Amadora vs. CA GR No.

L47745, April 15, 1988 FACTS: Seventeen year old Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to his death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victims parents filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports). ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable. HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death. Petition was denied.

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PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of AgapitoElcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977] Facts of the Case: Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named AgapitoElcano. A criminal complaint was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissedupon motion for reconsideration. Issues: 1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married. Ruling of the Court 1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act. As suchthe acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. 2. Yes, the abovementioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

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Filamer v. CA G.R. No. 75112 [October 16, 1990] Facts: Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. At the time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the hospital. The trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court's decision became final as to Funtecha. For failure of the insurance firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17, 1985, the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court's decision in toto. Hence the present recourse by petitioner Filamer. Issue: Whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha. Ruling: The Court ruled that even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. At the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused. Furthermore, the Court cited Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code, under the Labor Code, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.
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AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-14409 October 31, 1961 FACTS: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico, but the latter instead held the former by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is broken." Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment and the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting. As a result, a civil case for damages was filed against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico. ISSUE: WON AgapitoFuellasmay be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son HELD: YES.Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. This civil liability of the father or the mother, as the case may be, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them and the only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused".

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SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners, vs. RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 163609 November 27, 2008 FACTS: On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident. ISSUE: MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee RULING: 1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. 2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
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governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation. The petition is DENIED.

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CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968 FACTS: Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of M a r c h 2 4 , 1 9 5 8 a l o n g E . d e l o s S a n t o s A v e . , i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f S a n LorenzoVillage bound for the airport. Several members of his family were i n t h e c a r . Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe T h a i d r i v e n b y h i s d r i v e r R a f a e l B e r n a r d o . T h e t w o c a r s w e r e t r a v e l i n g a t a moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendants driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendants driver veered to the left w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n o f p a s s i n g b y t h e caretela b u t i n d o i n g s o i t s r e a r b u m p e r c a u g h t t h e r e a m o f t h e caretelas left wheel wrenching it off. Defendants car skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the p l a i n t i f f . T h e p l a i n t i f f o n h i s p a r t , s l a c k e n e d h i s s p e e d a n d t r i e d t o a v o i d t h e collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendants driver was negligent and liable ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code. RULING: The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the
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opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.

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MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON vs. RAUL DE LEON G.R. No. 165622 October 17, 2008 Facts: Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter prescribed the drugs "CortisporinOpthalmic" and "Ceftin" to relieve his eye problems. Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the Betterliving, Paraaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondents left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, "CortisporinOtic Solution." De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription and it was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the days incident. Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. Issue: Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable. Ruling: Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human health. In the United States case of Tombari v. Conners, it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines. In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of ones employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption.
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Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon. As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning.

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PALISOC v. BRILLANTES G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

FACTS: Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominadors stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died, the cause of death being shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs. The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI. The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause so long as they remain in their custody contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the pupil lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupils actions would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the defendant? HELD: The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded as party defendant. The phrase used in Article 2180, so long as the students remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco
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parentis to a certain extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In this case, The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory damages was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.

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AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 FACTS: On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it has struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant was negligent. RULING: YES. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
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responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. While contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, MACARIO M. OFILADA, as ex-officio Sheriff of Manila, and ILDEFONSO ORTIZ, respondents. G.R. No. L-20322 May 29, 1968 Facts: Ildefonso Ortiz instituted a civil action against the Handog Irrigation Association, Inc, a corporation, and the irrigation Service Unit, an office under the Department of Public Works and Communications to recover possession, with damagaes, a 958 sqm lot which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied. For failure to answer, the defendants were declared in default. Later, The Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Irrigation Servuce Unit(ISU) has no juridical entity to sue and be sued. The motion was denied on the ground that defendant is engaged in the business of selling irrigation pumps on instalment plan. A writ of execution was issued and later on a writ of garnishment was issued against the deposit/trust fund of the ISU with Philippine National Bank. The Solicitor General moved for the lifting of the order on the ground that the trust fund is a public fund exempt from garnishment. On appeal, the CA sustained the validity of the writ. ISSUE: Whether or not the ISU may be sued and the trust fund be the subject of garnishment. RULING: No. The Court ruled that the ISU is a government agency engaged in the administration of irrigation system to promote an economic policy of sustaining development and growth in agriculture. Aside from being an agency of the government pursuing a governmental function, the fact that it is collecting payment for irrigation pumps will not make the ISU one engaged in business. The instalment payment being collected is not for profit but merely for the purpose of financing the cost of the pump and its maintenance and administration. In addition, although the State allowed its self to be sued, the trust fund may not be automatically the subject of garnishment due to the fact that it is a public fund. Being a public fund, it may only be appropriated by law and may not be use for garnishment at the expense of the public.

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Salvosa v. IAC G.R. No. 70458 [October 5, 1988] Facts of the Case: Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. However, it is also an institution of arts and trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide. Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the BCF . Issue: WON BCF is subsidiarily liable. Ruling of the Case: Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

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San Fernando v. Firme G.R. N. L-579 April 8, 1991 On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. The heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. The case was transferred to branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of Bania Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme in its decision rendered the Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral damages and attorneys fees. ISSUE: WON the petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State. The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts anda also when the State files a complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municiapality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

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MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996 Facts: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd., she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that cars condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee). She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. Issues: 1.) Whether or not Li was negligent. 2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent. 3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Lis employer is liable. Held: 1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li's car was being driven at a very fast speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendants Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendants car. Moreover the witness declared that he observed Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to Lis allegation that Valenzuelas car was close to the center of the right lane. 2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency rule. Under the emergency rule, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
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Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. 3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court's satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latters goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

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