NATIONAL COMMISSION ON

TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES

Minutes of the March 2, 2004 Meeting

The Chair called the Commission to order at 9:08 a.m. All Commissioners were in
attendance.

Minutes. Commissioner Roemer asked that he be allowed to append the Monheim and
Gonzales letters to the minutes. The Vice Chair stated that the practice of appending
items to the minutes is generally not a useful one, but noted that he in fact had started the
practice, and so therefore could not object to Commissioner Roemer's desire to do so in
this case. Commissioner Roemer's submissions were agreed to. Commissioners Ben-
Veniste, Gorelick, and Kerrey submitted additional amendments to the minutes. The
minutes of the February 10 and February 24 meetings were approved.

Team 2 Presentation. Team Leader Kevin Scheid delivered a TS/SCI presentation on

the status of his team's investigative findings and policy recommendations. Team
members Lorry Fenner, Gordon Lederman, and Lloyd Salvetti participated in the
presentation.

Policy Discussion. The Executive Director introduced a staff strawman of major policy
ideas for the Commission's consideration. He emphasized that the purpose of the
discussion was not to arrive at policy recommendations, but to reach a consensus on
which topics the Commission will try to shape—or reshape—on the national agenda.

Topics 1 & 2: Defining our National Strategy, Bringing Foreign Policy Back In

On Terrorism and the Muslim World. The Executive Director stated that the
Commission can perform a service by accurately characterizing the threat, defining
objectives in the war on terror, and determining metrics for success. The Vice Chair
noted that the American people do not understand the phenomenon of terrorism. The
Commission must tackle the question of what kind of enemy we face: How do they
organize? How are they financed? How do they recruit? Why do they hate us so much?
Commissioner Lehman observed that it was the right approach to state the problem in
plain language that the general public can understand. Commissioner Gorelick added that
the Commission must address the dynamism of the enemy and the government's ability
to adapt to such change. She suggested that the Commission introduce the metric of
catastrophic terrorism into the lexicon, adding that what the government would have to
do to end all terrorism would result in the kind of world in which we would not want to
live.

Commissioner Kerrey noted that the Commission should 1) not insult the very people in
the Islamic world we are trying to influence, and 2) tell the truth about the threat we face.
Commissioner Gorton suggested that the Commission return to the definition of

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terrorism. He added that terrorism is employed by many groups for many reasons; the
real problem America faces is sympathy for al Qaeda in the Muslim world.
Commissioner Fielding stated that if the Commission can help people truly understand
the dynamic of Islamic terrorism, it would be a powerful incentive to keep the nation on
alert. Commissioner Roemer added that this is a war of ideas; the United States ought
not take on a war with a religion.

On U.S. Foreign Policy. The Vice Chair noted that the Commission is mandated to
examine American diplomacy. He suggested that the Commission make foreign policy
recommendations that flow from the 9/11 story. Commissioner Gorelick noted that
people in the Muslim world evaluate the United States based on their exposure to
American commercialism, movies, and the military. She added that the United States has
not been a benign presence in these societies for the past two decades, and we need more
tools than we currently have. The United States also needs a message, and she concluded
by urging the Commission to explore when the "national interest" (such as the strong
U.S. interest in oil from Saudi Arabia to the exclusion of other considerations) is not in
the "national interest." The Vice Chair added that the national interest is multi-faceted at
any given time.

On the Middle East Peace Process. Commissioner Lehman asked if the Commission
should take on this issue. Commissioner Gorton suggested the Commission stay out of
this debate. Commissioner Kerrey noted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been used
by Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. The Vice Chair stated that U.S. foreign policy has
consequences, and it is important for the American people to understand that. He didn't,
for example, recall any opposition to placing U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, but this
apparently was a trigger for Bin Ladin.

On Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Vice Chair cautioned that the Commission needs to
be careful on the Saudi question, as the attitude toward Saudi Arabia has hardened. For
decades, the heart of the deal had been oil versus protection of the monarchies. The deal
is changing now, and the dialogue is beginning to deepen. He noted that the United
States should never back off on its values. He went on to observe that the ultimate
nightmare would be if a radical Islamic regime came to power in Pakistan and gained
control of its nuclear arsenal. Commissioner Gorelick stated that the United States should
have issued to Pakistan in 1998 the ultimatum it did in 2001—you are either with us or
against us.

Commissioner Lehman suggested that the Commission take the issue of Saudi Arabia and
financing head-on. Commissioner Roemer added that the problem with madrassas should
also be addressed.

On Leadership. Commissioner Kerrey implored the Commission to consider when

diplomacy is no longer an option and when the nation's leaders need to take additional
steps. Commissioner Gorelick stated that if Presidents Clinton or Bush had asked for a
declaration of war prior to 9/11, they wouldn't have gotten it. Commissioner Kerrey said
that it is the job of the president to make the case. Commissioner Gorton noted that it will

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be highly controversial to make judgments about what should have been done, adding
that what the Commission can do effectively is provide recommendations for future
presidents.

Topic 4: Protecting Security and Preserving Liberties

The PA TRIOTAct. Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated that it was within the

Commission's mandate to look at the PATRIOT Act. He suggested that the Commission
look at the level of intelligence before the legislation and then examine whether the
legislation has enhanced information sharing. Commissioner Fielding suggested that the
Commission outline the debate and make constructive recommendations. Commissioner
Gorelick stated that there were a lot of PATRIOT Act provisions that are helpful; the
problem is that they vest a lot of power in the government. She suggested that the
Commission determine if there is adequate congressional oversight and mechanisms for
ensuring that these powers are properly used. Commissioners Ben-Veniste and Roemer
also expressed their concern regarding the need for proper checks and balances.

On Data Mining, Privacy. Commissioner Gorton noted that the Markle Foundation had
made a lot of progress in this area. He suggested that the Commission determine the areas
in which it can add the most value. The Vice Chair agreed that the Commission does not
have a comparative advantage in this area and that it ought not be a central question for
the Commission.

Topic 5: National Defense

Commissioner Gorelick suggested that multilateral cooperation be added to this section.

Topic 6: Living in a World of Risk

On Homeland Defense. The Vice Chair stated that a key problem with homeland
security is that policymakers are unwilling to make judgments about priorities; to do so is
too hard and very risky. He added that policymakers must make such judgments precisely
because they cannot protect everything or receive intelligence on every threat.
Commissioner Fielding added that devising priority lists runs the risk of such lists being
exploited by terrorists.

On Public-Private Partnerships. Commissioner Gorelick stated that the problem of

infrastructure protection was missing from this section. She suggested that the
government's hands-off approach to infrastructure protection in the private sector was
misguided; businesses don't sit down and share vulnerabilities. If the government
invested a little money, she added, it would pay off. The Chair reminded the Commission
of the excellent work that Team 8 member Emily Walker had been doing in this area.

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Commissioner Roemer noted that the basic premise of the legislation Randall Yim
proposed at the Drew hearing was good.

Topic 8: Treatment of Suspected Terrorists

On the Prosecution of Captured Terrorists. Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated that this

question pushes the bounds of the Commission's mandate, and that the Commission
would probably need to wait for the Supreme Court ruling before making any judgments.
The Chair and Commissioner Roemer agreed that there would not be enough time to
delve into this subject area. The Vice Chair and Commissioner Gorelick stated that the
Commission could not ignore the issue, although it should not go into much detail. The
Vice Chair added that the Commission should recognize the demands of the war on
terrorism. The United States has been condemned by much of the world because there is
no legal process in place. Commissioner Kerrey suggested the Commission address the
situation in Guantanamo.

On the 9/11 Plotters. The Executive Director urged the Commission to specifically
discuss the fate of the captured participants in the 9/11 plot. Commissioner Fielding said
that the Commission should name the people and state what they did; he was not sure that
the Commission needed to go further than that.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated his concern regarding the limitations on what the
Commission could say in the final report because the Moussaoui trial. The General
Counsel mentioned that the Levin committee had met once and would consider this and
other declassification issues.

Extension. The Chair recounted recent developments with the extension: Last week, the
White House spoke to the Speaker, and although he was not personally for an extension,
they were optimistic that he would go along with it. Over the weekend, the Speaker's
spokesman indicated a change of heart, and then he declared that the Senate bill would be
"dead on arrival." Senators McCain and Lieberman attached the Commission's extension
to the highway extension, and after a number of phone conversations, the Speaker agreed
to extend the reporting date but not the termination date.

The Executive Director had received assurances from the Speaker's staff regarding an
extension of the termination date. The decision could not wait because of the highway
extension was pending and the Senate was about to go out of session. The Chair and Vice
Chair had ten minutes to make a judgment, and they decided to proceed on the basis of
these assurances from the Speaker's office.

The Vice Chair stated that the letter from the Speaker was unsatisfactory because it does
not allow for an adequate wind-up period. Commissioner Roemer stated that the
Commission should have secured the extra 30 days before accepting the deal. The
Executive Director explained that by the time the Speaker had agreed to the July 26
deadline, there wasn't enough time to walk him through the issue of a close-down phase.
The Chair stated that the Vice Chair and Commissioner Thompson would join him for a

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meeting with the Speaker that afternoon to discuss these outstanding matters. The Vice
Chair thanked Commissioner Thompson for his assistance with the Speaker. The Vice
Chair added that the Speaker had heard that the Commission was planning to slip past the
statutory deadline. At that afternoon's meeting, they would tell the Speaker that the
Commission intends to honor the July 26 deadline.

Commissioners Ben-Veniste Roemer stated that the Commission should not accept
anything less than S.2136. The Vice Chair agreed. Commissioners Ben-Veniste,
Gorelick, and Roemer expressed his concern about the declassification process.
Commissioner Roemer added that the Commission has not reached out to the Speaker
enough. The Vice Chair agreed.

Meeting with President and Vice President. The Chair reported that the White House
had not changed its conditions for meetings with the President and Vice President. He
added that the Administration had suggested flexibility on the issue of time, but it
remained opposed to meetings with the full Commission.

Commissioner Thompson asked if the Administration's rationale for these conditions was
legal, as the meetings might give the appearance of testimony. The General Counsel
stated that this was the case. Commissioner Roemer suggested that the Commission
postpone this decision, adding that the White House would not be able to sustain its
position in the face of public pressure. The Chair and Commissioner Fielding expressed
their belief that the White House would not change its position. The Chair added that he
had tried repeatedly, and the Administration had not moved an inch.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste observed that the interviews (with staff taking the lead and
Commissioners folio wing-up) have gone well, adding that the staff had done an
incredibly good job in this regard. He suggested that the Commission maintain its
position of a meeting with the full Commission and continue its other interviews,
particularly with President Clinton and Vice President Gore. The Vice Chair agreed,
noting that there was some time before the Commission would have to make a decision.

Rice Testimony. Commissioner Kerrey stated that someone needs to testify publicly for
the Administration. Commissioner Ben-Veniste wondered if the Commission should
consider a subpoena. The General Counsel noted that the Commission does not have an
argument based on the need for information; the need is for public dissemination of that
information. The Chair stated that he would pressure that White House as much as he
could, but he wouldn't vote for a subpoena. Commissioner Fielding said that he did not
know what purpose it would serve to subpoena someone the Commission knows will
resist on a legal basis. He added that the Commission cannot say that it needs Dr. Rice's
public testimony in order to conduct its work.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste again suggested that the Commission vote on a subpoena and
hope that the White House reverses its position. Commissioner Kerrey stated that he was
not prepared to vote for a subpoena; it is the Administration's loss to prevent her public
testimony. Commissioners Gorelick and Roemer suggested that the Commission allow a

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longer period of time for Dick Clarke's testimony. Commissioner Ben-Veniste withdrew
his suggestion to subpoena Dr. Rice, but he reiterated the need for a fair and balanced
hearing.

The Executive Director added that the staff did not yet perceive the need for another
interview.

The Chair adjourned the meeting at 4:30 p.m.

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