Barangay Sindalan v. CA, G.R. No. G.R. No.

150640, 22 March 2007 Facts Barangay Sindalan, pursuant to its resolution, filed a complaint for eminent domain against the Sindayan spouses who were the registered owners of the parcel of land subject of the expropriation. The barangay sought to convert a portion of spouses Sindayans land into Barangay Sindalans feeder road. The spouses argued that the expropriation of their property was improper because it was sought for a private use. They alleged that the expropriation of their property, which was adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision, would benefit only the homeowners of said subdivision. The RTC ruled that the barangay had the lawful right to take the property of the Sindayan spouses. The Court of Appeals reversed. Issue Whether the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose No, the contemplated road to be constructed by the barangay would benefit only the residents of a subdivision. Held In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property must be for a public purpose. In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially employed for the community." The intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed. While the number of people who use or can use the property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of respondents lot is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose. Laynesa v. Uy, G.R. No. 149553, 29 February 2008 [Tenants filed a case of threatened ejectment and legal redemption against alleged owners of an agricultural land before the DARAB. While the case was pending, the local government passed a municipal resolution embodying an ordinance which reclassified the subject land from agricultural to industrial. The alleged owners of the land argued that DARAB had no jurisdiction since the subject land was already classified as industrial.

Held: Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-agricultural land by a local government, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Furthermore, Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code is unequivocal that nothing in said section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of RA 6657. As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, on the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160. ] Facts Robert Morley was an owner of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur. Santos. A portion of the land was sold to Sixto Cuba Sr., while the remaining portion was leased to Santos Laynesa and his son Nicolas as tenants. When Cuba Sr. died, Santos and Nicolas continued as tenants, delivering the owners share of the produce to the children of Cuba Sr., namely Sixto Cuba Jr. and Bienvenido Cuba. Subsequently, Sixto Cuba Jr. executed a deed of absolute sale of unregistered land, transferring the property to Pacita Uy. Notably, the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds. Later, Cuba, Jr. executed a deed of assignment of the undelivered owners share of the produce in favor of Pacita. Subsequently, Pacita demanded that the Laynesas vacate the land. She claimed that she had purchased the land. Thereafter, Pacita obtained a certification from the Municipal Agricultural Office (MAO) that the property was not prime agricultural property, and from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) that the subject land was not covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The certifications were sought so the land could be reclassified as industrial land. Meanwhile, the Municipal Council of Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur approved Resolution No. 67, which embodied Ordinance No. 28 and reclassified the land from agricultural to industrial. The Laynesas filed a complaint before the DARAB for threatened ejectment and legal redemption of the subject property. Pacita and her husband Paquito alleged that DARAB had no jurisdiction since the land had already been reclassified as industrial land. The DARAB ruled in favor of the Laynesas. The CA reversed and ruled that DARAB had no jurisdiction. According to the CA, the evidence on record shows that when the Laynesas

filed their action with the DARAB, the property was no longer agricultural but had been reclassified. Thus, the DARAB had no jurisdiction. Issue Whether the reclassification of a lot by a municipal ordinance, without the Department of Agrarian Reforms (DARs) approval, suffices to oust the jurisdiction of the DARAB over a petition for legal redemption filed by the tenants NO Held Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657), the adjudication of agrarian reform disputes was placed under the jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR, through the DARAB, shall exercise quasi-judicial functions and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all disputes involving the enforcement and implementation of all agrarian reform laws. However, in 1991, RA 7160 or the Local Government Code was passed into law, granting local government units the power to reclassify land. Being a later law, RA 7160 shall govern in case of conflict between it and RA 6657, as to the issue of reclassification. Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-agricultural land by a local government, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in question for threatened ejectment and redemption for the following reasons: (1)Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The case filed by the Layneses who were tenants of an agricultural land was for threatened ejectment and its redemption from respondents. It cannot be questioned that the averments of the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform matter and involve the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. Such being the case, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. It bears stressing that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Primary jurisdiction means in case of seeming conflict between the jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts, preference is vested with the DAR because of its expertise and experience in agrarian reform matters. (2)Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 is unequivocal that nothing in said section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of [RA] 6657. As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on quasi-judicial powers of the DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160. In view of the foregoing reasons, we rule that the DARAB retains jurisdiction over disputes arising from agrarian reform matters even though the

landowner or respondent interposes the defense of reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to non-agricultural use. On the issue of whether there has been a valid reclassification of the subject lot to industrial land, we rule that respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to buttress their assertion that all the conditions and requirements have been satisfied. Landowners must understand that while RA 7160, the Local Government Code, granted local government units the power to reclassify agricultural land, the stringent requirements set forth in Sec. 30 of said Code must be strictly complied with. Such adherence to the legal prescriptions is found wanting in the case at bar.

Francia v. Meycauayan, G.R. No. 170432, March 24, 2008 Facts The Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a complaint for expropriation against the Francia family in the RTC. The municipality planned to expropriate the property of the Francias, which located at the junction of the North Expressway main road artery and the MacArthur Highway, to establish a common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks. The RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose, and ordered the municipality to deposit with the Court 15% of the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated, to be based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. The RTC also ruled that the municipality may take immediate possession of the property pursuant to the Courts writ of possession only after depositing said amount. The Francias filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, contending that the trial court erred in issuing its order without conducted a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. The CA ruled that the hearing was not necessary because once the expropriator deposited the required amount with the Court, the issuance of writ of possession became ministerial. Issue Whether a hearing is necessary to determine the public purpose of the expropriation prior the issuance of a writ of possession No Held Under Section 19 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code, the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.