The Question of Malvinas and The Bicentennial

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The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial
Translated by The Translations Directorate of the Library of the National Congress Translators: Seipel Renata, Izetta Nora, Testa Claudia, Suaya Carola, Llull Gabriela The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial (compiled by: Agustn M. Romero). Buenos Aires: Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee, Honorable House of Deputies of the Nation. 152 p. ; 30 cm. ISBN 978-950-691-076-1. 1. Malvinas War. 2. Argentina Relationships with Great Britain. 3. Malvinas (Islands, Argentina) History. 4. Argentina Foreign Affairs. 5. Sovereignty Malvinas (Islands, Argentina). I. Romero, Agustn M., comp. II. Argentina. Congress. House of Deputies. Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee, ed. III. Library of the National Congress (Argentina), ed. Director: Bernardino I. Cabezas Compiler: Agustn M. Romero The opinions, ideas, doctrines, concepts and facts herein stated are the exclusive responsibility of the authors. Agustn M. Romero Printed in Argentina. Deposit made under Law 11723, April 2011
Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee

Honorable House of Deputies of the Nation
AUTHORITIES OF THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES OF THE NATION 128TH SESSION President
Eduardo Alfredo Fellner Deputy for Jujuy
First Vice-President
Ricardo Luis Alfonsn Deputy for Buenos Aires
Second Vice-President
Patricia Susana Fadel Deputy for Mendoza
Third Vice-President
Federico Ramn Puerta Deputy for Misiones
Parliamentary Secretary
Enrique Hidalgo
Administrative Secretary
Ricardo Jos Vzquez
Operational Coordinating Secretary

Jorge Armando Ocampos
Assistant Parliamentary Secretary

Marta Alicia Luchetta
Assistant Administrative Secretary

Andrs Daniel Eleit
Assistant Coordinating Secretary

Eduardo Santn
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF DEPUTIES
President
Alfredo Atanasof
First Vice President

Ruperto Eduardo Godoy
Second Vice President

Margarita Rosa Stolbizer
Secretaries
Gloria Bidegain Omar Chafi Flix Horacio Rodolfo Quiroga Marcelo Eduardo Lpez Arias
MEMBERS
Ricardo Luis Alfonsn Eduardo Pablo Amadeo Nlida Belous Rosana Andrea Bertone Patricia Bullrich Ricardo Buryaile Mariel Calchaqui Norah Susana Castaldo Luis Francisco Jorge Cigogna Alicia Marcela Comelli Carlos Marcelo Comi Roy Cortina Juliana Di Tullio Liliana Fadul Hiplito Faustinelli Carlos Alberto Favario Irma Adriana Garca Carlos Salomn Heller Cynthia Liliana Hotton Fernando Adolfo Iglesias Daniel Katz Julio Rubn Ledesma Mara Laura Leguizamn Marta Gabriela Michetti Pedro Omar Molas Carmen Rosa Nebreda Jorge Alberto Obeid Cristian Rodolfo Olivia Alberto Nicols Paredes Urquiza Federico Pinedo Agustn Alberto Portela Juan Carlos Sluga Fernando Ezequiel Solanas Silvia Beatriz Vzquez Mariano Federico West Jorge Ral Yoma
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE LIBRARY OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS
President
Senator Roxana Itat Latorre
Secretaries
Senator Juan Carlos Marino Senator Carlos Alberto Verna Deputy Juan Carlos Gioja Deputy Miguel A. Giubergia
Members
Senator Marina Raquel Riofro Senator Ernesto Ricardo Sanz Senator Luis Alberto Viana Deputy Mara Virginia Linares Deputy Ana Zulema Luna de Marcos Deputy Carmen Rosa Nebreda
General Coordinating Director

Bernardino I. Cabezas
AUTHORITIES OF THE PARLAMENTARYS OBSERVATORY OF MALVINAS QUESTION
President
Alfredo Atanasof
Vice President
Ruperto Godoy
Members
Rosana Bertone Federico Pinedo Nilda Belouz Liliana Fadul Norma Castaldo Hugo Perie
Academic Members
Lic. Agustn M. Romero Dr. Ernesto Lpez Dra. Lilian Del Castillo-Laborde Lic. Carlos Daniel Esteban Lic. Federico Lorenz
Secretary
Agustn M. Romero
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INDEX
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Preface Alfredo Atanasof Malvinas: The Big Challenge of the Argentine Congress in the Year of the Bicentennial Ruperto Godoy Defending Argentine interests in the South Atlantic Area Jorge Taiana The Question of Malvinas in the Year of the Bicentennial Nilda Garr The Question of Malvinas from the National Defense perspective Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy Federico Pinedo 204, 200, 194 and 177 Jorge Argello United Nations: The Question of Malvinas, a pending Question
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44 56 66
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82 94 106
Rafael Bielsa Argentine Malvinas Islands, Kelpers oil? Juan Archibaldo Lans When the English doubted their rights Fernando Petrella The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial of the Argentine Republic Eduardo Airaldi The Question of Malvinas Islands in multilateral diplomacy Agustn M. Romero Bases to formulate an Argentine Foreign Policy for Malvinas Federico Lorenz Representations of the enemy during Malvinas War. A contribution to the Bicentennial Alfredo Bruno Bologna The situation of Malvinas Islands at the beginning of the Bicentennial of the Argentine Independence
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128
140
164
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Juan Cruz Vzquez Malvinas in the Bicentennial: in search of the collective story Alejandro Kaufman Malvinas and memory, dictatorship and democracy Marcelo Luis Vernet Malvinas: towards an integrating conception Lior Zylberman It was not a spectacular war. Malvinas war and cinematography Juan Recce Malvinas: Argentina and the challenge of redefining its strategic identity. From the Kelper Small and Medium Size Enterprise to the European strategic enclave Toms M. Giudici Malvinas in the Argentine press: from the creation of the Political Military Commandery to the USS Lexington
204 218 242
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PREFACE
This book, The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial is the result of more than one year of hard work. Its corollary is a contribution to the debate about one of the most important subjects that affects Argentine national feelings. This work is intended to reflect the plurality of ideas, approaches and political opinions regarding the Question of Malvinas, according to the multidisciplinary view that the subject deserves, vindicating, at all times, the lawful rights of the Argentine Republic in the dispute about the sovereignty over the Islands and adjoining Southern maritime areas. That is why at the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee we have been working in order to help our country to achieve the aim of the First Transitional Provision of the Argentine Constitution: to recover the sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and to defend and promote Argentine interests in the South Atlantic and our Antarctic area. The singularity of this book lies mainly in that it contains articles written by three incumbent National Ministers; National Deputies from different political parties, the representative of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations, two former Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the views of distinguished diplomats, academics and intellectuals with international prestige. There is no other book dealing with a central
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aspect of public policies of such great value and importance. In this book readers will find diverse articles with the views of experts in international relations, as well as opinions and ideas from historical, political and social analyses. I want to express my gratitude to the authors that collaborated with their research so that this book may become an obligatory reference on the subject that we call, in a brief way: The Question of Malvinas. Besides, the bilingual nature of this work enlarges its significance. This will allow researchers, diplomats and journalists from all around the world to receive a serious and founded contribution dealing with diverse aspects of Argentine national interests in Antarctica and the South Atlantic area. Finally, I would like to remark the work and dedication of the Library of the National Congress, to thank the General Coordination Directorate which got involved in the project from the very beginning, the Planning and Modernization Directorate from which we always received selfless solutions, the Translations Directorate for its cooperation and its wide research work, and also the Subdirectorate of Publications for allowing this work to come true. To all of them and to each one in particular, thank you very much.
Lic. Agustn M. Romero

Secretary of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee The Question of Malvinas
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Alfredo Atanasof Malvinas: The Big Challenge of the Argentine Congress in the Bicentennial Year
Alfredo Atanasof *
Malvinas: The Big Challenge of the Argentine Congress in the Year of the Bicentennial
Eric Hobsbawm, recognised worldwide as one of the most important XX Century historians pointed out in his autobiography Interesting Times that Latin America had made forceful sense of what at first glance seemed impossible, allowing what counterfactual speculations cannot achieve, to offer a true array of solutions to the historical situation. The Question of Malvinas is a historical situation for the Argentine Republic starting on 2 January 1833 when frigate Clio forced gunboat Sarand to leave the islands -which did not belong to anybody- and announced that the British flag would replace the Argentine one on the following day. Jos Mara Pinedo protested but he could not resist a hugely superior force. The British official history states that the transfer of control was by persuasion, even though later on it was asserted that sending war ships to the islands was aimed at reaffirming British sovereignty over some islands that did not belong to anybody. This certainly confirmed that the region was taken by force from its former and true owner, Argentina, which, from then onwards, systematically objected to and protested against this clearly colonialist action.
* National Deputy, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (2010-2012).
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Argentinas immediate protest regarding the use of force for the clearly illegal occupation of part of our national territory, was also the beginning of the first state policy of our nation, which was implemented under different forms and to different extents, maintaining at all times- the legitimate purpose of recovering the islands. As regards relative standpoints in international diplomacy, this policy bore fruit, since the United Kingdom faced increasing difficulties to prove its historical and legal arguments before the different international organizations where the case was taken, and the British public opinion became gradually disinterested in the subject. The economic cost of supporting the islands at the beginning of the 80s started to have a negative influence on different sectors of British policy, which began to consider this cost as senseless expenditures. In terms of real policy, the implementation of our state policy regarding the recovery of the islands, had brought them to a significantly closer position, and the informal process to transfer responsibilities regarding communication, supplies and services related to the islands, continued to develop slowly but inexorably within the Argentine Republic. However, in 1982, the decision of the military government that ruled our country to subordinate our historical state policy to the needs of the domestic political situation in a desperate attempt to stay in power, hiding behind a 149-year claim, making a strong appeal to patriotism and basing their actions on the absolute historical validity and legality of the claim while invoking international law and taking the case to all international organizations gave the British the possibility to dramatically modify the scenario where reason was superseded by force. While Sir Winston Churchill used the phrase Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few to refer to R.A.F. pilots and illustrate the British triumph in the Battle of England, during the Second World War, we could say that, in our long-standing struggle to recover the islands, Never have so few (the military dictatorship) done so much harm. With the advent of democracy in 1983 and the full operation of
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institutions, we resumed -under different circumstances- our original strategy: a state policy for Malvinas. More than twenty five years of uninterrupted democracy allow us to be a fully integrated nation, respected for the legitimacy of our government in the international community. We exclusively resort to arguments based on historical facts and international law, using dialogue and negotiations with Great Britain as the only way to settle the dispute. This allows us to work our way uphill, obtaining new statements and resolutions supporting our stance at international organizations. After 1982, the United Kingdom decisively advanced a policy of unilateral facts, systematically refusing to establish any dialogue with Argentina if it involved the issue of sovereignty or actions modifying the status quo of the dispute. It started by establishing an exclusion zone and widening their so-called exclusive exploitation rights in the Argentine Sea. This was followed by an indiscriminate sale of fishing licenses and, after trying to hold joint conversations on the subject of oil exploration in the 90s, the United Kingdom decided to start hydrocarbon search operations in February 2010 by contracting an offshore platform belonging to Black Rock consortium, directly or indirectly linked to Borders & Southern, Desire Petroleum, Falkland Oil & Gas and Rockhopper Exploration. Argentina replied immediately by filing a whole set of protests before international fora, and even expressed its concern to Great Britains main historical ally, the United States of America, whose Secretary of State urged both parties to resume dialogue and declared that the United States was absolutely neutral in the dispute. What remains true is that if we take the facts into account, the British policy for the Islands seems to be strongly aimed at turning them into an attractive area for economic exploitation that may appeal to different multinationals, dragging interests and companies from different countries, and at supporting and providing economic feasibility to the contingency plan to which the British will resort once they find it impossible to uphold their rights over Malvinas: the self-determination of the Islanders.
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Let us now discuss the great challenge of the Argentine Parliament, since, in relation to a state policy, it is Parliament that must represent all political expressions, and design policies to be implemented by different administrations of the Executive Power, with the tactics they deem more convenient. We have the responsibility of thinking new policies because Great Britain is at ease with the current state of affairs: they act, we protest. So we are urged to revert this operational logic once and for all. All great western or eastern strategy manuals include, in different ways, the concept that knowing an opponent is the key to anticipating its acts. That is why we cite Churchill again:...The best plan of acquiring flexibility is to have three or four plans for all the possible contingencies, all worked out with the utmost detail. Then it is much easier to switch from one to the other as and where the cat jumps. Today the problem we are faced with is halting British intentions to explore and eventually exploit hydrocarbons in our Islands, but, while addressing what is urgent, we must not lose sight of the current strategic view of the conflict: they have the initiative and we act accordingly. We should recover the initiative: this is our task, which requires constant work, perseverance, creativity, boldness and patience. Therefore, I believe that the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee goes along these lines of thinking, as a key instrument to generate ideas, studies, and theses to support the formulation of policies that may materialize our legitimate claims over Malvinas and the South Atlantic Islands.
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Ruperto Godoy Defending Argentine interests in the South Atlantic Area
Ruperto Godoy *
Defending Argentine interests in the South Atlantic Area
I am very pleased, as Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Deputies and as Chairman of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee to present this book, entitled The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial. It has been some time now since we started working with a strong intent to prepare, within the context of the Argentine National Congress, a book with deep political and academic value addressing different topics related to our strategic interests in the South Atlantic Area. This work is intended to reflect the plurality of ideas, approaches and political opinions regarding the Question of Malvinas, vindicating, at all times, the lawful rights of the Argentine Republic in the dispute about the sovereignty over the Islands and adjoining Southern maritime areas. That is why at the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee we have been working with respect for the interdisciplinary spirit and political plurality, in order to help our country to achieve the aim of the First Transitional Provision of the Argentine Constitution: to recover sovereignty over Malvinas Islands. The Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee is an example
* National Deputy for the Province of San Juan 2007-2011.
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that, starting from different political views, it is possible to pursue a common objective, and provide that goal with enough significance to turn it into a national cause or a State issue. The national deputies that are members of the Observatory belong to the diverse political parties that are represented in the lower house, however each one has made his contribution so that this space fulfills their purposes, overcoming internal problems or struggles. I believe that this is an achievement that should be imitated in other political instances and initiatives. Therefore, the ideas and opinions stated in this work belong to their authors and do not imply support or agreement by the rest of the politicians and academics of the Institution. At the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee we believe that the unilateral measures adopted by the United Kingdom are not consistent with what has been resolved at the United Nations. Moreover, we demand that the sovereignty dispute between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland about Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and adjoining maritime areas be resolved as soon as possible, according to the United Nations resolutions and the declarations of the Organization of American States, the MERCOSUR and other regional and multilateral fora. At the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee we bear in mind that the British intent to consider Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands as countries and territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (to be called Treaty on European Union) and the EU Overseas Association Decision can be applied, is inconsistent with the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic to a sovereignty dispute over said archipelagos. Likewise, we share with all MERCOSUR member countries the vision of a common ideal: a Latin America free from colonialism. The British dominion of the Malvinas Islands and adjoining waters is an anachronism that must cease immediately. For the last two years, we have been working to achieve the clearly designed purpose of including the subject of Malvinas Islands in different aspects and levels of the social, academic and political life of our country. In this
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context, I would like to mention, among others, the following activities: PARTICIPATION OF THE OBSERVATORY IN THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE The Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee participated in the 9th National Congress of Political Science with a panel called Argentine strategic interests in the South Atlantic Area. The Congress was held in the city of Santa Fe, on August 19-22, 2009, and was attended by more than 2,000 students from all the country, and academics and lecturers from all over the continent. DAY OF THE REAFFIRMATION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER MALVINAS ISLANDS A historic event, organized by the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee, took place at the Delia Parodi Hall of the National Congress on June 10, 2009. Lic. Agustn Romero, Secretary of the Parliamentary Observatory, welcomed the audience. The lecturers invited by the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee included Argentinas ViceMinister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Victorio Taccetti; the First Vicepresident of the House of Deputies, National Deputy Patricia Vaca Narvaja; National Deputy Rosana Bertone (Province of Tierra del Fuego); and PhD. Lilian del Castillo, scholar member of the Observatory. ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED BY THE OBSERVATORY AT THE PROVINCE OF TIERRA DEL FUEGO On May 21, 2009, Lic. Agustn M. Romero, Secretary of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee was welcomed to the city of Ushuaia, among others, by its Major Mr. Sciurano, by the President of the Ushuaia Union of Malvinas War Veterans, Ramn Lpez, and by Colonel Guillermo Estvez, in charge of the naval base of the city. During the meetings, different issues about Malvinas Islands were analyzed and future cooperation projects were exchanged.
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THE OBSERVATORY AT THE 2009 BOOK FAIR The Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee was presented for the first time at the 35th Buenos Aires International Book Fair. The Observatory was present through a round table, coordinated by the Observatory Secretary, Agustn M. Romero. The speakers at the round table were: myself, as Chairman of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee; Deputy Luciano Fabris; Ambassador Eduardo Airaldi, General Director of the Malvinas and South Atlantic Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, Frida Armas, Coordinator of the Committee on Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf (COPLA, by its Spanish acronym). REAFFIRMATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AT ANTARCTICA On March 5, 2009, at the Antarctic Base Frei, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Honorable House of Deputies of the Nation and its Chilean counterpart, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Interparliamentary Issues and Latin American Integration, prepared a joint declaration within the context of the First Antarctic Parliamentary Meeting. RECOGNITION OF THE OBSERVATORY TO MERCOSUR MEMBER COUNTRIES On November 17, 2009, the Delia Parodi Hall of the National Congress was the venue for a public recognition to MERCOSUR full and associate member countries for supporting the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute over Malvinas Islands. Attendees to this event included: the National Minister of Education, Alberto Sileoni; the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Victorio Taccetti; the Secretary of International Affairs, Alfredo Forti, on behalf of the Minister of Defense Nilda Garr; the first Vice-president of the House of Deputies, Patricia Vaca Narvaja; national legislators of different parties; and representatives of different civil organizations.
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THE QUESTION OF MALVINAS NEW VIEWS AND STRATEGIES ABOUT THE CONFLICT WITH GREAT BRITAIN On April 15, 2010 a seminar was held at the National Congress, where Ambassador Jos Taccetti, Argentine Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered the opening lecture, which was followed by three round tables on strategic topics related to the South Atlantic Area and the policy of Great Britain, among others subjects. Prestigious academics lectured the audience, which included national deputies, representatives of different political parties, national and provincial authorities, and representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in our country. Finally, I would like to remark that at the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee this distinction was an inspiration to start recognizing people, institutions, non-governmental organizations, universities, study centers, among others, which have proved, in different ways, their commitment and determination in favor of Argentine rights over Malvinas Islands and our interests in the South Atlantic Area. To keep in touch with the Observatory: website: www.cuestionmalvinas.gov.ar Mail address: observatoriomalvinas@hcdn.gov.ar Telephones: (54) 11 6310-7560 / 4384-8483
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Jorge Taiana The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial
Jorge Taiana *
In 2010 we will commemorate the Bicentennial of the Argentine Nation. It is a good opportunity to reaffirm our sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and adjoining maritime areas. This is a special occasion to remember that since the beginning of our life as an independent nation, the first governments of the Provincias Unidas del Ro de la Plata took the Malvinas Islands into account in different administrative acts, and considered them as part of the Argentine territory that was being formed, inherited from Spain under the 1810 principle of uti possidetis juris. Likewise, next year it will be the 190th anniversary of the public act whereby Navy Officer David Jewett took possession of Malvinas Islands at Puerto Soledad, on behalf of the Provincias Unidas del Ro de la Plata. This act did not bring about any official comments by the United Kingdom during the process of recognition of the Argentine Nation that concluded with the signature of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in 1825. During the 1820s, Argentine governments took different sovereignty
* Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship 2005-2010.
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actions over Malvinas Islands, such as the appointment of governors, enactment of laws on fishing resources, and granting of territorial concessions. It is also worth mentioning that this year, a special series of post stamps of the Argentine Postal Service was issued to commemorate the 180th anniversary of the promulgation by the Argentine government of the decree that established the Political and Military Commandery of Malvinas on June 10, 1829. One hundred and seventy-six years have already passed since the British illegally usurped part of the Argentine national territory. On January 3, 1833, the United Kingdom interrupted the continued and pacific sovereignty of the Argentine Republic over the archipelago when it occupied the islands by force. The United Kingdom expelled the Argentine population and authorities that were settled there, and replaced them with a colonial government and British population. Argentina immediately protested against said act of force and has continued to assert its sovereign rights and to claim the restitution of the Islands since then. The international community has recognized the legitimacy of the Argentine claim. The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) in 1965 recognizing the existence of a sovereignty dispute regarding the Question of Malvinas Islands, defined it as a type of colonialism, and requested both parties to the controversy to resume bilateral negotiations as soon as possible in order to find a peaceful and final solution to the dispute. Since then, all resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, as well as other international, regional and interregional fora, have repeated said request. Argentina has repeatedly shown its willingness to engage in constructive, sincere and open dialogue to improve bilateral cooperation, especially through temporary understandings under the sovereignty formula, provided that cooperation on practical aspects related with the illegally occupied territories contributes to create an appropriate context to resume sovereignty negotiations. However, this purpose has not been achieved and it has been deeply
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Jorge Taiana The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial
affected by the British unwillingness to face the issue of sovereignty under the terms of United Nations resolutions, and by continued British unilateral actions related to the dispute, which not only violate the letter and spirit of said understandings but also contradict the United Nations call under General Assembly Resolution 31/49 (1976) - to abstain from introducing unilateral modifications to the matter while the Islands remain involved in the process recommended in the relevant resolutions. Notwithstanding all the above, the Argentine government will continue to repeat, in all multilateral fora and bilateral meetings, its permanent will to resume bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom as soon as possible, in order to find a peaceful and final solution to the sovereignty dispute, according to the call of the international community and the universal desire for a world free from colonialism.
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Nilda Garr The Question of Malvinas from the National Defense perspective
Nilda Garr *
The Question of Malvinas from the National Defense perspective
The defeat at the Malvinas War in 1982 not only unveiled the professional incompetence of the military dictatorship but also, and above all, revealed the terrible danger entailed by a simplistic reading of international dynamics, if interpreted through wrong strategic estimates. From the specific view of National Defense, of the Defense System, in general, and of the Military Instrument, in particular, it can be asserted that the frustrating experience of the Malvinas war evidenced the most unacceptable deficiencies and inconsistencies in Defense Strategy. It also proved the absence of the most basic professional capacity of military leaders, which was not surpassed by those who courageously gave their lives for their country. Indeed, one of the reasons for the disastrous military campaign, as was admitted in the famous Rattenbach Report, was the lack of responsibility with which such a military power (ranking second in NATO) was confronted, without meeting the necessary technical and professional conditions, both in terms of organization and military functioning and equipment. The return to democracy in 1983 and the reinstatement of civil control over the military under Law 23554 on National Defense excluded the military from the inappropriate roles they had been
* Former Minister of Defense 2005-2010.
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playing in domestic and foreign policy, reallocating the leadership of the political decision-making process to the authorities legitimately elected by the people. The process of regional integration, in turn, put an end to conflict hypotheses with neighboring countries, opening up a space to reconsider National Defense policies beyond the traditional assumptions of threats to territorial integrity, as well as to establish a regional and international context that was radically different from that of the late 80s. In the 90s, the insertion of Argentina into the world was thought in terms of the policy of economic liberalization, under a country model that followed the grounds of the so-called Washington Consensus. Consequently, National Defense was assigned a role determined by its alignment with the foreign policy of United States, the single global superpower after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse of this country model during the 2001-2002 crisis also evidenced the changing character of the strategy of international insertion of the country in the last decade of the 20th century, as well as the deadlock of the military reform that had started with democracy. The economic recovery that started in 2003 made it necessary to introduce structural reforms in the national policy, in accordance with social transformations in the country and changes in the international context. The regulation of the Law on Defense and the modernization process of the Armed Forces are consistent with these reforms. THE LESSONS OF MALVINAS Almost thirty years after the painful event of Malvinas, and in the year of the Bicentennial, we witness a change of paradigm as regards our National Defense. The efficient political leadership of National Defense affairs, as well as the ongoing modernization process of our defense system, irrefutably prove the existence of this change. The Malvinas military experience contrasts with the current progress of our Defense System, which -under precise and explicit political directives and parameters- now conforms to the paradigm of a modern Military, with effectively integrated Armed Forces through joint actions, joint military plans, a joint military doctrine, and joint training and
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education. These are sine qua non requirements for the fulfillment of the missions assigned to our Armed Forces, in particular, for the fulfillment of its raison dtre: the Defense of the Nation. The traumatic experience of the Malvinas War taught us several lessons that have been fully implemented in the above mentioned modernization process. As admitted in Decree 727/2006, regulating the Law on Defense, the single conventional war experience of our country during the 20th century duly and undoubtedly proved the relevance of strategic planning and joint military actions. In that context, the consolidation of the governmental institutional system as regards defense entails the final organic articulation of its parts, each of which must be exclusively devoted to performing the functions that have led to its creation. Along these lines, the establishment of the National Defense Council (CODENA, by its Spanish acronym) -the main assistance and advisory body to the President of the Nation as regards the analysis of the basic guidelines of the national defense policy, through the design and preparation of reports, assessments, opinions and/or projects to determine potential risk situations that may affect sovereignty and territorial integrity- is a key institutional aspect of the defense system, as provided for by lawmakers at the time of creating the system. The Ministry of Defense has fully accepted the role of permanent working body of said Council, through the Secretariat of the National Defense Council (SECODENA, by its Spanish acronym), which operates within it, thus ensuring continuity and systematization when addressing issues falling under the jurisdiction of said Council. Within the context of the Bicentennial, Argentina is faced with the challenge of defining a strategic vision for the 21th Century. In this sense, the government of Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner has given a significant step forward with Decree 1714/2009, which approves the Directive on the National Defense Policy. The Question of Malvinas Islands is included in said Directive. In fact, after recalling that the British illegal usurpation of our territory persists as a colonial enclave, it states that the Defense Policy of the Argentine Republic ratifies its legitimate and non-prescribing sovereignty over the MALVINAS,
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GEORGIAS DEL SUR AND SANDWICH DEL SUR ISLANDS, as well as the corresponding maritime and insular areas, since they form part of the national territory. Likewise, it also states that the recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, according to the principles of international law, are a permanent and unwaivable goal of the Argentine people: in this regard, it must be highlighted that the Argentine Government has focused on resuming sovereignty negotiations by insisting, before international and regional organizations and the international community as a whole, on calling the United Kingdom to resume negotiations, under the terms of resolutions and declarations of the United Nations Organization and the Organization of American States. In this context, the Argentine Republic rejects and objects to British unilateral actions in the disputed area, since they contradict the provisional understandings under the sovereignty formula and the United Nations resolutions urging both parties to resume negotiations aimed at solving the sovereignty dispute, especially UN General Assembly Resolution 31/49, which urges the parties to abstain from introducing unilateral modifications to the matter while the Islands remain involved in the process recommended by the UNO in its resolutions on the Question of Malvinas. In this sense, it must be taken into account that the United Kingdom intends to enlarge its alleged territorial sovereignty over the MALVINAS, GEORGIAS DEL SUR AND SANDWICH DEL SUR ISLANDS and over the Antarctic Region to three hundred and fifty (350) sea miles, based on Article 76 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. On the other hand, the lack of joint action and logistics by naval, air and land forces during the South Atlantic conflict was another painful show of inefficiency that we cannot allow to happen again. Therefore, since the Law of Defense was regulated, the institutional reorganization of the defense system assigned a vital role to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (EMCO, by its Spanish acronym), which is the highest body providing military assistance and advice to the President of the Nation, and which is responsible for military strategic planning. It is the Joint Chiefs of Staff who must lead the process of planning,
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the definition of a doctrine and the establishment of training methods that make it possible to integrate forces and attain the maximum operational capacity of the military. THE MALVINAS SITUATION TODAY AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS ON DEFENSE MATTERS Unfortunately, the innumerable calls by the international community to resume bilateral talks to solve the sovereignty dispute over Malvinas Islands have been systematically ignored by the United Kingdom. Even worse is the succession of British unilateral actions regarding fishing and oil exploration licenses, which, among other reasons, led the Argentine government to terminate as from March 27, 2007the Joint Argentine-British Declaration of September 27, 1995. Said Declaration had been signed under the sovereignty safeguard formula, and dealt with Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic, regarding hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the area subject to the sovereignty dispute. Likewise, the permanent British military deployment on the Islands is also regrettable, including the introduction of sophisticated military equipment such as four superjet Typhoon in 2009-, contrary to UN General Assembly Resolution 31/49, which urges both parties to the sovereignty dispute over Malvinas Islands not to make unilateral modifications in the situation. As stated in the protest letter submitted by the Argentine government at that time, this new deployment emphasizes the continued British military presence on Argentine land and maritime spaces. The illegitimate British occupation of our territory and especially the military presence continue to be repeatedly rejected by the Argentine Republic. But said military presence, comprising one of the largest contingents of British troops outside the United Kingdom, goes against the Argentine goal -shared with other countries of the region- of keeping South America and the South Atlantic Sea as a peaceful region. Recent multilateral pronouncements ratify this idea, particularly those that have been issued within the context of the South American Defense Council. Also at said Council, more precisely during the last meeting of
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the Council executive layer, held in Quito in January 2010, where discussions focused on the procedures to enforce promotion, reliability and security measures agreed by member countries of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, by its Spanish acronym), the Argentine delegation -led by the Defense Ministry- encouraged and obtained consensus to include an express reference to the Question of Malvinas, in the clause dealing with the GUARANTEE TO PRESERVE SOUTH AMERICA AS AN AREA FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO USE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITH PEACEFUL PURPOSES ONLY. Said clause read as follows: UNASUR member countries, in fulfillment of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and of other conventions on the subject, pledge to preserve South America as an area free of nuclear weapons and guarantee that nuclear technology will be used with peaceful purposes only. In compliance with the above, said member countries shall: - Guarantee that the nuclear facilities and materials under their jurisdictions will be used with peaceful purposes only and, pledge to refrain from carrying out, fostering or authorizing, directly or indirectly, the use, manufacturing, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon, as well as from participating in said activities in any way whatsoever. - Pledge to prohibit and prevent in their territories the use, storing, installation, building, or any other form of possession of nuclear weapons. UNASUR member countries shall adopt the necessary measures to demand respect and compliance with this commitment by other States, especially States Possessing Nuclear Weapons, including the collective request for them to withdraw the Interpretive Declarations to Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thus guaranteeing that the territories of UNASUR Member Countries, including those under dispute, like Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands, are preserved as areas free from nuclear weapons.
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Argentina makes every effort to assert the national position on the islands which, following the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, includes a protest before the European Union in each bilateral or multilateral statement, especially when the counterpart supports said statement. Thus, for example, in the recent Argentine-Brazilian Joint Presidential Declaration (Brasilia, November 18, 2009), both presidents expressed their concern for the presence in the region of military bases of extra-regional powers. This situation is incompatible with the principles of respect for sovereignty and for territorial integrity of the States within the region. The unilateral actions of the United Kingdom contradict the Madrid agreements. Following the Joint 1989-1990 Madrid Declarations signed with the United Kingdom, different temporary understandings on practical matters related to the South Atlantic area were reached under the sovereignty safeguard formula, through several joint declarations and exchanges of notes. These documents refer to measures to encourage mutual trust in military matters to avoid incidents; preservation of fishing resources; hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation; air and maritime communications between the Argentine continental territory and the islands; access to Argentine passport holders to the islands; building of a monument for the Argentine fallen in the 1982 Malvinas war; exchange of information on the outer limits of the continental shelf; preparation of a feasibility study on demining the Malvinas Islands and an analysis of their toponymy. Said understandings are provisional, dealing with the creation of a modus vivendi for the area under dispute and intended to generate the conditions to resume sovereignty negotiations. But the systematic denial of the United Kingdom, added to the reluctance to continue holding meetings of the forum where all issues related to disputed territories must be discussed (the South Atlantic Working Group - SAWG), have hindered the development of a cooperation agenda in defense. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense, in full coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has refused to resume negotiations about cooperation in defense the last round was held in December 2006 until SAWG meetings are restored to normal.
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CONCLUSION As established in our National Constitution, the Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and non-prescribing sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and over the corresponding maritime and insular zones, since they form an integral part of the national territory. The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respecting the way of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law, are a permanent and unwaivable goal of the Argentine people. In this context, the national defense policy is based on a strictly defensive strategy, intended to contribute to peace and international security, together with other countries of the region and friendly nations, within the framework of the United Nations. Therefore, we expect the United Kingdom to review its unilateral position on its illegitimate presence in the Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur Islands, and to accede to dialogue as requested by our country and the international community, through the institutional channels timely agreed upon, in order to unfailingly ensure peace and stability in the American South Atlantic Area.
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Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy
Alberto Sileoni *
Malvinas as an educational policy
INTRODUCTION Malvinas Islands represent one of those memories of pride and pain. They are the islands usurped by Great Britain in 1833, the memory of teachers saying that they are Argentine, the political struggles generated by them, the war fought in the context of the State terrorism, the pain for victims, the social difficulties related to the protection of Malvinas war veterans- And, above all, they represent the unbearable fact of the still present colonialism and the persistence of the unwaivable claim of the Argentine sovereignty on that territory. In the year of the Bicentennial we know that the Question of Malvinas, apart from being associated to a diplomatic question, raises a reflection on our history and on ourselves. The complexity of this subject was and still is present in the design of the educational policies that we have been developing since 2003. How to teach the subject of Malvinas? How to speak about the Argentine sovereignty and, at the same time, tell the story of the 1982 war carried out by the last military dictatorship? How to analyze the specific episode of the war without forgetting that it is a cause that comes from the bottom of the national history? How to transmit,
* Former Minister of Education of the Nation 2009-2011
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through Malvinas, the defense of our properties and the love for our homeland? The new National Education Act establishes that the subject must be present in the classrooms of the whole country with all its complexity. In its section 92, it commits the national Government and the provincial ministries to support, through the teaching of the Argentine rights, the sovereignty claim of our country over Malvinas islands and other archipelagos of the South Atlantic. In the same section, the question is associated to the promotion of teaching of recent history as a mechanism to consolidate a society respectful of democracy and human rights. In this way, the educational space adds to the first temporary provision of the National Constitution, which establishes that: The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and nonprescribing sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and over the corresponding maritime and insular zones, as they are an integral part of the National territory. The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respectful of the way of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law, are a permanent and unwaivable goal of the Argentine people. From the Ministry of Education of the Nation we propose different actions -production of materials, training, inclusion in the curricula design- in order to promote the reflection on this subject, as a possibility of recognizing us as a part of the national history, rich in regional shades and contrasts, and in agreements and disagreements. A history that is ours even though it still lacks a synthesis, because discussions are still open as well as the injuries caused by a past full of violence and frustrations, but also of collective hopes and dreams. In this section we propose to briefly review two aspects: 1- The Question of Malvinas in the Argentine school, the ways in which Malvinas was taught until 1982. 2- The Question of Malvinas in the present educational agenda, the submission of some proposals about Malvinas developed by the Ministry of Education of the Nation from 2003 up to now, within the framework of its educational policies about the recent past.
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1. THE QUESTION OF MALVINAS IN THE ARGENTINE SCHOOL During the twentieth century, the permanent argentine claims made before different international agencies constituted what is known as the Question of Malvinas, that is: the diplomatic, historical and legal context that sustains the position of our country. It is a process that went through different instances and that, at present, faces unprecedented challenges that are the product of the new world scenario. The President of the Nation, Cristina Fernndez, has categorically reaffirmed the permanent and unwaivable nature of the legitimate will of the Argentine Republic to recover, by pacific means, the exercise of sovereignty over Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime spaces. In the speech she gave at the inauguration ceremony on December 10, 2007 at the National Congress before the Legislative Assembly, she reaffirmed once more, our unwaivable and irrevocable claim to sovereignty over our Malvinas Islands, where there is a situation of colonial enclave denounced before the United Nations and that it is time to comply once more with the mandate of those United Nations of which we are part. At the same time, the Argentine Government reaffirms the respect for the islanders way of life guaranteed by the National Constitution and the commitment to consider their interests. The display of this dimension, the diplomatic question, was accompanied throughout our history by the development of the Question of Malvinas, that is to say, the strong presence of the archipelago and the claim for sovereignty in a wide and varied range of political, cultural and social forces. The usurpation of Malvinas Islands on January 3, 1833 was in different moments a symbol of several things: of the British imperialism, of the Creole resistance embodied in the gaucho Rivero, of the possibility always expected- of a national accomplishment. That process had several remarkable moments, from the school discipline that moved us to write in the blackboard that Malvinas Islands were, are and shall be Argentine, to the Condor Operation led by a group of young Peronists in 1966, during the dictatorship of Juan Carlos Ongana, going through the massive publishing of the work of Paul Groussac distributed due to the decision of the Socialist Senator Alfredo Palacios.
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Up to April 2, 1982 the public school had a privileged role in that process. It taught and transmitted the history of Malvinas, through a disciplinary approach mainly in the interrelation between the teaching of History and Geography- and through a series of rituals (commemorations, national anthems, acts, etc.) which proposed to act the homeland in the framework of school. The classrooms were places of construction and, at the same time, echo boxes of the national feeling generated by the islands. Education had a main role, among other things, because of the intimate and long-standing nature of the relationship between public school and national causes. In this sense, it may be interesting to review some documentary and testimonial sources that allow us to perceive that presence, which is not strain free. For example, in 1964, during the government of Arturo Illia when in the cultural and political field, a new structure of sensitivity characterized by nationalism, left ideas and Peronism review was beginning to appear a note addressed to rectors and headmasters of educational institutions proposed to teach the subject of Malvinas with an anti-imperialistic tone. During History, Geography, Civic Instruction and Democratic Education classes it was recommended to devote 10 minutes to read the news about the subject. The note said: I have the pleasure of addressing to that Rector/ Headmaster Office to remind you that next September 8, at the Meeting of the 24, the future of our Malvinas Islands shall be considered. The Representatives of the foreign powers, at that act, shall consider the problems inherent to colonialism and peoples self-determination and, in that agenda, the Malvinas Islands shall be included in the British colonies. The Argentine Republic can not and must not accept this decision because Malvinas Islands are a piece of its territory that was seized by force (.). ). Our country must not spare efforts to prevent the mentioned purpose and to achieve the final recovery of its islands. For this purpose, apart from every effort made by our Government in pursuit of this achievement, it is very important due to the psychological force of this action- to explain to the students of the educational institutions of the country the vicissitudes that the nation is experiencing, under the threat of the definite loss of a piece of its soil.
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The Argentine military dictatorship (1976-1983) gave a new and controversial meaning to the cause of Malvinas. Between April 2 and June 14, 1982, the Argentine Republic had a military confrontation with Great Britain for the sovereignty of the islands. A disembarkation force subdued the British garrison and raised the national flag that waived in the islands until the British forces, in turn, defeated the Argentine troops and reestablished the colonial situation. The defeat in that conflict was, undoubtedly, one of the facts that forced the so-called Process of National Organization to leave the power and opened a space for the transition to democracy. Malvinas war was a critical question in a diplomatic conflict that dated from more than a century and a half and that emerged from the plundering of a part of the Argentine national territory by an imperialist power. When the Argentine military dictatorship disembarked in the islands it was appealing to a national feeling deeply rooted in the culture and politics. It did so to produce an action of force that ended up with a humiliating defeat and, above all, with the loss of hundreds of lives destroyed by a corrupt government. But, undoubtedly, the intimate imbrications between the dictatorship and a vindication that was considered fair by society radically modified the circulation way of Malvinas cause. Was it possible to go on speaking about Malvinas in the same way? How to incorporate to that speech the pain for the victims and the defeat in the war? What could be said about the social behavior? How to sustain a national speech when Malvinas marks were unequally printed in the national territory? How to invoke the same national past that the perpetrators of the State Terrorism had hoisted? A teacher of Santiago del Estero province, whose testimony was taken by the Program Education and Memory of the Ministry of Education in one of its training campaigns, synthesized these dilemmas in her own experience of life: To speak about Malvinas causes pain. I know that many people may not understand what I want to express because I am one of those Argentine persons who suffered in the flesh that paradox of what the construction of the national being meant, that feeling that led us to define the meaning of homeland
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during the seventies. And I say in the flesh because I was educated in a school system in which the idea of the homeland heroes was instilled in us by means of symbols, virtual signs where the idea of the Malvinas Islands are Argentine entered my life from the first grade. I still remember Miss Rosa telling us the story as a tale about Gaucho Rivero. And afterwards the disappointment of the defeat in the war. We went from the vigorous imperialism of April 2 to the pain of the surrender, which leaves a mark when one is a teenager and thinks that fair causes must win as it happens in children tales. And later on the silence. In 1982, more than seven out of ten Argentinians who fought in Malvinas were the children of a nation educated in the public system, the same one described by the testimony. They were complying with the civic duty of the compulsory military service. They were mainly young men between 18 and 20 years old that came from the most diverse places of the Republic, some descended from the original peoples, others from immigrants, they had different ideologies and religions and shared the common situation of the war. They faced the possibility of death under very hard environmental conditions because they had learnt to do it in the name of an idea called homeland. The symbol of the islands concentrates two elements of deep and controversial meanings: on one hand, those elements linked to the national and Latin American identity and, on the other hand, the debates generated by the period of the military dictatorship and the previous years where Malvinas war is one of the most moving and at the same time frustrating episodes. That is why, perhaps, it has been so difficult, after the defeat, to say an official word about Malvinas. However, every April 2, the force of the event emerges with power in the small communities that make up each school. As in other Argentine episodes, those who kept its memory alive, struggling at the same time against generalizations and simplifications and, above all, against forgetfulness, were the most affected by the war. 2. MALVINAS IN THE PRESENT EDUCATIONAL AGENDA To combat the silence that saddens the teacher of Santiago del Estero,
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to understand the force of the event that emerges every April 2, to keep alive the memory of those who died in Malvinas and, above all, to think again in the way of building a nation that has justice as its horizon, since 2003 the educational policies of the Ministry of Education of the Nation aimed at teaching the subject of Malvinas with a strictness that did not exist since the war of 1982. Here we want to remark the main actions undertaken to transmit the subject of Malvinas to the new generations in the framework of school, mainly developed since the enactment of the new Act on National Education but with more emphasis since the thirtieth anniversary of the military coup. The Program Education and Memory, created on the thirtieth anniversary of the last military coup, had as one of its central themes the subject of Malvinas, under the title Malvinas war: Senses in conflict. According to this conflict, it displayed its work lines: - the production of material for the different educational levels, - the elaboration of specific pedagogical strategies, - the inclusion of the subject in the curricular design, - the call for the production of investigations on the local marks of memory in the different regions of the country, - the teachers training. The Ministry of Education produced, distributed and used as a basis for the teachers training meetings different materials elaborated by Education and Memory. The first one, published for the 25 anniversary of the war, was a school poster based on a letter sent from the islands in 1982, by the teacher-soldier Julio Cao, who died in combat. It is a highly emotional text that Cao sends to the headmistress of his school and that includes a passage addressed to her pupils of third grade. We have had no time to say good-bye and this has worried me many nights here in Malvinas, where I am complying with my duty as a soldier: to defend our flag, he says in the passage addressed to the children. He dares to confess to the headmistress that during the attacks, the soldiers entrust themselves to God and wait. I do not know if I trembled from cold or fear, but I trembled, he writes.
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Throughout the text, Julio Cao expresses without exaltation but firmly what means the defense of the homeland for him: a duty with the others and a service to the others, feelings that combine the experiences and limitations of every man: cold, fear, anxiety. This production was followed by two books published during 2009: Pensar Malvinas. Una seleccin de fuentes documentales, testimoniales, ficcionales y fotogrficas para trabajar en el aula y Soldados, a book of poems written by the veteran Gustavo Caso Rosendi that was published together with a handbook for the teacher. Both materials aim at achieving one of the purposes of the Act on National Education mentioned at the beginning of this article, which commits the National Government to sustain the teaching of the Argentine sovereignty over Malvinas Islands and the other archipelago of the South Atlantic and, at the same time, link it with the transmission of the recent history as a mechanism to consolidate a society respectful of democracy and human rights. I did not go to the war thinking about Galtieri but about San Martn, says a veteran mentioned in one of the chapters of Pensar Malvinas. I do not know why on earth/ I am writing/ with this blood that is so strange/ and so overwhelmingly mine, writes Gustavo Caso Rosendi in Soldados. The testimony and the poetic word concentrate some of the debates that the Ministry considers essential for the teaching of the Question of Malvinas. What place did the islands occupied in the national imagination? Why was the Malvinas cause built as a metaphor of the nation? Which where the school strategies to transmit these ideas? What happened when the military dictatorship appealed to that image to call for a war? What symbolic battles were fought after 1982 to institute Malvinas memories? What remained of that metaphor of life in common after the experience of the State terrorism? What regional differences appeared at the time of appropriating Malvinas experience? What can be said to the new generations about the subjects contained in these questions? What can be done with this legacy from school? The book La Cuestin Malvinas en el marco del Bicentenario (The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial) also includes as an
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innovation two research works made by teacher training students of Corrientes province, one of Corrientes Capital City and the other of Monte Caseros. In both cases, the generational and the territorial belonging afford a new point of view about the war, the dictatorship, the veterans and the role of the school. The consideration of these local differences was and still is- one of the purposes of this Ministry since, apart from bequeathing a past with sense to new generations, aims at contributing to the building of a national memory. Finally, another essential concern of the Program was the need to find the most efficient ways to teach those subjects preventing the repetition from drying the story. For this purpose, it was decided to work with images both photographs and films-, because these ones, always polysemous, represent a powerful resource to answer the questions that new generations may ask from their present concerns. 3. FINAL WORDS We have reviewed the place of Malvinas at the Argentine school, we have seen how the experience of the State terrorism radically modified the school aspiration of transmitting a past and we have pointed out which are the actions undertaken by this Ministry in order to reestablish the social ties and formulate again a national speech. We think that more than a quarter of a century after the war, we have to be able to reflect on that episode, as the best way to pay homage to those who fought there, their families, their mates and our dead. Popular sovereignty is, too, the space of memory where we treasure what we want to remember, the faces and careers we decide to honor, the commitments we try to sustain, even when we know that this effort will mean a hard, long, difficult and uncertain task. We hope that our educational policies contribute to support the awareness of the Argentine rights on Malvinas islands but, above all, the memory of the young soldiers and uniformed citizens that went to the islands perhaps with the only baggage of what they had learned at school about the southern archipelago. Those frozen faces in the war photos of 1982 pose the question about the country that
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we imagine for young people and about the country that they are beginning to imagine. That exercise about the past and the present has an essential space at school. The actions of the Ministry aim at designing policies that contribute to know the history of the islands, to feel them and love them as ours, to go beyond the present and find the best traditions that make up our national identity. To remember as when we were children and began our school life- that Malvinas are Argentine, that we shall go on vindicating our sovereignty over them and that those who died for their cause are heroes and shall live in our hearts, and that it shall be our duty to transmit that testimony to new generations in order to keep the memory of their generosity forever.
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Federico Pinedo 204, 200, 194 and 177
Federico Pinedo *
204, 200, 194 and 177
SOVEREIGNTY AND NATION In some way, childhood landscapes, as well as the teachings of parents or those who play their roles, are incorporated to our identity, that is to say, to what we are individually. The homeland, the land of our parents, the land we feel, shall also be the land of future generations, one of those identity elements that I do not know if I should define as sentimental, irrational or spiritual. The homeland of a community is a spiritual element of collective identity. Argentinians are the sons of those who made their lives in Argentina and in that sense we are, in some way, the Argentina, because we have the capacity to beget Argentinians who shall be, as us, sons of our land. The relationship between man and land is so real as the one that exists between two lovers. Nobody would say that that relationship does not exist or that it is not very important. That is why so many persons have died or shall die for the homeland cause. Having been born in Buenos Aires city, I would lie if I say that I am not moved when coming from abroad I set foot again in my homeland, whether I do it in the high plains, in Misiones, in Mendoza or in
* National Deputy 2007-2011, head of the PRO Caucus and of the Joint Caucus Propuesta Federal (Federal Proposal).
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Ushuaia. Even from the plane, it is moving to see the Andes covered with snow in front of Cuyo or the valleys and mountains towards Lima. That element that constitutes our nationality and our people that is our land moves us as love. Thus, we may understand why Malvinas is part of each of us, of each of our people. It is not as some would say- something that we learnt or an invention; it is something that we are. Those who do not understand the essence, the contents, the force of that national feeling shall not be able to explain the countless struggles fought by men, not for a piece of land, but for their homeland, whether it is Armenian or Ukrainian, Arabian or Jewish, Chinese or Mongolian, Polish or French. When national borders are fairly and lawfully delimited, patriotic feelings channel themselves into those limits. Argentinians do not miss the lands that an accepted arbitration award gave to our neighbors; when we set foot on those lands, our heart feels that it is over Brazil or Chile and has peace, whether we have agreed or not with an interpretation or decision. But in conflicts, in order to have interior peace, the healing presence of justice and law is required. TOWARDS THE BICENTENNIAL Two hundred and four years ago, Spanish and Creole people rejected for the first time the British invader, expelling them from the River Plate beaches that they had tried to conquer for their crown. The struggle against the invasion generated the national spirit that a few years later would give rise to our South American nation. Thus, it is almost impossible that we may accept another invasion of the same colonialist power as the one that took place some time ago over Malvinas Islands and their adjoining sea. Our nation celebrates two hundred years, since its inhabitants decided to govern themselves. One hundred and ninety-four years since its declaration of independence from any other world power, which was recognized by the British Prime Minister, George Canning. But together with those glorious days of our bicentennial, we always remember the one hundred and seventy-seven years of the injury
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caused by the colonialist usurpation of our insular and maritime land of the South Atlantic. It is time to make a balance and promote the intervention of law and justice. In the nineteenth century the British Empire expanded itself throughout the world exhibiting the use of force. We suffered it in the flesh several times in few years. 1806, the first invasion to the River Plate; 1807, the second invasion; 1833, military capture of Malvinas; in 1840, River Plate blockade together with France and capture of Martin Garcia island. When in 1846 Viscount Palmerston took on the foreign affairs of the Empire, he made peace with Rosas, returned the island in the middle of the river and ordered to salute the Argentine flag, without depriving himself of mentioning that the actions of his countries had been piracy actions, as H. S. Ferns remembers quoting H. L. BulwerLytton.1 It is evident that if Malvinas Islands had been in the place where Martn Garca Island is located, we would not be speaking today about sovereignty and the national flag would be waving over there. Only the Union Jack is waving because they were very far away. The reaction of Argentina to the international use of force was to seek for the strengthening of the international law. That was clearly seen in the gorgeous intervention of Roque Senz Pea and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Mara Drago who, in several international and academic forums promoted the doctrine that is named after our Minister of Foreign Affairs, according to which it is not legitimate for a nation to use the force to obtain the compulsory payment of debts by the creditors of its nationality. Drago doctrine was established on occasion of the blockade of Great Britain, Germany and Italy to Venezuela in 1902 and derived in the acceptance of its principle by The Hague International Conference in 1907, under the proposal of the United States and with the support of our country. Following this tradition, that is the tradition of a proud and selfconfident government, today we should insist on generating legal alternatives for our conflict with Great Britain and for this purpose the first step must be mutual understanding and the second one, an
1 Ferns, H, S., in The Land that England Lost, published by Alistair Hennessy and John King, British Academic Press, 1992, p. 52.
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effort to focus on the problem and the ways to effectively solve it, instead of tying ourselves to grandiloquent words that separate us from the contents that they should reflect. During the war of 1982, I had the opportunity of talking to a prominent British journalist of strong conservative origin. He asked me to different audiences- if it would be acceptable for Argentinians to establish that the sovereignty of the island would pass to our country the day of the death of the last living islander at that moment. Nationalist groups attacked him with the same ruthless severity of absolute and fundamentalist judgments. However, from our present perspective, how happy we would be with that alternative! What I mean is that, if in the past our extreme conviction about our sovereignty made it unnecessary to think in different alternative solutions, it is time to set in motion our brain with the same conviction but with other circumstances, without separating the reason from the heart. In other terms, we must guard ourselves against persons that call themselves nationalist or, even more, national, who deprive the nation of greater levels of effective sovereignty, putting their own personal position over what may be the best national interest. From a national and pro-Malvinas feeling (not so usual in these moments), I will try to expose some ideas. THE SOUTH AMERICAN CHALLENGE In order to analyze the question, we should note that Great Britain has been abandoning its ancient Empire, from India to the dunes traveled by T. E. Lawrence by camel. It has also been reducing its relevance in Argentina. If Argentina decides to undertake a national project that is common to its main ideologies has a long way ahead. We should note that we have taken the decisive step of leaving the war hypothesis against our neighbors, particularly Brazil and Chile. We should also note that this powerful event -revolutionary for our foreign policy- will lead us to a greater supranational integration in the South American region, which has already begun. This shall naturally have an influence on the conflict development. Does this mean that it is necessary to extremely toughen our
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traditional position, suspend the dialogue and just wait for a lucky future? I do not think so. I think that this circumstance will generate an opportunity to start a dialogue with a minimum seriousness, something that today does not happen. I am convinced that foreign relations of a country are a reflection of its domestic reality. For this reason, I think that in the South American integration process there are many things to do to strengthen our external position, which is where the national interest is really at stake. What will give soundness and strength to the UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) countries is the stability of rules and behaviors that promote the essential elevation of the human dignity threshold and the living conditions of our people; the pacific co-existence; mediumterm predictability; educational growth; the circulation of persons and goods to promote richness; tolerance and cultural plurality. It is very important to realize that our lives are not defined by the different ideological positions (which are essential), but by the common elements that ensure a peaceful coexistence. For this purpose, it is necessary to praise the good things of others rather than the bad things that, in our opinion, they have and it is also important to put emphasis on the common construction (and on its necessary conditions), rather than on the destruction of those things that we dislike. Democracy is that. It is a mechanism directed to achieve a relatively wide consensus, which requires to partially set aside personal ambitions rather than a mechanism used by changing and circumstantial majorities to do what they want abusing of a temporary position. This happens because nothing is everlasting, because change is the essence of life and reality takes revenge of those who abuse of it. This is the reason of the increasing importance of the South American agreement on the respect for the State of Law, common game rules, regional standards of social and economic organization, an independent justice that ensures the effective compliance of rights, the recognition to each individual of what belongs to him, according to the definition of realistic and strict laws. Tolstoi and the already mentioned Lawrence of Arabia affirmed that what ensures the attainment of big objectives and the creation of
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richness is the decision of certain persons to face the risk and danger. So, the function of governments consists to a certain extent- in reducing uncertainty levels in order to help entrepreneurs to make the decision of requesting financial resources to savers who deprive themselves of consuming, purchasing capital goods, generating employment and qualifying the staff, developing organizations capable of understanding the desires and needs of their peers and of satisfying them. This is the moral content of the competition that must aim at a better and cheaper satisfaction of the desires of third parties and not to the elimination of second competitors. A region with these characteristics shall naturally devote itself to improve and significantly increase the quality of life of its inhabitants, but that shall not be everything. An amazing revolution is taking place in the great powers of Asia, particularly in China and India, but also in many of their neighbors. The complementation of their economies with the potential of the central area of South America is evident. The great capacity of those countries to finance the building of the essential infrastructure to produce and transport goods shall be a necessary step of a strong and sustained demand of products of our region. This will generate a strategic realignment of international relations. That is the context of our next years, during which we shall be able to tackle our sovereignty problems in a constructive way. A world virtually unexplored by human kind is that of the Antarctic sea and continent, where our coexistence with the United Kingdom and the inhabitants of our islands shall take place. The Antarctic Treaty generates an interesting coexistence space and poses a challenge for South America. Could we agree with our neighbors on the unification of our sovereignty demands and our public policies in this respect, as General Leal, first Argentinian in setting foot in the South Pole, suggested in Marambio Base some time ago? Can we strengthen and ensure the sustainability of the maritime resources by means of joint agreements on rules and common defense with our South American partners? This also has an evident effect in the peaceful power relation in the South Atlantic.
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LOOKING FOR AGREEMENTS The first transitional provision of the National Constitution after the reform of 1994, that ratifies the legitimate and non-prescribing (Argentine) sovereignty over Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur islands and the corresponding maritime and insular spaces, may be considered as an insurmountable limit for a flexible agreement that could be negotiated on the sovereignty over the South Atlantic islands under British occupation. However, the second paragraph of that provision opens some doors to negotiations, limiting such sovereignty and defining which is the non-prescribing and unwaivable purpose of the Argentine people protected by our Constitution. Such paragraph provides that: The recovery of such territories and the full exercise of sovereignty -respecting the way of life of their inhabitants according to the principles of the International Law- are a non-prescribing and unwaivable objective of the Argentine people. What evidently makes possible a negotiation with the United Kingdom about the sovereignty over the islands is the constitutional limitation of such sovereignty established by the principles of the international law and, in particular, by the fact that the full exercise of the sovereignty over that territory includes the respect for the way of life of its inhabitants, a way of life that is objectively included in the legal system of the British metropolis. The objectivity of the present British legal system not only imposes a limitation to Argentina but also to the islanders will, establishing a legitimacy barrier to them. This gives rise to many possible alternatives to reach an agreement. The way of life of the inhabitants of the islands may be interpreted as referred to those who inhabit the islands at the time of the territories recovery, in the terms of the constitutional clause, making possible in this way to reach agreements such as the one referred to the recognition of the Argentine sovereignty with a simultaneous retrorent of those territories to Great Britain by a determined period, a hypothesis that was analyzed on several occasions and that may coincide with that of my British journalist. The Hong Kong solution, referred to the return of sovereignty and territorial integrity in a
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fixed term or in a term that may be fixed, represents an alternative. The two-flags solutions the sovereign one and another one that ensures the way of life of the inhabitants whether the British one or that of an international agency- already analyzed on other occasions could also be considered constitutional, specially if they had temporary limits. The eventual domestic institutional conflict of Argentina as regards the uniformity of the federal regime of government according to the political system established by the Constitution itself, could be considered subsumed under the umbrella of the limitations that the inhabitants way of life imposes to the full exercise of sovereignty. Thus, there may be a double legal status in such national territories, which would allow the special status of the islands to ensure their inhabitants that the Argentine democratic legal regime does not undermine certain rights that may be determined and recognized. This possibility is very rich in hypothetical consequences. In the past, the Argentine-British conversations about the sovereignty over the islands conversations that were ordered by the United Nations and took place even during the war of 1982- came to a halt due to the conflict between the positions of both parties: when Argentina expressed its decision of safeguarding the inhabitants interests, the United Kingdom tried to protect their wishes. Argentina, in 1994, overcame that conflict and agreed to go beyond certain interests to be defined and to ensure the inclusion of those wishes within acceptable terms for our country with respect to the way of life of the islanders. The Argentine action has taken a long time and, unfortunately, its implications have not been expressly praised by the counterpart or by its subjects in these coasts. It is clear that the intention of Argentina is not to harm or bother islanders, but to let its flag wave over its territory. The alternative of elective nationalities for islanders being obviously the Argentine nationality one of them- may be assessed. Transition stages for a legitimate exercise of rights such as the property right- that prevent discrimination against our fellow countrymen, including special regimes for lands or for determined products, may be explored.
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After having exposed so many alternatives, it would still be possible to resort to the countless benefits for islanders which are easily identifiable, if we thought about the unlimited common undertakings that some hundreds of persons might enjoy, having an enormous country ready to be their partner. The sole imagination of any possibility in this respect leads to the conclusion that the persistence of the conflict in the terms in which it is now posed is absurd. There are several possibilities. The composition of interests in conflict only requires to comply with the international law that orders parties to negotiate sovereignty, with a real will to solve the conflict and, above all, with good faith. Argentina shall soon find objective conditions of seriousness, strength and attraction that will allow it to initiate the way towards the solution of the almost bicentennial conflict, based on the safeguarding of its dignity and of its national interest under the terms defined by the National Constitution.
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Jorge Argello United Nations: The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial, a pending issue
Jorge Argello *
United Nations: The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial, a pending question
The Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee within the Honorable House of Deputies of the Nation constitutes a concrete evidence of the existence of a State policy with respect to the defense of the legitimate sovereignty rights of the Argentine Republic over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur islands and the adjoining maritime spaces. Its creation is one of the most evident signs of the importance that all the sectors of the Argentine institutional life assign to this subject which is so close to the national feeling. It was named after one of the main causes of the Argentine foreign policy that was constitutionally recognized as an evidence of the firm commitment of the Argentine Nation to recover the full exercise of sovereignty over that portion of the national territory usurped by force in 1833 and illegally occupied by the United Kingdom since then in spite of the permanent complaints of our country. To speak about the Question of Malvinas means to speak about the sovereignty conflict over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur islands and the adjoining maritime spaces, a conflict the existence of which is recognized in its maximum possible expression by the international community: the United Nations.
* Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations Organization 2007-2011.
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Therefore, the Question of Malvinas Islands is the name that the international community, within the United Nations, has decided to use to express that there is really an question that deserves to be considered and must be solved to stop being a pending question. That international community has shown the way to solve the question and, in that way, it has been indicating the elements that the two parties of the sovereignty dispute should observe. The rapid solution to this question makes full sense in the framework of the essence of the United Nations: the preservation of international peace and safety and, for this purpose, the peaceful solution of international controversies, providing the fundamental elements and principles that shall govern international life. Thus, the capital importance for the Argentine Republic of the treatment that the Question of Malvinas receives within the maximum universal agency, apart from other multiple international regional agencies and forums, and with that conviction it has always acted since the beginning of the existence of the United Nations. MALVINAS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW The Question of Malvinas Islands is considered as such by the United Nations since 1964, when the General Assembly held that it could decide on the question, what represented an unquestionable diplomatic success of our country. Before this, the treatment of the question was limited to the presentations made by the United Kingdom within the framework of the provisions of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, when Malvinas Islands were unilaterally registered among the non autonomous territories over which they had to provide information according to Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. With each presentation, our country reacted firmly reserving the Argentine sovereign rights over the Southern archipelagos and warning that the information provided by the United Kingdom as administrative power did not affect such rights in any way. Since 1961, the Argentine diplomacy developed the strategy of installing the question
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within the framework of the General Assembly, undoubtedly inspired in the magnitude of the decolonizing movement initiated in 1960 after the famous resolution 1514 (XV), the 50 anniversary of which is commemorated in 2010. A lot has been written about the importance, impact and contribution of this instrument that led to the decolonization of thousands of persons, allowing several former colonies to become free and sovereign States. The resolution proclaimed as its primary purpose to put a rapid and unconditional end to colonialism admitting, however, that there were several kinds and manifestations of such phenomenon. This singular and important aspect is reflected in the resolution text, which contains several elements, principles and safeguards that governed and still govern the decolonizing process. So, through the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in it, the right of self determination was recognized to each people subject to foreign subjugation, exploitation and domination, as well as the right of any state to its national unity and territory integrity, rescuing in this way the two governing principles of the decolonizing process in full compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter (Article 1, paragraph 2 and Article 2, paragraph 4, respectively). In that context, taking into account that there are several kinds and manifestations of colonialism, in 1961 Argentina held before the General Assembly that the free determination principle could not be indiscriminately applied to situations in which the territory had been separated by force from an independent State in the absence of an international agreement that validated this de facto situation and especially when the original population had been dispersed and groups of colonists of the occupying power had settled in the territory. That same year the General Assembly established the Special Committee which was in charge of examining the situation with respect to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples, through resolution 1654 (XVI), in order to submit proposals and recommendations about the progress made and the scope of the Declaration and to report the results to the General Assembly.
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These significant landmarks gave fresh impetus to the general decolonization agenda and Argentina took advantage of this situation. In 1964, the Argentine Delegation decided to take its sovereign claim to the Special Committee on Decolonization which, at that time, was divided into subcommittees due to the great quantity of territories to be decolonized. What would later become the question of Malvinas Islands was considered in the framework of the III Subcommittee during that year, occasion on which the Argentine Republic submitted a detailed statement about every historical, geographical, legal, political and economic antecedent that justifies the admissibility of our sovereign rights, a presentation that became the cornerstone and the obliged source of consultation about the Question of Malvinas known as the Ruda Statement in honor of Ambassador Jos Mara Ruda.1 As a result of the interesting debate at such sphere,2 the development of which would exceed the scope of this work, the conclusions and recommendations of the Subcommittee III that favored the Argentine position were later approved by the Special Committee on Decolonization. The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly approved that year the draft resolution which was adopted by the full General Assembly as resolution 2065 (XX), on December 16, 1965, by 94 positive votes, no negative votes and 14 abstentions, including the abstention of the United Kingdom Delegation. This first resolution overwhelmingly approved by the main universal agency specifically referred to the Question of Malvinas Islands represented a diplomatic success of vital importance for the Argentine foreign policy. It was not only possible to place the Argentine sovereign claim at the highest level of the international community but also to achieve the crystallization of the main elements of the question up to now. The international community acknowledged in this way the existence of a sovereignty conflict on the Question of Malvinas
1 Official Document of the United Nations A/AC. 109/106 of November 13, 1964. 2 Of particular interest is the report of such debates by the Argentine Delegate and one of the undisputed protagonists, Ambassador Lucio Garca del Solar, in his article The resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, cornerstone of the strategy for the recovery of Malvinas Islands in Argentine Contributions to the United Nations published by the National Committee of the Argentine Republic for the 50 Anniversary of the United Nations, 1995.
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Islands that is also defined as one of the kinds of colonialism that must come to an end and which involves two States as the only parties, with an express mandate to immediately solve it through bilateral negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution. For this purpose, the mandate indicates that the provisions and objectives of the Charter and of resolution 1514 (XV) should be duly considered as well as the interests of the islands population. The magnitude of the success was particularly significant taking into account the British position of denying the mere existence of the sovereignty conflict, a position that suffered a setback due to the force of resolution 2065 (XX) which led, in January of 1966, the British Foreign Affairs Minister to agree with the Argentine Foreign Affairs Minister on the compliance of the mandate imposed by the General Assembly, reporting such decision to the General Secretary of the United Nations.3 Since then, together with the initiation and development of the bilateral process of negotiations according to the provisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Issue of Malvinas Islands was periodically treated by the Special Committee on Decolonization, the Fourth Committee and the plenary of the General Assembly. The different resolutions adopted by the General Assembly reaffirmed the foundational mandate of 1965, with elements that reflected the vicissitudes of the bilateral process of negotiations and the reactions to specific situations.
3 Note of February 11, 1966, addressed to the General Secretary by the Standing Representative of Argentina (published as Official Document of the United Nations A/AC. 109/145), through which the corresponding part of the Press Release dated January 14, 1966 issued on the occasion of the visit to Buenos Aires of the then Foreign Affairs Minister of the United Kingdom, Michael Stewart, who said that The Ministers considered the differences between the Argentine and the British Governments about Malvinas Islands. According to the conciliation spirit that has inspired the Resolution of the XX General Assembly of the United Nations approved on December 16, 1965, both Ministers made a valuable and sincere exchange of points of view, during which the Ministers expressed once more the positions of their respective Governments. Finally, as a result of this conversation, both Ministers have agreed on immediately resuming the negotiations recommended in such resolution by diplomatic means or by those means that may be agreed in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and to prevent the question from affecting the excellent relations that link Argentina with the United Kingdom. Both Ministers agreed on transmitting this decision to the General Secretary of the United Nations .
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In this way, after having accompanied the bilateral negotiations with the adoption of consensus between 1966 and 1971,4 the General Assembly adopted again resolutions of substantial nature in 1973 (resolution 3160 (XXVIII), and in 1976 (resolution 31/49 (XXXI)), which declared the need of accelerating the negotiations mentioned in resolution 2065 (XX). The promotion of these resolutions by the Argentine diplomatic action was clearly and directly linked to the level of stagnation of the negotiation process after the signing of the understandings of 19715 and to the tension caused by the sending of Shackleton mission in 1976 to the area in conflict, which gave rise to the formal complaint of the Argentine Government. The adoption of resolution 3160 (XXVIII) on December 14, 1973 is the product of the deep concern of our country about the time passed since the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX) without achieving substantial progress, after the British abandonment of the Memorandum of Understanding agreed in 19686 and the consequent stagnation of the negotiation process, especially after the
4 In the consensus adopted about the Question of Malvinas Islands in 1966 and 1967, the General Assembly, taking into account Resolution 2065 (XX) and after taking note of the communications sent by Argentina and the United Kingdom, declared itself in favor of exhorting both parties to go on with the negotiations in order to achieve as soon as possible a peaceful solution for the conflict and of keeping the Special Committee on Decolonization and the General Assembly duly informed about the progress of the negotiations related to this colonial situation, the eradication of which is a matter of interest for the United Nations within the Framework of Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly (Official Documents of the United Nations A/PV 1500, A/PV 1641). In the consensus of 1969 and 1970, the General Assembly takes note with satisfaction of the progress made at the negotiations (in 1969) and in the special negotiations (in 1971), exhorting the parties to go on with their efforts to reach, as soon as possible, a definite solution for the conflict, apart from keeping the Special Committee and the General Assembly duly informed in the terms of the previous consensus (Official documents of the United Nations A/PV 1835 and A/PV 2028). 5 Joint Declaration on communications between Malvinas Islands and the Argentine continental territory dated July 1, 1971. 6 In his intervention before the General Assembly on December 17, 1968, the Argentine Delegate complaint about the delay in the negotiations as a result of the public state they took due to the debate at the British Parliament and, in particular, to the British claim about the fact that the recognition of the Argentine sovereignty, as a definite solution, should be subject to the wishes of the islanders, expressing the various reasons that justified the Argentine rejection of such claim (Official Document of the United Nations A/PV 1744). The then Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Costa Mndez, had declared himself in the same sense on December 12, 1968, and his declarations were included in the document about the Issue of Malvinas Islands prepared by the Secretariat in 1969 (Official Document of the United Nations A/AC. 109/L584)..
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adoption of the understandings on communications.7 With the adoption of this new resolution, the General Assembly declared the need to accelerate the negotiations after expressing its deep concern about the fact that 8 years had passed since the adoption of resolution 2065 without achieving substantial progress in the negotiations, also expressing its recognition for the permanent efforts made by the Governments of Argentina to enhance the decolonization process and promote the welfare of the islands population. On the other hand, apart from considering the Argentine concern about the stagnation of the negotiation process when it exhorted to accelerate them, resolution 31/49 (XXXI) of 1976 also included de complaint of our country with relation to the serious violation of the rules applicable to the Argentine maritime jurisdiction perpetrated by the British ship Shackleton, as a consequence of the activities of scientific geophysical and geological- research performed by such ship in the Argentine continental shelf, according to the report submitted by the then Argentine Standing Representative to the President of the Security Council.8 Indeed, through this resolution adopted on December 1, 1976, the General Assembly exhorted both parties of the conflict to abstain from adopting decisions which imply the introduction of unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in
7 In the note dated August 15, 1973 addressed to the General Secretary (Official Document of the United Nations A/9121), the Argentine Standing Representative, Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas, warned about the stagnation of negotiations, in spite of the efforts made by Argentina, since the British denial to materialize the joint formula achieved by both delegations during the negotiations which would have allowed, in August 1968, to make big progress towards the solution. In particular, he mentioned such efforts in his decision to maintain special conversations with the intention of promoting the islanders welfare, without setting aside the final purpose of the negotiation and within the general framework of the negotiations mentioned in resolution 2065 (XX). On the other hand, in his intervention before the Security Council on March 16, 1973 (Official Document of the United Nations S/1697), the Argentine Standing Representative had warned about the impossibility of making joint reports with the United Kingdom during the session of 1972, as it had been the practice, due to the British intention of altering the essence of the meetings held since 1970 because they are negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty conflict, observing that if the United Kingdom is not ready to go on with the negotiations recommended by resolution 2065, Argentina shall be obliged to change its attitude and consider itself free to look for the definite eradication of this anachronistic colonial situation 8 Note dated February 10, 1976, published as Official Document of the United Nations S/11973.
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resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) of the General Assembly. Only the United Kingdom voted against the resolution, which was approved by 102 favorable votes (and 32 abstentions). As a consequence of Shackleton incident, bilateral negotiations were paralyzed during a whole year, and the Ambassadors of the respective seats were withdrawn, a situation that lasted until the beginning of 1977 when the Minister of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat of the United Kingdom, Edward Rowlands, visited Buenos Aires (after visiting Malvinas Islands) with the intention of resuming negotiations and getting information about the life and work conditions of archipelago inhabitants. Through the Joint Report which was known in Buenos Aires and London on April 26 1977, both Governments agreed to carry out negotiations since June or July of 1977 about the future political relations including sovereignty with relation to Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and to the economic cooperation with respect to such territories in particular and to the Southwestern Atlantic in general.9 TREATMENT OF THE QUESTION OF MALVINAS ISLANDS AFTER THE CONFLICT OF 1982 Some time after the conclusion of the South Atlantic conflict, the General Assembly considered once more the Question of Malvinas Islands in November of 1982, which was separately registered for its treatment at the plenary of the General Assembly. Resolution 37/9 of November 4, 1982 ratified that the armed conflict did not alter the existence or the political and legal nature of the sovereignty dispute.10 Such resolution exhorted both Governments to resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute about the Question of Malvinas Islands, which has clearly persisted after the armed conflict as well as the existing mandate of
9 Transmitted by the Argentine Standing Representative to the General Secretary of the United Nations by note dated June 8, 1977 and published as Official Document of the United Nations A/32/110. 10 See Hope, A. F. J.; Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, at Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. Vol. VI, N 2, 1983.
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finding a bilateral solution as indicated by the General Assembly.11 The international community has recognized this situation during all the period during which bilateral diplomatic relations were interrupted through the subsequent declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which exhorted once more both parties to solve the sovereignty dispute through negotiations (resolutions 38/12 of 1983; 39/6 of 1984; 40/21 of 1985; 41/40 of 1986; 42/19 of 1987 y 43/25 of 1988). Specially important was the rejection by the international community in 1985 of the British intention of introducing two amendments to give pre-eminence to the self-determination right in the resolution on the Question of Malvinas Islands adopted that year, trying to alter the doctrine clearly established by the United Nations applicable to the case. Another important aspect is the request that the General Assembly sent to the General Secretary of the United Nations as regards the resolutions adopted since 1982, about the undertaking of a renewed mission of goodwill to assist the parties in the resumption of negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute referred to the Question of Malvinas Islands. Later, by Resolutions 38/12, 39/6, 40/21, 41/40, 42/19 and 43/25, the General Assembly asked the General Secretary to go on with his renewed mission of goodwill adopting the adequate measures to that end. RESUMPTION OF ARGENTINE-BRITISH BILATERAL RELATIONS In 1989, with the beginning of the process that led to the reestablishment of bilateral relations in October 1990, the Question of Malvinas Islands was annually considered by the Special Committee on Decolonization that went on adopting specific resolutions. All of them recognize the existence of the conflict, with particular emphasis on the special and particular nature of the colonial situation of this case that involves a sovereignty dispute. The existence of a sovereignty dispute is what distinguishes the Question of Malvinas
11 Resolution 31/49 was approved by 90 affirmative votes, 12 negative votes (including the vote of the United Kingdom) and 12 abstentions; for the first time, the United States voted affirmative.
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from the so-called classic decolonization cases, because there is not in the islands an active subject owner of the right to selfdetermination according to the United Nations Charter, resolution 1514 (XV) and the other corresponding resolutions of the United Nations on decolonization, that is to say, there is not a people subject to foreign subjugation, domination and exploitation but a number of subjects of the British Crown that illegally occupy part of a sovereign State: the Argentine Republic. TREATMENT AT THE SPECIAL DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS Since then, up to now, all the resolutions adopted by the Special Decolonization Committee about the Question of Malvinas Islands follow the doctrine of the United Nations in that sense, remarking that the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom should resume negotiations in order to solve the sovereignty dispute over Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime spaces. As it was said, the Special Decolonization Committee was established by Resolution 1654 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1961. Its mission is to examine the evolution of the non autonomous territories under its consideration (at present 16) and to promote their decolonization. For this purpose, it submits reports and makes recommendations about such territories to the General Assembly. To that end, it receives information from the administrative Powers, hears requests made by interested persons and/or related to the subject, and organizes regional seminars to obtain information about the political, social, economic and educational situation in the territories in which it may also organize visits with the previous authorization of the General Assembly.
12 Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Republic of the Congo, Cte dIvoire, Cuba, Chile, China, Dominica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Grenada, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Mali, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Saint Lucia, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Timor-Leste and Venezuela.
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It is made up of 28 Member States12 that year after year examine, among others13 , the Question of Malvinas Islands and adopt the respective resolutions. These resolutions and recommendations make up the annual Report on the tasks performed that is submitted by the Special Committee to the Fourth Committee and to the plenary of the General Assembly for its approval through the annual resolution titled Application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. This resolution, one of the most important as regards decolonization because it also decided to extend the term of the Special Committee, is adopted by an overwhelming majority of affirmative votes against the traditional opposition of the United Kingdom.14 The resolutions contained in the Report submitted by the Special Committee and approved by the General Assembly include the one referred to the Question of Malvinas Islands.15 This specific nature remarks the decolonization of this portion of the Argentine national territory illegally occupied by the United Kingdom since 1833, in spite of the continuous protest of the Argentine Republic and the permanent requests of the international community to find a rapid solution, taking into account the interests of the islanders. A matter of vital importance is that the inapplicability of the selfdetermination principle to the Question of Malvinas Islands due to the reasons that make it special and particular has been repeatedly reinforced by the Decolonization Committee as it goes on remembering its existence and the need to resume bilateral negotiations by the two parties as the only way to put an end to this situation. When it exhorts to achieve a fair, peaceful and lasting solution, it also reaffirms the interest of the international community in the existing mandate of
13 Anguilla, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, United States Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Saint Helena, Guam, American Samoa, Pitcairn, New Caledonia, Tokelau, Western Sahara and Gibraltar. 14 In December 2008, it was adopted as resolution A/RES/63/110 by the General Assembly by 177 favorable votes (including the vote of Argentina), 3 negative votes (United States, United Kingdom and Israel) and only one abstention (France). 15 The resolution on the Issue of Malvinas Islands adopted by the Special Committee on Decolonization on June 18 2009 may be consulted in the Report on the activities performed in 2009 published as Official Document A/64/23.
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good will entrusted by the General Assembly to the General Secretary of the United Nations. Part of the analysis process made by the Special Committee about the subject is the annual session specially devoted to the Question of Malvinas Islands during June, which is usually attended by the Argentine Minister on Foreign Affaires as Chief of the Delegation to make a detailed intervention about the state of the sovereignty conflict, to reaffirm the legitimacy of the Argentine sovereign rights and to renew the permanent will of the national government to find a solution according to the terms required by the international community. Two petitioners usually two for each party of the sovereignty dispute- participate before the intervention of the Chief of the Argentine Delegation. Several persons who are interested parties in the question -as it is required by the agency rules in order to be authorized by the Committee to take part in the petitioning hearinghave participated in representation of continental Argentina. In some cases, they have been Malvinas inhabitants who live in the Argentine continental territory or who directly descend from Malvinas inhabitants or important persons linked to the islands history before the British invasion of 1833. For the United Kingdom, petitions are usually made by the islanders, who -even elected by the rest of the British resident communitymake up the British colonial administration of the territory, in some cases born in the islands of ancestors who descend from the British colonists who were taken there since 1833. LATIN AMERICAN AND EXTRA-REGIONAL SOLIDARITY The Committee on Decolonization is the traditional scenario of the renewed expressions of regional solidarity with our country in this essential question of its foreign policy. Latin American States which make up this agency (Bolivia, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela) have permanently expressed their firm support to the Argentine sovereign rights in the treatment of the Question, jointly sponsoring the project annually adopted by the Special Committee
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on the question, which is traditionally submitted by Chile Delegation. They also enthusiastically intervene in the general debate, giving arguments about the legitimacy of our rights and denouncing the lack of compliance by the United Kingdom. Apart from other countries of the agency which usually defend the national position, this support is not only limited to its members but it also includes other voices as a proof of the regional and extraregional interest generated by the Question of Malvinas. So, the Latin American States that are not part of the agency, MERCOSUR Members and Associates, host countries of UNASUR meetings, of Ibero-American Summits or of the Rio Group, which declared themselves in favor of the Argentine position, among others, usually take part in the Special Committee Session to express the support of their governments, regions or blocs to the Argentine rights in the Question of Malvinas.16 CONCLUSIONS The United Nations have been a critical sphere for the Argentine Republic in the defense of its sovereign rights over Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime spaces. Since its creation, Argentina achieved the inclusion of its sovereign claim in the international agenda, a purpose which was achieved in 1965 with the recognition of the existence of the sovereignty conflict as a consequence of the British illegal occupation of that portion of the Argentine national territory. The opinion of the international community was and still is clear in this respect, with renewed expressions of support of other regional multilateral forums which reiterate the mandate imposed by the maximum universal agency to the Argentine Republic and to the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland: to resume sovereignty negotiations as a means to attain the fair, peaceful and lasting solution of the conflict, taking
16 At the session of the Special Committee on Decolonization on the Issue of Malvinas Islands, on June 18 and 19, 2009 the most remarkable interventions -apart from those of Bolivia, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela- were those of Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, which may be consulted in the session records (Official Document of the United Nations A/AC. 109/2009/SR.9 and A/AC 109/2009/SR.10).
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into account the interests of the islanders. The Argentine Republic has clearly expressed its firm commitment with the solution of the conflict and the respect for the way of life and interests of the islanders when it included that commitment in the National Constitution of 1994. Apart from renewing its commitment with the peaceful and diplomatic solution of the conflict, the Argentine Nation ratifies its non-prescribing and unwaivable sovereign rights over Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime spaces according to the international right and respecting the way of life of the islanders. It shall be from the Security Council of the United Nations that our country shall insist on the multilateral diplomacy path until putting an end to the conflict, even if the counterpart ignores the mandate of the international community to which it belongs. To persevere in the multilateral scenario not only ensures the essential visibility and exposition of the legitimacy of our sovereign rights. The United Nations is a sphere where the irresponsibility of the United Kingdom comes to light, generating many costs in terms of visibility and exposition as well as international prestige and credibility. In 2010, we commemorate the 50 anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) of December 1960, which gave rise to the process that allows the United Nations to have at present an enormous number of Member States which were able to get rid of the colonial domination under the shelter of the principles contained in it. The Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism17 shall also finish without having achieved the noble objective of decolonization by the international community because there are still cases of peoples that are subject to foreign subjugation, exploitation and domination and to special and particular situations that involve sovereignty conflicts that have not
17 On December 8, 2000, on the fortieth anniversary of the approval of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples by the General Assembly, the latter declared the period 2001-2010 as Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism (resolution A/RES/55/146) Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship (2003 2005).
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been solved, in spite of the repeated requests of the international community in that sense. Within the framework of these events, Argentina shall also commemorate in 2010 the Bicentennial of the May Revolution which was the beginning of its existence as a sovereign and independent state. Our country has the right, honor and privilege of attending these commemoration ceremonies with the conviction and pride of having achieved the independence defeating colonialism, renewing its unconditional support to the United Nations, to the international legality, to the preservation of the international peace and safety, to the peaceful solution of international conflicts and to the eradication of colonialism in all its ways and manifestations. A privilege and conscience duty only reserved for the members of the international community committed with the responsible fulfillment of their obligations.
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Rafael Bielsa Argentine Malvinas Islands, Kelpers oil?
Rafael Bielsa *
Argentine Malvinas Islands, Kelpers oil?
Former Ambassador Eduardo Sguiglia writes: ... Argentina celebrates two hundred years of independent life. The celebration coincides with the longest democratic cycle of its history. Almost three decades have passed since the fall of the last military dictatorship. During this period there were political and economic advances and setbacks. There was also an unprecedented crisis at the beginning of the new century. But the challenges posed by the future are no longer referred to the existence of public freedoms but to the solution of a question that has been a permanent source of concern. Shall it be possible to attain a modern, fair and stable nation? In that context, foreign policy is extremely important. Within that territory, there are unavoidable conflicts and inexplicable conflicts. For a Nation as ours, one of the secrets is to intelligently overcome the unavoidable ones and to reduce to the maximum extent the inexplicable ones. One of our unavoidable conflicts is the one with Great Britain about Malvinas Islands. Oil has been a source of friction, undermining mutual understanding.
* Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship 2003-2005.
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That great statesman who was Winston Churchill for Great Britain-, used to say that a fanatic is somebody who can not change his opinion and does not want to change the subject. A good definition for his fellow countrymen, when the question is to fight for their interests on every occasion throughout the planet. A paradigmatic example of Churchills definition was the Labor member of Parliament, Colin Phipps (1934-2009), fond of RollsRoyce and of Kensington apartments, a former politician who made up one of the missions to the Islands during the crucial midseventies. Monothematic about the black gold of Malvinas, in the mid-nineties he was a member of the company Desire Petroleum, with the purpose of exploiting the resources of the South Atlantic, an example of consistency and of unconsciousness in an explicit state: desire means wish. According to the obituary published about him in the English newspaper The Guardian on February 2 2009, Colin Phipps, who died at 74, had two parallel but asymmetrical careers: the least successful was the career of politician, during which he won two elections out of six attempts, first for the Labor party and then for the Social Democratic Party. However, he was much more successful as oil geologist, working at first for Royal Dutch Shell and then for his own companies. Churchill, supreme speaker, also stated: try to keep up appearances and the world will give you credit for everything else; this is not precisely what England has been doing with respect to Malvinas. Biotechnologist Federico Bernal, in a sensible work, holds that since 1975 there is a clear point of inflection in the British diplomatic strategy with respect to the Islands, passing from ambiguity to an increasing intransigence. The file included in the agenda the exploration and exploitation of the hydrocarbon, mining and fishing resources of the archipelago, what directly affected the desires and interests of Kelpers. The violation of among other instruments- Resolution 31/49 of the General Assembly of the United Nations that exhorts both parties of the dispute to hold bilateral negotiations and not to introduce modifications while
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the Islands go through the process of solution of the sovereign conflict (extremely overlooking the appearances), did not embarrass the Blonde Albion. Churchill was witty but not infallible. Between 1975 and 1976, a series of British missions confirmed important levels of oil and mineral richness in the islands. The results of the first mission report convinced the British government of keeping their ambitions over the islands unaltered. The possibilities of finding oil were certain. The United Kingdom sent between 1975 and 1976 three new scientific delegations (the one of Labor deputies Phipps and Gilmour in 1975 and those of Shackleton father and son in 1976) which confirmed the conclusions of the first one. One year later, some American companies specialized in geology and sponsored by British Petroleum, began to thoroughly study the area of the Malvinas archipelago. British Petroleum was part of the so called Siete hermanas of the oil industry, a name given by Enrico Mattei -father of the Italian modern oil industry-, to mention a group of seven companies that dominated the oil business in the early sixties. Mattei used the expression ironically, to accuse these companies of organizing themselves in cartels, protecting themselves instead of promoting the industrial free competition, causing trouble to different emerging companies. They were the following companies: Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso), which merged with Mobil and formed ExxonMobil (United States); Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands, United Kingdom); AngloIranian Oil Company (AIOC), afterwards known as British Petroleum (BP) (United Kingdom); Standard Oil of New York, afterwards known as Mobil today is merged and is part of ExxonMobil (United States); Standard Oil of California, afterwards known as Chevron later it merged with Texaco to form Chevron Texaco at present it is called Chevron Corporation (United States); Gulf Oil Corporation, which in 1985 was almost completely purchased by Chevron (United States), while the other part of the shares remained in power of BP; Texaco, which merged with Chevron in 2001 this merger was known during a time as ChevronTexaco, but in 2005 it changed its name again to
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Chevron; Texaco is now a trademark of Chevron Corporation (United States). Due to these corporate mergers, in 2005 only four out of the Siete Hermanas (Seven Sisters) are still operating: ExxonMobil, Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell, and BP. In 1982, the year of the War, thirteen international scientific reports stressed the oil importance of the sedimentary basin of which the Malvinas islands are part, stating that the hydrocarbons reserve was ten times larger than that of the North Sea. Then, Margaret Thatcher s reaction was not just a consequence of a temporary hormonal disorder caused by the aboriginal boldness in a time of political weakness. In 1993, geological studies as those of GravSat (search for regional gravitational abnormalities from satellite altimeters) and those of the British Geological Survey revealed the existence of a zone of 2000 km2 around the Islands which may probably contain oil in commercial quantities. On September 26, 1991, the Argentine and British Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed that the subjects linked to oil would be considered at the next meeting of the Working Group on South Atlantic Matters. On November 22 of that year, the Government of the Argentine Republic promulgated Act 23968 on baselines to measure the Argentine maritime spaces. The act is applied according to the provisions of the Convention on Maritime Law (CONVEMAR) and provides that Argentina has sovereignty and jurisdiction rights over the Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE) up to the 200 nautical miles and over the whole continental shelf, which includes the maritime bed and subsoil in all its extension. This Act is applicable to Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime spaces because they are part of the Argentine territory and it establishes once more the right to use the natural resources of its sea, as well as the mineral resources of its continental shelf, including hydrocarbons. At the same time, the Argentine Government expressed its disagreement with the maritime jurisdiction that the British Government assigns to itself. Finally, it mentioned the agreement between both Ministers of Foreign Affairs to meet on December 1991 in London and in 1992 in Buenos Aires,
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with the purpose of examining the situation created by the Argentine and British legislations and to consider possible ways of cooperation in these matters. At the meeting held between December 4 and 5, 1991 both countries agreed to establish a High Level Group to consider the already mentioned questions. The first meeting of the group was held in February 1992 and it was followed by several exchanges up to 1995, with the intention of reaching a cooperation understanding on hydrocarbons in the South Atlantic. This stage concluded with the Argentine-British Joint Cooperation Statement on Off Shore Activities in the Southwestern Atlantic dated September 27, 1995, which established a framework of reference for such bilateral cooperation as regards hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation. It was a temporary understanding under a sovereignty formula. A few days later, Kelpers bid 19 areas and granted 12 contracts, benefited by the legal security afforded by the agreement, and about half a hundred companies submitted offers. One year later, the islands government finally granted 7 off-shore exploration licenses to Shell, Amerada Hess, Lasmo, International Petroleum Corporation and the mentioned Desire Petroleum. The Statement -finished in the heyday of the so-called seduction policy of Kelpersafter countless Argentine efforts to avoid British unilateral actions contrary to the mentioned instrument, was considered ended by the Government in March 2007. On October 5, 1995, the Argentine Government submitted a protest note rejecting the British Government pretension of including into the Joint Statement such call for a unilateral bidding. The first stage of the 7 exploration licenses ended up in November 2001. At the beginning of the perforation works at the mentioned areas in the North of the Islands, the Argentine government, through a new formal protest before the British Government dated April 30, 1998, repeated the terms of its declarations of September 27, 1995 and October 5, 1995 and expressed its rejection to the bidding call for the exploration and exploitation of the resources located at the maritime areas belonging to the Argentine Republic and over which it had legitimate sovereignty and jurisdiction rights.
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Besides, the Hydrocarbons Committee of the Southwestern Atlantic created by the Joint Statement held eight meetings between March 1996 and July 2000. During the last one, both parties expressed in writing through a report the persistence of their diverging interpretations about the application of the Statement and agreed to make a pause to try to find solutions, committing themselves not to hold a new meeting until reaching an agreement. The substantial divergence between the parties referred to the sphere of application of the Joint Statement of 1995. Even though the statement established that it was applied to the maritime areas of the Southwestern Atlantic subject to a sovereignty and jurisdiction conflict (the area of Malvinas Islands of 430000 km2, with the exception of the Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands), the United Kingdom, on the contrary, intended to limit the cooperation with our country to a special cooperation area created by the agreement of only 21000 km2, reserving for its unilateral action the remaining disputed area. On August 25 and September 29, 2000, the United Kingdom issued two regulations -without having the necessary powers to do so- in order to establish a new licensing policy (open doors policy) which aimed at the direct granting of new licenses for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in the adjoining areas of Malvinas Islands, but without calling for international biddings. The Argentine government complained about this unilateral action with the notes dated October 5 and November 27, 2000. The British government went on carrying out unilateral actions when it granted independently from the Argentine counterpart a license for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in ten blocks located at the south and east of the Malvinas Islands. By note dated June 14, 2002, the Argentine government complained about the British intention to grant licenses for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the areas of the Argentine continental shelf that surround Malvinas Islands, which was evidently contrary to the bilateral understandings in the matter and to the solution of the sovereignty conflict between both countries. The recalcitrant unilateral action
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of the United Kingdom which continued without interruption since then in spite of the permanent Argentine complaints was contrary to the agreed bilateral cooperation. The Joint Statement of 1995 did not contribute either to generate the adequate conditions for the resumption of negotiations to solve the conflict. Even more, the United Kingdom tried to use the agreement to maliciously declare that oil companies which illegally operate in the disputed zone would be protected against a legal action of Argentina. According to available data, the approximate number of oil barrels that can be recovered at Malvinas Islands is 12.95 billion, which means 6.475 billion (50% less) barrels of proven reserves. The proven reserves of the continent and the so-called Austral Basin amount to 2.042 billion. These figures guarantee coverage of domestic consumption for 8.7 years. The aggregate amount of proven reserves which are not in dispute and those of the Islands would extend the current coverage period from 8 to 27 years. If the conservative figure of 6.475 billion barrels were enlarged to 9 billion, as suggested by other studies, Malvinas Islands would become the fifth oil power in America, after Venezuela, the United States of America, Brazil without including the 2009 increase in reserves- and Mexico. A genuine Persian Gulf in the South. The contracts that have been signed will benefit the de facto government of the islands with a 21% corporate tax rate (to be increased to 26% after completing the first year of the contract), a 9% royalty rate on the total amount of extracted oil and a variable charge for leasing the production area. According to Federico Bernal, as soon as exploitation begins - towards the middle of this year- and taking as a basis the lowest figure of proven reserves (6.475 billion barrels), nearly 3,000 Kelpers will have an economic prospect of 34.5 million dollars each, making them -according to the English newspaper The Guardian- one of the richest communities in the world. Since 1991, the Argentine government has sent more than 20 complaint letters to the United Kingdom; more than 10 to other countries that have contributed to the illegitimate British occupation of part of our territory by engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and
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exploitation; more than 200 discouragement letters to Argentine and foreign companies whose activities are related to this sector; and more than 150 letters to companies based in continental Argentina reminding them of the full force and effect of Resolution 407/2007, which sets forth sanctions for those who maintain profit relationships with those involved in the above mentioned activities that are against international law. On March 29, 2007, two days after the termination of the 1995 Joint Declaration, the Energy Secretariat issued the above mentioned Resolution 407, prohibiting the inclusion in the Oil Company Registry of individuals or companies that were -directly or indirectlyowners, shareholders or contractors of, or that maintained profit relationships with: a) companies that develop or have developed hydrocarbon activities on the Argentine continental shelf, without being authorized to carry out hydrocarbon exploration or exploitation activities by an Argentine authority having relevant jurisdiction; and/or with b) companies that render or have rendered oil services to companies that develop or have developed hydrocarbon activities on the Argentine continental shelf, without being authorized to carry out hydrocarbon exploration or exploitation activities by an Argentine authority having relevant jurisdiction. Under this resolution, companies holding permits and concessions issued by Argentine authorities having relevant jurisdiction, their controlling and controlled companies, affiliates, shareholders, and companies with which they maintain profit relationships, are prohibited from: a) participating, directly or indirectly, in: i) hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities on the Argentine continental shelf that have not been authorized by an Argentine authority having relevant jurisdiction, or ii) in companies that render or have rendered oil services on the Argentine continental shelf to companies that develop or have developed hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities,
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without being authorized by an Argentine authority having relevant jurisdiction, or b) providing business, logistic or technical support to said companies. If it is proved that any of these prohibitions has been breached, the enforcement authority shall initiate -without further formalitiesproceedings before the National Executive Power to cancel the relevant permits and concessions, notwithstanding other judicial or administrative actions that may be brought. Under the resolution, companies holding permits and concessions issued by Argentine authorities having relevant jurisdiction, their controlling and controlled companies, affiliates, shareholders, and companies with which they maintain profit relationships, are also prohibited from contracting -directly or indirectly- with: a) companies that develop or have developed hydrocarbon activities on the Argentine continental shelf, without being authorized to carry out hydrocarbon exploration or exploitation activities by an Argentine authority having relevant jurisdiction; b) companies that render or have rendered oil services to companies that develop or have developed hydrocarbon activities on the Argentine continental shelf, without being authorized to carry out hydrocarbon exploration or exploitation activities by an Argentine authority having relevant jurisdiction. Faced with recent Argentine claims, David Miliband, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, adopted the go on, go on tactic (coined by Argentine soccer referee Francisco Lamolina), downgrading an infringement that deserved expulsion and imprisonment for an indefinite period of time, on the pretext that life must go on. I believe that the Argentine government has more areas to cooperate than to dissent with the United Kingdom, he declared recently. On February 13, 2010, Merco-Press (South Atlantic News Agency) published that, according to news sources from Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government was planning to create an elite group with legal experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, Customs, and the Under-Secretariat of Ports and Navigable Waters, in order
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to draft legislation to keep away from Argentina all merchant vessels that are involved or about to participate in oil exploration activities in Malvinas. The idea is related to the decision of preparing a registry with statistical data on shipping activity in the area and compare them with data on maritime activity both in Great Britain and Malvinas Islands. The group could widen its role of preparing the legislation to include the determination of the business impact of these measures. The keystone of the strategy consists in creating a context of insecurity for illegal activities in the disputed areas, in light of the proven possibility of exploiting resources that belong to the Argentine Republic. Merco-Press quotes an official source: ... offshore oil extraction is a high-risk operation, and if the feeling of insecurity is inoculated, it could eventually discourage the whole venture. This announcement materialized on Tuesday February 16, when decree 256/10 was issued. News agencies reported that on said date president Cristina Fernndez had signed a decree providing that ...all vessels that intend to sail between Argentine continental ports and ports of the islands, or to cross maritime areas towards a port located in the islands shall request an authorization from the Argentine government to do so. The decision of the Executive Power was adopted ...to protect Argentine interests, since the national administration must ...reach a point where the protection of sovereignty and of all the resources arising therefrom is guaranteed. The Chief of Cabinet Anbal Fernndez informed that ...in order to pursue this strategy, we have created, within the Office of the Chief of Cabinet, a committee formed by the Ministries of Planning, Justice, Economy, Industry and Foreign Affairs, in order to coordinate actions to implement this decree. Fernndez explained that, in light of the exploration of hydrocarbon resources in Malvinas, the national government ....has insisted, in all fora, on the need to honor multilateralism and UNO resolutions. He added that: ...the United Kingdom has maintained its refusal to comply with UN General Assembly resolutions, which acknowledge the existence of a sovereignty issue that ought to be negotiated.
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The United Kingdom has violated the restraining order, which can be seen from the repeated situations involving the exploitation of natural resources. He also recalled that the Government complained to the United Kingdom that as is publicly known, our Constitution establishes our legitimate and non-prescribing sovereignty over Malvinas. This measure should be completed with the application of the letter and spirit of the above Resolution of the Energy Secretariat (SE 407/07), thus counterbalancing English inroads on the exploration and potential exploitation of oil resources in Malvinas through the granting of rights ...over the breadth and depth of the Argentine sea, including areas adjacent to the acknowledged exclusion zone, since the presence of several Argentine and foreign companies that operate under Argentine authorization may give soundness to the option with us or with them. To this we should add that out of the 19 oil sedimentary basins in Argentina, only five are exploited. One of the tasks that has undoubtedly been entrusted to the time of the Bicentennial is to overcome the temporal gap that often exists between thinking of an answer and putting it into practice. What Argentina lacks is not ideas, but people who can think at the time and place at which they ought to do so. Handling time is a critical factor in the conflict with Great Britain over Malvinas, without there being room for overacting a fake or interested friendship. That prototypical British citizen Churchill also said that the price of greatness is responsibility. It is a good piece of advice. Restoring Malvinas Islands to their full Argentinian status depends on how serious, shrewd and persevering we are, even if we have to ardently wait for four, forty or four hundred years, that is, until the third or fourth Centennial.
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Juan Archibaldo Lans When the English doubted their rights
Juan Archibaldo Lans*

When the English doubted their rights
It was in the year of the first Centennial of the May Revolution when an expert of the British Foreign Office produced a document that cast doubts on the soundness of that countrys rights over Malvinas and the other South Atlantic islands. Our duty is to trace all the background that may help to reinforce the legitimacy of the sovereignty claim over the islands that Argentina has been repeating since 1832. His Majestys Government has no doubts as regards their sovereign rights over was the ritual phrase that all British representatives uttered as a reply to any Argentine claim over Malvinas Islands. However, this was not always the case, since some one hundred years ago a historical study prepared at the Foreign Office cast doubts on the rights claimed by British governments. A study by Gaston de Bernhardt was used by the Foreign Office as a basis for defining the British policy. Later on, the opinion of another expert of the Foreign Office gave rise to a tense controversy at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In my book Aquel apogeo. Poltica internacional argentina 1910-1939 [That heyday. Argentine international politics 1910-1939]
* Former Ambassador of the Argentine Republic 2002-2006.
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I discuss these two documents, whose value derives from the fact that they describe the opinion of two British specialists. GASTON DE BERNHARDTS REPORT The first internal document of the Foreign Office that tells the story of the conflict and attempts to summarize the main titles and arguments put forward by Great Britain and Argentina was produced by Gaston de Bernhardt on December 7, 1910. It evokes the discovery, the first French inhabitants who settled in Port Louis in 1764, the Spanish occupation as from 1771, the secret agreement between Spain and Great Britain; the English withdrawal and the Spanish continuance on the islands without any objection being made at any time on the part of Great Britain to the possession of Soledad by the Spaniards, who continued in undisturbed exercise of all the rights of sovereignty not only over Falkland Islands but also over the whole group, wrote Bernhardt in his secret report.1 More than a legal expert, Gaston de Berhnhardt was a historian, but his points of view had the virtue of being the first systematic study, that, for many years, was the basic document for discussion at the Foreign Office. This document is no longer accessible at the Public Record Office, since it was withdrawn after the Malvinas war. Some time later, in 1911, the Assistant Secretary of State, Ronald Campbell, issued a document in which, on resuming the previous work, he specified the weak points of the British position and their titles.2 After recounting the transfer of land from Great Britain to Spain, and the agreements and statements that followed, Campbell notes that said evacuation -despite the indignation that it aroused among the British- was considered a full waiver of their rights to the group. He points out, contrary to what his colleagues affirmed some time later, that the islands were occupied by the United Provinces of Buenos Aires as successors to the title held by Spain, from which the
1 Gaston de Bernhardts memorandum of December 7, 1910 (F.O. 881/9755). Source: Ferrer Vieyra, Enrique. Notas sobre documentos del Foreign Office referentes al conflicto Malvinas. In: La poltica internacional, el derecho y el territorio nacional, Crdoba, El Copista, 1999. 2 Memorandum of R. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State, 1911. (F.O. 371/1288). Source: dem previous note .
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colony had just gained independence. The debate on the title and rights was already installed at the Foreign Office, where other internal documents contained opinions on the strengths and weaknesses of British arguments. In one of those documents, prepared by legal adviser G. Fitzmaurice in 1936, who later became a judge of the International Court of Justice, we can read, in the authors own handwriting: Our case has certain weaknesses.3 A very confidential internal document of the British Foreign Office, dated December 8, 1927, acknowledges that for over a century Argentine has claimed that the Falkland Islands are Argentine territory... . Later on, the author remarks that Argentina also lays claim to the South Orkneys and South Georgia.4 In Annex A to this memorandum, after describing the history of the islands and their occupation by force, he mentions the negotiations and protests undertaken by the Argentine government in 1832, 1833, 1841, 1842, 1884, 1887, 1888, etc. By 1927, the British were worried that the Argentine government may bring the issue of sovereignty before the Pan-American Union, which was for them a disturbing perspective. It would be a submission to the Inter-American Conference to be held in Havana. On the other hand, ambassador Howard had confirmed that the Department of State in Washington was updated on the whole issue.5 British worries were not limited to the hypothesis about the outcome of diplomatic hostilities promoted by Argentina, but to the fact that the initial history of the British occupation of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands had been to a certain degree- confusing, as expressed in the above mentioned very confidential memorandum signed by C.J.W. Torr of the Foreign Office.6 These worries - the actual existence of
3 John W. Fields memorandum of February 29, 1928 (F.O. 37/12735/13336). A. F. Orchards memorandum of December 3, 1928 (F.O. 371 /1 2736/1 361 68). G. Fitzmaurices memorandum of February 6, 1936 (F.O. 371/19763). Source: Ferrer Vieyra, Enrique, idem note 32. 4 C. J. W. Torrs very confidential memorandum to the cabinet of the British Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office, December 8, 1927, P.R.O. / F.O. 371/11959. 1927 Annual Report by Robertson to Chamberlain, dated January 27, 1928. P.R.O. / F.O. (A 1312/1312/2). 5 Confidential memorandum signed by (Sd) H. H. of October 24, 1927. P.R.O. / 1927 Annual Report by Robertson to Chamberlain quoted in Note 35. 6 Secret telegram N 6 Memorandum quoted in Note 35.
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Argentine intentions could not be verified in the Argentine documents that were consulted - were real and the British aim was to discourage any action in this respect. Sir Malcolm Robertson, who had served as British Ambassador during Marcelo T. de Alvears presidency, repeatedly gave a negative opinion of the President in relation to British interests. While admitting that he had a charming personality and courteous manners in politics, he considered him weak, unable and lacking in willpower. Although he did not have a high opinion of Yrigoyen either, he cherished his friendly attitude towards all things British. This assertion was included in a note sent by Robertson to the Foreign Office on November 3, 1928, in which, when discussing the topic of Malvinas, he confirms his opinion about the weakness of British rights.7 As regards the Falkland Islands, I have always considered, ever since reading the Bernhardts Foreign Office memorandum of December, 1910, that our claim to the islands was very weak indeed. In point of fact, it is based upon force and upon very little else. This view appears to have been held by successive British Governments since Lord Palmerstons days, for they have been at pains to avoid the questions being raised. I realize that the islands are of vital strategic value to us, and that we cannot give them up, however just or unjust our position may be. All I want to do is to follow out the policy of previous Governments and to remain quite quiet. I do not think that the Argentine Government will seriously raise the question unless we force their hands by taking umbrage at their periodical pin pricks, and their periodical reassertions of their claim. To Ambassador Robertson, what was important was the state of occupation, since it was far stronger than any number of notes which can only give rise to unpleasant controversy and might, ultimately, even bring the Argentine Government to the suggestion that the whole matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. The Ambassador knew that the apparently
7 Sir Malcolm Robertsons note to the Right Hon. Sir R. C. Lindsay of the Foreign Office, dated November 3, 1928. P.R.O. / F.O. 371/12737..
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small matter of the sovereignty conflict with Argentina was important and deserved serious consideration by the minister in London. The text of the above mentioned note seemed to show that Sir Malcolm Robertson was not so sure about the British position. This opinion also appears in the 1927 annual report of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, which, among other concepts, explains that:8 On the other hand, the Foreign Office memorandum of the 7th December, 1910, would tend to show that the Argentine claim is not altogether unfounded. Perhaps they feel that some day or another the British Empire may break up and so they had better keep their claim alive. For the moment I cannot take it all too seriously, especially in view of our wider local interests, but I am quite ready to do so should real occasion arise. During General Justos presidency, Argentina was less safe and relied more on an international context that -in economic termswas unfavorable or, in any case, more uncertain. The negotiation of the Roca-Runciman agreement and its subsequent additions and renegotiations garnered all the attention concerning relations with Great Britain. Animosity against the British began to build up in the Argentine society with the force of a reaction against this special relationship, and was exacerbated with the conflict over meat processing plants and the perception of some nationalist and left-wing sectors that this bond implied giving in to the interests of an empire that sucked up our wealth and dominated the mentality of the upper classes. The complicity of some leaders was the preferred target of anti-British opinions. Ambassador Chilton informed his views to the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, in his 1934 annual report:9 There is no genuine irredentist movement for the recovery of the Falkland group, as all sensible Argentines realise that the islands would be useless to them, and in the event of a European war would
8 1927 Annual Report quoted in note 35. 9 1934 Annual Report by Chilton to Sir John Simon, dated January 22, 1935 (item 38). P.R.O. / F.O. 371/18636 (A 1989/1989/2)..
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prove to be an extremely awkward possession, since a belligerent might try to occupy them for strategic reasons, and Argentina would more than probably become involved in hostilities... The question is really more than anything else a hobby-horse for a certain type of politician and jingle. which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both on principle and for internal political reasons, are unable to ignore altogether; since, however, the quadruped occasionally becomes unruly, they would probably not be sorry to see it suffer a painless death. It is therefore unlikely to become a serious political issue, but when it is ridden by persons who happen to hold an official position in the police, Post Office, etc., it is apt to become a nuisance, and to cause difficulties in connection with mails, passports, etc., which necessitate intervention by the Embassy. The British opinion about Argentine intentions seems to corroborate that the Foreign Office thought the strategy of the Argentine government was also not to stir the pot, by keeping the matter in the background. This can be inferred from the note sent by Ambassador Henderson to Sir Anthony Eden in January 1937. Said documents reads as follows:10 The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Argentine) informed the counsellor to the Embassy that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had no desire whatever to make an issue of the Falkland Islands question, but that their position was awkward when politicians or the press brought it to the fore, and when Government departments or the judiciary referred to them matters connected with it, they could not avoid taking official notice. They desired, however, as far as possible, to keep the matter in the background, and as a proof of their goodwill they had erased from the forthcoming presidential message to Congress all reference to contentious questions connected with the Falkland Islands. Regarding the sovereignty issue invoked by the British, doubts appear in many reports, especially in the case of the Orkneys (Orcadas)
10 1936 Annual Report sent by Ambassador Henderson to Sir Anthony Eden on January 26, 1937. P.R.O. / F.O. 371/20508 (A 1665/1665/2).
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and Georgia islands. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires even suggested linking the conflict over the islands with trade negotiations, in order to reach an amicable arrangement on the basis of recognising Argentinas legal right to the islands in return for Great Britains undisputed occupation of them. However, the Foreign Office replied that it was out of the question to abandon the British claim to legal sovereignty, and added that the legal basis of the claim had been discovered to be far stronger than it had been hitherto supposed.11 There were, of course, internal confidential reports of the Foreign Office that stated the fragility or a controversial view of the rights asserted by the British. These documents have been separated from public archives or have not been found. This assumption can be made from the confidential report that Sir Anthony Eden sent to the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, in which Eden refers to a semi-official communication sent by him to the Head of the Department in charge of Argentina, Sir Robert Craigie, in December 1935. Sir Anthony Eden tells Ambassador Henderson that there exist no doubts regarding the intention to maintain His Majestys Governments sovereignty claim over Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. He also admitted being aware that the legal basis of the claim was not as weak as it had been hitherto supposed. In a confidential note dated August 28, 1936, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced the legal situation at that time.12 What was original about the British view stated on this
11 Idem previous note. 12 Sir Anthony Edens confidential note to Ambassador Henderson of August 28, 1936. P.R.O. / F.O. 371/10763 (A 6461/889/2). The note also contains the following considerations: In the first place, 100 years possession, whether disputed or not, should found a perfectly sound title to sovereignty over the islands in international law, and there should be very little danger of such a title failing of recognition by the Permanent Court of International Justice or an international tribunal. Meanwhile, each year that passes, and in addition the celebration of the centenary of British occupation, strengthen His Majestys Governments case. At the same time, there is reason to doubt whether, in fact, Argentina ever had any grounds of claim to the islands at all. In the diplomatic exchanges of 1833 the case would seem to have been argued upon the wrong grounds by both sides. It would seem that the events in the 18th century were irrelevant, that the islands had become completely unoccupied in 1811, and that they had to be considered at that time as res nullius open to the occupation of any State. Further, unless the occupation of the privateer Vernet, whom the Argentine Government tried rather unsuccessfully to clothe with their authority, can be considered to have been an Argentine occupation, the islands were res nullius at the time of the British reoccupation in 1832.
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occasion was that the islands were res nullius at the time of the British occupation in 1832. Even if this had not been the case and if, in 1832, Argentina had possessed sovereignty, Great Britain has been in peaceable, though not undisputed, possession for 100 years, and has therefore acquired a title by prescription. Eden believes that the admission of Argentinas legal title, and still more, the cession of the meteorological station in the South Orkneys, would be too high a price to pay for the sake of bringing this long-standing controversy to an end. The British strategy was, therefore, to react calmly to Argentine actions without exaggerating the problem and to continue occupying the islands, which constituted the central aim of their policy. Eden, in the above mentioned confidential note of August 28, 1936, made the following analysis of the situation in light of Argentine claims: The only alternative method of solution that suggests itself is arbitration. Here too, however, I consider that the risk involved, slight though it may be, would not be justified, since an adverse decision would cost His Majestys Government no less than their whole strategic position in the South Atlantic. DOUBTS OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS An interesting episode evidences the intellectual doubts that the officially declared rights over the South Atlantic Islands aroused in Great Britain. In September 1936, while it was preparing a study on South America, the Royal Institute of International Affairs consulted Sir Stephen Gaselee, an expert from the Foreign Office, regarding the text on the Falkland Islands: The Head of the Working Group, Martin Wright, sent the following version:13 Great Britain annexed the Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1833, and has held them ever since, despite frequent Argentine assertions that they belong to her. The claim is based on the prior Spanish occupation during 1764-1811. British occupation of a part of the Islands dates from 1765, but the British colony was evacuated in 1774,
13 Letter of The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, dated September 8, 1936. P.R.O. / F.O. 371/10763.
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and the Spanish in 1811. Between 1811 and the British seizure in 1833, the islands were at first under no direct rule, although they were used by whale and seal fishers of many countries, and then, from 1823 till 1833, they were under Argentine control. Great Britain had never renounced sovereignty over the islands and, after its protests to the Buenos Aires Government had been ignored, it proceeded to annex them by force in 1833. There exists a series of minutes and opinions of Foreign Office officials or of independent intellectuals Sir Claude Mollet, Doctor James Robertson, Beckett which were apparenetly consulted.14 Those documents say that the experts mentioned above believed that the less said on the subject the better. The difficulty lay, as expressed at the meeting held on October 14, in that the seizure of Malvinas in 1833 was so arbitrary a procedure as judged by the ideology of the present day. As stated in the minute it is therefore not easy to explain our possession without showing ourselves up as international bandits. After many discussions, a very short text was proposed, which only noted the British presence since 1833 and acknowledged that Argentina disputed the legitimacy of the occupation. This was the version that the Institute had suggested for the book Brazilian Geography Book. At the Foreign Office, they knew that the Institute was willing to adapt the definition of the topic, insofar as they were aware that the Institute did not wish to appear to support in its publications tendentious and doubtful claims merely because they were British. It was evident -and it was so acknowledged- that at the Foreign Office they had an unnecessarily apologetic point of view of British behaviour. Finally, and after long internal discussions, Sir Stephen Gaselee sent an answer to the Royal Institute, asking them to modify the paragraph included in the publication, since it could be used by Argentinians, who never tire of spreading their propaganda on the subject with the
14 Minutes of October 14, 16 and 16, 1936 Argentine Claim. P.R.O. / F.O. 371/10763 (A 8083/889/2) 15 Sir Stephen Gaselees letter to Martin Wright of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, dated October 22, 1936. P.R.O. / F.O. 371/10763 (A 8083/889/2).
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object of showing that they were brutally turned out of the Islands by superior force. In conclusion, he suggested the following wording:15 The Falkland Islands were occupied by Great Britain in 1765. They were evacuated in 1774, but the whole group were re-occupied in 1833, since when they have been under British administration. The Argentines have disputed the legitimacy of the occupation and there is a difference of opinion between the two countries on the question of sovereignty. The British Government take the view that the occupation of the islands in 1823 by the American adventurer Vernet, upon which the Argentine claim is mainly based, could afford no title to Argentina because Vernet was never even remotely under the control of the Buenos Aires Government and was, as the United States Government stated at the time, when his settlement was broken up by a United States cruiser, really little more than a pirate. The islands had really become res nullius, when they were abandoned by the last Spanish settlers in 1811, and remained so till the British re-occupation. In any case an occupation which has remained continuously for over 100 years would create under the rules of international law a complete title by prescription. The criterion adopted by London during the 30s is thus eloquent: the islands did no belong to anybody and were occupied in 1833, and this occupation must be maintained as the old legimitacy title. As ambassador Henderson had already told Sir Anthony Eden, Great Britains legal claim to the Falklands did not at the time appear to be unassailable.16 The British government was not that coherent, though, since its own Embassy in Buenos Aires, in the 1934 annual report, had provided another version. It admitted that Vernets occupation in 1820 enjoyed the protection of the Republic and that he had settled on the Islands until Great Britain had ejected Argentine soldiers and colonizers.17 With the logic of an argument an attempt has been made to erase real facts; with occupation by force, to legitimate a right; and with time,
16 1936 Annual Report by Henderson to Eden, sent by note on January 26, 1937. P.R.O. / F.O. (A 1665/1665/2). P.R.O. / F.O. (A 1665/1665/2). 17 1934 Annual Report quoted in note 41.
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Called Malouines by the French and Malvinas by the Spaniards, the Islands were discovered by John Davis with the vessel Desir on August 14, 1592. They were seen by Sir Richard Hawkins on February 2, 1594 and visited by the Dutch... Captain Strong, on board the Welfare, sailed through the main islands and named the passage... Falkland Sound, in honor of the renowned royalist Lucius Cary (Lord Falkland) who had died in the battle of Newbury in 1643. The islands afterwards took the same name, though not before 1745. The first settlement was established in 1761 by Bougainville on behalf of the King of France... The following year, Captain Byron took possession of the Western Falkland Island and left a small garrison at Port Egmont on Sounders Island... The Spaniards, jealous of interferences by other Navies in the South Orkneys, bought the settlement at Port Louis from the French and rebaptized it Soledad in 1766, and in 1770, by force, they expelled the British from Port Egmont. The Spanish action brought other countries to the verge of war. The establishment was restored to Great Britain in 1771, but... in 1771 it was voluntarily abandoned... The islands were apparently left without permanent occupation and without any claimants until in 1820, Louis Vernet, under the protection of the Government of the Republic of Buenos Aires, established a colony at Port Louis. ... Finally, in 1833, Great Britain, which had never renounced her sovereignty claim over the Falkland Islands, ejected the Argentines and colonizers who were still living at Port Louis and resumed the occupation, which has lasted, without interruptions, up to the present. (Back Translation)
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Fernando Petrella The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial
Fernando Petrella*
The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial of the Argentine Republic
Any negotiation requires permanent updating of the available diplomatic instruments, as well as of the resources that are at stake in order to reach a positive and sustainable result. In this sense, the Bicentennial finds Argentina in an international scenario with a series of favorable elements that did no exist in the past. These elements add to the negotiating capacity of Argentina and, consequently, should not be disregarded. This work will refer to: A) New opportunities; B) Recovering the traditional vocation; C) Clarifying the tactic; and D) Prospects. A) NEW OPPORTUNITIES They include: a) neighbours like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay prove that it is possible to substantially improve institutional quality, reduce poverty, dominate inflation, overcome tax crises and integrate with the world without recriminations or protests. To the above mentioned countries I could add Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, with which we also maintain fluid relations. b) Excellent prices for the main Argentine export products, as well as sustained
* Ambassador, former Under-Secretary of Foreign Relations, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Permanent Representative to the United Nations..
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demand for them, due to structural reasons of the new international system. c) The markets of China, India and other Asian countries, which were unthinkable in the 80s or 90s. d) The limit of the Argentine continental shelf has been extended up to the point permitted by applicable international law. This negotiation, that began in the mid 90s (Guido Di Tellas term of office), will incorporate resources to the Republic which, if well used, will imply better living conditions for all inhabitants. e) Participation in the G-20, an organization that was created in 1999 and which Argentina joined at the initiative of Carlos Menem, one of its founding members. The G-20 is in charge, among other roles, of reorganizing the financial system and monitoring the International Monetary Fund, and is likely to foster the reorganization of emerging international relations. f) The final removal of the block policy, based on ideological parameters that precluded dissidence in both sectors, consolidated totalitarianism and denied significant trade opportunities to half of the world. g) The strategic alliance with Russia and South Korea (Jorge Taianas term of office). h) The beginning of a new stage regarding relations among countries, based, for the most part, on multilateralism. i) The reinstatement of dialogue and diplomacy as effective tools to handle relations among countries, and finally j) the new international agenda, fundamentally based on: Security in its widest sense, the environment, energy, food and the technology to produce it efficiently, and natural resources. The new agenda by no means implies the removal or loss of importance of the traditional agenda, which is still applicable given the fact that it is based on fundamental humanitarian aspects (human rights violations, extreme poverty, malnutrition) and conflicts, some of a political nature, others of a territorial nature, as in the case of Malvinas, and still others, more serious, which involve the potential or actual use of force, as in the case of the Middle East, Afghanistan and terrorism, to mention but a few examples. Bearing this new reality in mind, and if we take into account that the G-7 brings together the most industrialized countries in the world, it can be seen that, in principle, only two countries Canada and the USA- meet all the conditions to address the items of the agenda pertaining to security,
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the environment, energy, food and natural resources. If we take into account the G-20, three countries can be added: Russia, Brazil and Argentina, which, due to their resources, area, history and diplomatic tradition, also have enough potential. These considerations do not mean that other G-7 countries or that China, Mexico, India or Indonesia lack significance. They mean that some countries, including Argentina, seem to be better endowed than others in the current situation. The foregoing paragraphs intend to describe the factors that the current international system offers to Argentina, giving it valuable negotiation tools for the Question of Malvinas if such tools are used diplomatically and smartly. These factors were not so clearly perceptible in the past. They were not discussed at the highest and most influential levels, or during the 80s and 90s. B) RECOVERING THE HISTORICAL VOCATION Notwithstanding the unquestionable value of the issues discussed above, there is clearly a lot of room for improvement. Argentina, because of its importance, background and the way it is seen by other actors of the system (countries and organizations), cannot continue to skimp on its participation in globally urgent matters. Nowadays, it is an undisputed fact that the default, which to some extent explained and contributed to our isolation, is no longer a valid argument. During the presidencies of Ral Alfonsn, Carlos Menem and Fernando de la Ra, and partly with Eduardo Duhalde, Argentina was an active and responsible global and hemispheric actor. An example of this was the participation in the Contadora Group for peace in Central America during Dante Caputos term of office, and the first approximations to regional integration. Afterwards, during Guido Di Tellas and Adalberto Rodrguez Giavarinis terms of office, we could mention the clear leadership in UN Peace-keeping Operations (Iraq, Balkans, Kuwait, Haiti, Cyprus...), disarmament, trade rounds, hemispheric integration, regional peace (Peru/Ecuador), the strong and moderate defense of democratic institutions (Peru and Paraguay), peaceful nuclear development, and human rights that enabled Argentina to be seen as a converging
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country in terms of crucial issues with the countries of the western world (USA, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Israel) but without abandoning its role as genuine representative of Latin America and the developing world. In this regard, the then US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said to the Foreign Minister of the government led by the Alianza party, Adalberto Rodrguez Giavarini, that US-Argentine understanding was the most significant event of hemispheric relations in the XX century and that its continuation during Fernando de la Ras administration turned said understanding into a state policy (See Diplomacia Argentina en Naciones Unidas, 1991-1999, Estudio Preliminar, CARI, 2008, p. 44). Later on, in spite of the forced isolation to which Argentina was dragged following the default, the Duhalde period was mainly characterized by efforts to prevent Iraq from being intervened without regard to the UN Security Council. Making smart use of the opportunities offered by the international system to Argentina as described above- enabled us to make progress in practical aspects of the dispute over Malvinas Islands that were always endorsed by the United Nations, the Organization of American States and a significant number of individual countries from all regions. Therefore, by combining the conditions and experience shown by Argentine diplomacy in its participation in the classical agenda with the current conditions of the international system, Argentina will gain greater influence in any negotiation regarding the Question of Malvinas. This thought is also adapted to the present, and, without disregarding the positive aspects of our current diplomacy, it seems clear that integration with countries of the western world is less intense and the vocation to become involved in major global issues is less defined. Naturally, this affects the Argentine impact on more relevant actors when discussing fundamentals. What we have said so far is related to the negotiating background Argentina already has. Now, this background has to be put to work harmonically, with a clear direction and careful diplomatic techniques.
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c) CLARIFYING THE POSITION Let us consider certain facts which are still unclear those stimulating Argentine variability- and which conspire against the determination of true governmental policies, including governmental tactics. If the latter vary from one government to another -often due to capricious causes or simple personal circumstances-, the thread of the negotiation is broken off, affecting the long-term strategy and definitely favoring the status quo, or even worse, the other party. The first fact to be determined is on the basis of de facto situationwhether Argentina will pursue a dialogue and convergence policy in order to advance gradually towards a solution or a confrontation policy. In the past, confrontation included certain elements related to the use of force. The war was the most important and tragic of these factors, due to its consequences in every sense, but it was not the only factor. The confrontation spirit also appears in diplomacy, affecting its essence. The main purpose of diplomacy is to ease conflicts through the creation of conditions to solve them in a sustainable way, which often requires a compromise. But Governments that occasionally seek refuge in rigid and principle-based positions are particularly sensitive to territorial conflicts. This way of acting is not necessarily negative when there exists a sound legal foundation, as in the case of Malvinas Islands. However, if we fall into immobilism during a long time, circumstances may change. Actually, immobilism is hardly useful for the party who wants to change the situation. For Argentina, immobilism has often led to paralysis, that is, a lack of diplomatic actions in order to keep on moving conflict dynamics in favor of its own interests. Seeking refuge in the legal field without adding other efficient elements for rapprochement (Ferrari, Gustavo. Esquema de la Poltica Exterior Argentina, Eudeba, Temas, Buenos Aires 1981) seems to be for those who follow the conflict- an excuse for not acting and so avoiding opportunistic criticisms. Therefore, we are faced with the dilemma of determining whether
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the principles recognized when the conflict arose two centuries agoare still admissible or, in a very different world, other possibilities may be included without affecting the legal foundations that support Argentine points of view. In the light of the foregoing, it seems necessary to avoid static positions which have hardly served the Argentine case and which are evidently exhausted. The attitude should be different. We must remember that, since the adoption, in 1965, of UN General Assembly Resolution 2065/65, the negotiations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led the United Kingdom to consider the transfer of sovereignty, a condominium and a lease-back. None of these seemed enough. The hard task of wining islanders hearts and minds, a necessary element to achieve substantial progress in every territorial conflict involving population, looked like a secondary factor and not a fundamental one. Absolute and immediate solutions were promoted and searched for. All this was a serious mistake. It was only after the restoration of diplomatic relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1989 that Argentina initiated a convergence diplomacy with the United Kingdom in order to manage the practical issues deriving from the dispute. An islander-oriented policy, which should be studied in depth, arose within this vision. In this context of understandings, British sources pointed out that a change of status of the islands was possible, with an institutionally strengthened Argentina and leaving aside the use of force. These expressions suggest that the measures taken in 1989 were correct, notwithstanding the recognition that possible tactical changes are normal during a negotiation and do not represent an act of surrender. Never are Argentinians more dangerous than when they are reasonable, people used to say at the Islands. This is, precisely, the point. That is the spirit needed to resume a dialogue to gradually reach a solution, and to start destroying barriers between Argentine and British people, taking into account that the islanders are more than a tangential factor of the question. The Bicentennial may be an unrepeatable occasion to evaluate the status of the Question of Malvinas and to consider, in a comprehensive
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and objective way, the development and progress of these conflicts. A thorough monitoring of the Gibraltar problem and related Spanish policies are relevant factors for the Argentine case. The linkage between the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan is another case of interest. Territorial conflicts are never identical. But the principles to solve them are always similar. They are based on dialogue and leave aside confrontation. This wise principle of diplomacy must not be forgotten. D) PROSPECTS. At the beginning, we said that Argentina has new and important possibilities to perform a role according to its historical tradition and position in the international system. This fact should influence the Question of Malvinas if we resort to an active and efficient diplomacy. But the scenario is always changing and dynamic. New actors and challenges appear and also impact, in turn, on existing problems. The self-determination principle which is not applied to the Question of Malvinas- has gained momentum. At the time of writing this document, this principle is being debated and questioned in International Organizations in relation to Kosovo. The exclusion of the special and particular Question of Malvinas Islands is very important for the Argentine position, though Kosovo has received recognitions that cannot be endorsed at this stage. Maintaining majorities at the United Nations and, above all, at the Organization of American States is central to Argentine interests. The OAS includes not only Canada and the United States countries with indisputable influence- but also the Caribbean countries, whose support has been an important legitimating factor for Argentine rights. For that reason, the OAS is an irreplaceable organization in the Hemisphere. The issue of the external boundary of the Argentine Continental Shelf may cause, in the short term, difficulties in the South Atlantic Ocean, due to existing resources. Conflicts should be avoided. Perhaps, it is time to recreate, on the basis of mutual confidence and good faith, a system with the United Kingdom to allow problem management with a forward-looking for all South Atlantic inhabitants. The European Union, renewed and enhanced by the Lisbon Treaty,
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has included Malvinas Islands as an associated territory, somehow ratifying a colonial situation which is not admitted by several member countries. This circumstance may multilateralize the conflict against Argentina and to the detriment of the provisions of the UN General Assembly. It is worth remembering that in the United Nations the issue of Argentina has no unanimous support. Therefore, once again, we must look for support in the OAS, where unanimity already exists. The situation created by the European Union suggests that Argentina should not only appoint, as soon as possible, ambassadors to all vacant offices of the region, but also choose the most versed professionals in the Question of Malvinas. Delaying these administrative decisions strengthens the perception that the Argentine government does not attach enough importance to its territorial interests. Argentina should take up a Southern vision. A national airline is a necessary tool for this. Transpolar flights have an unquestionable appeal to reaffirm the Argentine presence and vocation in all the Southern area, including Antarctica. Recovering naval presence in the area will demand profound and essential changes in political attitudes. These changes are likely to be introduced soon, because history does not wait. No policy is possible or believable if the interested party does not procure the necessary resources to support its interests. Hence, an important contribution that the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee may make at the Bicentennial is to suggest the National Congress to tax such activities as they may deem appropriate, with the only purpose of encouraging national objectives in the South Atlantic area. Finally, we may say that little will be achieved if this declinistic attitude showed by certain opinion groups is not overcome. These sectors involuntarily discourage people who are technically and practically responsible for advancing the daily objectives of foreign policy. It is not a matter of ignoring reality, mistakes, or the main existing difficulties. Undoubtedly, something has been lost from the default up to now as regards Argentinas integration into the world. However, something has been gained. We must work on this in order to build the future that Argentina deserves.
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Eduardo Airaldi The Question of Malvinas Islands in multilateral diplomacy
Eduardo Airaldi *
The Question Malvinas islands in multilateral diplomacy
Next year we will commemorate the 50 anniversary of the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly December 14, 1960- of Resolution 1514 (XV) known as Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which initiated the decolonization process. Said resolution includes certain conceptual elements involved in the configuration of the Question of Malvinas Islands before the United Nations. These elements constitute part of the foundations of the Argentine position in this regard, namely: - The principle of territorial integrity, which limits the selfdetermination principle, is mentioned in the whereas clauses and established in the 6th operative paragraph: Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. This principle is related to the origin of the Question, the dispossession of the effective exercise of territorial sovereignty suffered by Argentina in 1833 due to an act of force of the United Kingdom. This act was never consented, so no right to title has arisen thereunder due to the passing of time.
* Former Ambassador. General Director of Malvinas and the South Atlantic Area. Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004- 2009.
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- The characterization of the beneficiaries of the decolonization process by the 1st operative paragraph of this Resolution: The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. This declaration is related to the understanding of the origin and nature of Malvinas current inhabitants. In fact, after the seizure of the islands, Argentine inhabitants and authorities were expelled and replaced by people brought from the British Islands, while, in practice, Argentinians coming from the continent were barred from Malvinas. This deliberate policy to establish and maintain a population characterized by its Britishness, has transformed said population from a people subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation into a group of inhabitants that the illegal occupier considers as its citizens. - The end of colonialism in all of its manifestations, mentioned in the preambular paragraphs of the Resolution. On this basis, the UN General Assembly resolved, as from 1964, that it had jurisdiction over the Question of Malvinas Islands, which, as from 1984, is considered by that organization as a special and particular situation because it involves a sovereignty dispute between two Countries. Resolution 1514 was approved by 89 votes with 9 abstentions (one of them of the United Kingdom). During 1961, 1962 and 1963 our countrys delegates to the General Assembly developed Argentine arguments. Therefore, the principle of free determination must be considered according to the circumstances conditioning its exercise: when there exist factors that limit its scope, such as the principle of territorial integrity; situations in which the territory of an independent Country has been seized without its consent in a subsequent agreement; and cases in which the original population has been replaced by groups of settlers from the occupying superpower; or the particular situation of territories in dispute. In 1961 the General Assembly created the Special Committee on Decolonization, known as the Committee of 24, which was in charge of examining the implementation of the 1960 Declaration, making
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suggestions and recommendations on the progress and scope of its application, and reporting to the General Assembly. In September 1964, at Subcommittee III of this body and as regards our Question, the Argentine Delegate, Ambassador Jose Maria Ruda, extensively presented for the first time in the United Nations some of the historical, geographical, political and economic antecedents of the fair Argentine sovereignity claim over the Southern territories. This statement was known as Rudas Argument. In his conclusion, the Argentine delegate declared that Argentina claimed the restoration of its territorial integrity through the return of the three archipelagos that Great Britain had taken by force, this being the only fair solution. In turn, Argentina would pay special attention to the welfare and economic interests of the current inhabitants. And Argentina would not accept the denaturation of the principle of free determination, applying it to consolidate situations that are a consequence of colonial anachronism, to the detriment of its legitimate sovereignty rights over the Islands. The Argentine position was supported by other delegations that took part in the debate, particularly manifesting Latin American solidarity. Finally, Subcommittee III unanimously approved the following conclusions and recommendations: - It confirmed that the provisions of Resolution 1514 can be applied to Malvinas Islands territory, whose situation it examined. - It recognized the existence of a dispute between the Argentine and British Governments as regards Malvinas Islands. - It recommended that the Special Committe should invite both governments to negotiate a peaceful solution to this problem, duly taking into account the provisions and objectives of the Charter, of Resolution 1514, the interests of the Islands inhabitants and the opinions expressed during the general debate. - It recommended that the Special Committe should invite both governments to report to it or to the General Assembly the results of their negotiations. As regards the Special Committee, it adopted the above mentioned conclusions and recommendations without objections.
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In 1964, the Argentine Delegate informed the General Assembly Fourth Committee that his government, complying with the C-24s recommendation, had invited the British Government, in September of said year, to negotiate the solution to the sovereignty dispute on the Question of Malvinas Islands, within the framework of the conclusions and recommendations of said Committee. Furthermore, he affirmed that in said process there would be no difficulties in finding a solution that recognized, satisfied and guaranteed the interests of Malvinas inhabitants. Also in 1964, the Fourth Committee approved a draft resolution introduced by Venezuela and supported by other 14 Latin American countries. This draft resolution was endorsed by the General Assembly on December 16, 1965, by 94 positive votes, no negative votes and 14 abstentions (including the United Kingdom). The so approved Resolution 2065 (XX) was the first one of the democratic and universal body of the United Nations on the Question of Malvinas Islands, and it took into account the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee. This Resolution addresses the essential elements of the Question: - The existing situation in the Question of Malvinas Islands is a form of colonialism that must come to an end. - It involves a sovereignity dispute obviously involving two States: Argentina and the United Kingdom. - Therefore, there are only two parties to the dispute. - The dispute must be immediately faced through negotiations, in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem. - Therefore, we must take into account the objectives and provisions of the Charter (among them, section 33 which includes the obligation of the parties in a dispute to negotiate a solution) and of Resolution 1514 (principle of territorial integrity), as well as the interests of the Islanders (thus leaving aside the principle of self-determination). Soon after the adoption of Resolution 2065, in January 1966, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Michael Stewart, traveled to Buenos Aires, where he held meetings with his Argentine peer, Miguel
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ngel Zavala Ortiz. As a result of these meetings, on January 14, both officials issued a joint press release, which, as regards the dispute, invoked the conciliation spirit that had inspired the Resolution and said that: both Ministers have agreed to continue without delay the negotiations recommended in said resolution through diplomatic channels or other means, in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem and prevent the question from affecting the excellent relationships between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Likewise, the Ministers agreed that this text had to be forwarded to the UN Secretary-General, which was done. In July 1966, the first session of bilateral negotiations proposed by the General Assembly took place in London. Said negotiations were extended in successive rounds up to 1968. As regards the conversations with the British, in December 1967 the Argentine Delegate informed the General Assembly that the negotiations were making progress to reduce divergence areas. In March 1968, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Stewart informed the House of Commons that the government would only agree to transfer sovereignty to Argentina if said transfer was included in an agreement that was fully satisfactory in other aspects, and if it was clear enough for the British Government that the islanders considered that such agreement satisfied their interests. That is to say, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs highlighted interests, as they had been invoked in Resolution 2065. Finally, in August 1968, the Argentine and British delegations signed ad referendum by their respective governments a Memorandum of Understanding, which had to serve as a basis for the final solution to the dispute. The essential part of the Memorandum expressed: The government of the United Kingdom as part of such a final settlement will recognise Argentine sovereignty over the islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after: i) the two Governments have resolved the present divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine
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Government and ii) the Government of the United Kingdom is satisfied that those interests are so secured (source: Oliveri, ngel M., Malvinas. La clave del enigma, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, Coleccin Controversia, Buenos Aires, 1992). The negotiations initiated under Resolution 2065 and the first result achieved with the Memorandum of Understanding in 1965 entail an implicit British acknowledgement and constitute a relevant testimony of the legitimacy of Argentinas rights over the Southern archipelagos. However, unfortunately, the negotiations and the first possibility of reaching a final solution to the dispute became, due to different factors, a controversial issue of British domestic policy, leading the British Government which was in a weaker position- to leave aside what had been agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding. This decision was expressed in Minister Stewarts declaration before the House of Commons on December 11, 1968, where, although he admitted that both governments had reached some form of understanding, he denied said understanding and his own words of March 1968 in the same place, by remarking that There is a basic divergence over Her Majestys Governments insistence that no transfer of sovereignty could be made against the wishes (no longer the interests) of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islanders. The Argentine reaction was made public on December 17, 1968 at the UN General Assembly, where the Argentine delegate rejected the reasons for which the British government had announced that it was not prepared to formalize the understanding. On that occasion, he declared that it was a sovereignty dispute and, therefore, a dispute between governments, in which the population whose interests must be especially taken into account- could not define the sovereignty problem according to its wishes. Then he remembered the principle of territorial integrity and the origin of the current population, which replaced Argentine inhabitants, who had been expelled without being consulted about their wishes as regards sovereignty over the islands. And finally, he pointed out that if the British thesis was applied to territories occupied by force and inhabited by settlers from the colonial superpower, the destiny of such territories would be in the hands of those
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who wanted to transform illegitimate possession into full sovereignity, under the protection of the United Nations and in violation of the most fundamental principles of justice and international order. In the following years and up to 1982, Argentine-British negotiations materialized through understandings under the sovereignty formula that concerned cooperation on practical issues derived from the dispute, in order to establish -through development of cooperationan adequate atmosphere to reach a final solution to the dispute while satisfying islanders interests. Conversely, as regards fundamentals, the negotiations officially or informally considered different formulas to solve the dispute, for example sovereignty transfer or condominium with lease-back to the United Kingdom. But this fundamental part of the negotiations was not materialized in an agreement due to the British lack of political will to fully comply with relevant UN resolutions. In December 1970, the Argentine and British permanent representatives sent similar letters to the UN Secretary-General reporting the holding of special meetings within the general framework of the negotiations to solve the dispute, understanding that the adoption of practical measures to promote freedom of communications and movements between the Argentine continental territory and the Islands may contribute to reaching a final solution. As a result of these special meetings, both governments signed in 1971 an agreement under the sovereignty formula to cooperate in regular air and maritime services; and in postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications; while Argentina assumed the commitment to cooperate in health, educational, agricultural and technical areas. However, in spite of the goal of the cooperation understandings, the United Kingdom gradually showed its reluctance to seriously face the solution to the dispute, in opposition to the provisions of Resolution 2065. For that reason, Argentina requested a new intervention of the General Assembly, which, in December 1973, issued Resolution 3160 (XXVIII).Through this decision adopted by 116 positive votes, no negative votes and 14 abstentions (United Kingdom)- the General Assembly expressed its grave concern at the fact that eight years had elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX) without
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any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations; its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands; and reasserted the terms of Resolution 2065 declaring the need to proceed without delay with the negotiations. Meanwhile, Argentina complied with the commitments assumed under the 1971 Agreement, making efforts to assign important resources to: Establishing a weekly air transport service for passengers, cargo and correspondence between the Islands and the Argentine continental territory, constructing an airfield at Malvinas Islands, granting scholarships to the Islands students, building a fuel storage plant at the Islands, and rendering health care and evacuation services. But, in spite of the continued negotiations and the Argentine actions in favor of Islanders which certainly alleviated the responsibilities of the illegally occupying and administering country- the United Kingdom performed allegedly jurisdictional acts that were protested by the Argentine government. Therefore, in December 1976, the UN General Assembly adopted the important Resolution 31/49 by 102 votes to 1 (United Kingdom) with 32 abstentions. This Resolution called upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands were going through the process recommended in the above mentioned Resolutions 2065 and 3160. Likewise, as regards the unilateral British actions, the Inter-American Juridical Committee issued on January 16, 1976, a strong declaration asserting that the Argentine Republic had an unquestionable sovereignty right over Malvinas Islands, so that the fundamental issue to be solved was the procedure to restore the territory; and that British behavior was hostile in order to silence Argentine claims and aimed at hindering the development of the negotiations recommended by the UN General Assembly. After the South Atlantic Conflict and during 1982, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 37/9 in November 1982, making a new call upon the Argentine and British Governments to resume
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negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, and asking the Secretary-General to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the above mentioned request. This resolution was approved within the Question of Malvinas Islands, which was included in the agenda upon the request of Latin American countries that also endorsed the project, in a new show of regional solidarity. Between this year and 1988 when diplomatic relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom were interrupted, and were only resumed in 1990-, the General Assembly annually adopted similar resolutions. In 1985, the United Kingdom made its first attempt to introduce two amendments in the relevant project, in order to give preeminence to the principle of self-determination, but these amendments were rejected by a wide majority. As from 1989, the annual assessment of the Question of Malvinas Islands is made by the Special Committee on Decolonization, which is known as C-24 and is formed by 28 member countries, including five Latin American countries (Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela), and their appreciated participation and contribution. This Committee annually approves a resolution similar to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. As regards the Organization of American States, in 1982 its General Assembly approved a resolution in support of the resolution adopted that same year by the United Nations. The same organization adopted, in the following year, another resolution providing for the continued assessment of this question up to its final solution. In 1984, the General Assembly decided to declare the Question as a being of permanent hemispheric interest. Since then, the OAS principal body has annually considered the Question; and as from 1992, through a Declaration that has received unanimous support. Our countrys long tradition of promoting and participating in multilateralism, assuming the responsibility of a democratic country, has gained new momentum in the current presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, through a foreign policy that, while participating in peace and international security preservation, is
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directed, in general, to reformulating the institutional system in order to adapt it to current realities, and, in particular, to promoting the value of democracy and justice, respect for human rights and international law, fairness in international trade, and regional integrity. As regards Malvinas, in 2004 the question was permanently included in the agenda of the General Assembly, and careful attention was attached to following up on and cooperating with the activities of the Special Committee on Decolonization, including the annual participation of our Minister of Foreign Affairs in its special session on said Question. Furthermore, always within the framework of the United Nations, the Argentine government continues fostering the Secretary-Generals mission of good offices, which has been renewed by the General Assembly since 1982. These actions describe our position that respect for United Nations resolutions is vitally important to maintain this organization as the central instrument of the international system. In bilateral terms, since 1990, when Argentina and the United Kingdom resumed their diplomatic relations, both countries signed a series of provisional bilateral ad-hoc understandings under the sovereignty formula, aimed at cooperating with certain practical aspects related to the disputed area as a means to create an appropriate atmosphere to resume negotiations in order to solve the dispute. However, said objective has not been attained due to the United Kingdoms persistent reluctance to address the sovereignty issue, and to its continued performance of unilateral actions affecting the disputed area. These actions not only violate the spirit and letter of such understandings but also contradict the United Nations calling to both parties to the dispute (General Assembly Resolution 31/49, 1976) to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in the relevant resolutions. Said British unilateral actions prompted the Argentine government to formally communicate the British government, in March 2007, the termination of the Joint Declaration on Hydrocarbons; and caused the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission not to hold any further
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meetings since December 2005, not to reestablish scientific data exchange and not to make joint research cruises. The Argentine Government has carefully communicated these decisions to the United Nations Secretariat, as well as the protests submitted to the British Government for its unilateral actions, in order that these documents may be circulated as UN documents among the member countries of said organization. The British Government insists on its refusal to resume bilateral negotiations to reach a final solution to the sovereignty dispute and remains completely indifferent to the obligations equally imposed on Argentina and the United Kingdom as member countries of the world organization, and to the particular responsibility of the United Kingdom -as permanent member of the Security Council- to solve its disputes under the methods established in Article 33 of the Charter and to comply with the relevant General Assembly resolutions, all of this in spite of the repeated calls of the international community made at regional and inter-regional fora. On the contrary, the Argentine Republic has always manifested its willingness to negotiate, its openness to constructive dialogue, under the international mandate of the United Nations and similar statements of other regional and bi-regional fora. This position was reasserted by the Argentine President on March 28, 2009, at her meeting with the British Prime Minister in Via del Mar, Chile. It is worth mentioning that the Question of Malvinas Islands has been included in the agenda of international bodies other than the UN, which support Argentine legitimate rights or the call to resume bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom: Presidents of Mercosur Full and Associate Member Countries, Heads of State of South American countries, the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI, by its Spanish acronym), the Rio Group, the Organization of American States, the Ibero-American Summits, the Group of 77, the Summits of South American Presidents, the Summits of South American-Arab Countries (ASPA, by its Spanish acronym), the Africa-South America Summits (ASA), and the countries of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (which includes Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and 21 African coastal countries from South Africa to Senegal).
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Agustn M. Romero Bases to formulate an Argentine Foreign Policy for Malvinas
Agustn M. Romero *
Bases to formulate an Argentine Foreign Policy for Malvinas
INTRODUCTION Undoubtedly, all the subjects included in a countrys foreign policy agenda are important. However, this does not mean that all of them generate the same interest and attention in the citizens, or that politicians or rulers consider them with the same passion. The Question of Malvinas is one of the subjects that attracts more interest when formulating the foreign relationships of our country, because it constitutes a vital and strategic priority within the design of the Argentine foreign policy agenda. The Malvinas conflict also forms part of the concern of every Argentine government, without distinction of parties or ideologies, and it is so important that rulers are always quick to announce that the Question of Malvinas will be included in the immediate and unwaivable objectives of their foreign policy. Due to its very nature, it constitutes the most sensitive foreign policy subject that affects our national feelings and, for that reason, the different governments try to include the Question of Malvinas in every international political debate, including multilateral fora. Additionally,
* Professor of Argentine Foreign Policy at the Political Science Degree and at the Master in Foreign Relations. University of Buenos Aires. Fullbright Scholar. Author of Malvinas: La Poltica Exterior de Alfonsn y Menem, Editorial Belgrano, Universidad de Belgrano, Buenos. Aires., abril de 1999..
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this subject encompasses economic, commercial and strategic interests. Many historical events were landmarks in the Question of Malvinas but, undoubtedly, the war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 was the most important one of the last decades, because that conflict was a turning point in the bilateral relationship with the country that effectively controls the Southern islands and adjoining waters. One of the greatest challenges for Argentina at the Bicentennial is to establish and maintain a sound and long-term state policy as regards Malvinas and the Argentine interests in the South Atlantic area. This policy will only be achieved through a serious debate including all the sectors related to the permanent Argentine interests in the South Atlantic area (Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legislative Power, business chambers, academic centers, regional economies, intellectuals, among others). Only then will we be able to forge and sustain a minimum consensus in order to establish the guiding principles of our actions in Antarctica and the South Atlantic area. The Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee of the Honorable House of Deputies of the Nation is the meeting place, because it reflects the positions of all the political sectors represented in the House and the multidisciplinary approach of academics from different fields of knowledge. The House of Deputies is the most representative institution of Argentina, since it reflects the needs and interests of citizens, provinces, regional economies and businesspeople of the Argentine Republic. The final objective of this work is to create a debate and analysis framework on the basis of a set of guidelines that should serve during the decision-making process regarding Malvinas- to establish and maintain a State foreign policy about Malvinas Islands, adjoining maritime areas and Argentine Antarctica. 1. WHAT IS A STATE FOREIGN POLICY? Some previous considerations. There are two indispensable elements that contribute to the construction of what we will call foreign policy: the decision-making process and the implementation of the strategy. Not only the different branches of government but also a wide variety
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of non-governmental actors that influence the formulation of policies take part in the decision-making process. Governmental policies Governmental policies are those formulated by a certain government without a previous national pact or agreement. Consensus cannot be generated without this important element. This situation does not eliminate legitimacy or legality from policies, but on many occasions it deprives different national actors of their access to debate. State policies State policies, unlike governmental policies, are long-range tools which go beyond incumbent governments and are supported by consensus or national agreements. Some definitions of State foreign policy Mario Bergara points out that: A State policy is that which is built with the greatest consensus possible and is sustained beyond governments. Countries with State policy are easily identifiable without much information: they keep their basic diplomatic objectives unchanged for long periods.1 However, this same author adds that State policies coexist with governmental policies and foreign public management with strategic institutional aspects and tactical design and implementation aspects of public policies, for example: debt policy, foreign trade policy, etc.2 On the other hand, Luis Solari Tudela defines foreign policy as: A set of actions at the international arena serving its national interests.3 Finally, Javier Prez de Cuellar conceptualizes foreign policy as: The set of positions and actions that a State adopts in its relation with other States or within international organizations in order to preserve its security, interests and influence.4
1 Bergara, Mario (2004), Polticas de Estado y de Gobierno. Crnicas. Montevideo. Web Address: http//www.crnicas.com.uy/noticia_9846. html. In: lvarez Sabogal, Julio Alberto (2005). 2 Idem. 3 Solari Tudela, Luis (2004), Derecho Internacional Pblico, 8a. ed., Studium Ediciones. 4 Prez de Cuellar, Javier (1997), Manual de Derecho Diplomtico. Fondo de Cultura Econmica, Mxico.
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From my point of view, foreign policy is the set of tools and strategies selected by States in order to be connected with different actors of the international scenario, based on their interpretation of their position and role within the international system. The principal objective of these strategies is to defend previously set national interests.5 Finally, a State foreign policy arises from arduous debate and from an amalgam of the positions of the different actors that constitute the domestic system, but without losing sight of external variables. 2. DEFINING THE NEEDS AND COMPONENTS OF A STATE FOREIGN POLICY A State foreign policy has the strength to protect a long-term strategy in order to defend national interests against crises and electoral vicissitudes, as well as against political situational circumstances. The best framework to formulate a State foreign policy is democracy, because it offers the scenario in order that the different national actors may better contribute to the general debate on the subject and on strategies for external relations. A State foreign policy must try to eliminate abrupt and circumstantial changes in order to show at the international level- a country image of soundness, responsibility, predictability and coherence. A true State foreign policy must establish the programmatic bases as regards the link with international actors and the international system as a whole. A true foreign policy, based on a sincere consensus or national agreement, will be grounded on foundations and guidelines which will defend national interests and the best opportunities to integrate with the international community. Once this consensus has been attained and the fundamental design guidelines of that foreign policy have been defined, all national actors will work to reach the proposed objectives and will not try to put obstacles in the way or a spoke in somebodys wheel. This is so because there will be an understanding that if pre-established
5 Romero, Agustn M. Definiciones y actores en las relaciones internacionales in Puertas a la poltica, Editorial Puertas de la Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (UADE), 2007.
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objectives are achieved, the successful outcome will not be attributable to one government or another, but to the country as a whole. To have and to strengthen a solid foreign state policy does not mean the absence of disagreements or criticisms. It does not imply either the absence of opposition or dissent but the need to work for the construction of contractual bases which prevent political destruction and paralysis. On many occasions, electoral processes and interests make it difficult to work with long term objectives, favoring above all electoral purposes. When we pose the need to develop a foreign state policy we face several problems or challenges. First, this area of survey or analysis has always been reserved to specialists or to an erudite elite who have had in their hands its development and implementation. In fact, there was (and there still is) a very widespread and shared idea according to which foreign policy subjects were only reserved to experts and academicians. In this way, the rest of the population was discredited and deprived of access to this sensitive area. In this same sense, as regards speeches of electoral campaigns and political platforms, the subjects related to foreign affairs are not an essential part of the debates. Consequently, they are considered as minor subjects in order to define what kind of country we want to have and what kind of international links we desire. Since the re-establishment of democracy in 1983 and with a greater democratization in the process of debate, generation of proposals and formulation of a foreign policy, the basis of a necessary foreign State policy has been developing. At this point, the National Congress could be a forum for the discussion and generation of ideas and projects because all the citizens, the big political forces and the civil society organized through NGOs, are represented there. Here a new element appears: the Parliamentary Diplomacy. So, it is necessary to formulate a State policy as a medium and long term strategy. This foreign relations strategy of our country should, at least, contain four important programmatic principles or pillars.
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. Social legitimacy . Continuity and permanent commitment . Consensus about the need to establish it . A common denominator to agree on its contents No democratic government has managed (under the above mentioned parameters) to establish and ensure the continuity of a real foreign State policy. This situation is historical (it is very usual in many other subjects) and reveals the immaturity of a large part of the Argentine ruling class, a great lack of interest in dialogue and openness. In other words, consensus must be reached among the different political forces about the model of foreign policy that our country wants to adopt with respect to Malvinas. Consequently, the margins of action would be reduced but not removed. It is in this aspect that each government must impose its own rhythm and style as regards design and planning. Therefore, there should be certain continuity and not a sudden change in the objectives pursued with respect to Malvinas. However, the task of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee must be an example for other areas of the Argentine foreign policy to establish long term bases of interests and strategies. The promotion, development and support of a foreign state policy project shall benefit the country because States which really want to grow and have an important role in the international system need a foreign policy that goes beyond the ruling party, taking into account that national interests are permanent while governments are temporary. The idea of reaching consensus about a State policy will not only be attributed to this government but to the political maturity attained by the Argentine ruling class at least in one subject. 3. BASES TO ACHIEVE AND KEEP A FOREIGN STATE POLICY FOR MALVINAS The framework of our countrys Bicentennial is a very good excuse to face one of Argentinas greatest challenges in the sphere of State policies: to be able to establish a set of guidelines as parameters to guide and sustain our actions towards Malvinas, including the perspective of our interests in the South Atlantic from a political,
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legal, and natural resources point of view, among the most important ones. The bases of the discussion about the development and implementation of the Argentine policy towards Malvinas should be framed within the following aspects: 1 The most important international legal foundations of Argentina are resolution 2065 of the General Assembly of the United Nations (cornerstone of the Argentine claims about sovereignty over the islands) and different resolutions of the Decolonization Committee of the same multilateral forum, which recognizes that the Question of Malvinas is a sovereignty conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom. In this same sense, the British government itself held that islanders have a limited autonomy. In this sense, there is a permanent disregard by the United Kingdom, of the resolutions about the Question of Malvinas Islands adopted since 1965 by the General Assembly and the Special Decolonization Committee of the United Nations which exhort both countries to solve the question of the southern islands sovereignty. Resolution 2065 (XX) issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations and cornerstone of the Argentine claim exhorts the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to immediately resume the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee in charge of examining the situation related to the application of the statement on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem, duly taking into account the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of Resolution 1514 (XV), as well as the islanders interests. It is time that London leaves behind its colonialist policy and recognizes that its presence in the South Atlantic is an anachronistic and regrettable situation if we take into account the development of modern societies. It is incomprehensible that a standing member of the Security Council of the UN fails to comply with resolutions and, at the same time, compels other members to respect the provisions issued by that multilateral organization.
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2. To work with our MERCOSUR partners and friends. With respect to this objective, we should remember the second resolution of strictly political nature adopted at the meeting of the Presidents of the MERCOSUR member countries, the Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Chile, signed on June 25, 1996 at Potrero de los Funes, Argentine Republic, named Statement on Malvinas, in which they support once more the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty conflict about the Question of Malvinas. Likewise, the Presidents of the MERCOSUR member countries and associate states have expressed once more that the adoption of unilateral measures by the United Kingdom of Great Britain is not consistent with the provisions of the United Nations and they have also stressed the regional interest in achieving a solution as soon as possible for the long sovereignty conflict between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime spaces, according to the United Nations resolutions and the statements of the Organization of American States, of the MERCOSUR and of other regional and multilateral fora. Our MERCOSUR brother countries have constantly stated that the intention of considering the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands as countries and territories to which the Fourth Part of the Treaty which establishes the European Community may be applied, is inconsistent with the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic with respect to the sovereignty dispute over such archipelago. Another example of South American solidarity was the decision of preventing any flight to or from Puerto Argentino from making a stopover in any territory of the MERCOSUR without previously touching the Argentine territory. 3. We should remember that the core of any platform of political action is the mandate of the Argentine Constitution of respecting the interests and not the wishes of the islanders. 4. With respect to the islanders role, it must be established that they could participate in the negotiations about the substantial controversy
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as observers or members of the United Kingdom delegation but not as a third party of the discussion because the dispute on the Malvinas sovereignty is a bilateral conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain. 5. The presence of national legislators both of the ruling party and of the political forces of the opposition in the official delegations of our country before the different international fora and bilateral relationships, in which the Malvinas question is posed, because in this way the national project of establishing a state policy is reinforced. Examples of the before mentioned are the different missions to foreign countries of Deputies of the Nation belonging to different parties. 6. Our country must go on respecting the fundamental principle of the international law according to which war does not give rights and the solution of the conflicts must be peaceful. In fact, since the re-establishment of democracy, no government has tried to repeat a confrontation strategy but to reaffirm our wish of holding peaceful negotiations with Great Britain according to the rules of the international law and different resolutions of the United Nations that exhort both parties to find an agreement through peaceful means with respect to the sovereignty over the southern archipelago. 7. The political, economic, cultural, scientific-technological and military links between our country and Great Britain should be increasingly strengthened. This may be observed in the close cooperation that exists between the Argentine and the British diplomacy at different international fora with respect to several political and key economic issues of world politics. 8 No government has followed the instructions of the United Kingdom about dropping the claim. This has been highlighted at different international meetings and even at bilateral meetings of high level where our presidents have reaffirmed our sovereign rights over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and their adjoining maritime spaces and the need for a new negotiating table and for an immediate conclusion of the colonial situation at the South Atlantic. 9 Finally, go on submitting the issue of the sovereignty conflict over the Malvinas Islands and their adjoining waters at every multilateral,
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regional and even bilateral forum in order to include it as a subject of obligatory consideration at international level. Some of these parameters have been adopted by different governments but not in a synchronized or harmonious way. The challenge is to translate these proposals into actions. The Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee is committed to the project of consolidating the design of a foreign state policy to defend and promote the Argentine interests in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic area.
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Federico Lorenz Representations of the enemy during Malvinas War. A contribution to the bicentennial.
Federico Lorenz *
Representations of the enemy during Malvinas War. A contribution to the bicentennial.
Enemy: Person to whom his evil nature moves to deny our merits or to exhibit the superiority of his own ones. Ambrose Bierce, The Devils Dictionary.
Introduction. Wars share, with perfect dates as that of the Bicentennial, a catalytic effect. Different social and institutional actors express their opinion about a series of elements which constitute their identities: the nation, the people, the homeland, the territory. To do it, they rely on the historical account built and sustained for decades and on the images they create about their neighbors, regardless of whether they are friends or not. The historization of those processes allows us to detect some changing elements about decisive or very significant events of the national history. Following an old popular desire, the Military Junta in power since 1976- planned an ordered a disembarkation that resulted in the recovery of the Argentine sovereignty over the
* Historian. He published Las guerras por Malvinas (2006), Cruces. Idas y vueltas de Malvinas (2007), Fantasmas de Malvinas. Un libro de viajes (2008) and Malvinas. Una guerra argentina (2009), as well as several articles about the recent Argentine History.
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islands. Deligitimated by the economic crisis and reports of human rights violations, the military in power attained a wide consensus with the measure. But it was an ephemeral presence that ended up in June, 1982, with the surrender of the Argentine military garrison to the forces of General Jeremy Moore. Argentina and Great Britain have a long history of relations mainly built up since the second half of the nineteenth century, which coincides with the national organization period in the case of the River Plate, and with the second industrial revolution from the British point of view. Prior to this period, the River Plate has been an object of conflict between the Spanish crown and the British. Thus, between 1806 and 1807, the Port of Buenos Aires was invalidated on two occasions by English forces, which were defeated both times. In spite of this situation or precisely since then- the economic and cultural links were more lasting and they grew stronger during Independence wars. Between 1953 and 1954, Argentina was consolidated as one of the main informal colonies to use the expression of Eric Hobsbawm- of the British Empire. Its livestock and grain production had an essential role in the English economy; in turn, it became an important market for the manufactures of the island. In Argentina, this dependency relation coexisted with a nationalist culture that assigned to Argentina a central place in America as a supposed bastion of Latin American cultural traditions, economically sustained by an agro-exports structure highly dependent on foreign countries in general and on Great Britain in particular. After the end of the First World War, the consequent economic crisis caused not only by the world context but also by the exhaustion of the agro-exports model, posed some doubts about the success of such equation. A current of thought, that harshly criticized the relations between the dominant elites of Argentina and the British Empire, began to consolidate. That economic and ideological dependency was seen as the main cause of Argentinas evils. On the other hand, the Army central institution in the national politics, which has been key since the coup of 1930- was intellectually and professionally influenced by Germany (this was not the case of the Navy). The presence of the British community in the Argentine society,
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though scarce in number, is very important at a symbolic level.1 Shortly before the war of 1982 it was still widely accepted among the dominant classes and important sectors of the society, what was particularly evident during the two world wars.2 Reports against imperialism coexisted with a great respect for the British habits and institutions. During the sixties and the seventies revolutionary groups, more radical or less radical leftist groups, intensified the antiimperialist discourse, but the relation with Great Britain was pushed to the background, as the stage which preceded the present American imperialism. Malvinas war, in 1982, was an accident in a century and a half of stable relations, though marked by the usurpation of the southern archipelago in 1833. How was the British enemy characterized during the conflict and afterwards? What elements of the British history, particularly the world wars, were taken by the Argentine propaganda to justify the victory and to explain the defeat later? In what vision of the Argentine history was the armed conflict of AprilJune, 1982, included? This text proposes a review of some of the representations of the British adversary during and after the war, based on the idea that knowing them may throw light on some aspects of the self-representations of certain social sectors and may also show the volatility of such images and the changing state of some representations which are considered essential (as those related to the identity), in spite of some worrying delays. THE NEW AND THE OLD. The disembarkation of April 2 was backed by several sectors of the Argentine society. Even many of the victims of the military dictatorship, in prison or in exile, agreed on the recovery, which was seen as an old wish of Argentinians. Since the end of the nineteenth
1 See, for example, the special issue of the magazine Todo es historia, The British in Argentina, N 374, September of 1998 and Andrea Graham Yool, La colonia olvidada, Buenos Aires, Emec, 2007. 2 See Otero, Hernn, La guerra en la sangre. Los franco-argentinos ante la Primera Guerra Mundial, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2009 and Lorenz, Federico, Voluntarios argentinos en la Gran Guerra, in Todo es Historia, N 373, August 1998.
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century, the courses of study and several public initiatives focused on Malvinas islands and their recovery, becoming a landmark in the consolidation of a national history.3 The imminence of the war relied strongly on that vindication wish and, mainly, on a vision of history which conceived an Argentine past as a long process that in a natural way would lead to a fair vindication and recovery of the archipelago. The media, clearly aligned (willingly or unwillingly) with the speech of the dictatorial government4 found in the Argentine history a series of symbols to characterize the conflict. One of the closest to the military dictatorship, for example, characterized the disembarkation of Malvinas in two centuries of history. The eight English invasions, was the title,5 appealing to the school memory of any Argentinian who remembered the confrontations of 1806 and 1807. In this case, these eight invasions were: January of 1765 (confrontations between the Spanish and the British crowns about the ports which controlled the Rio de la Plata mouth); June of 1806 and June of 1807 (the two English invasions that attempted to occupy Buenos Aires port); January of 1833 (the occupation of Malvinas islands by the Clo crew); November of 1845 (the attack of the Argentine coast river by the English-French squadron); July of 1908 (British occupation of the Georgias del Sur islands); and, finally, April of 1982. In this way, the conflict was associated with some landmarks of a strong symbolic presence in the Argentine public imagination and more specifically in the historical account that was the heritage of nationalist sectors which range from the most ancient right to the revolutionary left (the latter being the preferred target of the illegal repression).
3 See Romero, Luis Alberto (coordinator), La Argentina en la escuela. La idea de nacin en los textos escolares, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI, 2004 and especially Guber, Rosana, Por qu Malvinas? De la causa nacional a la guerra absurda, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 2001. 4 Blaustein, Eduardo and Zubieta, Martn, Decamos ayer. La prensa argentina bajo el Proceso, Buenos Aires, Colihue, 1998. A particular study of the Argentine graphic press during the Malvinas war (although from an exclusively semiological point of view) is Lucrecia Escuderos Malvinas: el gran relato. Fuentes y rumores en la informacin de guerra. Barcelona, Gedisa, 1996. 5 Gente N 875, 29/4/1982.
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This historical circumstance gave rise to one of the strongest arguments of the war, which defined Great Britain as an old colonialist power with anachronistic intentions in opposition to a young nation that was exerting a vindication right legitimated by history: On one hand, a country that, as ours, is known by its long peaceful tradition but that at the same time is under a military government without good press at the main information and communication centers of the free world; on the other hand, a second rank power that in many aspects -for example, as regards its navy- has been until recently one of the world superpowers.6 Faced with the contradictory situation of stigmatizing a country which had traditionally been seen with a favorable look, some analysts opted for describing the British as torn out by a cultural prestigious tradition that was conditioned by an imperialist vocation. It was a society that had to face that old inflamed beast of colonialism which does not resign itself to die: The 18000 km of historical involution made by England from London to the Georgias del Sur and Malvinas Islands placed on the shoulders of the most progressive sectors of the English people the burden of a hard and urgent task: to get rid of the colonialist domination that still conditions the course of its culture; only in this way it shall be finally able to leave behind the modern primitivism which alienates the British life.7 HISTORY GIVES US JUSTICE. From this point of view, the British primitivism was concentrated, by the Argentine propaganda, on two elements: Its condition of declining and second rank power and its lack of reasons to fight. A
6 Schnfeld, Manfred, The recovery of Malvinas, by our country, was a matter of international priority in the entire world, in La Prensa, 4/4/1982. Manfred Schonfeld expressed, during the years of the dictatorship and up to the mid eighties, the thought of those sectors of the right that supported the military coup but criticized the illegal methods of extermination. 7 Kovadloff, Santiago, Las Malvinas, Macbeth y los brbaros modernos, in Clarin, 19/4/1982.
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good example is the letter that an Argentine journalist writes to his son, from his garrison in the Patagonia, because it includes these elements together with the founding nature that the Argentine government gave to the war: The Greeks began to feel Greeks (they had that consciense for the first time) when they fought against the Persians at the Peloponnese. Max, here you are the Greek, not the Persian (... ) You do not belong to a country where young people wear shorts with the image of their flag. You are not from a country where on Friday nights, most young people prefer to drink beer with friends rather than love a woman. You do not belong to the country of Drake or Morgan but to the country of Belgrano and Sarmiento.8 This decadent image was also related to the false morals of the repression years in Argentina. The capture of the marines barracks at Moody Brooke, for example, generated, from the captured photos and material, a series of special reports where the English were described as drug addicts, drunkards and daily readers of pornographic material.9 The Argentine propaganda designed Great Britain as a second rank military power, the prestige of which was no longer enough to impose respect: they speculate ( ... ) with our inexperience in modern war affairs and with the quasi-mystic aura that would surround the majestic silhouettes of a set of war ships in the horizon. They speculate with the Royal Navy fame and they are entitled to do so. Bet, lets say it again, it is not more than a bluff and we should not be deceived by it.10 That secondary nature was early reinforced by the emphasis on the American support received by them. Surreptitiously during the negotiations period (that is to say, up to the sinking of the General
8 Gente N 880, 3/6/1982. 9 El archivo secreto de los marines en Malvinas, Gente 876. 6/5/1982. 10 Schnfeld, Manfred, La guerra austral, Buenos Aires, Desafos Editores, 1982, p. 43.
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Belgrano Cruiser), this was an always present element that would lead, in turn, to enhance the Argentine merit: Are our defeatist fellow countrymen -those who still keep a silent loyalty of widowers to the England of other times, those who prefer to give credit to the English news rather than to ours- aware of what means that the two main Anglo-Saxon powers should act by mutual agreement, one attacking and the other spying through satellites and providing logistical support, because otherwise they would not dare to attack Argentina? We are almost tempted to feel full of ourselves! Anyone would think that we are a superpower armed to the teeth.11 Up to 1982, the last international confrontation in which Argentina took part was the war with Paraguay (1865-1870). However, many Argentine military men considered that they had enough war experience to fight against Great Britain: the experience acquired in the struggle against subversion which, for the general public in those years, was something very different from what today is acknowledged as the massacre perpetrated by the Government and that at the same time for wide sectors of the armed forces appeared as a heroic deed.12 Precisely an advertising slogan of 1982 showed some manoeuvres of the Argentine Army and defined it as undefeated. The case of the military governor of Malvinas Islands, Mario Benjamn Menndez, is paradigmatic. He had participated in 1975 in the Independencia Operation, aimed at annihilating the Guerrilla focus initiated by the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP):13
11 Schnfeld, Manfred, La guerra austral, Buenos Aires, pp. 192-193. 12 Cardoso, Oscar; Kirschbaum, Ricardo; van der Kooy, Eduardo, Malvinas. La trama secreta, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana-Planeta, 1983, p. 66. 13 Menndez was under the orders of General Antonio Domingo Bussi, under whose command the first 14 clandestine detention centers of Tucumn province were established. Some testimonies of survivors and soldiers under the orders of Bussi remember that he obliged his officers to participate at least once in an execution of prisoners.
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Mario Benjamn Menndez appeared to be an officer with strong convictions and clear explanations. It was 1975 and that colonel was going through a cruel, hard and anarchical war. A war against an enemy capable of any resource, of any trap. And at that front, that colonel moved with absolute efficiency. He knew his rival and knew that he could win him. Finally, the victory in Tucumn was absolute (... ) Today, Mario Benjamn Menndez is a general and is in another front, in another battle.14 To the British decadence, the Argentine official propaganda added the lack of conviction of its soldiers. The Argentine soldiers, on the contrary, knew the legitimacy of their claim and this fact nurtured their conviction in the battle: Because the enemy does not clearly know why he is fighting. Because we know why we are fighting. Because we are not walking against history. Because we are 28 million soldiers. Because we never lost a war. Because we are fighting in our country, for our country.15 With respect to the main revolution of 1810, some media began to report the war actions at the southern islands in a section titled the new heroes of May, posing a historical continuity to the initial event of the independent Argentine history. If at that moment, Argentinians had passed through a decisive proof for their future, the war in the islands would constitute a new landmark: today the country is a book of history that is being written. Also in this May 25 of 1982, that year in which they invaded us again and we threw them away once more, as it will be said in the future.16 Faced with these convictions and foundations, the English adversary placed its colonialist will against history and its troops without a spirit of struggle. The British regular
14 La otra guerra del general Menndez, Gente N 875, 29/4/1982. 15 Argentinos a vencer, in Cronica, 11/5/1982. 16 Schnfeld, Manfred, La guerra austral, P. 245.
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army was described as an army of mercenaries. For this purpose, the announcement of sending Gurkhas troops to the islands was a central element of the Argentine propaganda. The Nepalese men are those who fight for others: in 1857 during the great rebellion of India they were loyal to the English. In return, the English made them lose their conscience of class, using them as soldiers. The other Nepalese people also look down on them. They were hired in 1900 during the expedition to China and during the First and Second Wars. They are mercenaries, they have no homeland for which to fight. Nepal has 14 million inhabitants and only 2000 (two thousand) hospital beds. They only fight for money. In their fists and in their hearts the word patriotism does not exist.17 Likewise, another publication added racist elements to the satanization of Nepalese people. They are neither English nor warriors, but murderers for money who confront Argentine patriots, and they are not -physically or morally- English. They are short, they have almond-shaped eyes and a bloodthirsty tradition that makes them undesirable in their own land.18 For the Argentine propaganda, between April and June, 1982, an army of mercenaries belonging to a decadent nation confronted the patriots of a young country the armed forces of which were undefeated and had recently triumphed in the struggle against subversion. How to explain the victory of Great Britain at the two world wars? How to redirect the Argentine affinity with the allies in both conflicts? HISTORY JUSTIFIES OUR VICTORY. The British performance at the Second World War had a main role in the Argentine propaganda. On one hand, it was useful to show that even a power could be defeated. On the other, to highlight some defects of the adversary and, as a counterpart, our own virtues. If with the example of the gurkhas the Argentine propaganda showed the British lack of motivation and pragmatism, other episodes were useful to describe them as cold and calculating. In the days prior to the disembarkation at the San Carlos Strait, a survey published
17 Los que pelean por otros, Gente, N 878, 20/5/1982. 18 La Semana, N 294, 17/6/1982.
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in a magazine of massive circulation recalled the disembarkation in Normandy to explain why the British offensive would fail: In this place there are two kinds of men... those who have died... and those who are going to die. Lets go out of this hell!! Those were the historical words of Colonel George A. Taylor, Commander in Chief of the 16 disembarkation Division. This may be the scenario faced by the British marines if they decide to challenge the 10000 Argentine soldiers that wait in strategic points. (... ) The violent seaplane attacks are still one of the cruelest expeditions of the war. In June 1944, the Allied Command estimated that during the invasion to France they would have 42% of casualties among its disembarkation troops and 25% among the troops transported by air. The estimations were quite precise. In Omaha, 40% of most units were lost. Hundreds of men died in the amphibious tanks when they were literally turned down by the waves. Many paratroopers thrown over what seemed to be a prairie fell in marshy zones and died in a meter of water, trapped by swamps and by the weight of their equipment.19 In a typical style of that time, the note stated the disembarkation costs but it never mentioned that it had been successful. This kind of notes was completed by those which explained that the long time of navigation would seriously affect the operation capacity of the British, referring to the South Atlantic General in evident reference to the General winter which had defeated the Grande Armee of Napoleon and to the Wehmacht of Adolf Hitler. The evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkerque (1940) was also repeatedly mentioned in the texts of the war time. Those mentions showed how the British transformed defeats into victories and, indirectly, questioned the truth of their media reports (which were not being received by Argentina). It is said that Great Britain feels more comfortable remembering its
19 Siete Das, N 778 12/5 to 18/5 of 1982.
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defeats because those memories foster the capacity of reaction and unifies the efforts of a people that, otherwise, would be in the middle of endless disputes. A glance at the recent British history allows us to observe, with no surprise, that the catastrophe of Dunkerque, for example, is interpreted as an evidence of the British capacity to face adversity.20 Besides, this adversary who did not recognize his own defeats or who transformed them into victories- did not respect the honor codes of wars. The sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano triggered the images of betrayal. The article titled The betrayal of the old warrior established a bridge between the Second War and the conflict of 1982, embodied in the ship that, before being acquired by the Argentine government had fought with the flag of the United States: This was not the first time in which the cruiser General Belgrano felt a cunning blow. On December 7, 1941 (when it belonged to the United States fleet under the name of Phoenix) it was anchored at Pearl Harbor naval base, at the Hawaii Islands, where it suffered no damage from the unexpected attack of the Japanese air force.21 Pearl Harbor as a betrayal model appeared not only with relation to the sinking of the Belgrano, but also to the British attack to the Argentine garrison in the Georgias Islands: We still know who is who, there is still a recognizable enemy flag. But don`t expect to find much more than this. Because, while the cables mentioned the meeting of Queen Elizabeth II with Margaret Thatcher and with the other Ministers of her Cabinet, to decide whether to declare the war or not ( ) Grytviken, at our island San Pedro, belonging to the Argentine archipelago of the Georgias del Sur was being bombarded by the British ships; from the air, an Argentine submarine peacefully anchored in its station was bombarded (an
20 Siete Das, N 777, from 5/5 to 11/5 of 1982 21 Siete Das, N 777, from 5/5 to 11/5 of 1982
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anchored submarine cannot do anything else at such a moment than having a peaceful attitude); there had already been an attempt of disembarkation of marines and, undoubtedly, on the publishing of this issue, the heroic Argentine garrison would have surrendered. There was only one case (...) in which a situation of similar hypocrisy was registered. We are mentioning the then Japanese Ambassador in the United States, Saburo Kurusu, who was making his way with all the solemnity of the case towards the seat of the corresponding American authorities to submit the document which contained the pompous text of the declaration of war who was received with a bittersweet salutation: The news about the attack to Pearl Harbour had arrived some minutes ago! 22 It is not the intention of this text to analyze the appropriateness of such war actions, but rather to show how they were seen during the conflict. Especially because the characterization of the adversary in these terms responded to the previous perception of the British that, as we have already mentioned, nurtured the nationalist readings of the Argentine history. The readers mails published during the Malvinas war include many of these prejudices. The British pragmatism, which had cost the lives of more than three hundred Argentine marines to produce a casus belli, also had a historical background. The United Kingdom, taking into account the needs of the battle, did not even take care of the lives of its own allies. In a letter titled Victims of the British, a reader remembers that: a recent Australian film tells the sacrifice of Anzac, Australian-New Zelander army that fought in favor of the British glory. From July to October 1941, the best part of the Australian army was cornered at Tobruk by the army of Rommel. The Prime Minister of that country, Menzies, protested to London about such sacrifice of lives. He did it once and again. Finally, after hard discussions, the English government replaced the Australians, but not with British soldiers. Polish soldiers were used.
22 Schnfeld, Manfred, La guerra austral, pp. 120-121.
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When it was necessary to try out disembarkations at the North of France, the lack of experience left a lot of fatal victims: At Dieppe Port all the sacrificed persons were Canadian.23 The same reader, after the sinking of the Belgrano, made an analogy between the famous sinking (also through torpedoes) produced during the First World War to remark again the disregard for human lives in the face of political needs; in sum, the pragmatism of the adversary even against essential questions of solidarity, loyalty and humanity: Great Britain was also capable of other actions which do not precisely honor its honesty. It was capable, for example, of sacrificing the life of one thousand and five hundred civil passengers, including among them more than 400 American citizens who were travelling in the ship Lusitania. In spite of the warnings received from Germany according to which any ship going through British jurisdictional waters would be torpedoed, London ordered the circulation of the ship in those waters at night and with the lights on with the intention of winning the support of the American public opinion due to the indignation generated by the attack. This triggered the entry of the United States to the First World War. Besides, Great Britain was capable of sinking the French fleet, its ally until some days before, which was cornered and defenceless at Mers-El-Kebir, Northern Africa, purely and exclusively to show that London kept its warrior spirit against the Third Reich.24 Foreign communities which in many cases included veterans of both world wars- were a direct link with the memories of the Second World War. In this case, the appeal to that story had two senses. The first one, to criticize western countries which had aligned with Great Britain in the diplomatic conflict. The other one, to ensure a continuity between both confrontations. In both cases, the legitimacy to speak was given by the sacrifice in conflicts in which Great Britain had been
23 Clarn, 25/5/1982. 24 Clarn, 3/5/1982.
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on the side of freedom; in the second one, instead, the notion of an ancestral confrontation -a struggle which passed from parents to sons- was built. The headmaster of an English school of the southern area of the Greater Buenos Aires, for example, remembered that: We have helped to train several generations of Argentinians teaching them to contribute to the peace, safety and development of the nation and the world. In this way, in the Second World War, 124 former students joined the troops that fought for peace, and eight of them gave their lives for the ideals of freedom. () In this painful circumstance for the world we see with surprise that the attitude of the Argentine Republic of vindicating its sovereignty over the South Atlantic islands has caused an inexplicable and unfair war threat of unforeseeable consequences.25 The underlying idea is that Argentina- in this case through Argentinians descending from Europeans- had contributed to fair causes in the past and that, instead, with respect to the conflict with Great Britain and in spite of its historical support to the cause of freedom of different European nations, was alone. During the Second World War the French community founded in Buenos Aires the De Gaulle Committee of Free France to help the French forces in the exile. Some Argentinians descending from the French went to the Committee to collaborate and many of them joined the forces of General De Gaulle some time later. Among the friends who left, I remember Marchaleis who died in an act of war in England and Bois who shared the same fate in France. Other ones spread their heroic Argentine blood over different nations of Europe and Africa. Today, verifying with deep sadness the belligerent attitude of Great Britain I wonder if the loss of those heroes and the injuries of those who returned mutilated, was worth it.26
25 Clarn, 24/4/1982. 26 Clarn, 17/5/1982.
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The attitude of other governments was criticized this time taking up again some negative aspects of Great Britain, appealing once more to essential questions related to the war. An Argentinian of Jewish origin, a former Israeli soldier, criticized in this way the abstention of that country in the conflict. Apparently, General Sharon forgets that before 1948 he had to fight precisely against the English colonialists to attain the independence of the state of Israel and a lot of Jewish blood was spread in vain due to the stubborn attitude of Her Gracious Majesty. It is forgotten that those who deported Jewish from Palestine to the Nazi Europe during the Holocaust were English colonialists. So, this man suffering from amnesia can not advice us -the Jewish-Argentinians- about which is our place when our homeland needs us.27 In the case of the countries which have fought with Great Britain during the Second War, the crisis of 1982 was understood in the light of the previous conflict. A daughter of Germans, interviewed for a newspaper said to the nation of her parents that Germany should remember who its real friend is, and that only the Graff Spee crew adhered to the recovery.28 A publication of the Argentine Army, on the twentieth anniversary of Malvinas war, includes these links. The publication of the biography of a soldier dead in the war states that Jos Gurrieri, father of the soldier dead in Malvinas, had also had his war against the British forty years ago. It was in the North of Africa, wearing the uniform of his native country, Italy. Moved by the loss of Ricardo, the man wrote a book of memories where his memories are mixed with the recent pain. The same text chooses the following abstract of the writing of the father, when it establishes the strongest link: the blood of my son, the same blood that ran in my veins, could be shed again in the struggle with the English enemy.29
27 Clarn, 9/6/1982 28 Clarn, 7/5/1982 29 Fundacin Soldados, Malvinas 20 Aos 20 Hroes, Buenos Aires, 2002, p. 37
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These fragments become relevant in the context of a press that up to the moment of the war did not leave too much space to this kind of notes, taking into account the prevailing anonymous and impersonal information. The testimonies or letters written by war veterans, representatives of communities and disappointed volunteers filled a very important space in the war press. The Second World War also appeared when the de facto President, Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, was described with a physical and gestural resemblance to George S. Patton (this fact proportionally increased his later discredit): Based on these data and on his impressive physical build, some of the helpful civilians that always dwell the commands in chief as advisors designed and promoted a kind of campaign to establish an analogy between this descendant of Italians and legendary General Patton, American hero of the Second World War. Except for some features of their faces and for a cruel language, these men had little more in common.30 Two other conflicts also appeared in the Argentine propaganda due to different reasons. The Vietnam war, as a model that showed that an armed nation could defeat a military power. The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicanor Costa Mndez, declared to the BBC: I think that Malvinas may result in a Vietnam for Great Britain. It is a place located at 10000 miles from London and it is very difficult to defend for the British.31 In the letters from the readers we find that a reader exhorts us to remember that for all historians, including American ones, The Vietnam war closed the colonialism cycle in the world.32 The Spanish civil war was also an important element in the memory of Malvinas. But the examples used by the memory also provide some keys about the kind of readings of history made by some nationalist sectors linked to the military. If the siege and the successful defense of Madrid by the Republicans could represent the undefeated resistance
30 Cardoso, Oscar; Kirschbaum, Ricardo; van der Kooy, Eduardo, Malvinas. La trama secreta, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana-Planeta, 1983, p. 22. 31 Cardoso, Oscar; Kirschbaum, Ricardo; van der Kooy, Eduardo, Malvinas. La trama secreta, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana-Planeta, 1983, p. 213. 32 Clarn, 19/4/1982.
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to a superior adversary, the chief of the Argentine Navy chose another kind of comparison, more consistent with his ideology: For the first time Anaya (the Navy commander) left aside his enigmatic attitude and commented with unusual enthusiasm: This is going to be like the Alczar of Toledo. Jofre (Staff Officer at Malvinas) did not want to be left behind and added with exaggerated optimism: The Alczar of Toledo shall be insignificant Admiral.33 HISTORY EXPLAINS THE DEFEAT The defeat at Malvinas war triggered the discredit of the Military Junta in power. Besides, it became a sign of information openness. After June 1982, the news and reports of violations to human rights were common. This fact introduced a situation of great complexity from the point of view of the social appropriation of the past: in many cases, the officers who had fought in a legitimate war had also participated in aberrant crimes against humanity. The support to the recovery by the de facto government also meant the support to military men considered as murderers of compatriots. For the armed forces, in general, this distinction was not so drastic and it was even irrelevant, but it became a political problem due to the civilian questionings. In 1998, Alfredo Astiz - an intermediate officer of the Navy who had participated in the illegal repression (was involved in several important events: his infiltration in the group of Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the kidnapping of two French nuns and the murder of the Swedish citizen Dagmar Hagelin) and had surrendered at the Georgias- declared in an interview which caused indignation: I was in four wars. And in more than thirty combats. I took part of the war against subversion, I was infiltrated in the enemy line with the Chileans, when it was said that there was no war, I was at Malvinas and I was an observer in Algeria. This is my fifth war. To keep silent, to contain myself all this time without saying a word, is my last war.34
33 Cardoso, Oscar; Kirschbaum, Ricardo; van der Kooy, Eduardo, Malvinas. La trama secreta, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana-Planeta, 1983, p. 282. 34 Trespuntos, Ao I, N 24, enero de 1998, p. 9.
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This was not an isolated feeling. On one hand, as we have already mentioned, during the war the participation in the repression had been, as in Menendez case, a favourable antecedent. The problem is that the defeat implied a crisis for both processes, which for commanders were a part of the same logic from which they interpreted history. What explanations could be found for the defeat? From the point of view of the Armed Forces, these ones had to comply with a double purpose: On one hand, to justify what soon began to be known as a model of improvisation and neglect for the subordinated. On the other hand, to offer elements so that the heroic deed of Malvinas could be contrasted to the reports of human rights violations. In this text I will mainly focus on the first of these aspects. As regards the second one, I will only point out that it tried to involve the civil society in the generalized will to review the recent past, based on the massive adherence to the recovery of April 1982, and to avoid a process through which the soldiers who died in the war were symbolically compared to the young people who disappeared during the dictatorship.35 In a turn proper of Koperniko, the same elements that during the conflict were used to delegitimate the adversary, were now the key to explain the failure. If, before, the history had taught that the intention of Great Britain was anachronistic and that it was a decadent empire, the passing of time (and the result of the war) gave a new vision of the situation. An important political analyst and military historian, in the publication issued in honour of the Army that we mentioned before, writes in the preface that: Some lessons of history without which we use to make important strategical mistakes - were underestimated. It was forgotten that the alliance between Great Britain and the United States has a historical weight. That it not only existed at the two world wars but also in the NATO framework in the struggle against the Soviet bloc. The British military participation together with the United States, both at the Gulf
35 I have dealt with this aspect of the post-dictatorship in Lorenz, Federico, Las guerras por Malvinas, Buenos Aires, Edhasa, 2006.
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conflict and at Afghanistan, confirms the existence of a permanent alliance with Washington in the strategic decisions of London.36 On the other hand, the culture and traditions of the British which during the months of the war were the obvious evidence of their decadence (for example, the dossier about the marines barracks) were read ten years after the war as the explanation of their victory, even in the most critical moments, as during the attacks at San Carlos Strait. The British, more used to wars where losses are multiplied and defeats happen and to the need of keeping the initiative, never felt intimidated.37 And if during the conflict the professionalism of the British army had been read only in the language of mercenaries without motivations to fight, exemplified in the gurkhas, the turn now implied to explain the English victory precisely from this professionalism. A publication of the Military Circle put special emphasis on remarking the historical characteristics which gave superiority to the British forces. The fleet, described as belonging to a second rank power, was now a force that has four hundred years of tradition of wars in all the seas of the world and a highly trained staff.38 In the case of the Army, in order to keep the traditions, the tactical units of armoured vehicles and infantry are historically associated to a regiment, distinguished with emblems, ceremonial customs and particular dress uniforms. This creates friendship and comradeship ties among the members who are assigned to the historical life of the regiment during their whole careers even if they fulfill duties in commando units or other organizations. The preservation of this sprit de corps through the regimental system has borne its fruits in more that 300 years of existence.39 Taking into account the reports of mistreatment to soldiers by their officers and non-commissioned officers, of shortage of supplies and in general of the improvisation and neglect with which they had been
36 Fundacin Soldados, Malvinas 20 Aos 20 Hroes, Buenos Aires, , p. 14. 37 Noticias 26/3/92, Malvinas: diez aos despus. 38 Coronel Carlos Augusto Landaburu, La guerra de las Malvinas, Buenos Aires, Crculo Militar, 1998, p. 251. 39 Idem, p. 254.
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treated, it could be said that the English, as they were professionals, had treated their young prisoners better than those who should have done it: the officers of the Argentine Army. The Argentine Air Force, unlike the sea and land forces, showed a high level of professionalism which explained the victory of the British and, therefore, the visions of that time remarked this aspect of their performance at the islands. The link with the Second World War, in the case of pilots, emerges from the praise of a veteran, the French pilot Pierre Clostermann. The official publications of the air force about the war include the letter sent by this French pilot during the conflict: I would like to express to you young Argentinians, combat comrads - all my admiration. You successfully faced the most updated electronics, the anti-aircraft missiles, the most dangerous objectives, that is to say, warships. In spite of the most terrible weather conditions of the planet, with a reserve of just a few minutes of fuel in the tanks, in the extreme limit of the operational range of your machines, you have departed in the middle of the tempest with your Mirage, your Etendard, your A-4 and your Pucar, with blue and white rosettes. In spite of the anti-aircraft defence devices and the powerful warship missiles, alerted well in advance by their radars and the American satellites, you have attacked without hesitating. Never in the history of the wars of 1944, did the pilots have to face such a terrifying set of mortal obstacles, not even those of the RAF in London in 1940 or those of the Luftwaffe in 1945. Your courage has dazzled us and not only the Argentine people must remember you but also many of us who are proud of having you as our pilot comrades. To the fathers and the mothers, the brothers and the sisters, the wives and the children of the Argentine pilots who went to death with the most amazing courage, I say that they have honoured Argentina and the Latin American world. Ow! The truth is only worth for the blood spread and the world only believes in the causes the witnesses of which give their lives for them.40
40 Capitn Carballo, Pablo Marcos, Dios y los halcones. Buenos Aires, Abril, 1983, Prlogo.
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The memories of the French about the conflict in which he had participated are also those of the pilot Pablo Carballo when he presented his book. It establishes a historical line which links the pilots of the different wars: In 1944, a lonely Spitfire departs from its base in England perforating the fog in search of the German Focke Wulf or the Messerschmit. In the narrow cockpit, Pierre Closterman, a pilot of the Free French Forces, twists his hands on the aircraft controls. Five years of struggle have passed and Clostermanns file accumulates the victories that make him become the undisputed French ace of the Second World War ( ) Almost forty years later, from the humid runway of some base in the Argentine southern end, a Douglas A4-B Skyhawk plane dyes with the red brightness of its reactor the grey Patagonia evening when undertaking a combat mission. Feeling as lonely as the French in his Spitfire, Captain Pablo Marcos Carballo goes to a combat in which everything is programmed, except the certainty of an unharmed return. The times are different but the heroism of war pilots has not changed. In homage to the courage of our pilots, Closterman did not hesitate to admit that never, in the history of the air war, there were actions as those carried out by the pilots of the Argentine Air Force.41 The link is not given by political affinities or ideological convictions, but by a set of traditions based on the experience of the battles. In this way, it is the enemy who can give testimony of our own courage. In this field, a usual practice in several publications written by military men is to give the word to the British at the time of speaking about the Argentinians; not only as adversaries, but also for their characteristics as combatants. This happens in the two texts about the subject written by Martin Balza, in charge of an artillery group at Malvinas and afterwards commander in chief of the Argentine Army: I have tried not to qualify the behaviour of the Army during the war and that is why I shall only
41 Capitn Carballo, Pablo Marcos, Dios y los halcones.
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appeal to some of the comforting British opinions.42 But the land becomes marshy once more every time we leave the abstract world of military virtues as courage and honour to make a historical and political interpretation of that time. In that sense, the memories of Malvinas war have for Argentinians a disturbing duality: That a desire shared by the majority of the Argentine people was conducted by an illegitimate government, perpetrator of systematic violations to human rights the judgment of which set precedent at world level. Both the illegal repression and the Malvinas war were conceived by Armed Forces that, at least during three decades, had prepared themselves for the third world war against Marxism, training themselves to use the arms against their own people and that in 1982 still kept a clandestine repressive structure that had let them remain in power. The emphasis on the characteristics of the adversary during the postwar made possible, in some cases, to deviate the attention on this central aspect to understand the conduction of the war, synthesized in the simple reasoning according to which some military men who prepare themselves for the domestic police function can not make a conventional war. A war in which still vindicate victory. Due to the attempts to launder the crimes committed during the illegal repression with some of the actions performed in the islands, Malvinas war, in consequence, is also stained by that history.
42 See, for example, Balza, Martn, Dejo constancia: memorias de un general argentino, Buenos Aires, Planeta, 2001, pp. 82 y et seg.
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Alfredo Bruno Bologna The situation of Malvinas Islands at the beginning of the Bicentennial of the Argentine Independence
Alfredo Bruno Bologna *

The situation of Malvinas Islands at the beginning of the Bicentennial of the Argentine Independence
On the occasion of the Bicentennial of the Argentine Independence it is important to recall what happened at that time at Malvinas Islands. Due to the Napoleonic occupation of Spain, some Provincial Juntas which governed in the name of Fernando VII began to establish themselves. As in Spain, in Buenos Aires the First Assembly (Primera Junta) was established on May 25, 1810. It inherited the territory of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata established by the Royal Decree of August 1, 1776 and completed by the Royal Regulations of Mayors on January 28, 1782. Its jurisdiction, apart from Argentina, included Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay and part of Rio Grande del Sur. The First Assembly of Buenos Aires was governed, like those of Spain, in the name of Fernando VII. Our country inherits from Spain the rights over the Malvinas Islands. Since Spain left the islands in 1811 and until 1820 there were
* Main Researcher hired by the National Council on Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). Director of the Masters Degree on International Integration and Cooperation of Universidad de Rosario and of the Center of Studies on International Relations of Rosario (CERIR) (by its Spanish acronym). Director of the Books on Argentine Foreign Policy (Cuadernos de Poltica Exterior Argentina).
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several administrative procedures by our country, as for example the authorization requested on January 30, 1813 by the English brig Rastrero to fish seals at Malvinas Islands and Patagonian coasts. Afterwards, the Army Colonel at the service of the National Navy at Frigate La Herona, David Jewit, performs different activities at the islands and hoists for the first time the Argentine flag on November 6, 1820. It is convenient to remember this legal act because Argentina inherits Malvinas Islands from Spain.1 This work includes the activity performed by the Argentine Republic in the Question of Malvinas during the administration of Cristina Fernandez since December 10, 2007, when she took office.2 The following aspects shall be taken into account: the Question of Malvinas in the Argentine Foreign Policy; the Question of Malvinas in the Government Foreign Policy; the Argentine agenda; the domestic agenda; the Executive Power; the Legislative Power; the foreign agenda; the United Kingdom agenda related to Malvinas; the day in which Prime Minister Gordon Brown took office; the new Constitution; the annual speech of the Prime Minister to the islanders; the bilateral agenda; the subjects not included in the agenda; the II Summit of South American and Arab countries Presidents and the Extraordinary Meeting of UNASUR. 1. THE QUESTION OF MALVINAS WITHIN THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY The foreign policy as regards the Question of Malvinas, Georgias del Sur (San Pedro) and Sandwich del Sur Islands cannot be separated from the general guidelines of the Argentine Foreign Policy. According to the detailed Report of the Government of the Nation prepared by the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers, the foreign policy developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
1 Bologna, Alfredo Bruno, Los derechos de la Repblica Argentina sobre las islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur (San Pedro) y Sndwich del Sur. EDIAR, Buenos Aires, 1989, p. 86. 2 The timr frame reduction of the subject is justified taking into account that the author makes the follow-up of the Question of Malvinas throuh the books written by the team of the Center of Studies on International Relations of Rosario (CERIR) about Argentine Foreign Policy, since 1994. In certain aspects of the work it shall be necessary to make some references to the Presidency of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007).
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Worship aimed at giving priority to the integration of Argentina in the world through- the strengthening of the International Law, - the democratic system of government - the respect for human rights - a balanced trade system - a better distribution of the benefits of globalization - a democratization of the decisions system at international agencies. Particular emphasis was put on the economic and commercial integration of Argentina in the world, especially with the countries of the region. Likewise, the assistance to Argentinians abroad continued to be a priority, giving support to the requirements made by them as tourists or residents. At the same time, the spreading of Argentine values and creativity went on, trying to transmit to the world an image representative of our country. Finally, we should remark that for the development of these Foreign Policy actions, it was necessary to coordinate efforts with other national, provincial and municipal offices, as well as with organizations of the civil society, which deepened the federal profile of foreign relations.3 The detailed Report of the Government of the Nation of 2008 does not include modifications with respect to the one of 2007.4 2. THE QUESTION OF MALVINAS IN THE POLICY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT The Detailed Report of the Government of the Nation corresponding to years 2007 and 2008 makes reference to the objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship, among which we find the following: - To uphold an unwaivable claim of sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime spaces, respecting the way of life of the islanders and according to the International Law. This objective is very similar to the first of the temporary provisions of the National Constitution of 1994, when it states:
3 Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers. Detailed Report of the State of the Nation, 2007, p. 33. 4 Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers. Detailed Report of the State of the Nation, 2008. p. 37.
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The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and non-prescribing sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and over the corresponding maritime and insular zones, as they are an integral part of the National territory. The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respectful of the way of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law, are a permanent and unwaivable goal of the Argentine people. The detailed Report of the Government of the Nation mentions the achievements of each one of the activities of the Ministry. With respect to Malvinas, we shall only mention the titles because their contents shall be subject to analysis. 1. Upholding the Argentine position at the bilateral Argentine-British agencies and at different international fora. 2. Submission of notes of protest, rejection and reserve to the United Kingdom and discouraging notes to those companies which operate in the area illegitimately occupied by the United Kingdom without the permission of a competent Argentine authority. 3. Reaffirmation of the Argentine position before Foreign Affairs Ministries and multilateral bodies. 4. Spreading of the Argentine position in the national and international media, particularly as regards the 25 anniversary of the South Atlantic Conflict. 5 Progress made in the tasks of collection and cataloguing of the documentary, bibliographic and cartographic material about subjects related to the South Atlantic. The detailed Report of 2008 includes the three first items. 3. THE ARGENTINE AGENDA Associated to the Question of Malvinas, we can analyze the Argentine agenda from two different aspects: the domestic agenda and the Argentine presentation at the international agencies. 3.1. THE DOMESTIC AGENDA In our country there is a traditional agenda about Malvinas which includes: a reminder of the British usurpation of 1833 and the
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ceremonies of April 2, the Veterans Day and the Malvinas Memorial Day. Besides, the President usually attends the annual General Assembly of the United Nations. In this part we shall analyze the actions of the Executive Power and the Legislative Power. A. EXECUTIVE POWER PRESIDENCY OF THE NATION First, we shall deal with the position adopted by the President of the Nation, Cristina Fernndez, at different national and international bodies. Cristina Fernndez succeeded her husband Nstor Kirchner (2003-2007) in the office. Inauguration speech of the President of the Nation This period includes the inauguration speech of the President of the Nation given on December 2007. On that occasion Cristina Fernndez said: I also want to reaffirm, once more, our unwaivable claim of sovereignty over our Malvinas Islands and we say to the occupying country, which at every international forum appears as advanced and respectful, that there is a situation of colonial enclave here reported to the United Nations and that it is time to comply with the mandate of those United Nations of which all of us are part. Speech of the President in the opening of the regular sessions of Congress The Question of Malvinas was also present in the speech of President Cristina Fernndez given on March 2, 2008, in the opening of the 126 period of regular sessions of the Congress of the Nation.5 That speech has two aspects: on the one hand the claim of Argentine sovereignty and on the other hand a request to the United Kingdom to authorize the relatives of the soldiers dead in the war of 1982 to visit the Cemetery of Darwin. The President said:
5 The speeches of the President of the Nation, Cristina Fernandez, were consulted in the Web Page of the Presidency of the Nation.
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For this reason, and trying not to be tedious in this rainy morning, I would like to refer to a subject very dear for us. I am speaking about the permanent claim over Malvinas Islands. But this year I want to add something more to what has always been a strong claim with respect to that shameful colonial enclave in the South Atlantic in the midst of the twenty-first century, a humanitarian action: that England authorizes the relatives of those who died and are buried in Malvinas to travel there by plane. This is the only thing that all the Argentinians are requesting to the United Kingdom: to authorize the trip by plane for the unveiling of the monument that they -with private aid- have built by themselves in memory of their victims. April 2, the Veterans Day and the Malvinas Memorial Day. As a consequence of the differences between the government and the farming sector about taxes and the unfavorable repercussions of the expressions of piquetero (a person who blocks a street or road to call the attention about a particular issue) Emilio Prsico who at a demonstration at the Plaza de Mayo (May Square)- qualified Malvinas veterans as Fascist, it was deemed convenient to change the homage place. The Act was held at the Palomar Air Base where President Cristina Fernndez took the floor and remembered her personal experience of the conflict from Ro Gallegos, her place of residence. She criticized the seduction policy followed by Menems Administration and ratified the challenge of going on with the unwaivable heroic deed of recovering Malvinas Islands. Veteran Esteban Tres was going to take the floor too but at the last moment his speech was cancelled. Once the act was finished, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taiana, accused Great Britain of hindering the humanitarian flight to Malvinas Islands. (Polack, Mara Elena, La gesta es irrenunciable e inclaudicable. Newspaper La Nacion. Buenos Aires, 3 de abril de 2008:14) Intervention of President Cristina Fernndez at the 63 General Assembly of the United Nations At her first intervention in the 63 General Assembly of the United
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Nations on September 23, 2008, President Cristina Fernndez introduces herself as the First elected woman President in the history of my country, I address to this honorable Assembly tackling the question of the human rights as the first subject of my intervention. With respect to the Question of Malvinas she states: Finally, ladies and gentlemen, I want to mention a question that not only affects my country beyond its specific geographical location, but also this Assembly and the need to face the twenty-first century without colonial enclaves. I am specifically speaking of the question of our Malvinas Islands, where in spite of the resolutions of this honorable body, and in spite of all the actions adopted at this level aimed at achieving the acceptance by the United Kingdom according to section 33 of the United Nations Charter- of the peaceful resumption of negotiations between the parties, this country absolutely refuses to tackle together with the Argentine Republic the discussion on Malvinas Islands. Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that a member of the Security Council, one of the main nations in the world in the defense of freedom, human rights and democracy, must prove that it not only includes the subject in a speech but that it is also really convinced of the need to put an end to this shameful situation of a colonial enclave in the midst of the twentyfirst century. I want to request once more, as the different presidents who have taken the floor before, -because Malvinas is for Argentinians a state policy- the cooperation of this honorable body that we have always had- to exhort again the United Kingdom to comply with the rules of the international law and essentially to give testimony of this sincere will to build a different word and a different citizenship.6 Speech of the President in the opening of the regular sessions of the Congress The Speech of President Cristina Fernndez, in the opening of the Regular Sessions of the Congress of the Nation on March 1,2009, does not refer to the Question of Malvinas islands.
6 The interventions of President Cristina Fernndez and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Jorge Taiana, were consulted at the web page of the Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations.
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April 2, the Veterans Day and the Malvinas Memorial Day. Due to a strange coincidence, President Cristina Fernndez was in London on April 2 to attend the summit meeting of the Group of the 20. It was appropriate to hold the ceremony at the Argentine Embassy in that city. Seven former soldiers who fought in Malvinas, the Chief of Staff of the Army, two ministers and five legislators participated in the homage. After placing a floral offering at the foot of the Monument to General San Martn, at Belerae Square, the President addressed to the public. The President apologized in the name of all Argentinians to Malvinas veterans (...) The homage to the dead in combat does not recognize nationality, it is the homage to all the victims and particularly to the men who are present here, who fought for the national sovereignty as officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who fulfilled that mission with honor. The duty of every good Argentinian is to acknowledge the effort made by those men because during a long time the existence of veterans was concealed as a shame; on the contrary, they are for us a reason of pride, respect and honor, both those who are here and those who shall never return. The President finished her speech with a Long Live the Nation. Intervention of President Cristina Fernndez at the 64 General Assembly of the United Nations At the 64 General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23 2009, the President of the Nation, Cristina Fernndez stated: ...the Argentine Republic, where we have a colonial enclave: the sovereignty of our Malvinas Islands, an question which has not been considered yet, according to what this Assembly has proclaimed in several resolutions, together with the United Kingdom. ...a short time ago, we were able to obtain the authorization -through a humanitarian attitude that we were requesting- for the relatives of the soldiers buried in the islands, there in the South, to travel by plane, unveil the cenotaph and render homage to the memory of those who fought for the Homeland.
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE On April 2, 2008, the Ministry of Defense publishes in the main newspapers of the country a whole page devoted to Malvinas victims, with their names and surnames, under the title: Honor to Malvinas victims. The national government pays homage to the soldiers, officers, non-commissioned officers and members of the Armed Forces, to the members of the security forces and civilians dead in the South Atlantic conflict. In a text box there is a map of Malvinas with the following inscription under it: 1982-2008. 26 years. It transcribes the Temporary Provision of the Constitution of the Argentine Nation according to the reform of 1994. The page ends with a Long Live the Nation with memory and justice in democracy, independence and peace. The Veterans Day and the Malvinas Memorial Day were also remembered in our country on April 3, 2009. The act organized by the Ministry of Defense was held at the School of Non-commissioned Officers Sargento Juan Bautista Cabral. The Ministry of Defense Nilda Garr led the act and said that Malvinas war was a crime of the dictatorship with painful consequences in terms of human costs and national interests. To these extremely serious mistakes, the dictatorship added after the war a deliberate policy of oblivion about what had happened to mitigate its historical responsibility and with that oblivion they condemned those who heroically fought in conditions of improvisation and shortage of the most essential things. That oblivion literally implied to conceal the survivals and abandon them to their fate as if they were responsible for the defeat. They tried to hide the truth and deny this memory to next generations. She expressed that In no way we shall waive our rights. But the way to do it is that of diplomatic negotiations and permanent claims. She explained that the 27 years passed have allowed us to make a calm reflection which enabled our people to make a clear distinction between the irresponsible dictatorship adventure and the unwaivable cause of Malvinas, and to reappraise the veterans and their heroic behavior.7
7 Otro crimen de la dictadura. Diario La Capital. Rosario, April 3, 2009.
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B. LEGISLATIVE POWER An excellent initiative was the establishment of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee in the House of Deputies. The body shall be headed by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Worship and shall depend on the Speaker of the House of Deputies. It is made up of: seven deputies and the same number of important academics linked to the issue involved. The objectives are: to study, discuss, spread and collect antecedents and promote every kind of academic activities related to the Question of Malvinas. The foundations state that the idea of establishing a Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee is based on the need of conceiving a space of reflection about an extremely important subject for the Argentine society within a framework of analysis and assessment of the variables which make up the Question of Malvinas Islands. The Document that established it explains that when it refers to the Question of Malvinas Islands it also refers to the historical controversy between our country and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the archipelagos of Georgias and Sandwich del Sur Islands and the adjoining maritime and river spaces, but that for brevity reasons it shall refer to the Question of Malvinas.8 The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taiana, at the opening of the web page of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee said: It is time for the United Kingdom to honor its commitment of responsible and peace-loving country and to hear the request -not only of Argentina- to reestablish the dialogue over the sovereignty at a diplomatic negotiations table as it had done between 1966 and 1982.
8 The establishment of the Malvinas Parliamentary Observatory Committee of the House of Deputies was processed under file number 1845-D-2006 and parliamentary proceeding number 34 (29/04/2006). The signatories of the proposal were Balestrini, Alberto Edgardo; Argello, Jorge Martn Arturo; Pinedo, Federico; Ruckauf, Carlos Federico; Storani, Federico; Teobaldo, Manuel.
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3.2. THE FOREIGN AGENDA Through an active diplomatic action, Argentina takes advantage of the meetings held at international agencies to request the United Kingdom the resumption of negotiations about the Question of Malvinas. The Argentine presentations during 2007 have been made at the Annual Assembly of the Organization of American States, at the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization, Rio Group, the South American Energy Summit, the Ministerial Meeting of the Peace and Cooperation Zone of the South Atlantic, the IberoAmerican Summit and the MERCOSUR meetings.9 The Argentine Presentations during 2008 were made at: the Annual Assembly of the Organization of American States, at the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization, Rio Group, IberoAmerican summit and MERCOSUR meetings. (Detailed Report on the State of the Nation, 2008, p. 63). To the mentioned list we should add the First Summit of the Latin American and Caribbean Countries CALC held on December 18, 2008. President Cristina Fernndez included the subject, and the final document added the support to the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute about the Question of Malvinas. The presentations made in 2009 were the following: XXXIX Annual Assembly of the Organization of American States, at the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization, Ibero-American Summit, Second Summit of South American and Arab countries, the European Union and MERCOSUR meetings. Within the International agencies we should mention the annual meetings at the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations, where apart from the Argentine presentation in charge of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship, Jorge Taiana, the representatives of the Legislative Council of the Malvinas Islands and the persons settled in Argentina also expressed their opinion. In 2009, the draft resolution exhorting the parties to resume negotiations was submitted by the Ambassador of Chile in the United
9 Detailed Report on the State of the Nation, 2007, p. 65.
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Nations, Heraldo Muoz and co-sponsored by the governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela. The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs was particularly harsh in his exposition. The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, starting from the historical background of the conflict, ended with a strong exposition about the unilateral actions carried out by the islanders and by the United Kingdom and the refusal of this monarchy to negotiate with our country. One of the petitioners imposed by the United Kingdom took the floor. The deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Malvinas, Janet Robertson, claimed the right of the islands to self determination emphasizing the importance of the new Constitution. The two Argentine petitioners were the descendant of the Anglican reverend Tomas Bridges, Dolores Reynolds and Marcelo Luis Vernet, great-great grandson of the first political and military commander of Malvinas, Luis Vernet, in favor of the Argentine position. Vernet said Malvinas islands were our land even before we were born as a nation. The land also made us part of it. Because we offered ourselves to it. We were the people of Malvinas. Stolen by an imperial power, by imperial interests, we are still the people of Malvinas expelled from their land. A member of the Legislative Council of Malvinas Islands, Mike Summers, some hours before the meeting of the Decolonization Committee said that Argentina is governed by a dictatorship with elections, which does not show any willingness to negotiate with the islanders. The only thing it shows is aggression. Besides, I do not see any plan to discuss about interest areas as for example fishing.10 4. THE UNITED KINGDOM AGENDA The following are unilateral actions carried out by the islanders or by the United Kingdom which have damaged a normal relationship between the main parties of the conflict.
10 Baron, Ana, El gobierno volvi a plantear en la ONU su reclamo por las Malvinas. Diario Clarn. Buenos Aires, June 19, 2009, p. 26.
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4.1. TAKING OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN After the resignation of Tony Blair as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown took office on June 27, 2007. In his salutation message to the new Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the President of Argentina, Nstor Kirchner, insisted on resuming negotiations about the sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. In his letter President Kirchner reiterated the strong will of the Argentine government to resume the delayed process of negotiations about the sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands, according to the corresponding resolutions of the United Nations. (Great Britain says goodbye to the Blair era with promises of change. The Argentine President wished him good luck in his Administration, La Capital, Rosario, June 28, 2007:25) 4.2. THE NEW CONSTITUTION FOR MALVINAS ISLANDS On November 4, 2008, Queen Elizabeth II of England signed the new Constitution for the islanders which became effective on January 1, 2009. According to the British Secretariat of State on Foreign Policy, Gillian Merron, the Constitution was prepared by the governments of the United Kingdom and the archipelago. The new Constitution aims at achieving a greater autonomy from the United Kingdom for the islanders. Argentina submitted a formal complaint on November 6, 2008. The note states that The Argentine government shall report before the international community this violation of the United Nations resolutions about the subject. The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the only purpose pursued by the United Kingdom when it grants or approves the socalled reforms is to perpetuate an anachronistic colonial situation. (Malvinas: protesta formal por la nueva Constitucin. La Nacin newspaper. Buenos Aires, November 7, 2008:10) 4.3. PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWNS ANNUAL SPEECH In his traditional New Year message to inhabitants of Malvinas Islands, Prime Minister Gordon Brown expressed, on January 4, 2008, that he had no doubts about British sovereignty over Falkland (Malvinas)
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Islands and that he undertook to uphold their security and everything that the inhabitants had achieved over the last 25 years. He recalled that that year had been deeply moving for Islanders due to the ceremonies and tributes made in 2007 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the war with Argentina. These ceremonies, which took place at the United Kingdom and Falkland, constituted an adequate and respectful tribute to those who lost their lives in the conflict, many of them defending their freedom and their right to decide their own future. In November, you welcomed back to the Islands some of the British veterans of that campaign, many of whom were returning for the first time and who were able to remember fallen comrades and recall memories of the conflict, said Gordon Brown. We all owe a debt to the courage shown by our soldiers, sailors and airmen and airwomen who we call upon to defend the freedoms and values that symbolise Britain and what she represents. At that moment, he recalled that with the agreement of the Falkland Islands Government-, discussions had been held with the Argentine Families Commission to enable the families of the Argentine fallen to visit the Islands. Brown noted: It is important that ordinary Argentines also have the opportunity to remember their loved ones who were sent into battle and your compassion in allowing such visits to go ahead is greatly appreciated. Yesterday, the Argentine Families Commission sent a communication to Clarn in which it expressed utmost satisfaction in relation to Browns statements. It recalled that a trip to Darwin was pending to inaugurate the monument to the 649 fallen in the war with the United Kingdom, to which relatives wish to take at least one person for each fallen victim.11 In his second New Year message to the inhabitants of Malvinas Islands, on January 5, 2009, Prime Minister Gordon Brown ratified that there would not be negotiations over sovereignty unless the right to selfdetermination was recognized. The Islanders have shown their will to continue being British. He expressed that Great Britain has no doubts as regards its sovereignty. He declared that he was prepared
11 Great Britain invites Argentine soldiers relatives to visit Malvinas. La Nacin newspaper. Buenos Aires, January 5, 2008.
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to talk with Argentina about terrorism financing, drugs and nuclear non-proliferation. He regretted that the visit of relatives to the Darwin cemetery had not taken place yet. In relation to oil, he said that the British government will continue to support the Islanders wish to develop oil exploitation around the Islands.12 The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered Prime Minister Gordon Brown that the British government had carried out a new unilateral action by adopting a new constitution for Malvinas Islands, which entailed further disregard for the resolution on the Question of Malvinas adopted by the UN General Assembly and Committee on Decolonization. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship highlighted the British refusal to address fundamentals in order to reach a just, peaceful and lasting solution to the sovereignty controversy, in accordance with the mandate of the international community. (Argentina reminded Brown of Malvinas sovereignty).13 4.4. COMMEMORATING 25 YEARS OF MALVINAS WAR The Argentine foreign minister Jorge Taiana made an assessment on the anniversary at the UN Committee on Decolonization, on June 21, 2007. In 2007 we commemorate a new anniversary of the South Atlantic Conflict, one of the worst moments of the long history of the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and adjoining maritime areas. The military dictatorship that ruled Argentina in 1982 acted behind the Argentine peoples back, departing from the traditional peaceful claim for the Islands. It was a mistaken decision, because the Argentine people always knew that the full exercise of sovereignty over the Islands would be recovered through peaceful and diplomatic dialogue. The United Kingdom has become publicly involved in a series of events of a celebratory and militarist nature that Argentina laments.
12 El Argentino.com. Retrieved on January 6, 2009. 13 El Argentino.com, Buenos Aires, 5-1-08. Retrieved on January 6, 2009.
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My country cannot share this spirit, and, quoting President Kirchners words, I would like to remind the United Kingdom that, as a powerful country, it may have won a battle [ ... ], but it will never beat the reason or justice that Malvinas Islands are Argentine and that, through peace, they will be Argentine again. This conflict -in which the United Kingdom could not be validly considered free from political responsibilities- did not alter the existence or the nature of the dispute and it was thus acknowledged, less than five months after hostilities ended, by the UN General Assembly. Just as in 1982, the international community continued to acknowledge this situation through several statements of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on Decolonization, among other fora.14 4.5. ENLARGING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF The British Embassy in Buenos Aires admitted that the United Kingdom was considering the possibility of making a submission to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over the continental shelf that surrounds the Islands. However, Andrs Federman, spokesman of the British Embassy in Argentina, made it clear that: No decision has been taken yet.15 The Argentine answer to this decision came shortly afterwards. According to the Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet, Alberto Fernndez, our country will be unyielding in its rejection of the project prepared by the United Kingdom. The Argentine President, in his speech before the 62nd UN General Assembly, held in New York on September 25, 2007, said: My Government vigorously rejects the British claim to establish maritime areas around the archipelagos. In particular, it rejects
14 Intervention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of the Argentine Republic, Mr. Jorge E. Taiana. Special Committee in charge of examining the situation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Question of Malvinas Islands, New York, June 21, 2007. Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations. 15 London enlarges its sovereignty. La Nacin newspaper. Buenos Aires, September 23, 2007, p. 1.
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the recently divulged intention of the United Kingdom to make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf - established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) - relative to the outer limits of the continental shelf of these Argentine territories.16 The United Kingdom submitted its proposal on May 11, 2009. Before that, on April 21, 2009, Argentina had done the same. The issue of the limits of the continental shelf concerning the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina remains unsolved within the United Nations. The issue of the continental shelf in the South Atlantic area is not unimportant if we take into account the economic possibilities offered by its waters and subsoil. 5. THE BILATERAL AGENDA In recent years, bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina have had problems to reach an agreement on issues of common interest regarding Malvinas. We could say, except in humanitarian aspects, that relations in this respect have broken off. On June 21, 2007, the Argentine Foreign Minister clearly expressed which were the difficulties that existed to establish dialogue between both parties at the UN Committee on Decolonization. In this presentation, the Minister made an update on the issues under discussion. As regards the preservation of fishing resources, bilateral cooperation was seriously affected by the recent implementation by the United Kingdom- of a new unilateral measure that constitutes a form of longterm illicit disposition of fishing resources in Argentine maritime areas, which, because they are illegitimately occupied, are subject to the sovereignty dispute. This illegitimate measure can be added to other British unilateral actions that were timely protested by Argentina, regarding, among others, fishing police actions in the South
16 Nstor Kirchners speech at the 62th UN General Assembly, Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations.
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Atlantic area from and outside the disputed area, the repeated sale of illegitimate fishing licenses, and unilateral measures related to waters surrounding Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands. The British have also required fishing vessels from third-party countries to pay for fishing licenses and meet other illegitimate conditions for the exploitation and control of fishing resources, which contradict General Assembly Resolutions and the multilateral system of the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. In spite of the repeated warnings made by my country to the United Kingdom from the very moment its intention became known, the British adopted a system of alleged property rights for up to 25 years to be applied to fishing resources in the disputed area. This unilateral and illegitimate measure infringes upon the 1990 Joint Declaration and the mandate of the international community. My Government has rejected said measure and made official protests, reporting thereon to relevant UN and OAS bodies. All these British unilateral measures have gradually denaturalized the mandate of the South Atlantic Fisheries Committee, increasingly damaging the cooperation that my country has sustained within said Committee. This has forced Argentina to consider the sense of its participation in said Committee. Bilateral cooperation in the subject has deteriorated to such an extent that all meetings of the South Atlantic Fisheries Committee have been suspended. Within this context, both countries have held two special diplomatic meetings in order to analyze the mandate of the South Atlantic Fisheries Committee and the legal and political framework in which it operates. Since no agreement has been reached, the parties have decided to meet again. Bilateral cooperation in hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation Likewise, in relation to hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, the Argentine Government repeatedly warned the United Kingdom about the implications of its continued unilateral actions openly contradicting the cooperation commitment undertaken by both countries in the Joint Declaration on Cooperation Over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic, signed on September 27, 1995, and the mandate of the
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international community. The repeated unilateral actions were timely and duly protested by the Argentine Republic. Bilateral cooperation in hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the area involved in the sovereignty and jurisdiction dispute were paralyzed after July 2000, when the South West Atlantic Hydrocarbons Commission held its last meeting after serious interpretative divergences were found to exist regarding the territorial application of the understanding. Therefore, both Governments agreed on the convenience of taking time to consider the issue and the best way to develop cooperation in the future, as established in the Joint Statement made by the Parties after the above mentioned meeting. However, both before and during this period of analysis, the United Kingdom did not refrain from taking unilateral actions in contradiction with the 1995 Declaration, which expressly provided for the joint action of both Governments in the area involved in the sovereignty and jurisdiction dispute. The attitude of the United Kingdom as regards this understanding did not help build a suitable atmosphere to resume the sovereignty negotiations that have been repeatedly called for by the United Nations in all its relevant resolutions. The intention of the Argentine Government was to inform the British Government about the conclusions reached in relation to this understanding at the diplomatic meeting that was repeatedly proposed by Argentina, as from February 2006, in order to deal with the status of all the understandings made between our countries under the sovereignty formula. Unfortunately, as we have said above, this has not been possible, given the refusal of the British Government to hold said meeting. The British behavior -which violates and abuses the bilateral commitment, and their refusal to engage in dialogue on the issue, led the Argentine Government to terminate said understanding on March 27, 2007. We received the support of all the Heads of State who participated in the First South American Energy Summit, held at Isla Margarita in Venezuela, and who, on April 17, 2007, unanimously approved a Presidential Declaration endorsing the decision adopted by the Argentine Government to terminate hydrocarbon cooperation with the United Kingdom for the reasons I have just explained. They also
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supported Argentine legitimate rights in the sovereignty dispute, firmly encouraging both countries to resume negotiations in order to rapidly find a just, peaceful and final solution to the sovereignty dispute. In connection with the two previously mentioned topics, there exists legislation which provides for sanctions to companies that request authorizations in Malvinas, both as regards fishing and hydrocarbons.17 Bilateral cooperation to eliminate landmines in Malvinas There used to be a joint Argentine-British commission for cooperation to eliminate the landmines that had been laid by Argentine armed forces. At the UN Convention held in Ottawa in 1997, which was attended by more than 100 countries, the United Kingdom undertook to remove before March 2009- more than 20,000 landmines that had been laid in the Islands. BBC London broadcast a communication of the Foreign Office, through which the United Kingdom requested a 10-year extension to comply with the commitment. The request was grounded on the characteristics of the soil of the Islands, which make the procedure very difficult and costly. A member of the Legislative Assembly of the Islands, Mike Summers, informed that until 2008, there had been no accidents and that the buried devices covered less than 0.1% of arable land. Communication between the continent and the Islands and the Argentine refusal to authorize charter flights by LAN Chile have suffered no modifications up to now. The Malvinas military base, which caused conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom, led Argentina to make submissions to several international organizations. The Question of the Malvinas military base was brought under the spotlight by Argentine President Cristina Kirchner, at UNASUR Extraordinary Meeting, held in San Carlos de Bariloche in 2009, in order to assess the presence of US bases in Colombia. 6. OUT OF THE AGENDA During Cristina Fernndez administration, there occurred some
17 Foreign Minister Jorge Taianas speech on the Question of Malvinas at the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, June 21, 2007. Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations.
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events that cannot be included in the traditional relationship pattern between Argentina and Great Britain. 6.1. THE II SUMMIT OF ARAB-SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES The Final Declaration of this Summit, held at Qatar on March 31, 2009, included the Question of Malvinas. In her speech, President Cristina Fernndez made a comparison between Malvinas and the Palestine conflict: The Questions of Malvinas and Palestine are but two terrible examples of non-compliance with the rules laid down by international organizations regarding law and recognition of our countries.18 The reaction of the Jewish community was straightforward: they rejected the arguments proposed by the President. Iftaj Curiel, cultural attach of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, said: The remark (by the President) is out of place and takes us by surprise. What was clear to me is that Israel is to blame for all the problems of the Arabs. But we did not know that we reached as far as Malvinas. Aldo Donzis, President of the Delegation of Argentine Israeli Associations (DAIA, by its Spanish acronym), said: I believe that likening two situations that are so different is a terrible confusion. We are comparing a colonial situation, such as the British one, with Israel, which is not occupying one centimeter of Palestine territory neither in Gaza nor in the West Bank. He also established a difference between the Israeli people, who have agreed to the creation of a Palestine State, and Kelpers, who wish to be British. The head of the Argentine Zionist Organization, Carlos Trauman, held that there is nothing to compare between both situations and that the President was wrong to compare a colonial enclave with a State like Israel, which is acknowledged by the United Nations. Sergio Widder, local delegate of the Simn Wiesenthal Center, said: We should remember that both in 1948 and now, Israel accepts the
18 Polemical claim for Malvinas in Qatar. La Nacin newspaper. Buenos Aires, April 1, 2009, p. 9.
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existence of the Palestine State, and those who boycott the creation of the Palestine State are Hamas terrorists.19 The interpretation of this view is that Argentina, during Cristina Fernndez Presidency, is trying to establish closer ties with Arab countries for economic reasons, open new markets and make progress in South-South cooperation. Our country had already participated in the first summit, which was held in Rio de Janeiro on May 11, 2005. 6.2. UNASUR EXTRAORDINARY MEETING The second out-of-the-agenda issue was discussed in San Carlos de Bariloche at the UNASUR extraordinary meeting. On August 28, 2009, this city was the venue of an extraordinary meeting of the UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) in order to establish the scope of a military cooperation agreement between Colombia and the United States, whereby the latter could operate seven bases (2 navy bases, 2 army bases, and 3 air bases). In her opening speech, Argentine President Cristina Fernndez recalled the establishment of a military base in Malvinas, an issue which is constantly referred to in claims to the United Kingdom: I do no intend to minimize the issues that are going to be discussed here today, but I do want to tell you that, in this sense, Argentina has had a very dramatic experience. Many kilometers from here, in our Malvinas Islands, bases have been unilaterally established by force by a power which is not only from outside South America but also from outside the continent, which was precisely the one that terminated the TIAR as one of the forms of unity that the Organization of American States had in relation to reciprocal assistance in case of aggression by a foreign power. Therefore, we have had terrible experiences in the continent regarding colonial enclaves with extra-continental bases.20
19 Rosemberg, Jaime, Surprise and anger of the Jewish Community and Israel. La Nacin newspaper. Buenos Aires, April 1, 2009. 20 Opening of UNASUR Extraordinary Meeting in Bariloche. Friday, August 28, 2009.
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CONCLUSIONS One of the most important facts of the period under analysis was the visit of relatives of victims fallen in Malvinas. This event was the result of negotiations that Great Britain and Argentina had been conducting for five years, which were concluded at the interview between the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and the Argentine President, Cristina Fernndez, held at the Meeting of Progressive Leaders, in Santiago de Chile, on March 26, 2009. This operation faced two problematic periods: 1. The making and transportation of a Monument for the Argentine fallen in Malvinas to be placed at the Darwin Cemetery.21 2. The trip made by relatives to visit Argentine soldiers fallen in Malvinas. The relatives were transported from Buenos Aires to Ro Gallegos. They took two flights to the Islands, the first one -with 170 relativesdeparted on October 3, and the second one -with 250 relatives-, on October 10, with aircraft of the Chilean company Lneas Areas Nacionales LAN. At Ro Gallegos, President Cristina Fernndez and Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana went to the airport to see them off. On that occasion, the President said: One day of this century an Argentine President will go there to pay homage to the fallen, invoking the legitimate rights we have over the Islands, invoking the law of the international community, because they will have to understand, once and for all, that there cannot exist colonial enclaves in the XXI century. She concluded her speech by saying Glory and honor to the fallen in Malvinas. Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana expressed: We feel satisfied about the task. We are waiting for Britain to sit down and talk about what they have to do, about sovereignty, which is what the international community has requested. After the celebration of the mass in Darwin, the President of
21 Bologna, Alfredo Bruno, La cuestin Malvinas: una lectura desde lo econmico in the work of Centro de Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales de Rosario (Center for Studies on International Relations of Rosario) (CERIR, by its Spanish acronym), La Poltica Exterior del gobierno de Kirchner. CERIR-UNR Editora. Rosario, 2006. Volume IV. Book 1, p. 219
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Relatives of the Victims Fallen in Malvinas, Hctor Cisneros, thanked the governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina and also the Islanders who had left aside past wounds to allow this homage. He remarked that the Government of the United Kingdom and that of the Islands refuse to discuss sovereignty, even if the Argentinians show title .22 - There exists a permanent Argentine claim to the United Kingdom for failing to abide by UN resolutions. The comparison between Palestine and Malvinas provoked strong disputes among governments and non-governmental organizations. However, there is no doubt that the United Kingdom -a permanent member of the UN Security Council-, as well as other non-permanent members, do not abide by UN resolutions. As an example, we may mention that: The five permanent members of the United Nations are the main weapon sellers, even when the objective of the United Nations is to achieve international peace and security. When a UN resolution is not in line with the US and UK foreign policy, it is tackled without regard to the UN Security Council, as in the case of the Iraq war. The permanent members of the Security Council wish to retain the possibility of holding nuclear weapons, but do not allow other countries to have access to them. - It would be advisable for the President to mention the same formula used by her predecessors and not to make a summary of topics like Malvinas in her annual speech before the UN General Assembly. The most precise formula would be to resort to the text of the 1994 National Constitution. - In this Bicentennial we should consider other solutions to the conflict. In this sense, Rodolfo Terragno holds that a diplomatic offensive should be launched in all fora. It is very clear that this is not a decolonization problem: there is an occupied territory and the occupation must come to an end. Carlos Prez Llana -among other proposals- coincides with Terragno when he says we have to speak
22 Clarn newspaper. Buenos Aires, October 4, 2009, p. 9.
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of deoccupation, not decolonization. And call things by their real names.23 We believe that this is an interesting proposal to resume the initiatives presented at the 1948 Bogot meeting, when the Charter of the Organization of American States was signed.
23 Seoane, Mara, Como evitar que Londres convierta a las Malvinas en un Estado independiente. Talk on the diplomacy of the conflict, with the participation of Andrs Cisneros, Carlos Prez Llana, Carlos Ortiz de Rosas, and Rodolfo Terragno. Clarn newspaper. Buenos Aires, April 1, 2007, p. 34 to 37. Regarding the discussion at OAS, Theory on occupied territories, see Bologna: Alfredo Bruno, op. cit. p. 165.
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Juan Cruz Vzquez Malvinas in the Bicentennial: in search of the collective story
Juan Cruz Vzquez *

Malvinas in the Bicentennial: in search of the collective story
Malvinas Islands have been, and still are, a central element in the development of the Argentine identity: a key piece in the socialization of the national subject. Their symbolism exceeds the form of the archipelago and reaches a historical-cultural dimension that shapes the feelings and reasoning of those who call themselves Argentinians, and cannot escape the discord and contradictions that have surrounded these Islands throughout the history we built and call ours in collective terms. The current social construct of Malvinas could constitute a real idea of them: a large number of cultural devices makes them present in a sea of daily existence, in this land, and from here they constantly ask for explanations, reminding us that they are a pending question of the Argentine People and the Argentine Nation. However, their assertion does not reach beyond this questioning, and only accompanies the nationality mandate in terms of the story of Malvinas, which comes to an end after writing (again and again) Malvinas are Argentine.
* Political Scientist. Teacher at Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) and Universidad de Belgrano (UB).
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The point is that, regardless of its soundest content1, this postulate has been more harmfully used during the de facto government of General Galtieri, and its activation in war terms has proved disastrous for a claim that dates back to 1833. In Argentina, the 1982 war became -from the day it was announced- very popular: the argument spread by the government among the members of society was the anti-imperialist struggle, and the recovery of the archipelago through the use of weapons in light of diplomatic uselessness. The slogan became -internally- an agglutinating pole for a society that was atomized by the bloody National Reorganization Process, while the other party (imperialist Britain) worked according to its most classic notion: aliens had to be expelled from our territory so that we could forget (at least momentarily) the aliens in government. At that time, explanations about Malvinas were scarce and/or biased: especially as regards what Malvinas meant and how they were to be recovered. This lack of explanations regarding the historical slogan resulted in better social internalization of the slogan, a more urgent spreading of it, and great mobilization due to the many interpretations it could have. Few voices objected to the decision and the ongoing process: either because of the little repercussion of their opinion in light of nationalist deafness; or the social crucifixion derived from expressing different opinions; or the silencing of plurality by the dictatorship. The slogan became univocal and war-like in the hands of the de facto government, and nothing was sufficiently explained. Thought and stories were not weeded: in the 1982 conflict nothing was built, and everything seemed to be ready-made. There was no collective story but a prevailing slogan, which was interpreted through a single discourse that subsumed -by reason or by force- all other discourses. The paradox crystallized when the defeat in the external armed conflict brought about a sudden internal victory: the democratic restoration. It was the cornerstone of many contradictions produced by post-1982 Malvinas. And even from then onwards the story did not develop: the
1 Referred to and linked to the sovereignty claim of the Argentine Republic over Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur Islands (sustained almost exclusively through diplomatic means, except for the 1982 armed interlude).
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slogan shut itself off even more, damaged by the armed conflict. Explanations came from the most varied positions, with clashing judgments and accusations; and so an argument vacuum built around Malvinas, which translated into the absence of a story about Malvinas after 1982 and into de-Malvinization, as the frame of an empty painting with no collective arguments. I. THE ABSENT COLLECTIVE STORY: FOUR CARDINAL PREMISES As causes for this argument vacuum, we may propose a combination of four central premises: 1) national causes are not discussed; 2) uses and discourses about Malvinas have changed throughout history, until their separation and atomization following the 1982 defeat; 3) the 1982 Malvinas war has given rise to a load of thorny chiaroscuros on the subject in the different social sectors; and, due to this, 4) it is extremely difficult to elaborate a common discourse on Malvinas in the post-war period to accompany the original mandate. As pointed out by Benedict Anderson (1998), the creation of a nation implies the elaboration of an imagined community, where collective historical stories are built in order to connect subjects under a single sense of belonging. This is the same aim of the internalization of a collective identity coined by Oscar Oszlak (2004), as a state capacity which operates through symbols and rites that fuse individualities into a single territorial and spiritual collectivity, permitting ideological control as a mechanism of state domination. This mission gives birth to national causes, as mandates that strengthen this feeling and solidify this cohesion. They are born to preserve the latency of a collective duty, of an original precept that urges the imagined community as a whole, that leads to its agglutination and to an alleged awakening of the living forces that wait within it in potential form. Especially when they acquire war-like notions, these causes are neither discussed nor debated: damage to the national morale (in defensive terms), or a right arising therefrom (in offensive terms), are proclaimed, and the alleged historical plan is carried out (see Delannoi & Taguieff, 1993). This was the logic that exploded in 1982 with Malvinas: an authoritarian regime took the
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country to a war against a NATO power, mobilizing almost all sectors of the society behind a national cause that opposed a long-standing situation of colonial imperialism. Under this pattern, discussing the need of the armed conflict implied disregarding the original plan, and opposing the war was a clear unpatriotic manifestation. The move towards war gave a new meaning to Malvinas: a radically polarized use that spoiled the diplomatic work which, though slow, had been -until then- the only legitimate channel (at the local and international level) to settle the question. However, this was not the first time that Malvinas had transformed its meaning: between 1833 and 1982, Malvinas Islands were respectively conceived and fused as a merely diplomatic question; as a popular cause; as a national cause; and as a national anti-imperialist armed cause (see Terragno, 2006; Bosoer, 2007; Escud, 2001; Guber, 2000; and Rozitchner, 2005). Hence, the last symbolic meaning of Malvinas caused previous notions to burst, and resulted in a loss of discursive linearity in which what was popular, national, diplomatic and war-like separated, atomizing the question/cause of Malvinas and reducing it to a de-Malvinization process as the only seeming way to collectively elaborate the mistakes and complicity of the armed event commanded by General Galtieris de facto government. As remarked by Lpez (1988), the South Atlantic war was a confusing chiaroscuro for the Argentine people. A muddled array of meaninglessness and justifications succeeded the contagious initial euphoria of the armed conflict: an erroneously claimed fair cause; a country that changed from victim to victimizer; a military tragedy (as defined by the Rattenbach Report); media and social manipulation that served to cover the dirty war; a society that was (consciously or unconsciously) an accomplice in the initial cheering and in the silence of the surrender; hundreds of drafted Argentinians and dead professionals; hundreds who committed suicide in the post-war period; abuses of Argentine officers against their own soldiers; an almost insurmountable distance from the diplomatic recovery of the islands; and an external defeat that triggered the internal victory of the return to democracy. The array of these thorny issues atomized
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the Argentine society even more, and each social sector elaborated Malvinas to their own convenience and/or according to their possibilities. The collective story of the Islands, which had been based on a relative consensus until March 1982, broke apart in a myriad of discourses that began to clash among them. The political rhetoric was repeated in official acts and announcements, and this position was adopted by a large part of society, while both sectors turned their backs on a new social actor (and vulnerable sector) formed by war veterans.2 Thus, the story disintegrated and Malvinas flowed into a new stage: de-Malvinization. Only after some time, did there arise a slow processing and thinking about post-1982 Malvinas: the making of national movies and documentaries; special reports made by mass media on commemorative dates; the publication and distribution of biographies of those who were there; the production of specialized literature by academics; the consolidation of veteran centers in the civil society and certain official institutional niches; the militancy of veterans by giving their testimonies in educational and/or media instances; and the spreading of a varied array of cultural devices in every corner of the Argentine territory. This slow but continuous emergence from the past succeeds in reviving more and more elements to process Malvinas after the war, and so there arise different memories that follow the origin of the social sectors that gave birth to them. These memories follow different paths and therefore unfold, again and again, one single story: different experiences, views and ideologies entrench themselves in their positions and attempt to string together, insofar as their relative rigidity allows them to do so. A social phenomenon with the significance, complexity and historical persistence of Malvinas may not be summarized in a single story, and so there begins a struggle among the different discourses different memories- to prevail in the cultural imagery of the Argentine society: a real discursive archipelago (if we may say so) where new generations of Argentinians cannot find solid ground in the historical legacy about which they know little
2 On veterans in the post-war, see Guber (2005); and Silva and Vazquez (2006)..
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or nothing for sure and/or for which they show little or no interest. Therefore, they are always subject to one version of the events, and this fragility of the memory destroys all attempts to elaborate a discourse on Malvinas in the post war period, so that it may accompany the original mandate: that of the fair cause and the legitimate claim of Argentine rights over the South Atlantic archipelagos: Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur Islands. We are not trying to propose a hegemonic and totalizing discourse about Malvinas after 1982, rather, we attempt to elaborate a Collective Story which strings together portions of each separate story and serves as a framework to unite them, in order to make the question/ cause of Malvinas an emblem of socio-cultural dialogue and Argentine concord, and not of insurmountable discord. II. DISPERSION AND DISAGREEMENT IN STORIES As previously remarked, the gradual re-emergence of Malvinas gave rise to a large number of cultural devices of the most varied kinds. The shape of the Islands, their name and the dates related to the war began to signal streets, parks, sports stadia, public institutions and stores. This symbolism has also been channeled through decals for cars and buses, online video games, patterns for T-shirts and graffiti, among many other examples (Vazquez, 2004). Given the lack of an image of national completeness,3 arising from the absence of the Islands as de facto territory, there is a sort of symbolic territorialization of Malvinas in the continent, putting together an allegorical idea of the islands that works as a memory device. A memory in which the vindicating slogan is clear and firm, but in which the details that it implies and used to imply become blurred for two main reasons: the heterogeneousness and wrath of national positions after the 1982 war, and their encounter in the wake of the difficulty in recovering the archipelago within the new international scenario that appeared after the war.
3 As regards this dimension of the analysis, related to physiognomy, see Gorelik (2004)..
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There appears a dilemma with a war hinge that affected both sides of the national border. Inside the border, the war burst in the collective story that, with differences, was, up to then, compressed into the diplomatic channel related to Malvinas. The role and positions of the different social sectors and institutions during the armed conflict brought about -after the Argentine surrender- the emergence of new opposed stances and strengthened existing ones. Outside the border, the war burst in the slow and difficult diplomatic work, destroying a series of key steps forward (such as talks on shared sovereignty and the bonds built between the continent and the Islands), and forcing Argentina to negotiate on the same bases but from a very fragile position (due to the new label of victimizer that the international society had given Argentina after the war). Stories, then, were left with feeble national bases and with an international environment that was hostile to a claim that, though sound, is now stained by the 1982 war events. Thus, at the domestic level, stories failed to meet in a collective memory of Malvinas, and now only converge at the international level in the vindicating position on the archipelago, as the sole front against a standstill in the multilateral fora where negotiations have taken place. Just as bringing about a collective memory of post-1982 Malvinas is difficult from the territorial point of view (under the national/ international dichotomy), so it is from the temporal point of view. Even in this respect, the war hinge was the apex of an escalation of the question/case of Malvinas, whose (new) political use caused the current disaster. Hence, the continuity of the historical past was slashed by the uncontrolled impulse of going to war, resulting in a present situation with nebulous senses and opposing positions on the matter. No attempt can be made to project a future situation in which the different stories can meet as a common goal to be achieved, since diplomatic negotiations on Malvinas were virtually deadlocked after the war, in a frozen state that was promoted and maintained by Great Britain and that allows it to advance its policy of consummated facts on the disputed archipelago. Without a collective story based on relative consensus, and without
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a national memory arising from it, the different positions intersect at the vindicating premise as the only convergence pole in the fight against de-Malvinization. From there, the symbolic territorialization emerges in each cultural device that contains the Islands in their shape, name, vindicating slogan and/or emblematic dates. The stories diverge, with occasional encounters to the extent permitted by their rigidity, and all of them are equally valid from the subjective perspective in which they are elaborated and defended. However, for this same reason, they are scattered stories: they lack the containment that could derive from joint action regarding Malvinas, they lack the framework of a Collective Story to channel the correct fragments and simultaneously soothe the mistaken fragments that each story has. III. TOWARDS THE CONFLUENCE OF THE STORIES IN THE COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE The Question of Malvinas represents, even at the globalized present, a subject that involves the essence of the Government-Nation in its most classical notion: the one that ruled in the twentieth century under the government dimension of territoriality and the national dimension of sovereignty. The diplomatic treatment of the Question of Malvinas since 1833 (as well as the tensions before that date generated by the archipelago) reveals an undeniable government centrality and encryption, which begins to appear in national and popular terms along the twentieth century. Especially since the midst of that century, different social demonstrations with the emblem of Malvinas took place, and the question becomes a popular cause that shall merge with the national cause irradiated from the Government-Nation. As Escud (1986) and Palermo (2007) point out,4 Malvinas is a paradigmatic case of Argentine nationalism, particularly understanding its construction and effects as harmful for the development of the Nation itself.
4 The first one analyzing the consequences of the Argentine territorial nationalism in the Argentine political culture (and the negative incidence of both factors in the foreign policy of the Nation); and the second one pointing to an endo-directed and defensive nationalism, focused on bad Argentinians.
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Even though we do not have the intention of discussing here this last assertion, it is important to analyze the comments of these two authors as regards the kind of symbolic and identifying construction of Malvinas, and the link established by them between a government and a society that gave life to it and transformed it with the passing of time. If Government-Society was the dyad that shaped and shapes Malvinas, then the post-war reconstruction is its responsibility; and if the stories of the post-war came one after the other starting from social cleavages, then it is the responsibility of the government to summon all of them for a communion in terms of stories. If we propose that this is the task to be done, it must be understood in its most plural and inclusive sense: the question is not to make a hegemonic and totalizing speech but to achieve a discursive channel of confluence. Each story must preserve its course... but without the confluence of them all, the only result shall be stagnation. This shall not help us in any way in the internal understanding of post-1982 Malvinas (and, consequently, it shall not help us in its external projection). As we have already mentioned, the stories anchored in the memoryare subjective processes and, in turn, elements of dispute about the hegemony of what is known as official speech. But stories may also be subject to a historization according to each time and to the events that took place up to a moment of the present times. And this happens because memory, when it gets rid of the particularity of each story that gave origin to it, goes through a transformation process and changes its nature: it encounters other stories and from that merger that is highly critical and cyclic in a temporary dimension- emerge collective stories. Those created by the dynamics of the Government-Society dyad, that has the first one as pole of institutionalization, since the sovereign government is the one that organizes within its borders-the culture of its territory in terms of nation (Grimson, 2000). Each memory and, therefore, each story emerge in terms of community while collective stories correspond to society. That is why each community as a subculture with its own symbolic universe (Berger and Luckmann, 1997) develops a sort of mechanical solidarity that makes a monologue with itself as regards the story that its
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memory should articulate. However, the collective story requires a dialogue of all those communities (and, consequently, their visions, experiences, perspectives and positions), and an organic solidarity when performing the works of memory.5 A new collective story becomes necessary and the beginning of its construction finds at the Bicentennial an excellent framework. IV. THE TIME FOR THE GREAT STORY Any complex and important process gains special momentum when it is proposed in the framework of a foundational historical landmark. Maybe, that is why commemoration, as a social event and action, is invariably tied to historical dates and to its constant repetition in terms of a simultaneous chronological evolution and temporary retrospection. As time is a permanent succession of processes, freezing part of it to establish a beginning results in an action as arbitrary as human: an attempt to handle, from the finiteness of the individual, the infinity of times. In sum, it is an attempt to give continuity to the stories which were born at one time and that continue accompanying individuals in their symbolic and identifying construction. The Bicentennial, as a great commemoration of what is considered the birth of the Argentine nation, offers in this sense an excellent framework to place in the time the proposal for the construction of a new collective story about post-1982 Malvinas. And this is not only for Malvinas as a landmark contained in the commemoration of the Argentine nation, but also for the specificity of a date that takes us back at the same time- to a foundational action that, one hundred years ago, made a foundational basis of Malvinas. In fact, in 1910 centenary framework of the Argentine Republic- the book Les Iles Malouines of the French Paul Groussac was published: a work that established Malvinas as a pillar of the Argentine nationality and as a national cause that from the past gave lessons to the present with a view to the future of the country.6 The date was a watershed: a split of time in its three most common senses, to make a call for the
5 The expression is coined by Elizabeth Jelin to title one of her works (2002). 6 In this respect, see Guber (2001).
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consolidation of a young State and its growth in the commemoration of its centenary. That work does not deal with the intentions and contents of this section but with the temporary framework of its publication: the impulse of a date and a time that urged the imagined (Argentine) community to construct new visions and perspectives of the collective future and the reasons and efforts of its construction. This impulse is present again at the Bicentennial, a new cycle that shall leave date and time, and a new call of the imagined community to construct images with a view to the future. From this point, and once more, Malvinas may be proposed as a pillar of construction. Not because it constitutes a nationality emblem, not because it represents a pending territoriality... but because it is the sum of the good and bad decisions that we have made as a community over the course of 200 hundred years (when our imagined community was born). Thus, Malvinas at the Bicentennial becomes a present and contemporary example of our evolution as the nation we were and we are, as a whole society. We are not speaking about foundational landmarks or nationality or nationalism constructions... because this commemorative date, as all other similar dates, only give impulse to new constructions insofar as they make a balance about the actions adopted: Insofar as they are reflective and incisive about the constructions made and about the bases which make possible new models to be built. If this may be the spirit to be crystallized, then the stories may look at themselves in the mirror, and each social community, each collective story, may assess -beyond its experience as a particular subculturethose contributions of their own which may nurture the collective story, those steps it may take towards other similar stories in a joint construction. Without an individual work: without an Hernndez, a Groussac or a Palacios that becomes an isolated point of reference of any construction, Malvinas shall find in the gathering of the stories a form free from itself: that partial ignorance of the own biography to mitigate the burden of the intended trip and begin again at each step of that initiated path. After the war interlude every Argentinian has something to say about
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Malvinas at any of its spheres: the war has exploded the story that so far existed, and all around this soil there are rests of an emblem which is not so much related to the territorial soil but to the Argentinians as the ones who set their foot on it. This Bicentennial is a privileged time for the pending collective story. It shall not be the only one or the last one, but it shall be a special spiritual occasion to collect the pieces of those things that speak about us, beyond the territory, beyond the battles... about the way we behave as time passes and about the way in which we write the blank pages towards the future.
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formacin del Estado argentino. Buenos Aires, Ariel. Palermo, Vicente (2007) Sal en las heridas. Las Malvinas en la cultura argentina contempornea. Buenos Aires, Sudamericana. Rozitchner, Len (2005) Malvinas: de la guerra sucia a la guerra limpia. Buenos Aires, Losada. Sartori, Giovanni (2001) La sociedad multitnica. Pluralismo, multiculturalismo y extranjeros. Madrid, Taurus. Silva, Mara Alejandra and Vazquez, Juan Cruz (2006) Ms de 350. Polticas pblicas y Malvinas, Dissertation at the I Seminar on Political Science, Organized by Universidad del Salvador. Buenos Aires, USAL, 13 y 14 de octubre de 2006. Terragno, Rodolfo H. (2006) Historia y futuro de las Malvinas. Buenos Aires, Librera Histrica. Vazquez, Juan Cruz (2004) De museos, pupitres e islas. Las Malvinas en la cultura argentina, en Revista de Ciencias Sociales, n 15. Buenos Aires, Editorial Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Weber, Max (1999) Economa y sociedad. Mxico, Fondo e Cultura Econmica.
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Alejandro Kaufman Malvinas and memory, dictatorship and democracy
Alejandro Kaufman *
Malvinas and memory, dictatorship and democracy
In what way does Malvinas war appear in our memory as a concept related to the Argentine social collective conscience? 1 In 1982, the Argentine social collective conscience started a war against a foreign power. The result, the defeat, can not be conceived -not even for an instant- in an independent way, but the fact in itself and the way of its formulation are a problem in itself. The dictatorial power which planned and led the war had begun to suffer a political and social decline and, in this context, the recovery of Malvinas appeared as a distraction and an achievement which could ensure a future continuity. According to its own speech, the dictatorship had won a domestic dirty war and an eventual victory at Malvinas would legitimate its declining power. The exterminating repression which was one of the main cores of the dictatorship project was successful from the point of view of the criminal materiality of their actions but very soon it placed the dictatorship in an unacceptable political and ethical field without any kind of institutional and pragmatic feasibility. This strategy to gain time with the recovery of Malvinas triggered an outcome that was already foreseen in those days.
* Former Director of the Degree inSocial Communication of the School of Social Sciences of the Universidad of Buenos Aires. 2008-2010.
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After so many years it is possible to reflect on the behavior of the dictatorship from an analytical point of view. It initiated a war without assessing the possibility of a defeat because it had not even foreseen the possibility of a war reaction to the disembarkation at the islands. It had not foreseen either the other great defeat that was brewing in those same days: the deep and unyielding defeat that it was going to suffer sooner or later as a consequence of having given war appearance to a criminal plan against humanity, which can not be presented in the light of history as something different from what it was: a crime. 2 The social institution is not only defined by the legal, ideological or religious names with which the social conscience is self-represented. The analytical criterion that allows us to define the really existing social and cultural entity as the social collective conscience articulated among its members and separated from other ones identified as different may not coincide with the formulations of selfrepresentations. Such a discrepancy is in itself a social and political problem, which may eventually cause serious consequences. It is not costless for a social collective conscience to adhere to a distorted, absent or exaggerated image of itself. When we refer to the dictatorship of 1976, to the Military Process, we use to make a distinction in which the antagonist is democracy. The appropriateness of this distinction shall depend on the correlation it keeps with the effective agglutination of concepts which distinctively appear between the entity dictatorship and the entity democracy. In other words, the discontinuity between one and the other shall enable us to establish such a distinction. This makes necessary to define the requirements or conditions that establish how to characterize the distinction. 3 The condition of the crime against humanity is the first and definite specification which shall lead to the distinction between dictatorship and democracy. As we know, the democratic institutionalism is not enough to solve a characterization of the discontinuity. It is necessary but not sufficient. A dictatorship is not necessarily associated to a criminal condition against humanity. While the democratic
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institutionalism in itself does not ensure either an ethical and political exemption as the one we are considering here. However, in our recent history it was the crime against humanity perpetrated by the dictatorship of 1976 what put an end to the cycle of military coups. There was a discontinuity that had not existed before. 4 The word crime contains in its etymological composition the notion of separation, distinction, discontinuity. The crime separates from the social collective conscience the individual who commits it and excludes him from the territory, in the ostracism or in the exile: Exiled it be he who, due to its boldness, acts in a wrong way. He shall not dare to sit by my hearth or take part in my thoughts!1 All this is well known. Instead, the experience characterized by the crime against humanity is a historical, social, cultural and political novelty. The analytical framework required by the recent history makes new methodological and conceptual formulas necessary. A crime against humanity is perpetrated by a social collective conscience against another one, the victim of the perpetrator. The war is also a homicide action of a social collective conscience against another one. In the war, the parties in conflict have competence 2 to commit a homicide, one against the other. It does not depend on any actual assessment or prediction, because it is in the violent development of the confrontation that the conflict is solved. Not only is brute force at stake but also everything that the human condition confers to us over the other, everything that makes the supremacy of a party over the other possible. It is not the death of the other what defines supremacy but subordination, the imposition of the will, the coercion, the loss of freedom and in the limit, the death itself, as it is obvious. But death, homicide, is only a part of the confrontation the purpose of which clearly specified and agreed by both parties, even with a tacit agreement- is the supremacy, domination and governance over the other. The war ends with the surrender of the other party. The premise of the surrender, culturally codified since several millenniums ago, is
1 Sophocles, Antgone, in Tragedias, Gredas, Barcelona, 2006, p. 150. 2 Offensive-defensive capacity.
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respect for life and the acceptance of subordination, the supremacy of the adversary or enemy. The characteristic of the crime against humanity is that the homicide is committed against a defenseless victim, who is first placed by force in an irreversible defenseless condition, either by a previous defeat in the battlefield, by the existence of humiliating racist laws or by deceits or omissions which prevented the victim from perceiving what was going to happen. Then, the extermination is perpetrated by a collective social conscience over another one, the identifying characteristics of which are defined by the exterminator. This is another difference with the war. In the war confrontation, as both opponents are sovereign, the integration of each of the opposed social collective consciences is defined by themselves, not by their opponents. We do not define the social composition of the collective conscience of the enemy, except in an indirect way as part of the conflict itself, through alliances or other strategic procedures but without possibility of determination about those things that only the enemy decides. Instead, the exterminator defines at his whim the composition of the collective conscience destined to sacrifice. That is why it always appears to us as arbitrary, to a greater or lesser extent, because the behaviors, elections or practices of the victimized social collective practices do not intervene in the configuration of its identity. The composition of the victimized social collective conscience is unilaterally determined by the exterminator. Therefore, ultimately, the victimized social collective conscience is not even a social collective conscience because it has not been constituted as such in its social and historical process. The identification of the perpetrator is self-defined by contrast with his collective victim. The processes of self and hetero definition also occur during the wars, but from the point of view of the effective configuration of social collective consciences- it is only self-definition what prevails when such collective consciences are established as nations, groups or other collective categories. Among the reasons3 that explain the absence of movements of revenge
3 Reasons which are very far from being clarified.
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for the crimes against humanity it is necessary to include this -lax, dispersed and irregular from the point of view of identity- nature of the collective consciences, victims of such crimes. Survivors emerge from a limit condition of the existence as human beings, exempted from any other feature due to the perpetration, before the redress that they shall later receive, between the meshes of testimony and memory. The individual revenge is an unlikely event, performed by an individual who is exempted, even in the imagination, from anything else than a collective conscience of victims and survivors, in which the human capacity for the exercise of violence -among the other human capacities in suspense- was eliminated. The survivor of the extermination is in principle exempted from a collective conscience which supports him in his individual and collective capacity for the exercise of violence. It takes a long time, years, to recover that collective social capacity. In the unilateral antagonism between perpetrators and victims of crimes against humanity the failure of the exterminating project is verified: it does not consolidate the social collective conscience subject to the perpetration but, on the contrary, it exerts dispersion effects on it and finally it separates it from humanity. 5 The important question, overshadowed by the seriousness and density of the crime against humanity is, apart from the need to avoid its repetition, how does a social collective conscience that includes perpetrators and victims return to normal conditions?.4 In our recent history there was a bet, first, on the struggle for the movements of human rights against the dictatorship and, in the postdictatorship, for the truth and justice, with emphasis during several years on the practice of punishment. Punishment is characterized as an essential modality directed to the separation of the perpetrators. We know its limits, especially when legality aims at the almost
4 The formulation of this question in the context of this text gives for granted the ridiculous nature of an intended reconciliation, but at the same time poses an unavoidable coexistence that must be accepted as such, with all its extreme difficulties. When perpetrators utter it, the formulation of the reconciliation is integrated to the denial deviations. In the case of some survivors or relatives, it shall be necessary to resort to deeper inquiries about the human soul.
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exclusive characterization of atrocious actions. In general terms, the perception of the limited nature of the persecution of atrocious behaviors by the perpetrators accused in the courts is shared. There are other ways of ostracism practiced over essential actors of the perpetration, through more indirect actions of institutional, professional, business and media nature. A relative consensus separates such actors from some dimensions of the public and governmental institutions, with limitations. The purpose of the mentioned practices of punishment and ostracism is to establish an efficient interruption with respect to the social configuration in which those two distinctions were verified: Criminal-perpetrator social collective conscience against victimized social collective conscience. The rest of the society which agreed in different degrees, or which was spectator of the horror, also participates in an additional way: it was a third actor, in some way a survivor, who emerged from the selective operation carried out by the collective perpetrator. In that sense the collective third actor suffers from similar disintegrating effects: it was the collective perpetrator who exempted him from extermination. To survive to such a condition is not costless; on the contrary, and not only for the guilt determinations, the social collective conscience which is a spectator of the horror is a victim of the same classification whim which led the others to be exterminated. Then, we are speaking about the saved in opposition to the drowned, to use the words of Primo Levi. According to the expressions of some of the Argentine perpetrators, with not very different words, the only way to save ourselves from extermination is to belong to the exterminating collective conscience. 6. So, the recent history is also made up of the construction of knowledge about the consequences of the exterminations. What should be done in a post-history period in order to restore the social ties, the coexistence, the social and cultural participation within the framework of a social collective conscience that was not constituted as a consequence of a successful war over another collective
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conscience, but that survived to an extermination perpetrated by a part of the population, articulated with the government machinery because without this machinery the extermination is not possible in the present historical conditions. We should remember what was mentioned before: the extermination may come after a successful war but it is not essentially a massacre of war prisoners, while the practice itself of the extermination defines or redefines the social composition of the victimized collective conscience. The post-extermination period requires then the institutionalization of discontinuities which may efficiently separate the perpetrating social collective conscience from the social collective conscience of the survivor or historical successor of the construction of identities in a determined territory. If we pay attention to the last twenty-five years of the post-dictatorship period we shall be able to analyze the series of events which gave rise to a discontinuity in countless spheres and situations: since the trial of the military juntas of the dictatorship up to the teachers qualifications exams at the public universities of the democratic institutionalism, going through multiple events and formulations during all these years in all the imaginable, institutional and testimonial ways. 7. However, there is a social and political field which remained widely exempted from any exercise of discontinuity with the dictatorship: that of the hegemonic media. Essential protagonists of the dictatorship, actors with different levels of influence in the perpetration, they also were and are fundamental factors of the continuity with the dictatorship because the media discourse is the author of one of the nuclear articulations of what agglutinates a social collective conscience: the discourse construction and circulation. Malvinas war is a privileged moment of the recent history of the hegemonic media because during it they showed an unusual creativity and willpower not later denied, repaired, reviewed or subjected to selfcriticism. On the contrary, the years of the post-dictatorship period were witnesses of a long work for the continuity with the dictatorship, of an ideological and political work directed to conceal complicities
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and also to go on with the functional project of the dictatorship. Beyond the accurate assessment with which we define the participation of the hegemonic media with respect to the dictatorship, there is an unavoidable conceptual component with relation to Malvinas war. Even though with respect to the horror events they used an extremely perverse language, which is still used in our society and in our culture, this language concealed the horror and, at the same time, revealed it. It constituted the social, political and economic model which determined the dictatorship, which during the previous decades made up the agendas of the de facto governments and which after the end of the dictatorship of 1976 could finally establish themselves in the civilian discourse. It is true that they have not achieved yet efficient partisan political institutions, but they have achieved greater efficiency through ubiquitous transversal presence in the political life of the Argentine citizenship. Menemism was its consummation. The unavoidable conceptual component conferred by Malvinas war due to the antagonist nature of society with relation to the hegemonic media is the systematic and uniform lie about the war itself. The fact that the majority of the population was deceived about what was happening in the battlefield might be understood as an event imposed by circumstances, as it usually happens in wars. Indeed, the war does not only threaten the life, as it is known, but also, as it is usually said, the first victim is the truth. War is not consistent with a liberal public sphere, where civil rights linked to expression and information are exercised. To assert that in all the countries in war there is a decline, weakening or suspension of the public sphere and the freedoms of expression and information is patently obvious. But nothing of all this happened in the Argentina of 1983, because it had already happened since 1976. Dozens of journalists had already disappeared, countless publications had closed and all the other things we know about the conditions in which the media acted during the dictatorship. The hegemonic media story about what happened in the battlefield was very far from any survival condition in an adverse context or from a situation in which some publications adhered to the dictatorship and other ones had a more distant role. Instead, there was a general
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celebration of an inexistent victory, as it is well known. That is not either the main problem: Within a social framework of atrocious repression, as the one experienced during the dictatorship, there is no place for any expectation of exemption, except for exceptional heroic deeds. The great and hurting problem posed by the celebrating and highly uniform adherence of the hegemonic media to the dictatorship during Malvinas War lies in what happened after, during the following decades. There was nothing important to mention in the sense here posed. There was not discontinuity. What could or should have happened in a society in which everybody was deceived all the time, when the situation that imposed that lie ended? Within the framework of the hegemonic media there were not discontinuities. It was the other way round; some ties between the dictatorship and the post-dictatorship were established, with some fluctuations about the implicit vindication of the military process project. 8. In the recent Argentine history, the denial of the horror events was not verified. Unlike other limit experiences as the one of the extermination of the Armenian by the Turkish or the extermination of the Jewish by the Nazis, the perpetrators and their accomplices do not deny what happened and they do not doubt either about the factual or material dimension of the horror events. They do not deny the atrocities. They interpret them. They interpret them again. They configure and reconfigure the stories. And that is possible because the hegemonic media, unlike what happens in other places, take part in the continuity of the stories of the dictatorship that they produce and go on producing themselves. All this happens in front of a lifeless and passive society which accepts the succession of the hegemonic media discourses, except for numerous but insufficient exceptions, at least in comparison with the progress made in other fields linked to human rights. 9. As they have permanently told lies to all the population during Malvinas War and, as they have refrained from constructing a discontinuity even a symbolic, partial or criticizable one- we find that some of the singular characteristics of the Argentine hegemonic
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media may not be completely understood if not related with that original sin of the Argentine press which consisted in a systematic lie uttered by all the hegemonic media, without a later rectification. In a first instance, the media abandoned in this way their institutional social role of representing the reality. They did not comply with their social role, as other institutions did. As an example, we can mention the banks which did not return the deposited money, the physicians and midwives who stole children, the judges who were tools of the horror, the politicians who did not govern or legislate, etc. We should note that, in spite of the extreme crisis of 2001, many or all of these institutions partially or totally recovered with an excessive cost- their objectives as such. And not necessarily through procedures of review, self-criticism or self-purification. There were policy changes but, above all, modifications of the behaviors that, with the passing of time, became consistent. Although the example is not applicable to other institutions, the truth is that the banks did not disappear for ever, but that they recovered their deposits and that the banking system is part of the Argentine social collective conscience, as before the crisis (both that of 2001 and the one which took place during the dictatorship). 10 The hegemonic media followed two main directions as paths of the continuity of the dictatorship. First, the reduction of the question of the human rights and the crime against humanity to a problem which may have a diversity of opinions from victims and murderers. A diversity that excludes any violence and reduction to the testimonial exposition establishing parity between perpetrators on the one hand and victims of the horror on the other. In a second instance: unspecified equality of any victim of pain, grief, accidents or crimes of any nature. Mothers of the pain on equal terms with Mothers of Plaza de Mayo. This equality was deeply rooted and naturalized in the collective conscience. Second, the systematic and generalized transposition and subsumption of the political, reflective or information meanings of the entertainment regime, under the direct and permanent conduction of the same media personalities who made identical tasks during the dictatorship.
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Such entertainment operations coincide in an essential aspect: the prevailing speeches about journalistic and information ethics refrain from establishing their foundational basis in the dictatorship and instead they relate them to secondary, peripheral or even anecdotic events occurred during the post-dictatorship period. Once the essential historical strategic tasks of the human rights movement were performed by the society and the government, and notwithstanding the long way we still have ahead, the media problem requires the foundation of a deontological base of the professions linked to the press in the media event of the -unanimous and generalizedinstitutionalized lie during Malvinas War. It is essential to introduce a discontinuity with that catastrophic experience for the civil society and initiate a foundational path in the field of ethics and good journalistic practices. In that path, it shall be necessary to leave behind an idea established by the dictatorship both in the media practice and in the public: we cannot believe in anything of what is said in the media, we must only agree with the agenda established by them and forget it through the resource of entertainment. Society and politics are colorful mosaics of sects to which we may adhere or not without interfering in their shades or transformations. The process of adherence or rejection constitutes an entertainment practice. This summary is not alien to the global environment. The extreme way in which the hegemonic media were monopolized in the post-dictatorship period created a media sphere which must be deeply reviewed if we want to consolidate a habitable democratic society. 11. In the same way as a social movement with an unusual creativity and energy made possible to include the problem of human rights in the late dictatorship and post-dictatorship period, the vindications we need as a society with respect to the hegemonic media shall become visible provided that they are absorbed by social movements with similar capacity and perseverance in the struggle for a public and social information ethics. It is not enough for a government which suffered in a determined stage of its institutional period the worst consequences of the existing media regime to have undertaken
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the enforcement of the audiovisual services act. As it happens with the whole problem of human rights, the media problem as part of the latter, still requires a long political and educational task in the Argentine society. We need to imagine this demand because certain minimum parameters, even in the era of the society of the ultra technological show and multimedia, should move their narrow limits to co-existence levels much greater than those we are used to see. Industrial media, the business of which mainly lies in the rendering of a service that permanently resorts to the catastrophic alarm, based on the fire alarm at the full theatre as a method of attraction of the public.
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Marcelo Luis Vernet Malvinas: towards an integrating conception
Marcelo Luis Vernet *

Malvinas: towards an integrating conception
- We can hear old words - So, prick up your ears. Antonio Machado. Proverbios y Cantares
Interestingly, the first view that our papers register about Malvinas is that of a ship sailing in the high seas. The story is known but it is worth remembering it. On May 30, 1810, Cornelio Judas Tadeo de Saavedra, as President of the Government Board, stamps his signature on an official document. With or without a revolution, the Government proceedings and affairs follow their slow course. It is a claim. The first pilot Gerardo Bordas who was Malvinas Governor from August 1808 to January 1810, arrives at the station of Montevideo and requests the payment of pending wages and incentives corresponding to his function. On March 9, 1810, Rear Admiral Jos Mara Salazar, General Commander of the Navy at the station, takes the request to Viceroy Cisneros. On March 20, Cisneros orders
* Great-great-grandson of the first political and military commander at Malvinas Islands, Luis Vernet.
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to send certified copies of the Real Orders existing at the General Treasury about allowances or some other important Malvinas items to the Navy Minister of the Rio de la Plata station, with headquarters in Montevideo. I do not know if at that time Cisneros had lost some of his power or if it was typical of the slow colonial bureaucracy not to give an immediate compliance to the provisions, the truth is that the reply never arrived. On May 20, Salazar insists on his request to the Viceroy. I imagine poor Bordas, perhaps pressed by his wife, going everyday from his home to the Station to ask Rear Admiral Salazar if he had news from Buenos Aires. There are news from Buenos Aires; not the ones expected by Bordas. As a result of a week of agitation, not yet called May Week, the person who now reads the official document of Rear Admiral Salazar is Cornelio Judas Tadeo de Saavedra, President of the Government Board that has replaced Viceroy Cisneros. So, on May 30, 1810, five days before the Revolution, the name Malvinas appears in an official paper that bears the signature of Saavedra and Juan Jose Paso, as Secretary. And there we can read, as an antecedent of the subject in question, that in the Order dated December 13, 1806 the Superior Board of the Real Treasury provided that: for the expenditures and payments we shall consider from now onwards the establishment of Malvinas as a ship sailing and all the employees at that destination as depending on the ship, and the Navy shall have the same accounts in the same way as the ones of the other warships according to their particular and exclusive ordinances. This curious decision is based on the need to keep the uniformity of the modality, something that is so necessary and convenient for the real service objects of a same class. Today, two hundred years later, in our most common and spread view, the sharp silhouettes of Malvinas disappear in the emptiness. Separated from any context. Like a ship, run aground, isolated. We may argue that they are no longer a symbol that has represented the Nation itself. And that is true. As it is true that, as we tend to keep the uniformity of the modality in the objects of the same class, we treat it as a flag. And there we can find Malvinas, embroidered in the
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heart, stuck in the windows of the cars, erected in monuments and faades, sailing through a sea of blue paint in the school handbooks. Nothing to object. It is a product of love and loyalty. But when we think about Malvinas, we must put them in context. It is the context what updates meanings. Without a context, the senses become abstract, petrified in an essentialism which closes the interrogations. The purpose of these notes is to try to obtain a comprehensive understanding of Malvinas Islands conceiving them in increasingly wide and related contexts. Patagonia, South Atlantic, South America. They do not add anything we do not know. If they have any merit, it is to make even more obvious the evident, through the simple path of seeing it again. To give a context to Malvinas may be a risky task. It may alter the peacefulness of the established rituals in which we all coincide. It is, undoubtedly, a political task in the most essential sense of the word. This bicentennial of the May Revolution may be a good opportunity to allow Malvinas, that ship that never moors in any place, to sail again in the same alive waters of life according to the words of Saint Teresa, although these waters are, many times, turbulent and unsafe. Two hundred years ago, Cornelio Saavedra orders again to send the certified copies of the Real Orders existing at the same General Treasury about allowances and some other Malvinas items because the Navy Commander has stated that you have not sent yet the mentioned copies. That is why it corresponds to you, this Governing Board, the task entrusted to the mentioned Navy Commander, so that with his authorization these copies are sent to this same Board. God save you for many years, Saavedra says before stamping his signature in the official paper. I hope God has kept them for many years because, even though I do not know how the procedure went on, according to the succeeding events, I suspect that the poor first pilot, Gerardo Bordas, has not been paid yet. God save us! MALVINAS IS PATAGONIA If we do not think about Malvinas as an indissoluble part of a wider whole
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-the extended Patagonia- it shall be very difficult for us to understand our history in Malvinas and its particular present situation. Malvinas was the first Argentine colonizing project of the Southern Patagonia and it was always linked to it in meaning and fate. For better or worse, Malvinas was the main irradiating center of the colonizing currents of the National Territories of Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz, at the end of the nineteenth century. Malvinas is today, among so many meanings, an integrating part of the most extensive and recent Argentine province with the longest name, the Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands. THE DUTY TO FOUND A COLONY In taxonomies of Argentine history, Malvinas are obviously included in the category Sovereignty Disputes. But this point of view has clouded another circumstance. Malvinas were part of a Patagonian colonization project which shared -though with special featuresthe atmosphere, the political vicissitudes and hardships of the first attempts to found colonies and receive immigrants that characterized the 1820s in Argentina. However, the project is not included in this category. The report on the subject prepared by the National History Academy in 1956, to commemorate the centennial of the foundation of Colonia Esperanza, does not even mention it. Curiously enough, this colonizing enterprise, about which little is said and known, survived the government of Rodrguez; the huge 1825-26 crack that shattered the fantastic enterprises of Rivadavia and the quotes in the London Stock Exchange; Rivadavias presidency; the war with Brazil; the shooting of Dorrego; and the civil war. Far from Buenos Aires, the project became consolidated when all other initiatives had failed. Unlike other contemporary projects that presupposed the transfer of a pre-existing community (the Scottish of Parish Robertson, the English of Barber Beaumont, the German of Heine), the colony at Malvinas was founded with Argentine population and housed settlers from many different nations. This story unfolds over a decade, featuring Luis Vernet as one of its most outstanding protagonists. It begins in 1823 with the concession
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granted by the Government of Buenos Aires to the Pacheco-Vernet enterprise to exploit furs and oil of sea lions and capture wild cattle on Soledad Island. It reaches its climax with the creation of the Commandery of Malvinas in 1829 and the appointment of Vernet to the office of Commander. The story ends tragically due to the aggression of two foreign powers: the United States, which destroyed and plundered the Colony in 1832, and Great Britain, which occupied the Islands some time later, in January 1833. The history of the Argentine colonization of Malvinas is the central theme of the development of a state policy that was maintained in time by different administrations, despite the difficult circumstances that characterized the process of independence and national organization of our country. This policy had precise and express aims: To claim sovereignty and title to our Patagonian continental and insular territory, within a plan that privileged Malvinas Islands as a strategic enclave in the Southern region. The other focus was on the Commandery of Patagones, in the North, with which Malvinas maintained profuse traffic and relations. To protect our natural resources, especially in connection with controls over fishing and amphibian hunting in the region, an intention that had already been set forth in the 1821 regulations and expressly ratified in Section 3 of the 1829 Decree. Predation by fishing vessels of other countries, mainly Great Britain and the United States, was already worrying. To favor the establishment of settlements and the development of fishing activities as the basis of a national navy. Among these acts of government and assertions of title it is especially important to mention the Decree of January 5, 1828, which gives legal certainty to the colonization process by giving Vernet all empty plots of land on Soledad Island (...) and Statenland Island (Isla de los Estados), subject to the express condition that, within three years as from the date herein, a Colony must be established. The whereas clauses of the decree signed by Juan Ramn Balcarce, War and Navy Minister of Governor Manuel Dorrego, include a list of the great benefits the country would derive from populating
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the Islands to which title is claimed. The decree mainly refers to the increase in trade with foreign countries; to new channels of national prosperity derived from promoting the important fishing sector; to the significance of military strategies, since at those difficult times a war with the Emperor of Brazil was ongoing, and importance was attached to finding in those Islands a base for maritime operations; and to the fact that for populating and enlarging the territory of Southern coasts and developing their ports nothing will be more useful than populating those Islands... We believe that these few lines contain the central themes of a regional geopolitical approach in which Southern Patagonia is the scenario and Malvinas constitute the core of its development. The foundations of the colony on Soledad Island were laid by Argentine settlers, mainly rural workers who, as from 1824, arrived from the provinces of Santiago del Estero, Entre Ros, Crdoba, Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Uruguay in successive expeditions. As a little Argentina, Malvinas Islands also opened their doors to all the inhabitants of the world. So, in 1829 families of German farmers arrived at the Islands, and, together with Argentinians, erected their houses. Dutch families undertook milking and butter production activities. The Scottish and the French forgot the sea and became horsemen, working together with our countrymen. There were also Genovese, English and Irish fishermen and sailors. These men brought their crafts as their only fortune. The baker of the colony was Portuguese; the carpenter, Jamaican. Africans from Cape Verde, whom the war with Brazil had brought as slaves, found a distant home as settlers in Malvinas. This reality would nowadays be called a multicultural model with respect for diversity. The land ownership system, which facilitated the acquisition of farmlands together with urban plots, fostered the settlement of families. Additionally, agents were appointed to disseminate the advantages of investing in the main financial and trade markets of Europe and the United States. The permanent population soon exceeded one hundred persons and it was constantly increased by the crews of the vessels that stopped to procure fresh water and supplies at Port Soledad. There they worked, formed their families,
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had children, and buried their dead, which made them undisputed owners of those lands. The fourth child of Luis Vernet and Mara Sez, who was named Malvina, was born there. This was the first time an Argentine girl had been given the name of this land. Another outstanding characteristic of the colonizing process in Malvinas was the establishment of a diversified productive development model that was -of course- regionally conceived: it included the continent and the surrounding islands up to Cape Horn, and it proved to be successful and sustainable. The model was based on the fishing industry -represented at the time by seven enterprises; the domestication and breeding of cattle under the ranch model, just as in the province of Buenos Aires; the exploitation of wood in Statenland Island (Isla de los Estados), both for use at the colony and for export; the industry of salted meat and fish; the introduction of merino sheep for wool production; and the development of subsistence agriculture for the population. Tax exemptions and a fishing monopoly for 20 years, established by Dorregos government, completed the scheme. Exports included furs of sea lions and rabbits, and cowhides; jerky and salted fish; wood from Statenland Island (Isla de los Estados) and baleen. The main importers were Brazil, the United States and Great Britain. We can make one last consideration to show the unavoidable Patagonian spirit of this feat. In this year 2009, which is about to finish, we have commemorated -without much bustle- the 180th anniversary of the creation of the Political Military Commandery of Malvinas Islands and Islands adjoining Cape Horn in the Atlantic Sea, as it was officially called. If we read again the yellowish papers we treasure as documents that evidence our legacy, we would clearly see what is obvious. Let us listen to these papers: When, after the glorious revolution of May 25, 1810, these provinces separated from Spanish domination, Spain was the actual owner of Malvinas Islands, and of all the other islands that surround Cape Horn, including the one known as Tierra del Fuego, affirms in its whereas clauses the decree of June 30, 1829, thus justifying the creation of the Commandery of Malvinas. The map that these words depict coincides, except for
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the Antarctic sector (which by then had barely been seen), with the current map of the province of Tierra del Fuego, which was created under Law 23775 of 1990 -after four years of controversial debateand whose borders are still today subject to final approval. Later on, we will go deeper into this matter. A SHARED STORY I learned about the love story of Carlos Moyano and Ethel Turner thanks to a confidence of frigate captain Teodoro Caillet-Bois who published, in 1947, an article in number 198 of the magazine Argentina Austral, which was published by Sociedad Annima Importadora y Exportadora de la Patagonia, better known as La Annima by inhabitants of Santa Cruz, since such a long name was rather inconvenient given the strong winds that habitually blow in those lands. I call it a confidence because, other than the short marriage certificate on folio two of the minute book that was first used on this occasion, there exist no chronicles or documents to prove the marriage of the navy sergeant major Carlos Moyano, who was at the time the brand new governor of the recently created National Territory of Santa Cruz, and the young Ethel Turner, who had been born in Malvinas. What is known about this marriage derives from family memories and tradition. In this case, thanks to the data furnished to Teodoro Caillet-Bois by Mara Clarisa Moyano,1 daughter of Carlos and Ethel. The story has all necessary elements: one Sunday at Stanley, slightly snowing, after the service at the little protestant temple. Miss Ethel, 16 years old, wrapped up in a woolen mantilla resembles a little princess. Moyano, a 29-year-old weather-beaten sailor, who had been travelling through Patagonia for ten years. And, according to frigate captain Teodoro Caillet-Bois, Cupid with his bow and arrow. Serious researchers, who always spoil love stories, omit the snow, claiming that the encounter took place in the summer of 1885. With or without snow, this story is told by Caillet-Bois. I would like to
1 After this note, in 1948, Mara Clarisa Moyano published a long biography of her father: Carlos Moyano: el explorador de la Patagonia.
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refer to the circumstances that surround this love at first sight, since they make a new linking knot between Malvinas and Patagonia. In 1884, President Roca decided to divide the vast Patagonia by creating five National Territories. Firstly, the vast Santa Cruz. He appointed Carlos Moyano as its first governor. Santa Cruz is a desert. Moyano knows this desert. He travelled along its coasts, explored its lands, discovered its lakes, searched for the source of its rivers, defined its hydrographic basins and described their courses, marked tracks, specified the features of the orographic system and went deep into the Andes.2 A man of action, his life can only be defined with verbs. Verbs define the civilizing hero of the late and long XIX century, who also has to put the action in writing through reports, books, travel journals. Moyano wrote: The use of deserts for industry and trade comprises two stages: The first one involves swords; the second one, geographers. The swords clear the field and when they say that there are no more battles to fight, there appears the second link of the splendid chain of progress with the arms of science, with which it investigates, recognizes and analyzes the treasures that nature has put there.3 But he did not clarify, to the best of my knowledge, against whom the battles are fought or whether ownership is to be enjoyed over a desert; he did not specify how many times the sword must clear the field or who are to be cleared, that is, how many times the splendid machinery of progress can be restarted and the sword be made to strike again and again to clear the field. But that is another story. Carlos Mara Moyano knows that Santa Cruz is an immeasurable desert, and believes that his duty as a governor is to populate it. He knows that all previous colonization attempts have failed. He knows that he must find men raised amidst the wind, men accustomed to gaze into the distance with half-closed eyes, to possess the land so that sheep flocks may multiply. Where could he find them? In Malvinas. So there he goes to Malvinas with his eagerness and the bow of the lugger Piedra Buena. Once in Malvinas he speaks of an
2 Lenzi, Juan Hilarion. Carlos Mara Moyano. Marino, explorador y gobernante, Secretara de Estado de Marina, Buenos Aires, 1962. 3 Quoted by Lenzi, Hilarion. Ibidem.
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immeasurable land, claiming that he has the power to divide it in immeasurable plots and distribute it among men capable of forcing it to bear fruit. He finds what he is searching for, besides finding Ethel, probably on a Sunday, with or without snow. The story of the use of deserts for industry and trade is the circumstance that surrounds the encounter of Carlos Moyano and Ethel Turner. Sheep flocks, dogs, shepherds and pioneers arrive from Malvinas. If we ask who are the owners of the land in Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego at the turn of the XX century, together with the emblematic names of Braun, Menndez, Behety and Nogueira, there appears a group of families who own large estates, including: Halliday, Scott, Rudd, Wood, Waldron, Hamilton, Saunders, Reynard, MacGeorge, Felton, Smith, Douglas.4 They are generally considered British. And it is true. So true that, for example, George MacGeorge donated the plot where, in 1911, the British Club of Santa Cruz was erected. At that time, it was called Coronation Club to honor George Frederick Ernest Albert Windsor, who was crowned as George V of the United Kingdom in 1911. Still today, at the British Club you can enjoy excellent lamb marinated with rosemary and garlic. Still today you may celebrate the Queens birthday, on May 24, and sing the Argentine National Anthem at the turn of May 25. But these British subjects had a common feature: they had landed on the windy Santa Cruz from Malvinas. During Moyanos administration, a triangle of fluent exchanges developed regardless of nationalities, the angles of which were Malvinas, Santa Cruz and Punta Arenas, in Southern Chile. Undoubtedly, this circumstance was key to the subsequent development of Southern Patagonia on the basis of large estates and wool production. In this process, the participation of the British community from Malvinas was crucial. The First World War, followed by an impressive escalation in the price of wool at international markets, favored the exponential growth of this activity. In 1914, out of 571 owners of cattle exploitation enterprises, 158 (27.6%) were Argentine and 413 were foreigners (72.32%).5 The British community was the largest
4 Mainwaring, Michael. Falkland Islands to Patagonia. 5 Genaga, Rosario. Instituciones, grupos e ideologa en la Patagonia austral.
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and within it, those from Malvinas were a majority. So much so, that in 1918, when Germn Vidal -governor of the Territory- reorganized the Rural Society of Santa Cruz, the elected president was John Hamilton, a Scottish from Malvinas, who had moved to Punta Arenas in 1883, and then to Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego in 1886/7. The history of these Malvinas-born pioneers is linked to Patagonia by a more subtle though equally strong- bond than immeasurable estates. The life of any of them may be told as if it were a legend which involves the use of Patagonian deserts for industry and trade that was foretold by Moyano. The profuse Patagonian literature, from the already traditional Argentina Austral to current publications, frequently includes short descriptions of these pioneers lives, whose legendary nature does not make them any less real. Their lives resemble those of our Southern pioneers, among other reasons, because they derive from the same mythical and cultural matrix. I would like to provide a simple and evident example to emphasize this reality. One of the foundational stories of the heroic colonization of Patagonia involves cattle herding. However, if in the South we ask about the Big Herding, we will no doubt be told the story of the herding mission that departed in 1887 from Fort Conesa with 5,000 sheep and 500 horses and arrived at Ro Gallegos two years and 1,500 kilometers later. The heroes of this adventure were five Scottish pioneers. Four of them had come to Patagonia from Malvinas: George McGeorge, William Saunders, John Hamilton and John MacLean. The fifth member, Henry William Jamieson, had arrived a few years earlier from Australia and was General Rocas local guide. Frigate captain Teodoro Caillet-Bois tells us that before returning to Malvinas, Carlos Moyano proposed to Ethel Turner and was accepted, but since Ethel was only 16, he had to wait until she turned 18 to marry her. On September 15, 1886, Carlos and Ethel married in Santa Cruz. He who wishes to see this marriage as echoing Romeo and Juliets story is wrong. The relationships that the British and the Argentinians have developed throughout history are infinitely more complex than the rather primitive hatred of Montagues and Capulets.
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THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALVINAS We all know that Malvinas form part of the Patagonian province of Tierra del Fuego but we often forget it. Given their peculiar location, we are more used to name and conceive them as that unredeemed land6 than to image them forming part of a province with the concrete contingencies this implies. We have already mentioned that the decree of June 10, 1829, which created the Political Military Commandery of Malvinas Islands and Islands surrounding Cape Horn in the Atlantic Sea, anticipated the creation of the Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands and was its first historical antecedent. Deciding whether or not Malvinas were to be expressly included in this political entity was not an easy issue. Decree Law 2191/57 provides that: The National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands comprises: the Eastern part of Isla Grande and the other archipelagos of Tierra del Fuego and Statenland (Isla de los Estados) and Ao Nuevo Islands, according to the borders established by the treaty of July 23, 1881; Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sndwich del Sur Islands; and the Argentine Antarctic Sector between meridians 25 West and 74 West and parallel 60 South. After the return to democracy, Ral Alfonsns administration undertook the task of turning the last National Territory into a province. Finally, in 1986, the Executive Power introduced a bill in the House of Deputies promoting the creation of the province of Tierra del Fuego. The position of the Government at that time was that Argentine Antarctica, Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands ought to remain as a national territory, and named it national territory of Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands. We are not going to analyze the many confrontations that occasionally overwhelmed the four-year debate on the bill. Malvinas were in the
6 Translators Note: the Spanish term irredenta, translated as unredeemed refers to Irredentism, which, in turn, means any position advocating annexation of territories administered by another state on the grounds of common ethnicity or prior historical possession, actual or alleged.
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limelight but, as always, they were invoked to solve, settle or hide other conflicts and interests: provincial or national sea? a large province or a small province? among others. After this long struggle, the Law that turned the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego into a province was enacted in 1990. Section 1 of Law 23775 meticulously established its borders. Teachers must have been surely worried when they read the long second paragraph of this section -full of parallels, meridians, grades, minutes, islands and islets with strange names-, while trying to figure out how they would make their students draw a map of the new province. The good news was that Malvinas Islands were expressly mentioned and could be painted in the same color as the little triangle of the Eastern sector of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego. By then, Carlos Sal Menem already governed the Republic. By Decree 905/90 he enacted the law, partially vetoing section 1. On May 15, 1990, when law 23775 was published in the Official Gazette, the long second paragraph which so meticulously established the borders of the new province had disappeared. And with it, the explicit reference to Malvinas. The National Executive Power justified its decision manifesting that the demarcation established in section 1 requires more precision to adequate it to the legal order in force, and that the fixed borders could involuntarily generate interpretations by third countries which do not coincide with our countrys positions regarding the matter. Some people argued that in the long enumeration of islands and islets, some Chilean islets had been involuntarily included; others pointed out the special features of a completely insular province in relation to the political and economic control of the adjoining sea; but, in light of the vague arguments, the veto was undeniably obscure. From that moment up to now, another debate has been ongoing. The work and substantive progress made by the Committees on Constitutional Affairs and on Foreign Affairs and Worship of the National House of Deputies are expected to have the positive result of fully and completely overcoming this conflict before the end of the 2009 legislative period. In the forthcoming scenario, Malvinas Islands expressly form part of the territory of
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Tierra del Fuego, not only by invoking the 1957 Decree-Law. We are there. Where are we? In the municipality of Malvinas Islands. I do not say so. It is mentioned in the Constitution of Tierra del Fuego, whose territory comprises: Section 169.- This Constitution recognizes the municipality as a socio-political, natural and essential community with a life of its own, sustained by adequate socio-cultural and socioeconomic development, in which families linked by their roots and proximity- coincide in the search of common welfare. It guarantees the municipal system based on the political, administrative, economic and financial autonomy of communities. And Section 170 provides that: Those communities which have the characteristics mentioned in the preceding section with a minimum stable population of two thousand inhabitants shall be recognized as municipalities by the Province. Malvinas Islands barely meet the requirement. Consequently, the province of Tierra del Fuego would be, among other peculiarities, the only Argentine province with a municipality occupied by a foreign power. I am not trying to municipalize the national cause of the unredeemed7 islands: I simply believe that we have interesting prospects if we consider this argument as the starting point to address the serious and complex problem of our sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom. From this context, perhaps we could clarify this complexity, question it, search for alternatives and solutions within the different levels of the problem, delineate -together with the general policy- the small and daily one which, so many times, with its sets of gestures, reachable goals, and converging strategies, supports the main themes and builds their political viability. Let us see. Let us try to see. Malvinas Islands are an indissoluble part of a wider whole: the Argentine Patagonia. Their history has been woven in this way. It is thus proclaimed by the Constitution of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands which forms part of Patagonia: The Province hereby declares that it belongs to the Patagonian region and coordinates its policy, plans
7 See note 139.
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and management with the provinces of the region and the National Government. This situation is worth emphasizing, as much as the British colonial government tries to hide it, even in the most insignificant details. Nowadays, one of the main economic activities of the islands is squid fishing. The species Patagonian loligo is the most sought for by European fishing ships. For the Islands government it is simply Loligo, as if there were not in the world sixteen other species within this genus, apart from the Patagonian one.8 Much to the dismay of colonial authorities, another species carries the sonorous name of Illex argentinus. It would be better for us to spread, together with the Islands silhouette, slogans reaffirming Malvinas Argentine Patagonia or Malvinas Tierra del Fuego, Argentina. This would evidently expose one of the principles which is the core of our position and is accepted by the international community: the Islanders pretense of self-determination cannot be accepted because it directly implies infringing upon the national unity and territorial integrity of Argentina. There are different levels and fields, but everything contributes and builds sense to support a policy, including the cephalopods name. It is just an example, but if we affirm that there is an Argentine province which has a municipality occupied by a foreign power, we are speaking about infringement of National unity, infringement of territorial integrity. Simply, if we contextualize it, circumscribing it to a more tangible and delimited territoriality, the absurd excess of the British pretense becomes more evident. Certainly, it is the Federal Government that must seek a solution to the sovereignty conflict, under Argentine laws. This dispute recognizes only two parties, the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom, which usurped the Islands in 1833. But there is a third actor in this drama: the British citizens who inhabit the usurped municipality of the province of Tierra del Fuego. The British - who are fond of irony have been striving for many years to give this actor a leading role, and have even attempted to make the Islanders decide on the sovereignty dispute. It is sad -but instructive- to recall the meeting that the then
8 Terragno, Rodolfo. Historia y futuro de las Malvinas.
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Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Di Tella held in May 1999 with representatives of the Islands government. It was in London. The Minister, standing under an umbrella of paradoxes that did little to protect him, tried to smile while he signed a joint declaration stating that an interesting exchange of opinions on air communications, cooperation in fishing resource preservation, and poaching control had taken place during the meeting. In no international forum or bilateral meeting does the Argentine Republic have anything to discuss with this actor, because doing so would consolidate the Foreign Office strategy, which advances slowly but firmly towards the independence of Malvinas. There is a lot to be thought, imagined and discussed in order to build coexistence scenarios with the Islanders. We can have a better picture of this if we see the scenario where coexistence may occur. The picture may be even better if we think it from this concrete territory, this age-old scenario of friends and foes in which we have woven a common history, a drama in which a rather sloppy author abused the resource of the unity of opposites and does not know how to bring the conflict to an end. I am not speaking of seducing the Kelpers by sending them -from the Port of Ro de la Plata- Christmas cards, books with the adventures of Winnie the Pooh, or videos of Pingu with his igloo, which an eccentricity collector from Stanley is most likely to hoard. I believe we should think ourselves in a common history taking place on a scenario that naturally includes us. Fortunately, the province which includes our Malvinas is entirely insular. Undoubtedly, it will be easier to imagine and build concrete forms of coexistence embodying the constitutional rule of respecting their inhabitants way of life. The new and wise Constitution of the insular province of Tierra del Fuego stresses, respects and promotes the development of municipalities as socio-political, natural, and essential communities with a life of their own, sustained by adequate socio-cultural and socioeconomic development. From this starting point, it will be more natural and concrete to think, imagine and build environments in which Islanders interests are respected. Are these ex nihilo constructions? Nothing is constructed out of
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nothing. Coexistence and respect for Islanders way of life9 and interests are built from a culture, a common mythical matrix, from stories in which our destinies criss-cross in that immense dream we call Argentine Patagonia. Even more, they are built from the historical experience in which this coexistence was the matrix of the first national project for the colonization of Southern Patagonia, the colonization of Malvinas. Let us see. Let us try to listen. In 1828, the enterprise has been already launched with the legal and political support of the government of Buenos Aires. Luis Vernet is in Patagones. He needs horses, tools, wood, clothes. He buys seventy horses with the necessary tack; he buys axes, tongs, hammers, shoes, stockings and jackets; he buys locks, two little boxes of glasses, a basket of assorted crockery, ten saddles, pads, a case of medicines, quillapis. He settles accounts with Mr. Alfaro, Justice of the Peace at Patagones and one of the heroes of the resistance against Brazilians in the battle of Cerro de la Caballada. He ships the horses to Malvinas in the brigantine Combine, and all the other things in the polacca Fiburtina. That year, the incipient colony solemnly commemorates the May 25 revolution. The main details of the celebration have been saved from oblivion, thanks to the sparing diary of Emilio Vernet, Luis brother, which described the events at Port Soledad: May 25, 1828, dawn broke with some heavy showers and hail. At sunrise three cannon shots were fired and the flags of both Great Britain and Buenos Aires were hoisted;10 at noon, three more cannon shots were fired, and three more in the evening. After lunching meat roasted with hide on and cakes especially prepared for the occasion, we practised target shooting until dusk. People organized a ball at the coopers ranch, which lasted all night. By 1829 Vernet has already been appointed Political Military Commander of Malvinas. He goes to live there with his family. On August 30, the
9 National Constitution, First Temporary Provision. The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereingty, respecting their inhabitants way of life. 10 We should not forget that, at that time, the Commandery of Malvinas formed part of the State of Buenos Aires.
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Day of the Patroness of America, Santa Rosa de Lima, all the population gathers to see Vernet take office and present the Decree of June 10, 1829. The national flag is hoisted and receives a 21-gun salute. White and light blue ribbons are distributed for people to wear on their hats. Vernet concludes his announcement by saying: and to that effect, the flag of the Republic has been hoisted and saluted in the best way permitted by the incipient condition of this population. The Commander expects that all inhabitants will be constantly subordinated to the laws, living like brothers and sisters in union and harmony in order that the expected population increase which the Superior Government has promised to foster and protect may give rise -in this Southern territory- to a community that will honor the Republic whose control we recognize. Hail the Nation! Mara, Vernets wife, also keeps a diary. One day in 1829, we read: Thursday, October 22. It is cloudy and drizzly. A British woman who went to Statenland with her husband asks us if she could stay here until the brigantine returns () I am happy that she stays, because she is a good seamstress. The story continues on Thursday, November 5: It is cloudy and there is a strong wind. Today Miss Nims, the British woman who stays with us, occupied a bedroom in the upper floor. Another day without important events, she writes: Monday, December 7: Bad weather. Miss Nims stayed with me all day long. We described garments that can only be used here. I try to see them. They are sewing and making up garments which can only be used in Malvinas. They laugh. Perhaps they could tell how to solve this problem. In a whisper, while I see them, I remember some verses that we could make ours: Mother, mother, erect the house again and lets embroider history. Tell my life again. 11
11 Orozco, Olga. Les jeux sont faits.
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MALVINAS, THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SEA, SOUTH AMERICA We have tried to put Malvinas in their natural Patagonian context in order to question them and try to understand our history and some of our challenges. It is just an outline, which expects to contribute towards a deeper development. However, I wish to mention at least the general aspects of other contexts that also contribute to this comprehensive understanding. If we do not think of Malvinas in their South Atlantic enclave, we will hardly understand what is in dispute. We will not understand why, throughout their history, Malvinas were a disputed land among the principal powers. From the mid XVIII century, Great Britain and France are at loggerheads with Spain over the possession of Malvinas Islands. Surely, it is not that small portion of land what interests them the most. The first one to clearly take notice of it was commodore George Anson of the British Royal Navy. On referring to Malvinas he states that it is difficult to perceive just how important this location may prove to be, at such a Southernmost point, and so near Cape Horn. He goes on to say that this fact, even in times of peace, may be very advantageous for this Nation and, in times of war, may turn us into masters of those seas.12 In 1765, the French settler Louis Antoine de Bougainville, first colonizer of Malvinas, wrote that: If we possess Malvinas Islands, we will be, in every possible sense, owners of the South sea and of the Ro de la Plata.13 This hub of the South sea was strategically important for three concurring reasons. As a gateway to the riches of Oceania, Asia and the American ports of the Pacific; as a reservoir of valuable natural resources; and as a military enclave to control the bi-oceanic passage and South America. Since then, the circumstances have changed a lot but the problem remains essentially the same. By the end of the XVIII century and beginning of the XIX century, whale and sea lion
12 A voyage round the world, in the years 1740-1744, by George Anson Walter, Richard, 1748. 13 Bougainvilles confidential report to the Duke of Choiseul, minister of Louis XV. Quoted by Rafael Saiegh, Francia en las Islas Malvinas.
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oil, a non-renewable resource, became exhausted in the North. The growing demand for lubricants and fuel for industries and urban lighting had decimated the resources. The bows of whalers and sea lion-hunting boats headed Southward. This situation is clearly depicted in the reports sent by the new Commander of Malvinas to the Government in December 1829: Foreigners, whose only concern is their immediate and present use, without considering the future, carry out the hunting in a pernicious way. They invade the fields and kill indiscriminately and at all times, even during the birthing season. It is due to this, and to the constant and abundant arrival of hunters, that present numbers of sea lions have been reduced to one twentieth of the 1820 figure.14 Between July and August 1831, in compliance with applicable law, three U.S. schooners which had repeatedly infringed fishing regulations were captured. The commotion is huge. U.S. President Andrew Jackson starts paving the way for the concept of preventive war. By late December that year, the U.S. warship Lexington made a punitive expedition to Malvinas, destroying premises, capturing settlers and spreading fear. They are accused of being pirates. Prisoners include Jacinto Correa, Silvestre Nez and Dionisio Heredia. I, who have been a keen reader of Salgari, Stevenson and British history, cannot imagine a pirate named Jacinto Correa. The British occupied the Islands without providing any excuses: to them, any rock emerging from the sea is potentially British. Today, what is about to become exhausted is petroleum in the North Sea. Today, any Sunday magazine foretells apocalyptical wars for resources. Today, Malvinas are at the heart of a huge territorial dispute that directly involves the borders of the Argentine Continental Shelf. This can be inferred from the maps that are attached to the Argentine submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Today, just as throughout their history, albeit more dramatically, Malvinas are South Atlantic Sea, and it is the South Atlantic Sea that is in dispute, not merely the usurped municipality of
14 National Gereral Archives (AGN, by its spanish acronym), Vernet Collection.
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Tierra del Fuego. Consequently, this situation which directly affects Argentina, involves and concerns the whole region. At the last meeting of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, held in June 2009, the Argentine Foreign Minister, Jorge Enrique Taiana, denounced the British insistence on including parts of the Argentine national territory in its submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and remarked a central aspect of the problem: ...the presence of a powerful military base set up by the United Kingdom on the Islands (...) constitutes a disturbing element in the maintenance of peace and security in the South Atlantic Sea, a goal to which Southern Cone countries are especially committed. We are there. Where are we? In South America. It is not me that says so, it is proposed by the Constitution of the European Union, which defines Malvinas as an overseas associated territory. The United States proved it to us when it decisively supported their North Atlantic allies in the Malvinas War. It is imposed on us, as a natural defense attitude, by the briefing papers of British security experts who think of Malvinas as a European Union military base.14 If we do not answer that Malvinas are South America, we will hardly find a solution to the riddles with which the Sphinx tries to strangle us. Let us consider the municipality of Malvinas from this South American context. Why should there be a North Atlantic military base in the South Atlantic Sea? This circumstance should worry Islanders as much as it worries us, since it directly conspires against their admittedly peaceful way of life, since it deeply disturbs their interests, unless they believe a sustainable economy with long-term strategic development may be built within a Fortress. What would Mara and Miss Nims think, while sewing, about the prospect of having their children play and grow up in the vicinity of a military base? This circumstance affects them directly for one simple reason: they live here, in the vast Patagonia, in the hub of the South Atlantic Sea, in the peaceful South
14 The status and location of the military installations of the Member States of the European Union and their potential role for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) ROGERS, James and SIMN, Luis. At www.europarl.org.uk Subcommittee on Security and Defence, March 30, 2009.
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America. And our destinies are tied together. Facing the blind alleys that hatred generates, let us search for a way out, let us think Malvinas from South America. Not only in the declarations at Regional Fora. Not only in light of the proven solidarity shown by countries of the Region towards our claim. Let us think Malvinas from Mercosur, from Unasur, from comprehensive projects with large scopes and shared interests. Let us imagine and build concrete alternatives that help anticipate the future. Let us invite those who want to hear us to share this hope. Undoubtedly, South America is still the New World. A boy is walking down the street. At a distance I can see on his T-shirt the abrupt silhouette of Malvinas against a sea which is the Argentine flag. I think that, perhaps, his father fought at the war. There is a slogan on the T-shirt that I cannot quite make out. The march of time is relentless. I move on and I can sense hope. Perhaps the slogan is Malvinas are South American. May God allow me to live long enough to see it.
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Lior Zylberman It was not a spectacular war. Malvinas war and cinematography
Lior Zylberman *
It was not a spectacular war. Malvinas war and cinematography
War films are characterized by magnificent visual and special effects, exemplary heroes, great villains, heroic deeds, triumphalism and sacrifice. From the pioneers The Birth of a Nation, D.W. Griffith, 1915, Wings, William Wellman, 1927 or All quiet on the western front, Lewis Milestone, 1930, the genre is clearly consolidated as such with the great number of productions about the Second World War in which heroism is a value to be highlighted. The genre experienced an improvement and an update at the rhythm of the different innovations of the cinematographic language, merging in this way with action movies. In our country, films as La guerra gaucha (Lucas Demare, 1942), El santo de la espada (Leopoldo Torre Nilson, 1970), or Juan Manuel de Rosas (Manuel Antin, 1972), could also be included among the pioneering films: a synthesis of historical films with war films. In the last decades, the contemporary action and war films have apparently privileged above all the spectacular1 dimension, creating
* Licentiate Degree in Sociology, university teacher and Master in Communication and Culture at the School of Social Sciences (UBA). At present he is preparing his Master dissertation about the cinematographic approach of the last military dictatorship. 1 Company, Juan Miguel and Marzal, Jos Javier. La mirada cautiva, Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 1999.
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in this way not only a new reality but also new narrative strategies as regards their characters and the dramatic developments. In turn, war films seem to be a window to the past, a re-presentation of the heroes who created the nation or who served to the world order; as an example of this we can mention the different films about the disembarkation at Normandie or the films about the battles in the Pacific. At the same time, many of them show us that past with beautiful images: that beauty highlights their spectacularity, slow cameras, bright colors, abrupt editing, or cameras placed in spectacular positions for example, the shot of the bomb falling on a ship, with the camera over the bomb, in Pearl Harbor (Michael Bay, 2001). Even when the films tried to have an anti-war position, as in the case of the mentioned Paths of Glory (Stanley Kubrick, 1957), Apocalypse Now (Francis Ford Coppola, 1979), Platoon (Oliver Stone, 1986), Capitaine Conan, (Bertrand Tavernier, 1996) or The thin red line (Terrence Malick, 1998), all these films are full of beautiful images, solemn music, great explosions, virtuosity -in their shots and camera movements- and even full of poetry. Within this topic, there is also a kind of film in which there is not a licentious heroism or men who fight as automatons and without contradictions; these are stories which show us the war conflict as the second act of the War, being the return to home its continuation. In this way, for the American war films, the production of films about the Vietnam war entailed on many occasions a certain change in the paradigm of this genre. Films like Coming Home (Hal Ashby, 1978), The Deer Hunter (Michael Cimino, 1978) or Born on the Fourth of July (Oliver Stone, 1989) show us the return of the war veteran not as an honorary situation but as a continuation of the war in other fields. Then, the films are not a window to the past but a way to reflect on it.2 Unlike the written story, the films personalize, dramatize and confer emotions to the story and, in this way, we could say that films entail a virtual presence
2 In this respect, see the contributions of Robert Rosenstone about the use of films as historical documents: Rosenstone, Robert. El pasado en imgenes. Ariel, Barcelona, 1997.
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MALVINAS WAR AND CINEMATOGRAPHY Malvinas War was part of the plan of the Armed Forces Government which took power by force on March 24, 1976. In that sense, the war is the continuation of the genocide practice3 supported by such forces. Unlike the hundred of films produced about repression and annihilation actions, national cinematography has rarely tackled this war conflict. We may suggest several hypotheses about this refusal but that is not our purpose. Although it is a difficult subject to tackle, the films that we shall analyze on many occasions separate that conflict from the macro process. With this we mean that the war at the Atlantic has a direct continuity with the previous moments of the last de facto regime. The war conflict still poses questions about its vindication and appropriation. Can we split the sovereign fair claim from the genocide regime? Does the fact of having supported the war -both in marches and in collections and other social activities- mean to support the de facto regime? Before initiating the proposed path, it is interesting to point out that there is a very small number of films about the subject, which was only increased with technological innovations (digital video), generational innovations (with new filmmakers) and certain massification of documentary films (especially in TV). Unlike classic war films, the films which show us Malvinas battles do not transmit us beautiful images, solemn music, great explosions, virtuosity or poetry: Malvinas was not a spectacular war, we could even say that it is an anti-cinematographic war because the films which show its stories during the conflict exhibit dirty images, filth, dull and grey colors. There is sacrifice and heroism in the soldiers, not so much in their struggle against the enemy but in their mere survival. In the films the villain to be defeated was not the enemy; the enemy proved to be on the same side. In this way, the war is built almost without pyrotechnics, we only see soldiers digging fox holes, resisting sea cold and hunger, waiting in a totally adverse landscape, in a rocky, mountainous field covered with grass and moss.
3 For the analysis of the concept of genocide, see Feierstein, Daniel. El genocidio como prctica social. FCE, Buenos Aires, 2007.
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There are few films about Malvinas war; however this does not exclude a possible analysis in a comparative tone. It is not our intention to make a critical assessment of film making or to follow a chronology; our purpose is to observe and point out their different plots as well as the stories shown, their subjects and the development of their plots. Before dealing with the films, we must remark that they shall be presented in two big blocks: fiction and non fiction.4 The first one has a style where the main elements are representation, mise-enscne and dramatization; the second one is based on archive images, interviews and off-stage voices. THE FILMS Fiction Fiction films about Malvinas have a clear disadvantage with respect to non fiction ones. During the first decade of institutional restoration, we could assert that cinematography did not frequently deal with this subject, except for Los chicos de la Guerra (Bebe Kamin, 1984). In comparison with the different aesthetic expressions of the military dictatorship tackled by the cinematographic industry, the film of Kamin was not only a pioneer in this style but it also entailed a way of representation that only 21 years later would reappear in Iluminados por el fuego (Tristn Bauer, 2005). Both films, then, have elements in common as well as some differences which should be analyzed beyond cinematographic and budgetary aspects. Los chicos de la Guerra, based on the novel of Daniel Kon, who would later be co-scriptwriter of La noche de los lpices (Hctor Olivera, 1986), presents a story of three voices: Pablo, Santiago and Fabin; each of them, in turn, represents different sectors of the society: high, low and middle low classes. While Fabian and Santiago go to the war due to the military service, Pablo is sent to the front at the request of his father. Even though a military man who was a friend of his father might save him from this duty, his father does not accept the offer. In this way, with Fabian as the main character,
4 Nichols, Bill. Introduction to Documentary, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2001.
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the film goes from his first school days in 1968 up to his graduation. His everyday life is also useful to place the historical context which shall lead us to the last military dictatorship. So, this character is universalized as a symbol-type of all the war children. Santiago embodies the low income children; he, when he goes to the South, lost the only thing he had: his work as a dishwasher at a bar. At the same time, his boss is a clear example of the Argentine moods at the moment of the recovery of the islands: before leaving, he sings, he cheers him, he treats him as a hero. While the children dig fox holes at Malvinas, in Buenos Aires their parents create a committee to send them clothes, food and letters, and they also have a radio program that they suppose may be heard at the islands. In the landscapes of the battle, not only the lack of experience of many soldiers with their weapons is evident but also the cold, the adverse weather conditions and the survival in the flooded fox holes. In this way, the film develops the idea that the Argentine soldiers not only had the English as enemies but also the war conditions themselves a subject that is more harshly treated in Iluminados por el fuego. In a context of food shortage, mainly due to plundering by officers, children are threatened when they ask for more food and warm clothes; these conflicts between officers and soldiers are frequent. If the arrival at Malvinas of the Argentine troops had a triumphal tone, after some battles, the last days do not have the same splendor. Soldiers are left to their fate, only the friendship ties they created allow them to endure the final stage of the war at the island and the image of their dead friends at the battlefield. With the weapons blocked, the children of the film are captured by the English. The third act of this film focuses on what happened afterwards: Fabian, in a shock, does not respond to his relatives, he only reacts when his girlfriend visits him and they go to a recital of Juan Carlos Baglietto; Santiago lost his job, his former boss does not receive him with songs or praises, he gives him some money and assures him that he will not have any problem to find another job. Santiago ends up in prison after being involved in a pub quarrel; finally, Pablo the war has driven him crazy- the high class boy is, in this film, the one who
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crossed the limit towards madness, locking himself with a weapon in a room of his house. His shot in slow camera is followed by a non fiction sequence, with war veterans demonstrating at the streets. Before Iluminados por el fuego, a series of films also tackled the subject. In a more general context, La deuda interna (Miguel Pereira, 1988), treats the military dictatorship from the experience of a rural teacher in Chorcn, Jujuy. There he shall become the friend of Vernico, one of his pupils, who shall later be a member of the General Belgrano crew. The teacher, who is transferred from that town to another one, learns by the television about the sinking of the cruiser. Only when he returned to Chorcn, he will learn, through a photograph, that Vernico, as part of his military service, was sent to Malvinas in that cruiser. People still ignore that information, but the film makes the spectator reflect, and understand that both the repressions of the dictatorship and the tragedy of the children of the war are not exclusive of Buenos Aires, the great city. Even though in Los chicos de la guerra or in Iluminados por el fuego there are secondary characters from the interior of the country, La deuda interna privileges the interior as the dramatic core: the war is, in this way, a trauma throughout the national territory and population. As regards short films, Malvinas war has been tackled by Bruno Stagnaro in Guarisove (1995). With humor, this short film presents a group of soldiers who, after tuning in the radio a football match, thinks that the English are at the other side of the line; however, their real adversaries are not the ones who are in front of them, but their compatriots. In this way, there are two groups without leading officers because they have abandoned them. After an encounter with a kelper who tells them that the war has finished, the soldiers go on with their march. The humor of this short film lies in satirizing many dramatic situations mentioned by war veterans and showed in fiction films. As a consequence of the confusion and the bad organization, on several occasions, there were shots among Argentinians in the own Argentine side; in the same way, the escape of many officers is here tackled, obviously, in a sarcastic way. In the same tone, we could place Fuckland (Jos Luis Marqus, 2000).
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In spite of its narrative premise that borders on an occasional and even coarse- nationalism and although this film is not directly related to the war conflict, the film is soaked of the islands daily life. Based on the rules of the already forgotten Dogma5 this story speaks about Fabin, who travels to the islands with the purpose of getting English women pregnant to begin, in this way, to populate the islands with Argentinians (even in this case we should think that the mother is still English... ). Beyond the difficulties of this film, the daily life at the island is very suggestive; the results of the war, the war itself, is experienced as part of the daily routine. We could even think that the war has benefited kelpers as a community because the confrontation has not only allowed them to be recognized by the Crown as citizens but also to feel reborn; in more philosophical terms, it seems that the war has given them a common fate. All these films focus on Malvinas, the islands, the war, the combats. For war veterans, the anxieties and problems began when they returned. Although Los chicos de la guerra describes Pablo, the high class boy, as the one who has a more difficult reinsertion into society the film suggests his suicide- it shall only be with El visitante (Javier Olivera, 1999) that the problems and anxieties of a war veteran shall be posed. Pedro, a war veteran who lost an arm in the confrontation, makes a living from driving a taxi. At night, the bad dreams of the battle assault him, specially the death of Ral, his best friend, who stayed for ever at the islands. One day, the ghost of Ral appears to Pedro asking him to be with a woman because he died very young and never had that experience; as Ral does not have a body, he asks Pedro to use his. In this way, Pedro does not only seek love for his friend, but also for himself; misunderstood by his landlady, by his neighbors, even by his former combat comrades, who have a radio program, and his friend Botella, also a war veteran, who works at a neighborhood supermarket. Even though the film does not refer
5 Dogma 95 was a film movement developed in 1995 by Danish directors Lars von Trier, Thomas Vinterberg, Kristian Levring and Soren Kragh-Jacobsen. The films made according to this movement must be filmed in natural settings avoiding the sceneries mounted in studios, with cameras in the hand or on the shoulder, recorded with direct sound and without special musicalization.
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to it, we can clearly see differences between war veterans and their reinsertion in the daily life. Two former combat comrades are seen as more organized, in the radio program El combatiente with a better economic situation and with a solved past; they recommend Pedro to make a psychological therapy to feel better. Instead, both Pedro and his friend, and even the ghost of Ral, are shown as persons with an emotional instability, they do not have any recognition, they live with sadness and confusion. The request of Ral shall lead Pedro to deepen his emotional instability, preventing him from developing a relationship with Telma, one of his neighbors; in this way, in his imagination, Pedro will not only see Ral but he shall also repeatedly see a knife. The film harshly ends with a plate which says that up to the moment we know about 206 cases of suicide among Malvinas war veterans. In this way, El visitante shows in images a problem never tackled in any film before. The cinematograph industry could only tackle the subject in a more comprehensive way when the question of the war veterans appeared in the political agenda, the media and the documentary films. It was be precisely Iluminados por el fuego that rescued this subject from oblivion. The film, which is in a certain degree more crueler than the previous one, presents a problem which was happening during the last years in the context of the new interpretations and surveys about the last military dictatorship. If the problem of Malvinas war veteran was consolidated twenty years after the confrontation, in the year 2005 it is possible to make different interpretations of the events of the previous decades. Those years entail a greater production of documentary films, as we shall later see, and it is in that context where the film of Bauer has its premier. Then, we could say that this film makes a synthesis of the contents of the previous titles: it not only undertakes a more realistic exhibition of the military confrontation but it also tackles the problem of war veterans. The film starts precisely with the suicide attempt of a war veteran who is taken to a public hospital. There, after the call of his wife, Esteban goes to visit his comrade. In the same way that Los chicos de la guerra, this film also uses flashback as narrative resource; the
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memories of Malvinas seize Esteban who is now a journalist working in a television channel- at his present. Facing the suicide attempt of his former comrade, Esteban tells us in off that up to the moment more than 290 war veterans had committed suicide and that this number was reaching the number of war casualties. The youth of Esteban at the war conflict is shown when he informs his mother from a telephone booth of the regiment- that he is going to the islands. Esteban is also a boy. The diegesis is interrupted with the archive images of General Galtieri announcing the victory at Malvinas; in them we also see the preparations of the Argentine troops. The film has subtleties about the presentation of the soldiers in the islands while we see how some of them dig foxholes and many of them walk in the mud in boots and also in tennis shoes. This is contradicted by the expressions of a lieutenant who asserts, while the soldiers shiver with cold, that he does not see moral fibre, that cold and hunger do not exist, only God and the Nation. He finishes his impassioned speech exhorting everybody to shout a long live the nation. This attitude is frequent in many non fiction films in which when we hear the sound of the environment we appreciate this shout, a shout used as a weapon.... or as a shield. While some soldiers think about shooting themselves on their feet to be saved, other ones receive as a portion of food, a boiled mate and a piece of hard bread. It is interesting to hear, in the dialogues, the different accents of the characters; even though the main plot of the film takes place in Buenos Aires, this shows us the plurality of origins of the soldiers. In cold and hunger conditions, Esteban together with Alberto and others hunt a sheep to eat. This will end with them being punished by the first Sergeant, some of them shall be obliged to dance and Alberto, together with another one, shall be tied in the mud. At present, in a conversation with Marta, his friends wife, she tells him the sufferings and the different fate of her husband: a repair shop he had to close, a work in a factory that he lost when it closed and as all war veterans we went from one side to the other. At the house of her friend, Marta confesses him that she did not live with him any
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more, she tells him about his problems with alcohol, his depression and his militancy with other veterans. Again at the hospital, Esteban talks to Alberto, his friend in coma, and he whispers him that they have to return to the islands to close the story, to face the ghosts. Soldiers humiliations at the islands did not end with corporal punishments, tied soldiers start freezing without being useful for missions or other purposes. Verbal mistreatment by superior officers should be added. They thought that by insulting their subordinated soldiers, they would win the war. In one of the final combats, in the middle of a bombing, Esteban is called by the Lieutenant who asks him to keep his belongings. Here we can see again the terrible contrast between officers and soldiers: while the first ones lived in relatively comfortable houses, soldiers lived in humid or flooded holes. In this scene, then, while the Lieutenant keeps his belongings, Esteban notes that the end of the war is near, he knows that his friend stayed in the battlefield. Likewise, the Lieutenant insults him for not keeping his recorder; finally, Esteban leaves the Lieutenant and goes in search of his friend in the battlefield. After leaving Alberto in the infirmary, Esteban falls exhausted. The war has finished. In the final sequences of the confrontation, Esteban reports in off that our chiefs hid us in the barracks, imposed us a silence pact, not to speak about Malvinas. So, when they came back, there were not greetings, applauses or banners: only my mother was waiting me to give me a hug. While Esteban was at hospital, Alberto finally dies. In the following sequences, Esteban goes to Malvinas, to the place where the battlefield was, to his hole; at the cemetery of Argentine victims, he leaves Albertos pendant at the grave of another friend. That year 1982, estuvimos ah (Csar Turturro and Fernando Acua, 2005) was also filmed. This long film shows Carlos who, together with Jos and Pedro, both born in 1963, faces the war hardest moments. Besides, a Navy pilot, who is also a father and a husband, must carry out one of the most important missions of the Argentine Air Force, the Invencible Operation, a joint operation between the Navy and the Air Force to destroy the English aircraft carrier. Unlike the other films mentioned, this production aims at following like
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the war films canons, in their air shots, musicalization and beautiful images. The suggestive aspect of this film lies in its origin. Produced in Baha Blanca, it marks a trend which shall also be followed by non fiction films: the tackling of this subject from different regions of the country. In this sense, 1982 estuvimos ah is not the only film which attempts to give a different treatment to the hegemonic production of the great city. Non fiction In the remaining sections, we shall analyze the documentary films which tackle the subject of Malvinas war. Even though in recent years -and specially after twenty-five years of the beginning of the war- an important number of documentary films in this respect has been made, it is not our purpose to consider them all or exhaustively. Filmed during 1983 and premiered on the following year, Malvinas: a story of treasons was directed by Jorge Denti and produced by Nerio Barberis, former members of the Cinematographic Group of the Base together with the disappeared Raymundo Gleyzer (to whom this film is dedicated). The film clearly has an interactive modality6, resorting both to interviews and to archive material. This documentary film, together with Malvinas: alerta roja, has a certain degree of originality as regards the use of archive images: their pioneering condition, above all, gives them an urgency nature and also implies the encounter with these images after the information manipulation performed by the regime during the confrontation. Denti s film, apart from showing us images of the war, interviews different social actors: veterans, historians, politicians, Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, the Nobel Prize winner Adolfo Prez Esquivel, as well as historians, among them, E. P. Thompson, English politicians and workers. Unlike future documentary films on the subject, this film was not exclusively focused on the confrontation; it also offers a wider view of the causes which triggered the war. In that sense, this film holds that Malvinas war was one more of the imperialist battles which have taken place in
6 For the modalities see Nichols, op. cit.
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history. So, the film poses a clear continuity between the regime that took the power by force in 1976 and the war initiated in April 1982; in turn, this peculiarity allows us to give a context to the war and to understand it, not as the whim of a drunk general any more, which was the explanation of many documentary films. The film proposes to historize the conflict with England almost since the foundation of the Viceroyalty. At both sides of the ocean, the interviewed persons state that the war was used as a distraction and with the purpose of saving both governments: the military junta to consolidate its power and Margaret Thatcher reviving the nostalgia of Churchills timesin order to give another impulse to its government. However, as a worker says in an interview, Malvinas does not leave us any teaching if we limit ourselves to criticize the military junta; it is important to know what is behind: destruction both physical and symbolic- of industry and culture. The film ends showing us a mobilized country, war veterans claiming for their comrades dead in combat. Malvinas: alerta roja was filmed in 1985 by Eduardo Rotondo, a cameraman of a news agency who was summoned to cover Malvinas. As his images were very shocking for Channel 9 which had hired him, they were not transmitted. Instead, his photographs were published in the magazine Gente. Rotondo was the only cameraman who registered the day of the surrender. His images are part of the basic archive stock for almost every documentary film about the subject. Like Dentis film, Rotondos also proposes to historize the conflict beginning the film with the English invasions of 1806. However, unlike the previous one, it rarely mentions the de facto regime and the continuities between its genocide practices and Malvinas war. In that sense, Malvinas: Alerta roja has a discourse of a rather nationalist nature which asserts that the war in the South Atlantic was a struggle for sovereignty. In fact, the commentator identifies the English along the film as the enemies. In that way, the documentary film is developed in a clear expositional way, appealing to unique available images. Alternating a voice in off that speaks in the first person of the plural with interviews, the images, rather than illustrating the story, follow certain chronology. Although the archive is supplemented by
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other kind of images, as the visit of the Pope or the meetings at the Security Council of the United Nations, the strength of this film lies in its original images. To them, we should add two kinds of interviews: some of them made in situ during the war, to the soldiers; many of them with the bombings as background and with the interviewer inciting the soldiers. The other series of interviews made in studios highlights the heroic deeds of several soldiers, among them, those of Colonel Seineldn.7 Unlike the testimonies given by war veterans in almost every documentary film, in this one, they appear wearing the military uniform. In this way, the adversity faced by the Argentine soldiers, apart from the enemy, seems to limit itself to that of the adverse weather conditions. The conflict posed in other films not only documentary ones- is not developed by this one. Like in fiction, the war conflict had to wait for a long time before another documentary film tackled the subject. After a bit more than ten years another film with a similar style was produced: Hundan al Belgrano (Federico Urioste, 1996). As the previous one, this film uses an expositional modality with a rather historical story of each one of the details of Malvinas War. The film has certain similarities as regards its style and visual treatment with La Repblica Perdida II (Miguel Prez, 1985). To illustrate the story which uses an almost objective tone, the film is developed on the basis of archive images, maps and long interviews with several English personalities. At the same time, it tries to analyze the real reasons that made Margaret Thatcher order the sinking of the General Belgrano, making impossible any kind of peace agreement. Along the story, the documentary film provides evidences and testimonies about the economic interests of the United Kingdom in the region, mainly as regards oil and fishing. At the end, in a military act, a war veteran proudly states: we are not going to allow them to call us the poor boys of the war, we gave our life for the nation, in this way, the former soldier accuses the military men of having tarnished a fair cause. Finally, with a rather cryptic and disturbing speech, the commentator closes the film warning us about
7 We should remember that in 1985 this military man had not yet headed any uprising.
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the proximity of the final war between North and South, between looters and looted. After this film, silence again. During the period of the commemorations for the 30 years of the military coup of March of 1976 and the 25 years of Malvinas war, a great number of documentary films was produced. To this we should add that during the last decades we were witnesses of what is called the documentary boom: a sudden and exponential multiplication of documentary films8. A good part of their growth is also a consequence of television: the specialized signals and the over-the-air channels gave space both to produce and to spread documentary films. In these, the interactive modality prevails; here, the story is not so much told by the voice in off of a commentator but by the voice of the veterans, posing subjects about their daily life during the war and their reinsertion after the battles. For example, in Malvinas: La retirada (2007), produced by the History Channel and presented by Gastn Pauls, the events of the war are told taking the testimonies of the veterans as an essential part of the story. They complain about the lack of training they had: we faced professional soldiers, says one of them; the clothes provided to them were not adequate for those cold temperatures, and they also complain about the pact of silence they were forced to make at the end of the war. In the same line, we can mention No tan nuestras (Ramiro Longo, 2005), a documentary film about Sergio Delgado, who fought in the Mount Longdon Battle, remembered as the most cruel of the war before the surrender. As his veteran comrades of other films, Sergio makes reference to the bad training and food, remarking the good treatment he received from the English after he was captured. As many other veterans, Sergio mentions the good quality of the food he received when he was a prisoner, as well as the healings and surgeries to which he was subjected because, during the battle, a splinter almost cost him the amputation of his leg. Together with Sergio, the camera visits the war museum of the Seventh Regiment, where Sergio made his military service and from where he left to Malvinas. There, Captain Luis Assar gives a military
8 Lipovetsky, Gilles and Serroy, Jean. La pantalla global. Anagrama, Barcelona, 2009. p. 143.
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-rather than political- explanation about the war, complaining about the mistake of having called them the children of the war and of having shown them crying: they were 18 years old soldiers, the captain states. However, as a counterpart, we can see in the archive images how the English prepared themselves for the war and how the Argentine army waited for its enemy. In the same way, Sergio says that during the war he lost more than 20 kilograms and that it was not a consequence of his weeping... Finally, we can mention some other productions that are registered in this trend: Malvinas, la mirada de una ciudad (Damin Andreoli and Matas Perfetto, 2008) or Malvinas, 25 aos de silencio (Myriam Angueira, 2008). The peculiarity of these documentary films is that they were both produced in the interior of the country, the first one in Arroyo Seco, Province of Sante Fe and the second one in Chubut and Esquel. Once again, the voice of the veterans gathers momentum, giving them greater scope because it not only appears as the memory of the veterans but also as a testimony of the participation of soldiers from all the latitudes of the country. As in previous stories, veterans refer to the obligation to keep silence imposed on them for years. CONCLUSION The proposed summary aimed, among other things, at showing how cinematography has elaborated the war of Malvinas through time. From the first productions which were more impersonal, up to the present life stories, cinematography not only conferred to the war the human nature at stake in that confrontation but also repeats the idea of anti-spectacular war. In this way, the war built by cinematography does not have an epic poetry or beautiful images; heroism is reduced to the mere survival, to the concern for the comrade, and not so much to the cause itself. Although all the veterans point out that they understand the sovereign claim over the islands, there are still pending debts, political and social interpretations about these events and the reasons for their oblivion and rejection. So, cinematography -not as a window to the past but as a tool of interpretation and reflection- is a good path.
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Juan Recce Malvinas: Argentina and the challenge of redefining its strategic identity. From the Kelper Small and Medium Size Enterprise to the European strategic enclave
Juan Recce *
Malvinas: Argentina and the challenge of redefining its strategic identity. From the Kelper Small and Medium Size Enterprise to the European strategic enclave
In his youth, Jorge Luis Borges was captivated by a short story titled Wakefield, of the American writer Nathaniel Hawthorne, published in 1837 in a book called Twice-Told Tales. Wakefield was mentioned on several occasions in the stories of Borges. Wakefield is the fiction name of a realistic character, a man from London who abandoned his wife during a long time. He, on the pretext of a trip, left his house, rented a room in the next street and there, without the knowledge of his wife or his friends and without any reason for such self exile, lived during more than twenty years. During this time, he watched the house everyday and he frequently caught a glimpse of his helpless wife. And after such a long parenthesis in his marital happiness, when his death was taken for granted, his heritage had already been distributed and his name had been erased from all the memories; when his wife had resigned herself to her autumnal widowhood, one night he quietly crossed the door of his house.1
* University teacher and Coordinator of the Political Phenomenology Program (PFP) of the Argentine Center of International Studies (CAEI) 1 Hawthorne, Nathaniel, Wakefield, In: Twice-Told Tales, 1837. Translation into Spanish available at the site of the Library of Chile University.
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What had led Wakefield to such self exile? Hawthorne replies that his reasoning was so unarticulated and vague that he had taken this step with a purpose in mind but without having been able to define it with sufficient clarity for his own reflection. The vagueness of the project and the disturbing effort with which he had made it were typical of a weak person.2 Along those twenty years of exile, the unusual destiny of Wakefield was to keep the original portion of human affection and to be involved in the interests of men but without his influence over them.3 Wakefield was an anonymous ghost who wandered around the streets of London, immersed in the vertiginous rhythm of the city as in the old times, but the crowds passed by without noticing him.4 He did not know it. Aged, unrecognizable and changed as he was, he was rarely aware of this and he felt as if he were the same person he had always been. In fact, he was sometimes assaulted by flashes of reality, but just for some moments. And even on these occasions, he insisted on saying I will soon return, without realizing that he had spent twenty years telling himself the same.5 Unable to re-create himself and to rethink his world, with an absolute impunity, after twenty years, Wakefield knocked at the door of his widows house and got in as if nothing had happened. Nathaniel Hawthorne ends this story -which deserved the attention of Borges and today gives rise to our reflection on Malvinas and our strategic identity-, in a lapidary way: ... in the apparent confusion of our mysterious world, individuals adhere so perfectly to a system, and the systems adhere so perfectly among them and to a whole that by only stepping aside, any man is exposed to the terrible risk of losing his place forever. In the same way as Wakefield, he may become, to put it in some way, the outcast of the Universe.6 The behavior and the strategic estimations of the United Kingdom,
2 Ibidem 3 Ibidem 4 Ibidem 5 Ibidem 6 Ibidem
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the European Union, the traditional and emerging powers force us to reconsider the problem of Malvinas and the Argentine Sea but trying to understand the future. The redefinition of our strategic identity requires to leave the past behind, that past of recent traumas and the distant mythical glories, in order to work about the future before we lose our place forever, not only in the world but mainly in our regional neighborhood. Wakefield returned to his house thinking that he was the same person and that his wife and his people would also be the same. He ignored that the passing of time had made him old and unrecognizable. Even then, his inability to face reality was anchored in an essential fact: for him, who had decided to be a mere spectator, the world had to go on being exactly the same as the one he abandoned when he decided to step aside. Wakefield thought that his simple glance meant participation; however, the crowds passed by without noticing him.7 When he decided to go away to dissolve the ghosts of his inner world he lost the possibility of being a co-conditioning agent of this external system. Twenty years later, the inner Wakefield and his external world were unarticulated. The bicentennial of our independence finds the issue of Malvinas and the South Atlantic in a process of change. As Wakefield, we run the risk of tackling them with the eyes of the past. The nature of the conflict changes as a consequence of the increasing complexity of the sociogram of sectorial interests and preferences. Malvinas is a European cause and the South Atlantic is a space which begins to give signs of no longer being an idyllic Peace and Cooperation Zone which may become a scenery of power balance between old and new geopolitical players. What does the complexity of this sociogram of sectorial interests and preferences mean? Only twenty-five years ago, the isolated islands of the South Atlantic were a humble village where the thin line between the public and the private was erased in the fragile material equation of a forgotten
7 Ibidem
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subsistence economy. The South Atlantic War gave an unprecedented impulse to the islands growth. Soon, the islands community became a dynamic economy of services. The kelper small and medium size enterprise.8 -benefited by the Keynesian breathe of life given by the United Kingdom- structured its macroeconomics with microeconomic criteria. A small business complex was enough to administer four management niches: Fishing licenses to foreign flag ships, granting of oil exploitation areas to multinational companies of the sector of hydrocarbons, tourism and triangulation of financial capitals. As a consequence of this model, in practice, there has not been since then a clear distinction between the Government Council of the Islands and the managers of the small and medium size enterprises, elected from their stable vegetative population of two thousand inhabitants, who take leaves to hold public offices. Malvinas is no longer an irrelevant geopolitical space in the world power system since the declaration of the regional integration bloc with more influence in the international community has been made. In the Lisbon Treaty, the 27 sovereign wills of the Communitarian Europe have redefined the strategic value of the British overseas territories, as they did with the last vestiges of geopolitical capital of the colonial powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Malvinas, French Guiana and the English-French-Dutch Caribbean are now a part of the residual heritage of the colonial powers which may be used by post-modern Europe. Wakefield should note this. Although the declaration made in the Treaty of Lisbon has no legal effects erga omnes and Argentina reacted firmly in the right time, Lisbon is a political action. Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, Sandwich del Sur Islands, the adjoining maritime spaces and the Argentine Antarctic Sector are already part of the geopolitical imagination of the statesmen of the twenty-first century, those who mobilize their power and resources in search of their vital interests. Wakefield thinks that his view and his legitimate diplomatic declarations are a way of participation, but the crowds pass by without noticing it.
8 Small and Medium Enterprise
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Anchored in his praiseworthy moral principles, Wakefield says that the soft power of the friendly sovereign inter-subjectivities that surround it shall be enough to win some day the arm wrestling to the United Kingdom and, afterwards, to the Post-modern Europe. But he ignores that, as soon as he decided to go away to dissolve the ghosts of his inner world, his friends, imprisoned by the systems that mutually adjust themselves, distributed his heritage and erased his name from all the memories. New roles, rules and status were established in the social practices during his self exile. His space and his potential were occupied by others. Wakefield lost the possibility of being a co-conditioning agent of his external system and now he is condemned to accept the conditionings from the outside until he is able to rethink himself. The automatic solidarity of his friends is like the sermon of John the Baptist: a voice that shouts in the desert. The diplomatic channel is stagnated and as a result of our inability to reconsider the problem -while we mistakenly perceive that the world remains ceteris paribus waiting for us- the channel of the facts goes on reshaping the network of sectorial interests and preferences. Although the permanent diplomatic support of the Ibero-American community to the issue of Malvinas deserves our gratitude, Argentina should also have an understanding attitude with respect to the channel of the facts that has forced our friends to solve their sectorial interests and preferences contravening our cause. Wakefield left the space empty, and although his friends have affection for him, they must include in their estimations the costs and benefits of giving logistical support to the British Nuclear Submarine, for example, or as an indifferent Motherland, who goes on sticking its poisonous fishing licenses in our idealistic Spanish Americanist heart. Our soft power is several times inferior to the soft power of the United Kingdom and the Post-modern Europe. An adult articulated and vigorous foreign policy forces us to make an honest and pragmatic interpretation of the real possibilities of our partners to carry out the practical consequences of their discursive policies as a result of the high level of political and
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economic interdependence and military cooperation they keep with the United Kingdom. Identity is the logical prerequisite of otherness. Without an identity, we are incapable of looking at ourselves in the mirror of our alters. And although on some occasions we are assaulted by flashes of reality, our unarticulated and vague reasoning and the consequent vagueness of our project and disturbing effort sink us more and more in the marsh of inaction and in the dark hole of the lack of creativity. The others change and that is why the self-adjusted system invites us to be either contemporary or pariah. The contemporary international environment is completely different from that of the international environment of the cold post war: The world power structure has initiated a historical descent to the south; Emerging powers as China, India, Brazil and South Africa struggle for the economic and military polarization of the international system and not for its mere multilateralization; the global energy and mining map has been reshaped and new areas of vital interest have appeared, having the seas as their epicenter the world workshops have been relocated and with them the rivermaritime logistic routes; global warming announces the geopolitical modification of the Antarctic scenario, drawing the horizon of de-internationalization of the continent to a period previous to 2041 and accelerating the demilitarized campaigns of scientific research of the countries of the world, 99% of which are in charge of military components. In this context, some years later, Wakefield must assume the challenge of re-understanding his world, redefining his identity and acting in a creative way, or going on living from memories. To rethink oneself implies to activate our geopolitical imagination,9 to go from the geographical determinism to the geographical possibility , and, therefore, from the legal determinism to the political possibility.16
9 Cfr. Agnew, John, Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics, London, Routledge, 1998. 10 Cfr. OLoughlin, John, New Geopolitcs, En: OLoughlin, John, Dictionary of Geopolitcs, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1994
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Some events may contribute to develop our geopolitical imagination. The transformation of the Kelper Small and Medium Size Enterprise into an European strategic enclave must lead us to reconsider, just reconsider, our official refusal to enter into threeparty negotiations, opening at least the possibility of undertaking a soft way of approaching the islanders. The kelper identity does not exist as such. Without trans generational roots and before a vegetative growth equivalent to zero, islanders are not people entitled to self-determination but a mere transplanted population. The cohesionist logic of this community is not anchored in an ancient identity and a common symbolic capital, but in an economic project at insular scale which transforms each islander into a shareholder and an employee of the kelper small and medium size enterprise. A scenery of conflictive interests between islanders and the Postmodern Europe could be the opportunity for a real social and political approach to the occupying population. The search of an improved instance may be a way of triangulating a solution that allows us to get out of the diplomatic mess. Today we completely reject to consider the islanders preferences but, what would happen if the islanders wished to be Argentinian? We are completely aware that we are not a sociological, institutional or macro economically attractive option for islanders and that, in the present equation of cost-benefit, to join Argentina would be a suicide for the individual benefit of any employee of the kelper small and medium size enterprise but, let us go on imagining, what will happen when the first drop of profitable oil is extracted from the Malvinas Sea? Perhaps, in the long term, islanders will enter into conflict with the fiscal interests of the Crown and the Post modern Europe. In such circumstances, we should be able to promote a warm reception of a new Twenty-fourth Province, which is beneficiary of a preferential regime of federal tax co-participation and foreign trade fiscal privileges, full guarantees for the exercise of the constitutional right of ownership of natural resources and programmed policies of demographic balance in exchange for the full exercise of the sovereignty over our geopolitical spaces of Antarctic projection.
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Wakefield should try to recover his role of conditioning agent of his external system. Islanders should begin to consider at least in a vague way- the possible advantages of incorporating themselves to the Argentine Federal Pact. Then, should we simply wait for a favorable hypothetical scenario for us? The Twenty-fourth Province could become a new tool for the construction of soft power that in a transparent and totally honest way may be proposed to the world. Our communication efforts would convey in this way the traditional multilateral diplomatic action allowing us to revitalize the soft power derived from the political solidarity of our partners having generated our own lever for the renewal of the conflict management. We should transform the Patagonia in a demographic garden of economic (mining, hydrocarbons, farming and fishing) prosperity and institutional stability which is the accurate reflection of our recreated strategic identity, that one that crystallizes a new idea of the national being,11 the consequence of which is a renewed public effort to ensure regional peace and stability through a modern and powerful defense mechanism. Unlucky Wakefield was sometimes assaulted by flashes of reality which led him to say I shall soon return, without realizing that he had spent twenty years telling the same thing to himself. A similar number of spared years may lead us to lose forever our place in the world. Let s resume the debate and think what we want to be and how we shall do it.
11 Cfr. Lacoste, Ives, Rivalries for Territory, In: Lvy, Jacques, From Geopolitics to Global Politics, Routledge, 2001, p. 145
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Toms M. Giudici Malvinas in the Argentine press: from the creation of the Political Military Commandery to the USS Lexington
Toms M. Giudici *
Malvinas in the Argentine press: from the creation of the Political Military Commandery to the USS Lexington
When the Government of the United Provinces of Ro de la Plata hoisted the Argentine flag in Malvinas Islands on November 6, 1820, reaffirming its undisputed right to former Spanish possessions, the national press took notice of the event. Since then, this has faithfully shown that the relationship between the press and Malvinas has a long and rich history. U.S. journalist Bill Kovach, author of the prestigious book The Elements of Journalism, once said that journalism is the first version of History.1 The purpose of this article is to review and describe, by referring to the exact moment and place, the impact on the Argentine public opinion -through the press- of two facts that marked the subsequent development of the controversy over Malvinas. Said facts are the establishment of the Political Military Commandery of Malvinas Islands in 1829, and the conflict with the United States over the destruction of the Colony of Malvinas by the
* Licenciate Degree in Political Sciences. Specialization in International Relations. Member of the Committee on Malvinas of CARI and the Institute of International Security and Strategic Affairs (ISIAE, by its Spanish acronym). 1 Blaustein, Eduardo and Zubieta, Martn, Decamos ayer, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Colihue, 1998, p. 9.
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corvette USS Lexington, which may be considered as the triggering event of the subsequent British invasion of Malvinas. It was thus expressed by Alfredo Palacios, who considered it outrageous that the U.S. Charg dAffaires should defend British rights over Malvinas. Regarding the actions of the U.S. official, he said that his unexpected defense of Great Britain, upholding their alleged rights instead of limiting himself to the facts concerning the seizure of the ships, paved the way for British claims.2 He added that the move by Great Britain on January 1, 1833 was preceded and even prepared may be inadvertently- by U.S. consular officials who facilitated the raid carried out by frigate USS Lexington in Port Soledad on December 28, 1831, whose crew captured the officials who were there and then alleged, as a justification of such vandalism, that through a third party claim- they had property rights over Malvinas Islands, since they did not belong to the United Provinces but to Great Britain.3 These facts impacted heavily on the public opinion and were widely covered by the newspapers and weekly publications of greatest symbolic and cultural influence of the time, such as La Gaceta Mercantil, El Lucero, and The British Packet, a news weekly intended for the English-speaking community of Buenos Aires. CREATION OF THE POLITICAL MILITARY COMMANDERY OF MALVINAS ISLANDS In 1829 Malvinas began to have greater significance in the Argentine press, since on June 10 a Decree signed by the interim Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, Martn Rodrguez, created the Political Military Commandery of Malvinas Islands, followed by the appointment -through a Diploma- of its Commander, Mr. Luis Vernet. The news was published by the newspaper La Gaceta Mercantil, on June 13, and by the news weekly The British Packet, on June 20. The article included an official document whereby the Government,
2 Palacios, Alfredo L., Las Islas Malvinas, archipilago argentino, Buenos Aires, Editorial Coleccin Claridad, 1934, p. 55. 3 Idem, p. 24.
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after showing its title to the Islands and to all other islands surrounding Cape Horn (since our country was the successor of the rights held by Spain over those lands), specified the reasons for creating the Commandery, explaining that measures had to be taken forthwith to protect the rights of the Republic, to enjoy the benefits that could derive from the products of the Islands and to afford adequate protection to their inhabitants. It also reproduced the above mentioned decree. It is worth noting the third section, which read: The Political Military Commander shall strive to have the laws of the Republic observed by the inhabitants of the Islands, and shall ensure that the regulations on the hunting of amphibians are complied with along their coasts.4 This last provision was the cause of the conflict with the United States regarding the actions of the vessel USS Lexington. Also, in an editorial of June 17 that same year, La Gaceta Mercantil praised the Governments decision to create the Commandery, besides noting that it was the first time this considerable portion of territory had been given the importance it deserved, and criticizing the lack of attention and interest that prior administrations had shown in relation to the Islands. The editorial also highlighted the strategic importance of Malvinas, given the fact that they were the only refuge near the Eastern and Western coasts of South America and the last stop for European vessels that intended to sail on to the Pacific. To reinforce its opinion, the editorial quoted the words of the well-known British Admiral Anson, who said that he was convinced that all expeditions to the South Sea would be spoiled as long as they were obliged to stop at the port of Brazil, and anything that could relieve them from this need deserved public attention. He added that they ought search for a place to stop further South, so that their vessels could stock up before reaching Cape Horn.5 Finally, the editorial added that this same seaman had proposed that Malvinas should be this refuge. Lastly, the editorial stated that the Republic could be congratulated on
4 La Gaceta Mercantil, Buenos Aires, June 13, 1829, Inner Part, p. 2. 5 dem, June 17, 1829, p. 2.
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having one of the most impressive ports in the world and that many benefits could be obtained from this territory due to its fertile land, its milder climate as compared to other regions, the hunting of the sea lions that abounded in its coasts and the possibility of being visited by foreign vessels in need of refuelling, provisions and the like, which would generate many economic advantages for the country. THE CONFLICT WITH THE UNITED STATES OVER THE USS LEXINGTON As explained above, one of the sections of the decree that established the Political Military Commandery of Malvinas provided that the Commander was to be empowered with authority to enforce regulations on the hunting of amphibians along the Islands coastline. Anchorage charges were systematically evaded by whalers that fished there. In August 1831, due to an incident with the U.S. fishing vessels Harriet, Breakwater and Superior, Commander Luis Vernet returned to Buenos Aires in the schooner Harriet, whose cargo he had seized in order to submit the case to the Prize Court. The U.S. Consul in Buenos Aires disregarded the Argentine right to regulate fishing in Malvinas and on December 31, 1831 the U.S. warship USS Lexington, under the command of Captain Silas Duncan, landed its men on the Islands, who destroyed all military facilities, swept the buildings, stole seal furs, arrested most of the inhabitants and before leaving, stated that the Islands were fully devoid of any Government.6 This very serious event had huge repercussions on the Buenos Aires press and became the most important news of the time, with longlasting echoes. The first chronicle of the event was published by La Gaceta Mercantil on February 8, 1832. It was an announcement of Governor Luis Vernet that included a preliminary presentation of the facts that had taken place in Malvinas, aimed at informing the public. Mr. Vernets statement, after expounding the above mentioned facts
6 Statements of Enrique Metcale (Interim Commander of Malvinas), Guillermo Dickson and Julio Grossy, made at the Port of Montevideo. El Lucero, Buenos Aires, February 15, 1832, Inner Part, pp. 1 to 3.
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and describing them as atrocious and as blatantly prejudicial to national sovereignty rights, anticipated that a few days later a long article would be published to justify the capture of the three U.S. schooners, since he had been called a pirate by that country for having seized the schooners for no apparent reason. The following day, the same morning newspaper published an editorial declaring that what had happened was an outrageous infringement of the jus gentium, a coward act of insulting violence against a defenseless and unprepared Argentine front, and that it expected the U.S. Government to quickly repair the Argentine honor. On February 11, the newspaper published part of the State of the Union address presented by U.S. President Andrew Jackson to the U.S. Congress on December 6, 1831, in which Jackson referred to the Republic and its actions in Malvinas. He said: I should have placed Buenos Ayres in the list of South American powers in respect to which nothing of importance affecting us was to be communicated but for occurrences which have lately taken place at the Falkland Islands, in which the name of that Republic has been used to cover with a show of authority acts injurious to our commerce and to the property and liberty of our fellow citizens. In the course of the present year one of our vessels, engaged in the pursuit of a trade which we have always enjoyed without molestation, has been captured by a band acting, as they pretend, under the authority of the Government of Buenos Ayres. I have therefore given orders for the dispatch of an armed vessel to join our squadron in those seas and aid in affording all lawful protection to our trade which shall be necessary, and shall without delay send a minister to inquire into the nature of the circumstances and also of the claim, if any, that is set up by that Government to those islands. In the mean time, I submit the case to the consideration of Congress, to the end that they may clothe the Executive with such authority and means as they may deem necessary for providing a force adequate to the complete protection of our fellow citizens fishing and trading in those seas.7
7 La Gaceta Mercantil, Buenos Aires, February 11, 1832, p. 2.
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After quoting these words, the editor of the newspaper concluded the article saying that President Jacksons statements confirmed that the act of the USS Lexington had not been authorized by the U.S. Government since it will never let itself be tarnished by a despicable occurrence, legitimating actions that are so much opposed to the noble and loyal character of its institutions and foreign policy.8 Meanwhile, on February 11, the political news weekly The British Packet published an article about the episode concerning the USS Lexington on its front page, as well as the above mentioned U.S. Presidents statement. It is worth adding that in both articles it referred to Malvinas as Falkland Islands, and continued to do so afterwards. On February 15, El Lucero published an announcement in which the Government informed that inquiries had confirmed the action taken by the crew of the USS Lexington in Malvinas, and ensured the population that it would file the relevant claim and request adequate reparation, and that it would not retaliate against U.S. citizens living in the Republic. Some days later, Luis Vernet published a very long declaration expressing how and with which formalities he had proceeded to capture the three U.S. schooners for repeatedly hunting amphibians in the coasts of Malvinas. He also explained that he had first resorted to the special court having jurisdiction to solve the matter and, at the same time, proved the Republics sovereignty right over Malvinas Islands and surrounding areas up to Cape Horn. On February 21, El Lucero, after a minute inquiry into the facts, published an editorial to qualify the actions of the Commander of the USS Lexington, the Argentine Government and the U.S. Consul. To begin with, the editors trusted that the Government would make a just and firm claim and the United States would provide full and prompt reparation; they also believed that the Government had acted impeccably, since it had always endeavored to maintain the conflict within the legal sphere, trying not to hinder the latters work, and had made every possible effort to maintain, at all times, amicable relations with the United States.
8 Idem, p. 3.
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The United States Consul had always attempted to depart from the legal path and had finally reacted negatively, protesting against the seizure of the fishing vessels and against Argentinas sovereignty rights over Malvinas. As regards the Commander of the USS Lexington, the editors expressed that he had lied about the purpose of his trip to the Islands, since in a declaration before departing to Malvinas he had informed that the trip was only meant as a visit and that he provided this information to avoid bad intelligence regarding the purpose of the trip and to remain in keeping with the candid and frank manner in which U.S. business is done.9 His actions not only amounted to serious misconduct but also to crimes that called for a forceful reaction. That same day, February 21, 1832, La Gaceta Mercantil informed that the Government had withdrawn US Consul George Slacums exequatur, empowering him to appoint a person to succeed him, until a new consul was appointed. Likewise, it was informed that Mr. Slacum refused to appoint a successor and to deposit the U.S. naval papers with the Harbour Masters Office of the Port, which stored all the navigation documents of vessels from countries that did not have a Consul in Buenos Aires. On February 22 the same newspaper went on to inform the U.S. officials refusal and greeted the satisfactory reaction of the Argentine Government in light of this attitude, praising its positive behavior towards the U.S. citizens that lived in our country. Meanwhile, both El Lucero and La Gaceta Mercantil published a circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing the governors about the events concerning the USS Lexington. On June 15, La Gaceta Mercantil informed that the Government of the Province of Buenos Aires, in charge of handling the countrys foreign relations, had recognized Francys Baylles as the new U.S. Charg dAffaires. On June 19, another article regarding the conflict with the United States was published by La Gaceta Mercantil. The article reported
9 El Lucero, Buenos Aires, February 21, 1832, p. 2.
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on an announcement of the U.S. Navy Department that expounded the events concerning the USS Lexington in Malvinas, but omitted the most injurious facts and distorted some information. The announcement explained that an official notice had been received by the Navy Department, saying that the USS Lexington had returned to Montevideo from Malvinas with most of the persons who had been involved in the outrages against U.S. interests and citizens; having recovered the captured and plundered vessels that were still at the Barkeley sound (the area surrounding the Port of Malvinas) and having aided those of their seamen who had been illegally detained or inhumanely abandoned to die in the adjoining Islands.10 The following day, the newspaper published a letter by Luis Vernet addressed to the general public, in which he objected to the fact that La Gaceta Mercantil had been the only newspaper of the city of Buenos Aires that had published this notice of the United States Navy, and replied to the person who had written said communication (whose name was unknown) that out of the three vessels one had returned to the United States, the other one was on its way to the Pacific and the last one had been in Buenos Aires since November 1831, so it was impossible that what the notice described had actually occurred. On July 6, La Gaceta Mercantil published an article of the newspaper Courier & Enquirer of New York which legitimated the events that had taken place in the Islands on January 3, alleging an inherent right of the United States to fish along the coastline of Malvinas, and that, therefore, Commander Duncan of the USS Lexington had to use force to oppose the interruption of fishing activities. According to the Courier & Enquirer, this right was based on the fact that Britain shared said right with Spain before the American Revolution and the United States were entitled to it as a former British colony. Then, the editor of La Gaceta Mercantil published a long editorial in which he refuted the argument of the inherent right. He began by saying that it was unthinkable, insolent and absurd to claim such a right over a group of Islands to which they had never had any title,
10 La Gaceta Mercantil, Buenos Aires, June 19, 1832, p. 2.
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that the alleged recognition by Spain was false and that, even if it existed, it did not entitle the United States as a former British colonyto continue enjoying this already untimely right in the territory of an independent country like the Argentine Republic. The editor wondered whether there existed a document acknowledging the alleged right, and whether it had been shown that both before and after its declaration of independence, the United States was barred from fishing in Malvinas. One single example is enough: in 1793, seventeen years after the U.S. Declaration of Independence, thirteen U.S. ships which were fishing along the coastline of Malvinas were requested to leave by a Spanish warship, which warned them that not only was the U.S. precluded from fishing there but also from navigating those seas. Likewise, the editor refuted the alleged British right to fish along the coastline of Malvinas. To do so, he cited the 1790 treaty between Spain and Great Britain, which categorically disproved said right. In section 4 of said treaty, His British Majesty undertook to resort to the most effective means to prevent navigation and fishing in the Pacific Ocean and the South seas by British subjects from being used as an excuse for illegal trade with Spanish establishments, and with a view to this it was expressly provided that British subjects were not to navigate or fish in said seas at a distance shorter than ten maritime leagues from any of the coasts already occupied by Spain.11 In section 6, it was further agreed -regarding the Eastern and Western coasts of South America and adjoining Islands- that said subjects were not to set up any establishment in any parts of these Southern coasts and of the adjoining Islands already occupied by Spain.12 It is thus shown that Spain was the only power that had exclusive fishing rights along the coasts of its possessions and our Republic had inherited those rights. More importantly, on July 10 the editor of La Gaceta Mercantil,
11 Miller, J. R. History of Great Britain from the death of George II to the coronation of George IV, Philadelphia, MCarty & Davis Editions, 1836, p. 21. 12 Idem.
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on continuing to elaborate on the matter, made it clear that they had failed to mention that the United States had recognized the independence of the United Provinces and that said recognition had been accompanied by a map including Malvinas Islands. Hence, President Jacksons statement to the U.S. Congress affirming they would send a minister to Buenos Aires to inquire into our alleged rights over Malvinas lacked all coherence. As regards The British Packet and Argentine News such was its full name-, it had published all the official documents of the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Commander Luis Vernets and other citizens messages, just as La Gaceta Mercantil and El Lucero had published them. In particular, on April 21, this news weekly reported the arrival of a U.S. navy squadron, led by Commodore Rodgers, who upon being welcomed by the population- had been reminded of the irritation that still prevailed over the USS Lexington incident, although he believed said fact would not overshadow the visit. On April 24, Commander Rodgers announced the release of the prisoners that had been captured by the Commander of the USS Lexington at Malvinas and were still being kept as hostages. This was confirmed the following day by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, on September 8 The British Packet informed that the new U.S. Charg dAffaires, Francys Baylles, had applied for and obtained his passport and that it was believed he would leave Buenos Aires, given the unsatisfactory state of negotiations regarding the events that had taken place at Malvinas Islands in January that year. The editors of these newspapers were not the only ones who gave their opinion on the facts: people in general also participated through readers letters to the above mentioned newspapers and weekly publications, and there were even exchanges of opinions among several of them. Both El Lucero and La Gaceta Mercantil published some letters and answered others, but it was through The British Packet that (U.S. or British) citizens expressed themselves more frequently. El Lucero, in its edition of February 16, 1832, reproduced a readers letter signed by some patriots that had first appeared in El Recopilador, a newspaper published in Montevideo. The letter
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criticized the attitude of the Commander of the USS Lexington and the fact that he had acted beyond the orders of his Government. Lastly, it expressed that the behavior of Commander Duncan was not to be mistaken for that of his Government, since both were quite different. On February 19, El Lucero published a translation of a readers letter that had appeared in The British Packet, since it was considered important for the public opinion. In said letter, another American citizen such was the signature- asked the citizens of Buenos Aires to be patient until the truth about the events that had happened in the Islands were uncloaked, and although he highlighted that he was a genuine patriot, he made it very clear that he would not hesitate to object to any act of aggression by his Government. As regards La Gaceta Mercantil, it published an answer to a readers letter published by The British Packet on February 11 and signed by a North-American, which criticized La Gaceta Mercantil for its offensive words about the Commander of the USS Lexington which had been published in an editorial on February 9. The newspaper answered that it had never doubted the moral qualifications of Commander Duncan but that it did not believe the comments about his acts in Malvinas were exaggerated. As mentioned above, The British Packet published a significant number of readers letters. On February 18, 1832 another NorthAmerican citizen signed a letter criticizing the editor of La Gaceta Mercantil for his words against an editorial of the newspaper Cosmopolitan published on February 15 which did not condemn the acts perpetrated by the Commander of the USS Lexington. On March 3, a U.S. citizen asked the population not to engage in extreme debates. Lastly, on March 10 one of the prisoners captured in Malvinas and later released by Commander Rodgers revealed that he had been mauled by Commander Duncan, who had called him a thief and a pirate, and stressed the difference between his treatment and the one he had received from the crew of the USS Lexington and, afterwards, of the vessel Warren. The purpose of this article has been, on the one hand, to describe the passion expressed by the public opinion -from the dawn of our
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history- regarding the news on Malvinas, and, on the other hand, to challenge the belief that the Argentine press only began to prioritize the issue of Malvinas as from the second half of the XX century. To conclude, on celebrating its bicentennial, the Argentine Republic acknowledges that the issue of Malvinas has played an important role in its history. However, we may still have to become more aware of the significance that our Islands have had in the development of our national identity during the XIX century. We may undoubtedly affirm that, within the context of the Argentine bicentennial, the treatment of the issue of Malvinas by the Argentine press has been clearly important from the very beginning of our history, since the Islands have been considered a priority and a vital territory for Argentine interests and for the public opinion, which has adamantly expressed its feelings and has shown a fervent and enthusiastic commitment to Malvinas Islands.
Bibliography Newspapers El Lucero, Buenos Aires, February 1832. La Gaceta Mercantil, Buenos Aires, June 1829 and February 1832. The British Packet, Buenos Aires, June 1829, February and March 1832. Books Becerra, Alfredo, Protestas por Malvinas, Buenos Aires, Caja Editora, 1998 Blaustein, Eduardo and Zubieta, Martn, Decamos Ayer, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Colihue, 1998 Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, Malvinas, Georgias y Sandwich del Sur, Buenos Aires, CARI, 1983-1995 Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba-Stonehouse, Virginia, Seales de guerra, Buenos Aires, Javier Vergara Editor, 1992 Miller, J. R. History of Great Britain from the death of George II to the coronation of George IV, Philadelphia, MCarty & Davis Editions, 1836. Palacios, Alfredo L., Las Islas Malvinas, archipilago argentino, Buenos Aires, Editorial Coleccin Claridad, 1934.
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Ruperto Godoy Defending Argentine interests in the South Atlantic Area

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Ruperto Godoy Defending Argentine interests in the South Atlantic Area

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Ruperto Godoy Defending Argentine interests in the South Atlantic Area

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Jorge Taiana The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial

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Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy

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Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy

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Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy

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Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy

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Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy

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Alberto Sileoni Malvinas as an educational policy

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Federico Pinedo 204, 200, 194 and 177

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