; but due to his false representation, he was was allowed, passed, and was admitted to the Bar. His admission, having been obtained under false pretenses, was revoked by the court Telesforo A. Diao's name was thereby deleted from the roll of attorneys, and consequently required to return his lawyer's diploma within 30 days.

In Re: Attorney Felix P. David Adm. Case No. 98 . July 13, 1953. (Ponente Pablo, M.) Facts: In administrative case number 35, Atty. Felix David is suspended for 5 years (November 9, 1949 November 8, 1954) for malpractice in his profession. Atty. David admits that he is suspended but continued his profession in his written report filed on March 17, 2951. In the present appeal of Atty. David, he acted as an agent in behalf of SyTan Tek for claims and not as a lawyer. Subsequently Atty. David filed a motion for execution in another civil case of the Court of First Instance in Malayan Saw Mill vs. Tolentino for an order to demolish homes. In the defense of Atty. David he only acted as counsel fo Sy Tan Tek in 1948 but advised his client to another counsel due to his suspension. However due to restriction of time Atty. David signed in behalf of Sy Tan Tek. Atty. David said that he did not violate his suspension since he was in good faith knowing that he only signed in behalf of the appellee without designating that he is a practicing attorney at law. Issue: Whether or not Atty. David violated his suspension Held: Yes, being suspended Atty. David is not obliged to serve his client. An agent or attorney cannot appear for trial. Atty. David cannot allow his name to appear in a pleading under the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency. Practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts proper profession. The preparing and filing of motions, requesting the execution of the judgment, demolition of homes of the defendant, asking the court to order the Sheriff to betray the amounts collected, are acts that are art of the exercise of the legal profession. In the present allegation of writing a memorand um to the Court Of Appeal is doing the profession of lawyer and an agent cannot do it. Hiding as an agent does not alter the nature of service that lawyers provided and pretending as an agent but in reality acting as a lawyer made his situation more guilty as he goes openly in the view of the public. Evidence of record, showed that respondent Felix P. David, practiced law profession and wilfully disobeyed the decision in Sept. 30, 1949 Admin Case No. 35. Therefore disqualifies David as lawyer and is declared cancelled and ordered to return to the Clerk of the Court.

RELATED PROVISIONS: RULE 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Section 27.

Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 1. A Lawyer shall uphold the Constitution obey the laws of the land and Promote Respect for law of and legal process. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7. A Lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. Rule 7.01 A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked: As a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963) As an operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970), As chief executive officer of an investment bank and of a business conglomerate (1970-1986), As legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer on various companies (1986) As a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. As former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, he worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. As a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi judicial body (1990), Issue: Whether or not the respondent satisfies the requirement of 10 years practice of law for him to assume the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Held: Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

Ramos vs. Maalac, 89 Phil. 270 FACTS: Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan regarding a foreclosed parcel of land. Petitioners question the validity of the CFI ruling that they will be held in contempt for refusing to vacate the land. The said property, being collateral for a loan to a Mr. Rivera, was foreclosed due to non-payment of loan amount and its interest within the prescribed periods. Mr. Rivera later sold the property to Ms. Lopez, who later filed petition that she be placed in possession of the land. The petitioners question the ruling of the court. ISSUES: Whether or not: (1) The decision of the lower court is valid; (2) Directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipa Lopez is valid; and, (3) The term appearance would include only presence in courts. HELD: YES on first two issues. NO on the third issue. Claim of the petitioners as to the validity of the decision cannot be sustained for the reason that it is in a nature of collateral attack to judgment which on its face is valid and regular for a long time. It is a well known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought principally for the purpose. The second issue was also not taken for the simple reason that the issuance of writ of possession in foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the purview of Section 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but is merely ministerial and complementary duty of the court. In the third issue, the word or term appearance includes not only arguing a case before any such body but also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer.

IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, JUAN T. PUBLICO, petitioner. FACTS: The records disclose that Juan Tapel Publico filed a petition to take the Bar Examination in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar examination. His uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was sixteen (16) years of age, that he was eligible for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by utilizing the school records of his cousin and namesake, Juan M. Publico when, in actual fact, petitioner had not completed Grade VI of his elementary schooling, much less, First and Second Year High School. Dulcisimo Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school records or credentials. In the meantime, Juan T. Publico took the 1960 Bar examination, passed it, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys. Legal Officer-Investigator found that Juan Publico studied at Buhi Elementary School, Bato, Catanduanes, until Grade VI, but finished only Grade V in said school, because on February 1, 1950, or before the end of the school year 1949-1950, he left said school and came to Manila. Once in Manila, he enrolled in Third Year high school at the University of Manila. After being asked to submit his school records, he sent for the records of records of his cousin Juan Marino Publico. From the foregoing, he was found to have falsified his school records and thus violated the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law. His name was stricken from the roll of attorneys. After 11 years, he filed for 4 subsequent petitions for reinstatement which were then denied. At bar is his fifth petition. He avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel, who accompanied him to school and enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his remonstrations; that the misrepresentation committed about his at academic records was not his own fault alone, but was precipitated by his uncle, who as member of the faculty of the Catanduanes Institute had access to the records of the school; that being merely sixteen years of age, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment. He also submitted evidence proving his good moral character and honesty. ISSUE: Whether or not Juan T. Publico be reinstated in the roll of attorneys. HELD: Almost nineteen (19) years, by February 23, 1981, shall have elapsed since petitioner was barred from exercising his profession. Cognizant that the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, we find that the evidence submitted by petitioner, particularly, the testimonials presented on his behalf, as listed heretofore, his good conduct and honorable dealings subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations, render him fit to be restored to membership in the Bar, and that petitioner has been sufficiently punished and disciplined. WHEREFORE, petitioner Juan T. Publico is hereby ordered reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered. Additional provisions in relation to the case of IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, JUAN T. PUBLICO, petitioner: 1. Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 2. Rule 138, Part V: Legal Ethics, Revised Rules of Court: SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

FACTS: Atty Vicente Raul Almacen is the counsel of Calero in the case of Yaptinchay vs. Calero The trial court, after the hearing rendered judgment against his client he moved for reconsideration and served a copy of the motion to the adverse party but failed to notify the latter of the date and place of the hearing in the CA, the court moved to also dismiss the case for the reason that the MR does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing and is nothing but a useless piece of paper. The Supreme Court refused to take the cse and in a minute resolution denied the appeal, it was at this point that Atty Almacen filed his "PETITION TO SURRENDER LAWYER'S CERTIFICATE OF TITLE" The pleading filed by Atty Almacen is interspersed from beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and deregoratory remarks against the court, as well as its individual members. Atty Almacen described the court as "a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason thier own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He also referred to his client as "one who was deeply aggrieved by the court's unjust judgment" and has become " one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." He also referred to the member of the court as "justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." The court asked Atty Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary actions must be taken against him. Atty Almacen asked that he be given permission to give his answer in an open and public hearing. He reasoned that since the court is the complainant, prosecutor and judge, he preferred that he answer and be heard in an open and public hearing so that the court could observe its sincerity and candor. The court allowed Atty Almacen to file a written answer and thereafter be heard in an oral argument but his written answer offers no apology but is full of sarcasm and innuendo. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Almacen is guilty HELD: Yes, and he is indefinitely suspended until further order form the Supreme Court. Wellrecognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The decisions of the court as public property and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see it. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and justices thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. it is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. In his relations with the court, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Statements made by an attorney in a private conversation or in the course of political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring scorn and disrepute to the administration of justice may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. Post-litigation utterances or publication made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actions, whether amounting to a crime or not,

which transcends the permissible bounds of fair comments and legitimate criticism constitute grave professional misconduct. There is no comfort in the argument of Atty. Almacen that his utterances were made after the judgments against his client attained finality. He could still be liable for contempt as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. The pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is of no consequence. The sole objective of the proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL. Facts: Petitioners are questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 972, or the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, which passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained only an average of 72 percent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others motions for the revision of their examination papers that were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. Issue: Held: Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules .

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY Facts: Benjamin Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), Dacanay reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004? Held:
No. The Supreme Court approved the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications. Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Dacanay acquired Canadian citizenship by reason of naturalization but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225."All Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a)the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b)the payment of professional tax; (c)the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d)the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.