The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic Author(s): Michael J.

Sandel Reviewed work(s): Source: Revue de Mtaphysique et de Morale, 93e Anne, No. 1, John Rawls Le Politique (Janvier-Mars 1988), pp. 57-68 Published by: Presses Universitaires de France Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40902940 . Accessed: 15/12/2012 18:09
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The Political Theory oftheProcedural Republic

My aim is to connect a certain debate in political theory with a certaindevelopmentin our political practice.The debate is the one between rights-based liberalismand its communitarian,or civic republican critics.The developmentis the advent in the United States of what " mightbe called the procedural republic ", a public life animated by liberal ethic. In the modern American welfarestate, it the rights-based the liberal dimensions of our traditionhave crowded out the seems, with adverse consequences for the democratic dimensions, republican of the regime. prospectand the legitimacy In this paper, I will firstidentifythe liberal and civic republican theoriesat issue in contemporary political philosophy,and thenemploy thesecontrasting theoriesin an interpretation of the American political to show that we can illuminateour politicondition. I hope ultimately the contendingpolitical theories and selfcal practice by identifying in thatdirection. it This embodies. effort images essay is a preliminary I Liberalsoftentake pride in defending what theyoppose-pornography, forexample, or unpopular views K They say the stateshould not impose on its citizens a preferred way of life,but should leave them as freeas possible to choose theirown values and ends, consistentwith a similar libertyfor others. This commitment to freedom of choice requires liberals constantlyto distinguishbetween permission and praise, be1. In this and the following section, I draw on the introductionto Sandel, ed., Liberalismand Its Critics, Oxford,Basil Blackwell, 1984.

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MichaelJ.Sandel it. It is one thingto allow tweenallowinga practiceand endorsing affirm else to it. something argue, pornography, they it. They this distinction sometimes Conservatives exploit by ignoring that favor would allow abortions those who that abortion, charge the thatthosewho defend of school prayer oppose prayer, opponents of withtheir cause. And in a pattern ofCommunists sympathize rights in our politics,liberalsreplyby invoking familiar higher argument that less,but rather ; it is notthattheydislikepornography principles more. ofchoice,or fair orfreedom valuetoleration, procedures they seemsincreasingly the liberalrejoinder But in contemporary debate, and should toleration unclear. its basis moral Why increasingly fragile, values are also at freedom of choice prevailwhen otherimportant ofmoral theanswer ? Too often stake impliessomeversion " becauseall relativism, is to " legislate theidea thatit is wrong morality morality " ? and whatis filth merely subjective. Who is to say whatis literature and whosevaluesshoulddecide? ". Thatis a valuejudgment, Relativism (" Who usuallyappearslessas a claimthanas a question thatcan also be askedofthevalues is tojudge? "). But it is a question are valuestoo, and freedom and fairness Toleration thatliberals defend. values can be that no the claim be defended and theycan hardly by thatall liberalvaluesby arguing to affirm defended. So it is a mistake is no of liberalism defense The relativist valuesare merely subjective. at all. defense theliberal can be themoralbasisofthehigher principles then, What, has offered twomainalternatives ? Recentpolitical invokes philosophy the otherKantian. The utilitarian -one utilitarian, view, following in thenameof maximizing liberalprinciples defends Stuart John Mill, The state should not impose on its citizensa the generalwelfare. of preferred way life,even fortheirown good,because doingso will that at leastin thelongrun; better reduce thesumofhumanhappiness, even if,on occasion,theyget it wrong. choose forthemselves, people " " The thename", writes whichdeserves Mill, is thatof onlyfreedom to ourowngoodin ourownway,so longas we do notattempt pursuing He adds it ". obtain their efforts to or impede others of theirs, deprive ofabstract does notdependon anynotion thathisargument right, " I only number. the for ofthegreatest on theprinciple regard greatest good must be but it all ethical on as the ultimate ; questions appeal utility interests ofman on thepermanent in thelargest sense, grounded utility " as a progressive being 2. as a general utilitarianism have been raisedagainst Manyobjections the have Some of moral philosophy. doctrine conceptof questioned in are all human that the and principle goods assumption utility, all values to Othershave objectedthatby reducing commensurable.
ch. I. 2. Mill, On Liberty,

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ThePoliticalTheory and desires,utilitarians are unable to admit qualitative preferences unableto distinguish distinctions ofworth, nobledesires from base ones. a But mostrecent debatehas focused on whether utilitarianism offers basis for liberal for individual principles, respect convincing including rights. In one respect,utilitarianism would seem well-suited to liberal does not require purposes. people's values, Maximizing utility judging them.And the willingness to aggregate only aggregating preferences themsuggests a tolerant evena democratic without one. spirit, judging Whenpeoplego to thepolls,we counttheir voteswhatever are. they as itfirst Buttheutilitarian calculusis notalwaysas liberal appears.If the Romans Coliseum to watch the lion devour pack enough cheering the Christian, the collectivepleasureof the Romans will surelyoutthepainoftheChristian, intense itbe. Or ifa bigmajority weigh though a smallreligion abhors and wantsit banned, thebalanceof preferences will favorsuppression, not toleration. Utilitarians sometimes defend individual thatrespecting on the grounds themnow will serve rights in thelongrun.Butthiscalculation is precarious and contingent. utility It hardly secures theliberal notto imposeon somethevaluesof promise will is an inadequateinstrument others.As the majority of liberal itself it fails to secure individual so the utilitarian politics by rights is an inadequate liberal foundation for philosophy principles. The case againstutilitarianism was made mostpowerfully by Kant. He argued thatempirical suchas utility, wereunfit to serve principles, as basis forthe morallaw. A whollyinstrumental defense of freedom and rights not only leaves rights but failsto respectthe vulnerable, inherent of persons.The utilitarian calculus treatspeople as dignity meansto thehappiness ofothers, notas endsin themselves, of worthy 3. respect liberalsextendKant's argument withthe claim that Contemporary utilitarianism failsto takeseriously thedistinction In between persons. above all to maximize thegeneral theutilitarian treats welfare, seeking as a wholeas ifit werea singleperson our many, ; it conflates society diverse desires intoa single ofdesires, and tries to maximize. It is system indifferent to the distribution of satisfactions among persons, except as thismayaffect insofar the overallsum. But thisfailsto respect our and distinctness. It usessomeas meansto thehappiness ofall, plurality and so fails each as an endin himself. to respect Kantiansrejectthe utilitarian of an Modern-day approachin favor ethicthattakesrights In their moreseriously. are so view,certain rights fundamental thateven the generalwelfare cannotoverride them.As
3. See Kant, Groundwork trans. H.J.Paton,New York, ofMorals, oftheMetaphysics and Row,1956,and" On theCommon : ThisMaybe TrueIn Theory, But Harper Saying " in It Does NotApply in Practice, HansReiss, ed.,Kant'sPolitical Writings, Cambridge, 1970. Press, Cambridge University

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Michael J.Sandel " Each Rawlswrites, an inviolability John founded on person possesses ofsociety as a wholecannotoverride... the justicethateventhewelfare secured to not or to the rights byjusticeare bargaining " 4. subject political calculusofsocialinterests needan accountofrights thatdoes notdependon So Kantianliberals More thanthis,theyneed an accountthat utilitarian considerations. ofthegood,that does not does notdependon anyparticular conception thesuperiority ofone wayoflifeoverothers. presuppose Onlya justifiaboutendscould preserve theliberalresolve notto favor cationneutral orto imposeon itscitizens a preferred ends, wayoflife. anyparticular could thisbe ? How is it possibleto But whatsortof justification affirm certainliberties and rights as fundamental without embracing endsoverothers ? without some somevisionofthegood life, endorsing -to affirm It would seem we are back to the relativist predicament ends. liberal without principles embracing anyparticular The solutionproposedby Kantianliberalsis to drawa distinction " and the" " a framework ofbasic the" right between good - between and the conceptions of the good thatpeople may and liberties, rights theframework. It is one thing forthestateto chooseto pursuewithin else to affirm some a fair framework, theyargue,something support defend the to it is to ends. For one right free example, thing particular free their own that be to form so opinionsand people may speech it on thegrounds else to support ownends,butsomething choosetheir than a life worthier that a life of politicaldiscussionis inherently thatfree or on thegrounds withpublicaffairs, unconcerned speechwill defense is availableon the welfare. increase thegeneral Only the first framework. as itdoeson theidealofa neutral Kantian view,resting neutral to a framework Nowthecommitment amongendscan be seen - but is no relativist as a kindofvalue- in thissensetheKantianliberal affirm a of in refusal its to itsvalue consists preferred way life precisely is prior theright ofthegood.For Kantianliberals, or conception then, cannot be to the good, and in two senses. First,individualrights theprinciples of thesakeofthegeneral for sacrificed good,and second, on any particular cannotbe premised theserights justicethatspecify maximize is notthat therights What vision ofthegoodlife. they justifies rather thatthey but the welfare or otherwise thegeneral promote good, and which individuals within fair a framework groupscan comprise for witha similarliberty own valuesand ends,consistent choosetheir others. ethicnotoriously of the rights-based Of course,proponents disagree and about whatpoliticalarrangeare fundamental, about whatrights liberals framework ments the ideal of the neutral requires. Egalitarian liberties civil a scheme of favor and welfare the together state, support
1971 Oxford Press, , p. 3-4. 4. Rawls, A Theory Justice. Oxford, University of

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ThePoliticalTheory
- rightsto welfare,education, with certain social and economic rights healthcare, and so on. Libertarianliberalsdefendthe marketeconomy, and claim that redistributive ; theyfavor policies violate people's rights a scheme of civil libertiescombined with a strict regime of private property rights. But whether egalitarian or libertarian,rights-based liberalism begins with the claim that we are separate, individual and conceptionsof the good, persons,each withour own aims, interests, and seeks a frameworkof rightsthat will enable us to realize our forothers. witha similarliberty capacityas freemoral agents,consistent II Within academic philosophy, the last decade or so has seen the ethicover the utilitarian ascendance of the rights-based one, due in large part to the influence of John Rawls' importantwork, A Theory of Justice.In the debate between utilitarianand rights-based theories,the The ethic has come to prevail. legal philosopher H.L.A. rights-based " Hart recently describedthe shiftfrom the old faiththat some formof " utilitarianism must capture the essence of political morality to the fcfc must lie witha doctrineof basic human rights, new faiththat the truth of individuals... Whereas specificbasic libertiesand interests protecting of many philosophers not so long ago greatenergyand much ingenuity such were devoted to makingsome formof utilitarianism work,latterly have been devoted to the articulationof theories energiesand ingenuity " ofbasic rights 5. But in philosophyas in life,the new faithbecomes the old orthodoxy beforelong. Even as it has come to prevail over its utilitarianrival,the ethic has recentlyfaced a growingchallenge froma differrights-based ent direction,froma view that gives fullerexpression to the claims of citizenshipand communitythan the liberal vision allows. Recalling the of Hegel against Kant, the communitariancriticsof modern arguments of the right over the good, liberalismquestion the claim forthe priority it embodies. Following and the pictureof the freely individual choosing Aristotle,the y argue that we cannot justify political arrangements to common purposes and ends, and that we cannot withoutreference conceive our personhood withoutreference to our role as citizens,and in a common life. as participants This debate reflects two contrasting picturesof the self. The rightsbased ethic,and the conception of the person it embodies, were shaped in large part in the encounter with utilitarianism.Where utilitarians conflateour many desires into a single systemof desire, Kantians insist
5. Hart, "Between Utilityand Rights", in Alan Ryan, ed.. The Idea of Freedom, OxfordUniversity Oxford, Press, 1979, p. 77.

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MichaelJ.Sandel on the separateness of persons.Wherethe utilitarian self is simply defined as the sum of its desires, the Kantianselfis a choosingself, of the desiresand ends it may have at any moment. As independent " The selfis Rawlswrites, to the ends which are affirmed prior by it; even a dominant end mustbe chosen from numerous among possi" 6. bilities The priority oftheselfoveritsendsmeansI am never defined by my aims and attachments, but alwayscapable of standing back to survey and assessand possibly to revise them. This is whatitmeansto be a free and independent self, capableofchoice.Andthisis thevisionoftheself in theidealofthestate thatfinds as a neutral framework. On expression therights-based it is we because are ethic, precisely separate, essentially selvesthatwe need a neutral a framework of independent framework, thatrefuses to chooseamongcompeting and ends.Ifthe rights purposes self is prior theright to itsends, then must be prior to thegood. criticsof rights-based Communitarian liberalismsay we cannot in this way, as bearersof selves conceiveourselvesas independent detached from our aimsand attachments. wholly Theysay thatcertain ofourrolesare partly constitutive ofthepersons we are- as citizens ofa members a a if or of or of cause. we But movement, partisans country, are partly defined the communities we then we be must also inhabit, by in the purposes and ends characteristic of thosecommuniimplicated " ties.As AlasdairMaclntyre is good forme has to be the writes, what one who inhabits theseroles" 7. Open-ended it be, the goodfor though in the story of mylifeis alwaysembedded of thosecommunities story from whichI derivemy identitywhether or city,people or family these makea orcause.On thecommunitarian stories nation, view, party moraldifference, not onlya psychological us in the one. They situate andgiveourlivestheir moralparticularity. world, What is at stakeforpoliticsin the debatebetweenunencumbered selvesand situated ones? Whatare the practical differences a between and a politics of rights of thecommongood? On some issues, politics thetwotheories forsimilar policies. mayproducedifferent arguments For example, thecivilrights be justified movement ofthe 1960'smight in thenameofhuman and by and respect for persons, byliberals dignity in the name of recognizing communitarians the full membership of fellow citizens the life the excluded from common of nation. wrongly in hopesof equipAnd whereliberals support publiceducation might to becomeautonomous individuals, capable of choosing pingstudents theirown ends and pursuing themeffectively, communitarians might to become supportpublic educationin hopes of equippingstudents
6. Rawls, A TheoryofJustice, p. 560. 7. MAClNTYRE, After Virtue,Notre Dame, Universityot Notre Dame Press, 1981, 205. p.

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The Political Theory to public delibemeaningfully good citizens, capable of contributing rationsand pursuits. On other issues, the two ethics might lead to different policies. Communitarianswould be more likelythan liberals to allow a town to offends ban pornographicbookstores,on the groundsthat pornography its way of lifeand the values thatsustain it. But a politics of civic virtue does not always part company with liberalismin favorof conservative policies. For example, communitarianswould be more willing than liberals to see states enact laws regulatingplant some rights-oriented closings, to protect their communities from the disruptive effectsof capital mobilityand sudden industrialchange. More generally,where as and entitlements the expansion of individual rights the liberalregards is the communitarian troubled and moral political progress, unqualified by the tendencyof liberal programsto displace politics fromsmaller formsof association to more comprehensive ones. Where libertarian liberalsdefendthe privateeconomy and egalitarianliberals defendthe welfarestate,communitariansworryabout the concentrationof power in both the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state, and the erosion of those intermediateformsof communitythat have at times sustaineda more vital public life. Liberals oftenargue thata politics of the common good, drawingas it muston particularloyalties,obligations,and traditions, opens the way to prejudice and intolerance. The modern nation-state is not the of modern life Athenian polis, they point out ; the scale and diversity have rendered the Aristotelean political ethic nostalgic at best and dangerous at worst.Any attemptto govern by a vision of the good is temptations. likelyto lead to a slipperyslope of totalitarian Communitariansreply that intoleranceflourishesmost where forms traditions undone. In our day, the of lifeare dislocated,rootsunsettled, less the convictions of confidently has from totalitarian impulse sprung situated selves than fromthe confusionsof atomized, dislocated, frustratedselves, at sea in a world where common meaningshave lost their " force.As Hannah Arendt has written, What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not but the factthatthe worldbetweenthem has lost its power to primarily, " to relate and to separate them 8. Insofaras our gatherthem together, our sense of common involvementdiminished, public lifehas withered, we lie vulnerable to the mass politics of totalitarian solutions. So responds the partyof the common good to the party of rights.If the party of the common good is right,our most pressing moral and political project is to revitalize those civic republican possibilities but fadingin our time. implicitin our tradition
8. Arendt, The Human Condition, of Chicago Press, 1958, Chicago, University p. 52-53.

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Michael J. Sandel III How mightthe contrastbetween the liberal and communitarian,or civic republican theorieswe have been consideringhelp illuminateour presentpolitical condition? We mightbegin by locatingthese theories in the political historyof the American republic. Both the liberal and the republican conceptions have been present throughout,but in measure, with shiftingimportance. Broadly speaking, the differing to the republicanstrandwas most evidentfromthe time of the founding late 19th century; by the mid- to late -20th century,the liberal to predominate,graduallycrowdingout conception came increasingly republican dimensions. I shall try in this section to identifythree moments in the transitionfromthe republican to the liberal constitutional order: l)the civic republic, 2) the national republic, 3) the proceduralrepublic.

/. Civic Republic The ideological originsof American politics is the subject of lively and voluminous debate among intellectualhistorians ; some emphasize the Lockean liberal sources of American political thought,others the civic republican influences9. But beyond the question of who influencedthe founders'thoughtis the further question of what kind of political life they actually lived. It is clear that the assumptions embodied in the practice of 18th centuryAmerican politics, the ideas " and institutions that togetherconstitutethe civic republic", differ from those ofthe modernliberalpolitical orderin several respects.First, liberty in the civic republic was defined, not in opposition to might democracy,as an individual'sguaranteeagainstwhat the majority and will, but as a functionof democracy, of democratic institutions civil liberty referred not to a set of dispersedpower. In the 18thcentury, in the sense of immunities, as in the modern " rightto personal rights, " in the government ". privacy", but, in Hamilton's words, to a share " was public, or political liberty, to Civil liberty equivalent democracy
9. For examples of the liberal view, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in New York, Harcourt Brace, 1955, and more recently, Isaac Kramnick, America, " Republican Revisionism Revisited", American Historical Review,87 (1982), and John Diggins, The Lost Soul ofAmericanPolitics,New York, Basic Books, 1984. For examples of the republican view, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Press, 1967, Gordon Wood, The Creation of Revolution, Cambridge,Harvard University theAmericanRepublic,New York, Norton, 1969, and J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian PrincetonUniversity Moment,Princeton, Press, 1975.

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The Political Theory or government by the people themselves". It was "not primarilyindi" ofbodies politic,or States 10. vidual, but the freedom the terms of relation between the individual and the nation Second, mediatedby decentralized werenot directand unmediated,but indirect, forms of political association, participation, and allegiance. As " of Laurence Tribe points out, it was largelythroughthe preservation that the rightsof persons boundaries between and among institutions " were to be secured ! ] . Perhaps the most vivid constitutional expression of this fact is that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states,and was not understoodto create individual immunitiesfromall action. When Madison proposed, in 1789, a constitutional government " the equal rightsof amendmentprovidingthat no State shall infringe the nor the freedom of or of of conscience, speech press,nor of the right trialby jury in criminalcases ", the liberal, rights-based ethic found its clearest early expression. But Madison's proposal was rejected by the Senate, and did not succeed until the 14th Amendment was passed some 79 yearslater. Finally, the early republic was a place where the possibilityof civic virtue was a live concern. Some saw civic virtue as essential to the of liberty ; othersdespaired of virtue,and soughtto design preservation institutions that could functionwithoutit l2. But as Tocqueville found in his visitto the New England townships,public lifefunctioned in part as an education in citizenship: " Town meetingsare to libertywhat schools are to science ; theybringit withinthe people's reach, primary theyteach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establisha freegovernment, but withoutmunicipal institutions it cannot have the " spiritof liberty 13. 2. National Republic The transition to the national, and ultimately, the procedural republic,begins to unfoldfromthe end of the Civil War to the turnof the centuryI4. As national marketsand large-scaleenterprise displaced a decentralizedeconomy, the decentralizedpolitical formsof the early republic became outmoded as well. If democracy was to survive, the concentrationof economic power would have to be met by a similar concentrationof political power. But the Progressivesunderstood,or
10. Wood, The CreationoftheAmericanRepublic,p. 24, 6 1. 11. Tribe, AmericanConstitutional Law, Minela, The Foundation Press, 1978, p. 2-3. 12. See, for example, Madison, Federalist, n5|, and Herbert Storing, What the AntiFederalists WereFor, Chicago, University ofChicago Press, 1981, ch. 3. 13. Tocqueville, Democracy in America,vol. I, ch. 5. 14. In this and the followingsection, I have drawn fromSandel, "The Procedural Republic and the UnencumberedSelf", Political Theory,12 (1984).

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Michael J. Sandel some of themdid, thatthe success of democracyrequiredmore than the centralizationof government ; it also required the nationalization of formof political communityhad to be recaston a politics.The primary national scale. For HerbertCroly,writing in 1909, the " nationalizingof American political, economic, and social life" was " an essentially formative and enlightening political transformation ". We would become more of a democracyonly as we became " more of a nation... in and in spirit" 15. ideas, in institutions, This nationalizingproject would be consummated in the New Deal, but forthe democratictraditionin America, the embrace of the nation was a decisive departure.From Jefferson to the populists,the partyof democracy in American political debate had been, roughlyspeaking, the partyof the provinces,of decentralizedpower, of small-townand small-scale America. And against them had stood the party of the nation- first thenWhigs,thenthe Republicans of Lincoln Federalists, a partythat spoke for the consolidation of the union. It was thus the historicachievement of the New Deal to unite, in a single party and what Samuel Beer has called " liberalism and the political program, " national idea 16. What mattersforour purpose is that,in the 20th century,liberalism made its peace with concentratedpower. But it was understoodat the startthat the terms of this peace required a strongsense of national the extendedinvolvecommunity, morallyand politicallyto underwrite mentsof a modernindustrial order.If a virtuousrepublicof small-scale, a national republic democraticcommunitieswas no longera possibility, seemed democracy'snextbest hope. This was still,in principleat least, a politics of the common good. It looked to the nation, not as a neutral but ratheras a formative framework forthe play of competinginterests, community,concerned to shape a common life suited to the scale of modernsocial and economic forms. But by the mid - or late - 20th century, the national republic had run its course. Except forextraordinary moments,such as war, the nation proved too vast a scale across which to cultivate the shared selfor constitutunderstandings necessaryto communityin the formative, ive sense. And yet,given the scale of economic and political life,there seemed no turningback. If so extended a republic could not sustain a ethic would sortof legitimating politicsof the common good, a different have to be found. And so the gradual shift,in our practices and froma public philosophy of common purposes to one of institutions, fairprocedures, from the national republicto the proceduralrepublic.
15. Croly, The Promise of American Life, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, D. 270-273. 16. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea", The Public Interest, Fall 1966, p. 70-82.

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ThePoliticalTheory 3. Procedural Republic. the triumph of a liberalpublic The procedural republicrepresents with adverse a over consequencesfor republicanone, philosophy It reverses the the of and the democratic regime. politics legitimacy and democracy, therelation between transforms terms ofrelation liberty and tendsto undercut the kindof and nation-state, of the individual in theprocedural on whichit nonetheless depends. Liberty community ofdemocracy butin opposition to is defined, notas a function republic whatthemajority as an individual's guarantee against might democracy, whererights are will. I am freeinsofar as I am the bearerof rights, the the 17. Unlike the of modern version trumps liberty earlyrepublic, - concentrated - in facteven requires power.This has at least permits as I have a with the of Insofar to do universalizing logic rights. partly minimum whether free or a its to income, speech provision right, be assured be left oflocal preferences butmust at cannot to thevagaries themostcomprehensive levelof politicalassociation. It cannotbe one in New Yorkand another in Alabama.As rights and entitlements thing is therefore from smaller forms ofassociation displaced expand, politics - in our case,thenation.And and relocated at themostuniversal from evenas politics flows to thenation, democratic powershifts awayfrom as and institutions toward insti(such political parties), legislatures insulated tutions to be from democratic and hence pressures, designed better individual the equippedto dispenseand defend rights (notably and bureaucracy). judiciary These institutional thesense developments maybeginto accountfor ofpowerlessness that thewelfare statefailsto address and in someways doubtless clue to our condition deepens.But it seemsto me a further can be locatedin thevisionoftheunencumbered selfthatanimates the liberalethic.It is a striking feature of the welfare statethatit offers a of individual and demands its citizens a also of powerful promise rights, measure ofmutual Buttheself-image that attends the high engagement. theengagement. As bearers cannotsustain ofrights, whererights rights are trumps, we think of ourselves as freely individual selves, choosing, unbound antecedent to rights, or to the agreements we by obligations make.And yet, as citizens oftheprocedural thatsecures these republic we find in a formidable ourselves of implicated rights, willy-nilly array and we did not choose and dependencies expectations increasingly reject.

fck 17. See RonaldDworkin, Liberalism ", in Stuart ed.. Publicand Private Hampshire, 1978,p. 136. Press, Morality, Cambridge, Cambridge University

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Michael J. Sandel In our public life,we are more entangled, but less attached,than ever before.It is as thoughthe unencumberedselfpresupposedby the liberal ethic had begun to come true -less liberated than disempowered, entangled in a networkof obligations and involvementsunassociated with any act of will, and yet unmediated by those common identifithatwould make themtolerable.As cations or expansive self-definitions the scale of social and political organizationhas become more comprehensive,the termsof our collective identityhave become more fragmented, and the forms of political life have outrun the common purposesneeded to sustainthem. Michael J.Sandel Harvard University

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