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THE HOOK

A Company, 39th Combat Engineer Bn. L.Z. Young August 1968

By Morris Bealmer

This document was written May, 2007 and is dedicated to the men who served with the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) and supporting units in the Republic of South Vietnam. It is published for their use only. All rights are reserved.

Morris Bealmer CSM, USA(RET) 39 Engineer Battalion April 1968-April 1969


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Fountain. Colorado May, 2007

INTRODUCTION
That the passage of almost thirty nine years has failed to diminish the memories of THE HOOK and the incidents that took place there is amazing. It is also proof, as evidenced by the email messages from the participants in those incidents, of how profoundly their lives were and in many cases still are affected by them. When the author (if I may be so bold as to call myself that) decided to assemble these messages in a format that would let the reader better understand the story as witnessed by those who were there, I thought it would be an easy task of simply copying and pasting those messages. I now understand that to do true service to this story would require the skills and resources of someone much more accomplished in this type of effort than me. I should also tell you now that I was not present at The Hook when these encounters took place. When the September, 1968 ambush occurred I had just been assigned as S-2 Sergeant and was stationed at Chu Lai. Prior to that I was a Platoon Sergeant with Company D and had worked on the first section of the road west from Tam Ky. I believe my interest in the story is fueled by the intense feeling of helplessness I felt that night and by having the unhappy duty the following day of relaying the names and personal info of the KIAs and WIAs to higher headquarters. I hope that printing the names of those involved in this story will cause no harm. I feel that everyone involved in these incidents deserves recognition for their sacrifices and I hope they have received it. One additional caution. This story was assembled, if that is the correct word, for the enjoyment of former members of the 39 th Engineer Battalion and supporting units. The terminology used might not be understood by other readers and very few of those born after 1970 will have any idea about the controversy that surrounded the war in Vietnam. It is not a guts and glory tale. It is a representation of what many who served in combat engineer units faced in Vietnam. So here is the story as best I can tell it. I apologize in advance for any mistakes. To avoid making too many of these I have printed the messages in their original format where possible. Thank you. Morris Bealmer

FIGHT, BUILD, AND DESTROY

THE HOOK

As I began this literary adventure I realized I needed to explore my reason for committing to such a task. Neither my education nor my background would indicate that I have any great talent as a writer. My undergraduate education was in Business Administration and my work history as a surveyor, soldier, and postal clerk do not identify me as a budding author. But these papers are not written for a commercial purpose, nor for an academic exercise or paper, but rather for a desire to see the events described in e-mails arranged so that the reader gets a sense of how this all occurred. Tom Brokow has written a bestseller about World War II participants that describes the greatest generation and we hear repeated references to our current military as the best one ever fielded. I don't wish to detract from the accomplishments of these individuals, I am sure they have earned these accolades; however, I feel the young soldiers of the Vietnam Era also represent a great generation. I am not talking about myself, a career soldier who was bound to do what he was ordered, but rather about the draftee and the young enlistee of that time. They did not burn their draft card, flee to Canada, or seek deferment through favorable treatment. (In the early 70s I advised a reserve armored engineer company whose educational level was 16 years, the Combat Engineer Battalion I advised had more college graduate engineers in its enlisted ranks than most engineer OCS classes, and the local Army Reserve Command was full of those fortunate enough to come from influential families). The men I am talking about accepted their responsibilities, perhaps begrudgingly in some cases, left their homes and families and packed off thousands of miles to fight in a dirty, not so little, war that had little support among their fellow citizens back in the United States. For the combat engineer, this often meant moving into a virtual hole in the ground covered with sand bags supported by wooden beams that afforded minimal protection against a direct hit by enemy mortar fire. These bunkers were arranged behind apron fence and concertina wire that was supported by Claymore and other anti-personnel mines, fences that enemy sappers were willing to try to breach if the opportunity presented itself. Every morning he would be out of his rack before daylight, perform his daily ablutions, probably with cold water in a tin pan or his helmet, grab some hurriedly prepared breakfast and load up for the days work. If he was lucky enough that his squad didnt have mine sweep then he could probably look forward to an exciting day filled with duties such as burning shit, assembling culvert, reinforcing the bunkers or perimeter, pulling vehicle and equipment maintenance, or many of the other tasks that were required to sustain 100 to 150 men located on a small outpost in an extremely unfriendly environment. Of course, when the units conducting mine sweep reported that enough road had been cleared that the work of maintaining that section could begin, he grabbed his steel pot, flack jacket, and weapon, climbed aboard the back of the squad vehicle, and headed off to the job site that was probably either knee deep in mud or choking with laterite dust. On the way there he could keep his mind occupied with hopes that no undetected mines had been left for his vehicle to discover, that the enemy had not crept in behind the sweep team to set up a hasty ambush in hopes of knocking off a friendly vehicle or two, or that the seemingly always present sniper might finally get lucky and get off an accurate shot. All of this designed to keep the mind clear and the pucker factor high. We will discuss in more detail what the mine sweep personnel have been doing when we get to the main body. And we do not want to ignore the rest of the unit. The

maintenance, medical, supply, mess, commo, admin, heavy junk, water point, etc.; all of those people who share this environment, eat the dirt, travel the same roads and suffer the same shelling. They deserve some kudos also. So, throw in a noon meal of Cs, another 5 or 6 hours of labor, then our man returns to the LZ (along the same route with the same opportunities for enemy encounters) for an evening meal that is hopefully not Cs again. Then there is maintenance to be performed on weapons and equipment, a briefing by his squad leader on the current situation, assignment of work details for the next day and of security duties for that night. Then, hopefully, he will have enough time and light to read his mail if he was fortunate enough to receive any on the re-supply chopper or truck that day. Communication with friends and family was spotty at best. The rest of the day and night, with the exception of 4 to 6 hours perimeter security, were his to rest up for the next days activities. Unless of course, there was an alert, a probe against the perimeter, a stray mortar round to keep everyone alert, or maybe one of the other guards saw a shadow move and killed it with a burst of ammo or a Claymore mine. So in addition to suffering the same or perhaps even worse living conditions that the WW 2 vets faced, he also had to contend with the same types of enemy weaponry that our current forces face. All of that plus virtually no support from the home front. Despite this, and contrary to popular opinion, the war was being won when a political decision was made to stop attacking North Vietnam and pull out all US Forces. This ensured the resulting loss of the war. So those who denigrate the Vietnam Veteran, at least those that I served with during the period 1965-1970, do not know what they are talking about. As you read this document, you might conclude that I am just another bitter, disgruntled Vietnam Veteran who hates the military and everything about it. Nothing could be further from the truth. The army was very good to me. When I retired in 1977 after 21 years service it was only because I did not want to change my MOS as CSM to that of a staff SGM, a move that my medical condition required if I wished to stay in the army. I am proud to say that during my assignments as cannoneer, heavy equipment operator, rifleman, pioneer, combat demo specialist, squad leader, platoon sergeant, intel sergeant, first sergeant and command sergeant major I never requested nor was I assigned to a unit higher than battalion level. So I am not familiar with what transpires at brigade and higher levels. But my experience at battalion and lower levels is that most of the personnel are good people interested in doing a good job. Why the September, 1968 engagement was reported the way it was is above my pay grade, I simply copy what was recorded by others. I do know from personal experiences that RVN forces did not always react in a way one might desire when they were supposed to provide security for your work force. So, I leave it to the reader to judge the merit of my writing. As I said, I was not on site so I am sure there can be many corrections to what happened. I also realize that my description of the day of a combat engineer is not allinclusive, I only try to catch the essence of it based on personal experience and observations made during two tours in Vietnam. I gain nothing from misrepresentations. This is merely an effort to paint a word picture of something that happened 39 years ago that will perhaps give me a better understanding of how it was concluded. It has always bothered me. So with no further hesitation, lets see what everyone has to say about it. The Hook: I don't know who named it because I was there in 1971 and it was called that when I got there but I was One of the last 39th'er to go around it because my platoon finished the road. A sharp bend of the road that resembled a

fish hook I guess, where the road crossed a stream over 6 60" culverts that we replaced with a 40' bridge". 1 Men, especially soldiers, are inclined to give descriptive, although rather generic nicknames to places and or events that hold a special meaning to them. Such names as "The Gap", "Red Hill", "Fat City", all are recognizable to certain individuals. "The Hook" is one such place/event. One indication of its significance can be found in the following sentences: "There was an abandoned dozer with 39th markings in the stream a couple of hundred yards west of the culvert site. I don't remember the company but I was told that it was from a platoon that was ambushed and wiped out there. I'm sorry if I am opening old wounds but if anyone remembers that and can talk about it I would like to know what happened before me." 2 And another: D-7 in the river was operated by Spec Bilyeu (spelling?) from HQ Co in 68. Late Aug, early Sept time frame. A Co was at Young and had a bad ambush there, An air strike was called in on the D-7 to keep it out of NVA hands There are others here that know more about the hook than I do, From that period I got there in time to report the equip't on deadline report to Grp, I was Material Readiness NCO at the time.. 3

This email is from a soldier who worked the area by The Hook in 1970. As you can see, the same concerns were there during this period. Dear John Lewis, Can you recall the date that the ambush was on the road in 1971 and what kind of equipment was the 137th using to bring in fill from the borrow pit? I was at Tam Ky running a 290m from the pit at this time. I was driving 5 ton with the 137th and our sleeping tent was under the big guns, leaving little to sleep by.( this was end of season 1970) We use to back out loaded 5 tons down the road to the hook following mine swipes for a final test for mines. The hook was a area of great concerns for us with ambushes. We got flooded out at the end of season and had to be flown out on choppers a few days later. We were told that VC had damn up north of hook and then relieved it, what ever but it wipe us out. The Hook has left many nightmares since 1970.4

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In answer to the query above, the following email was posted. I wanted to include it because once again the writer gives such a great description of how our forces tried to overcome the VCs efforts to destroy the road. I arrived in country Jan 9 1971 with 2 MOS's 1331 Combat Engineer Platoon Leader and 1542 Infantry Platoon Leader due to being assigned to an infantry battalion at Fort Knox before being shipped to Nam. The Colonel looked at my personel file and said I see that you are Infantry qualified; I have just the place for you. The next day I was on a Huey for Tien Phuoc which was on the road west of Tam Ky past LZ Young and the Hook. For the first month or so we finished rebuilding the runway that was flooded during rainy season, we also added a Cobra gunship refueling and re arming apron at the north end of the runway. We lived on the artillery fire base that had the 8" and 175mm self propelled howitzers I don't remember the artillery outfits unit number. Around the first of March we started working on the road. D company was at Tam Ky with third platoon at Tien Phuoc we would mine sweep and meet at the abandoned village by LZ Young. We usually finished the mine sweep by noon and then worked on the road the rest of the day. We built rock head walls at the ends of all of the culverts and the 137th came in and raised the road east of the hook to the borrow pit. There were 6 60" culverts at the hook, on two different occasions the VC blew one of the culverts and then mined the area to get us when we fixed the culvert. We replaced the two temporary bridges between the hook and Tien Phuoc with steel I beam and wooden deck bridges and we dug out the culverts at the hook and built a 40' bridge at the hook with 2 20" spans, a pier in the middle using Concrete footings, wooden piers and steel I beams and wooden deck. Then we added 6" of 2" minus rock to the road and shot it with pentaprime and sprinkled it with sand so that the tar wouldn't track. One of the rock hauls was ambushed at the hook with one of the drivers being shot and wrecking his truck. The mine sweeps were at LZ Young when that happened so the gun truck went to the ambush and I went to the top of LZ Young to relay the radio traffic because the mountains around the hook would block the radio signals. We found a lot of IED's in the road and one time a command det was set off with SSGT Bernard on top of it. Spec 5 Demo man Barnett tried to run across the rice patty and cut the wires that were visible but the enemy set it off before he could get to the wires. After the road was finished third platoon moved from Tien Phuoc to Tam Ky to be with the rest of the Company. I have pictures of the bridge that was built at the hook but I don't have high speed to send them. In August I was transfered to C Company to the NDP that overlooked the My Lai village site and you could see the South China Sea from it. I'll write about finishing the road around the Batangan Peninsula at some other time. Thanks5 This would probably be the correct place to get a little background information about "The Hook" and the road that it was a part of. In April of 1968 Co.D, 39th Engineer Battalion moved from LZ Baldy to Tam Ky and began work on a small dirt road (Route 533) heading west to the town of Tien Phouc. The road was a vital supply route to the area it traversed and the enemy was willing to go to great lengths to stop the work of friendly forces trying to keep it open. Most of the small bridges had been destroyed and the road needed to be widened to
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accommodate the passage of military traffic. Although there were some instances of enemy attempts at interference with the work on this section, other than a few mines (or IEDs), sniping, attempts to blow culverts, and some heavier fire on one occasion, no major delays occurred. The first section of the road was satisfactorily upgraded and in August 1968 Co. A moved to LZ Young and begin construction of the remaining portion of the road. (Authors note: as a member of Co D, I was more than happy to see someone else take on the rest of this road. Although I traveled the last section only one time, the terrain was such that it was obviously a dangerous place.) "The Hook" was a part of this section. This is also a good time to explain how to engineer companies operated under the conditions imposed upon them in Vietnam. While the major objective was the upgrading of the roads there were many obstacles that had to be overcome first. Before any construction work could begin the roads had to be cleared of mines and other obstacles. This was a daily task. Although the terrain dictated exactly how this was accomplished, most units followed a fairly common procedure, at least on roads of this type. One platoon was normally assigned the task of clearing the road. This platoon would be formed as follows: two or three soldiers would form the point and walk ahead of the rest of the platoon to provide an early warning of any surprises. A squad minus would be placed on each flank of the road for security. At least two individuals would be assigned to mine detector duty and with each mine detector another individual would follow to probe for any mines detected. Following these would be the demolition man whose job was to destroy any mines. The next part of the party would be vehicular. First would come the proof trucks (more on these later). The arrangement of the rest of the vehicles would be as the platoon leader desired, normally the three-quarter ton with 50 caliber machine gun and the platoon leaders jeep with the M-60 machine gun. This is a very simplistic description of a mine sweep. Unfortunately the situation seldom lent itself to simple solutions. But first let's talk about the proof trucks.

"Oh the loaded 5 tons that were driven backwards after mine sweep to check the road were called proof trucks and the drivers got $35 hazardous duty pay extra each month the same as the demo man. Everyone was volunteering to proof truck drive because they got the extra pay and they didn't have to walk mine sweep. Mine sweep! Walking the road all exposed, swinging the detectors, getting a hit and then having to probe the hit to see if it was positive or not then if it was positive putting a 1/4 block of C4 on it and blowing it in place. And just think I don't have PTSD. Yeah right." 6 And: "BY THE WAY, DRIVING A 'PROOF' VEHICLE BACKWARDS FULL OF SAND WAS DISCOVERED IN DECEMBER 1966 BY BATTALION MAINTENANCE AFTER A MONTH OR TWO OF TRYING TO WELD REBAR UNDER THE WHEELWELLS TO HOLD SANDBAGS. I BELIEVE BOB CHAPMAN HAD A LOT TO DO WITH COMING UP WITH BOTH SOLUTIONS. I CAN SAY THAT TOO MANY 39THERS WERE

GETTING HURT ON MINESWEEP PROOFING PRIOR TO THAT. INTERESTING THAT THIS SOLUTION WAS STILL BEING USED IN 1971."7 As stated before, describing a mine sweep or road clearing operation is very difficult because many units used in different formations to complete this task. To give the reader a feel of how a typical mine sweep might be conducted, two descriptions are offered. The first was as seen by a member of the operating unit. The second is by a non-engineer who accompanied an engineer unit making a sweep of Route 535 west of LZ Baldy. This is a very interesting description by an individual who is on his first mine sweep and will be followed to its conclusion as this shows how rapidly and violently the situation can change.

"One day I had nothing to do. A day just like many others. I awakened early and after smoking a cigarette I opened a can of Vienna sausages for breakfast. After breakfast I walked to a piss tube to take a leak while I smoked another cigarette. I returned to my bunker to find my partner starting to wake up. When he asked me what I was going to do I told him I might go out with the engineers. He just grunted. My name is Doug. My call sign was Raider Xray Alpha. My buddy and I did forward work for our battalion. The battalion call sign was Raider. Each company in turn was Raider Alpha, Raider Bravo, Raider Charlie and Raider Delta. Our call sign was Raider Xray signifying that we were a forward element. Some times we didn't have much to do. After daylight the engineers started moving out. They were trying to open a road from LZ Baldy west toward the Laotian border. I had spoken with a couple of engineers and they said I could ride along with them. You have to see them in operation to believe what they do. After the point men move out the minesweepers follow behind. They carry metal detectors and move them in a wide arc, swinging from one side to the other and back again. Headsets connected to the metal detectors alert them to possible mines embedded in the roadway. If they get a signal indicating a mine another engineer digs with a bayonet in an effort to locate the mine. C4 is placed to explode the mine in place. But the detectors miss some mines. A five-ton dump truck loaded with dirt follows the minesweepers. This truck is driven backwards. The rear wheels of the truck are supposed to trigger any mine missed by the sweep team.
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Hopefully the weight of the load on the rear tires will trigger the missed mines with little damage to personnel. I bet it's not easy driving in reverse for miles especially when you expect to be blown to kingdom come at any time. Of course progress is slow. We just kind of eased down the road at a snails pace. The minesweepers are walking at a pace slow enough to allow them to hear changes in the tone in their headphones. I was riding in a vehicle with two other guys. I almost got out and walked alongside just to have something to do. But in the oppressive heat and humidity you learn to conserve energy and drink all the water you can. Every one is alert and ready at all times. Any thing is possible and ambushes are a common occurrence. I was ready with my weapon as we moved past a village on our right. There were only old people and children in site. The old people watched us warily. The younger children played in the dirt as children usually do. There weren't any young men in sight. They were hiding somewhere waiting to ambush us or resting in a tunnel after an engagement on the previous night. Another unit had ambush patrols out and had fired on a group of enemy last night killing several. The village set higher than the roadway. As we moved past with the villagers warily watching, tunnel openings were plainly visible in the bank. I couldn't help but wonder why the village was still there. The tunnels should have been blown up to close them. And the villagers evacuated. We finally reached a place where we had to ford a river. Progress halted as patrols and minesweepers moved across the river to check things out. The day before a vehicle had hit a mine on the opposite bank killing three people. Every one wanted to be especially cautious. I was standing on a high spot watching. The high spot was the riverbank during monsoon season when the waters ran very deep. At the time the river was only 15 ft. wide and shallow. The dump truck was setting at the waters edge about 8 ft. to my front. Four feet to the right of the truck was a bomb crater. It was five feet deep with three feet of water standing in the bottom and ten feet across. One of the new guys was talking to me when things started to get hairy. There was a blinding flash followed by a huge explosion. The heavy truck seemed to rise up and float in the air as I watched. Then heavy pieces of metal appeared to rip them selves away from the

truck and fling them selves through the air. Several pieces buried in the ground around me and my friend as the concussion knocked us to the ground. I jumped to my feet in time to see the driver stand up in the truck and scream in pain. The fuel tank had exploded and he was on fire from the waist up. I ran to the truck trying to help the driver. One of the engineers got there right before me and started pulling the burning driver out. I helped him get the driver out of the truck. We dropped him in the bomb crater. The water helped extinguish the flames and cool off the burns. Together we carried him up the roadway and put him down. I started hollering for a medic. We had put him down by a jeep and the medic started working on the driver who was already in shock. The jeep had a radio so I picked up the mike and started calling Dust Off, the med-evac chopper. A lieutenant took the mike away from me and changed the radio to a new push and started talking.. There were several other guys down. I ran back to the truck making sure no one else was in need of help. When I got to the truck it was still burning and the driver's ammo started cooking off. I was startled when the cartridges started popping off and fell in the crater again. There wasn't any one on that side of the truck so I climbed out of the crater and started around the back of the vehicle. A grenade cooked off and the explosion knocked me into the river. I regained my footing and went around to the other side. There were some wounded who were being cared for. One man was lying on his stomach holding his upper body off the ground by resting on his extended elbows. He was bleeding badly from a head wound but appeared to be ok. I returned to the jeep where a medic was taking care of the burned driver. I watched for a while as he treated the man. The med-evac arrived and hovered over a rice paddy. There wasn't any place for him to land. I kept shifting my attention from the driver to the pilot as the medic worked. Finally the pilot indicated he was going to take off. I told the medic that we needed to get the driver aboard as the helicopter was leaving. The medic grabbed the driver's feet so I picked up his upper body and started running backwards as we carried him to the helicopter. We were in the middle of the rice paddy when I fell and all of us took a tumble. We picked him up again and finally got him loaded out. The bird took off in a swirl

as we ducked and ran. At the jeep I looked down at my hands. They were covered with the driver's skin. I wiped both hands against my fatigue shirt. I don't know if he survived or not."8

Another version of the same incident by a member of the unit:

The sweep was over and we had taken a break to eat a bite. I was facing away from the truck eating crations. As the driver started to leave the scene, he let the truck roll backwards a bit ( new drivers always had trouble starting 5-tons on grades w/o rolling back a bit). A 5 ton makes a very distinctive pop sound when starting on a grade IF you let it roll back. This truck made that sound a split second before the explosion. I was standing on the opposite side of a small burm to the right of the 5 ton and maybe 20 feet away, when it went up. The burm was just high enough to shield me from the direct blast, but low enough for the blast to send me flying through the air, landing running with my c-rations still in my hands. A Sgt/E-5 was literally blown by me on fire. Myself and another rolled the Sgt., maybe in a blanket, to put out the diesel fuel fire in/on his clothes. If I remember right, he escaped with minor burns. The driver lost his left ear and maybe the hearing in that ear and had some minor burns. Several others scattered around the immediate area had hearing problems for a while. 9

The two individuals above were talking about the same incident. The quote below refers to the explosion two days earlier that happened on the opposite side of the stream. Both illustrate the destructive power of the mines that were encountered. Although we refer to them as mines, today they would probably be called improvised explosive devices (IED). They were usually very large, 20 plus pounds and emplaced so that any metal in the detonator was far below the surface and extremely hard to locate with the mine detectors. And yes, the driver did survive, there were no K. I .A.s that day.

I remember this day very well like it happened yesterday. I assumed command of"D" Company this day and was with the new Battalion Commander, a Lt. Colonel. He was showing me the river crossing. As we approached the river, a jeep from"C" Company approached us from the other side with the Lieutenant, a sergeant and another soldier. After the Mine was hit by the jeep, we could only find the engine which was about 200 yards from the crater. I will not describe the injuries I saw as it was horrible."10

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So now we have a better understanding of mine sweeps let us take a look at how the upgrading of the road was progressing in 1971, almost three years after the incident that I was interested in. So once again I will copy from the soldier who thought his group was one of the last to work on The HOOK:

When we were finishing the road the battalion would assemble all of the 5 tons from all of the companies and send them full of rock from the quarry to us so that we could rock the road. The rock was called 2" minus because the rock crusher was set at 2" and everything that came out of it was loaded in the trucks. The dust and smaller rocks made it pack very good. We spread the rock 6" thick and then spread pentiprime (tar) on top of it and then spread sand on top of it so that it wouldn't track. In August 1971 one of the rock haul convoys was ambushed at the Hook. One of the drivers was shot and his loaded 5 ton rolled off of the road. D company at Tam Ky had built a gun truck by putting a mine damaged armored APC in the bed of a 5 ton and armor plating the cab. The APC was an armored cav unit and had armored gun turret's on it. It had a minnie gun, two 50 cals and two m-60's. The gun truck was at the village below the site of LZ Young at the time and rushed to the ambush site. I went to the top of LZ Young to relay radio traffic. The Major from the MACV in Tien Phuoc was at the ambush site and was calling in artillery fire. I was monitoring his traffic because I had 3 radios, one on the 3/4 ton and two portable (prc 25's ?) from mine sweep. He gave the coordinates in the wrong order and was calling the artillery on himself. I argued with him on the radio and got him to correct himself. The truck ran off of the road about two hundred yards south? of the culverts on the Tam Ky side. At that same spot a month or so earlier when the 290's were there we had a loaded 290 slip off of the built up road and we had to hook another 290 to the side of it and pull it with a dozer to get it back on the road. In 1971 there were less that 100,000 troops left so there were a lot of empty LZ's. When I came back from RR in July I watched the ceremony of the last Marines leaving Nam at the Da Nang air port. Some times to chase the shadows out of your mind you have to bring them out to the light. When you bring them out to the light you can see them more clearly and deal with them better and heal. "11

So The Hook was still working its evil magic in 1971. For three years this section of road had been a thorn in the side of the American soldier. Not having access to the unit journals that covered this time frame I cannot quote any statistics. These figures are available but having spent time with a staff and knowing that the spot reports initiated at squad level are often not recognizable after traveling up through the many layers of administrative handling I prefer to use the words spoken by the soldiers at ground level. But as a drawdown of US forces began in the early 70s it was surely not a pleasant time for those troops still engaged in upgrading the road around The Hook. I am sure that many of them had the same feelings as expressed in the following quote:

"A flood wiped out the camp (1970) at Tien Pluoc....We had been stressed out because of Charlies threats every day on the road to the hook, I was driving a five ton as I was still new in country by this time. We were living in our equipment surrounded by water. Stranded for some days seem like weeks it was
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dark grey dreary wet to the bones, cold. We was waiting for a hit by Charlie and felt his presence every night the sun went down and all I remember was having a small old empty box that had chocolate chip tollhouse cookies in it that my grandma sent me and was the only package I got in Nam, no mail was being delivered at this point and I remember late one night sticking my face in the bottom of that box and smelling my grandma's home made cookies. There was one last cooking candle light and remember looking in that box, I had the smallest amount of hope in me left. Like the men in that book we found ways to give ourselves hope together we would find it and privately we cried inside. War does that each generation. To this day I can not let these men in uniform go without a package or letter from home." 12

Those of us who have spent some time in beautiful South Vietnam can certainly relate to the writer's comments about how dreary and miserable it could be during monsoon season. Add to that the fear of enemy action, knowing that your security was minimal, and the stress level certainly reaches new heights. It is ironic that he was comparing his situation with that of Willie and Joe in Bill Mauldins World War II book "Up Front". All a soldier wants is to survive his current situation and get back home in one piece. Tactical, strategic, and geopolitical plans have no place in his thoughts; he just wants his misery to end. What generals in Saigon or politicians in Washington, DC had planned is of no importance to him.

So now we have arrived, by traveling backward through the events that occurred at The Hook to the enemy encounter that I wished to investigate. Although I was only a distant observer and not a participant, the incident has always bothered me. I remember clearly, almost thirty nine years later, when the runner from Battalion came and told me I was needed in the S- 2 section because something bad had happened at L. Z. Young. The remainder of that night was spent hoping for a good outcome for the soldiers trapped in the ambush at The Hook. I was not needed. Everything was being handled from the S-3 section and my section could do nothing but wait for the end of engagement, daylight, and the arrival of the dreaded enemy encounter report with its summary of friendly losses. We even turned off our radios (in S-2) to make sure we did not accidentally break squelch on the wrong frequency and reveal the location of one of our own troops. A Company definitely did not need any interference from us that night.

There are, I guess, several reasons for my more than usual interest in this as opposed to the many equally serious engagements the battalion had. First was the realization of how helpless I, and the rest of battalion staff were once the company was in contact in such a situation. Next was my feeling about how inappropriately the matter was handled at division and higher levels. And probably most compelling was when I read the following email:

My Uncle, Randy Farlow, was with Company A, 39th Engineer Battalion in1968 when he was killed in action. I am a IT consultant and former marine. I told my mother that I would help her find anyone who may

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have known him (as she was younger when he was killed). Can anyone help me? 13

And I am proud to say that the response from my fellow 39thers (is that correct?) was immediate, sympathetic, and very informative. Later I will publish some of these, after we have looked at what really occurred during this ambush and the ensuing fight. I would also guess that some private emails were sent from former members of his uncles unit that we, rightfully so, do not have access to. Of course, immediately following his uncle being killed, the commanders involved would have written to his designated next of kin with information about the tragedy but these have a habit of disappearing after so many years. Also, most of the replies to the nephew will also be used to illustrate what was happening and how these individuals absorbed and retained these memories. As a matter of respect, I first planned on withholding individual names. These are easily accessible in the original emails and it was my rather personal decision not to publish them even though they are a matter of public record. At the recommendations of some of the first readers who felt these individuals deserved recognition for their sacrifices I decided to change this policy. I hope no one is offended. There is one other personal note that I would like to add. During my two tours in Vietnam, on the few occasions where it was necessary to expose the soldiers to injury during a possible face-to-face encounter with the enemy, there were always more volunteers than were needed. I do not know if this was peculiar to personnel assigned to combat engineer units that I was fortunate to serve with or not, but it was certainly true. Now some of the answers to the nephews inquiry are posted.

I was with Company A, January '68 through January '69, but my mind is pretty fuzzy regarding faces and names, so I may or may not be of any help. I do seem to recall a "Randy" with his leg in a cast? I don't recall why (i.e., broken/wounded?). I also seem to recall this Randy might have been in a Sergeant Redmonds squad (Name/ Spelling/ Platoon?). My photo's were lost/destroyed in 1973, so any you or your mother might want to share may (may not) help. Sorry for being so unclear, but after returning home I suffered from a form of amnesia the VA associated with PTSS. Even after 30 years, I still have recurring bouts, but now they center around short term memory loss (Global Transient Amnesia). God Bless You and Your Mom, and Good Luck with your search, and Semper Fi. 14

Good luck in broadening your search, and don't give-up. I think we've discussed some of this already, but have you had any luck finding pictures of your uncle that we can publish and maybe jog some memories? Being a vet yourself, you know that many of our
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letters home to family and "close friends" often included pictures, and often identified the names of friends and acquaintances we made during our tours of duty. If necessary, you can also get copies of company rosters and morning reports for specific dates/time frame to help in your search, which are available from the DOA Military Records Center in St. Louis, Mo. 15

That is the day that eight 39thers from A Company were killed near LZ Young. The work party was returning late afternoon and was ambushed. Then the ones that went out from Young to help were ambushed. I remember that 42 NVA were killed that evening. (that number of enemy was confirmed by the Bn Surgeon who was there the next morning) 35 39thers were missing the next morning but were all located my mid day. I hope that someone will give you more info on what happened. I think that someone from our group was there, but what they remember I do not know. My site has a photo of A company leaving ChuLai when they deployed to LZ Young Aug 1968. Also photo of HQ dozer with bullet hole in block and A company truck. Also I have a small article about the ambush that was in the Pittsburgh Press, the unit mentioned was the 198th, but it was the 39th. See the pictures under A Company related at my msn group site. JB's 39th photos.
http://groups.msn.com/JBS39THPHOTOS/
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A link to my site is at the

left of this groups under links. I remember there was a lot of bad feeling about what happened in that ambush, one being from the poor security provided the work crews by the ARVN's.(They left early as night was falling, providing the NVA the chance to set up the ambushes) This I heard from someone from HQ heavy equipment platoon who was a dozer operator during the ambush. I hope you hear from someone who was there and knew your uncle. All of those killed were good soldiers doing a tough job and not getting the credit for it they deserved for serving there country. I hope that someone who knew Randy will get in touch with you and your family16

So what do we have? On September 17, 1968, a platoon of combat engineers and personnel attached to them were returning to LZ Young, their companys base camp, after working all day upgrading an essential road from Tam Ky to Tien Phouc. As they drove into the area known as The Hook, they were ambushed by an entrenched, well armed enemy. Fighting back, they notified their company at LZ Young and a relief force was rapidly assembled. explains what happened next: It is also known that their security, provided by the local Popular Forces, had disappeared. The words of the man leading the workforce returning to base camp

"Let me see if I can add some insight. A Company was upgrading a road from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc (spelling?). Rick Waldrop was the Company Commander. I was the platoon leader of the platoon that was working west of our firebase the day of the attack. About dusk we noticed that all of our local Ruff Puff Vietnamese security forces had disappeared. (They provided perimeter security so that we could use all of our people to work on the road.) We started back to base camp, and had just reached the start of an S curve in the road when the lead truck took a rocket. I was at the rear of the convoy, and when I jumped out to go see what happened, my jeep was also blown up, killing my driver. We all rolled to the
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right to get into the ditch next to the road, and the enemy was in the opposite side ditch. We exchanged shots, rolled grenades back and forth, etc. throughout the night. 2LT Jerry Bright led a relief party from the firebase to try to get to us. Thats probably the group that your uncle was in. Unfortunately, they were ambushed as they came around the S curve and took a lot of casualties. Early the next morning (still dark), we were joined by an armored cav unit commanded by 2LT Tom Jackson. They helped put down suppressing fire and chased most of the enemy away. We were finally able to get Medivac choppers in to take away the wounded, and those of us still walking headed back to the firebase at dawn. Incidentally, the NVA had set up triangulated 50 cal positions, and shot down 1 jet and 2 choppers that were trying to support us. One of our NCOs earned a Silver Star that night for going out onto the trucks and killing enemy soldiers that were trying to come in and kill our wounded. The next day the rest of the armed cav troop swept the woods and found a reinforced NVA bunker complex not far from the road as well as several of the M-14s taken from our troops. Unfortunately, we had many Purple Hearts resulting from that night. No officers were relieved of duty. The incident made the Stars and Stripes as well as several stateside newspapers. I hope this helps."17

So there you have a very clear and concise description of what happened at The Hook. But I am sure that those readers who have experienced combat (especially in Vietnam) are picturing quite a story from the platoon leaders words. I am going to take the liberty to interpret the impression I get from his email. It is quite possible that I am wrong and if this is true let me apologize now. But here is the gut feeling I get from this based on my experiences. In doing so I do not want to turn this into an old soldier and his war stories type of document, I will keep the comparisons short and use them to support rather than to detract from what I consider a great description of the engagement by the platoon leader. First of all, after a long day of work, hurrying back to the relative security of the LZ, knowing that your SECURITY FORCE of indigenous forces had disappeared, was probably not a good feeling. Somehow, the PFS(Popular Forces), RFS(Regional Forces), the Regular Army(ARVNS)and whatever local forces you had to rely on, all had antenna that seemed to warn them when a dangerous situation with the enemy was imminent and that it might be wise to disappear. This was not so much the case during my first tour of duty. You could feel pretty confident about them and on at least one occasion the local forces pulled my fat out of the fire. But I think that by 1968 some Vietnamese had Americanized the war, that is, by observing our actions of more troops, bigger guns and tanks, faster aircraft, they could let us do the serious fighting and they would just try to get through the war alive. (Not a bad philosophy except that they had to quit relying on us to win their war in the 70s when we Vietnamesed it right back to them. We all know what happened then. That was when we, the US Army lost the war!! ) And I may be completely wrong in this, after all I am just an old man looking back almost 40 years, but I remember that nothing pissed me off more than traveling through a larger city with the troops, all of us tired, dirty after not having a regular bath or change of clothes and from riding the dusty road in a convoy, and seeing the Vietnamese military cooling their heels in a safe place. Usually sitting in a shady place, sometimes with a hammock strung between two supports, maybe a girlfriend or wife nearby, tailored fatigues and shiny boots, it always got to me. But back to my far from expert analysis. That they hit the first and last vehicles in the convoy is no surprise, it
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was SOP. I lost my driver (WIA not KIA Thank God) to the same tactic in 65. And that they had another one set up for the relief force was also to be expected. Now from here on I have to leave it to other minds. I have never had to undergo an experience like these soldiers did. The feelings one gets when under fire are unpleasant enough, I can only imagine a night spent under the conditions these men endured. At this point I feel the need to insert another observation or opinion. After getting this far in my writing, I realized that for non-military types, maybe even for soldiers who havent experienced combat, it is hard for them to realize why the events transpired as they did. I guess you could call it the Sylvester S Syndrome, named after the movie star who always came out on top. They wonder why our side just didnt grab a couple of extra weapons, let out a yell, and charge across the road, surviving the automatic weapons fire, killing all of the enemy and rescuing the wounded. Perhaps something like this was attempted, I dont know. But knowing a little about the capabilities of the enemy and his weaponry, I know that the likelihood of such a charge succeeding would be very small. That there were men up, killing the enemy and protecting the wounded, is a testimony to the bravery of the unit. The enemy was obviously well prepared for the ambush and apparently had been given a lot of time to set up their positions by the actions of the PF security force. And given the loss of aircraft to obviously prepositioned weapons indicates to me that this could have been part of a larger plan that wasnt completed because of the resistance by the engineers and cavalry at the ambush site and LZ. Just a wild guess again. So before I make a fool out of myself writing about something I didnt go through, lets look at the observations of a soldier at the LZ:

I was with A Company 12/67 - 1/69, and was Alpha 6's (Captain Waldrop) driver and RTO,and was on LZ Young during the ambush-battle at The Hook. During the fight, I was kept busy on the radio trying to maintain communications with the field, getting and giving information, relaying the Captain's directions, and making sitrep's and requests for support to BN HQ, the infantry, and even to the Vietnamese PF's (Popular Forces) or "Ruff Puffs" that were supposed to be supporting our work group, but who'd bugged out at the outset of the fighting at The Hook. During the fighting, we at CoHQ lost contact with both the ambushed work group and our rapid response team sent out to relieve and re-enforce. Further, most attempts to get air support into the area were unsuccessful due to well placed and coordinated enemy automatic weapons fire from the bordering mountain peaks surrounding the Hook. During this time we also started receiving sporadic fire at the LZ. At one time me and another guy were sent to the lower helipad near the front gate to help bring in and offload an incoming chopper; there we received ground fire and had to seek cover, but we were able to flag off the bird and get back up to HQ. Ultimately, the infantry committed to an early morning sweep to relieve our people at The Hook. Because we'd lost effective contact, we agreed on a challenge and response of "Pall Mall," hoping our guys would recognize the cigarette brand and respond to the infantry's challenge; some of our guys figured it out, and the others were able to communicate enough info for recognition. After the guys had been relieved, I had the sorry job of radioing BN with after action report details: I recall eight KIA and a number of WIA's. I can't recall most names of the 39'th guys that fell or were wounded tha day, but I checked the Wall and found the following eight; Neil George Bollinger (43W L12)

Bernard James Cook (43W L13) Steven James Dawson (43W L13) Randel Farlow (43W L14) Rex Michael Hoover (43W L16) Harold James Kissinger (43W L16) Larry Dean Smith (43W L22) Warren Allen Smith (43W L23) The following link will take you to a site that contains a MACV Summary report for month of September 1968: http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/FacultyPages/EdMoise/macv.html Scroll down site to find "Monthly Summary Report for September and select/click on "The Text." Then scroll through the report to page 27, September 17(Tuesday). Understand that MACV didn't get much right, so its best to go with Al's summary... he was there! Note that the MACV report doesn't say that the Vietnamese "security force" (PF's or "Popular Forces?) high tailed it," but it does note that they had zero casualties!18

Now I would like to insert a few email comments that reflect the feelings of the members of Company A about the encounter. They are not in any special order, just reflections I thought were interesting. And I ask the reader to remember, if your wound was serious enough, when you were loaded on that medical evacuation helicopter, or Dust Off, that was probably the last you were seen of by your friends and others. So some of these emails are the first contact they have had in almost thirty nine years.

Hi, My name is Walter Gurbisz, I was with a-co, 1st plt from 4-1-68 to 4-1-69 my nickname was twiggy and my call sign was junky spray 6-5 and black jack 6-6, my plt sgt. was sgt Singleton.I was the RTO and alternate Demo man, I remember curtis bell , virgil stormer, dan goddard and john pedro. I was wounded at the ambush out side of LZ Young, LIke to know if u rem. me or can help me out with locating some of the guys. I was next DOC Steve Dawson when he got shot, then we got separated, we both got hit with shrapnel at the beginning of fight then got shot in rt. arm, then doc got hit again, he gave me a bandage and that was the last I saw of him, welcome home19 Definitely a man who was at the site of the ambush. What a picture he paints in just a few sentences! And an unspoken tribute to the two men involved. The DOC, still doing his job of trying to offer medical assistance after being wounded twice. Unfortunately, as we know from other emails, he did not survive the ambush. Welcome Home. I was Capt Waldrops RTO and driver. Although I don't remember the faces (and lost most of my VN pictures in a fire), I recall your name, nickname, RTO information as well as several of the
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guys you id'ed in your email, i.e., Curtis Bell and Steve Dawson. I thought you'd get a kick out of one of the remaining pictures I have (attached) that shows Sgt. Singleton getting his Silver Star. That's me next to him. Do you happen to remember a Pvt. Randy Farlow who was with the reaction team sent from Young to your aide and was one of our KIA at the Hook? He was also one of our KIA'd that day. His nephew, Rice Thornburg, is a member of our web group and has been trying to get any information he can on his uncle. We've told him about the events of that day, his place on the Wall, and other misc. info., but nothing direct and personal about the man. Regardless, you might want to get in touch through the site. Good luck in finding more of the guys.

Welcome Home, Happy Holidays, Merry Xmas & Happy New Year20

Here comes the answer to how the subject of the nephews inquiry (Randy in this email I believe) was fatally wounded.

Hi, Pvts Randy Farlow and Harold Kissinger were sitting right across from me and Doc. Dawson when the truck got hit with a B-40 rocket (i think) Randy and Harold were shot in the back of the neck or head. I believe the driver's name was TAYOLOR. also I think I was in that formation with Sgt Singleton,I was getting my 1st. Purple Heart ,next to me was a Spanish Sgt*. can't remember his name. Merry x-mas and happy new year TO YOU21(*SSG Julio Perez was awarded the Silver Star for his actions during this ambush.) There does not seem to be much need to go further into this part of the story. We have discussed why I wanted to write this document, the conditions that a combat engineer and the others who were with him lived in and how they performed their duties in this less than perfect environment. Working backward from 1971 to 1968 I tried to show that the section of road called The Hook was a very dangerous place for the American soldiers who had to work there. Finally, we have the request for information from the nephew of a soldier who was fatally wounded at The Hook. The answers he received from the men who were present when his uncle was killed led to the discussion of the ambush and the ensuing events at The Hook. It would seem that all that is now required is for this paragraph to provide the concluding phrases and for the story to end here. But perhaps a look at the reactions to this event at various levels should be taken. Being on the scene, so to speak, I can say that at battalion level the anger and disgust over the actions of the Vietnamese security force was universal. All felt that extreme cowardice had been displayed and some of us felt that there was possible collusion with the enemy. It was rumored that the same anger was felt at group headquarters. Now I must say that what follows is pure rumor, although it was widespread. It was said that demands for an investigation received a lukewarm response from division headquarters and that once the matter came to the attention of MACV Saigon an even less enthusiastic response was given,
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perhaps even an order to close the discussion completely. There was talk of a cover-up to conceal the security forces actions but again, this was all rumors and eventually the day to day actions took precedence and the matter, while not forgotten, retreated into the background. But if you read the MACV Summary Report for the Month of September 1968 (a link is available in several of the email) you will probably be less than surprised that some doubt lingers to this day about the actions at higher levels of command.

It would not be appropriate to end this document with rumors about what some higher headquarters did or did not do. And there is still the one question that the nephew asked about his uncle. What sort of a man did he turn out to be? Of course not knowing the man, this can only be addressed in general terms. The more personal knowledge would have to come from his fellow squad and platoon members who might be able to share those memories. So lets begin by taking a look at how he was probably outfitted that last day. Probably not too impressive when compared to the images of todays warrior that we see on TV each evening. His boots were probably badly worn and missing any semblance to a shiny finish, the work and time did not lend itself to shining boots. If he was lucky enough to still have an issue of jungle fatigues (many times the supply of these was siphoned off at higher commands, leaving the soldier to get along wearing the normal issue fatigue uniform) they were wrinkled, quite possibly sweat stained and dirty, laundry facilities usually being in short supply at company level. His upper body protection was his flak jacket. It is a pretty good bet that he was not its first owner so the fit is probably problematic. Almost surely it has been used as his pillow and seat cushion, most likely with rips and tears from being slung into the back of a 5 ton truck. And it has been water soaked by the monsoon rains. I doubt if it would pass any inspection as to how much protection it would provide against enemy small arms fire but it was better than nothing. To protect his head he wore the famous steel pot with liner. Unchanged since WW 2, it had provided protection for millions of soldiers, and evidently did a pretty good job. Plus it had the advantage of being able to be used as a wash basin when its owner needed water to shave or take a whores bath. No Kevlar, no mounts for night vision devices, no chin strap, just an old steel pot, heavy, uncomfortable, but next to your weapon, probably your most necessary piece of equipment. Plus, if you ever had to enter that dangerous territory known as the Division Rear, the MPs at the gate wouldnt let you in unless you were wearing one. So maybe our soldier wouldnt come out too good in a beauty contest with todays military, but he got the job done. And I wasnt there when the word went out to load up and go relieve that ambushed platoon but I bet it didnt take long before everyone had climbed on the trucks and were ready to go. And a word about the trucks, not up-armored, no Congressional Committee or national news service to complain about our troops having inadequate equipment. If I remember correctly they were tied up worrying about our Commander in Chief who was quitting under pressure from a bunch of anti-war protesters. (An option not available to the ordinary soldier) But I digress; the trucks were just plain old 5 ton dumps with a man up on the headache rack with an M-60 machinegun. These were working trucks that transported men and equipment to and from job sites and when necessary, into a firefight. So how would I define what sort of man the uncle had already grown into? Well there is a word that gets thrown around a lot nowadays. If you are unlucky enough to be working in a building that some nut blows up they call you this and might even give your grieving family lots of money. And anyone

who is stationed on or off shore in a country where there is a war going on gets called this. So given that our soldier and his friends willingly went to the relief of their ambushed comrades knowing full well that they were facing a well armed, well entrenched enemy and that such action could and most likely would lead to them being injured or killed, then I think they could also be identified by this word. They all grew up to be heroes.

REFERENCES
NOTE: ALL FOOTNOTES EXCEPT AS NOTED WERE TAKEN FROM THE 39TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT) WEB SITE. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. The Hook; John Lewis; Msg 4858 dated March 4, 2007. The Hook; John Lewis; Msg 4858 dated March 4, 2007. The Hook; Unidentified; Msg 4860 dated March 4, 2007. 1971 History That I Know; Tim Kirkpatrick; Msg 4844 dated February 27, 2007. The Hook; John Lewis; Msg 4858 dated March 4, 2007. ibid.. The Hook; Ed Wenners; Msg 4859 dated March 4, 2007. One More Day; Doug Wilburn; Msg 3270 dated August 21, 2005. NWPA, LZ Baldy-Mine Work, 1968, Retrieved from http://www.vietnamphotosbyrbm.com/index.html

10. One More Day; Philip Badame; Msg 3276 dated August 22, 2005. 11. The Hook, John Lewis; Msg 4858 dated March 4, 2007. 12. Up Front; Tim Kirkpatrick; Msg 4891 dated March 7, 2007. 13. Looking For Randy Farlow; Brice Thornburg; Msg 3795 dated February 6, 2006. 14. Looking For Randy Farlow; Douglas Franksen; Msg 3801 dated February 8, 2006. 15. Continued Search ...; Douglas Franksen; Msg 3858 dated February 27, 2006.

16. Looking For Randy Farlow;

John JB Barden; Msg 3838 dated February 19, 2006.

17. Looking For Randy Farlow; Al Bornmann; Msg 3824 dated February 15, 2006. 18. The Hook; Doug Franksen; Msg 4872 dated March 6 2007. 19. A Co-68; Walter Gurbisz; Msg 4537 dated December 4, 2006. 20. A Co-68; Douglas Franksen; Msg 4537 dated December 4, 2006. 21. A Co-68; Walter Gurbisz; Msg 4539 dated December 4, 2006.

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