Ethical Engineers? Why Not? Author(s): Archie J.

Bahm Reviewed work(s): Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter, 1983), pp. 33-36 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/688907 . Accessed: 28/03/2012 00:57
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Responses & Reconsiderations

Ethical Engineers? Why Not?

ArthurL. Caplan's"Ethical Engineers Need Not Apply: The State of Applied Ethics Today"* ably describes the present status of applied ethics and his ugly picture of "engineers" persuadesus that "ethical engineers" would do more harm than good:"The main thrust of this essay has been to critique what I have called the 'engineering' view of applied ethics as an inadequate conception of what is involved in applied normative inquiry."He describes"the engineering model" as "value-free," as "always recognizing that the nature and description of the problem is not in dispute," and as seeing "theories as hierarchicalpyramidsof deductively linked generalizations."He criticizes it as having "no single theory," implying that he believes it claims to have one. He complains:"Itis simply naive to think that a well-trained philosopher can step boldly into the emergencyroom or neonatalunit and immediately dissolve moral conundrums by dint of expertise in moral theory." Although I doubt that nuclear engineers, for example, would recognize themselves as fitting his description, I do agree with his rejection of the model that he depicts. But when I turn to his own constructive suggestions, under the heading of "What Should Applied Ethics Be?",I find no proposal about how an applied ethicist might help in dealing with actual medical problems. Instead, he lists some advantages to ethical theorists engagingin

applications: it "raises a number of interesting theoretical issues"; it provides "opportunity for easy examination of preconceivedideas,"for "examination of the scope and adequacy of existing moral theories," and for "reshaping normativeviews"; or it may "highlight tacit values" and "providea rich taxonomy of descriptive values," and increase "awareness of need for conceptual clarification." Caplan's conclusion seems to confess that he has no more to offer than his engineering model scapegoat: ". . . the pressuresand demands of the real world do not provide an optimal environment for supporting the kinds of inquiry necessary to examine these issues with great depth or rigor." Should we not ask: "Why should Caplan's applied ethicist apply?" Is "Applied Ethics" Possible? Because Caplan is engaged as an applied ethicist, and because the directors of his and at least four other important centers for applied ethics accept the view that "ethical theory, or knowledge of the ultimate bases for moral appeals inherent in human nature, is not necessaryfor proposing solutions,"t I take his defense of this view as most serious. In spite of Caplan's assertion in a letter to me (dated 9 March 1982) that "I do not think anyone seriously believes that it is possible to do applied ethics sans theory," his article claims that "[d]evotees of desert, so-

cial worth, utility, merit, and need will inevitably conflict as a direct result of their eagerness to apply particular moral rules." The article emphasizes his view that "No single moral theory can lay claim to the mantle of truth." He excuses the absence of agreement about basic ethical theory by saying that "Thereare many ways currentlyof constructing theories in ethics." He seems unworried about the prevalence of competing alternatives and the failure of professional ethical theorists to locate andunderstandthe ultimate foundations for moral appeals. He has not offeredus such a theory and appearsnot to be tryingto obtain one or even to believe that such an attempt might succeed. So I judge his view as also exemplifying the application of ethics without ethics to apply and as actually supporting a deficiency in American culture which needs to be overcome.
Enlightened Self-Interest

Having rejected both Caplan's "engineering model" and his lack of constructive suggestions as deficient, I am challenged by the question of how to make up the deficiencies. What do I propose?
* ArthurL. Caplan,"EthicalEngineers Need Not Apply: The State of Applied Ethics Today,' Science, Technology,& Human Values, Volume 6, No. 33 (Fall 1980): 24-32. t See my "Teaching Ethics without Ethics to Teach," Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 1 (1982): 43-47.

?) 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the President and Fellows of HarvardCollege. Published by John Wiley &tSons, Inc. Science, Technology, ee)Human Values, Volume 8, Issue 1,pp. 33-38 (Winter 1983) CCC 0162-2439/83/010033-06$02.20

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Science, Technology, & Human Values-Winter 1983 social roles, and then with some larger groups such as recreational, educational, religious, occupational, and political. Each person normally has limits to the extents of these identifications and the limits often are experienced in terms of opposition to other persons or groups. Some persons (e.g., those who are shy) are slow to achieve extensive identities and some (e.g., those naturally gregarious)are fast. Some develop rigid self-conceptions, some adapteasily, and some delight in roletaking ventures. Each person naturallydesires what is best for itself and thus has interests in self in each of the ways it is conceived. It desires what is best for its body, mind, family, social roles, and each of the groups it regards as its own. Each of these interests is part of a self that is inherently self-interested in that they are parts of the self and the self naturally seeks to satisfy these interests as much as possible. Unfortunately, desires may be frustrated as well as satisfied. A common kind of frustration results from having conflicting desires such that satisfaction of one involves frustration of another. For example, I like both apple and cherry pie. On some occasions I must choose between them, frustrating my desire for one while satisfying my desire for the other. On another occasion, my sister and I may both desire the one remaining piece of pie. If I take it, she will feel frustrated. Because she is my sister and I love her and desire that she should have her desires satisfied, I have a conflict of desires-to eat the pie and to have my sister eat it. I must choose between which of the desired results better. Ifmy interest is shortappears range,I eat the pie and frustrate my sister.Such action is called "selfish." If my interest is long-range, I offer her the pie, because she is a good cook and will prepare more pies in the future. Such action exemplifies wiser self-interest. Because each self seeks to maximize satisfactions, it naturally seeks enlightenment, i.e., how to choose and act understanding in ways facilitating such maximization. The "enlightenedself-interest theory" is intended to state what persons do naturally, including seeking more understandingof ways for long-range maximization of satisfactions.

My proposal is, first, an ethical theory that anyone can draw from his own experience by observing attentively how he and others make decisions about what they believe they ought to do. "Ethics,"according to my dictionary, is "the discipline dealing with good and bad and moral duty and obligation." An ethical theory is an hypothesis about the nature of good and bad, of duty or obligationor, to use the term I prefer, "oughtness." "Good" and "bad," for present purposes, are feelings of satisfaction and frustrationof desire. Distinction needs to be made between ends and means, the ends (or ends-in-themselves) being feelings of satisfaction and frustration, and the means (or means-to-ends) being whatever is instrumental in producing the ends. Since the objects, or objectives, of desiringappearas things or activities, the feeling of satisfaction in eating pie, for example, is a good-in-itself, an intrinsic good, and the pie and all that was involved in preparingit for eating serve as means or instrumental goods. Since feelings of satisfaction may cause desires for more such feelings, they may also serve as instrumental goods. "Oughtness," or the feeling of oughtness, which each person can observe for oneself, consists in the powerthat an apparently greatergood has over an apparently lesser good in compelling our choices. When faced with two alternatives, one of which appearsbetter than the other, which ought a person to choose?The better. Why? Because it appearsbetter.This apparent"bettemess"is the ultimate basis for choosing, i.e., for choosing as one ought. This ethical theory has been named "the enlightened self-interest theory." Understanding it involves understandingthe nature of self, its interests, and "enlightenment." Each person understands its self in terms of self-concepts. Each normally identifies itself with its body, mind and ideas, desires and interests, andall that it considersits own. Each normally identifies itself with its mother,family, intimate groups,and

Self as Social Our traditional ideals emphasizing individualism obscure the extents to which each self is essentially social. Each person is born of a mother, associating biologically with her before birth, depending on her for nourishment, care and protection, and gradually becoming aware of differences from her. A person gains self-awareness partly through the attitudes and actions taken towardit and observing its own responses. It becomes aware of itself as pleased and pleasing, as praisedand blamed, and as attracting assistance and being ignored. Its desires are shaped by toys provided,by behavior to emulate, and by rewards for approved behavior. A child first copies its mother model, or siblings, its father model, the milkman and others who appear,or fairies, heroes, and deities described in stories, and then builds its own ideas from the most desirable traits in each. Accepted social roles, as student, babysitter, newsboy, athlete, typist, clerk, nurse,physician,lawyer,and so forth, further mold a self's concepts, desires, motives, and ideals. Associating with others involves give and take, as each person helps to satisfy or frustrate others' desires. A principle of reciprocity may be observed operating in human association, such that when a person is helped by another a tendency to help the other appears. When one is harmed by another intentionally, intention to respondharmfully often occurs. A person usually admires those by whom one is admired, at least for providing such admiration. The principle of reciprocity does not work exactly, but it works well enough so that most persons learn that, in the long run, selfishness is

Responses & Reconsiderations

35

counterproductive.A chief tenet of the enlightened self-interest theory is that a wisely self-interestedperson not only will not be selfish but also is more likely to thrive in promoting its interests through generously helping others by cooperating, sharing, and caring. Oughtness: Two Kinds Oughtness occurs actually when a person faced with two alternatives, one of which appearsbetter than the other, has a feeling of preferenceand compulsion to choose the one appearing as better. Actual oughtness is situational. Many ethical principles, often included in codes, are stated as universals: "A physician ought always to save a life whenever possible." Such an ought is conditional in the sense that no physician feels actual compulsion to save a life until in the presence of a life that will die without his or her help. In its conditional form, the principle may be stated: "If a physician is in the presence of a life that will die without his or her help, then he or she always ought to try to prevent it from dying." Such conditional oughtness is stated as universal. But ethical principles may be conditional in another way. Instead of being stated as universals without exceptions, they may be stated in ways intending to make clear that exceptions are to be expected. A physician coming upon a personwho may die without help may find that one or more other physicians are already serving the patient fully, or that the person is about to be executed by a firing squad, or that continuation of the person's life will result in deaths to many others, or that the person has demanded to be allowed to die. Here, other ethical principlesintervene and have priority over the physician's stated principle. Therefore, the principle is more correctly stated as "If a physician is in the presence of a life that will die without his or her help, then the physician always ought to try to prevent the person from dying, other

things being equal." "Other things being equal" signifies that the principle holds under ideal conditions or under conditions where no other principles have priority. My proposal includes the recommendation that all ethical principles be stated as universals conditional upon exceptions-that is, "oneought always to choose the better of two alternatives (such as helping or not helping to save a life), other things being equal." When this is done, the common objection that ethical principles are false when and because exceptions occur will be avoided. Oughtness is of two kinds: actual (which is situational)and conditional (which is universal, except, when properly stated, for exceptions). Ethics as Scientific Ethics may be regardedas scientific in two ways. First, scientific principles-formulated in terms of the scientific attitude that requiresopenmindedness about any relevant evidence that may appearin the futureare properlystated in terms of "other things being equal." Scientists who regard such an attitude as presupposed often neglect to add the phrase, or its equivalent, in actual statements. By intending to state ethical principles in the same way, and by presupposing an attitude of tentativity and conditionality, one may hold that ethical principles (generalizations based on equally sound evidence) may attain the status of scientific principles.There is nothing in the nature of the scientific attitude and method which prevents them from being applied to understanding the nature of values and oughtness and of particular kinds of goods and oughts. This is the first way in which ethics is scientific. Many scientists do not have value or ethical issues in mind when pursuing their investigations. When a physical scientist concludes, for example, that "water boils at 212?Fat sea level under normal atmospheric conditions," he or she is not intending to state either that it is good

or bad to boil water or that anyone ever ought to do so. The principle statedis not an ethical principle.But when a person acquainted with this principle is in a situation where boiling water is desired, then he or she can call upon it, not as an ethical principle,but as a basis for an ethical principalthat can be stated: "Whenever a person desires to boil water at sea level under normal atmospheric conditions, he or she ought to heat the water to 212?F, other thingsbeing equal."This is an ethical principle because it is stated as a conditioned ought. It is as much an ethical principle as any other principle stated as a conditional ought. The purpose of citing this example is to illustrate how every principle in every science, assuming that it is reliablyfounded,may serve as a basis for an ethical principle stated as a conditional ought. In this way, all sound scientific principlesmay serve as bases for, and thus as resources for, ethics as a science. My proposal thus includes regarding ethics as a field of inquiry best represented by the enlightened selfinterest theory, distinguishing between actual and conditional oughts and interpretingethical principles as conditional oughts. Such principles are, then, regardedas scientific both because they are stated in terms of other things being equal and because they include all other reliable scientific principles as resources available as bases.

Applied Ethics: A Multidisciplinary

Challenge

I believe that few persons working in the area of applied ethics today have an ethical theory to apply, and that this lack is evidence of misunderstanding the nature of ethics and ethical theory. That such misunderstanding is now culturally induced, is widespread, and has many causes does not minimize it as a deficiency. It does have implications for whether and how much those seeking advice about ethical theory

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Science, Technology, & Human Values-Winter 1983 oughts) are relevant to a particular sition slightly-thus making their case and be able to help evaluate enterprise (by Overton's lights) "scitheir relative importance in com- entific"; and (3) that Overton's parison with the principles of other preoccupation with the dogmatism specialists believed to be relevant, and closemindedness of the advobut also will remain alert to defi- cates of creation-science has led him ciencies in information calling for into a chronic confusion of doctrines further scientific research.Becoming and their advocates. an applied ethicist should be an adRuse makes no reply to the second venture in multidisciplinary growth point. Quite why is unclear since, and in perpetualre-evaluationof both standing entirely alone, it is more the reliability and deficiency of than sufficient to give one pause available principles and their con- about the worryingprecedents set in certed use in particular practice. McLean v. Arkansas. But Ruse does deal, after a fashion, with points (1) Archie J. Bahm and (3). Since we do not see eye-toProfessor of Philosophy Emeritus eye about these matters, I shall try University of New Mexico to redirect his gaze. Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131
The Logic of "Essential Conditions"

are warranted in trusting ethicists, including applied ethicists, who refuse to name, explain, verify as reliable, and demonstrate the practical relevance of a sound theory to the problems that seekers face. I prefernot to use the term "ethical engineer." But to the extent that a distinction between pure and applied science is useful, and if ethics is the science of enlightened self-interest, then applied ethics is the practice (technology and engineering) of enlightened self-interest. If "engineer" means competent, practicalproblemsolver,then we need all of the ethical engineers we can get. Whv not? I will not attempt here a detailed comparison of the enlightened selfinterest theory with other theories. I propose incorporating desirable partsof many theories as specialized principles acceptable when relevant and suitably modified. For example, the utilitarian "greatestgood for the greatest number" principle may be stated: "When faced with a choice between the greatest good for the greatest number and the greatest goodfor less than the greatest number,one ought always to choose the former, other things being equal." The Kantian "imperative" may be held as an enlightened, inductive generalization: "Treat humanity, whether in one's self or others, always as an end and never as a means merely, other things being equal." [Even persons having theistic preconceptions may observe that God, beingomniscient, and thus fully enlightened, practices the enlightened self-interest theory and that the Church, claiming to provide enlightenmentfor its members, advises them to do likewise.] When enlightened about the inof theory and practice, terdependence i.e.,of the need for continuing openmindedness and tentativity of attitudeessential to science, an ethicist will be on the lookout for new evidence emerging in increasingly complicated, practical problems havingimplications for foundational theoryitself. My enlightened applied ethicist not only will be aware of whichethical principles (conditional

More on Creationism
MichaelRuse is distressedthat I have taken exception to Judge William Overton's opinion in McLean v. Arkansas.* Where I saw that ruling as full of sloppy arguments and non sequiturs, he hails it as "a first-class piece of reasoning." Since Ruse has claimed that my reservations are "hopelesslywide of the mark,"I feel obligedto enter the fray once again, in the hope that reiteration will achieve what my initial argument has evidently failed to pull off, namely, to convince knee-jerk demarcationists like Ruse that things aremore complicatedthan they have conceded. Inmy short commentary, I sought to show: (1)that the criteria which JudgeOverton offered as "essential conditions" of science are nothing ofthe sort, since many parts of what we all call "science" fail to satisfy those conditions; (2)that several of Overton's criteria constitute extremelyweak demands from an epistemic point of view, so weak that if Creationism does not already satisfy them (which I believe it manifestlydoes), it would be child's play for creationists to modify their po-

Considerthe following parable:suppose that some city dweller said that the "essential conditions" for something to be a sheep were that it be a medium-sized mammal and that it invariably butt into any human beingsin its vicinty. A countryfellow might try to suggest that his city cousin evidently did not understand what a sheep was. He might show, forinstance, that there are plenty of things we call sheep which never butt into anything, let alone human beings. He might go further to say that what the city fellow is calling a sheep is what all the rest of us as a goat. Suppose,finally, that regard a second city fellow, on hearing his town friend abused by the bucolic bumpkin, entered the discussion saying "I once knew a sheep that butted into human beings without hesitation, and besides I once saw a goat which never bothered human beings. Accordingly, it is correct to say that the essential conditions of

*See Larry at the Bar: Laudan, "Science Causesfor Concern," Science, Technology,& Human Values, Volume 7, No. 41 (Fall 19821:16-18; and Michael Ruse, "Pro ludice," Science, Technology, & Human Values, Volume 7, No. 41 (Fall 1982): 19-23.