Contention I: Inherency A. Current Rail Security measures rely on consequence management rather than risk management.

David Randall Peterman, Analyst in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Services, May 26, 2005 On May 20, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security issued security directives for passenger rail systems. these directives have not been made public, but according to reports, largely reflect actions already taken by many rail systems. These include removing or hardening trash containers on boarding platforms that could be used to hide bombs, increasing the presence of security officers, using video surveillance in and around stations, using bomb-sniffing dogs for random inspections of passengers and baggage, and encouraging riders to look for suspicious activity. With limited options for preventing an attack, transit agencies have focused on minimizing the harm from an attack (this is referred to as consequence management). Consequence management efforts include vulnerability assessments, emergency planning, emergency response training and drilling of transit personnel, ideally in coordination with first responders, as well as purchase of communication and safety equipment. The federal government has assisted many of these efforts with funding and expertise.8 These actions also help agencies prepare for natural disasters, criminal activity, and other potential disruptions to their operations.

B. Clarification of responsibilities among the different agencies responsible for rail security is needed
Statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; and Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues United States General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 2004

We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security, including rail security, have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security. To clarify the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security matters, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Homeland Security use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clearly delineate their roles and responsibilities. To date, this recommendation has not been implemented.

Contention II: Harms

A. We are unprepared for a cyber attack on the information networks associated with our Rail Systems. Such an attack could cripple this critical infrastructure.
Dr. Deborah FRINCKE, 2003, Dr. Deborah Frincke joined the National Security Agency in July 2011 as Deputy Director of the Research Directorate, Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES). , Railway Security Issues: A Survey of Developing Railway Technology Trains are essential to the daily operation of the nation. Commuters and passengers make daily use of the trains, while tons of freight are moved daily from suppliers to consumers. Shutting down rail traffic would severely hamper movement of workers and materials all over the United States. Europe is even more dependent on rail service than the United States. As part of the critical infrastructure of a nation, it is likely that rail systems will be rising on the threshold of interest for potential attackers. The question of which is likely to be the most attractive of freight, passenger, or unmanned as a potential target is not yet answered. One could, however, speculate that those directed against unmanned, autonomous vehicles would be more effective and have greater impact because of the lack of a crew to manually recover control of the train if an attack were to occur. Railway security is no longer the exclusive purview of private police walking a beat in the rail yards. Since 1994 standards were put in place that requires more than just physical security. Microprocessors are used in many applications that are safety critical. Networks connect control and communications functions, making them vulnerable to the types of attacks all other networks endure. The addition of communications to a central authority, usually wireless, increases the number of ways that security can be breached and the train can be attacked. Electronics in the control path solve many problems, but also introduce additional vulnerabilities. Control networks and communications are not the only way that rail systems can be attacked. Rail companies have placed a great deal of information on the computer in order to better service their customers. Lists of passengers, manifests and lading documents, ticketing, scheduling, routing, and signaling are also susceptible. Network security is required in order to keep this information, and the transportation of this data, safe. A mix of physical and network security is required. To date, rail systems have not addressed this need for security, but this need must be filled in order to keep this part of the nations critical infrastructure safe and operational.

B. The TSA is incapable of recognizing threats and responding to security threats, placing our entire rail system at risk.
GAO 2012, PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY: Consistent Incident Reporting and Analysis Needed to Achieve Program Objectives GAO-13-20, Dec 19, 2012 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-20 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has inconsistently overseen and enforced its rail security incident reporting requirement because it does not have guidance and its oversight mechanisms are limited, leading to considerable variation in the types and number of incidents reported. Though some variation is expected in the number and type of incidents reported because of differences in rail agency size, location, and ridership, local TSA inspection officials have provided rail agencies with inconsistent interpretations of the reporting requirement. For example, local TSA officials instructed one rail agency to report all incidents related to individuals struck by trains. However, local TSA officials responsible for another rail agency said these incidents would not need to be reported as they are most often suicides with no nexus to terrorism. Providing guidance to local TSA inspection officials and rail agencies on the types of incidents that are to be reported could improve consistency across different TSA field offices. GAO also found inconsistency in TSA compliance inspections and enforcement actions because TSA has not utilized limited headquarters-level mechanisms as intended for ensuring consistency in these activities. TSA's rail security inspection policies do not specify inspection frequency but call for performing a "reasonable number" of inspections. However, 3 of the 19 rail agencies GAO contacted were not inspected from January 2011 through June 2012, including a large metropolitan rail agency, although local officials said it was unlikely that no incidents had occurred at that agency. Without inspections, TSA's assurance that rail agencies are reporting security incidents, as required, is reduced. In addition, TSA took enforcement action against an agency for not reporting an incident involving a knife, but did not take action against another agency for not reporting similar incidents, though the agency had been inspected. Enhancing headquarters-level mechanisms for overseeing inspection and enforcement actions in the field could help ensure more consistency in these activities and improve TSA's ability to use the information for trend analysis. TSA has not conducted trend analysis of rail security information, and weaknesses in TSA's rail security incident data management system, including data entry errors, inhibit TSA's ability to search and extract information. Data entry errors occur in part because the guidance provided to officials responsible for entering incident information does not define the available data field options. Without the ability to identify information from the data, such as the number of incidents reported by incident type, TSA faces challenges determining if patterns or trends exist. Additional guidance for officials who enter the incident information could help to reduce data entry errors and improve users' ability to search and extract information from the system, ultimately improving TSA's ability to analyze the incident information. These weaknesses notwithstanding, TSA has made limited use of the incident information it has collected, in part because it does not have a systematic process for conducting trend analysis. TSA's purpose for collecting the rail security incident information was to allow TSA to "connect the dots" by conducting trend analysis. TSA has used the rail security incident information for situational awareness, but has conducted limited analysis of the information, missing an opportunity to identify any security trends or patterns in the incident information, or to develop recommended security measures to address any identified issues.

PLAN I. The Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security will issue a memorandum of agreement, which will serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Transportation, Department of Homeland Security, and Transportation Security Administration with respect to rail security.

II. This memorandum will also instruct those agencies to utilize a risk-management approach to rail security. Any funding needed will be taken from the TSA's aviation security budget. The Affirmative reserves the right to fiat.

Contention III: Solvency A. Risk Management correctly identifies the greatest security threats and directs resources to these critical arreas most effectively.
Statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; and Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues United States General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 2004

Using risk management principles to guide decision-making is a good strategy, given the difficult trade-offs the federal government will likely have to make as it moves forward with its transportation security efforts. We have advocated using a risk management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest priority.15 As figure 5 illustrates, the highest priorities emerge where threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality overlap. For example, rail infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack, and a likely target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable to attack. The federal government is likely to be viewed as a source of funding for at least some rail security enhancements. These enhancements will join the growing list of security initiatives competing for federal assistance. A risk management approach can help inform funding decisions for security improvements within the rail system and across modes

B. Clarifying responsibilities and improved oversight prevent duplicate efforts and significantly enhance security.
Statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; and Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues United States General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 2004 Coordination is also a key action in meeting transportation security challenges. As we have noted in previous reports, coordination among all levels of the government and the private industry is critical to the success of security efforts. The lack of coordination can lead to such problems as duplication and/or conflicting efforts, gaps in preparedness, and confusion. Moreover, the lack of coordination can strain intergovernmental relationships, drain resources, and raise the potential for problems in responding to terrorism. The administrations National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets also emphasize the importance of and need for coordination in security efforts. In particular, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets notes that protecting critical infrastructure, such as the transportation system, requires a unifying organization, a clear purpose, a common understanding of roles and responsibilities, accountability, and a set of well-understood coordinating processes. We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security, including rail security, have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security. Legislation has not defined TSAs role and responsibilities in securing all modes of transportation. ATSA does not specify TSAs role and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes in detail as it does for aviation security. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is responsible for ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also did not eliminate DOT modal administrations existing statutory responsibilities for securing the different transportation modes. Moreover, recent legislation indicates that DOT still has security responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes. To clarify the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security matters, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate their roles and responsibilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOT disagreed with our recommendation, noting that DHS had the lead for the Administration in transportation security matters and that DHS and DOT were committed to broad and routine consultations. We continue to believe our recommendation is valid. A mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, would serve to

clarify, delineate, and document the roles and responsibilities of each entity. This is especially important considering DOT responsibilities for transportation safety overlap with DHS role in securing the transportation system. Moreover, recent pieces of legislation give DOT transportation security responsibilities for some activities, including the rail security. Consequently, the lack of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities could lead to duplication, confusion, and gaps in preparedness. A mechanism would also serve to hold each entity accountable for its transportation security responsibilities. Finally, it could serve as a vehicle to communicate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to transportation security stakeholders.

Advantage 1: Economy

A. Inadequate Rail Security renders all other forms of security meaningless.

Statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; and Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues United States General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 2004

Another common challenge for both passenger and freight rail systems is the interconnectivity within the rail system and between the transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The passenger and freight rail systems are part of an intermodal transportation systemthat is, passengers and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to reach a destination. For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can move from ship to train to truck. The interconnective nature of the transportation system creates several security challenges. First, the effects of events directed at one mode of transportation can ripple throughout the entire system. For example, when the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went on strike in 2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by almost 30 percent during the first week of the strike, compared with the year before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other that is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the breach could affect other modes. An example of this would be if a shipping container that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a U.S. port where it was placed on a train. In this case, although the original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or trucking industry would be affected as well. Thus, even if operators within one mode established high levels of security, they could be affected by the security efforts, or lack thereof, in the other modes.
B. This threatens our entire economy. TSA, 2012
http://www.tsa.gov/freight-rail

The freight railroad network is a vital part of the national economy, playing a key role in the global supply chain for both raw and finished goods. There are approximately 140,000 miles of active railroad track in the United States, upon which 565 common carrier freight railroads operate. Freight railroads serve nearly every industrial, wholesale, retail, and resource-based sector of the U.S. economy, and are responsible for transporting a majority of goods and commodities that Americans depend on daily. Since other sectors rely on railroads as a primary transportation provider, disruptions to the national rail network could have an adverse impact on the national economy as a whole.

Advantage II: Hegemony

A. The failure of the Rail System destroys our Army's ability to mobilize. This makes deployment both domestically and abroad impossible, crushing military readiness and power projection.
Global Security 2013, Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/stracnet.htm During the Great War, getting the troops to their training centers, then to ports of embarkation, and finally across the Atlantic was such a mammoth undertaking and had to be executed on such an emergency basis that confusion and mismanagement could hardly have been unexpected. To co-ordinate rail transportation, the government established a Railway War Board, which later became the Railroad Administration, but so congested did the railroads become that the government eventually seized and ran them through the Railroad Administration. Under its Railroads and Highways for National Defense program, DOD, with the support of the Department of Transportation (DOT), ensures the Nation's rail and highway infrastructure can support defense emergencies. The Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET) consists of 38,800 miles of rail lines important to national defense and provides service to 193 defense installations whose mission requires rail service. The military places heavy and direct reliance on railroads to integrate bases and connect installations to predominantly maritime ports of embarkation. Mainlines, connectors, and clearance lines must all combine to support movement of heavy and/or oversized equipment. To ensure that military needs are factored into railroad industry decisions that may impact on national defense, the Department of Defense relies on the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). In this capacity, MTMC identifies facilities of the railroad infrastructure important to national defense, informs the commercial and civil sectors of Defense needs, and encourages the retention and upkeep of railroad assets vital to support military movements. To ensure this continuity and coordination, MTMC has created the Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET). STRACNET has identified 32,500 miles of rail line critical for movement of essential military equipment to ports located around the country as well as another 5,000 miles of track essential to connect one facility to another. In addition to identifying key lines and facilities, MTMC also conducts analysis of potential railroad industry construction, mergers, bankruptcies, and abandonments to determine how any of these actions may affect DOD mobility capabilities. Since 1976, MTMC has reviewed more than 2,100 abandonments affecting 33,000 miles of track, as well as eight bankruptcies affecting more 1/3 of the nation's railroad network. MTMC analysis and reviews are the main source of DOD input to the railroad industry in attempts to preclude the loss of a critical section of track or facility that is essential to effective movement of heavy military lift requirements. The Railroads for National Defense Program (RND) ensures the readiness capability of the national railroad network to support defense deployment and peacetime needs. The Program works to integrate defense rail needs into civil sector planning affecting the Nation's railroad system. Rail transportation is extremely important to DOD since the predominance of our heavy and tracked vehicles will deploy by rail to seaports of embarkation. The RND Program in conjunction with the US Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), established the Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET) to ensure DOD's minimum rail needs are identified and coordinated with appropriate transportation authorities. STRACNET is an interconnected and continuous rail line network consisting of over 38,000 miles of track serving over 170 defense installations.

B. US leadership solves nuclear war

Khalilzad 95 Defense Analyst at RAND, (Zalmay, Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War The Washington Quarterly, RETHINKING GRAND STRATEGY; Vol. 18, No. 2; Pg. 84) Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best longterm guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Advantage III: Terrorism

A. Rail Systems are more susceptible to a terrorist attack than the aviation system.
Statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; and Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues United States General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 2004

In addition to the common security challenges that face both passenger and rail systems, there are some challenges that are unique to the type of rail system. In our past reports, we have discussed several of these unique challenges, including the openness of mass transit systems and the size of the freight rail network and the diversity of freight hauled. According to mass transit officials and transit security experts, certain characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, mass transit systems are open (i.e., have multiple access points and, in some cases, no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of mass transit systems can leave them vulnerable because transit officials cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves the systems. In addition, other characteristics of some transit systems- high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)also make them attractive targets because of the potential for mass casualties and economic damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make mass transit systems difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that pass through a mass transit systemespecially during peak hoursmake some security measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. In addition, the multiple access points along extended routes make the costs of securing each location prohibitive

B. Unchecked Terrorism Will Lead to Extinction

Yonah Alexander (Professor and Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism); Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century; Spring 2000

Present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.