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QUESTIONS FOR TOPIC AREAS:

Collection
HUMINT:

9/11 Closed by Statute

2. Did restictions on using HUMINT sources with human rights violations result in the
discontinuation or rejection of any assets? When?
3. What were the priorities for the recruitment of HUMINT sources? What were the
changes, if any, over time?
SIGINT:
1. What SIGINT sources were used against Al Qaeda during 1992-2001?
2. Were any SIGINT sources compromised, and how? ,.

9/11 Closed by Statute

Analysis
1. Identify the process through which DI analysts were assigned to cover Al Qaeda. At
what points were additional analysts assigned to the target, and how was this action
implemented? With what follow-up?
2. Who first identified the significance of the Al Qaeda threat? What was her
methodology, and what support did she receive from DI and other CIA management
to persue this line of analysis?
3. How many analysts within CTC were assigned to Al Qaeda prior to 9-11? How
many were assigned within CIA to tracking financial networks?

Management
1 Determine whether CIA or the 1C as a whole have a formal system through which
they could raise their alert level to deal with the Al Qaeda threat prior to 2001. How did
this system affect resource development and allocation, security, etc.?
2. Determine whether CIA or the 1C as a whole have established procedures for
responding to the DCI's declaration of war on Al Qaeda similar to the DEFCON system
used by DOD.

Resources
1. For each 1C agency and CIA directorate, identify:

• Annual spending

• Staffing levels and attrition/ recruitment rates


2. Identify how these spending levels were developed (i.e., funding originally
requested; adjustments by DOD, OMB, Congress)

3. Identify procedural constraints in recruitment analysts with appropriate language


and other skills (e.g., personnel "slot" limits and allocation; time required for processing
new personnel; policies concerning suitability of personnel).

4. Identify "macro" factors that affected overall intelligence spending levels, e.g.,
budget agreements, administration fiscal policy, specific events like theNRO surplus
funding issue.

Oversight

1. Identify the process through which congressional oversight committees determined


whether QA and 1C planning and operations addressed the DCI's priorities effectively;
assess its effectiveness.

2. Identify report language during the 1992-2001 period that directed CIA and 1C to
take specific action to develop capabilities against the terrorist threat; assess response to
these instructions.
3. Identify factors that may have limited the ability of Congress to implement effective
oversight, e.g. turnover of membership of oversight committees; security measures
imposed on Congress, inability to discuss issues such as intelligence spending with
other members or the public.

4. Determine whether Congress used all of its authorities under existing statute to
implement effective oversight (e.g., access to documentation, authority to release
information, etc.)
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MEMORANDUM

To: Kevin Scheid


From: Bruce Berkowitz
Date: April 7, 2003
i
Questions for Intelligence Topic Areas

The following questions and requests for information are intended to establish
"ground truth" — a factual record of actual actions that were undertaken (or not
undertaken) and may have contributed to the 9-11 intelligence failure.

In addition to being of intrinsic interest, the responses to these questions could be


used to develop a timeline explaining how intelligence organizations responded to
the Al Qaeda threat, and when.

These questions also suggest specific documents and interviews to request.

Collection

1. Provide CIA tasking for recruitment of HUMINT assets to collect against the Al
Qaeda threat prior to 9-11.

9/11 Closed by Statute

3. Identify any occasions when congressional or 1C guidelines caused CIA to reject


an asset with potential application to Al Qaeda.

4. Describe the SIGINT assets used to collect against Al Qaeda during 1992-2001.
Describe the amount and quality of information provided by each.

5. For the period 1992-2001, identify any SIGINT collection assets used against Al
Qaeda that were compromised, and describe the extent of the damage to U.S.
capabilities that resulted.

9/11 Closed by Statute

7. Did congressional instructions to NSA or the 1C affect the ability of NSA to


develop its own capabilities to obtain close access SIGINT?| 9/n closed by statute |
9/11 Closed by Statute

9/11 Closed by Statute

Analysis

1. Within the DI, who first appears to have detected the significance of the Al Qaeda
threat? What was her methodology, and what support did she receive from DI and
other CIA management to pursue this line of analysis?

2. Describe the process through which DI analysts were assigned to the Al Qaeda
target after this initial discovery was made, but prior to 9-11. What are the
procedures for reassigning an analyst to a new target?

3. Provide a timeline from 1992 through 2001 showing the number of analysts
assigned to cover Al Qaeda. How many analysts were assigned within the CTC and
CIA as a whole to cover Al Qaeda prior to 9-11?

Management

1. Do either the CIA or the 1C as a whole have a formal process through which they
can raise their level of alert in response to a growing threat? Did it exist prior to 9-
11?

2. Describe the steps (if any) that the CIA or other 1C organizations are directed to
undertake when this system goes to a higher level of alert.

3. Did such a system activate when the DCI "declared war" against Al Qaeda in
1998? Describe the measures organizations use to provide feedback to the DCI when
they are directed to go to a higher level of alert.

4. Did security regulations within the CIA and 1C prevent organizations and
individual analysts from sharing data effectively?

Resources

1. For the CIA, each CIA directorate, and each 1C agency, provide for each year from
1992-2001:

• Annual funding
• Staffing levels and attrition/recruitment rates

2. For each year, provide the change in each of these values following review by
OMB and Congress.

3. For CIA and NSA, provide the following data concerning constraints on
assigning personnel to the Al Qaeda threat:

• Personnel funding
• Personnel slots
• Time required to place new hires on the job
• Policies concerning suitability of prospective personnel

4. Identify "macro" factors each year that affected overall intelligence spending
levels, including:

• White House/Congress budget agreements


• Discrete events, e.g. response to the NRO surplus

Oversight

1. Describe the process (if any) congressional committees employed to determine the
DCI's budget and policy priorities.

2. Describe the process (if any) congressional committees employed to determined


the degree the NFIP supported these priorities.

3. Identify statute and report language during the 1992-2001 period that directed CIA
and other 1C agencies to develop capabilities against the terrorist threat; assess the
response to these instructions.

4. Identify factors that may have limited the ability of Congress to exercise effective
oversight, e.g., turnover of membership, security rules limiting discussion of
intelligence spending or other issues.

5. Determine whether Congress employed all of its existing authorities to


implement effective oversight.

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