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(im)polite behaviour that is perceived to be beyond what is expectable (19, 161). These concepts offer a means of distinguishing the appropriate domain of (im)politeness and establishing its contestability and historical situatedness. Watts admits that the notion of politic behaviour may be controversial for those who would like to equate expected behaviour with polite behaviour, but this aspect is perhaps less controversial for sociologists given a somewhat careless appropriation of Bourdieus conceptual framework. Watts argues that his notion of politic behaviour is similar to Bourdieus concept of habitus, which he characterizes as the set of dispositions to act in certain ways, which generates cognitive and bodily practices in the individual. The set of dispositions is acquired through socialization (149). Watts notes that the habitus is generative of practices that negotiate resources in the marketplace of capital in a given field. While this rendering of Bourdieus habitus may seem reasonably unproblematic, even if a little impoverished, what makes Watts discussion particularly nettlesome is that he seems to imply that the habitus merely represents subjective structures that are combined with the objective structures of a field. He thereby neglects the extent to which the habitus mediates objectivity and subjectivity because it is simultaneously composed of structured structures and structuring structures (Bourdieu 1977:72; 1990:53). In a telling phrase, Watts argues that [S]ocial practice is thus equivalent to the ways that the product of the subjective structures internalized as his or her habitus multiplied by the capital the individual has gained in the marketplace is combined with the objectified social structures of the field (150). This is rendered too neatly as a causal relationship [(habitus) (capital)] + field=practice] that belies a more nuanced understanding of the way that the habitus signifies a mutually constitutive relationship between individual and social practices. For Watts, language is the cornerstone of habitus, and consequently he claims that linguistic practice is a product of a distinctive linguistic habitus and linguistic capital that are situated in relation to a linguistic maketplace (150). The effect is a fairly mechanical conception of habitus that is not only reductive, but avoids elaborating the real potential that Bourdieu offers a theory of linguistic politeness through le sens pratique, that is the intuitive know-how that designates the embodied, involuntary understandings of social life that are not always cognitively perceived (Bourdieu 1990:66-69). If politic behaviour is to be distinguished from (im)polite behaviour on the grounds that the latter exceeds normally expected behaviour in a linguistic situation, it seems problematic to claim that the former is consonant with habitus because the dispositions of the habitus always include within themselves classificatory schemas that situate and assess both expected and unexpected forms of behaviour. For Bourdieu, the habitus operates as means of distinction that allows one to discern differences that only become socially pertinent if they are perceived by one who is capable of making the distinction (1998:9). Habitus understood this way not only enables one to identify forms of (im)polite behaviour, but seems to easily express both politic and (im)polite forms of behaviour. A further problem is that Watts argument appears to depend on an attenuated conception of symbolic power that often seems to stand in for a conception of power tout court. Here, symbolic power is the ability to use the capital in a specific social field in order to change the social order of the field deliberately but without being perceived to do so (277). While Watts captures the extent to which symbolic power is something that is exercised only if it is recognized, that is, misrecognized as arbitrary (Bourdieu 1991:170, emphasis in original), he neglects the extent to which symbolic power represents a set of force relations that necessarily rests on a foundation of shared beliefs.
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Symbolic power thus generates capital that is based on the mutual recognition of attributes such as honour, nobility, politeness that are only available to agents endowed with dispositions adjusted to the logic of disinterestedness (Bourdieu 1997:234-235). For Bourdieu, disinterestedness is associated with an ethic of generosity that transcends ones particular interests in relation to a given field. Consequently, symbolic power as manifest in the struggle over symbolic capital is necessarily grounded in shared meanings and thus, seems at odds with Watts desire to avoid associating politeness with social harmony or cooperation (143). Again, the truncated form of these concepts contains and limits the conceptual and substantive possibilities that Bourdieu might otherwise offer linguistic politeness. Despite these criticisms, the books stands as a useful introduction to the study of linguistic politeness, and is notable for its attention to the play of force relations in constituting social interaction. Melanie White Department of Sociology, Trent University melaniewhite@trentu.ca
Melanie White is the author of a number of articles on civility, character and citizenship. Previously, she has held a Canada Research Chair Postdoctoral Fellowship in Citizenship Studies (2003) and a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Postdoctoral Fellowship (2004). References Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. [1972]. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 1990. [1980]. The Logic of Practice. Translated by R. Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. . 1991. [1982]. Language and Symbolic Power. Translated by G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. . 1997. "Marginalia -- Some Additional Notes on the Gift." Pp. 231-241 in The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity, edited by A. D. Schrift. New York: Routledge. . 1998. [1994]. Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Brown, Penelope and Steven Levinson. 1987. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.