WORKPLAN FOR EVALUATING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PRIOR TO 9-11

(25 June 2003 Rev.)

OVERVIEW

Objective: Write a chronological narrative of the IC's efforts to analyze the Al Qaeda threat between
1991 and 2001; identify and analyze factors that the determined the effectiveness of these efforts.

APPROACH

1. Using the Joint Committee inquiry as a baseline, conduct follow-up research to fill in gaps, clarify
items in dispute, and provide an authoritative chronology, including a version suitable for release that
will address the public's concerns and inform future policy discussions. Tasks include:

A. Identify and analyze the players and their actions

1. Consumers: Identify policymakers responsible for tasking and receiving analysis. Track
changes in this tasking and their feedback to 1C analysts over time.

2. Managers: Identify and assess the decisions of 1C managers responsible for analysis
responding to this tasking, and for planning and managing the IC's analytic resources

2. Producers: Identify the individuals and organizations in the analytic community

analyzing the Al Qaeda threat. Identify skills, specializations, and assignments, and how
this mix changed over time.

B. Assess the IC's analytic operations prior to 9-11

1. Assess number and types of analytic personnel assigned to Al Qaeda in CIA, NSA, other
relevant organizations. Develop time lines, decision points in allocation of personnel.

2. Document management decisions and process for the analytic process in CIA, NSA, and
other organizations tracking Al Qaeda; identify efforts underway during 1995-2001 to
adapt and focus on new threats; assess results of these efforts.

C. Assess the IC's analysis and its state of understanding of the Al Qaeda threat prior to 9-11

• Identify major DI and other 1C products: PDBs, NIEs, SEIB items, and briefings. Evaluate
the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness of the IC's intelligence on Al Qaeda at
key points in time. Document the information flow - producers, consumers, feedback.

• Identify and evaluate other analytic products and services (e.g., internal CTC
memorandum; operational analysis supporting border monitoring, law enforcement, other
CIA activities)

• Identify intelligence gaps revealed and discussed in the analysis. Assess how this affected
subsequent analysis and collection tasking.

2. Identify and evaluate issues concerning the performance of the 1C in analyzing the Al Qaeda threat,
especially as these factors may shape the IC's abilities to monitor other threats of a similar nature or
level of concern. Using finding raised by the Joint Committee report as a starting point, issues to be
investigated include:

A. If the analytic resources devoted to Al Qaeda prior to 9-11 were, as some members of the Joint
Committee suggested, inadequate, what were the obstacles that prevented the 1C from
responding more effectively? What resources were available? What were the operating and
management procedures for analysis? How did these procedures affect the ability of 1C
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analysis to surge and concentrate its resources, draw on all sources of information, adopt new
methodologies, etc.?

B. What were the links between the 1C and domestic law enforcement organizations? How did
they work on a day-to-day basis?

C. Evaluate the effectiveness of these procedures in respect to the ability of 1C analytic

organizations to respond to strategic warning. How did the 1C respond to strategic warning and
deliver analysis? What factors determined its ability to do so?

D. If analysis tradecraft and associated management and operating procedures were inadequate
for analyzing the Al Qaeda threat prior to 9-11, have they been changed? Are they adequate
for analyzing other threats that the 1C will need to deal with in the future (e.g., WMD,
disease, regional powers, threats using terrorist-type tactics, etc.)

E. Evaluate the effectiveness of 1C management of the analytic process — e.g, training, tasking,
SOPS, production, coordination, feedback, response.

F. Using the results of this analysis, develop proposals for addressing problems affecting analysis
in the following form: measures that can be adopted immediately by 1C organization heads;
measures that would require executive orders by the President to resolve division and
assignment of responsibilities; and measures that would require action by Congress to provide
new statutory authorities.

Required resources for the workplan

1. Publications and documents

A. National Intelligence Council NIEs, SNIEs, and other major products pertaining to Al Qaeda

B. CIA IMs, lAs, typescripts, SEIB, PDB items pertaining to Al Qaeda

C. CTC and IOC analytic reports, memoranda, and other analytic and operational support
products pertaining to Al Qaeda

D. NSA reports and supporting data pertaining to Al Qaeda

E. Planning and strategy documents by (or directing) the DI and other analytic components within
CIA, NSA, and DOD intelligence organizations during 1992-2001

• Interviews

A. NSC staff (In coordination with other teams and other Team 2 groups)

B. CIA Deputy Directors for Intelligence; officials responsible for PDB, SEIB, other DI products;
CTC, IOC, UBLTask Force analytic heads;

C. Chairmen, National Intelligence Council; NIO for Warning and NIO At Large

D. Heads of NSA/ SID and other components responsible for SIGINT analysis on terrorism

E. Various analysts and mid-level managers in the CTC, DI regional offices, and NSA analytic
and processing components, to be individually identified internally later

F. Other CIA, NSA, and 1C officials as required and available

Schedule

Draft of the main product, a monograph suitable for publication and release to the public as an
unclassified document by the end of December.

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