Question for Steinberg

• One criticism of the concept of a Director of National Intelligence is that whoever

held the position would end up a "czar" without power. You endorse the creation of a
DNI. How would you ensure the DNI had sufficient authorities to carry out the
responsibilities of the office?

• You argue that the country needs "a single individual with responsibility (and
accountability) for all intelligence related to the counter-terrorism mission." Are you
suggesting that the DNI should "own" all of the Department of Defense intelligence
assets and all of the Department of Homeland Security intelligence assets? What
would this mean for the personnel of the military and of the entities such as the Secret
Service or Coast Guard within DHS? How would disputes between the DNI and the
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Homeland Security be resolved?

• Would you give the DNI budget authority over all intelligence agencies? Would you
give the DNI the authority to consolidate and standardize the personnel systems
involving intelligence personnel?

• You suggest a number of changes in the architecture of the intelligence community,

the FBI, and the Executive Office of the President in order to meet the challenges of
the terrorist threat. Which of your recommendations do you consider to be essential?
Can essential reforms be achieved without creating a DNI?
r

PANEL: Warning of Transnational Threats

• What are the essential methods or principles that have been developed over the years
for analyzing and preparing warnings of a surprise attack?

• Before 9/11, were these methods or principles properly applied to the danger of a
catastrophic terrorist attack?

• What is right and wrong with the current system of warning? What is—and should
be—the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and
Defense, and the National Security Adviser?
s
Whmsjn^£harge qfwarning of terrorist attacks against theJLJnited
/"National Intelligence Council? The Directorate of Intelligence in the CIA? The
i Department of Defense? The CIA Counterterrorism Center? The Directorate of
i Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection in the Department of Homeland
V,Security? Or the jecently established Terrorism Threat Integration Center? rWKcT
should be in charge? ~ "

• Has the Congress met its responsibility in establishing priorities, providing resources
and providing oversight of the Intelligence Community? What changes in its role do
you recommend?
*- —
v
• What needs to be done to improve our ability as a government to provide better
warning?

Wliu shuuld be in st-

« --• »
• Some officials outside the intelligence community have complain© .e past that '" X
/'.. «*•'-•
there is'too low a threshold,for warning of.p'ossible.tefforist attacks o you .believe
this is a problem an&-ifso, how should ifbe^sorved? /.,-

• What entities or mechanisms currently exist within the federal government that allow
warning to be connected to timely and effective responses to the warning? How can
these be strengthened?

Ms. McCarthy wrote in ? 1998 piprrnmnr g that "the likelihood of a cataclysmic

warning failure is growing." Do you believe that the attacks of 9/11 were "a
cataclysmic warning failure?"
More warning questions

• How many entities within the intelligence community should have some responsibility for warning of
terrorist attacks? What is the appropriate role with respect to warning of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center? The Counterterrorist Center? The National Intelligence Council?

• Concern has been expressed by some in the past that there is too low a threshold for warning of
possible terrorist attacks, especially when the warning does not contain specific or actionable
intelligence. How can the intelligence community ensure that those who receive warnings do not suffer
warning fatigue?
Intelligence and National Security Policy

• What is your assessment of how well the government is coordinating the conduct of
efforts against terrorism and the relevant work of the intelligence community?

• Are the attacks of September 11 evidence of systemic problems with the leadership,
organization, performance or funding of the Intelligence Community? What changes
in the Intelligence Community do you recommend?

• The Congressional Joint Inquiry recommended the establishment of a Director of

National Intelligence with direct authority over the national intelligence agencies of
the government. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this proposal? Do you
support it or not?

Should the Director of Central Intelligence have the same management authorities as
the heads of all other large government departments and agencies: i.e., hire and fire
authority, the authority to execute an appropriation, and the authority to reallocate
funds to higher priorities among intelligence capabilities?

• Can the DCI fulfill his role as the President's principal advisor on intelligence if
agencies with lead responsibility for imagery intelligence, signals intelligence,
foreign weapons intelligence, and collection system acquisition capabilities (NIMA,
NSA, DIA and NRO respectively) are part of the Department of Defense?

• What is the impact of such an organizational structure on national, strategic priorities

such as global terrorism?

• What is the impact of such an organizational structure on the provision of intelligence

to a major new customer, the Department of Homeland Security?

• Has the Congress met its responsibility in establishing priorities, providing resources
and providing oversight of the Intelligence Community? What changes in its role do
you recommend?
• Considerable attention has been paid over the last decade to the relationship between
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. What in your view
is the optimum relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense?

• The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security creates a new important

customer for intelligence. What should be the relationship between the head of the
U.S. intelligence community and the Secretary of Homeland Security?

• In the past, we have drawn lines between foreign and domestic intelligence. It is
now recognized that the gap between foreign and domestic intelligence must be
closed in order to prevent international terrorist attacks. Is the creation of a director
of national intelligence the best way to close that gap? Should there be one individual
with responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligence related to
counterterrorism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this proposal?

At any given time, the resources that can be devoted to the collection, analysis and
dissemination of intelligence are finite. What are the current mechanisms by which a
director of central intelligence can maximize the resources devoted to a top priority
issue, such as the war on terrorism? Are these tools sufficient?
 UNCLASSIFIED / COMMISSION SENS

Background Information Concerning A Director

6x
The question of whether to strengthen the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) -
including whether to create a DNI - is intertwined with tw^issues that have perpetually faced
theJntelligence
SOIaouZiS--
Community J ^
(1C):
' -
«L^, effectivene
T-he-DCI simultaneously serves as the CIA director, btttdoco ouch "dual-hatting" inecoaoc \e IC's

2. The 1C has two main customers: (1) "national,"^.^ythe President and the National
Security Council; and (2) the Department of Defense (DoD), to support military*^-L&cuj *
operations. How much control should DoD have over the 1C?

The National Security Act of 1947 sets forth the DCI's authority and responsibility.
The CIA is the only agency over which the DCI has authority that resembles plenary control.
The National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
are part of DoD. Some of the DCI's authorities include:
• The DCI develops the budgets for CIA, NSA, and NIMA. However, the budgets are
appropriated to DoD, not the DCI. Moreover, the DCI lacks control over "execution,"
meaning how NSA and NIMA actually use their appropriations.
• The DCI may reprogram funds appropriated to NSA and NIMA only if the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef) does not object.
• The SecDef consults with the DCI on appointments to head NSA and NIMA, but the
DCI's consent is not required for the SecDef to make recommendations to the President.

The DCI has a Deputy DCI (DDCI) responsible for the CIA. The DCI also has a
DDCI for Community Management, an Assistant DCI (ADCI) for Collection, and an ADCI
for Analysis & Production to manage the ir^TT^fe' i '" W Q » ^^-^-P

C-tions for Strenthening the DCI

1 . Without creating a DM, thus keeping the DCI as director of the 1C and of CIA:
a) Appoint an individual as DCI who takes an expansive view of the DCI's authority over
NSA and NIMA.
b) Buttress the DCI's prestige by giving the IC's budget appropriation directly to the DCI
rather than to DoD.
c) Give the DCI "budget-execution" authority over NSA and NIMA.

2. Creating a DNI by separating the position of DNI from CIA director, but keeping NSA
and NIMA within DoD:
a) Give the DNI only the same power that the DCI currently has over the 1C.
b) Give the IC's budget appropriation directly to the DNI rather than to DoD.
c) Give the DNI "budget-execution" authority over NSA and NIMA.
<i;reci\, M
Creat^ a DNI and transfer) NSA and NIMA from DoD to the DNIs
a) Have DoD maintain some authority over NSA and NIMA, such as by requiring the
DNI to obtain DoD consent for changes to NSA and NIMA's structure and missions.
b) Create a Department of National Intelligence, giving the Secretary of National
Intelligence plenary authority over NSA and NIMA; DoD becomes a customer^

UNCLASSIFIED / COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Additional questions for Deutch and Schlesinger

• Considerable attention has been paid over the last decade to the relationship between the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. What in your view is the optimum relationship
between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense?

• The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security creates a new important customer for
intelligence. What should be the relationship between the head of the U.S. intelligence community and
the Secretary of Homeland Security?

• In the past, we have drawn lines between foreign and domestic intelligence. It is now recognized that
the gap between foreign and domestic intelligence must be closed in order to prevent international
terrorist attacks. Is the creation of a director of national intelligence the best way to close that gap?
Should there be one individual with responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligence related to
counterterrorism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this proposal?

• At any given time, the resources that can be devoted to the collection, analysis and dissemination of
intelligence are finite. What are the current mechanisms by which a director of central intelligence can
maximize the resources devoted to a top priority issue, such as the war on terrorism? Are these tools
sufficient?