Correspondence Between the Formalism and Our Experience 3.

1 The Quantum State of an Object The basis for the correspondence between the quantum state (the wave function) o f the Universe and our experience is the description that physicists give in the framework of standard quantum theory for objects composed of elementary particl es. Elementary particles of the same kind are identical. Therefore, the essence of an object is the quantum state of its particles and not the particles themsel ves (see the elaborate discussion in the entry on identity and individuality in quantum theory): one quantum state of a set of elementary particles might be a c at and another state of the same particles might be a small table. Clearly, we c annot now write down an exact wave function of a cat. We know with a reasonable approximation the wave function of some elementary particles that constitute a n ucleon. The wave function of the electrons and the nucleons that together make u p an atom is known with even better precision. The wave functions of molecules ( i.e. the wave functions of the ions and electrons out of which molecules are bui lt) are well studied. A lot is known about biological cells, so physicists can w rite down a rough form of the quantum state of a cell. This is difficult because there are many molecules in a cell. Out of cells we construct various tissues a nd then the whole body of a cat or of a table. So, let us denote the quantum sta te constructed in this way |>OBJECT. In our construction |>OBJECT is the quantum state of an object in a definite stat e and position.[3] According to the definition of a world we have adopted, in ea ch world the cat is in a definite state: either alive or dead. Schrdinger's exper iment with the cat leads to a splitting of worlds even before opening the box. O nly in the alternative approach is Schrdinger's cat, which is in a superposition of being alive and dead, a member of the (single) centered world of the observer before she opened the sealed box with the cat (the observer perceives directly the facts related to the preparation of the experiment and she deduces that the cat is in a superposition). 3.2 The Quantum State that corresponds to a World The wave function of all particles in the Universe corresponding to any particul ar world will be a product of states of sets of particles corresponding to all o bjects in the world multiplied by the quantum state |> of all the particles that do not constitute "objects". Within a world, "objects" have definite macroscopic states by fiat:[4] |WORLD> = |>OBJECT 1 |>OBJECT 2 ... |>OBJECT N |> (1)

The quantum states corresponding to centered worlds of sentient beings have exac tly the same form. The only difference is that in the product there are only sta tes of the objects perceived directly, while most of the universe is, in general , entangled; it is described by |>. 3.3 The Quantum State of the Universe The quantum state of the Universe can be decomposed into a superposition of term s corresponding to different worlds: |UNIVERSE> = i |WORLD i> (2)

Different worlds correspond to different classically described states of at leas t one object. Different classically described states correspond to orthogonal qu antum states. Therefore, different worlds correspond to orthogonal states: all s tates |WORLD i> are mutually orthogonal and consequently, |i| 2 = 1. 3.4 FAPP The construction of the quantum state of the Universe in terms of the quantum st ates of objects presented above is only approximate, it is good only for all pra

ctical purposes (FAPP). Indeed, the concept of an object itself has no rigorous definition: should a mouse that a cat just swallowed be considered as a part of the cat? The concept of a "definite position" is also only approximately defined : how far should a cat be displaced in order for it to be considered to be in a different position? If the displacement is much smaller than the quantum uncerta inty, it must be considered to be at the same place, because in this case the qu antum state of the cat is almost the same and the displacement is undetectable i n principle. But this is only an absolute bound, because our ability to distingu ish various locations of the cat is far from this quantum limit. Further, the st ate of an object (e.g. alive or dead) is meaningful only if the object is consid ered for a period of time. In our construction, however, the quantum state of an object is defined at a particular time. In fact, we have to ensure that the qua ntum state will have the shape of the object not only at that time, but for some period of time. Splitting of the world during this period of time is another so urce of ambiguity, in particular, due to the fact that there is no precise defin ition of when the splitting occurs. The reason that I am only able to propose an approximate prescription for corres pondence between the quantum state of the Universe and our experience, is essent ially the same that led Bell 1990 to claim that "ordinary quantum mechanics is j ust fine FAPP". The concepts we use: "object", "measurement", etc. are not rigor ously defined. Bell was, and many others are looking (until now in vain) for a " precise quantum mechanics". Since it is not enough for a physical theory to be j ust fine FAPP, a quantum mechanics needs rigorous foundations. However, in the M WI just fine FAPP is enough. Indeed, the MWI has rigorous foundations for (i), t he "physics part" of the theory; only part (ii), the correspondence with our exp erience, is approximate (just fine FAPP). But "just fine FAPP" means that the th eory explains our experience for any possible experiment, and this is the goal o f (ii). See Butterfield 2001 and Wallace 2001b for more arguments why a FAPP def inition of a world ("branch" in their language) is enough. 3.5 The Measure of Existence There are many worlds existing in parallel in the Universe. Although all worlds are of the same physical size (this might not be true if we take quantum gravity into account), and in every world sentient beings feel as "real" as in any othe r world, in some sense some worlds are larger than others. I describe this prope rty as the measure of existence of a world.[5] The measure of existence of a wor ld quantifies its ability to interfere with other worlds in a gedanken experimen t, see Vaidman 1998 (p. 256), and is the basis for introducing probability in th e MWI. The measure of existence makes precise what is meant by the probability m easure discussed in Everett 1957 and pictorially described in Lockwood 1989 (p. 230). Given the decomposition (2), the measure of existence of the world i is i = |i|2. It also can be expressed as the expectation value of Pi, the projection operator on the space of quantum states corresponding to the actual values of all physic al variables describing the world i: i UNIVERSE Pi UNIVERSE (3)

"I" also have a measure of existence. It is the sum of measures of existence of all different worlds in which I exist; equally, it can be defined as the measure of existence of my perception world. Note that I do not experience directly the measure of my existence. I feel the same weight, see the same brightness, etc. irrespectively of how tiny my measure of existence might be.