Middle Platonism and the Seventh Epistle

HAROLD TARRANT

There is little excuse for new discussionsof the authenticityof the Seventh can be produced. Epistleunlesssubstantialnew evidenceor new arguments Moreoversuch evidence must come from outside the CorpusPlatonicum, as should be evident from the followingconsiderations: (i) The interpretationof late Plato can differ so markedly from one scholar to the next that there is no chance of agreementas to the central features of late Platonic theory and attitude, with which the Epistle, if genuine, would have to conform. (ii) There is no shortage of 'inconsistencies'(on the surfaceat least)withinthe body of worksacknowledgedto be genuine; thus apparent inconsistenciesbetween the Epistle and the Dialoguesprove little.(iii) Therewouldseem to be a certaincommunityof feeling between ancientPlatonistsin general,such that, even if the Epistle were entirely compatiblewith the Dialogues, this would prove no more than that it was composed by a Platonist who understood Plato well. (iv) The Epistlesbelong to a differentgenre from the Dialogues,and thus may be expected to show some stylisticdifferences.(v) There is no agreement as to the existenceof any genuine Epistleswith which the Seventh may be compared. For most philosophersand historiansof ideas the chief concern is the authenticity or otherwise of the philosophical digression (c.340-345c), which mightconceivablyhave been writtenand added by a secondwriter. In this case the difficultiesbecome particularly for it is difficult restrictive, to imaginemuchevidenceoutsidethe Corpus Platonicum whichcould help one. Naturallyif one could confidentlyrejectthe Epistleas a whole, then one could rejectthe digressionwith similarconfidence;but it appearsthat thereis no conclusiveevidence leading one either to rejector to accept the mainbody of the work.I acceptneitherthe view thata work(particularly a letter)has to be attributedto its purportedauthoruntil it is provedspurious; nor that it should be regarded as spurious until authenticity is demonstrated.1We must accept that the historian of ancient ideas examinesissues on which proof is often impossible;he must often adopt the 'likely story'or suspendjudgement. It is pointlessto dogmatizeabout the unknown.
75

I quote from a footnoteof the late W.K.C.Guthrie:2

Throughout the literatureone is baffled by the way in which Dr. A will recognize unmistakably'the hand of the Master'in passages which to Dr. B are trivial and quite unworthyof P. To carryon the game, I am in this case on the side of Dr.A: no one but P could or would have writtenlike this, and the passagegives us no less than his own attempt to compressinto a few pages the essence of his laterphilosophy.

Regrettably I must agree with Guthrie about the way in which the

authenticity-game is played,and I see in his personalcontribution towards it a challenge to those who reject the digressionto show us some other writerwho could have forged it. I intend to take up this challengelaterin my paper,and to side with Dr. B, in spite of my full awareness that there are many who have based their judgements upon a far deeper understandingof Platothan I mighthope to acquire.Amongthem I include(Dr. As) K. von Fritz,M. IsnardiParente,J. Stenzel,and Guthriehimself,3 and (Dr. Bs) L. Edelstein and N. Gulley.4 In particularI have acquiredless feeling for Platonicexpressionthan C. Ritter,who was firstto athetizethe digressionwhile acceptingthe bulk of the Epistle.5 My sole excuse for writingis new 'evidence',acquiredaccidentally and is thattherewas pertaining only to the digression; put briefly,my argument a time when Platonismknew the Epistlebut did not know the digression. Thiswill be recognizedas an argument ex silentio,but let me statenow that it operates at the most conclusive level possible for such arguments.It proves nothing to note that early Middle Platonism,including Plutarch, never makes use of the digression;it proves little to add the observation that the restof the Epistlewas well enoughknown,and that therewaswide use of the PlatonicCorpusin general;it does approachto proofwhen one shows that the digressionwas not used in spite of its obvious relevanceto some pressingissues of early Middle Platonism;but the highestdegreeof ex silentioproof is reachedwhen one is able to show passagesin Plutarch and otherswhere the digression,had it been known,would certainlyhave been used. I shall attemptto showsuch passages,and I believethatthiswill offer substantialreasons for concludingthat the digressionis a very late
addition to the text, made to some influential copy before A.D. 175,

I hope to perhapsas earlyas the firstcenturyB.C.,probablyat Alexandria. be able to show how the philosophy of the digressionagrees with the Platonismof its time of composition.This would perhapsexplainwhy the digressionis comparatively highly regardedin Europe.6 Standardliteratureon the SeventhEpistle notes that the first obvious referenceto the workappearsin Cicero;7 equally it fails to note wherethe first obvious referenceto the digressionoccurs.This is a seriousomission 76

now that statistical evidence has suggested to some writers that the digressionis by a separatehand.8I do not claim to be able to offer the first example of an ancient author'suse of the digression,but I can perhaps make some significantobservations: (i) Passagesused to demonstrate Cicero'sknowledgeof the Epistledo not demonstratehis knowledgeof the digression. (ii) I have not noticed any obvious allusion to the digressionin Philo Judaeus, nor is any parallel with the digression mentioned in Colson's notes to the Loeb text or in Leisegang'sindex to the Cohn-Wendland edition.9 Both these sources makes it plain that Philo alludes to a wide rangeof other Platonicworks. (iii) R.M. Jones has collecteda large numberof parallelsbetween Plato and Plutarch;'0 many parallelswith Epistle VII are naturallyfound in the Life of Dion; parallelswith EpistlesIII (315c), IV (321b), and XIII (360d) are found at Mor. 36c, 808d, and 467cd/474e/533b. Nowhere is any parallelwith Ep. VII 338a-345c3to be found. (iv) While therewas debateamong early Middle Platonistsabout which classes of things had Ideas, the commonest view (see Didascalicus9 [p. 163.22-27Hermann])excluded at least one class of things for which the digressionhad postulatedIdeas,i.e. manufactured objects(cf. 342d5).It is remarkable that Platonists,like the doxographicaltradition,"were ready to ignore so explicit a statementof Plato'sposition on this issue as that of the digression.'2 It is in the second half of the second century A.D. that the digression appearsto be playinga greaterpart.I suspectits influenceon Numeniusfr. 14(des Places),'3and c. 175the PlatonistCelsusdid use the 'trueaccount'of the digression (cf. 342a3-4) in an anti-Christian polemic entitled 'TrueAccount'14 There is reasonfor suspectingthat Justin (significantly?) Martyrwas alluding to the digressionat Dial. 4.1,15 dating from within a decade of A.D. 160.Thereafterreferencesand allusionsto the digression are found in many authors. Let me state now that I am not intendingto argue that the digression dates from the period immediately preceding Numenius, Justin, and Celsus. I do not wish to exclude the possibilitythat it was writtenin the secondquarterof the secondcenturyuntil I see evidencethatit was known beforethat,but it couldhave been in existencea long time beforeit came to Platonists'attention.As we shallsee shortly,I thinkit likely thatits date of compositionwas earlier than Plutarch,though not early enough to have become part of the text usuallyused by Plutarch. The remarkable thing is not that the digressionshould have remained unknown for a time, but 77

ratherthat it should have found its way into all texts in due course.I have as to whetherthis could have occurredunless the digression reservations in was alreadypresentin the influentialedition of the worksby Thrasyllus edition,was the early firstcenturyA.D., or, if not originalto theThrasyllan into a primecopy of that edition at an earlydate. This copy incorporated might soon come to have influence in the region where it was located (presumablyAlexandriaor Rome), but it would probablytake considerable time for copies of it to reach other parts. When it did so, the compatibilityof the digressionwith MiddlePlatonicideas would have led to its acceptanceas genuinelyPlatonic,and thus it would have ensuredits insertioninto local textstoo. Let us ask ourselvesnext where we should have expectedreferencesto the digressionduringthe Middle Platonicperiod.It would seem logicalto with the mainbodyof the begin with Cicero,who firstshowsacquaintance Epistle. There is little evidence of detailed Platonic interpretationin in we do encountera debateon epistemology Cicero,but in the Academica which both sides claimedthe authorityof Plato.The debateemergedfrom the conflict between Philo of Larissaand Antiochusof Ascalonwhichhad surfaced in 87 B.C., and much of the material probably derives from Antiochus'Sosus, his replyto Philo'sRomanbooksof 88/7 B.C.Thereare good reasons why the Philonian position should have appealed to the reasons digressionif it had been known.It would have offeredsubstantial for continuingto rejectall mechanicaltheoriesof the acquisitionof certain 1), giving considerable justification for the knowledge (342e2-343e traditionalAcademicuncertaintywhen it states that difficulties"fill each man, as it were, with all unclarityand perplexity"(343c4-5).But at the same time it would have allowed the Philonians,who ought not to be and who sought to teach positively (if regarded as genuine sceptics,16 justificationfor (a) statingthe as much testimonyshows,18 esoterically)'7 obvious concerning everyday matters(see 343c5-8),'9and (b) believing if not is availableto the truth-seeker,20 thatsome obscurecognition-process Referenceto the from the senses or fromStoic 'catalepticpresentations'.21 Platonic Ideas in the digression would not have embarrassed the who wereawarethatPlato's'truth'belongedto the realmof the Philonians, mind (Cic. Ac. 2.142, cf. Antiochians at 1.30-32),for the digressionis discreetlysilent about the natureof the Ideas,and even avoidstheirusual names: the Idea is simply 'the Fifth' (342a8 etc.). The Philonianswould have approvedof the digression'sdenial that the true intellectualcould ever write about the most importantaspects of his philosophy(34lb-d, emphasison They would also have approvedof the digression's 344cd).22 78

the student'sneed to find out for himself(341c5-e3,cf. Cic. Ac. 2.60).They might also have utilized its criticism of the pupil who prematurelyand inaccuratelyreveals what he has heard from his master (341a8-c4), for Antiochus of Ascalon could plausibly have been included among such persons. Indeedthis digressionwould have suitedPhilo so well, thatI have had to suggest that it could have been forged to suit his purposes.23 I do not actuallybelieve that it was forgedby him or for him, but I stronglysuspect that it was forged to supporta broadlyPhilonianposition at a later date. There is no survivingevidence that Philo was aware of it, in spite of its relevanceto his position, and if it had ever been a key passage for Philo, then it would have become a key passagefor Cicero,his pupil.24 Even if Philo did not collect individual passages from the Platonic Corpusto supporthis fallibilistview of Plato,we mustnote thatothermore extreme'sceptics' did makesucha collectionto supportthe 'sceptic'view of Plato.Not only did they make extensiveuse of the Theaetetus,25 they also extracted arguments for a sceptic view from the Timaeus,26 Phaedo,27
Phaedrus,28and early aporetic works like the Euthyphro, Charnides, and

Lysis.29Since it seems to have been the Pyrrhonianswho made the principalcollectionof such arguments30 (if not in an attemptto show Plato to be a Pyrrhonist),31one assumesthat final detailsof the collectiondo not antedate the first century B.C., the usual date for the activities of Aenesidemus.32 Indeed there are signs that the collection was made by Aenesidemushimself.33 If Aenesidemus(?) had known of the digressionI find it difficultto believe that he would not have extractedan argumentfor non-apprehensibility (&xotrAXri4xa) fromit, in particular fromits insistence that men are confused by their inabilityto penetratebeyond the qualities of a thing to the natureof the thing itself (342e-343c).
When we come to the anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus,

recentlyredatedby myselfto the secondhalf of the firstcenturyB.C.,34 the apparentlack of influenceof the digressionbecomes more noticeable;for even within the survivingpages the authorgives a reasonablyclearpicture of his approach to Platonic epistemology. For him the Meno and the Theaetetus are the key epistemologicalworks.The fallibilismof Philo of Larissais still in evidence,35 as is a mild esotericism.36 The Platonicmethod of teachingis now clearlyregardedas a processof solicitingfromwithinan internalrevelation,not the passingon of doctrinesfrom teacherto pupil.37 Positive Platonic thinking is much more in evidence than in anything which survives of Philo of Larissa (as it needs to be in a Platonic commentary), and the Ideas play a backgroundrole. The digressionof the 79

could thus digression', SeventhEpistle,often knownas the 'epistemological easily have been utilized by the author.A more detailed comparisonwill follow shortly. There is room for disagreementas to whether Philo Judaeus,had he known the digression,would have made use of it; indeed it is unclear whetherhe even knew the Epistlesat all.38If he did not, then it is fairly clear that they were not then known as a source for Platonicdoctrine,as extensively.39 Platonicum Philoseemsto have studiedthe restof the Corpus If he did know them, he could surely have used the digressionto good effect. He himself placesemphasisin severalpassageson the difficultiesof attaining real knowledge,40but seeks to justify confidence in his own teachings through belief in a revelation from above.41This agrees well enough with the digression.But does it agree with the esotericismof the digression?The revelationis not such as cannot be expressedin words; indeed it was revealedby Moses. Yes, but Moses revealedit in riddlesso of On the whole the esotericism that it requiredallegoricalinterpretation. him. the digressionmighthave appealedto Philoratherthandisconcerting And in view of his interestin the Platonicrevelationas seen in the mythof it may seem surprisingthat he ignores the revelationthe Phaedrus,42 processdescribedin the digression(343e-344c). We have seen that early Middle Platonismin generaldid not heed the objectsas seen at digressionwhen decidingto rejectIdeasof manufactured itself naturally Didascalicus Didascalicus9 (p. 163. 22-27 Hermann).The follows the usual view, and seems unawareof any explicit statementof Plato'swhich could contradictthat view. If the authorwere offeringhis that Plato'sdirectstatementof own philosophyit would be less surprising but the workis supposedlya been ignored; at 342d5 has his own position compendium of Plato's own doctrines,and intends only to unearth the beliefs upon which the Dialogues are founded, not to presentan original Platonistsystem. That the authordoes not know the digressionis both a possible and a naturalconclusion.The Index Platonicusof P. Louisoffers drawnfromall genuineDialogues over 15 columnsof PlatonicParallels,43
other than Hippias Ma, and Mi., Menexenus, Apology, and Crito, as well as from Theages, Axiochus, Definitions, On Virtue, and Sisyphus. Naturally

one cannot expect much mention of the Epistles in a work on Plato's but one might expectsome referenceto the digressionof Epistle doctrines, VII seeing that it gives a clearand concise statementof doctrine. Louis'note 499 (to Didasc.34.2)pointsto a possibleparallelwithEp. VII 326ab in conjunctionwith Republic473cd, but only note 481 purportsto offer a parallel with the digression(340d). Louis says of the word ilXE80

xpwa[?vov

at Didasc.33 (p. 187.13-14Hermann)"expression emprunt6eA la Lettre VII, 340d",but it is the wordalone and not the contextthat might be thought to be evidenceof borrowing.Plato's"tingedsuperficiallywith as it were, opinions"and the expressionin Didasc.33 "tingedsuperficially, by virtue" hardly require to be related historically.In Middle Platonist times the verb 'rTLXp.wvvvIL was common enough, being found in Lucian,44 Plutarch(Mor.395e, cf. 382c),Rufus Medicus(Anat. 30), Pollux(VII, 129), and Plotinus (4.5.7, 5.6.4). I do not know of any other use of the word before the time of Plutarch,except at Ep. VII 340d - if even thatprecedes Plutarch. There is certainly no use of it in such authors as Polybius, Philodemus,and PhiloJudaeus.Thusits appearancein both the digression and the Didascalicusis more likely to spring from the proximityof their dates of composition than from a conscious borrowingon the part of the authorof the latter. It thus remainspossiblethatthe authorof the Didascalicus did not know the digressioneven though he knew nearlyall the Corpus Platonicum. The non-appearanceof materialfrom the digressionis noteworthynot only in the section on Ideas, but also in the comparativelydetailed sections on theoryof knowledge (chapter4) and on assimilationto God (chapter28); for 344abroughtout the connectionbetweenbecomingvirtuous,becoming wise, and becominglike the objectof wisdom- connexionswhich Didasc. 28 (p. 182. 2-7 Hermann)insistson, and which had been foreshadowedin its principalsource for the doctrine,Theaetetus 176a-c. The importanceof the Didascalicus lies in its adherenceto the teachings of contemporary withoutany realeffortto be original.It school-Platonism, uses those passages of Plato which would normally have been used, Well-known perhapswith some additionsbut with very few subtractions. passagesof Plato could not suddenly fall into oblivion, and were almost certain to surface in such a work as this. The digressionfailed to surface here; thereforeit was not well-knownat the time.45 Our most important evidence for contemporary ignorance of the digressionis found in Plutarch,a man whose knowledgeof the Epistlesin general cannot be disputed, and who accepted their authenticitywithout qualms.46He alone, of genuine Middle Platonists,has left us a considerable body of writingsin whose pages numerousPlatonic allusionsoccur. He has left us the Life of Dion, in which he sometimesmakesappealto the wordsof the SeventhEpistle.47 NaturallyPlutarch's greatinterestin Plato, and in the interactionsbetweenPlatoand othermen of importance, has led him to introducemuch materialon Platothat most historiansof the period or biographersof Dion would not have found relevant.48 But Jones was 81

unableto point to any parallelsbetweenthe Life and thatpartof the Epistle between 338a and 345c (see n. 10). The Bud6 text sees parallels with materialbetween 338c and 339c in Dion 18.3-7,but points to no obvious borrowingbetween 339c and 345c.49 It does admittedlyrefer to 341b-e &ya0ov CTELv), but ('parexemple')in relationto Dion 14.3(To GLW?I(4LCVOV that section does not make the identificationbetween the object(s) of Plato's esoteric philosophy and the Good, and Plutarchhad no need to learn of Plato's reluctanceto speak in detail about the Good from the Epistle. He could surely recall Aristoxenus'reportof the connexion between the Good and the 'unwrittendoctrines'(Harm. 2.30-31, Meibom), and he had sufficientevidenceof Plato'sreluctanceto discussthe matterin Rep. 506b8-el. Indeed I imagine that Plato'sreluctanceto revealthe full time, and one of the chief detailsof his systemwas notoriousin Plutarch's connexions which Plutarchmade between Platonic and New Academic
practice.50

One must thereforeask why it is that Plutarchfailed to mentionPlato's experienceof teachingDionysius and of the latter'sill-judgedpublication of Plato's doctrine, as described in the digression. I cannot accept the answerthat it was not relevantto Dion's life, for Plutarchobviouslyfound the partplayedby Platoof considerablesignificanceto the criticalrelations between Dion and Dionysius; or at very least he thought that they thoroughly deserved a digression.Plutarchcould have made capital out of Dionysius'inabilityor unwillingnessto graspthe truemeaningof Platonic philosophy.The fact that he does not do so is mostreadilyexplainedby his ignoranceof c.340-345c3.His failureto take account of the digressionin two significant discussionson epistemologyin the Moralia adds to our
suspicions.51

It is not, however,anything to do with Plutarch'sepistemologywhich leads me to the conclusion that the Moraliatoo show him to have been ignorantof the digression.It is rathertwo passages,one fromthe De E apud
Delphos and the other from the De Defectu Oraculorum, where Plutarch

indulgesin lengthydiscussionsaboutfive-foldelementsin Plato'sthought. Besidessuch obvious passagesas the MegistaGeneepisode of the Sophist of Goods in the Philebus(66a-c),he brings (254d ff) and the Classification in the ontological classificationof Philebus 23c ff (which is not even obviously five-fold), the five regularsolids of the Timaeus(53c-55c),and the suggestion in the same work that if there were not one world there might be five (55d2).52Plutarch has omitted by far the most striking five-fold classificationof the PlatonicCorpus - the classificationof the 'things to do with knowledge' in the digression (342a7 fl). This 82

classificationactuallyhas its five-fold naturehighlightedby the use of the term'the fifth' for the PlatonicIdea throughout, and could have been used in the De E with far more effect than passagesactuallyused (particularly Phil. 23c ff). Its omissionthereis striking.In the De Defectuits omissionis less striking,owing to the fact thatthe discussionevolvesfromthe question of how many worldsthereare;but even therethe Megista Gene have crept in (428c) as has the sum of Plato'sfour elements + soul (422f-423a). In view of the importanceof the De E it would be well to list some of the five-fold classificationswhich were introducedby Plutarchin propria persona in supportof a numericalinterpretation of the puzzlingDelphic E. I confine myself to the materialwhich follows the introductionof Plato at 389f: (a) 389f, the Timaeus and the possibilityof 5 worlds (b) 389f-390a,Aristotle'sfifth elementor 'fifth substance' (c) 390a, the five regularsolids of the Timaeus (d) 390b, the five senses(sometimesassignedto 5 elements) (e) 390c, Homer'sdivision of the world into 5 (f) 390c-e, point-line-plane-solid-soul (g) 390e, God-demon-hero-man-beast (h) 390f, Aristotle'sfive-fold psychology,with Platonistemendations (i) 391b, Megista Gene (j) 391bc, Phil. 23cff (k) 391cd, Phil. 66aff In so varied a list, designed purely to illustratethat five is a specially potent number,and with its strong Platonistcolouring,there is no doubt that the classificationof Ep.VII 342a7ff wouldhave had a place if Plutarch had thoughtof it. How significant,then, is the fact that he did not thinkof it? If the praise of the number five in the De E had been an isolated phenomenon,then I shouldhave been willingto acceptthatPlutarch could have forgottena seemingly importantpiece of evidence. But the passage fromthe De Genioconfirmsto us thatits sister-passage was no meread hoc assemblage of passages demonstratingthe potency of five. The material had at some stage been assembled with considerablecare and interest, probablybefore Plutarch's time. Plutarchcame to take an interestin such investigationsas a result of his curiosityconcerningthe Delphic E, as is shown by the mention of the E in the De Genioalso (426f). Similarlythere is no doubt that Plutarchwas fascinatedby the notion of five Platonic worldssomehowcorresponding to the five regularsolids,a topicwhichhad been discussed with some ingenuity by Theodorus of Soli before him
83

(427a ff).53 Thus any evidencefor the potencyof the numberfive in Plato's workswould have been carefully noted and committed to memoryby a reader like Plutarch.He has collected so much trifling materialon the numberfive (e.g. De E 387e-388e,389c-f, De Defectu429d-430a)that he could scarcelyhave judged the passage from the digression(342a7 ff) as anythingless than critical. That my arguments for Plutarch'signorance of the digression are somewhatunusualI do not question.For this reasonI suspectthattheywill not hastily be accepted.But when the issue has been carefullyconsidered for some time, and with due considerationfor Plutarch'sphilosophical leanings,his personalinterests,and his objectivesin writing,I suspectthat others too will recognize that it is most unlikely that Plutarchknew the
digression at the time of writing the Life of Dion, De E apud Delphos, and

His ignoranceof the digressionwould confirm De Defectu Oraculorum. whatone alreadyhad cause to suspect:that the digressionwas little known in the early Middle Platonistperiod. If that suspicionis correct,then it is highlyprobablethat the digressionwas forgedduringthat period. The Plutarchiantreatises De E and De Defectu are again of great importancein revealing a motive for such a forgery. There was great interestin any possiblesignificanceof the numberfive for Plato.We do not here,for thatinterestis confirmed haveto confine our attentionto Plutarch ratherearlierin Seneca'sEp. 65.7-10,where Plato is depictedas adding a fifth cause to Aristotle's four: the paradigmaticcause. Here then is a passage,however different from the epistemologicalclassificationof the digression(342a7ff), whichalso makesthe Ideaa 'fifth'.The otherletterof Seneca in which he discusses Plato's metaphysicsin detail (58.16-24), though dividing the real into six Platonicsenses, might also be connected with the interestin Plato'suse of five-folddivision,for the firstuse given is the generic use, and this is followed by five specific uses in hierarchical order; thus the underlyingmetaphysicseems to be five-fold ratherthan six-fold. Elsewherein Middle Platonismone may find lists of five namesapplied Butovert to God,54or indicationsof an underlyingfive-foldmetaphysic.55 signs of an interestin Plato's use of five-fold classificationis dying after Plutarch.If we concentrateon the first centuryA.D., however,it would seem that the evidence is clearer,in particularin the PlatonizingPythagorean Moderatus.E.R. Dodds long ago drew attention to a five-fold and was able to link this with considerable ontology in Moderatus,56 plausibility to early interpretationof the five57positive hypotheses of Moderatusseems to have assumed that these five Plato's Parmenides.58 84

hypothesespresentedfive esotericpicturesof Pythagorico-Platonic ontology, depicting(a) a supremeOne above Being,59 (b) a second One identified with the really real and the intelligible, (c) the realm of the soul, which partook of the One and the Ideas, (d) the sensible world, which reflectedthe Ideas, and (e) matter,which was not-realand deprivedof all form. It seems to me that a five-fold metaphysicof God, Intelligibles,Soul/ Mathematicals,Sensible bodies, and Matter is also in evidence in Plutarch'streatmentof the Posidonianinterpretation of the PlatonicWorldSoul at Mor. 1023bc.I hesitateto tracethe metaphysicback to Posidonius, but am moreconfidentthat it was to be found in Eudorus,the likelysource of most of Plutarch'smaterialon earlierinterpretations.60 Let us note that Eudoruswas also the first thinkerwe know of to have takenan interestin seeing esotericPythagorizing teachingsbehind the positive hypothesesof the Parmenides,61 and that he is the firstwe know of to have made use of the five-fold classificationof Goods at Phil. 66a-c.62 There is, I suggest,a plausible case for seeing early Middle-Platonicinterest in an esoteric significanceof the numberfive and of five-fold divisionin Platoas having originatedwithEudorus;perhapsTheodorus'interestin the five worldsof the Timaeus had anticipated him,63but I know of no way of dating Theodorus relative to Eudorus. And I have doubts as to whether his interestswent far beyond the five worlds and five regularsolids of the
Timaeus.

Now one might anticipate the objection that if some early Middle Platonisthad attached great significanceto the number five and to fivefold classificationin Plato, then we might have expected to hear rather more about this; we might have expected to see evidence of some good reason leading to such an attitude.If he thought he had discoveredsome underlyingkey to the interpretation of laterPlato,why was this good news not immediately spread abroad? The answer is surely obvious. Any Platonist,thinking he had discoveredsomething esotericin Plato, something meant to be confined to the school, might feel that he had an obligationto confine his discoveriesto withinhis school. It mightalso have been to his advantage,in respectof both income and prestige,if he could encourageoutside belief to expect exciting revelationswithin his school. One might expect reflectionsof the inner doctrinesin such a Platonist's exotericwork, togetherwith propagandaexplainingthe secrecyproperto the core of Platonicdoctrine. That such secrecysurroundedthe early Middle Platonicschools is little less than certain. When one considersthe case of Eudorusof Alexandria
85

one is able to observe that there is a strangelack of significantdoctrine attributedto him in our sources.Thereis plentyof materialrelatingto his some of it giving us important explanationsof the doctrinesof others,64 Butwe havenothingto informus directlyof clues as to his own doctrines.65 Eudorus'own metaphysicalsystem; nor have we any Eudoranexplansystem.Hence Eudorusremains ations of the core of Plato'smetaphysical Eudorus,though he could doubt No "to us a rather shadowy figure".66 adhered to the traditionalAcademic never be described as a 'sceptic',67 practice of concealing his own opinion on important philosophical Eudorusprobablydeterminedthe tone of much subsequent questions.68 Platonism, such as the attitude of reluctance to commit too much to exoteric writing found in [Plutarch]De Fato.69It is noteworthy that Eudorusseems to have seen a stable underlyingcore of doctrinein Plato, which revealeditself in many modes of expression;thus he surelysought for a deeper (esoteric?) significance behind Plato's words.70Diogenes recordsthe belief materialat 3.63,71 perhapsfollowingThrasyllan Laertius, that Plato employed a range of differentterms in order make his system unintelligible to the layman. Similar remarks are made about Plato's De obscureand riddlingmannerof referringto his doctrinesin Plutarch's Defectu,not long before the introductionof the 5-worldsmaterial(420f), on and in Numenius,fr. 24.57-64des Places.The anonymousCommentary sees doctrinein Plato,but assertsthatit is not revealedin his the Theaetetus 'inquiries'(59.12-21). From this we may gatherthat the centuryor so of Platonicscholarship day tendedto see Platoas reluctantto give full expression beforePlutarch's to his most important beliefs. This view of Plato seems to have been accompaniedby the reluctanceof Platonic teachers to have their own account of Plato's core-doctrinespublished outside their 'schools'.Thus while various extant Middle Platonic texts suggest that there had been some central five-fold metaphysicaldoctrine,none (with the possible exdo more than offer an insubstantial ception of the fragmentof Moderatus) reflection of that metaphysic.The digression'sfive-fold epistemological may itselfoffer a carefullycontrivedreflectionof thisesoteric classification doctrinein a settingwhere 'Plato'explainshis reluctanceto metaphysical writeopenly of his key doctrines,and explainsalso the pitfallsof learning such doctrines at second hand.72In accordancewith the contemporary belief that Platovaried terminologyto confuse the layman(D.L. 3.63) the PlatonicIdea is always referredto simply as 'the Fifth', also highlighting the specialsignificanceof the number. It is not easy to discover any more about the context in which the 86

digression was composed (assuming it to be spurious), for the author clearly felt that his own doctrinesshould not be widely known. Moreover he clearlywanted the sentimentsexpressedin the digressionto be read as the productsof Plato'sown hand, and he would thus have been reluctant to use vocabularyor ideas which could not have come from Plato himself. Furthermorehe must have known Plato well, seeing that he felt he had insights into the core-doctrinesof Platonic metaphysics.There would be few, if any, indicationsof the later date of the writer,and therewould be nothing which did not originatefrom a thoughtfulPlatonistmind. There are a few relevant observationsto be made about the forger'sdate and philosophicalorientation,but one cannot expect them to be conclusive. We may begin by noting that the authoris interestedin Plato'sPythagorean connexions. As Edelsteinhas noted with regardto the episode on the testing of pupils (340bl-341a7),73 "for a moment,one may think that
the forger . . . believes in the closeness of the Platonic and Pythagorean

schools, and ascribes to the master a method similar to the well-known method of testing the novice which the Pythagoreans applied."74 But it is ratherthe idea of a test itself than the actualcontent of it which reminds one of the Pythagoreans.Since the digression'stest is said to have been particularlysuitable for tyrantswho already have an inaccurateidea of one's teachings (340b5-6), it is just possible that the passage had been composedby a Platonistwith some experienceof teachingsuch persons:of Academicsonly Nestor of Tarsusspringsto mind as a possiblecandidate,75 but Thrasyllus himself was astrologer at Tiberius' court76and should perhapsbe associatedwith the Pythagorean while Arius wing of Platonism, Didymus' Platonic interestsqualify him for consideration;but officially this friendof Augustuswas a Stoic,77 and the authorof the digressionwas but that. Only Thrasyllusstrikesone as a possible forger,and he anything certainlyhad the opportunityto interpolatematerialinto his own edition of Plato. We are not really in a position to judge how far the digression'sdeeprooted scepticism of mechanical explanations of knowledge would fit Thrasyllus.The lack of clarityand of value attributedto knowledge(EiTtoi-irr ) at 343bc and d8-el, which must be held to pertain also to correct

opinion and intellection(vovs)on the authorityof 342c (thus arousingmy suspicions of spuriousness),78 indicates the author's recognition of the validity of New Academic activity;it shows some sympathyfor the OneAcademythesispropoundedin Philoof Larissa's RomanBooks.79 It is only the author'sbelief in some non-mechanicalrevelation(341cd,344ab) that lifts him above scepticism proper. This attitude towards knowledge 87

remindsone of certain passages in Philo of Alexandria,Thrasyllus' contemporary.80 Bothmay have inheritedsimilarattitudesfromthe Academic Eudorusof Alexandria.81 Thereare two significantwaysin which I believe thatEudoraninfluence has crept into the digression:it makesgreatuse of the 'categories' of iToLov TL and -r (or ov, far morethan one would have expectedfromthe miserable Platonic precedent (Meno 86el, 87b3); and it seems to relate the revelation-process to the doctrineof assimilationto God, in so far as one has to be like the objectrevealed(344a2-4).82 Eudorusseems to have done considerablework on the categoriesafter the awakeningof interestin the Aristoteliantreatisein the mid-firstcenturyB.C.,83 and it was probablyhe who popularizedthe assimilation-doctrine so that it became the standard Middle Platonic goal of life.84In short, I believe the principalinfluence behind the digressionwas Eudorusof Alexandria,but this is insufficient reasonfor also believing that he wroteit. The forgeris morelikely to have been Thrasyllus,acting under the influence of Eudorus'interpretation of Plato. Since I have suggestedelsewherethat the Commentary on the Theaetetus is a work of Eudorus,85 a brief comparisonbetween this work and the digressionseems warranted. The extant part of the commentaryhas only just got as far as the first attempteddefinition of knowledge(151e) and Plato'searlydiscussionsof it, and it mustbe remembered thatthe discovery of more of the commentarycould alterour impressionsof it considerably. NeverthelessI have considerabledoubts as to whether its author could have been responsiblefor the digression.Evenin the introduction it is plain thataccuracyplays a significantpartin the productionof knowledge,for it is necessarythat the judging faculty,86 or criterion 'by which', must be accurate;accuracydoes not belong to knowledge(in the ordinarysense)in for knowledgeof the digression(343bc).Also requiredby the commentator P is awarenessof why P (col.3); the digressionwould not appearto make such a requirement, and seems to thinkin termsof knowing'things'rather than propositions.The commentatoracquireshis ideas of knowingwhy P from the Meno,87 whose recollectiontheoryis also used;88 though it could be argued that the Meno operatesbeneaththe surfacein the digression,89 that would not appearto be a majorsource of the writer,who ignoresthe Meno'simportantdistinctionbetweenknowledgeand trueopinion(342c). showslittleinterestin ordinary Ultimatelythe digression knowledge,and is concernedonly with knowledgeof 'the Fifth',in whicha flashof revelatory light(341cd,344b7)playsa fargreaterpartthan the preparatory processes; the commentator does not separateoff any specialkindof knowledge,does 88

not seek for a comparablerevelation,and does not even makeany obvious use of the Ideas in the extant pages. The commentator produces a Platonism with a late-Hellenisticcharacter;he still thinks in terms of mechanicalcognitive processes.The authorof the digressionproducesa new Platonicmysticismof an earlyimperialcharacter.In spite of similarities of interest(scepticismconcerningpurelyphysicalcognitiontheory,90 the rikpV1a and o'RoiwaLs92), L,91 the two authorscould not be identified. Thus, since I identify the author of the commentarywith Eudorus,I shouldnot be temptedto hold Eudorusresponsiblefor the digression. The forgerwas moreextremeperhaps.Whetheror not he is sufficientlyextreme to be identifiedwith the authorof Ep. II 312d3-314c7 I am not sure.The matter has to be considered, since both philosophical digressions first appearin the sameperiodin a similargroupof authors.93 Thissuggeststhat at the time when the edition with the digressionof the SeventhEpistlewas becomingavailablewidely, the passagewhich I regardas a parallelphilosophicaldigressionin the SecondEpistlewas coming to be known.Could this have belongedto the same edition?Could it have been the workof the same editor? The similaritiesbetween the two passages are certainlymost striking. The fearof the writtenwordwhichis evidentat 341bc and 344cdis likewise presentin the SecondEpistleat 312de and 314bc,whereit is accompanied by an almost paranoidfear of the letter'sfallinginto the wronghands. But we cannotstate that the SecondEpistlewas writtenby a man with stronger views on the question of writing.The obvious reason for the exaggerated precautions of the philosophical digression here is that this letter is discussingwhat the authorthought to be the suprememetaphysicaldoctrinesof Platoat 3 12e-313a; the digressionof the SeventhEpistlediscusses no more elevated level than that of the Ideas. Even so the principle of speakingthroughriddles(II 312d7-8)does occurin the otherdigressionin so far as the forger avoids the usual terms for Ideas and substitutes'the Fifth'. The moreexaltedstatusof mattersdiscussedin II 312e313aalso explains the greatercontemptfound here for the 'rotov as opposed to the Trthan at VII 342e-343c.Whenwe are searchingfor the supremebeing,as at 313a, it is 'the causeof all evils'to wonderaboutwhatkind it is; whenwe searchfor 'the Fifth' as at 342e, informationwhich indicates quality is merely a hindranceto the determination of the substance. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that both these philosophical digressions show great interest in the relationship between Platonist teacherand his pupils,particularly if that pupil happensto be a 'tyrant'.It 89

seems, however, that Dionysius is less despised in the Second, though it should be added that in both cases (313a-c,341b,344d-345b)Dionysiusis seen to have a tendency to think he knows everythingalready: a hint perhapsthat some actual relationshipbetweena Platonistand a monarch had inspiredboth digressions. My final point of comparisonwould requirea separatearticleto establish fully. I have no doubt that 312e is referringto the discussionof the that One in the five positivehypothesesof Plato'sParmenides. Everything, is the whole discussion,is concernedwith the supremeKing, i.e. the One. is about the secondlevel of entities The second(i.e. hypothesis,142b-155e) while the third (hypothesis, 155e-157b)is about (i.e. intelligible Ideas),94 Thus far interthe third level of entities (psychicalsor mathematicals).95 The pretationof the hypotheseswould be similarto that of Moderatus.96 numberof hypotheseswhich assume the unity or existenceof the One is five, and I stronglysuspect that Middle Platoniccuriosityconcerningthe relevanceof the numberfive for Platohad its originsin the beliefthatthere were five metaphysicallevels picturedin these five positivehypothesesof the Parmenides. The digressionof Epistle VII providesan exampleof early interestin 'fives' in Plato, while the digressionof Epistle II is concerned with the passagewhich is the sourceof that interest.97 A small linguistic point which could be thought to suggest identical authorshipis the tendency to favour asyndetonwhen commencingstatementsof (or allusionsto) criticaldoctrine.We find thisat 312e 1and 313a3, do not these digressions and again at 342a7,b4, and 343a5. Unfortunately to tell us much,and we are unlikely presentenough materialfor stylometry to find many striking features given that Platonic style is consciously imitated.It would be ludicrousto expect such passagesas this to include any materialwhichcould prove them to be fromthe same hand.I am here concernedonly to show that they could be from the same hand.98 Althoughall conclusionswhich this papermakesare tentative,and may need to be revised in the light of new discoveries,one ought perhapsto assume, on the basis of evidence presented, that the digressionof the Seventh Epistle is an early Middle Platonic addition:possibly by Thrasyllus.If we are preparedto date the digressionto the late firstcenturyB.C. or early first century A.D. then it might explain some minor confusion concerningthe natureof the Ideas in the digression.Edelsteindenied that theoryof Ideashere,and held thattheywere therewas a trulytranscendent for the position This cannotbe right,10? seen as belongingwithinthe soul.99 it from the 'Fifth'as well to soul is said of knowledgewithinthe distinguish In as from name, definition, and sensible image (342c5-dl). fact it seems
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clear that the 'Fifth' belongs neither in the soul, nor in the voice, nor in physicalbodies. Where then?If our date is correctthen we could certainly expect the Ideas to be located in the divine mind.101 Can such a theorybe detectedin the digression? My answeris that the accompaniments to such a theoryare to be found there. Edelstein's attempt to put the 'Fifth' within the soul is partially justified,and partiallyonly, by the fact that the knowledgeof the 'Fifth'is obviouslyan internalexperience;we do not 'look away'(&'LToi3X&rrrnv)102 to the Idea, but turn a certainamountof worldlyinformationaroundin our heads until wisdom (pp0vqaLs) and intelligence(voi3s) shine forth(344b7); they shine like a self-nourishingfire withinthe soul, sparkedoff by some fire elsewhere(34Ic7-d2),like knowledgeof divine originin Numenius.103 The 'Fifth'is ratherthatoriginalexternalfireand does not enterwithinthe mind; the fire within the mind is a differentthing, the 'knowledgeof the Fifth' (342e2, cf. 343e2), or 'wisdom and intelligence' (344b7). 'Intelligence',though the highestkind of knowledge,does not seem to graspthe 'Fifth';it merelycomes close to it in kinshipand in likeness(342d2)as one fire is akin to another. It is an internal likeness of the external 'Fifth', createdin us by our diligence,our intellectualpowers,and our own likeness to the 'Fifths'in respectof virtue(343e-344b). Thus the 'Fifth'is not an objectof cognition in the normalsense; we approachit only by recreating our own Fifth-substitute withinus; the processis one of likeningourselves to the (hithertounknown)'Fifth'.
To the best of my knowledge Platonism knew no doctrine of 'jloFo;ats
7EIIrTr,

only of OpiwL0UOLS 04s. Though found in Plato,10 that doctrine assumes greater importance in early Middle Platonist times.105But assimilationto God had always involved assimilationto the virtues(Tht. 176bc,esp. b2), and it is clear that theseare the important'Fifths'in which the authorof the digressionis interested(344ab, a8-bl). If assimilationto these 'Fifths' is assimilation to God, then it is clear that the 'Fifths' somehowbelong to God; thoughthe virtuescould perhapshave belonged to him as being his particulargood qualities,it is clear that many of the 'Fifths'could only belong to him as thoughtswithin his mind: the Idea of Fox, for example,or of Walk(see 342d7-8). Let us now ask ourselvesbrieflywhatwas the epistemologyof thosewho placed the Ideas in the mind of God. How is it that man'smind could be expected to reach up to the Ideas,when those Ideas were confined to the mindof a divinity?Does he peer into the divine mind?But we cannoteven peer into each other'sminds.We might perhapsbe able to work out what our neighbour thinks if we have some basic informationavailable to us
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about the premises from which he begins, and if we, like him, think rationally.We can recreatehis thoughtswithin ourselves,as long as we thinklike he does. We have accessto his mind only by makingour minds work in the same way. I assumethereforethat knowledgeof the Ideas in the likeness early Middle Platonisttimes wasjust such a case of recreating been some have perhaps may own minds; there the Ideas our within of whenthat within the divinepartof us whichcould recognize memory-trace could scarcelyconlikenesshad been recreated,but such a memory-trace stituteactive knowledgeof the Idea.06 God's thoughtsremainedhis own; as that of the divine mind,107and but we sharedin the same construction own minds,and recreatethe same to our we could restorethatconstruction and the same virtueswithin it. Hence our minds mathematicalpatterns'08 will contemplate the same Ideas within themselvesas God's mind contemplateswithin itself. upon I cannot hope to make my point moreforciblywithoutembarking In a complete examinationof early Middle Platonistepistemology. due course I hope to be able to do this. At presentlet it suffice to say that my the knowledgeof Ideasin earlyMiddlePlatonism currenttheoryregarding is identical with the theory which I would attributeto the authorof the digressionof the SeventhEpistle.I regardthisas important epistemological confirmationof my belief that the digressionis an early Middle Platonic
document.'09 University of Sydney
NOTES L. Edelstein, Plato's SeventhLetter(Leiden, 1966),p. 2, seems almost to adopt such an attitude: "Recognizing that in any case the burdenof proof lies with those who consider the letter genuine,..." 2 Historyof GreekPhilosophy V (Cambridge. 1978),p. 402 n.l. 3 In addition to Guthrie (op.cit.pp. 402-417), see K. von Fritz, Platonin Sizilien unddas (Berlin, 1968) and 'Die philosophische Stelle im Problem der Philosophenherrschaft siebenten platonischen Brief und die Frage der esoterischen Philosophie Platons', Phronesis 11 (1966), 117-153; M. Isnardi Parente, Filosofia e politica nelle lettere di Platone (Napoli, 1970) and La Parola del Passato 10 (1955), 241-273; J. Stenzel. 'Ober den Aufbau der Erkenntnisim VII. platonischen Brief, Kleine Schriften(Darmstadt, 1957),pp. 85-106. 4 L. Edelstein (op.cit., n.l. above); N. Gulley, Entretiens Hardt 18 (Geneva, 1972), 105-143. 5 C. Ritter, Platons Gesetze(Leipzig, 1896), Anhang: 'Brief VII und Vlll', pp. 367-378. The view that the digressionis not an integralpart of the letterhas continued to be taken

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seriously,and besides Morton and Winspear(below, n.9) one may mention W. Brocker, 'Der philosophische Exkurs in Platons siebenten Brief, Hermes 91 (1963), 416ff. He would see only 342al-344cl as an addition,while Ritterconcentrateson 341a-345c4(pp. 372-3), while regarding340b ff with some suspicion (p. 373). Morton and Winspearsee 341b-345d as the productof a separatehand, while I should athetize all of 340bl-345c4. 6 Europe, and the Tilbingen school in particular(on whose views see K. Gaiser, 'Plato's enigmaticLecture"On the Good"', Phronesis25 (1980), 5-37), tends to be the home of the view that Plato adopted an esoteric metaphysicalsystem much of which emerged more openly in later times, and hence that Plato can be, and indeed should be, understoodin termswhich the Anti-esotericswould regardas peculiar to later Platonism.The Seventh Epistle is often seen as offering support for the Esoteric view (i) by suggesting that importantdoctrine must not be transmittedin writing(see Gaiser, pp. 15-16with n. 33), (ii) by continued use of Ideas, intuitivelygrasped,and (iii) by presentingsome systematic doctrine, at least, which is not found in the Dialogues. If the digression is a Middle Platonicdocument, however, (ii) and (iii) are to be expected, while (i) is a useful device for allowing later Platonists the freedom to search for a deeper revelation beneath the Dialogues than any which openly emergeswithinthem. I do not believe that the argument for the digression'sauthenticityat p. 18 of Gaiser'sarticleworksagainst my theory of so late a date for its interpolation. TD. 5.100, Fin. 2.92. 8 See A. Q. Morton and A. D. Winspear,It's Greekto the Computer (Montreal, 1971),pp. 80-83. 9 Loeb text, ed. F. H. Colson et al., vol. x (1962), indices by J. W. Earp, and Philonis Alexandrini,Operaquae Supersunt ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland,vol. VII (Berlin, 1926), indices by J. Leisegang. 10 The Platonismof Plutarch(Univ. of Chicago diss., 1916)now published with intro. by L. Taran(New York, 1980),pp. 109ff,particularly119. '1 Arius Didymus (Diels Dox. p. 447.1-2, 16) and Aetius 1.10.1 (p. 308bl9) appear to imply that there are Ideas of natural entities only; Aetius' treatmentof Platonic Ideas (1.3.21, 1.10.1-3)shows no awarenessof the digressionand its 'fifth',while the concept of Ideas as thoughtsof God barelyaccordswith the notion of Ideas of artefacts,particularly if these thoughts are seen as blueprintsfor the universe as at Hippolytus Philos. 19.2 (p. 567 Diels). 12 I assume that where references to Ideas of artefactsoccur in Platonic Dialogues (the best known examples being Rep. 597b ff and Crat.389a fl) they need not have been seen as committingPlato to such Ideas, particularly at a time when Plato was believed to speak in deliberatelyobscure terms in such works(below, p. 86), and to shun directexpression of doctrine for the most part. Where Plato employed concepts during an argumentthey could not immediately be assigned the status of doctrine. For that reason individual Platonists might claim the right to decide for themselves. Dialogues are subject to interpretation, but much of the digressionhad either to be accepted or denied. 13 See fr. 14.11-12(des Places = 23 Leemans):olov &v'COLS &q' irTpoV Xvxvov kE0t4PqOvT0 XuxvovqxpsExovTa, and compare Ep. 341c7-d1: olov &irso -rVp6S 'IMavMroS Friqav q4ZS. Both passages are treating the acquisition of knowledge, in particular knowledge of divine origin. Numenius suggeststhat the revelation-process leaves the same IEtsor ov(ia in the receiveras in the giver; he is thinkingchiefly of God-given knowledge here, so that the revelation-processmust be accompaniedby assimilationto God (cf. Ep. 343e-344a).

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Origen, ContraCelsum4.3ff, trans.H. Chadwick(Cambridge,1953),pp. 320-3,shows of materialbetween 341d that Celsus supportedhis view with quotationsand paraphrase and 344b. In his introduction(xxi) Chadwicknotes that R. Bader,Der AlethesLogosdes Kelsos (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1940), pp. 2-3, connects the title with Ep. 342a3-4. MiddlePlatonisttimes, it seems, had an appetite for 'trueaccounts'from time gone by. 15 J.C.M. van Winden, in his edition of the Dialogue with Trypho (Leiden, 1971),draws attention to a parallel here with Ep. 341cd as well as with Phd. 65e-66a and Rep. 509b. There is an ovi,reOqr6Vin the text which might possibly be inspired by 341c5, and an
(cf. c7); more significantly, we read cxiqvvns evi 'rrvxvuta TOXis i-;uxlXts lyytIPvovov T6 L&&

14

a2 avyyevi, cf. a6). auyyrvis,which is reminiscentof 343e-344a(especiallye3 Ecv Trfux6nT, 16 See Harold Tarrant,'Agreementand the Self-Evidentin Philo of Larissa', Dionysius5 (1981), 66-97. 17 See Ac. 2.60, and the doctrine of concealment at De Or. 1.84; also Ac. fr. 35 = Aug. c.Acad. 3.43. 18 See Philo's programmefor moral philosophy in Stob. Ecl. 2.39.20 ff (Wachsmuth), and Aenesidemus' allegations of dogmatismwithin the Academy (of Philo), Phot. Bibl. cod. 212 p. 170a14-38 (Bekker); also Cic. De Or. 1.84-93 (with Tarrant, Classicum8 (1982), 7-1 1),Ac. 2.7-9, 35. I should add also Aetius' reportsof 'Academic'doctrines,pp. 396b5-7, 17-19,398b24, 403b8-1I (Diels, Dox.). l9 According to the Philonianseven Carneadeswas willing to abandonhis scepticismon matters not debated by the philosophers (Aug. c.Acad. 2.11, cf. Num. fr.27.57-59des Places = Eus. P.E. 14.738d); Philonians themselves were willing to appeal to general agreement and to the self-evident characterof certain truths(see Tarrant,loc.cit. above [n.161,and Numenius fr. 28 des Places = 8 Leemans = Eus. P.E. 14.739b). 20 Philonians regardedthemselves as truth-seekers (zetetics?),as may be seen from Cic. Ac. 1.46 (de omnibus quaeritur),2.7 (studium exquirendi and summa cura studioque Zetesis also appearsto be 2.9 (exquirere);also fr. 33 (reruminquisitorem). conquirimus), an ideal of anon. In Tht.,who sees Tht.itself as a zetesis(2.43, 3.20 etc.) and would argue that a dogmatist school did not extend the range of its zetesis sufficiently (e.g. Stoics, 11.25); anon. regards the Socratic method of examining people through question and answeras zetesis (58.23ff), and sees its catharticfunction as important(2.9-11, 58.33-36, cf. Philo Lar.in Stob. Ecl. 2.39.20ff(Wachsmuth).The zetetic processin anon. has a mild New Academiccharacter,in so faras it is free fromaffirmationand denial (59.12-17);but it is considerably more positive in purpose than Pyrrhonistzetesis (D.L. 9.70, S.E. PH. 1.7) and perhaps more akin to the zetesis of Plato's 'zetetic' dialogues (D.L. 3.49ff). I (who are scarcely assume that the less naturaluse of the term to characterizePyrrhonists is secondaryto an earlierand morenaturaluse of the term(as with the term truth-seekers) 'sceptic',see n. 67 below). 21 Philonians maintained the Academic attack on the senses, but with an emphasis on (Aetius,Dox. p. 396b17-19,cf. Cic. theirlack of accuracyratherthan their'unhealthiness' Ac. 2.79ff with the fragments of Ac.Post. II). They maintained their attack on the cognitive presentation as defined by the Stoics, but did not reject the notion of some cognitive act if more modestly defined (though not as a 'criterionof knowledge'),S.E. PH. 1.235 (on which see my comments in Dionysius5 (1981), pp. 84-92, and LCM. 7.2 (1982), 21-2). 22 Because their views on philosophical issues (if they had any) were not to be communicatedto the public, Cic. De Or. 1.84,Ac. 2.60, fr. 35, Numenius fr. 27.57-59and 70-72 des Places. It may be that their reasonsfor silence were not identicalwith those of

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[Platol, but it was certainlyopen to them to believe (with Gaiser, loc. cit. [above, n. 6] n. 33) that [Plato] thought his doctrine able to be expressedin words(writtenor otherwise), but not able to be directly expressed in any manner consistent with a Platonist'seducational objectives. In any case it is the Academic practiceitself, ratherthan any underlying theory,which Cicerowas anxiousto defend. And Numenius at least (fr. 24.57-64des Places) sees a link between Plato's reluctance to express his doctrine clearly and New Academic 'heresy'. 23 Dionysius5 (1981), p. 70 with n. 16. 24 Cicero had several teachers who exerted an influence upon him, including also the dogmatist-Academic Antiochus of Ascalon, and the Stoics Diodotus and Posidonius (ND. 1.6),but he remainedtrue to Philo'sAcademicismas is clear from the same passage as well as from Ac. 2.7-9; for he could legitimatelyfavourany philosophicalposition and still be true to his Academicismjust as long as he maintaineda criticalattitude to such a position. Note that when he asserts that he finds some Antiochian arguments very persuasive(Att. 13.19.5)he concedes nothing; for in using the Academic term'IOctv6vhe is reaffirminghis adherence to New Academic criteriaof judgement. 25 See anon. In Thi. 54.38-43, anon. Prol. in Plat. Phil. 10 (p.205,17-21, 206. 11-13 Hermann). 26 See D.L. 9.72; the relevant passage is Tim.40d. 27 See anon. Prol! in Plat. Phil. 10 (p. 205. 27-35 Hermann); Plato is said to reject our senses, but also to reject our intellect because it is thrown into confusion by the senses; thus he rejects both possible sources of information. See also Olymp. In Phd. 8.17 (p. 15.1-12Norvin) for evidence of 'ephectic'use of Phd. 28 See S.E. PH. 2.22, Phr. 230a: 'Socrates'does not know whether he is a man or not. 29 See anon. Prol. in Plat. Phil. 10 (p. 205.12-17 Hermann). 30 Anon. ProLin Plat. Phil. 10-11is counteringargumentswhich were designed to show that Plato belonged among the 'Ephecticsand Academics'(p. 205.4 Hermann),but more especially that he was ephectic (see also p. 205.11, 207.9 and 12). 'Ephectic' was the standard late Neoplatonic term for a Pyrrhonistsceptic (see the introductions of the various Categories-commentaries), and is so used at anon. Prol. 7 (p. 202.22-27),where 'Ephectics' are distinguished from Academics. Since the arguments were certainly not devised to show that Plato was a sceptic of the Pyrrhonistratherthan the New Academic variety,it is clear that anon. attachesimportanceto the term 'Ephectic'because he has in mind Pyrrhonist championsof the scepticview of Plato.The argumentsare such that they must come from a source concerned with the discovery of arguments rather than one devoted to the historicaltruth:their object is not to secure belief, but to counter-balance the argumentsof those who saw Plato as a dogmatist.See also also n. 32 below. 31 I assume that the orthodox Pyrrhonistview held that Pyrrhowas foreshadowed by earlierthinkers,but that he had out-strippedthem all in the rigourof his 'scepticism'(cf. S.E. PH. 1.7); Plato was held to have been one of these (D.L. 9.72), though there was perhapsdissension among Pyrrhonists concerningthe degree to which he could be said to have embraced'scepticism'(S.E. PH. 1.222with Heintz'semendation:see my article'The Date of Anon. In Theaetetum', CQ. forthcoming,n. 66). In anon. Prol. there is no doubt that Plato is depicted as an Academic rather than a Pyrrhonistin the Pyrrhonistarguments, for he makes hesitant statements ratherthan completely suspendingjudgement, and he appears to sanction the non-apprehensibilitydoctrine in the strongerAcademic fashion (but Tarrant,loc. cit., does note that the passagepaints Plato as ratherextreme in his Academicism:there is no conflict here, as I hope to show elsewhere).

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It is now usually believed that LuciusTubero,dedicatee of Aenesidemus'Pyrrhonian Logoi (Photius 169b33)was Cicero'sfriend L. Aelius Tubero(cf. Lig. 2 1).Aristocles(Eus. only to emphasize P.E. 14. 763d) says that Aenesidemus'activitieswere ExOsxa; 'rrp6n1v that they are a product of the Roman age and have no respectableGreek pedigree.The words are a taunt, and were certainlynot meant to be taken literally. 33 See Tarrant,loc.cit. (n. 31 above), includingnn. 77-78. 34 See Tarrant,loc.cit. (n. 31 above),passim, also Dionysius5 (1981), p. 68 n. 9. 35 Note the apparent approval of Pyrrho'srejection of all Hellenistic-stylecriteria at 61.15-46 and the interest shown in Pyrrhonistrelativity-theoryin col. 63 (chiefly with regardto sensation). Note too the apparentreluctanceto agree that the senses are either accurateor to be highly valued (3.7-12) and the One-Academythesis at 54.43-55.7. 36 One assumes that the One-Academydoctrineof 54.43-55.7entails belief in an esoteric 'dogmatism'in the Second if not the Third Academy (cf. S.E. PH. 1.234);54.23-30and 59.12-34see Plato as partlyesotericin his methods.(N.B. I suspectthe editor'srestoration would be betterthan kar[LVowl, for it is sometimesuseful to 'conceal' of 59.28: - 'Ear(Lv OTE] or 'by-pass'the truth,never useful to obliterateit.) 37 46.43-54.30: considerableattentionis paid to the processof 'Socraticmidwifery'. 38 The Loeb notes refer only to Ep. VIII 355b in conexion with QuodOmn.Prob.3, but there is no evidence of Philo's having known the passage. The Cohn-Wendlandedition sees a parallelwith (but again hardly a borrowingfrom) Ep. VII 326b. 39 Leisegang'sindex, under Plato, lists over 3 columns of Platoniccitations,allusions,or parallels,drawn from Tim.,Phr., Laws, Rep., Tht.,Crat.,Gor.,Symp.,Meno, Phd., Phil., Prot.,Ap., Menex., Sph., Ion. Axiochus,and Eryxias(approximateorderof importancein Philo). 40 e.g. Ebr. 166-205,Jos. 125-147,Fug. 135-6, 188-193,206, Spec. 1.333-343,Prov. fr.l, Opif. 72, Her. 247. 41 e.g. Sac. 12-13, but the notion of a divine revelation,of a higher kind than human 'knowledge',is fundamentalthroughoutPhilo'swritings. 42 See R.M. Jones, 'Posidonius and the Flight of the Mind', CP. 21 (1926), 97-113, particularly101-7. 43 Albinus, Epitome,ed. P. Louis (Paris, 1945). 44 Dom. 8, Im. 16, Iup.Tr.8. 45 But since John Whittakerdemonstratedthat there are no good groundsfor attributing the Didascalicusto Albinus (Phoenix 28 (1974), 320ff and 450ff) one cannot insist that it belongs to the mid-second century A.D. Often the date of its source material is more relevant.Stylometrycan at least reveal partsof the workwhere the sentence-lengthdrops the less original(?) parts well below the 24-25 words per sentence-unitwhich characterize fairly consistently. These are chapters 1 (surely the author'sown introduction);9.3 (p. 163.28 Hermann)to II (where new materialon Ideas and God, as well as a digressionon qualities, has presumably been introduced); about the last half of 14 (time and the planets); 18-22(probablya pr6cisof the source);24-25(extramaterialon the soul); 26 (on fate: like 24-25 not foreshadowedin the division of philosophy in chapter3); 28 (up-todate materialon assimilationto God); 30-33 (original,or sourcemodified?);and 35-36 (a digressionon the Sophist,and the author'sconclusion).Averagesentence length in these partsare as follows: I - 17.83,9b - 11.64,10 - 13.70, 11- 12,88,14b- 20.13, 18 - 22.56,19 20.76, 20-22 - 15.21, 24- 17.22, 25 - c.15.49-17.91, 26 - 15.94, 28 - 17.05, 30 - 17,90, 31 -

32

16.13,32 - 15.68,33 - 19.21,35-36 - 17.00.I suspectthat the author'sown naturalsentence length was around 17 wordson average,droppinga little when presentingarguments(as

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a 9b-lI and 24-25). There remainchapters2-9.2, 12-17(except part of 14), 23 (Timaeusbased like 12-22,and no doubt from the same source), 27, 29, and 34 (politics). It should be noted that 12 is known to stem from Arius Didymus (Diels, Dox. p. 447) or from some closely related source. Minor discrepanciesbetween 9b- 11 and partswith longer average sentence-lengthconvince me that the work is not homogeneous. If I am broadlycorrect, then the passage which speaks against Ideas of artefacts(163.22-27 Hermann)falls only just within the unoriginal material:so close to new material that the author would have excised it if it had been out of date. It is interestingthat the passage which I regardas the best candidate for dependence upon the digressionof Ep. VII falls in chapter 1, which I r ITE presume to be original: xai r rp6o8tx0ol0)VT)V VUXFVOXL 8 cov.ITpOoEL, .,poVaL -X avTCJxai EVr6&ELav xvi iLV't[uv. Compare 344a. This may be an argumentin favourof the final work's having stemmed from the late second century A.D. 46 cf. G.R. Morrow,Studies in the Platonic Epistles (Urbana. 1935) p. 26: 'for Plutarch was obviously as convinced that they were the writings of Plato as he was convinced of their value as historicalsources'.
47 e.g. 4.5 ('S ax'Trs y&ypatE HX&?Wv),11.3 (as cpnoIV avr6s). HX&rwv), and several less striking instances.
48

18.9 (oVi7w pv

bi

qrqatv6

The comparisonwith Nepos and Diodorus is instructive,cf. Gulley (lOc. cit. n. 4 above) p. 108:'only Plutarchpays any substantialattention to the partplayed by Plato.And only Plutarchrefers to the Epistles' 49 Bude text, ed. R. Flaceli0reand E. Chambry(Paris, 1978). 50 Note that Plutarchappearsto have defended Philo of Larissa's One-Academythesis in a lost treatise (LampriasCat. no. 63). His works appear to show a loyalty to Arcesilaus and Carneadesas well as to Plato. On the early Middle Platonicview of Plato as one who concealed his doctrine see below, p. 86. 11 Quaest.Plat. I (999c-1000e)and fragments215-7. 52 It would appear from the De Defectu that Plutarchinheritsfrom Theodorusof Soli his interestin the possibility that there are five worlds ratherthan one. There is, of course, nothing in the Timaeusto suggest that Plato had some special affection for the notion of five worlds, and explanation must be sought elsewhere for Theodorus' interest in the question. It is possible that he had been stimulated by Old Academic texts, for a quaint interest in five physical bodies in five regions of the universe with five corresponding types of divinity appearsin the Epinomis(984b2ff)just as there are five types of matterin Speusippus(see below, n. 63). 53 See also my discussion of Theodorus in relation to Speusippus and the Platonic Parmenides,Phronesis 19 (1974), 130-145.Theodorus' date is unfortunatelynot known, but his interestin mathematicalaspects of Plato's Timaeusis also attestedat De An. Proc. 1022cd and 1027d. My inclination is to place him after Crantor and Clearchus of Soli (whose views he seems to be replyingto at 1022d),yet before Eudorus,who appearsto be the source of much of the historicalmaterialon the interpretation of the psychogony(see 1013b, 1019e, 1020cwith H. Cherniss'note b, Loeb ed. p. 300). 54 Twice at Didascalicus 10 (p. 164. 27-30 Hermann); Aetius 1.7.31 (p. 304a1-2, b23-24 Diels); Maximus Tyrius Or. 29.7g (cf. 4.9d 'Who is helmsman, who general, who lawgiver, who yeWpY6s [cf. Numen. fr. 13 des Places], who householder?').It may also be relevant that both the physical chapters of Didasc. (14-15) and Aetius 1.7.31 appear to attributefive ordersof divinity to Plato: Father-Creator, sphereof fixed stars(Didasc.)or intelligible (Aetius), astrals, element-powers, and earth (Didasc.) or all-embracing cosmos (Aetius). The lists are very different from the five kinds of God which are

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associated with the five elements at Epinomis984b2ff, whose obvious influence on the author of Didasc. (see L. Taran, Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the PseudoPlatonic Epinomis (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 161-4) was probably not direct; other unknown influences were at work too. 55 Ideas are related to God, the Ideas themselves,us (quasouls?),the sensible world,and matter at Didasc. 9 (p. 162.12-16Hermann). I draw attention to what I believe to be a related five-fold metaphysical pattern in Numenius (fragments 13, 16, 18, and 22 des Places = 22, 25, 27, and T25 Leemans)in Antichthon13(1979), pp. 26-28. In the Prologus of Albinus (6, p. 150.15ffHermann)and the Introductio of Theon Smyrnaeus,both from the second century A.D., are related theories of a five-fold Platonic education-process. Theon's account likens this process to progressin a mystery-religion(p. 14.18ffHiller), but barely a trace of religious language is found in Albinus, the initial catharticstage being seen in relation to medicine ratherthan religion.Indeed the chief point of contactis the number of stages, a number which receives more emphasis in Theon, who also emphasizes the number of five mathematical sciences (used at the cathartic stage), relatingthem to the five-fold purification(?) of Empedocles B143(p. 15.9ff).A common influence seems to have determinedboth the numberof stages and the catharticnatureof the firststage in both authors,and it must be Theon who is most indebted to it: for (a) he is inclined to excerpt the works of others, and (b) the passage has not been reworked sufficientlyto adapt it well to the context,while only the firststage is reallyrelevantto his mathematical subject. Since Thrasyllus is an important influence on Theon (see p. 47.18ff, 85.8ff, 87.8, 93.8, and 205.5 at the conclusion:cf. J. Dillon, TheMiddlePlatonists (London, 1977),pp. 397-8), and is well-known to, but not very influentialupon, Albinus (p. 149.12-17),he may well be Theon's source and a passing influence on Albinus. Note that Theon (like Albinus' Prologus) was concerned with the Thrasyllansubject of the order of the Dialogues (see al-Nadim, Fihrist, trans. B. Dodge (New York, 1970), pp. 592-4 = pp. 245-6 Fliigel), and is committed to the notion of tetralogies. Material in Plutarch'sDe Iside on Horus as five (374ab) which relates to De E 387e and De Defectu 429d-f suggeststhat theremay be some five-fold underlyingmetaphysicrelatingto Osiris, Osiris'efflux, Typhon, Isis, and Horus in the platonizingaccountof 37 la ff, but the issue is complex. 56 'The Parmenidesof Plato and the Originsof the Neoplatonic One', CQ. 22 (1928), pp. TAPA. 93 (1962), 129-142;cf. J.M. Rist, 'The Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides', 389-401. $7 I am aware that many modern scholars of Plato prefer to divide the positive hypotheses into four (with 155e4-157b5being regarded,with Cornford,Plato and Parmenides(London, 1939), p. 194, as a corollary of hypothesis 2), counter-balancingthe four negative ones. But unless the words"ETL 8i ToTpirovX)ywgv (155e4) are themselves an early Middle Platonicaddition to the text it seems that Plato would have counted five, and there seems to be a little evidence that Speusippusdid so too (see Tarrant,loc.cit.(n. 53 above), 138ff).FranklyI do not see how Moderatus'interpretation could have evolved without the existence of some tradition (written rather than oral) of five separate hypotheses. 58 The evidence for Moderatus'views is to be found in a report,via Porphyry, at Simpl. In Phys. p. 230.34ff (Diels). It may be possible to claim that Porphyryis responsiblefor of the adulteratingthe passage with Neoplatonic elements, thus readingan interpretation Parmenidesinto Moderatus; but I would join Dillon (op. cit. [n. 55 above] p. 349) in resisting such a suggestion, not least because I see Neoplatonism, and Porphyry's

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Neoplatonism in particular,as having evolved from Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism,particularlyin respectof Platonicinterpretation. 59 The notion of a One beyond being goes back at least as far as Speusippus(fr. 34e Lang = 57 Isnardi Parente = F43 Taran; cf. Proclus, In Parm. ed. R. Klibansky and L. Labowsky(London, 1953),pp. 38-40 = fr. 62 I-P = F48 T, and Iamb. De Comm.Math. Sc. 4 p. 17.7-8 Festa). Taran'sattempt to detach this doctrine from Speusippus,claiming that the words W"UTE- 6E V Tvt LvaL To 'Ev OVXT6 (Arist.Met. 1092a14-15)are only Aristotle's opinion of where Speusippus'system ought to lead, and do not at all reflect Speusippus' own view, is based upon the application of his private school-masterlyrules for Greek consecutive clauses. How this could be a clause of intendedresult without it being the intentionof SpeusippusI fail to understand;certainlyAristotlecannot have intended such a result. Moreover Aristotle simply has not been granted the premises for establishing such consequences for Speusippus' system. Pace Taran (Speusippusof Athens (Leiden, 1981), 104-5 and 338-9), Aristotle'sgrammarestablishes only that he is not reportinga clause of actual result(indicativeconstruction)used by Speusippus;but there is no reason why Speusippus should have preferredthe indicative constructionto the infinitive construction in the first place; the latter is appropriatewhenever one would wish to express the naturalresult, the result that tendsto follow (Goodwin, GreekGrammar 1450).TarAn also tries to show that other Aristoteliantestimonyproves that the SpeusippeanOne was an entity in the normal sense of the word; the testimony is forced into yielding information on matterswhich Aristotledid not intend to comment upon, let alone try to report accurately. I hope to say more on this topic in a review for Classical Philology. It is difficult to interpret the passage in Proclus, but it is clear enough that Neoplatonists associated Speusippus(i) with the Parmenides (cf. fr. 61 I-P = F49b T = Porphyry(?) In Parm.fr. I) and (ii) with a One beyond being. The lamblichan passage may perhapsbe a reworkingof Speusippean doctrine ratherthan Speusippus'own words (Taran p. 107; IsnardiParentein Athenaeum53 (1975), 88-110), but the Speusippeanelement can hardly have been derived from Aristotlepace Taran.It is inconceivable that the period of great Pythagorico-Platonic interest in the mathematicalpassagesof Plato'sworks which preceded the studies of Plutarchand Theon Smyrnaeuswould have failed to have recourseto such of the works of Speusippuson mathematicsas had survived.Rist (loc. cit. [above. n. 561 p. 390) oversimplifieswhen claiming that the system of Speusippus was a dualism, without a single universal cause, and thus without significant influence on 'Neo-Pythagoreanism'(the word is not yet well understood).Had he looked moreclosely at Aristotle, Rist might have been persuaded that Speusippus too had distinguished between One (henadic) and One (monadic), cf. pp. 395-7 on Proclus,Theon, and Eudorus;for Taran notes that Aristotle sometimes 'substitutes' monad for Speusippus' One, but not for PlatonistOnes in general (p. 36). For Monadseems to signify the One (one?) in a purely arithmetical role as joint-principle with multiplicity (Met. 1092a29, Top. 108b29), whereas the One is sometimes seen as something more fundamental,a starting-pointfor all classes of substance (Met. 1028b21-24= fr.33a L, 40 I-P, F29a T), each of which has only one trulyseparateprinciple(ibid.,cf. De Comm.Math.Sc. p. 16.20-22,17.5, 17.13-19), this being the materialprinciple.When the One is consideredas an element of the class of number, and only then, it appears in the guise of the monad (cf. De Comm. Math.Sc. p. 17.14-15: 's iv &pLOIO6S pv&&Ba xoTr TO'EV, O'v'rs artyLyv kv ypouLRois.. .). Consequently when Aristotle discusses the notion of a primaryOne in Speusippus,prior to other ones (Met. 1083a24-27= fr.42 L, 76 I-P, F34 T), he cannot referto a 'monad'priorto monads, even though his argumentfrom analogy with the dyad and triadwould have been greatly

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strengthenedby that term.The One has been hypostatizedby Speusippusin a way which principlespeculiar to a single class were not; for the One was a general principleof 6vica (De Comm.Math.Sc.p. 15.9),which is preciselywhy the One, but never (explicitly) any principlepeculiar to a class, cannot be an iovitself. 60 On his use of Eudorussee n. 53 above; also Dillon (op.cit.[n.55 above] p. 116). But if of Plutarchuses Eudorusas a basic source,why'does he not give Eudorus'interpretation 35ab?His attitude to Xenocratesand Crantor(1013b) is compatiblewith his having been (1023b). These must have found attractiveelements in Old 'TrpiHOLt8WVLOV among oiL Academic theories: the epistemological considerations in Crantor, Xenocrates'use of One and Many. Eudorus, I think, associated the latter with Same and Different rather than with Indivisibleand Divisible. My suspicion stems from my regarding1024d(1v Se To 0rTEpov.. .) and sequel as once more Eudoran;for P. Thevenaz, L'Ame du Monde,Le chez Plutarque(Paris, 1938),p. 82, noted that Plutarchseems here Devenir,et la Mati&re to derive Rest and Motion from Same and Other (1025a), whereas he had already criticized Xenocrates (1013d) for such an assumption. Note too that the dual nature of cognition, which is here thought to depend upon Same and Other,is earlier,in Plutarch's own criticism of Posidonius (1023d-4b), said to depend upon Indivisibleand Divisible. Finally let us note that Plutarchnow defines Same and Other as 'Idea of things in the same state' and 'Idea of things in a different state' (1025c), but that such definitions are reminiscentof the Posidoniandefinition of soul as 'Idea of the all-extended . . .' (1023b, after Speusippus'descriptionof the Platonic World-Soul,fr. 40 L = 96-97 I-P - 54 T: TarAn's commentaryis recommended);this seems to use a sense of'Idea' which Plutarch himselfcriticizesat 1023c.[lt is difficult to see how soul could be composed of Ideasin the normal Platonic sense,just as it could not be an Idea in such a sense.] 61 See Dodds, loc.cit. (above, n. 56); Rist. loc.cit. p. 397, sees the evidence in a different light, and therefore regards Moderatusas the first to make substantialuse of the Parmenides;Eudorus,he claims, 394-8, was dependent ratherupon the Philebus(I 5ab). But this is a passage which features prominentlyin Proclus'commentaryon the Parmenides vovxaLovao;as, (p. 779.22 etc.). Rist has been ably answeredby John Whittaker,'E'rixetva Vig. Christ. 23 (1969), 91-104, particularlyp. 98 n. 10. It should not be forgotten that Thrasyllus'having coupled Phil. with Parm.early in the third tetralogyguaranteesthat a close connexion was seen between the two works in his day. It is likely that Parm. was thoughtto investigatethe firstprinciplequa One, while Phil. examined it qua Good. The Philebus'liberal sprinkling of material on One, Many, Limited, and Unlimited would also have ensured that the two dialogueswould be seen in close relation. 62 See Stob. Ecl. 2.55.13-21 (Wachsmuth): I presume that Arius is here continuing to employ Eudoranmaterial(see CQ forthcoming,n. 136). Early use of the Philebusin the interpretationof Plato's mathematicalmetaphysicshas been postulated by Rist (n. 61, above) and linked by him with Eudorus.Certainly one can say that Theon of Smyrna, Intr. p. 21.14-16, gives evidence of early interest in the dialogue. He can scarcely be originalat this point, for earlierin the chapter(p. 18.3ff, 19.7ff,and 19.22ff)his wordsare almost identicalwith those of Moderatus(Stob. Ecl. 1.1.8-9);the likeliestcommon source is Thrasyllus. 63 See above, n. 53. 64 Of Plato in Plutarch'sDe Animae Procreatione and in his famous emendation to the text of Arist. Met. 988a 10-1I (Alex.Aphr. ad loc.); of Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras,and Aristotle in the 'problems' following his division of ethics (Stob. Ecl. 2.45.7ff); of the Pythagoreansin Simpl. In Phys. p. 181.10ff(Diels); of Aristotle (criticism ratherthan
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interpretation)in sundry parts of Simpl. In Categ.; reportsof the physics of Posidonius and Diodorus (possibly of others too) in Achilles Inir. adAratum. 65 I think particularlyof those reportsmentioned in n.64 which concerned Plato and/or Pythagoras. 66 Dillon, op.cil. (above, n.55), p. 115. 67 Eudorusis habitually regardedas a 'dogmatist',and this view arisesfrom modern use of the simplistic sceptic-dogmatistdichotomy. While dogma was then a term for 'doctrine', not all who had doctrines could be called 'dogmatic' today, nor was dogma inconsistent with a New Academic position. 'Sceptic' still did not mean anything like what we mean by the term,as may be seen in certainpassagesof Philo of Alexandria(e.g. Ebr. 202), cf. K. Janacek, Listy Filologicke 102 (1979), 65-68; but Janacek pays too little attention to traces of the emergentnew meaning at Fug. 209 and Congr.52, and does not appear to know QG. 3.33 where that new meaning is already the school-name of the Pyrrhonists.The fact is that though Eudoruswas not a 'sceptic',this cannot be used to prove that he was not following New Academictraditions,for neitherPhilo of Larissanor Charmadaswere 'sceptics'(see Tarrant,loc.cit. n. 16 and loc.cit. n. 18 above). I attributea similar position to Eudorusin CQ 1983. 68 Cic. De Oratore 1.84, ND. 1.11, Ac. 2.60. 69 568c, 574f; I can offer no opinion here as to the identity of the author. 70 He appears to have been responsiblefor the view that Platowas of many voices, not of many opinions: Stob. Ec. 2.49.25-50.1(with Heeren'ssuppl.), also 55.6. On its Eudoran origin see H. Dorrie, Platonica Minora(Munchen, 1971),pp. 159-160.I like to compare anon. In Thi. 59.12-21, where it is said that Plato'smeaning is not stated in his 'inquiries', but that it nevertheless revealsitself imperceptiblyto those acquaintedwith his methods. 71 One cannot be certain of his source here; Thrasyllus had been followed from the middle of 56 to the middle of 61, perhapsvia Favorinus,who is mentionedas a source at the end of 62. All of 63-64 would appear to come from a single source. 72 If I am correct, the forger has been inspired by the reference to others who were
iTopoxovaUtT0v
TrV xa/r qptXoaoqiav at 338d3, so that he develops this Twvi:v 9p4LEOTOL

theme at 340b6-7 and 341a8-b5 using similarterminology('rrap&xovaRa, -napaxoA).That such terminology should be used three times within three Stephanuspages, but nowhere else until the first century B.C., gives an unexpectedly technical ring to the language of 'Plato'. 73 op.cil. (above, n.l.), p. 73. 74 The reader is referredto Zeller, Ph.Gr.I i6 p. 400. 75 But see J. Glucker, Antiochusand the late Academy(GOttingen,1978),pp. 122-3. 76 Suet. Tib. 14, 62; Tac. Ann. 6.20 ff; Dio 55.11.1-3, 57.15.7, 58.27.1: presuming that Tiberius' Thrasyllus is not a different person from the Platonic scholar as has been thought by some (e.g. Grote, Furneaux).Such a view, however,is called into question by a scholiaston Juv. 6.576, who clearlyidentifies the Platonistwith the court astrologer,and there seems no reason to challenge the accuracyof his information.Note that Thrasyllus exercised some influence over Tiberius (Suet. Tib.62), but that he reportedlywas lucky enough to survive murderous intentions on the part of Tiberius (ibid. 14, Dio 55.11.2). Thus it may be said that his relationshipwith Tiberiuswas stormyenough to rival that of Plato with Dionysius. 77 Or so it appears in the Epit. Diog., on which see Glucker, op. cit. (above, n. 75), pp. 349-350. 78 It seems to me that it is quite contraryto the spiritof the Dialogues to speak of taLur11L
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and vovsas belonging to a q)poas.. . srrpvxvia ipavXs(343de), and that such wordswere not uninfluenced by Academic 'scepticism'. 79 Cic. Ac. 1.13. 80 e.g. Prov. fr. i; see CQ 1983. 81 It is currently fashionable to suppose the influence of Eudorus on Philo, e.g. W. Parusia, Theiler,'Philo von Alexandriaund der Beginndes kaiserzeitlichenPlatonismus', (Frankfurt,1965), 199ff. Festschrift fur J. Hirschberger 82 Although our forgeris here speaking(in theory)of the knowledgeof Ideas in general, it is clear that he thinks particularly of the knowledge of true virtue, beauty, and goodness: paradigmswhich one might expect to discern in the God to which one likens oneself (cf. Tht. 176c). 83 1 assume that there is substancein the storiesof Strabo( 13.54)and Plutarch (Sulla 26) concerningthe rediscoveryof the treatisesin 86 B.C.,and theirsubsequentacquisitionby Andronicus. 84 Stob. Ec. 2.49.8 (Wachsmuth);the doctrinereappearsin Albinus Prol. 5-6 (pp. 150-1 Hermann),Didasc.28 (p. 181.16ffHermann),Apul. De Plat. 23 (p. 126.4ffThomas),and D.L. 3.78 (along with doxographic material in Clement Strom. 2.131.2ff and Theodoretus). 85 'The Date of Anon. In Theaetetum,CQ (forthcoming). 86 Anon. firstrefers to a criterion'throughwhich we judge like a tool' (2.23-26),and that 'by which' (26-27) should perhaps be regardedas different from this; for, to judge from Tht. 184d, it should be the mind as opposed to the senses: moreover3.7-12 suggest that anon. does not allow accuracyto the senses, as he does to the criterion'by which'. 87 See 3.2 1-25 (cf. 15.16-23);Meno 98a. 88 47.45ff, up to and including 56.26-31. The Meno's mathematical episode is also mentioned at 28. 43ff. 89 The revelation-process is not, I think,incompatiblewith the theoryof recollection,and knowing-the-ldea becomes knowing-the-cause if one chooses to regard the Ideas as causes. However it is not necessary to read such theories into the digression. On the TLand ov or T; (342eff) and their possible relation to Meno 86e-87b see 'categories'Tnoi6V above, p. 88. 90 anon. Cols. 3. 61, 63 etc. 91 anon. 4.31-5.3, 9.30ff; Ep. 343e-344a. 92 anon. 7.14-20, cf. 58.39ff; Ep. 343e-344a. 93 Celsus in Origenc.Celsum6.18 (p. 331 Chadwick),JustinApol. 1.60.7,Clement Strom. 5.103.1 et al.; Dillon op.cit.(above, n.55) p. 367 thinks that Numenius may have known the passage, and notes its use by Apuleius (p. 313). 94 Or World-of-Ideas as a single entity with H.J. Kramer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik(Amsterdam, 1967),p. 221 n76; much depends upon whether the m?piof 312e3 and 4 should be read with the preceding singulars(understandingIaaLXeaperhaps) or with the pluralswhich follow (as I prefer). 95 Or the ensouled Cosmos with Kramer;again the question raisedin n.94 above applies. 96 See above, n.58. 97 My theory is that Speusippusfirst wrote of Plato'sinterestin seeing five metaphysical and perhapsof a wider significanceof that number to the Plato levels in the Parmenides, whom he knew. The early commentators on the mathematical aspects of Plato who and tried flourishedup to Theon's time made use of Speusippusin their interpretations, The digressionof Ep. 11is in my to recreatethe vision which lay beneath the Parmenides.

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view part of this later search for the vision behind the Parmenides,and I find it most interestingthat John Glucker (op.cit.[above, n.75],pp. 40-47) has recentlytriedto relateit to this work in particular.His explanationof the 'young and beautiful Socrates'of 314c is very attractive,but only if he does not persistin his attemptto see the statementthat there exists no Platonic writingas a statementwithout qualification(p. 43). The passagesurely means that there is no Platonic writing about the supreme principles of mathematical metaphysics, but that what is now being talked about (Parmenides)is the product of a youthful Socrates. [The fact that 'Parmenides'questions 'Aristotle'in the second part of the work need not, I think, bother us.] 98 1 do not see Glucker's alleged differences between the two digressions(see previous note). 99 op.cit. (above, n.l.), pp. 95-99. 100 See TarAn,op.cit. (above n.54), p. 153 n. 660. 101As in the doxographicaltradition(Aetius etc., see above, n. 12),in Seneca Ep. 65.7-10, 4 (p. 9.Hoche), and in the Didascalicus(9, p. 163.13 in Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introductio etc. Hermann). 102 Typical Platonic terminology,e.g. Euthphr. 6e5. 103 fr.14 des Places, see above, n. 13. 104 Tht. 176b, Rep. 613ab, Tim.90a-d.
105 See n.84 for references.
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107

e.g. anon. In Thi. 46.43-49, Cic. Fin. 5.59: sine doctrinanotitiasparvas. The assimilation-process recognized by Middle Platonists was generally seen as involving a God withinthe heavens, akin to the intellect of the Platonic World-Soul,see Didasc. 28 (p. 181.36-37 Hermann), Eudorus in Stob. Ecl. 2.49.8ff.(Wachsmuth),and perhaps Albinus, Prol. 5 (p.150.8-12 Hermannwith Tim.90a-d). 108 The Ideas are often numbers in the mind of God (e.g. Seneca and Nicomachus, locis cit., [above, n.101]), and the process often involves attuning oneself to the harmoniesof the heavens as at Tim.90a-d. 109 My thanks to the editor for some welcome and constructivecomments.

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