Comparative Studies From Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and The Bhopal Disaster in India

European Journal of Social Sciences Volume 34 Issue 2 October 2012 PP: 328-341 Assessing Community Resilience to Man Made
Dissaster: Comparative Studies from Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and the Bhopal Disaster in India
Achmad Room Fitrianto
Abstract The Porong Mud flow in Sidoarjo represents a major environmental and social disaster in Indonesia. Some experts mentioned that it caused by oil drilling activities and others mentioned it was triggered by the Jogjakarta earthquake that stroke on the 27th of May 2006. However, both opinions agree that this dissaster was caused by the underground blowout which is an un-controlled flowing of fluids that flow into the weakest areas. It cannot be denied the mud-flow has ruined the environment, depopulated the region, thrown many out of employment and income, and ultimately has adversely impacted the regional GDP. Disasters, whether natural or human-made, adversely impact mostly the poor. In order to mitigate the negative impacts government set up such benevolent and rational policies. However those policies that are set up still cannot fulfill community satisfaction especially for the victims. Policies that cannot achieve community expectation are a sign that there are missing links in the mitigation and redevelopment plan mechanism. This is because the government policies are not free from values and interests. As Ramesh & Howlett (2003) said that every policy is always related to politics. There was some similarity in the Bhopal tragedy and the mudflow disaster: firstly, both disasters occurred in residential areas. Secondly, both disasters involved national and multinational companies (BPK report, 2007; Pohl, 2007; Mokhiber, 1985; Ungarala, 1998). Thirdly, both tragedies indicated an abuse of power from the government in granting permits (Broughton, 2005; Mokhiber, 1985; BPK report, 2007). Governments should be brave enough to disregard all private interests that intervene in government policy-making. Moreover, the government has to bring in new and tougher regulations for potentially dangerous industries such as mining and drilling and for the chemical industry, especially if they are close to residential areas. As Karpagam (1999) suggests, the government should charge high pollution taxes to these high-risk industries in order to prevent unwanted accidents and to reduce pollution. Besides the pollution tax, subsidies should be introduced to control high risk industries. Through subsidies, the government is able to offer rewards to companies that manage to reduce their emissions from some base level or to those that can develop sufficient pollution control installations. Another instrument is refundable deposits and pollution permits (Karpagam, 1999). Refundable deposits could act as future funds to assist recovery efforts in case of any disaster occurring. Webber in Healy (2006) defines planning as a process of open argumentation that should facilitate the debate among societies regarding future, planned development. This development planning should use and combine all potencies that are implemented based on certain measurements and organised by formal institutions. For that reason, sustainable and environmentally friendly planning is needed, not only to solve the mudflow problems but also for the Sidoarjo sustainable development program as a whole.
European Journal of Social Sciences Volume 34 Issue 2 October 2012 PP: 328-341
Introduction The Sidoarjo mudflow resulted in a major environmental and social disaster. Consideration of this case provides strong insight into the Indonesian governments recent environmental management of the disaster, which demonstrates weaknesses, particularly in terms of enforcement and accountability.
Based on 2001 census data, Sidoarjos population was 1,293,111 with a local income of Rp. 133,790.02 million (AU$ 15.7 million), much of it originating from taxes. The district is the second richest after Surabaya. In the last decade, Sidoarjo experienced an annual economic growth rate of roughly 5 % (The Sidoarjo Statistics Board, 2006). This growth was supported by industrial activities that are concentrated in three sub districts: Waru, Sidoarjo1 and Porong. Porong is one of Sidoarjos sub districts, located approximately 40 kilometres south of Surabaya. Porongs economic activities were supported by 19 villages, comprising in total of 17, 954 households. Land use in Porong is distributed as follows: housing: 845.37-hectares, industry: 24.63-hectares, mining: 5.09-hectares, agriculture: 1,287.24-hectares. (The Sidoarjo Statistics Board, 2006)
Mining exploration in Sidoarjo Based on geographical and geological conditions, the East Java province can be divided into three parts: the first is in the north, where oil, gas and limestone resources are present; the second is located in the centre of the province and has farming potential, water and geothermic resources. The last is the south, where mineral resources are present (Dinas ESDM Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2007).There are at least
1
Sidoarjo district consists of 18 subdistricts with Sidoarjo being one of those subdistricts
fourteen oil and gas fields in East Java which are currently being explored by thirteen companies. It is estimated that the oil fields contain 583,475.5 million barrels of oil and 10,301.7 billion cubic feet of gas (Dinas ESDM Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2007).
Figure 1.1 Brantas Production share contract map
Source: Gelder & Denie (2007)
Brantas Block Production is one of East Javas oil and gas blocks, and is operated by Pertamina and Huffco Brantas Inc. These companies were authorised to explore 14.950 km2 in 1990 (BPK report, 2007). According to a letter from the Acting Director General of oil and gas, addressed to the Head of BP Migas, No.816/DJM/2002, the Brantas Production share contract allowed for oil and gas exploration of over 3,041.64 km2 At the time of the mudflow disaster, this block was being explored by Lapindo Brantas Inc which held 50% of the shares. PT. Medco E&P Brantas held 32% and the Australian company Santos Brantas Pty Ltd held 18% (BPK report, 2007;
Gelder & Denie, 2007). Brantas Production consists of twelve exploration wells with another 30 wells still in the process of being explored. The disaster
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The Porong mudflow disaster occurred on the 29 of May 2006. Five thousand cubic meters of mud a day spurted up in the beginning. This has now increased to around 130,000 cubic meters a day and remains constant (Williamson, 2007). There is now a lake of mud, which has buried approximately 600 ha of land and villages and caused more than 10,000 people to become internal refugees. Moreover, based on the National Planning Bodys (BAPPENAS) calculations, this disaster has caused an infrastructure damage of Rp 7.6 quintillion (1 billion dollars Australian). Public opinion adjudged that the disaster was triggered by oil drilling activities conducted by PT Lapindo Brantas. The drilling had been subcontracted to PT Medici Citra Nusantara, which is owned by the Bakrie Group2. It arose as a result of PT Lapindo Brantass failure to install a casing to cover the drilling well as required by the Indonesian mining regulations. The mud leaked at a depth of around 1,800 metres below the surface (Pohl, 2007). The drilling took place in Banjar Panji village which is now known as the Banjarpanji-1 well and is located in the Brantas Production Sharing Contract (PSC) area in Sidoarjo regency, East Java province. This area is operated by Lapindo Brantas, which had a 50% working interest in the contract, while PT Medco E&P Brantas had 32 % and the Australian company Santos Ltd had 18%. (Gelder & Denie, 2007; US embassy, Jakarta , 2006).
The Bakrie Group consists of the business unit PT Bakrie & brothers.
Many experts agree that the Porong Mudflow disaster was caused by the underground blowout which is an un-controlled flowing of fluids that flow into the weakest areas. These areas could be those that have high permeability and high porosities or flow into the fracture zone near the casing shoe (BPK report, 2007). Interestingly, there are two explanations that outline the causes of the underground blowout: the first is that drilling activities caused the mudflow eruptions. Davies (2007) states that the Porong mudflow disaster was caused by a high-pressure aquifer that was initiated by the fracture of propagation many kilometers below the surface. The nearest human activity being carried out in that region was the drilling in Banjarpanji-1 well. According to the second explanation, the mudflow was triggered by the Jogjakarta earthquake on the 27th of May 2006. This caused a fracture zone in Porong. This is also the explanation given by the BPPT (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi - Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology) after a series of workshops that were held on the 6th October 2006 and from the 20-21st February 2007. BPPT concluded that the centre of the mud was located at a depth of 1000-2000 meters. The mud erupted to the surface due to the tectonic activities that are related to geo-hydrology and geothermal activities. In short, the Porong mudflow disaster was triggered by the earthquake in Jogjakarta (Istadi, 2007; Budi, 2008).
Figure 1.2 The map location of the mudflow
Source: Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing, 2008
Source: Sidoarjo Tourism , 2008 -edited
Despite the controversy about the causes, the leaking of hot toxic mud must be stopped. There are at least four methods that have been used. The first was to re-drill the well using a snubbing unit. This failed because the snubbing unit that was inserted was blocked by the fish that were left in the well. (Indonesian Government website, 2006; Purbalingga regency website, 2006; Tempo Interactive, 15 July 2006). The second was to re-enter the well using a side tracking drill, but this also failed as the land surface gradually flattened (Energi Mega Persada, 2006). The third was to use a relief well. This method involved the drilling of three different wells using 1.500 HP (horse power), in Kelurahan Jatirejo (relief well 1), in Desa Renokenongo (relief well 2) and in Desa Kedungbendo (relief well 3). The drilling was to achieve a depth of 3000 -4000 feet in order to stop the leaking of the well. The method involved a side drilling technique angled at around 10 degrees from the target angle of 50 degrees, but this method failed as well (Hot Mud Flow Word Press website: 2006; Energi Mega Persada: 2006). The last method attempted involved
inserting into the mud a high density chained ball (HDCB), described as killing mud softly by the expert. This method was also not successful (Jawa Pos, 25 February 2007). To date, there have been two presidential decrees established to prepare and search for a method to stop the mudflow and manage the surface problems caused by it, including the social and economic effects. The first decree, (Presidential decree number 13/2006) gave a mandate to the National Team for the Mitigation of the Sidoarjo Mudflow disaster. (Timnas Penanggulangan Lumpur Lapindo) (National Secretary Website: 2007). According to this decree, the team was established from the 29th of May 2006 to the 8th of March 2007 until it was replaced by the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo) which based itself on the second decree, Presidential decree Number 14 /2007, which included the main guide to mitigate the mudflow disaster.
Problems That Occurs This disaster has affected the development planning of regional and provincial areas since it occurred 29 of May 2006. As Bridgman and Davis (1998) commented, since the problems have been identified, a private concern such as an oil-drilling leak has been transformed into a policy issue. Stone (1989) points out three aspects that should be understood in order to establish priorities: firstly, the actors involved must be identified and their problems understood. In this case, besides understanding the problems of the people who were displaced, other people who were affected indirectly such as the businesses that used the freeway daily must be also recognised. Secondly, the multiple effects of the
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problems must be identified. For example, the mudflow not only disturbs the distribution of goods but the ecosystem as well. The next aspect is that clear and well defined policies are needed to solve the problems that have emerged.
Hot and hazardous mud Dwi Andreas Santosa, Executive Director of the Indonesian Centre for Biodiversity and Biotechnology (ICBB), found that the content of the Lapindo mud in early December 2006 consisted of 10.45 ppm (parts per million) Cadmium (Cd), 105.44 ppm Chromium (Cr), 0.99 ppm Arsenic (As) and 1.96 ppm Mercury (Hg) (Antara, 2006). Moreover, analyses conducted by the Public Works Department of East Java province found that the content of Hg was higher, namely 2.5 ppm. (Mawardi, 2006). In addition, according to an environmental analysis initiated by the East Java Regional Development Office, the Sidoarjo Regional Environment and Mining Office, and PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., the mud contains phenol at concentrations exceeding the maximum residue limit. Phenol is toxic to fish and aquatic vegetation, not to mention human health (Pohl, 2007). In addition, the mud microbiology analyses that were also conducted by the ICBB showed that the Lapindo mud contains dangerous bacteria such as Coliform, Salmonella and Staphylococcus aureus (Antara, 2006). Furthermore, this mud volcano emits H2S (hydrogen sulphide) gas radiation from the centre of the gushing mud. It was reported that levels of H2S were at 700 parts per million (ppm) on the first day of the mud flow, then dropped to 3 ppm on the second day and apparently to zero on the third. In addition, small amounts of H2S continue to spew out from the site at certain levels that make the air smell foul (Down to Earth, 2006). However, analyses
conducted by PT Energi Mega Persada, classified the mud as non-hazardous and nontoxic (Pohl, 2007).
The relocation of businesses Hamzirwan (2007) states that at least 20 factories, each consisting of 2,500 employees, have been closed and approximately 1,000 workers were fired due to their factories being buried under the mud. Tempo (22 January 2007) reported that at least 15,000 factory workers lost their jobs. Moreover, the Executive Director of Greenomics Indonesia estimated that this disaster would reduce the East Java domestic gross product by 10 % or Rp 469.2 quintillion (Kompas, 27 April 2007).BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan-the Finance Auditor Board) calculated that approximatley Rp 71,383.37 million of potential income from that region was lost (BPK report, 2007). Figure 1.3 Buried industrial area in Porong
Source: hotmudflow , wordpress,2006
Source: Farm1,2006
According to the Sidoarjo Regencys Department of Small and Medium Business and Cooperation data, approximately 2,299 small businesses and medium sized
enterprises have collapsed and become bankrupt, and 80 % of those were small businesses (Kompas , 12 January 2007) Furthermore, Sidoarjo Deputy Regent, Syaiful Illah, (Interviewed by Tempo, 22 January 2006) estimated that this mudflow has reduced the output of rice fields by about 12 tons of unhusked rice per hectare for every harvesting season. The detailed data shows that rice field areas that were affected by the mudflow are in fourteen villages and cover an area of 722.35 hectares (BPK report, 2007).
The relocation of public transportation routes and gas and water installations The effects of this disaster have the potential to reduce national economic growth by 1.03 %. In addition, it is also likely to reduce the regional gross domestic product of Sidoarjo by 90. 2 % (Kompas,27 April 2007). This is due mainly to the freeway being buried by mud between the 37 39 kilometre mark. Moreover, the freeways fly over in Porong was cracked by a subsiding effect on the 30 cm depth and therefore had to be demolished on the 28th of December, 2008 (, 2007). The mud also threatened the main road and the railway, disrupting the distribution of goods in East Java province, especially in the Sidoarjo district.
Figure 1.4 The buried freeway and threatened railway in Porong
Source: Bromund Volker, 2006
Source: Antara, 2006
Furthermore, this mudflow threatened the gas and water line under Porong Road. The gas pipe line exploded on the 22nd of November, 2006 and killed thirteen people. Moreover, the flattened lands surrounding the mud caused damage in water installations. Since the disaster, the water pipe line has been broken 10 times. (Kompas, 1 October, 2007) This has caused the breaking of optic wire used by Indosat (Indonesian telecommunications company).
The gaps between government policy and community needs The policy initiatives that have been set up to cope with the disaster demonstrate the willingness of the government to mitigate the effects of the disaster (Ife & Tesoriero, 2006). The governments willingness is the result of a political process that reflects the impact of government on society (Heywood, 2004). In more detail, Heywood (2004) describes the policy as a linkage among intentions, actions and results. By intention, Heywood (2004) is referring to whether the government is for the people or for the interested groups. On the other hand, policy implementation reflects government action, whether the government really means to solve the problem or is just paying lip service. The level of community satisfaction demonstrates the result of the policy. If the community is satisfied with the government policy, it will support the government. The governments response to the disaster was demonstrated in the two presidential decrees: Presidential Decree 13/2006 (Keputusan presiden 13/2006) and 14/2007 (Peraturan Presiden 14/2007). Both decrees clearly state that the tasks and duties of the mitigation authority were to formulate methods to stop the mudflow, and manage the surface problems caused by it, including its social and economic impacts3. However, the government effort to mitigate the impact of the mudflow showed lack of political willingness. The mitigation authority was just a technical body whose only effort was to dam the mud without considering other aspects. As Ife and Tesoriero (2006) explain, the community based services are seen as structures and processes for meeting human need, drawing on the resources, expertise
Presidential decree 14/2007, article 1, sub-article two, mentions the social and physical reconstruction.
and wisdom of the community itself. Structurally, the presidential decrees are on track for providing the expertise to stop the mudflow and to provide adequate compensation to the victims. However, the social construction programs that have been set up are not sufficient4. The government simply assumed that giving society more money would solve the problems. Community members need further assistance to normalise their lives after being disturbed by the disaster. There are four aspects that seem to have been neglected by the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo): the first is that there was no adequate support for empowering and providing assistance programs for small and medium sized enterprises that were affected by the mud. It was reported that around 2,299 small businesses and medium sized enterprises collapsed and became bankrupt. Therefore, it is important to regenerate the local business activities. Secondly, there was no adequate training for the victims who lost their jobs. Chapter 10 of the Presidential Decree 14/2007, states the duties of the social deputy5 of the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency who was to develop strategies to solve the social problem that resulted. Moreover, the Presidents direct instruction given on the 28th December 2006 stated that the government agencies responsible for the disaster had to explore new employment opportunities for the victims who lost their jobs as a result of the disaster. However, the facts are that insufficient assistance was given to workers who lost their jobs. For example, there were around 1,022 farm workers registered in Renokenongo, Jatirejo, Siring Ketapang, and Kedungbendo
The Surabaya post of 27 May, 2009 reported that in 2008 the Indonesian footwear centre and BPLS trained 440 disaster victims in a new life skill such as food processing, handicraft production, and automotive mechanic training. It plans to train another 420 victims in 12 rounds in 2009. 5 The Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency is comprised of the head of agencies, vice head of agencies, secretary and three deputies that are responsible for the agencys operational activities with regards to infrastructure and social matters.
villages (BPS- Sidoarjo in figures 2008). When the mud buried the farmlands in those villages, these workers were not skilled to obtain employment in other sectors. Therefore, government involvement in providing special training to provide new working skills is important (Karpagam, 1999) Thirdly, there were no sufficient educational incentives for the victims. Logically, if 15,000 factory workers lost their jobs, none of those could replace the 1,022 farmers in order undertake farm work without adequate re-training. As 2,299 small businesses and medium sized enterprises collapsed and became bankrupt, many parents could not continue to pay tuition fees for their children. Therefore, these children would have found it difficult to enroll in a school or university. Moreover, based on the Indonesian Supreme Audit Board (BPK report, 2007), up to the 13th December 2006, 18 schools were buried and about 5,397 students were affected. Therefore, special treatment for these affected students was essential. Finally, it is general knowledge in Indonesia that every village has its own customs; therefore, the government or the agencies must consider this when formulating resettlement programs. Providing social assistance in order to prevent social clash is essential as social clash could occur as a result of the difference in customs in new settlement areas. For example, in Indonesia there are two big Islamic movements, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both groups practise different customs and rituals as part of their daily activities. If there was no social assistance from the government, this would create new tension between both Islamic movements. In short, the government should be aware of its policy gaps. A more proactive approach towards the formulation of creative programs to reduce the negative effects
of the disaster is necessary. Capturing good practices from other disaster mitigation programs in other countries of the world would offer helpful lessons. The following section compares the mudflow disaster in Porong with the Bhopal disaster in India.
Mitigation programs for the Bhopal disaster in India- a comparison. The Bhopal disaster occurred on the 3rd of December, 1984 in India. A poisonous fog exploded from the big stacks of the Union Carbide pesticide plant. This fog contained the highly toxic chemical, methyl isocyanate (Karpagam, 1999). Bhopal is a densely populated city in the state of Madhya Pradesh, Central India. Bhopal experienced a catastrophe that was never imagined before. Approximately 2,000 people died instantly, and about 300,000 people were injured. In addition, more than a thousand animals were killed and about 7,000 animals were injured (Broughton, 2005; Eckerman, 2005; Mokhiber, 1985; Ungarala, 1998; Karpagam, 1999). Further research shows that many of the survivors were still suffering from one or several of the following ailments: partial or complete blindness, gastrointestinal disorders, impaired immune systems, posttraumatic stress disorders, and menstrual problems in women (Broughton, 2005; Ungarala, 1998). In addition, the number of spontaneous abortions, stillbirths, and offspring with genetic defects increased (Broughton, 2005; Ungarala, 1998).
Figure 5.1 Bhopals location
Source: Google map, 2009
In order to revitalise the dead city of Bhopal, the Indian Government sued the Union Carbide Company (UCC). This action was in response to the tragedy and pressure from the Indian people. The government sued for an estimated US$ 3 billion compensation (Ungarala, 1998). However, in October 1991, the Indian Supreme Court endorsed the lower court decision of 1989, sentencing the Union Carbide Company to pay $470 million for all claims (Broughton, 2005). The full payment was made to the Indian government ten days after the decision (UCC, 2001).
However, at Union Carbides annual meeting in 1996 it was announced that nothing further would be done regarding the disaster. However, the annual meetings members reversed the companys original publication when it announced that it would build a $ 20 million hospital for the victims of the Bhopal tragedy through a London-based independent charitable trust (Ungarala, 1998). Moreover, the corporation and its subsidiary were also charged with corporate irresponsibility for
pursuing profits over safety and hazard standards (Ungarala, 1998). The employees of UCC worked together, and with their acquaintances and stakeholders, participated in reducing the impact of the terrible facts of the tragedy (Ungarala, 1998).
Despite the court decisions and rejection from the Union Carbide Company, a formal statement from UCC stated that the company instantaneously granted approximately $2 million in aid to the Prime Minister of India as a relief fund. Moreover, there were three programs that were set up: firstly, to extend medical support to the victims by providing medical equipment supplies or medical expertise and assistance, and by sending an international team of medical experts to Bhopal. Secondly, to provide sustainable health support. For example, UCC funded the enhancement of the ability of health workers to provide services to the victims by sending Indian medical experts to special meetings and training overseas. In another example, UCC provided a $2.2 million grant to Arizona State University to establish a vocational-technical center in Bhopal. Thirdly, to build a philanthropical program through the Indian Red Cross and establish an independent charitable trust for a Bhopal hospital. In addition, UCC provided initial funding of $5 million to the Indian Red Cross and approximately $20 million to the hospital. Interestingly, UCC also provided approximately $90 million to the charitable trust for the hospital from the sale of its interest in Union Carbide Indian Limited (UCIL)6 (UCC, 2001).
The lessons The Porong mud flow disaster has produced huge material losses, torn the social fabric, and exiled thousands of people. The Supreme Court and the police are still
UCIL(Union Carbide Indian Limited) is the company that runs the Union Carbide Company in India
investigating the mismanagement of the Banjarpanji- 1 well drilling. However, political interests interfere in this investigation. As a result, the investigation still has not progressed. Despite all the controversies, the Sidoarjo government can use the social mechanism Musrenbang to reduce the negative effects of disaster. The question is who should pay for reconstruction development programs. Table 5.1 The difference between the Bhopal tragedy and mudflow disaster in Porong
Causes Mudflow Disaster in Misconduct in mining, drilling Porong oil activities suspected trigger by the Yogyakarta earthquake Bhopal tragedy in India The Differentiates Government Company response response Only acting on the basis of government wait and see responses government not Company bought the neutral but biased land that was buried as towards company compensation interests Still exploring another well in Block Brantas Granted relief fund Shared the profit from Collected all the the sale of its interest data and sued the in UCIL company Evaluated the factory plants safety procedures
Caused by the leaking of a pesticide plant
Source: author analyses result, 2009
The recent facts show that the Indonesian community can practise the swadaya mechanisma mechanism where people can contribute to the development program but where the government has only a limited budget to support it. Moreover, the corporate body i.e. the businesses in Sidoarjo, could also be asked to contribute. In particular, Lapindo Brantas which owns 49 oil wells in Brantas Block could make a contribution. Like what UCC did in India, PT Lapindo should also allocate a certain percentage of its profits in exploring oil and gas to develop the entire infrastructure.
A prompt response and the evaluation of all related activities could prevent another disaster. For example, after the toxic pesticides leak in Bhopal, India, the factory plan of the UCC was evaluated and observed in order to prevent similar disasters (the Union Carbide facility in West Virginia, USA was promptly closed as it also manufactured methyl isocyanate. It remained closed until safety measures were re-examined and more light was shed on the cause of the Bhopal tragedy) (Browning, 1993). Similarly, the Indonesian government should evaluate the whole procedure for obtaining a Kontrak karya (working contract) or a Kuasa pertambangan (mining authority) for gas and oil exploration, especially if the exploration site is near residential areas or public infrastructure. Table 5.2 The similarity between the Bhopal Tragedy and mudflow disaster in Porong The similarity findings Involveme Social Close to Delay in nt of bigtrauma residential court multinatio areas procedures nal company Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inadequate due to city site plan
Mudflow disaster in Porong Bhopal tragedy in India
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Source: Author analyses result, 2009 There was some similarity in the Bhopal tragedy and the mudflow disaster: firstly, both disasters occurred in residential areas. Secondly, both disasters involved national and multinational companies (BPK report, 2007; Pohl, 2007; Mokhiber, 1985; Ungarala, 1998). Thirdly, both tragedies indicated an abuse of power from the government in granting permits (Broughton, 2005; Mokhiber, 1985; BPK report,
2007). Governments should be brave enough to disregard all private interests that intervene in government policy-making. Moreover, the government has to bring in new and tougher regulations for potentially dangerous industries such as mining and drilling and for the chemical industry, especially if they are close to residential areas. As Karpagam (1999) suggests, the government should charge high pollution taxes to these high-risk industries in order to prevent unwanted accidents and to reduce pollution. Besides the pollution tax, subsidies should be introduced to control high risk industries. Through subsidies, the government is able to offer rewards to companies that manage to reduce their emissions from some base level or to those that can develop sufficient pollution control installations. Another instrument is refundable deposits and pollution permits (Karpagam, 1999). Refundable deposits could act as future funds to assist recovery efforts in case of any disaster occurring. Webber in Healy (2006) defines planning as a process of open argumentation that should facilitate the debate among societies regarding future, planned development. This development planning should use and combine all potencies that are implemented based on certain measurements and organised by formal institutions. For that reason, sustainable and environmentally friendly planning is needed, not only to solve the mudflow problems but also for the Sidoarjo sustainable development program as a whole.
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Comparative Studies From Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and The Bhopal Disaster in India

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Comparative Studies From Porong Mud Flood in Indonesia and The Bhopal Disaster in India

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European Journal of Social Sciences Volume 34 Issue 2 October 2012 PP: 328-341 Assessing Community Resilience to Man Made

Achmad Room Fitrianto

Figure 1.1 Brantas Production share contract map

Source: Gelder & Denie (2007)

Figure 1.2 The map location of the mudflow

Source: Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing, 2008

Source: Sidoarjo Tourism , 2008 -edited

Source: hotmudflow , wordpress,2006

Figure 1.4 The buried freeway and threatened railway in Porong

Source: Bromund Volker, 2006

Source: Antara, 2006

Figure 5.1 Bhopals location

Source: Google map, 2009

Caused by the leaking of a pesticide plant

Source: author analyses result, 2009

Inadequate due to city site plan

Mudflow disaster in Porong Bhopal tragedy in India

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