al-Islm wa Usl al-Hukm A Historical Justification of Egyptian Nationalism

Abstract In Islam and the Sources of Authority, Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq put forward one of the earliest Islamic defenses of secular governments. The work is well-known today, but there is still significant disagreement about the sources of Abd al-Raziqs reasoning. His work, for example, includes radical revisionist narratives of the caliphates origins. Some authors have suggested that these narratives were drawn more from non-Muslim writers on Islam, while others have insisted that they were not at all rooted in Western thought, but rather, sit firmly within the dictates of Islams sacred texts. This paper examines two of the institutions that shaped Abd al-Raziqs historical reasoning, namely, Egyptian nationalist parties and the Egyptian University. Abd al-Raziqs aim in writing Islam and the Sources of Authority, this paper argues, was to defend the secular brand of nationalism promoted by Egypts Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Writing at a time when high religious sentiment challenged the propriety of secular nationalism, Abd al-Raziq chose to engage these religious sentiments with religious arguments, buttressed by what he called scientific research. This paper demonstrates that Abd al-Raziq understood his historical arguments as scientific, insofar as they employed methods of European historical research. These were methods that Abd al-Raziq first learned while studying the history of Arabic literature under Carlo Nallino at the Egyptian University. Abd al-Raziqs historical narratives were, in fact, drawn from Islamic sources, and did not rely on the findings of European researchers. This paper argues, however, that his method of critically examining and assessing these sources was broadly, and self-consciously, shaped by European traditions of historical scholarship.

1. Introduction In May of 1925, Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq published his notorious contribution to Islamic political thought, Islam and the Sources of Authority. A promising young scholar with an alamiyya degree from Cairos al-Azhar madrasa, Shaykh Ali rejected the traditional Sunni belief that the caliphate institution was an integral part of Islam. His work drew intense criticism. For months Egyptians could read scathing reviews of Abd al-Raziqs work in the papers. Numerous books were written to refute him. Abd al-Raziq did find some defenders, but they acted in defense of Egyptians freedom of expression. No one defended his position on religious grounds. 1 Abd al-Raziqs colleagues at al-Azhar famously denounced his work. In a high profile court
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Meir Hatina. The Call to Separate Religion and State in Modern Egypt. Middle Eastern Studies 36.1: 39.

hearing, al-Azhars High Council of Ulema decided that he had departed from basic theological creeds that no Islamic scholar could rightfully give to doubt. They revoked his alamiyya degree on August 12, 1925, ending his tenure as a shari'a court judge. 2 Since the publication of Islam and the Sources of Authority, numerous scholars have suggested that the controversy it provoked was partly caused by the unorthodox research methods that Abd al-Raziq applied to the question of the caliphate. Henri Lammens, the first orientalist to examine Abd al-Raziqs work, asserted that with Sheikh Ali Abd al-Raziqs book, historical criticism burst into the conservative circles of Islam. 3 Jacques Berque claimed that Abd alRaziqs method of exposition, 4 betrayed a change in the realm of al-Azhar. 5 Abd al-Raziqs critics, Berque alleged, were the enemies of secular history. 6 Most recently, John Kelsay has suggested that one reason for the Abd al-Raziq controversy was that Abd al-Raziqs exploration of the sources went further than the al-Azhar scholars were prepared to go. 7 Each of these statements suggest that Abd al-Raziqs work drew criticism not just for the conclusions it reached, but also for the way in which Abd al-Raziq justified themspecifically the way he read and assessed classical sources of the Islamic tradition. Lammens and Berque propose that his reasoning was informed by the European discipline of historical criticism. Following this suggestion, this paper examines Abd al-Raziqs historical reasoning in Islam and the Sources of Authority. It demonstrates that Abd al-Raziq used European methods of historical research, which he described as scientific. Abd al-Raziq received training in European historical scholarship while attending Carlo Nallinos lectures on the history of Arabic literature at the Egyptian university in 1910. There, he learned that literary history was a great service to the

For al-Azhars decision, see Reply of the High Council of Ulema to the book Islam and the Sources of Authority. Henri Lammens. Islam: Beliefs and Institutions, 223. Indeed, citing the publication of Taha Husayns Fi al-shir alJahili in 1926, Lammens opined that the condemnation of the al-Azhar tribunal seems unlikely to stop the march of ideas advanced by the Egyptian alim [Abd al-Raziq] (223). 4 Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 360. 5 Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 359. 6 Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 360. 7 John Kelsay. See his Arguing the Just War in Islam, 85.
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nation, as the preservation of a national literature strengthened the nations unity. He was also shown a historical-critical approach to literature, which took literary works as products and producers of an underlying historical reality. Abd al-Raziq used his historical training to challenge popular narratives of the caliphates origins, and to put forward a counter-narrative reinforced by the authority of science. His aim in this effort was to justify the secular concept of national unity promoted by Egypts Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Islam and the Sources of Authority, this paper suggests, is a predecessor to works of the 1930s, like Muhammad Husayn Haykals Hayt Muhammad and Taha Husayns Al Hmish al-Sra, which attempted to promote the values of

Egypts liberal intellectuals through the medium of Islamic literature.

2. Abd al-Raziqs Scientific Research in Islam and the Sources of Authority Arguing that Abd al-Raziqs reasoning was informed by European scholarship may seem to merely repeat and reinforce previous interpretations of Islam and the Sources of Authority. This interpretation was largely based on the heated responses of Abd al-Raziqs critics. For example, in his review of Islam and the Sources of Authority, Rashid Rida ranked Abd al-Raziq among the Europeanized apostates, who eagerly attend to making the government of Egypt an irreligious government like the government of Ankara. 8 Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit, likewise, faulted Abd al-Raziq for citing orientalists like T.W. Arnold in his work. The consensus of Muslims, he argued, is that the claim of a non-Muslim, about matters pertaining to the religion of Islam, is unacceptableespecially when pertaining to the caliphate. 9 In a similarly disapproving tone, Shaykh Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn suggested that Abd al-Raziqs reliance upon scholars who lack training in the sharia sciences is nothing but an obstacle in the path of research that distracts the nave and leads them to hesitation and suspicion. 10

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Rashid Rida, al-Manr, 26:101. Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit, Haqqat al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm, 43. 10 Quoted in Souad T. Ali, A Religion, Not a State, 106.

Given the criticisms of Abd al-Raziqs contemporaries, Albert Hourani inferred that his work provoked intense controversy mainly because it proposed a revisionist historical theory that was drawn more from non-Muslim writers on Islam. 11 Recently, Souad T. Ali has correctly argued that this is an inaccurate description of Islam and the Sources of Authority. 12 In fact Abd al-Raziq cited only a few European authors in his work, and these sparse citations played no significant role in his arguments. 13 For example, after arguing that the Quran offers no clear endorsement of the caliphate, Abd al-Raziq cited T. W. Arnold, writing, if the reader desires to study this subject further, he should consult The Caliphate, by Sir Thomas Arnold, the well-known authority. 14 Clearly, Abd al-Raziq approved of Arnolds scholarship, yet this reference held little weight in his argument. Indeed, prior to this citation, Abd al-Raziq had explained that Islamic scholars already concur that the Quran does not provide evidence for the purported duty to establish a Caliph. The impartial ulema, as well as the bureaucratic ones, have been unable to find in the Quran any argument for their view. So they have abandoned it in favor of what we have seen, claiming consensus [ ] , and resorting to analogical syllogisms and the postulates of reason. 15 Abd al-Raziq supported this claim by citing scholars like Adud al-Din al-Idji (680/1281756/1355), who asserted that the consensus judgment of scholars regarding the necessity of establishing a caliph rested upon no further authority. In other words, Abd al-Raziqs claim that
Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 189. Souad T. Ali, A Religion, Not a State, 106. 13 In all, Abd al-Raziq cited 3 non-Muslim works: 1) Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Students History of Philosophy (11); Thomas Arnolds, The Caliphate (15, 30); and The Gospel of Matthew, (49). Arnolds work was cited twice. The second citation was given as further reading to substantiate Abd al-Raziqs claim that, during the Ottoman caliphate, jealousy and love of power led to much unnecessary bloodshed between Muslims (30). Beyond these citations, Abd al-Raziq, referred to the findings of political scientists, at a few points in his work, although he never cited these claims. It appears that Abd al-Raziq referred to British political scientists in these passages, since at one point, he uses English to mention their key concepts (70). 14 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 15. ). Abd al-Raziq may have been introduced to Arnold at some point. At the very least, his admiration for Arnolds work ran deep, as Abd alRaziq sent him a copy of Islam and the Sources of Authority upon its publication. (see Anita Burdett. Letter from T.W. Arnold to Wakely, in volume II of Islamic Movements in the Arab World 1913-1966, 35-36). 15 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 14. For the most part, I follow C. C. Adams translation of Islam and the Sources of Authority, although I have modified it in places. For this translation, see C. C. Adams 1928.
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the caliphate lacked clear Quranic support was not new, nor was it an idea imported from European scholarship. Citing T. W. Arnolds work may have raised eyebrows, but it did not support any innovative or controversial claims that could not find support within classic works of Islamic scholarship. More importantly, Abd al-Raziqs historical narrative of the caliphates origins showed little similarity to Arnolds. Arnold, with some reservations, endorsed traditional Sunni narratives, according to which the first four Caliphs of Islam inherited the Prophets political office by means of election. Following these narratives, Arnold also believed that the Umayyads departed from the principle of election, and introduced the unsanctioned principle of hereditary succession. 16 Abd al-Raziq, as we will see, argued that the Prophet Muhammad never held political authority, and that there was, therefore, no political office for the first caliph to inherit. Furthermore, he argued that each caliph gained his position purely by means of force and the sword, 17 not by election. Given the wide discrepancy between Arnold and Abd al-Raziqs historical narratives, it can hardly be argued that the latter was drawn from the former. Beyond Arnold, there are very few citations of European works in Islam and the Sources of Authority. While Abd al-Raziqs reasoning is innovative in important ways, to be discussed below, he never relied upon explicit findings of European scholarship to justify his innovations. Given the paucity of references to European authorities in Abd al-Raziqs work, we can see why Hamid Enayat, despite the testimony of Abd al-Raziqs critics, claimed that Abd al-Raziqs strong point was that his work did not indicate much absorption of Western thought. 18 More recently, and more resolutely, Souad T. Ali has asserted that his arguments are not at all rooted in Western thought, but rather, sit firmly within the dictates of Islams sacred texts. 19 These descriptions of Islam and the Sources of Authority are partly true, but largely misleading. Can we

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T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate, 22. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92. 18 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, 62. 19 Souad T. Ali, A Religion, Not a State, 70.

really imagine that an Islamic justification of political secularism, 20 put forward in the Cairene milieu of 1925, was not at all rooted in Western thought? This would mean that Abd al-Raziq just happened to independently arrive at political conclusions that had been endorsed by Western European intellectuals since the 17th century. While theoretically possible, this scenario is highly improbable. In Abd al-Raziqs time, Egyptian society itself was rooted in Western thought, in the form of the British occupation. Ali overlooks this obvious environmental influence, I believe, because she aims to prove that Muslims should endorse Abd al-Raziqs conclusions. That is why she asserts that his arguments sit firmly within the dictates of Islams sacred texts. Setting the propriety of her theological judgments aside, it is important to note that Alis defense of Abd alRaziq assumes the same false dichotomy put forward by Abd al-Raziqs critics: namely, that beliefs and practices must be either Western or Islamic. More importantly, she makes the false assumption that the sacred texts of Islam contain dictates. Texts, of course, do not make dictates or claims; people do. It is the reader who takes a text to make a certain claim, which she may then accept or reject. By asserting that Abd al-Raziq merely expressed the claims made in sacred texts, Ali buries the question of how Abd al-Raziq read these texts, and why he took them to make certain claims. Sections 3 and 4 take up these questions, and argue that Abd al-Raziqs read Islams classic sources by the lights of Egyptian nationalism and European historicism. The most important reason for examining Abd al-Raziqs method of reading Islams sacred texts is that he was explicit about the novelty of his approach. Indeed, Abd al-Raziq asserted that a certain section of his book should not be taken as a traditional work of Islamic scholarship: This is an investigation that lies outside of the field of religious creeds [ ] that the ulema are accustomed to investigating, and concerning which they have arrived at a settled opinion; it pertains more strictly to the department of scientific research [ ] than it does to the department of religion [ ] . 21
This is the subtitle of Alis book-- A Religion, Not a State: Ali Abd al-Raziqs Islamic justification of Political Secularism. 21 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 49.
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By labeling his research as scientific rather than religious, Abd al-Raziq suggested that he was following a method of research distinct from the ones used in the theological investigations of the ulema. Unfortunately, Abd al-Raziq never made his research methodology explicit. It is significant, however, that Abd al-Raziq did not claim that his entire work was scientific. The above-cited passage appears in the second section of his three-part work, where Abd al-Raziq begins his historical examination of the origins of the caliphate institution. This tells us that Abd al-Raziq believed his historical inquiry constituted scientific research, and was a departure from Islamic traditions of scholarship. Section 5 will examine Abd al-Raziqs historical argument in detail. This argument is central to Islam and the Sources of Authority. Indeed, it comprises two thirds of the work. Islam and the Sources of Authority is a short work103 pagessubdivided into three sections. In the first section, The Caliphate and Islam, Abd al-Raziq demonstrated that the caliphate finds support neither in the sources of the sharia, nor the claim of reason. In the following section, Government and Islam, Abd al-Raziq argued that the Prophet never held political authority over the umma. This argument discredited the traditional claim that the caliph succeeded the Prophet in political leadership. It was followed by the concluding section, The Caliphate and Government in History, where Abd al-Raziq proposed that Abu Bakrs authority rested upon military force, rather than the consensual endorsement of Muslims. 22 Abu Bakr used his armies to consolidate the first state in Islamic civilizationan institution that was created, rather than inherited, and departed from the Prophets example in important ways. Although Abd al-Raziq divided his work into three parts, he believed himself to be making two arguments. 23 The first argument, contained in section I, concluded that the caliphate

Abu Bakr was the first caliph, or successor, to the Prophet Muhammad. According to the standard histories of early Islam, Abu Bakr inherited Muhammads responsibilities of state, but not his prophetic mission. 23 Perhaps this claim is controversial. In her recent treatment of Islam and the Sources of Authority, Souad T. Ali describes the works three sections, without mentioning a special relationship between sections two and three (Ali, 7090). I claim that these sections are linked based on Abd al-Raziqs language in the paragraph concluding section I.

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institution was illegitimate. This argument, made by way of sharia reasoning, 24 had its merits, but the history of Islam provided reasons to doubt it. The caliphate was an institution founded by the Prophets most revered companions, and later maintained by eminent Muslim scholars throughout the history of Islamic civilization. Anyone challenging the legitimacy of the caliphate office would have to explain why it had gained the widespread endorsement of learned, exemplary Muslims over many centuries. This prompted Abd al-Raziqs second argument, in which he attempted to set forth his personal opinion concerning the caliphate and concerning its origin. 25 Abd al-Raziqs aim was to challenge standard historical narratives describing the origins of the caliphate institution, and provide his readers with an alternative account. He made this historical argument in sections II and III. As we have seen, this is the portion of Islam and the Sources of Authority that Abd al-Raziq considered scientific. In short, the arguments made in sections II and III were meant to provide historical reasons for endorsing the sharia-based arguments in section I. Abd al-Raziqs hope was to show his readers that their reverence for the caliphate was based on unpersuasive sharia reasoning (section I), and a misunderstanding of Islamic history (sections II and III). This brief overview of the structure of Islam and the Sources of Authority demonstrates the hybridized nature of Abd alRaziqs reasoning. Abd al-Raziq put forward religious arguments from the sharia, and scientific arguments from history, that he intended to be mutually reinforcing. As we take a
Having established that the caliphate is not something that arose upon foundations of the true religion nor yet to sound reason, Abd al-Raziq turned to section II, writing: Perchance the reader may, at this point, claim the right of asking what is our personal opinion concerning the caliphate and concerning its origin. It is our duty then to attempt to set this forth, seeking from Godmay He be exaltedHis gracious help and guidance and succour in so doing (Abd al-Raziq, 38). In this paragraph, we see Abd al-Raziq turning from his sharia-argument against the caliphate, to a historical argument concerning the true origin of the caliphate. This latter argument is the subject of the remainder of Abd alRaziqs worksections II and III. For this reason, I believe, Abd al-Raziq constructed his work as a case laid out in two interrelated arguments. This is the framework I use to discuss Abd al-Raziqs reasoning throughout this chapter. 24 By sharia reasoning, I mean the traditional pattern of reasoning used by Islamic scholars, according to which arguments are justified by the Quran, the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, the Consensus of previous scholars, and analogical reasoning. The term sharia reasoning is taken from John Kelsay. See his Arguing the Just War in Islam. 25 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 38.

closer look at Abd al-Raziqs argument from history, we will see that certain steps within this argument rely upon theological reasoning. Abd al-Raziqs blend of religious and scientific reasoning, therefore, is not simply segmented into two different portions of his book. It also occurs within each section. 26 Ultimately, this makes Abd al-Raziqs distinction between scientific and religious inquiry difficult to maintain. As is well known, Abd al-Raziq had immediate political reasons for writing Islam and the Sources of Authority. After Ataturks abolition of the caliphate in 1924, a coalition of Azhari ulema, in cooperation with the Egyptian palace, began organizing a caliphate congress to be held in Cairo. 27 Members of Egypts liberal political partiesthe Wafd and the Liberal Constitutionalistsbelieved that the Azharis intended to name Egypts King Fuad as the caliph of Islam. They feared that the caliphate title would strengthen Fuads hand in Egyptian affairs, allowing him to manipulate the religious sentiments of the Egyptian populace, and weaken the authority of Egypts newly-formed parliamentary institutions. Because Abd al-Raziq was a committed member of the liberal constitutional party, many commentators have rightly argued that Islam and the Sources of Authority was put foreword as challenge to Fuads candidacy. Rather than arguing that Fuad was unqualified to act as caliph, however, Abd al-Raziq made the more radical argument that no one should act as caliph, because the caliphate office had no basis in Islam. This immediate context is important, and has been well-described in numerous works. 28 In order to fully grasp the significance that Islam and the Sources of Authority held for Abd alRaziqs contemporaries, however, it is important to take a longer view of Egyptian history, and

Indeed, Abd al-Raziqs argument from the sharia also relies, at points, upon his revisionist history. Abd al-Raziq argued that the caliphate institution cannot be justified by appeals to ijma (consensus), because throughout Islams long history, scholars have always been compelled by force to endorse the caliph. Their consensus endorsement, Abd al-Raziq argued, holds no more weight than the Iraqis endorsement of King Faisal. See Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 32. 27 For an account of this congress, see Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled, 86-105. For the Egyptian palaces role in organizing the conference, see Kramer, 89; Elie Kedourie, Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-52, 185. 28 Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled, 86-105; Elie Kedourie, Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-52, 177-212; Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, Egypts Liberal Experiment, 86-87; Maurius Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt, 137; Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 60-63; Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 358-60; P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 303-05.

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describe the Abd al-Raziq familys participation in Egyptian political movements stemming back to the late nineteenth century.

3. The Abd al-Raziq Family: A Pillar of Egyptian Secular Nationalism The Abd al-Raziq family was a landowning family of rural notables from Egypts Minya province, which possessed a long line of religious scholars. Ali Abd al-Raziqs grandfather, Ahmad Effendi Abd al-Raziq (?-c. 1860) was a qadi, as was his father before him. 29 Ahmad Effendis son, Hasan Abd al-Raziq (1844-1907), was Alis father. Like his father, Hasan was well educated in the religious sciences; he attended al-Azhar for eight years, although he had to abandon his schooling in order to take over the familys affairs when his father died around 1863. 30 Under Hasans leadership, the Abd al-Raziq familys landholdings, wealth, social status, and political influence greatly increased. 31 Hasan was elected to the newly-established Assembly of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwwab) in 1877. 32 The Assembly was later abolished by the British in 1883, and replaced with the Legislative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura), to which Hasan was also elected and remained a member for more than eighteen years. 33 Hasan was also a close friend and

Ali Abd al-Raziq, Min thr Musta f Abd al-Rziq, 7. According to Ali, this qadi post was inherited within the Abd al-Raziq family for many generations. He could trace the post back to his great, great grandfather, but there may have been Abd al-Raziqs holding the post prior to him. See Ibid. 5-6. 30 Ali Abd al-Raziq, Min thr Musta f Abd al-Rziq, 10. Hasans older brother Ahmad Effendi al-Saghir, took over the familys affairs prior to Hasan. But he died shortly after his father. 31 Ali Abd al-Raziq, Min thr Musta f Abd al-Rziq, 11. 32 Ali Abd al-Raziq, Min thar Musta f Abd al-Rziq, 11.When Hasan Abd al-Raziq first joined the Assembly, it was known as the Consultative Assembly of Deputies (majlis shura al-nuwwab). This body was first formed by Ismail in 1866 in order to strengthen his credit with foreign lenders by persuading them that his regime had popular support. Nonetheless, some argue the Consultative Assembly did challenge Ismails fiscal policies See Jacob M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt; Davis, Challenging Colonialism, 26). Others challenge this view, arguing that the Assemblys purported powers to challenge Ismails authority are not based on documentary evidence but on wishful thinking. See A. Schloch, Constitutional Development in Nineteenth Century EgyptA Reconsideration, Middle Eastern Studies 10.1: 7; see also F. Robert Hunter, Egypt Under the Khedives, 216-26. In 1879, with the Assembly playing a more prominent role in Egyptian politics, the deputies demanded new laws for the assembly, making ministers responsible to the assembly. It was at this point that the assembly became known as the Assembly of Deputies. See Abdelslam M. Maghraoui, Liberalism without Democracy, 122-23. For a good overview of the historiographical debate surrounding the assemblys alleged powers, and the crucial year of 1979, see AbdelAziz EzzelArab, The Experiment of Sharif Pashas Cabinet (1879): An Inquiry into the Historiography of Egypts Elite Movement, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36.4: 561-589. 33 Ali Abd al-Raziq, Min thar Musta f Abd al-Rziq, 11.

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supporter of the Muslim reformer Muhammad Abduh. 34 In the 1870s, as the Egyptian government went dangerously far into European debt, Abduh and his followersmany of them large landowners like Hasanbecame increasingly critical of Khedive Ismail. They advocated greater legislative powers for the Assembly of Deputies. This advisory body largely dominated by rural notables, like themselves, who they believed could better administer Egyptian affairs. The Abd al-Raziq home in Cairo became an important intellectual salon, where Abduhs supporters would meet and policies against the Khedive and his court could crystallize. 35 Hasans role in organizing petitions against the Khedive was recognized; Ismail banished him to the Sudan, but was persuaded to rescind his order just before Hasan departed. 36 Therefore, by the British occupation of 1882, the Abd al-Raziq family was already recognized as one of a number of politically-engaged, prominent landholding families who were critical of the Khedives rule and affiliated with the Islamic reform movement led by Muhammad Abduh. Many in this Abduhs circle earned European-style educations, either through Egyptian state schools or degree programs in European universities. They believed Islamic law had to be reformed with the aim of creating a new, dynamic Islamic framework that could provide the basis for modern civilization in the Muslim world. This required a return to the forgotten teachings of Islams pious forbearers, and an incorporation of the fruits of European learning. 37 In the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, some leading members of Abduhs circle, including Qasim Amin, Mahmud Sulayman Pasha, Ali Pasha Sharawi, Hasan Abd al-Raziq, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, and Sad Zaghlul began to slowly secularize their Islam-based approach to social reform. 38 This group eventually coalesced into the Umma Party in 1907. 39 Increasingly, their
Ali Abd al-Raziq, Min thr Musta f Abd al-Rziq, 12-13. Eric Davis, Challenging Colonialism, 40. 36 Ali Abd al-Raziq, Min thr Musta f Abd al-Rziq, 12. 37 For an overview of Muhammad Abduhs teachings, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 130-60. 38 For an account of this shift among Abduhs followers, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,16192; Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 22-31. Walid Kazziha, The Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics. 39 For the creation of the Umma Party, see Walid Kazziha, The Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics.
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arguments for the reform of Egyptian customs and institutions were couched in the language of European science and rationalism, rather than Islamic terms. This departure was largely a reaction to the nationalist agitations of Mustafa Kamil and his Watani party beginning in the last decade of the nineteenth century. In their study of Egyptian nationalist trends from 1900-1930, Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski explain that the turn of the twentieth century in Egypt saw the birth of two rival nationalist ideologies. On the one hand, there was the Ottoman-Islamic orientation promoted by Mustafa Kamil and the Watani party. This was the dominant trend in Egyptian nationalist reasoning from the 1890s to the Allies defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War. On the other hand, there was the anti-Ottoman, secular nationalism promoted by Muhammad Abduhs disciples in the Umma Party. 40 Advocates of both parties assumed a kind of Egyptian territorial nationalism, which held that Egyptians were united as part of a geographically distinct, historically unique Egyptian nation rooted in the Valley of the Nile. 41 Both parties also assumed that the strengthening and maintenance of national unity was essential to Egypts progressive development. According to Mustafa Kamil, for example, strong national unity was one of the keys to Europes advancement: Everything that exists in those regions, by way of justice, order, freedom, and independence, great prosperity and great possessions, is undoubtedly the product of this noble feeling which spurs the members of the nation in their entirety to strive for a common purpose and a single goal. 42 The Watani and Umma parties disagreed, however, about the bases of Egyptian national unity, and the loyalties it ought to inspire. This disagreement was largely shaped by the parties conflicting positions concerning the British administration. The Watanis insisted on immediate evacuation of

40 41

Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 4-15. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 11. 42 Quoted in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 206.

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the British without conditions. 43 The Umma Party, however, believed the wisest political strategy was to work with the British administration to help modernize the Egyptian state until Egyptians were ready to govern themselves. Disagreement about the legitimacy of the British administration led to rival nationalist ideologies that were put forward via different styles of argumentation. Mustafa Kamil attempted, quite successfully, to arouse anti-British sentiment by appealing to pan-Islamic solidarity. For every living nation there are two great obligations, he claimed, the obligation toward its religion and its creed, and its obligation towards its watan and the land of its fathers. 44 Kamil stressed that Egyptian loyalty to the Ottoman Caliph was a religious obligation. This pro-Ottoman loyalty did not conflict with loyalty to the Egyptian nation, Kamil believed, because Ottomans and Egyptians shared an interest in expelling the British. The Ottomans were one of the few powers capable of helping Egypt to tear off the British yoke. The Umma Party strongly opposed efforts to reestablish the Khedives former powers, or to strengthen ties with the Ottoman state. Under the British administration, Egypts large landowners had been able to hold an increasing number of administrative posts. As more of their sons received European-style educations and attained government positions, the landholding classes imagined that they were in position to eventually take the reigns of the Egyptian state, once the British relinquished them. 45 A return to Khedival or Ottoman rule would only subject them to an administration they had less power to control. Therefore, as Kamil began appealing to pan-Islamic sentiments in order to intensify Egyptian displeasure with British rule, landholders like Hasan Abd al-Raziq took his agitations as a threat to their own well-being, and the possibility of an independent Egyptian nation. In turn, they used the Umma Party, and its official newspaper, alJarida, to articulate a secular nationalist ideology that could win Egyptians away from the policies of the Watanis.

Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 203; Arthur Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892 - 1919.". 44 Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 7. 45 Walid Kazziha, the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics, 378-380

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Albert Hourani explains that the Umma Party dissolved the relationship established by Abduh between Islam and civilization. 46 This shift was partly based on their disapproval of Mustafa Kamils abuse of pan-Islamic sentiments. But it was also due to the fact that some of them, Qasim Amin and Lutfi al-Sayyid for example, were strongly influenced by works of European intellectuals, like Comte, Renan, Mill, and Spencer. 47 Amin and Lutfi took their works to describe universal laws of social progress that governed all societies, thereby charting the path of modernization for the Egyptian nation. Endorsing these theories, they began openly promoting European values as true in themselves, independent of an Islamic framework. Western-educated Umma Party members who followed this line imagined themselves as Egypts intellectual elite; 48 they were responsible for guiding the evolution of Egypts customs and institutions by teaching their countrymen of the benefits of the European sciences, and the virtues of European society. Reflecting on this responsibility, Lutfi claimed the best leaders are those who, though of the elite, can descend to the level of the masses and share their crude sentiments in order to gain their confidence and lead them unawares in the direction of their real interests. 49 As the editor of alJarida, Lutfi attempted to engage and massage these crude sentiments by promoting a secular sense of Egyptian identity. Lutfi argued that strong, flourishing nations cannot be built upon religious solidarity. Religious solidarity is incompatible with the sacred Egyptian slogan Egypt for the Egyptians, 50 insofar as it promotes divisions between Egypts Christians and Muslims. The nation, for Lutfi, is a natural association of people that has no basis in religion. The umma, he wrote, is that civic association which is a product of nature and one of its creations. It has the right to life and
Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 169. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 167, 173; Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 24, 25, 27, 28. 48 Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 6-8, 19-25, 27, 30, 31, 35, 37, 38; Jamal Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, 91; Walid Kazziha, the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics, 382-83. 49 Jamal Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, 91. Cited in Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 203 n.62. 50 Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 8.
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freedom, just as every individual possesses these natural rights. 51 Fanatical pan-Islamic sentiments threaten this natural association, as does the imperialist principle of allegiance to the Ottoman caliph. Lutfi demanded that Egyptians identify themselves as Egyptians before anything else. 52 Cultivating a sense of exclusive loyalty to the nation was essential to Egypts progress. The pan-Islamic, pro-Ottoman sentiments expressed by Mustafa Kamil, as Lutfi had it, encouraged the continuation of outdated government institutions that prevent Egypt from realizing its national potential and entering into more advanced stages of social evolution. Critics charged that the Umma Party was elitist, being representative of the ayan (rural notables) and not the umma (nation). 53 The party conceded but qualified this accusation. The ayan, Lutfi claimed, were the representatives of those who have real interest in the country. While the Watani party was created by a few educated Egyptians, he argued, the Umma Party included among its members the majority of the heads of prominent families, who represented the interests of the whole nation, a claim which no other party in Egypt could make. 54 Despite Lutfis claim that the Umma Party, through its notable leadership, represented the interests of the entire nation, its secular variety of Egyptian nationalism clearly lacked the popular support of the Watani party. 55 A clear example of the unpopularity of their position came during the Italian-Ottoman war of 1911-12. While the Watanis encouraged Egyptians to support their Ottoman sultan in the battle against Italy, Lutfi argued that Egypt had no interest in this war and called for Egyptian neutrality. This recommendation provoked an intense public response so negative that the Umma Party forced Lutfi to temporarily step down as al-Jaridas editor. 56

Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 13. Quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 14. 53 Quoted in Walid Kazziha, the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics, 382. 54 Quoted in Walid Kazziha, the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics, 382. 55 Walid Kazziha, the Jaridah-Ummah Group and Egyptian Politics, 382. See also Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 28-29. This perception of the Umma circle continued in the 1920s, when its leaders formed the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Wafdist newspapers referred to the Liberal Constitutionalists as the party of aristocrats. Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, Egypts Liberal Experiment, 66. 56 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, 10.
52

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As we have seen, the Abd al-Raziq family was a prominent supporter of the secular nationalist movement in Egypt from the very beginning. Hasan Abd al-Raziq was the Umma Partys first vice-president, although he died shortly after its formation in 1907. His sons followed in their fathers footsteps. They were also prominent Umma Party members, often frequenting the offices of al-Jarida. 57 They maintained an intellectual salon in their fathers Cairo home. When alJarida ceased publication in 1915, Mustafa Abd al-Raziq, Alis brother, helped to found the journal, al-Sufur, which promoted the policies of the former Umma Party. 58 When the leadership of the Umma circle created the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, in 1922, Hasans sons became members. The Abd al-Raziq family funded the partys official newspaper, al-Siyasa. 59 With the familys long, high-profile involvement in Egypts secular political parties, it is little wonder that Ali Abd al-Raziqs contemporaries read Islam and the Sources of Authority as a politicallymotivated work written by a Europeanized apostate. It was clearly in line with the secular nationalist platform advocated by the Umma Party circle since 1906, reasserting their long-held opposition to the Egyptian monarchy and the Ottoman caliphate. Islam and the Sources of Authority was also a departure, however, from the Umma circles political strategy of nearly two decades. Rather than insisting upon the supremacy of secular nationalism, or discounting religious commitments from the lofty perch of scientific rationalism, Abd al-Raziq chose to engage the heated issue of the caliphate in religious terms. This strategy of social reform was a throwback to Islam-based reform promoted by Muhammad Abduh. Ali Abd al-Raziq, with his alamiyya degree from al-Azhar, and his ten-year tenure as a sharia-court judge, was uniquely qualified to defend the Liberal Constitutionalists position with religious arguments.
Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 30. In the al-Jarida office, lectures were given often by Lutfi al-Sayyid and other prominent lawyers. Young members of the Umma circle, like the Ali Abd al-Raziq, would meet with Lutfi and read books like Mills On Liberty, Spencers Justice, and Carlyles Heroes and Hero Worship and The French Revolution (see Ibid., 38). 58 Alis brother, Mustafa, who later went on to become the Shaykh al-Azhar helped found al-Sufur in 1915. Al-Sufur was an avant-garde journal of modern literature and social criticism, which was published until 1918. Ali Abd alRaziq also contributed articles to al-Sufur. See Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 53; Elisabeth Kendall, Literature, Journalism and the Avant-Garde, 34-37. 59 Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 78.
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But, as Abd al-Raziq insisted, his book is not a standard theological work. Rather, it is a hybridized work that combines methods of sharia reasoning with European historical criticism. Abd al-Raziqs choice to confront religious teachings with historical criticism reflects his learning outside of al-Azhar. Simply growing up in his fathers household and frequenting the offices of alJarida would have given Abd al-Raziq exposure to the works of European scholarship most discussed among Egypts leading intellectuals. 60 Souad T. Ali overlooks this influence when she claims that Abd al-Raziqs reasoning has no roots in Western thought. More importantly, she neglects the formative importance of Abd al-Raziqs period of study at the Egyptian University. There, Abd al-Raziq attended Carlo Nallinos lectures on the history of Arabic literature. 61 Through Nallino, Abd al-Raziq learned European methods of historical research that he would later apply in Islam and the Sources of Authority. 62

4. Historicism in Modern Egypt Carlo Nallino (1872-1938) was part of a small group of Italian orientalists hired by King Fuad to teach at the Egyptian University upon its opening in 1910. 63 His courses influenced a number of students who went on to become leading Egyptian intellectualsamong them, Ali Abd al-Raziq, Taha Husayn, Ahmad Amin, and Mansur Fahmi. 64 Judging by his students accounts, Nallinos lectures had a profound impact upon them. According to Taha Husayn, one of Abd al-Raziqs classmates and another influential member of the Umma circle, Nallinos lectures were a turning point in the history of Modern Egyptian thought and culture. 65 In his opening lecture on the history of Arabic literature, Nallino explained his overriding responsibility to his
See note 57. C. C. Adams, The Modern Reform Movement in Egypt and the Caliphate, 348. 62 Nallino also wrote a work on the Caliphate, which like Arnolds book, focused on debunking Ottoman claims to the caliphate. Abd al-Raziqs arguments show no direct borrowings from this work. See Carlo Nallino, Notes on the nature of the "caliphate" in general and on the alleged "Ottoman Caliphate." 63 Donald Malcom Reid, Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt, 39. 64 Donald Malcom Reid, Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt, 153. 65 Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husains Education, 52. Ahmad Amin similarly claimed that he learned the methodology of research from reading Nallinos History of Astronomy among the Arabs (Reid, 153).
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students: Nothing is requested from me but to apply methods of historical research upon Arab history that have become customary in the history of our European literature, with great utility. 66 He could not have imparted this knowledge at a more opportune moment, as historical narratives had become a favored weapon in Egypts nationalist culture wars. In his recent study of history writing in twentieth-century Egypt, Yoav Di-Capua explains that the modern idea of history is a form of thought and a habit of mind that arrived in Egypt in the late nineteenth century, bringing with them specific institutions and modes of reasoning. 67 DiCapua refers to this modern idea of history as historicism, a European intellectual import that more than anything else . . . sought to understand the past from the point of view of the final outcome of progress. 68 History writing became a tool for uncovering the laws of progress. 69 This made historical narrative a powerful way of rejecting or endorsing contemporary institutions and customs. Nationalists of all political persuasions upheld historical knowledge as essential to the strengthening of the Egyptian nation. As Mustafa Kamil put it: What is the lethal drug that the nation has taken with such pleasure? What is the disastrous misfortune of the country that befell its inhabitants while they (passively) continue to gaze at it? How come this beloved nation forgot that it was she who conquered, subjugated, stroked, and emerged triumphant . . .? Obviously, the reason for this disastrous state of affairs is the neglect of civil education [tarbiyya wataniyya] and the erasure of instructive history to the mind and spirit. . . . History, History! This is the common school for all classes of the nation. This is the instructor that will acculturate the glorious prince, the celebrated minister, the erudite scholar, the student, and the ordinary poor man. 70 We see here that Kamil believed that Egyptian society had fallen into decay partly because Egyptians had forgotten their history. 71 The point of studying Egyptian history anew was to

Carlo Nallino, Trkh al-db al- Arabyah min al-jhilyah hatt asr ban Ammayah, nuss al-muhda rt allat alqh bi-al-jmi ah al-Misryah f sanat 1910-1911, 57. 67 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 11. 68 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 29. 69 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 46. 70 Quoted in Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 52. 71 Similarly, Abd al-Raziq argued that Muslims have endorsed the caliphate, thereby hastening the decline of Islamic civilization, because they have failed to understand their own history. See page 8 above.

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revivify the nations spiritto teach Egyptians to identify themselves with great heroes and conquerors of old. This was a point that all nationalists took for granted. There was heated disagreement, however, about the ways in which Egyptians ought to become acculturated. This led to historiographical conflicts, as conflicting narratives were put forward to justify rival nationalist trends. 72 For example, orientalist research into ancient Egypt provided scientific evidence of the greatness of Egypts past. Yet it could be used in controversial ways. During the 1920s Muhammad Husayn Haykal 73 wrote numerous articles celebrating Egypts pharaonic past with the aim of excavating Egypts true, unIslamic nature. 74 While he believed his findings to be the fruits of research conducted with scientific precision and all the freedom of thought possible, 75 it is no coincidence that they justified a sense of Egyptian identity that gave legitimacy to the Liberal Constitutionalists secular nationalism. Islam and the Sources of Authority is another work that uses the science of history to legitimate a secular nationalist Egyptian identity, although it uses Islamic rather than pharaonic materials to make its case. This description of Abd al-Raziqs work might make it seem a polemical abuse of history, rather than a respectable historical work, but in Abd al-Raziqs context this distinction is difficult to make. 76 Take Nallinos lectures, for example. Nallino professed the intention to simply pass European research methods on to his students. But he, like Kamil and Haykal, also recognized a moral purpose for studying history. [T]he literature of your noble language and its history is not only a scientific problem, Nallino told his students, but a glorious service to your nation whose undertaking is obligatory for all of you. He went on:

See, for example, the debate between Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Abduh concerning whether or not Mehmet Ali ought to be considered the founder of modern Egypt. See Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 31-35. 73 Muhammad Husayn Haykal was a member of the Umma circle who later became the editor of the Liberal Constitutionalists newspaper, al-Siyasa. For an excellent biography of Haykal, see Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt. 74 Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 50. 75 Quoted in Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, 43. 76 Martin Kramer makes this suggestion. See his Review of Modern Islamic Politcal Thought by Hamid Enayat, 239.

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Surely, what defines and preserves the unity of the nation is especially the unity of language, literature, customs, tastes, and inherited ideas from ancient times, with no break or interruption. If its preservation is neglected, then the nation will decline into the dilemma of its decayrather, the frustration of its unity. If you review books of Western history, you will find that some of the European nations have endured civil strife, wars, tribulations, corruption, and subjugation and forced servitude to its enemy. Yet it was saved from the complete annihilation of its unity by the preservation of the literature of its language, and concern for the perpetual remembrance of its glorious ancient works of science and literature. Many a nation that has been flung into the flux of affairs and adversities of the greatest political decline has begun to reform its servile condition and return to its original state in terms of prosperity, political reform, and independence, when its devoted scholars began their efforts in penetrating research into its history, the conditions of its forbearers, and the restoration of the literature of its language. . . as if they, in their work, have thrust the spirit of life into the exhausted, near-dead body of the nation. Woe to every nation overcome by slackness in preserving its literary treasures and continuing the memory of its works. 77 With the authority of a European university professor, Nallino projected the nations identity into the past, as if it were a pre-existent entity, waiting to be discovered in literary artifacts. For Nallino, nations existed from ancient times, with no break or interruption. Nations that shirk the responsibility of history are sure to weaken and be threatened with disintegration. Many European scholars of Nallinos time would have concurred with these sentiments. Just as European researchers studied Beowulf, Chanson de Roland, the Divine Comedy, El Cid, or The Song of the Nibelungs to justify conceptions of British, French, Italian, Spanish, and German identity, Egyptian intellectuals, following their lead, set about using literary artifacts to support concepts of Egyptian identity. 78 Since the formation of political parties in 1907, however, these concepts had been in sharp dispute. Abd al-Raziq turned to classic sources of the Islamic traditionincluding the Quran, hadith collections, theological treatises, and historical annalsin order to justify the Liberal Constitutionalists promotion of a secular Egyptian identity, based on ties of geography, custom, and language. For example, Abd al-Raziq argued that the Prophet Muhammad allowed
77

Carlo Nallino, Trkh al-db al- Arabyah min al-jhilyah hatt asr ban Ammayah, nuss al-muhda rt allat alqh bi-al-jmi ah al-Misryah f sanat 1910-1911, 18. 78 For a description of this kind of engaged nationalist philology in nineteenth-century European scholarship see, Karla Mallette, European Modernity and the Arab Mediterranean, 6-19.

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the Arabian tribes to manage their own political, economic, and social affairsas if they were autonomous states. 79 This was clearly an attempt to legitimate contemporary concepts of nation by projecting them into the past. Islam and the Sources of Authority was written, therefore, with the aim of fulfilling a responsibility to nation, as well as religion. Scientific history would demonstrate that Islam endorsed states administered by the most recent conclusions arrived at by the minds of men, and the most assured results that the experience of nations have indicated to be the best principles of government. 80 While many Egyptian nationalists used historical narratives to support their nationalist commitments, most, like Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Husayn Haykal, were not professional historians. Still, they used the veneer of science and rationalism to give their narratives persuasive force. Abd al-Raziq was no exception in this regard, although his coursework with Nallino did provide him with more training in European historical research methods than most. Nallino taught his students that among the Arabs, the state of historical science was undeveloped. Even the best Arab historians have confined themselves to detailing the memory of events and occurrences year by year, without research into [their] causes, social circumstances, the connection between events, their effects, and without extending their aim to anything more than a genuine memory of the apparent contingencies that befall the nation 81 This critical observation about the deficiencies of Arab history reveals the virtues of European historical research that Nallino intended to pass on to his students. History, for Nallino, is a causal narrative that explains the rise and fall of civilizations. The problem with Arab chronicles is that their chronological framework simply listed events, without paying any attention to the connections between them. This made the fates of nations appear to be random contingencies, rather than the rational outcome of causal

See page 29 below. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 103. 81 Carlo Nallino, Trkh al-db al- Arabyah min al-jhilyah hatt asr ban Ammayah, nuss al-muhda rt allat alqh bi-al-jmi ah al-Misryah f sanat 1910-1911, 56. Cf. Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husains Education, 54.
80

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sequences. 82 Therefore, Nallino explained, even the best Arab historians didnt examine carefully the progression of works in the development of civilization, or its decline. 83 Understanding the progress or decline of a civilization requires historians to assume normative standards of social development, by which they may measure the civilizations they study. For Abd al-Raziq, these standards were expressed in the most recent conclusions arrived at by the minds of men. Judging by these European standards of progress, he considered the political institutions of the Muslim world as backwards. 84 In Islam and the Sources of Authority, as we will see, Abd al-Raziq attempts to account for this backwards state of affairs by examining the conditions that led to the feeble condition of political philosophy in Islamic scholarship. Following Nallino, Abd al-Raziq proposed to chart the decline of Islamic civilization through its works of political literature. Nallino taught his students to track the development of literary traditions by reading historical sources contextually. That is, researchers had to account for the social, economic, and political circumstances that stimulated a literary work, as well as the effects it helped create. This historical approach to literature, Nallino explained, allows researchers to account for the origin of each class of the literary arts. . , the path of its growth or decay. . , the influence of authors upon each other, and the reasons for changes of taste and custom. These topics of research were precluded by Arab scholars historical methods. Nallino demonstrated the benefit of his method by applying it to ghazal love poetry. The ghazal poets social milieu had a distinct impact upon his writings. In the Hijazi cities, one notices the development of a more sensual style, while in the Arabian deserts, authors tended toward a chaste form of expression. 85 Examining the social reality underlying literary artifacts also provided the historian with critical leverage against traditional accounts of their formation. In his lectures, for example, Nallino
This is a standard observation made of Arab/Islamic historical works, as distinguished from modern, European works of history. See, Jack A. Crabbs, The Writing of History in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, 13-26; Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, 36-46. 83 Carlo Nallino, Trkh al-db al- Arabyah min al-jhilyah hatt asr ban Ammayah, nuss al-muhda rt allat alqh bi-al-jmi ah al-Misryah f sanat 1910-1911, 56-57. 84 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 31. 85 Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husains Education, 53.
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questioned the authenticity of some Pre-Islamic poems, since they contained styles of language and Islamic concepts that were not present in the Pre-Islamic milieu. 86 Abd al-Raziq, as we will see, also used a contextual historical approach to literary sources in order to explain the meager development of Islamic political writings. He argued that the weakness of the Islamic political sciences reflects their development under harsh conditions of repression inherent in the caliphate system. Moreover, Abd al-Raziq turned to the social milieu of Muhammad and his companions in order to demonstrate that they could never have endorsed contemporary doctrines of the caliphate. These doctrines, in their claim to trace back to the Prophets time, were every bit as forged as certain works of Pre-Islamic poetry.

5. Abd al-Raziqs Historical Argument Nallinos historical approach to reading literary works contextually, within the framework of social development, can be seen in Abd al-Raziqs account of the origins of the caliphate. In this account, Abd al-Raziq assumed, and attempted to explain, the backward state of politics [ ] among Muslims. 87 He believed the primitive condition of the political sciences in Islamic learning was indicative of this state of affairs: It is a fact readily observable in the history of intellectual activity among Muslims, that the lot of political sciences among them, as compared with other sciences, has been unfortunate in the extreme, and that it has led in their midst a most precarious existence. We do not know of a single author among them in political science, nor a translator. Nor do we know a single study on any part of the laws of government or of the principles of politics, except, possibly an inconsiderable amount which is of no weight whatever in comparison with their intellectual activity in other sciences than that of politics. 88 Why, Abd al-Raziqs asked, had Islamic scholars written so little on political science? Surely they had reasons to study the subject. On the one hand, given the frequent political disputes that raged
Abdelrashid Mahmoudi, Taha Husains Education, 56-57. This was the thesis Taha Husayn later took up in Fi alShir al-Jahili. 87 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 31. 88 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 22.
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throughout the history of Islamic civilization, it is hard to believe that few scholars would have thought to study the principles of political authority. On the other, many Muslim scholars were devoted students of the Greeks. Given their reverence for Plato and Aristotle it is unlikely that they would have taken little interest in works like the Republic and Aristotles Politics. What, then, are the circumstances that produced the weak condition of . . . political sciences among Muslims? 89 In this set of questions, we see Abd al-Raziq framing his historical argument with the kinds of questions that Nallino asked. Abd al-Raziq aims to explain the unfortunate state of Islamic political literature. This account, he believes, will provide insight into the current weakened state of Islamic civilization. It must be arrived at, moreover, by an examination of the social reality that influenced the underdeveloped state of Islamic political writings. The dearth and feebleness of Islamic political works is best explained, Abd al-Raziq argued, by political censorship that necessarily followed from the establishment of the caliphate institution. As he had it, the caliphate office left human beings insatiable lust for power unchecked. The office was based purely upon military power, which the caliph would naturally use to eliminate all forms of dissent: [T]he caliphate in Islam has never rested upon anything except the foundation of awe-inspiring, intimidating force, and. . . . this force, except in rare cases, has been material armed force. 90 That the caliphate is established upon subjugation and compulsion means nothing more than this: 1) that these two [i.e. subjugation and compulsion] are kept on the lookout for anyone who might make a rebellious attack upon the position of the caliphate, or show hostility to it; and 2) that the sword is held in readiness for those who touch that throne with evil design or work for the shaking of its support. 91 This account of the sources of the caliphs authority was hardly a sympathetic description of the institution. Moreover, as Abd al-Raziq noted, it challenged the fundamental principle . . . of the caliphate according to Muslim thought: namely, that the caliphs authority should be derived
89 90

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 24; 30. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 27; cf. 25. 91 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 28.

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from the choice of the men of influence. 92 This principle, Abd al-Raziq explained, assumes that the caliphate rests upon the good will and pleasure of the men of influence among Muslims. 93 Abd al-Raziq conceded that theoretically, it is within reason that there should exist . . . a caliphate of the description given by advocates of the caliphate. 94 He turned to history, however, to demonstrate that this theory has never been instantiated in practice. History does not mention any caliph who is not associated in our minds with that armed dread that surrounds him, that constraining power that overshadows him, and those unsheathed swords that defend him. 95 What Abd al-Raziq is attempting, here, is to debunk traditional narratives of Islams glorious caliphate. He chose to do this by turning to the origins of the caliphate, and critically revising narratives of Islams most cherished, and unquestionably legitimate, period of caliphal rulethe Rightly-Guided Caliphate. In this argument from history, Abd al-Raziq challenged two basic assumptions in traditional narratives of Abu Bakrs ascension as Islams first caliph. First, Abd al-Raziq argued that Abu Bakr did not inherit this office from the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet Muhammad, Abd al-Raziq argued, never held political authority, nor did he ever head a state. Therefore, the caliphate office was created by Abu Bakr and his supporters. It was an innovation that finds no basis in the Prophets practice. Secondly, Abd al-Raziq argued that Abu Bakrs leadership was never sanctioned by the consensus of the Prophets companions. Indeed, Abu Bakr consolidated his position by fighting the ridda wars, which means that his authority, like that of all caliphs, was based upon the foundations of force and the sword, 96 rather than the choice of men of influence. Abd al-Raziqs prose indicates that he was well aware that his revisionist narrative was likely to provoke a hostile response. [P]lunging into the investigation of this subject, he wrote,
Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 24-25. Quoted from Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah. 93 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25. 94 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25. 95 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25-26. 96 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92.
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may become that starting point of an attack, the fires of which they will kindlethose who do not know religion except as a hard and fast form, which [allegedly] should not be pursued by the mind nor approached by speculation. 97 As discussed above, Abd al-Raziq claimed to be conducting scientific research, in order to forestall such attacks. He was subjecting Islamic historical narratives to rational criticism, which implied that his research was not governed by the same standards of judgment as madrasa scholarship. Unlike theological inquiry, Abd al-Raziq insisted, his research does not, in reality, touch [upon] anything of essential import in religion nor any pillar of Islam. 98 Still, Abd al-Raziq believed that emotional attachments to traditional narratives of the caliphates origins would make his readers reluctant to endorse his arguments. We have some fear, he wrote, that the affecting picture that the historians try to paint of this era may deceive you. Know, then, first of all: that in the science of history there are many mistakes. How often is history at fault! And how often it may be grievously in error! 99 The claim that the Prophet Muhammad established a government, Abd al-Raziq argued, was one of these mistakes.

5.1 Muhammad: prophet, not statesman If the Prophet founded the Islamic state, Abd al-Raziq inquired, why is it that the historical record gives so few details about the system of government he put in place? 100 There is no evidence suggesting that essential government officeslike the ministry of finance or of justiceexisted. 101 There are stories of the Prophet appointing certain persons as qadis or governors. But upon closer inspection, these accounts are often contradictory, and the responsibilities attached to these posts are never clearly described. Some accounts, for example, claim that Ali ibn Abu Talib was sent to the Yemen as a qadi. But others claim he was sent to

97 98

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 47. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 48-49. 99 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85. 100 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 39-45; 57; 85. 101 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 45.

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collect the Prophets khums (tribute), or to command of an army to subjugate the Hamdan tribe. 102 If the Prophet did appoint believers to certain positions of government, it seems he did not do so in accordance with a fixed rule. The historical records indicate that Muhammad made such appointments casually, for a limited time only. 103 A government, Abd al-Raziq suggested, could not function on such an ad hoc basis. Even the Prophets own administrational procedures are unclear. For example, the sources claim that that he acted as a judge, but do not describe his procedure for making judgments: When we wish to elicit anything concerning his procedure in passing judgment, we find that to elicit anything from these cases is not easy, in fact, it is impossible. The reason is that what has been handed down to us in the way of traditions concerning the Prophets judicial action is not sufficient to give us a clear picture of such action, nor of what procedure it may have followed; if, indeed, it followed any fixed procedure. 104 Given these ambiguities in the historical record, Abd al-Raziq argued that an impartial investigator may very well arrive at the opinion that the Prophet did not assign governors . . . in the countries that God granted him victory, for the direction of their affairs, the management of their circumstances, and the preservation of order within them. 105 A scientific researcher, therefore, was entitled to question whether the Messenger of God was or was not a king. 106 In other words, did the Prophet even possess political authority? To answer this question, Abd al-Raziq turned from traditional works of history to the Quran. God, Abd al-Raziq explained, repeatedly states that Muhammads office is simply to preach to others and warn them of Gods judgment:

102 103

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 41-42. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 45. 104 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 40. 105 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 45. 106 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 48.

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Warn then, for you are a warner. You have no authority over them. But if one turns away and rejects God, God will punish him with a mighty Punishment. 107 For you are nothing but a warner. Verily, we have sent you with the truth; as a bearer of good tidings and a warner. There has never been an umma without a warner having lived among them. 108 Obey God then, and obey the Messenger. But if you turn away, our Messenger is charged with plain preaching. 109 But if they turn aside from you, we have not sent you to be their guardian. Your duty is to preach. 110 In all, Abd al-Raziq cited 37 verses summoning Muhammad to preach and to warn. It is in these verses, he argued, that God explains the meaning of the Messengers mission [ ] . 111 The Prophet was not sent to establish a government over people. God clearly commanded that there be no compulsion in religion. 112 If people turn away from Muhammad, or disbelieve his message, he cannot force them to become believers. As God put it: But if the Lord had pleased, surely all who are in the earth would have believed together. What! Will you compel men to become believers? 113 Abd al-Raziq emphasized Gods repeated claims that Muhammad is not the keeper of men, that he is not in charge of them, and that he is not their guardian. These assertions, as he had it, reiterated Muhammads status as purely that of a preacher and warner: Follow what your Lord has reveled to you. There is no God but He! And turn away from the polytheists. Had God pleased, they would not have

Quran 88:21-24. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 53; 72. Quran translations are, although I have consulted C. C. Adams translations in his translation of Islam and the Sources of Authority, as well as Yusuf Alis translation of the Quran. 108 Quran 35:23-24. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 75. 109 Quran 64:12. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 75. 110 Quran 42:48. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 72. 111 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 65-69. 112 Quran 2:256. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 53. 113 Quran 10:99. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 53; 71.

107

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joined other gods with Him. And we have not made you a keeper over them, nor are you a guardian over them. 114 But your people reject it [Gods signs], while it is the truth. Say, I am not in charge of you. For every prophecy is its set time, eventually you will know it. 115 Assuredly we have revealed the Book to you for people in truth. Whosoever is rightly guided, it is for his benefit. And whosoever has strayed, on the contrary, commits error. But you are not their guardian. 116 If God declared that Muhammad was not in charge of people, he could hardly have been a king. The Quran, therefore, clearly states that political authority is incompatible with the mission of a Messenger. The Sunna, Abd al-Raziq argued, concurs. It is reported that when a certain man visited the Prophet and appeared anxious in his presence, the Prophet said make yourself at ease, for I am not a king nor a tyrant, but I am only the son of a woman of the Quraysh who used to eat dried meat in Mecca. 117 By the Prophet Muhammads own account, then, he was not a king. This is further verified by a report in which the angel Gabriel gives Muhammad the choice of becoming either a king or a servant. Muhammad chose the latter, declaring that a prophet is a servant. 118 It is important to note that while Abd al-Raziq used the Quran as an authoritative source in his historical argument, he did not treat it as an ordinary literary source that was produced by the economic, political, and social conditions of human communities. Rather, like his colleagues at alAzhar, Abd al-Raziq treated the Quran as the word of God. His argument from history, therefore, is itself a hybridized combination of historical and theological reasoning. In this specific piece of his narrative, he used source criticismhis assessment of the vague and contradictory information in sources describing Muhammads alleged stateto support his reading of the Quran. His

Quran 6:106-07. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 71. 115 Quran 6:66-67. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 71. 116 Quran 39:41. Quoted in Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-usl al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 72. 117 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 76. Quoted from Ahmad ibn Zaini Dahlan (d. 1304/1887) Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah. 118 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 76.

114

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reading of the Quran, in turn, complimented his source criticism, indicating the reason why sources describing the Prophets government are so obscure. Abd al-Raziqs hybridized reasoning shows that his distinction between scientific and religious reasoning is not clearly drawn within his work. Jacques Berque was not quite right, therefore, to identify Abd al-Raziqs critics as the enemies of secular history. 119 European-style historical research led Abd al-Raziq to challenge his critics proprieties. But his historical arguments relied upon theological judgments. They rejected these judgments as much, if not more, than his research methods. 120 Since Muhammad was a warner, but not a guardian, he never created a state apparatus overseeing the affairs of the Arab tribes. Muhammad did unify the tribes, but the unity of the Arabs that existed in the time of the Prophet was not a political unity from any point of view. The sovereignty of the messenger [ ] over his people, Abd al-Raziq explained, is spiritual sovereignty; its source is faith of the heart and its sincere and complete submission, which is followed by submission of the body. On the other hand, the sovereignty of a civil ruler [ ] is a material sovereignty, depending upon submission of the body and not having any connection with hearts. 121 Muhammads followers obeyed him out of belief in his mission and a willing submission to it. Their unity, therefore, was a unity of faith and of religious belief, not a unity of empire nor of monarchical tendencies. 122 The Prophet did lay down Islamic codes that regulated beliefs . . , private relations, manners and customs, and punishments. 123 But these regulations constitute a religious code only, entirely concerned with the service of God and the religious welfare of mankind, nothing else. 124 As Abd al-Raziq had it, a territorial map of the

Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, 360. Had Abd al-Raziq used secular history to support his colleagues endorsement of the caliphate, rather than challenge it, they would most likely have embraced his work as a major scientific contribution. This was the response to Muhammad Husayn Haykals Hayat Muhammad, published in 1933, which also claimed to adhere to Western scientific methods and listed Thomas Carlyle in its bibliography. See Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order, 113-30. 121 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 69. 122 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 83. 123 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85. 124 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85.
120

119

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Arabian peninsula in the Prophets time would have resembled the fractured checkerboard of states seen on maps of the Middle East after World War I: The Arabs, although the Divine Law of Islam did unite them, continued in those days in that condition of differentiation in regard to politics . . . and in regard to other manifestations of civil, social, and economic life. That is equivalent to saying that they constituted numerous states, to the degree in which the life of the Arabs at that time may be designated as a state or government. This was the state of the Arabs at the time when Muhammad departed to meet his exalted Friend. 125 State boundaries posed no threat to the religious unity established by the Prophet Muhammad. Nor did a Muslim peoples decision to administer there own political, economic, or social affairs. The Liberal Constitutionalists, in their promotion of a secular nationalist identity, followed in the footsteps of the Prophet.

5.2 Abu Bakr: Islams first king Abd al-Raziq concluded that Muhammad was but a messenger sent on behalf of a religious summons, who possessed neither kingly rule nor government, and . . . was not charged with the task of founding a kingdom in the political sense. 126 This judgment undercut the traditional belief that the caliphate office had been inherited by from the Prophet Muhammad. Since Muhammad wielded no political authority, no one could have succeeded him in political leadership. Yet Muslims did refer to Abu Bakr as caliph (successor) of the Prophet of God. Why would they have done so, if they didnt conceive him as succeeding the Prophet in his political leadership? Abd al-Raziq had to explain this. He did so by following the procedure recommended by Nallino, and examining the historical milieu in which Abu Bakrs caliphate took shape.

125 126

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 85. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 64-65.

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Abd al-Raziq argued that the language of the Arabs in Abu Bakrs context undermined the traditional understanding of his succession. The Prophet throughout his whole life, did not refer to anything that might be called an Islamic state or an Arab state. 127 Indeed, as Abd al-Raziq had already argued, the Prophet Muhammad never founded a state. Abu Bakrs contemporaries, therefore, could never have imagined that he was assuming the Prophets role as head of state. In what sense, then, did they refer to Abu Bakr as Muhammads successor? Abd al-Raziq reminded his readers that caliph, in Abu Bakrs context, was a novel title used to describe his newfound status as the leader of the umma. As such, there was no clear concept or doctrine behind the term. According to Abd al-Raziq, the term caliph was originally a poetic way of acknowledging Abu Bakrs legitimacy. The Arabs called Abu Bakr Muhammads successor, metaphorically, with the sense that he succeeded the Prophet in maintaining Arab unity. This unity was not based, however, upon the Prophets spiritual authority, for Abu Bakrs contemporaries believed that Muhammad was the seal of the Prophets. Nor was it based upon a pre-existent state office, since Abu Bakrs contemporaries had never encountered an Islamic state. Rather, it was based upon a new type of authority, that is, political authority constituted by military force. With Abu Bakrs institution of the caliphate office, Muslims, for the first time, were governed by a political authority. In Abd al-Raziqs words: There is no doubt that the Messenger of God was a leader of the Arabs and the rallying point of their unity, in the sense which we have previously explained. When, therefore, Abu Bakr became a king over the Arabs and gathered them into a unity, in the newly-originated political sense, it is proper, in the [linguistic] usage of the Arabs, to say that he was, in this regard, the caliph of the Messenger of God. 128 It was the creation of a new institution, not the inheritance of an old one, that made Abu Bakr the successor to the Prophet. Abd al-Raziq also asserted that it made Abu Bakr the first

127 128

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 87. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 95.

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king in Islam. 129 This was a scandalously impertinent claim. Traditional Sunni narratives cast Abu Bakr as the first of four rightly-guided caliphs. These were the caliphs who presided over a golden age of Islama time when the umma was ruled in accordance with Islamic customs and institutions. After the rightly-guided caliphate, the caliphs throne was usurped by the powerful Umayyad clan, based in Damascus. They made the caliphate a hereditary office, thereby transforming the caliph into a king. From this period onward, the umma was governed by the same mundane, monarchical institutions that ruled over other communitiesnot the system of governance proper to Islam. By calling Abu Bakr Islams first king, Abd al-Raziq knowingly dissolved the assumed periodization of Islamic history, according to which the golden age of the rightly-guided caliphs was followed by the decline into monarchical rule under the Umayyads. He argued, instead, that the period of monarchy began with the death of the Prophet. Abd al-Raziqs intention, however, was not to claim that Abu Bakrs moral status was equal to that of the reviled Umayyads. Rather, the point was that there is no real distinction between caliph and king. Both terms name a ruler over a nation possessing political and civil unity. 130 Whether one calls this ruler caliph or king, his authority is political, resting upon purely upon awe-inspiring and intimidating force. 131 Abu Bakr was no exception: If you have noticed how the taking of the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr was accomplished and his authority established, it will have become plain to you that it was an oath taking of a political, kingly sort, having all the characteristics of a newly constituted state, and that it came to be only as governments come to be, upon the foundations of force and the sword. 132 Abd al-Raziq explained that Abu Bakr rose above many other contenders to fill the power vacuum left after the Prophets death. Traditional narratives tend to focus on the oath of allegiance pledged to Abu Bakr, suggesting that he became caliph with the ummas full support, and did not need to resort to force. Once again, Abd al-Raziq used source criticism to debunk this narrative.
129 130

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 70. 131 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 25. 132 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 92.

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The classical sources of Islamic history, he explained, reveal that there was no consensus about how the umma should be governed upon the Prophets death. Most Arab tribes rejected the need to maintain the tribal unity Muhammad had forged. 133 Even the leadership at Medina raised similar doubts. When the Ansar and the Muhajirun disputed about which group had the right to lead, a member of the Ansar proposed that the umma be split in two. Both parties ultimately rejected this proposal, but the fact that it was raised shows that maintaining the unity of the umma was not a foregone conclusion. Abu Bakr did, eventually, receive the oath of allegiance from the people of Medina. But even some Medinans, like Ali ibn Abu Talib and Sad ibn Ubadah, refused to make the oath. 134 Clearly, then, Abu Bakrs support was not universaleven in the city of Medina. Ali and Sads withholding of the oath of fealty to Abu Bakr was regarded as unimportant, Abd al-Raziq argued, because no one considered the caliphate a religious office. The Medinans understood themselves to be setting up a secular, worldly government: Abu Bakr did not claim, nor did any others of the important men of the people, that the command over Muslims was a religious office, or that rebellion of it was rebellion against religion. 135 It was known to Muslims at that time that they were proceeding to set up a secular worldly government [ ] , nothing more. For this reason, they considered rebellion against it, and opposition to it, lawful. They knew that they were but differing in regard to on of the concerns of this life, not in a matter of religion, and that they were disputing only concerning a political matter that did not affect their religion or disturb their faith. 136 This is why the classical sources do not describe Ali or Sad, as apostates. Had allegiance to the caliphate been considered a religious obligation, Ali and Sad would have committed apostasy. Other rebels against Abu Bakr, however, are considered apostates in the classical sources. These rebels were members of the tribes outside of Medina. They are described as apostates [ ] ,
133 134

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 86. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 93. 135 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 94. 136 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 93-94.

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or renouncers of Islam. Abu Bakr, we are told, as the authorized successor to the Prophet Muhammad, was compelled to wage a series of wars against these tribes. These are the famous ridda warsthe wars of apostasy. Ultimately, Abu Bakr emerged the victor, thereby saving the unity of the Arabs and the predominance of Islam. Once again, Abd al-Raziq argued that these stories neglect historical evidence to the contrary. The historical sources indicate that not all of these rebels were in reality apostates, turning infidels [ ] against God and His Messenger. 137 These indications are subtle; in order to recognize them, a researcher must read these sources against the grain of popular assumptions. Abd al-Raziq referred to these counter-narrative deposits within the classical sources as firebrands, or glowing embers [ ] 138 : How much we are conscious of the obscurity of history and its wrongdoing, as we attempt search diligently into what history has related of those men who rebelled against Abu Bakr and were styled apostates, and of those wars of theirs that were styled the wars of apostasy. However, an occasional firebrand [ ] from the light of truth is ever tossed forth into the dark recesses of history; some day the ulema will turn towards this glowing ember [ ] . And let us hope that in the light of this fire they will find guidance. 139 Abd al-Raziq cited the case of Malik ibn Nuwairah as one of these glowing embers. He is typically regarded as an apostate. Despite his labeling, classical sources show that Malik announces, with complete explicitness . . . that he still continues in Islam, but that he will not pay the zakat to the master of Khalid (Abu Bakr). 140 Would an apostate insist that he was still a Muslim? Many historical commentaries explain that the rebels apostatized by refusing to pay zakatone of the acknowledged pillars of Islam. Once again, Abd al-Raziq turned to Abu Bakrs social environment to challenge this thesis. He conceded that zakat is an essential duty that all Muslims must perform, but argued that not all of Abu Bakrs opponents withheld zakat with the
Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 97. I translate qabas [ ] as both firebrand, and glowing ember, in the passage cited below, only for the sake of rendering better English style. Hans Wehr gives firebrand, and live coal, as possible meanings. The idea is that these muted themes in historical sources are remnants of the light of truth, ready to ignite more material and provide more light. 139 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 97-98. 140 Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 98.
138 137

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intention of neglecting their religious duties. Indeed, Malik insisted that he refused to pay zakat to Abu Bakr. Contemporary Arabian tribal custom make this qualification significant. According to these customs, weak tribes would acknowledge the authority of dominant tribes by paying them tribute. Hence, Malik refused to pay Abu Bakr the zakat, not because he shirked the religion of Islamindeed, he explicitly insisted the contrarybut because he refused to acknowledge Abu Bakrs leadership over his tribe. It is not the case, therefore, that all of Abu Bakrs wars against the tribes were wars against apostasy. Many of these wars were fought between Muslims, in a contest for political authority. That affair was, then, a contest which was other than religious: it was a contest between Malik, the Muslim who remained firm in his religion, but who was from the Tribe of Tamim, and between Abu Bakr, the Qurayshi, who was setting up an Arab state, the leaders of which were from the Quraysh. It was a dispute concerning the kingship of a king, not concerning rules of religion nor principles of faith. 141 Moreover, in Abu Bakrs milieu, the doctrine of zakat being an essential pillar of Islam had not acquired the weight of centuries of tradition that it has today. Muslims were in the earliest stages of determining the meaning of Islamic identity. Accordingly, Umar was unsure of Abu Bakrs decision to fight the recalcitrant tribes, and asked him How can you fight against these men, since the Messenger of God said, I was commanded to fight against men until they say, There is no God but God. 142 This question reveals that the essential features of Muslim identity were still up for grabs as Abu Bakr embarked upon the Ridda wars. With the hindsight of wellestablished theological doctrine, it makes sense to say that Abu Bakr chose to confront Muslims who had abandoned their basic religious duties. In Abu Bakrs time, however, the propriety of his decision was ambiguous, and its correctness could have been reasonably challenged on religious grounds. Indeed, given Abd al-Raziqs belief that the Prophet Muhammad allowed the tribes

141 142

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 98. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 99.

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under the Islamic fold to govern themselves, one could argue that apostates like Malik ibn Nuwairah actually adhered to the Islamic tradition, as the caliph chose to reject it.

6. Conclusion This paper has attempted to improve upon the previous descriptions of the arguments put forward in Abd al-Raziqs Islam and the Sources of Authority. Previous studies have mentioned Abd al-Raziqs upbringing in a prominent political family, and the fact that he attended the Egyptian University, but have failed to describe the ways in which Abd al-Raziqs writing reflected his life. This paper has argued that the ends and means of persuasion, in Islam and the Sources of Authority, were determined by Abd al-Raziqs involvement in the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the Egyptian University. A close reading of Islam and the Sources of Authority shows that he referred little to European authors, but it also reveals that his arguments were broadly shaped by European patterns of reasoning. For example, Abd al-Raziq assumed a progressive view of the history of civilization. This enabled him to judge Islamic political institutions as backwards, 143 and since they are not based on the most recent conclusions arrived at by the minds of men. 144 Moreover, Abd al-Raziq revered scientific inquiry as the most reliable means of arriving at knowledge that can be used to reform and develop society. Following other European scholars, he classified history as scientific discipline, and believed that it had the potential to recover a nations authentic identity from literary sources of the past. Though Islam and the Sources of Authority is thoroughly shaped by European patterns of reasoning, it is an original work that attempts to synthesize them with Islamic styles of argumentation. Abd al-Raziq reached singular conclusions, which he arrived at by his unique, hybridized style of reasoning. He did not simply repeat the theses of European scholars. This brings us back to the observations of Abd al-Raziqs critics, who loudly protested to his citations
143 144

Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 31. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islm wa-us l al-hukm [Islam and the Sources of Authority], 103.

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of T. W. Arnold. In one sense, they blew two references to a non-Muslim work way out of proportion. In another, however, their observations hit the mark. The point of highlighting the Arnold citations was not to argue that Abd al-Raziqs work was derivative. Rather, the point was that it was innovativethat something new was happening in his work. By the standards of Abd al-Raziqs critics, his path-breaking investigations were confusing and condemnable. Others might disagree with their condemnation, but it must be admitted that they were right to suggest that Abd al-Raziqs innovative reasoning stemmed from his engagement with European scholarship.

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