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Casino vs. CA December 2, 1991 | Regalado Facts: The Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum (Coliseum for short), owned by petitioner and located in Gingoog City, was a licensee of a cockpit under the Revised Administrative Code. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 49 which classified certain areas as residential zones, declaring the site of Coliseum as such. This lead to the cancellation of petitioners license to operate the cockpit. Article 10, Section 6.44 of the Resolution No. 49 provides that the change in the zoning ordinance will be treated as an amendment, provided that any amendment to the zoning ordinance or provision thereof shall be carried out through a resolution of 3/4 vote of the Sangguniang Panglunsod. Said amendments shall take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC. Subsequently, Resolution No. 378 reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. Out of the 9 members of the sangguniang panlungsod, 4 voted for the amendment, 4 voted against, and 1 abstained. The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting for the amendment. The resolution was transmitted to the city mayor for approval which the latter returned to the the sangguniang panlungsod saying that his approval was not necessary since it didnt involve a disposition of the city government funds. The succeeding mayor issued the permit need to operate a cockpit. Respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc. protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC), claiming that there was no certificate of registration issued by the PGC. PGC eventually sent a telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight in the Coliseum in view of its failure to register with the PGC. Gallera filed an action for prohibition and mandamus alleging that Resolution No. 378, purportedly amending zoning Ordinance No. 49, is invalid. RTC declared the mayors permits null and void and ordered the petitioner to desist in operating the said cockpit. Issue: WON the mayors permits are valid Held: NO. Resolution No. 378 was declared invalid by the CA for failure to comply with the required votes necessary for its validity. Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and the LGC require only a majority for the enactment of an ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by the resolution in question without complying with the categorical requirement of a vote incorporated in the very same ordinance sought to be amended. In other words, Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto, is a specific and particular provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a different number of votes. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one, which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect only such cases

within its language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. In the instant case, although the general law on the matter requires a mere majority, the higher requisite vote in Resolution No. 49 shall govern since municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion or incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a particular statute. Since the amendment of Resolution No. 49 didnt comply with the required number of votes, Block 125, where Coliseum is located, remains classified as a residential area, hence the operation of a cockpit therein is prohibited. Gamboa vs. Aguirre July 20, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago Facts: Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members, respectively. The governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the duration of the formers official trip abroad until his return. When the SP held its regular session, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner and asked him to vacate the Chair which petitioner refuse to do. 7 members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while 4 others voted against with 1 abstention. Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief in the lower court. The Governor already re-assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor. (The case is already moot and academic since the terms of office of the local officials involved have already expired.) Issue: WON an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) Held: NO. The Local Government Code of 1991, provide that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he become(s) the Governor and assume(s) the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein. When the vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions of the Governor. When the Vice-Governor exercises the powers and duties of the Office of the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only acts as the Governor but does not become the Governor. Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming an Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely exercising the powers and duties of the higher office. For purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, the Vice-Governor is deemed as a non-member of

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the SP for the time being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. This is because the authority vested by law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress. Unlike under the old Code, where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief Executive, but also the presiding officer of the local legislative body, the new Code delineated the union of the executive-legislative powers in the provincial, city and municipal levels except in the Barangay. Under R.A. 7160, the Governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is no longer considered a member thereof. This is clear from the law, when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the SP, which is the legislative body of the province, and enumerates therein its membership (Section 48 of the LGC). Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded applying the rule in legal hermeneutics that when the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Garcia vs. COMELEC September 30, 1994 | Puno Facts: Petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under Sec. 122, par. (b) of R.A. No. 7160. They started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to them, the vice mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter to the executive director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for local initiative and referendum. The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance." The COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners. Issue: (1) WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. (2) WON COMELEC was correct in denying the petition for local referendum on the ground that its merely a resolution and not an ordinance Held:

(1) YES. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations. The interpellations on Conference Committee Report confirm the intent that resolutions are proper subjects of local initiatives. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. The principal author of the LGC of 1991, former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, wrote in his book that all sorts of measures may be the subject of direct initiative for as long as these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact. The subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance of its people. (2) NO. The case at bench is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression delineating the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. The framers of our 1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance and they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body (Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI). Also, petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of vice mayor to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10. Worse,

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respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC September 26, 1996 | Panganiban Facts: March 1992: Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone. (Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone) RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. Petitioner was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines. November 1992: The American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy. April 1993: The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed a Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. They later on submitted it to the Office of the President. Respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227. Not satisfied, respondent resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC. Respondent COMELEC EB denied the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not n ordinance. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in SC to set aside the COMELEC resolution denying the initiative. COMELEC then issued another resolution providing for the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Issues: (1) WON the petition seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become final and executor which is Garcia v. COMELEC (NO)

(2) WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the resolution which governs the conduct of the referendum (YES) (3) WON the local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact (still at the proposal stage so not yet an approved law) Held: (1) The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum. In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal resolution as the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly exercised. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. (2) To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUMonly. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus: (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

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Initiative Entirely the work of the electorate Process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives Process of voting is more complex

Referendum Begun and consented to by the law-making body Consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body Yes or no in the ballot

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. (3) The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. While regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact. Ortiz vs. Posadas March 3, 1931 | Malcolm Facts: Seven of the thirteen members present, including the president, of the municipal council of Tabaco, Albay, voted in favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning cockpits, and six members voted against the ordinance, with three members absent. One CFI judge held it was valid while another declared it invalid. Issue: WON the ordinance is valid? Held: NO. Sec 224 of the Administrative Code1 is clear and only needs application. It is also mandatory; therefore Ordinance No. 25 is void. The ayes and noes are taken upon: The ayes and noes shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances upon all propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and upon any other proposition, upon the request of any member, and they shall be entered upon the journal. The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary to the passage of any ordinance or of any proposition
1

1. the passage of all ordinances 2. all propositions to create any liability against the municipality 3. any other proposition, upon the request of any member The affirmative vote of the majority of all the members of the municipality shall be necessary. Creating indebtedness refers to proposition and not to ordinance. The contention that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all the members of the municipal council, is devoid of merit. McLean v City of East St Louis: The law requires that the yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances, and the concurrence of a majority of the legislative body is necessary to their passage. Hibbard Co v City of Chicago: If a proposition not in form of an ordinance creates any liability or provides for the expenditure or appropriation of money, the requirement is the same, while as to other propositions, whether the yeas and nays are entered upon the journal or not, the majority of a quorum is sufficient. City of Manila vs. Bagui et al April 12, 2005 | Tinga, J. Facts: The Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) built and opened Victoria Court. The City Council enacted Ordinance No. 7783 prohibiting the establishment or operation of business that provide certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area. MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Injunction with the lower cour, seeking that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels but only the power to regulate, (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions, (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected, (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment, (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory, (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it, and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or

creating indebtedness; but other measures, except as otherwise specially provided, shall prevail upon the majority vote of the members present at any meeting duly called and held.

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other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. RTC declared Ordinance No. 7783 is null and void. Issue: WON Ordinance No. 7783 is valid Ratio: NO. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. It must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 7783 violates the constitution a. It violates due process. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. The objectives can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. b. It violates equal protection of laws. There are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. Also, there is no logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. c. It is repugnant to general laws and is ultra vires. The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit. The City of Manila also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of

d.

persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. The Ordinance also runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area allowing the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

V. Perez vs. De la Cruz March 28, 1969 | Castro Facts: Petitioner Virginia Perez is the vice mayor of the City of Naga. In 1968, in a private conference held among the seven city councilors and the vice mayor with the latter presiding, the matter of selecting the secretary of the municipal board of said city as well as the chairmen of various committees came up for discussion. At the indication by the four Nacionalista Party councilors (herein private respondents) to vote for a particular person, Perez expressed her intention to vote, on the deliberation on such matters, to create a tie vote and thereafter exercise her power as presiding officer to break such deadlock. Later, in another conference, reiterated the same intention to vote twice, and such statement was radiocast. A week after said conference, the four Nacionalista councillors filed with the CFI a petition for prohibition seeking to prevent Perez from casting her vote in the selection of the secretary and other committee chairs except in the event of a tie vote. Said councillors allege that the vice mayor of Naga City is not a member of the municipal board but only its presiding officer, and that pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of said board, the chairman of the board cannot vote except in the case of a tie. They claim that they are entitled to the relied of restraining the vice mayor from voting on legislative matters and acts and proceedings of the municipal board, because such proposed actuations, unless restrained, would engender an anomalous situation which could cause great and irreparable damage, among others. The CFI issued an order granting the prayer for preliminary injunction and commanded the Sheriff to restrain the respondent from casting her vote in the selection of the Secretary of the Board. In response, Perez filed a motion to dismiss and/or dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction,

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assailing the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the suit and alleging that the complaint stated no cause of action. She further assailed the issuance of the writ as undue interference in matters purely legislative in character. The CFI denied the motion to dismiss. Upon petition to the appellate court, the CA issued a restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ. Subsequent to the order by the CA, Perez and the Liberal councilors passed an amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the municipal board granting the chairman thereof the right to vote as a member, and as presiding officer the right to vote again in case of a tie vote. A few months later, the CA rendered a decision dismissing Perez petition for certiorari and dissolving the restraining order issued by it. Hence the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. Giving due course to the petition, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. As matters now stand, Perez has been allowed to sit in the municipal board as member and presiding officer. Issues: (1) WON the vice mayor of Naga, besides being presiding officer of the municipal board, is also a member thereof (2) WON the CFI have jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibitory injunction against Perez Held: (1) NO. There is absolutely nothing in the charter of the City of Naga which provides that the vice mayor is a member of the municipal board thereof. In the absence of any statutory authority constituting the vice mayor as member of the municipal board, in addition to being the presiding officer thereof, he cannot be held as one. The cases that petitioner invokes involve municipalities wherein it is explicitly stated that the vice mayor shall also be a member of the board. Such is not the case at bar. Reliance on the Amended Rules of Procedure is untenable. The amended rule presupposes that the chairman is a member of the board, which it is not, and the rule was passed pendente lite and that without quorum. The proposed amendment is a complete nullity. (2) YES. Perez contends that as a legislative official performing legislative actions, she is not subject to any prohibitory process, invoking Vera vs. Avelino, wherein it was ruled that a writ of prohibition refers only to proceedings exercising judicial or ministerial functions. Such ruling is inapplicable. The doctrine therein laid is based on the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances and is not applicable to local governments. Moreover, executives at the local or municipal level are vested with both legislative and sometimes judicial functions, in addition to their purely executive duties. By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings. It is the view of the court that in insisting to vote twice in the municipal board, petitioner acted without jurisdiction and such

may be validly prevented and restrained by a writ of prohibition. Homeowners Association of the Philippines v s. Municipal Board of City of Manila August 30, 1968 | Concepcion Facts: The Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino filed a petition for declaratory relief to nullify Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of the City of Manila, which regulated the rentals of lots and buildings for residential purposes. It provides that the lessors or sublessors of lands devoted to residential purposes are prohibited from increasing the rental to an amount in excess of the proportion, percentage wise, in the increase of the assessed value of the land leased or subleased. RTC declared the ordinance ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio. It held that the declare a state of emergency, which may justify the regulation of house rentals, exclusively pertains to Congress. It also said that the ordinance disconstitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners. Issue: (1) WON Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is valid (NO) (2) WON proceedings in the CFI is valid (in relation to Section 4 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court) (YES) Held: (The Court will not pass on the allegation regarding the power of the City of Manila to declare a state of emergency or to acknowledge the existence thereof.) (1) NO. Individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only and only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. If such demands are brought about by a state of emergency, the interference upon individual rights, resulting from the regulations adopted to meet the situation, must be, by and large, co-extensive, coequal or co-terminous with the existence thereof. And, since an emergency is by nature temporary in character, so must the regulations promulgated therefor be. As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, to be valid and legal, must be for a "definite" period of time, the length of which must be "reasonable", in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount. The practical reason for the requirement that a statute passed to meet a given emergency, should limit the period of its effectivity is to prevent that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency from becoming permanent law (since Congress might not enact a repeal). (2) The City of Manila did not raise this question or invoke said Section 4, Rule 64, either in its answer or in a MTD in the lower court.

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Upon the other hand, the City Fiscal of Manila was notified therein. In fact, he filed a memorandum, apart from the memorandum submitted by counsel for the City of Manila. At any rate, the determination of the question whether or not the Solicitor General should be required to appear "in any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or executive order, rules or regulation" is a matter left to the "discretion" of the Court, pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Inasmuch as said requirement is not mandatory, but discretionary, non-compliance therewith and with Section 4 of Rule 64 the interpretation of which should be harmonized with said Section 23 of Rule 3 affected neither the jurisdiction of the trial court nor the validity of the proceedings therein, in connection with the present case.