Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Primary Credit Analyst: Virginie Couchet, Madrid (34) 91-389-6959; virginie.couchet@standardandpoors.com Secondary Contact: Soledad Martinez-Tercero, Madrid (34) 91-389-6954; soledad_martinez-tercero@standardandpoors.com Data Analyst: Pulock Baidya, London (44) 20-7176-3986; pulock_baidya@standardandpoors.com
Table Of Contents
Focus On Index Composition Related Criteria And Research
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 1
Table 2
Baseline 2013 Real GDP (year-on-year growth, %) Annual average unemployment rate (%) House prices (year-on-year growth, %) Net mortgage lending (year-on-year growth in balances, %) ECB policy rate (%) (1.5) 2014 0.6
Comment
Improving export performance could help stop the domestic economic contraction by 2014 The unemployment rate continues to post new highs Still few signs of improvement as the excess supply of dwellings remains a strongly negative factor Household deleveraging looks set to continue We expect the ECB to keep its policy rate low, given the ongoing eurozone downturn
Unfavorable
26.8 (8.0)
26.5 (5.0)
28.0 N/A
28.5 N/A
25.1 (10.5)
(1.5)
(1.4)
N/A
N/A
(3.4)
Somewhat unfavorable
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.9
Neutral
Sources: Eurostat, OECD, Banco d'Espana, Standard & Poor's. N/A--Not applicable. Baseline--Expected scenario. Downside--Alternative scenario; severe recession.
In the first quarter of 2013, severe delinquencies in Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) index reached a historical peak of 5.38%. In our view, the prolonged economic downturn will continue to cause the credit quality of the assets backing Spanish RMBS transactions to deteriorate. In
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
this report, we also take a closer look at our index composition and the contrasting performance that we have observed between different originators. Spanish economic indicators remain bleak. Further expected domestic demand weakness suggests that the economy will remain in recession throughout 2013. We expect GDP growth to decline by 1.5% in 2013 and to increase by only 0.6% in 2014 (see "Entrenched In Recession, Europe Seeks A Balance Between Deleveraging And Growth," published on March 26, 2013). Overview In Q1 2013, severe delinquencies in our index peaked at 5.38%. We expect the economy to remain in recession throughout 2013 and unemployment to continue to rise. The rapid increase in unemployment, as well as severe fiscal consolidation and tight financial market conditions are fueling the housing market's slump. It is likely that we will take more negative rating actions in 2013, as a result of declining credit quality, the lack of structural mitigants, and the increased number of ineligible swap providers in many transactions. Servicer performance differs throughout the credit cycle and the asset and borrower credit quality that the transactions are exposed to is also diverse.
At the end of 2012 and in Q1 2013, the unemployment rate accelerated, exacerbated by a shrinking active labor force. Long-term unemployment continues to rise, and we now forecast unemployment to reach 26.8% in 2013 and 26.5% in 2014. As indicated in previous index reports, we believe that unemployment is a key determinant of delinquencies. The rapid increase in unemployment, as well as severe fiscal consolidation and tight financial market conditions are fueling the housing market's slump (see "Recession Keeps House Prices In The Dumps In Most European Markets," published on May 7, 2013). According to the Spanish Housing Ministry, house prices plunged by 10.5% in 2012 from 6.78% a year earlier and have now fallen by 28% from their March 2008 peak. In our opinion, Spain's housing market remains overvalued as we forecast a further 20% house price drop in the next four years. This is partly due to a large number of unsold houses, which will force prices dowcn. In 2012, the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program estimated the number of unsold homes on the market at between 700,000 and one million. New property numbers dropped to 70,000 in 2012, from a peak of about 760,000 in 2006, suggesting that the pricing adjustment process is now under way and should continue. We believe that the price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios will still need to adjust further to reach equilibrium. The house price decline has affected regions differently, with eight out of the 17 Spanish regions experiencing house price declines that were above the national average (which was a 14.3% decline in Q1 2013, according to official data). We expect further house price corrections of 8% and 5% for 2013 and 2014, respectively. Despite lower interest rates, household debt ratios declined in 2013 due to contracting credit growth and growing unemployment. The number of mortgages continues to remain very low and decreased again in Q1 2013, after increasing marginally in January. However, the deleveraging process is slow and the level of nonperforming loans in residential market transactions still appears low, compared with the country's total nonperforming loan ratio of 10.7%.
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
This is partly driven by doubtful loans in the commercial real estate sector. Given ongoing economic uncertainties, the falling housing market, and increased recovery periods for rated transactions, we expect long-term delinquencies and defaults to increase in the RMBS transactions that we rate, resulting in fewer recoveries, even if Spanish mortgages benefit from low interest rates as the market is predominantly indexed to variable interest rates. As a result, this limits the number of delinquencies observed in the mortgage market. As of Q1 2013, our long-term arrears index was 5.4%, which is more than the 4.79% June 2009 peak. While the growth of severe delinquencies and defaults was slower in Q1 2013 than between end-2007 and mid-2009, severe delinquencies and defaults have now reached an all-time high in our index. Severe delinquencies in December 2012 were 53% higher than in Q4 2011, with the pace of deterioration accelerating in Q4 2012. Q1 2013 saw a more pronounced deterioration. Loans originated from 2006 onward have continued to perform badly, particularly the 2009 and 2010 vintages, while loans originated with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios at closing that were more than 70%, have experienced higher delinquencies. In particular, delinquencies for loans with an original LTV ratio of more than 90% are back at their highest levels since the 2008-2009 period. The prepayment rate freefall observed in our index stopped in the second half of 2012. It has since marginally increased on a quarterly basis since Q3 2012, but this is mainly due to our index composition (low prepayments are associated with seasoned transactions in our index and the inclusion of transactions from 2011). Mortgage servicers are likely to find it increasingly difficult to maintain their mortgage pools' performance as the effectiveness of forbearance arrangements is limited. We believe that the use of these arrangements by mortgage servicers has underestimated the number of reported severe arrears as recently disclosed by the Bank of Spain. As a result of the Bank's initiative (the April 30 Bank of Spain directive) to improve disclosure of nonperforming loans, it is likely that severe delinquencies will spike after its implementation (see "Spain's New Mortgage Laws And Bank Guidelines Could Push Up RMBS Losses But Improve Transparency," published on June 11, 2013). In our view, transactions' structural features will not be able to offset deteriorating credit quality. For example, Spanish RMBS transactions do not benefit from asset overcollateralization and the most junior notes' issuance proceeds usually fund the reserve fund at closing. Recoveries on defaulted assets are also constrained by the depressed Spanish housing sector, with recovery timings lagging further and recovery proceeds reducing. As severe delinquencies continue to roll into defaults, this will further weaken transactions' structural features to mitigate losses. The transactions reported in the "Focus on index composition" section below as underperforming our index have depleted reserve funds, and due to the lack of excess spread and recoveries, are not able to be replenished. The transactions also have very low excess spread and rely on swap mechanisms for credit support. It is likely that we will take more negative rating actions in 2013, as a result of declining credit quality, the lack of structural mitigants, and the increased number of ineligible swap providers in many transactions that are very sensitive to the support that swap agreements provide. The impact of these factors is likely to be less significant for the senior classes of notes in seasoned transactions. This is due to a build-up of credit enhancement and cash flow diversion mechanisms from the junior to the senior notes.
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
While we did not rate any new issuance in the Spanish mortgage market in Q1 2013, most of our rating actions were due to counterparty reasons. We expect to take further rating actions for counterparty reasons as remedy periods elapse. Counterparty scenario analysis. In order to provide further transparency on the components of our ratings, at the end of this report, we have set out a scenario analysis using the assumption that all supporting parties and the sovereign are rated 'AAA' in order to demonstrate the likely ratings, were they not a constraining factor (see charts 8 to 12 and table 4).
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
that we rate is largely influenced by Bancaja 10 and Bancaja 11's performance (both closed in 2007). This is because these transactions have experienced higher severe delinquencies and defaults than the other ex-Bancaja originated transactions that we rate. The remaining Bancaja transactions that we rate are more seasoned and have different portfolio features. We rate three RMBS transactions originated by Banco PastorIM Pastor 2, 3, and 4. In our opinion, these transactions clearly demonstrate the highest delinquencies and defaults seen in broker-originated loans (loans granted by a bank outside of its geographical core market). In Q1 2013, severe delinquencies in IM Pastor 3 and 4 were 17.7% and 14.7%, respectively, compared with just 1.75% in IM Pastor 2. Severe delinquencies observed in the Pastor-originated transactions were 10% in Q1 2013, peaking at 11.4% in Q4 2012, 46% higher than in Q4 2011. While severe delinquencies are historically higher in UCI-originated transactions, their loan and borrower features have resulted in delinquencies peaking at 15.20% in Q1 2013, compared with 14.60% in September 2009. The volume of delinquencies and defaults varies by closing date. Transactions that closed before 2005 (UCI 7, 8, 9, and 10) have the lowest severe delinquencies (the lowest being UCI 7 at 0.8%). By contrast, transactions that closed after 2005 report higher delinquencies, with UCI 16 at 21.4%, followed by UCI 17 at 19.4%. After peaking in September 2010, and underperforming our index until Q4 2012, severe delinquencies in Banco Santander S.A. originated transactions have been decreasing for a while. We cannot be sure, however, if this will continue in the long term. Loans originated by Bankinter S.A., Barclays Bank S.A., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A., Ibercaja Banco S.A., Kutxabank S.A., or savings banks that didn't originate loans outside of their core geographical region, have continued to experience very limited credit quality deterioration.
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 1
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 2
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 3
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 4
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 5
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 6
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 7
Table 3
MADRIDRS.2 MADRID RESIDENCIAL II, Fondo de Titulizacin de Activos SANTHIP.6 BBVARMBS.9 IMBP.2 Fondo de Titulizacin de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6 BBVA RMBS 9, Fondo de Titulizacin de Activos IM Banco Popular, Fondo de Titulizacin de Activos MBS 2
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 3
Jul 8, 2009 Jul 3, 2009 Jul 1, 2009 Jun 12, 2009 May 22, 2009 May 21, 2009 Apr 7, 2009 Mar 18, 2009 Feb 4, 2009 Dec 30, 2008 Dec 23, 2008 Nov 27, 2008 Nov 19, 2008 Nov 13, 2008 Nov 13, 2008 Nov 5, 2008 Aug 6, 2008 Jul 17, 2008 Jun 25, 2008 Jun 12, 2008 Jun 11, 2008
AYT.IFC1 IMBMFTA.1 AYT.IFCM1 AYT.IFCG1 AYTKUTXA.4 SOLLION.1 BANCAJA.BVAVPO1 UCI.19 MBSBANC.6 MADRIDRS.1 MADRIDIC.1 BBVARMBS.7 TDA.31 BANKINT.18 BBVARMBS.6 SANTHIP.5 TDA.CRDFMO1 CSSPIA.QEX1 IMSABDEL.2 BANKINT.17 AYTGOYA.2
Monte de piedad y Caja de Ahorros San Fernando de Huela, Jerez y Sevilla Bankoa S.A. Caja de Ahorros de Murcia Caja de Ahorros de Galicia Kutxabank S.A. ING Direct N.V. Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castellon y Alicante and Banco de Valencia, S.A. Union de Creditos Inmobiliarios, Establecimento Financiero de Credito Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castellon y Alicante Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. Banco Guipuzcoano Bankinter S.A. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. Banco Santander Central Hispano S.A. Credifimo, E.F.C, S.A.U. Banco Espaol de Credito S.A. Banco de Sabadell S.A. Bankinter S.A. Barclays Bank S.A.
Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 3
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 3
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 3
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 3
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 3
Counterparty scenario analysis. We have carried out a scenario analysis using the following assumptions: Scenario 1: All supporting parties are rated 'AAA'; Scenario 2: All sovereigns are rated 'AAA' and there is no cap on the ratings due to country risk; and Scenario 3: All supporting parties are rated 'AAA' and all sovereigns are rated 'AAA' and there is no cap on the ratings due to country risk. In scenarios 2 and 3, we have not included all of the factors that we usually take into account when determining the maximum differential between sovereign and nonsovereign ratings (see "Nonsovereign Ratings That Exceed EMU Sovereign Ratings: Methodology And Assumptions," published on June 14, 2011). If these factors were taken into account, the potential outcomes could be significantly lower. The results of this analysis are intended to provide transparency on the components of our ratings, and are not credit ratings in themselves. Note that the ratings list provided in table 3 is current as of May 31, 2013, and as we take further rating actions, it may be subject to change.
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 8
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 9
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 10
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 11
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Chart 12
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.)
Scenario 1 Estimated rating if all counterparties were rated 'AAA' AA- (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) Scenario 2 Estimated rating if the sovereign was rated 'AAA' A (sf) A(sf) A+ (sf) Scenario 3 - Estimated rating if all counterparties and the sovereign were rated 'AAA' AAA (sf) A (sf) A+ (sf)
Transaction AyT 11 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT 11 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT CAIXA SABADELL HIPOTECARIO I, FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
Class A B A
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
AyT Caja Murcia Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt Caja Murcia Hipotecario II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt Caja Murcia Hipotecario II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt Caja Murcia Hipotecario II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caixa Laietana I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caixa Laietana I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Circulo I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Circulo I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Circulo I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Circulo I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Espana I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Espana I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Espana I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Caja Espana I N/A C BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BB+ (sf)
A (sf)
BB+ (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BB+ (sf)
BBB (sf)
BB+ (sf)
BBB (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
N/A
BBB (sf)
BBB (sf)
BBB (sf)
BBB (sf)
N/A
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
N/A
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
N/A
A- (sf)
AA- (sf)
A- (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
N/A
A- (sf)
AA- (sf)
A- (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
N/A
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
N/A
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
N/A
BBB- (sf)
AA- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BBB- (sf)
BBB (sf)
BBB- (sf)
BBB (sf)
N/A
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA CCM I AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Sa Nostra I AyT Genova Hipotecario II Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario II Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario III Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario III Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario IV Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario IV Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario IX Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario IX Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario IX Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario IX Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria N/A N/A A A A (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf) AA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
N/A
A2
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
A+ (sf)
A+ (sf)
A+ (sf)
A+ (sf)
N/A
A- (sf)
A- (sf)
A- (sf)
A- (sf)
N/A
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
N/A
A2
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
N/A
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
N/A
A2
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
A+ (sf)
A+ (sf)
A+ (sf)
A+ (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
AyT Genova Hipotecario VII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VIII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VIII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VIII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario VIII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario X Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario X Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario X Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario X Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario XI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario XI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario XI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Genova Hipotecario XI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria AyT Goya Hipotecario III Fondo De Titulizacion De Activos AyT Goya Hipotecario III Fondo De Titulizacion De Activos AyT Hipotecario Mixto V, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Hipotecario Mixto V, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Hipotecario Mixto V, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A C BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf)
N/A
A2
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
N/A
A2
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
N/A
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
N/A
A2
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
N/A
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BB+ (sf)
BB+ (sf)
BB+ (sf)
BB+ (sf)
N/A
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
N/A
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
AyT ICO-FTVPO Caixa Galicia Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT ICO-FTVPO Caixa Galicia Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT ICO-FTVPO Caixa Galicia Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT ICO-FTVPO Caja Murcia Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT ICO-FTVPO Caja Murcia Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT ICO-FTVPO Caja Murcia Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt ICO-FTVPO III Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt ICO-FTVPO III Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt ICO-FTVPO III Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt ICO-FTVPO III Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt ICO-FTVPO III Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Ayt ICO-FTVPO III Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Kutxa Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Kutxa Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Kutxa Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Kutxa Hipotecario II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Kutxa Hipotecario II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos AyT Kutxa Hipotecario II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A A(G) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) BB+ (sf) AAA (sf)
N/A
BB+ (sf)
AA- (sf)
BB+ (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BB+ (sf)
BBB (sf)
BB+ (sf)
BBB (sf)
N/A
A(G)
BB+ (sf)
AA- (sf)
BB+ (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
BB+ (sf)
AA- (sf)
BB+ (sf)
AA+ (sf)
N/A
BB+ (sf)
A (sf)
BB+ (sf)
A (sf)
CAI CAJA RIOJA CAI CAJA RIOJA CAI CAJA RIOJA N/A
A(G) A(G) B B C C A
BBB (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf)
AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf)
BBB (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) A- (sf) AAA (sf)
AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
N/A
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
N/A N/A
A2 A3
AA (sf) AA (sf)
AA (sf) AA (sf)
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT
Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 5 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 5 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 5 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 7 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 7 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 7 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja 7 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bancaja-BVA VPO 1, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A B C D E A2 A3 B C D E A B C A2 B C A2 B C D A BBB- (sf) B+ (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) A (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) B+ (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) A (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) B+ (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) A (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) B+ (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) A (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf)
A2 B C D
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
Bankinter 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 13, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 13, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 13, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 13, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 13, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 3 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 3 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 3 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 4 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 4 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 4 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 5 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 5 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 5 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 6 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 6 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 6 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria Bankinter 8 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 8 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Bankinter 8 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A E A2 B C D A2 B C D E A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C CCC- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) BBB+ (sf) A+ (sf) BBB (sf) BB+ (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) A+ (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) A+ (sf) A- (sf) CCC- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) CCC- (sf) AAA (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) AAA (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) D (sf) AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf) BBB+ A+ (sf) BBB (sf) BB+ (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) A+ (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) A+ (sf) A- (sf) CCC- (sf) AAA (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) AAA (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) D (sf) AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf) BB+ (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf)
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT
Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
BBVA RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 5 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 5 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 5 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos BBVA RMBS 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos CAIXA PENEDES 1 TDA, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos CAIXA PENEDES 1 TDA, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos CAIXA PENEDES 1 TDA, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos CAIXA PENEDES 2 TDA, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos CAIXA PENEDES 2 TDA, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos CAIXA PENEDES 2 TDA, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos castellana finance. ltd. castellana finance. ltd. castellana finance. ltd. castellana finance. ltd. castellana finance. ltd. Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A A2 A3 A4 B C A B C 0 A BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) A- (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) AAA (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB (sf) B (sf) AAA (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BBB (sf)
BBB (sf)
BBB (sf)
BBB (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
A B1 B2 C1 C2 A
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
AA- (sf)
AA- (sf)
AA (sf)
AA (sf)
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT
Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6 N/A D A- (sf) A- (sf) A- (sf) A- (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
A (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
N/A
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
B (sf)
N/A
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
N/A
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
N/A
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
N/A
A1
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
N/A
A2
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
N/A
A3
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
BBB+ (sf)
N/A
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
B- (sf)
N/A
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
N/A
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
N/A
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
N/A
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
N/A
BBB(sf)
AA (sf)
BBB (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
BBB(sf)
AA- (sf)
BBB (sf)
AA- (sf)
N/A
BBB(sf)
A (sf)
BBB (sf)
A (sf)
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT
Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 11 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 11 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 11 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 14 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 14 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 14 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 15 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 15 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 15 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 16 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 16 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 16 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 16 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 16 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 17 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 17 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 17 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 17 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 18 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 18 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 18 N/A D BBB(sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
N/A
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
A B C A B C A B C A2 B C D E A2 B C D A B C
AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B- (sf) AA- (sf) B (sf) B- (sf) BBB (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) A+ (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) BBB (sf) B (sf) B- (sf)
AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B- (sf) AA- (sf) B (sf) B- (sf) BBB (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) A+ (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) BBB (sf) B (sf) B- (sf)
AA (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B- (sf) AA (sf) B (sf) B- (sf) BBB (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) A+ (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) BBB (sf) B (sf) B- (sf)
AA (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BB (sf) B- (sf) AA (sf) B (sf) B- (sf) BBB (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) A+ (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) BBB (sf) B (sf) B- (sf)
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT
Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 18 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 7 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 7 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 8 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 8 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 9 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 9 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 9 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, Hipotebansa 11 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, Hipotebansa 11 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, Hipotebansa X Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, Hipotebansa X Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 10 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 10 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 12 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 12 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria UCI 12 GC Pastor Hipotecario 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos GC Pastor Hipotecario 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos GC Pastor Hipotecario 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos GC Pastor Hipotecario 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos GC SABADELL 1, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecario GC SABADELL 1, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecario N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A D A B A B A B C A B A B A B A B C A2 D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) BB- (sf) AA- (sf) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) BB (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) BB (sf) BBB+ (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) BB- (sf) AA- (sf) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) BB (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) BB (sf) BBB+ (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) BB- (sf) AAA (sf) BB+ (sf) AA (sf) BB (sf) AA (sf) A- (sf) BB (sf) BBB+ (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) BB- (sf) AAA (sf) BB+ (sf) AA (sf) BB (sf) AA (sf) A- (sf) BB (sf) BBB+ (sf)
N/A
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
BB- (sf)
N/A
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
CCC (sf)
N/A
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
N/A
A2
BBB- (sf)
A- (sf)
BBB- (sf)
A- (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
A- (sf)
BB (sf)
A- (sf)
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT
Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
GC SABADELL 1, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecario Hipocat 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Hipocat 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A C BB (sf) BB (sf) BB (sf) BB (sf)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
A2 A3 B C D A2 A3 B C D A2 B C D A2 B C D A2a A2b B C D
BB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) B (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf) B (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BB+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf)
BBB (sf) BBB (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) B (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) A+ (sf) A- (sf) BB (sf) AA (sf) AA- (sf) BBB- (sf) B (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf)
BB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) B (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) BBB+ (sf) BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf) BB (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf) B (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BB+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf)
BBB (sf) BBB (sf) CCC- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) B (sf) B (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) A+ (sf) A- (sf) BB (sf) AA (sf) AA- (sf) BBB- (sf) B (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf)
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT
Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
IM Banco Popular MBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM Banco Popular MBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM PASTOR 2, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 2, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 2, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 2, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 3, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 3, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 3, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 3, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria IM PASTOR 4, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM PASTOR 4, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM PASTOR 4, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM PASTOR 4, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM Sabadell RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM Sabadell RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM Sabadell RMBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos IM UNNIM RMBS 1, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID ICO-FTVPO I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RESIDENCIAL I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID Residencial II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A A A-(sf) AA- (sf) A-(sf) AAA (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
A (sf)
BB (sf)
A (sf)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
A B C D A B C D A B C D A
AA-(sf) A- (sf) BB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) A- (sf)
AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) A- (sf)
AA- (sf) A- (sf) BB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) A- (sf)
AAA (sf) AA (sf) A- (sf) BBB (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) B- (sf) CCC- (sf) A- (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
A- (sf)
BB (sf)
A- (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB+ (sf)
BB (sf)
BB+ (sf)
N/A
NR
NR
NR
NR
N/A
A (G)
A (sf)
AA- (sf)
A (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
AA- (sf)
AAA (sf)
AAA (sf)
N/A
A (sf)
AA- (sf)
A (sf)
AA (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
MADRID RMBS I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS II, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS III, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS III, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS III, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS III, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS III, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS III, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos MBS Bancaja 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos SOL-LION, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A A2 B C D E A2 A3 B C D E A2 A3 B C D E A1 A2 B C D E A A A- (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (sf) CCC- (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) A- (sf) A- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) A (sf) A (sf) A (sf) BB+ (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (SF) CCC- (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) A- (sf) A- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BB+ (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) A (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (SF) CCC- (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) A- (sf) A- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) A (sf) A (sf) A (sf) BB+ (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf) A- (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (SF) CCC- (sf) A+ (sf) A+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) A- (sf) A- (sf) CCC+ (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA (sf) AA (sf) A (sf) BB+ (sf) B+ (sf) B- (sf) A (sf) AAA (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
SOL-LION, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos SOL-LION, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA 31, Fondo de Titulizacin de Activos TDA 31, Fondo de Titulizacin de Activos TDA 31, Fondo de Titulizacin de Activos TDA Cajamar 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Cajamar 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Cajamar 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Cajamar 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Cajamar 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A B C A B C A2 A3 B C D A2 A3 A4 B C D A2 A3 B A B C D A1 A2 A (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) A (sf) A- (sf) BBB- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) CCC (sf) AA- (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) A- (sf) AA- (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) BBB- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) CCC (sf) AA- (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) A- (sf) AA (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) AAA (sf) A (sf) A (sf) A- (sf) BBB- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) CCC (sf) AA- (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) A- (sf) AAA (sf) BBB (sf) BB- (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AA (sf) A- (sf) BBB- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) B- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) CCC (sf) AA- (sf) CCC (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
TDA CAM 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA CAM 9, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 3 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A A3 B C D A B C D A B C D A B C A1 A2 A3PAC B C D E F A1 A2 AA- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) A+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) A+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) A+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) D (sf) D (sf) D (sf) AAA (sf) A+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf) AA (sf) BBB (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) AA- (sf)
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Table 4
Estimated Ratings Under Scenario Analysis (Scenario 1, Third Column From The Right. Scenario 2, Second Column From The Right. Scenario 3, Right-Hand Column.) (cont.)
TDA Ibercaja 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Ibercaja 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA IBERCAJA 7, FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS TDA IBERCAJA 7, FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS TDA IBERCAJA 7, FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria TDA Tarragona 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos TDA Tarragona 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A B C D E A B C D A A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) BBB (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) AA- (sf) A- (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) AA- (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) BBB (sf) BBB (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) BBB (sf) A (sf) BBB- (sf) BB (sf) D (sf) AA (sf) A- (sf) BBB- (sf) BB- (sf) AAA (sf)
N/A
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
BB (sf)
N/A
CCC- (sf)
CCC- (sf)
CCC- (sf)
CCC- (sf)
N/A
A(G)
A-
AA- (sf)
A- (sf)
AA (sf)
N/A
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
D (sf)
N/A N/A
A B
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Spanish RMBS Index Report Q1 2013: Severe Delinquencies Reach An All-Time High, Yet Vary Widely Among Servicers
Scenario Analysis: Whats Driving Spanish Mortgage Arrears?, April 13, 2012 How Spains New Best Practices For Mortgage Lenders Could Affect RMBS Credit Quality, March 22, 2012 Nonsovereign Ratings That Exceed EMU Sovereign Ratings: Methodology And Assumptions, June 14, 2011 Principles Of Credit Ratings, Feb. 16, 2011 Update To The Cash Flow Criteria For European RMBS Transactions, Jan. 6, 2009 Update To The Criteria For Rating Spanish Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, Jan. 6, 2009 Methodology Behind European RMBS Indices, Nov. 8, 2004
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