A Prevention Technique For Worm Attack Detection in The Security System

IPASJ International Journal of Computer Science (IIJCS)
A Publisher for Research Motivation ........
Volume 1, Issue 1, June 2013
Web Site: http://www.ipasj.org/IIJCS/IIJCS.htm Email: editoriijcs@ipasj.org ISSN 2321-5992
A Prevention Technique for Worm Attack detection in the Security System

Dr. S. K. Walker
Department of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Science, University of Salamanca
ABSTRACT
The web plays major role within the Communication World .The Active worms can drive security threats to the web. Active worms apace propagated and unendingly Compromise computers on web .Active worms throughout their life therefore exhibit nice challenges to defend against them. we tend to examine a replacement category of active worms, cited as Mimecy worm. The mimecy worm ability to showing intelligence manipulate its scan traffic volume over time. The mimecy worm mimics its propagation from existing worm detection systems supported analyzing the propagation traffic generated by worms. we tend to examine properties mimecy worm and conduct a comprehensive comparison between its traffic and non- worm traffic. we tend to observe that these 2 sorts of traffic area unit barely distinguishable within the time domain. However, their distinction is evident within the frequency domain, because of the apace artful nature of the mimecy worm. we tend to style a completely unique spectrum based mostly theme to notice the mimecy worm. Our technique uses the facility Spectral Density Distribution of the scan traffic volume and its corresponding Spectral Flatness live to tell apart the mimecy worm traffic and background traffic .Using comprehensive of detection metrics and universe traces as background traffic ,we conduct intensive performance evaluations on our projected spectrum based mostly detection technique. The performance knowledge clearly demonstrates that our technique will effectively notice the mimecy worm propagation. Our Spectrum based mostly technique effectively detective work not solely the mimecy worm, however ancient worms likewise.
1. INTRODUCTION
Active worm refers to a malfunction package that propagates itself on the web and infect different computers on the web .Multiple universe worms can drive notable harm on the web. several active worms area unit accustomed infect an oversized variety of computers and recruit them as boats or zombies, that area unit networked along to make zombie nets. These zombie nets is accustomed (i) launch Distributed denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that corrupt the web Utilities [5], (ii) access direction which will be victimized through massive scale traffic sniffing, key work, fraud [6], (iii) destroy knowledge that incorporates a high cost [7]. Researchers conjointly showed risk of super-botnets, networks of freelance botnets which will be coordinated for attacks of new scale[10]. For associate resister, super botnets would even be very versatile and proof against counter measures. A network based mostly worm detection system plays a serious role by observation, collecting, and analyzing the scan traffic generated throughout worm attacks. during this system, the detection is usually supported the self propagating behavior of worms which will be delineated as follows: once a worm infected pc identifies and infects a vulnerable pc on the web, this freshly infected pc can mechanically and unendingly scan many information processing Addresses to spot and infect different vulnerable computers. As such, varied existing detection schemes area unit supported a inexplicit assumption that every worm-infected pc keeps scanning the web and propagates itself at the best attainable speed. moreover, it's been shown that the worm scan traffic volume and variety of worm infected computers Exhibit exponentially increasing patterns [2]. The attacks area unit crafting attack methods that supposed to defeat existing worm detection Systems. especially, concealment is one attack strategy utilized by recently-discovered active worm known as Attack worm[5] and also the self stopping worm[6] circumvent detection by torpid with a pre determined amount. Worm may additionally use the evasive scan[7] and Traffic morphing technique to cover the detection [8]. This worm tries to stay hidden by sleeping (suspending scans) once it's suspects it's underneath detection. Worms that adopt such good attack methods might exhibit overall scan traffic patterns completely different from those of ancient
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worms. during this paper, we tend to conduct a scientific study on a replacement category of such good worms denoted as Mimecy worm .The mimecy worm incorporates a self propagating behavior kind of like ancient worms . The mimecy is achieved by manipulating the scan traffic volume prevents exhibition of any exponentially increasing trends that area unit tracked by existing detection schemes. we tend to note that the propagation dominant nature of the Mimecy worm cause retardation a propagation speed. but by fastidiously dominant its scan rate, and position itself to launch ensuant attacks.
Fig 1.Types of Attack An active worm refers to a malicious package program that propagates itself on the web to infect different computers. The propagation of the worm relies on exploiting vulnerabilities of computers on the web. several real-world worms have caused notable harm on the web. These worms embrace Code-Red worm in 2001 [1], Slammer worm in 2003 [2], and Witty/Sesser worms in 2004 [3]. several active worms area unit accustomed infect an oversized variety of computers and recruit them as bots or zombies, that area unit networked along to make botnets [4]. These botnets is used to: (a) launch large Distributed Denial-of-Service (Dodos) attacks that disrupt the web utilities [5], (b) access direction which will be victimized [6] through massive scale traffic sniffing, key work, fraud etc, (c) destroy knowledge that incorporates a high cost [7], and (d) distribute large-scale uninvited advertizing emails (as spam) or package (as malware). there's proof showing that infected computers area unit being rented out as Botnets for making a whole bootleg trade for rental, trading, and managing owned com-puters, resulting in economic incentives for attackers [4], [8], [9]. Researchers conjointly showed risk of super-botnets, networks of freelance botnets which will be attacks of new scale [10]. For associate resister, super-botnets would even be very versatile and proof against countermeasures. Due to the substantial harm caused by worms within the past years, there are important efforts on developing detection and defense mechanisms against worms. A network-based worm detection system plays a serious role by observation, collecting, and analyzing the scan traffic (messages to spot vulnerable computers) generated throughout worm attacks. during this system, the detection is usually supported the self-propagating behavior of worms which will be delineated as follows: once a worm-infected pc identifies and infects a vulnerable pc on the web, this freshly infected computer1 can mechanically and unendingly scan many information processing addresses to spot and infect different vulnerable computers. As such, varied existing detection schemes area unit supported a inexplicit assumption that every worminfected pc keeps scanning the web and propagates itself at the best attainable speed. moreover, it's been shown that the worm scan traffic volume and also the variety of worm-infected computers exhibit exponentially increasing patterns. Nevertheless, the attackers area unit crafting attack methods that will defeat existing worm detection systems. especially, stealth is one attack strategy utilized by a recently-discovered active worm known as Attack worm [15] and also the self-stopping worm [6] circumvent detection by torpid (i.e., stop propagating) with a pre-determined amount. Worm may additionally use the evasive scan [17] and traffic morphing technique to cover the detection [8]. This worm tries to stay hidden by sleeping (suspend-in scans) once it suspects it's underneath detection. Worms that adopt such good attack methods might exhibit overall scan traffic patterns completely different from those of ancient worms. Since the present worm noticeion schemes won't be able to detect such scan traffic patterns, it's important to grasp such smart-worms and develop new countermeasures to defend against them.
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In this paper, we tend to conduct a scientific study on a replacement category of such smart-worms denoted as Camouflaging Worm (C-Worm in short). The C-Worm incorporates a self-propagating behavior kind of like ancient worms, i.e., it intends to apace infect as several vulnerable computers as attainable. However, the C-Worm is kind of completely different from ancient worms within which it camouflages any noticeable trends within the variety of infected computers over time. The camouflage is achieved by manipulating the scan traffic volume of worm-infected computers. Such a manipulation of the scan traffic volume prevents exhibition of any exponentially increasing trends or perhaps crossing of thresholds that area unit tracked by existing detection schemes [19], [20], [21]. we tend to note that the propagation dominant nature of the C-Worm (and similar smart-worms, like Attack) cause a retardation within the propagation speed. However, by fastidiously dominant its scan rate, the C-Worm can: (a) still win its final goal of infecting as several computers as attainable before being detected, and (b) position itself to launch ensuant attacks [4], [5], [6], [7].
We comprehensively analyze the propagation model of the C-Worm and corresponding scan traffic in each time and frequency domains. we tend to observe that though the C-Worm scan traffic shows no noticeable trends within the time domain, it demonstrates a definite pattern within the frequency domain. Specifically, there's a clear concentration inside a slender vary of frequencies. This concentration within a slender vary of frequencies is inevitable since the CWorm adapts to the dynamics of the web in an exceedingly revenant manner for manipulating and dominant its overall scan traffic volume. The on top of revenant manipulations involve steady increase, followed by a decrease within the scan traffic volume, such the changes don't manifest as any trends within the time domain or such the scan traffic volume doesn't cross thresholds that would reveal the C-Worm propagation. Based on the on top of observation, we tend to adopt frequency domain analysis techniques and develop a detection theme against wide-spreading of the C-Worm. notably, we tend to develop a completely unique spectrum-based detection theme that uses the facility Spectral Density (PSD) distribution of scan traffic volume within the frequency domain and its corresponding Spectral Flatness live (SFM) to tell apart the C-Worm traffic from non-worm traffic (background traffic). Our frequency domain analysis studies use the real-world web traffic traces (Shield logs dataset) provided by SANs web Storm Center (ISC) [22], [23]2. Our results reveal that non-worm traffic (e.g., port-scan traffic for port eighty, one hundred thirty five and 8080) has comparatively larger SFM values for his or her PSD distributions. Whereas, the C-Worm traffic shows relatively smaller SFM price for its various PSD distribution. Regions. moreover, we tend to demonstrate the effectiveness of our spectrum-based detection theme compared with existing worm detection schemes. we tend to outline many new metrics. Maximal Infection magnitude relation (MIR) is that the one to quantify the infection harm caused by a worm before being detected. different metrics embrace Detection Time (DT) and Detection Rate (DR). Our analysis knowledge clearly demonstrate that our spectrum-based detection theme achieves far better detection performance against the CWorm propagation compared with existing detection schemes. Our analysis conjointly shows that our spectrum-based detection theme is general enough to be used for effective detection of ancient worms likewise.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section a pair of, we tend to introduce the background and review the connected work. In Section three, we tend to introduce the propagation model of the C-Worm. we tend to gift our spectrum-based detection theme against the C-Worm in Section four. The performance analysis results of our spectrum-based detection theme area unit provided in Section five. We tend to conclude this paper in Section half dozen.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Active Worms Active worms area unit kind of like biological viruses in terms of their infectious and self-propagating nature. They establish vulnerable computers, infect them and also the worm-infected computers propagate the infection additional to different vulnerable computers. so as to grasp worm behavior, we tend to initial have to be compelled to model it. With this understanding, effective detection and defense schemes may well be developed to mitigate the impact of the worms. For this reason, tremendous effort has targeted on this space [12], [24], [14], [25], [16]. Active worms use varied scan mechanisms to propagate themselves with efficiency. the fundamental kind of active worms is classified as having the Pure Random Scan (PRS) nature. within the PRS type, a worm-infected pc unendingly scans a group of random web information processing addresses to search out new vulnerable computers. different worms propagate themselves a lot of effectively than PRS worms victimization varied ways, e.g., network port scanning, email, file sharing, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, and Instant electronic messaging (IM) [26], [27]. additionally, worms use {different|totally completely different|completely different} scan methods throughout different stages of propagation. so as to extend propagation potency, they use an area network or list to infect antecedently known vulnerable computers at the initial stage of propagation [12], [28]. they will conjointly use DNS, topology and routing info to spot active computers rather than indiscriminately scanning information processing addresses [11], [21], [27], [29]. They split the target information processing address area throughout propagation so as to avoid duplicate scans [21]. Li et al. [30] studied a divide-conquer scanning technique that would probably unfold quicker and stealthier than a standard random-scanning worm. Ha et al. [31] developed the matter of finding a quick and resilient propagation topology and propagation schedule for Flash worms. Yang et al. [32] studied the worm propagation over the sensing element networks. Different from the on top of worms, that arrange to accelerate the propagation with new scan schemes, the Camouflaging Worm (C-Worm) studied during this paper aims to elude the detection by the worm defence system throughout worm propagation. Closely connected, however orthogonal to our work, area unit the evolved active worms that area unit polymorphic [33], [34] in nature. Polymorphic worms area unit able to amendment their binary illustration or signature as a part of their propagation method. this may be achieved with self-encryption mechanisms or semantics-preserving code manipulation techniques. The C-Worm conjointly shares some similarity with surreptitious port-scan attacks. Such attacks try and verify on the market services in an exceedingly target system, whereas avoiding detection [35], [36]. it's accomplished by decreasing the port scan rate, concealment the origin of attackers, etc. because of the character of self-propagation, the C-Worm should use a lot of complicated mechanisms to control the scan traffic volume over time so as to avoid detection. 2.2 Worm Detection Worm detection has been intensively studied within the past and may be usually classified into 2 categories: hostbased detection and network-based detection. Host-based noticeion systems detect worms by observation, collecting, and analyzing worm behaviors on end-hosts. Since worms area unit malicious programs that execute on these computers, analyzing the behavior of worm executables plays a very important role in host-based detection systems. several detection schemes constitute this class [37], [38]. In distinction, network-based noticeion systems detect worms primarily by observation, collecting, and analyzing the scan traffic (messages to spot vulner-able computers) generated by worm attacks. several detection schemes constitute this class [19], [20], [21], [39], [40]. Ideally, security vulnerabilities should be prevented to start with, a retardant that should addressed by the artificial language community. However, whereas vulnerabilities exist and create threats of large-scale harm, it's crucial to conjointly target network-based detection, as this paper will, to notice wide-spreading worms. In order to apace and accurately notice Internet-wide massive scale propagation of active worms, it's imperative to watch and analyze the traffic in multiple locations over the web to notice suspicious traffic generated by worms. The wide adopted worm detection framework consists of multiple distributed monitors and a worm detection center that
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controls the previous [23], [41]. This framework is well adopted and kind of like different existing worm detection systems, like the Cyber center for unwellness controller [11], web motion sensing element [42], SANS ISC (Internet Storm Center) [23], web sink [41], and network telescope [43]. The monitors area unit distributed across the web and may be deployed at end-hosts, router, or firewalls etc. every monitor passively records irregular port-scan traffic, like affiliation tries to a spread of void information processing addresses (IP addresses not being used) and restricted service ports. sporadically, the monitors send traffic logs to the detection center. The detection center analyzes the traffic logs and determines whether or not or not there area unit suspicious scans to restricted ports or to invalid information processing addresses. Network-based detection schemes unremarkably analyze the collected scanning traffic knowledge by applying sure call rules for detective work the worm propagation. for instance, Venkataraman et al. and Wu et al. in [20], [21] projected schemes to look at statistics of scan traffic volume, Zou et al. bestowed a trend-based detection theme to look at the exponential increase pattern of scan traffic [19], Lakhina et al. in [40] projected schemes to look at different options of scan traffic, like the distribution of destination addresses. different works study worms that arrange to wrestle new patterns to avoid detection [39]. Besides the on top of detection schemes that area unit supported the worldwide scan traffic monitor by detective work traffic abnormal behavior, there area unit different worm detection and defense schemes like sequent hypothesis testing for detective work worm-infected computers [44], payload-based worm signature detection [34], [45]. additionally, Cai et al. in [46] bestowed each theoretical modeling and experimental results on a cooperative worm signature generation system that employs distributed fingerprint filtering and aggregation and multiple edge networks. Dantu et al. in [47] bestowed a state-space feedback management model that detects associated management the unfold of those viruses or worms by activity the rate of the quantity of latest connections an infected pc makes. Despite the various approaches delineated on top of, we tend to believe that detective work wide scanning anomaly behavior continues to be a helpful weapon against worms, which in observe multi-faceted defence has benefits.
3. MODELING OF THE C-WORM

3.1 C-Worm The C-Worm camouflages its propagation by dominant scan traffic volume throughout its propagation. the best thanks to manipulate scan traffic volume is to indiscriminately amendment the quantity of worm instances conducting portscans. As different alternatives, a worm aggressor could use associate open-loop management (non-feedback) mechanism by selecting a irregular and time connected pattern for the scanning and infection so as to avoid being detected. still, the open-loop management approach raises some problems with the invisibleness of the attack. First, as we know, worm propagation over the web is thought-about a dynamic system. once associate aggressor launches worm propagation, it's vey difficult for the aggressor to understand the correct parameters for worm propagation dynamics over the web. Given the wrong information of worm propagation over the web, the open-loop system won't be able to stabilize the scan traffic. this can be a glorious result from system theory [48]. Consequently, the general worm scan traffic volume within the open-loop system can expose a way higher chance to indicate associate increasing trend with the progress of worm propagation. As a lot of and a lot of computers get infected, they, in turn, participate in scanning different computers. Hence, we tend to contemplate the C-worm as a worst case assaultive state of affairs that uses a closed-loop management for regulation the propagation speed supported the feedback propagation standing. In order to effectively evade detection, the general scan traffic for the C-Worm ought to be relatively slow and variant enough to not show any notable increasing trends overtime. On the opposite hand, a really slow propagation of the CWorm is additionally not fascinating, since it delays speedy infection harm to the web. Hence, the C-Worm must modify its propagation in order that it's neither too quick to be simply detected, nor too slow to delay speedy harm on the web. To regulate the C-Worm scan traffic volume, we tend to introduce an effect parameter known as attack chance P (t) for every worm-infected pc. P (t) is that the chance that a C-Worm instance participates within the worm propagation (i.e., scans and infects different computers) at time t. Our C-Worm model with the management parameter P (t) is generic. P
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(t) = one represents the cases for ancient worms, wherever all worm instances actively participate within the propagation. For the C-Worm, P (t) desires not be a relentless price and may be set as a time variable perform. In order to realize its camouflaging behavior, the C-Worm must get associate acceptable P (t) to control its scan traffic. Specifically, the C-Worm can regulate its overall scan traffic volume such that: (a) it's kind of like non-worm scan traffic in terms of the scan traffic volume over time, (b) it doesn't exhibit any notable trends, like associate exponentially increasing pattern or any mono-increasing pattern even once the quantity of infected hosts will increase (exponentially) over time, and (c) the typical price of the general scan traffic volume is spare to form the C-Worm propagate quick enough to cause speedy harm on the Internet3. We assume that a worm aggressor intends to control scan traffic volume in order that the quantity of worm instances collaborating within the worm propagation follow a random distribution with mean MHz . This MHz is regulated in an exceedingly random fashion throughout worm propagation so as to camouflage the propagation of C-Worm. Correspondingly, the worm instances have to be compelled to modify their attack chance P (t) so as to confirm that the whole variety of worm instances launching the scans is roughly MC. to manage MC, it's obvious that P(t) should be attenuated over time since M(t) keeps increasing throughout the worm propagation. we are able to categorical P(t) employing a straightforward perform as follows: P(t) = min(MC/M(t), 1), wherever M (t) represents the estimation of M(t) at time t. From the on top of expression, we all know that the C-Worm must get the worth of M (t) (as near M(t) as possible) so as to come up with associate effective(t). Here, we tend to discuss one approach for the C-Worm to estimate M(t). the fundamental plan is as follows: A C-Worm might estimate the share of computers that have already been infected over the whole variety of information processing addresses likewise as M(t), through checking a scan try as a replacement hit (i.e., touching associate antiseptic vulnerable computer) or a replica hit (i.e., touching associate already infected vulnerable computer). This technique needs every worm instance (i.e., infected pc) to be marked indicating that this computer has been infected. Thus, once a worm instance (for example, pc A) scans one infected pc (for example, pc B), then pc A can notice such a mark, thereby turning into aware that pc B has been infected. Through verifying such marks throughout the propagation, a C-Worm infected pc will estimate M (t). Appendix A discusses one various however the C-Worm might estimate ( ) to get ( ) because the propagation B has been infected. Through verifying such marks throughout the propagation, a C-Worm infected pc will estimate M(t). Appendix A discusses one various however the C-Worm might estimate M(t) to get M (t) because the propagation income. There area unit different approaches to realize this goal, like incorporating the Peer-to-Peer techniques to bare info through secured IRC channels [49], [50]. 3.2 Propagation Model of the C-Worm To analyze the C-Worm, we tend to adopt the epidemic dynamic model for unwellness propagation, that has been extensively used for worm propagation modeling [2], [12]. supported existing results [2], [12], this model matches the dynamics of real worm propagation over the web quite well. For this reason, kind of like different publications, we tend to adopt this model in our paper likewise. Since our investigated C-Worm may be a novel attack, we tend to changed the initial Epidemic dynamic formula to model the propagation of the C-Worm by introducing the P (t) - the attack chance that a worm-infected pc participates in worm propagation at time t. we tend to note that there's a large scope to notably improve our changed model within the future to replicate many characteristics that area unit relevant in realworld observe. Particularly, the epidemic dynamic model assumes that any given pc is in one amongst the subsequent states: immune, vulnerable, or infected. associate immune pc is one that can't be infected by a worm; a vulnerable pc is one that has the potential of being infected by a worm; associate infected pc is one that has been infected by a worm. the easy epidemic model for a finite population of ancient PRS worms is expressed as4, dM (t) = M (t) [N M (t)], (1) where M (t) is that the variety of infected pcs at time t; N (= T P1 P2) is that the variety of vulnerable computers on the web; T is that the total variety of information processing addresses on the web; P1 is that the magnitude relation of the whole variety of computers on the web over T ; P2 is that the magnitude relation of total variety of vulnerable computers on the web over the whole variety of computers on the Internet; = S/V is termed the try wise infection rate [51]; S is that the scan rate outlined because the variety of scans that associate infected computer will launch in an
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exceedingly given quantity. we tend to assume that at t = zero, there area unit M (0) computers being ab initio infected and N M (0) computers being prone to additional worm infection. The C-Worm incorporates a completely different propagation model compared to ancient PRS worms owing to its P (t) parameter. Consequently, Formula (1) must be rewritten as, time t, and forward that M (t) = (1+_) M(t), wherever nine is that the estimation error, the Formula (2) is rewritten as, dM (t) = MHz [N M (t)]. (3) dt 1 + z(t) With Formula (3), we are able to derive the propagation model for the C-Worm wherever M (0) is that the variety of infected computers at time zero. Assume that the worm detection system will monitor Pm (Pm [0, 1]) of the total web information processing address area. while not loss of generality, the chance that a minimum of one scan from a worm-infected pc (it generates S scans in unit time on average) are going to be discovered by the detection system is one (1 Pm)P (t)S . we tend to outline that MA(t) is that the variety of worm instances that are discovered by the worm detection system at time t, then there area unit M (t) MA(t) unobserved infected instances at time t. At the worm propagation early stage, M (t) MA(t) M (t). The expected variety of freshly discovered infected instances at t + (where is that the interval of monitoring) is (M (t) MA(t)) [1 (1 Pm)P (t)S ] M (i)[1 (1 Pm)P (t)S ]. Thus, we've MA(t + ) =MA(t)+M (t)[1(1Pm)P ( t)S ]. victimization straightforward mathematical manipulations, the quantity of worm instances discovered by the worm detection system at time t is, MA(t) = P (t) M (t) Pm = Pm MHz . 1 + z(t) (4)
3.3 Effectiveness of the C-Worm We currently demonstrate the effectiveness of the C-Worm in evad-ing worm detection through dominant P (t). Given random Selection of c, we tend to generate 3 C-Worm attacks (viz., C-Worm 1, C-Worm a pair of and C-Worm 3) that area unit characterised by completely different choices of mean and variance magnitudes for MC. In our simulations, we tend to assume that the scan rate of the standard PRS worm follow a traditional distribution metallic element = N(40, 40) (note that if the scan rate generated by on top of distribution is a smaller amount than zero , we tend to set the scan rate as 0). we tend to conjointly set the whole variety of vulnerable computers on the web as 360,000, that is that the total variety of infected computers in Code-Red worm incident [1].
Fig. . Discovered infected instance variety for the C-Worm and PRS worm Fig. one shows the discovered variety of worm-infected computers over time for the PRS worm and also the on top of 3 C-Worm attacks. Fig. a pair of shows the infection magnitude relation for the PRS worm and also the on top of 3 CWorm attacks. These simulations area unit for a worm detection system mentioned in Section a pair of.2 that covers a a pair of0 IPv4 address area on the web. the explanation for selecting 220 information processing addresses because the coverage area of the worm detection system is because of the actual fact that the SANs web Storm Center (ISC), a
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representative ITM system, has similar coverage area [23]. within the ITM systems, an oversized variety of monitors area unit unremarkably deployed everywhere the web and every monitor collects the traffic directed to alittle set of information processing address areas that aren't unremarkably used (also known as dark information processing addresses). Therefore, the address area of ITM system isn't a slender vary address area, rather an oversized variety of tiny chunks of addresses indiscriminately unfold across the worldwide information processing address area.
For the C-Worm, the trend of discovered variety of worm instances over time (MA(t)) (defined in Formula (4)) is way completely different from that of the standard PRS worm as shown in Fig. 2. This clearly demonstrates however the CWorm success-fully camouflages its increase within the variety of worm instances (MA(t)) and avoids detection by worm detection systems that expect exponential will increase in worm instance numbers throughout large-scale worm propagation. Fig. three shows the quantity of scanning computers from traditional non-worm port-scanning traffic (background traffic) for many well-known ports, (i.e., 25, 53, 135, and 8080) obtained over many months by the ISC. examination Fig. 3 with Fig. 1, we are able to observe that it's onerous to tell apart the C-Worm port traffic from background port-scanning traffic within the time domain. From on top of Figs. 1 and 2, we tend to conjointly observe that the C-Worm remains able to maintain a definite magnitude of scan traffic thus on cause important infection on the web. As a note concerning the speed of C-Worm propagation, we are able to observe from Fig. one that the C-Worm takes roughly ten days to infect seventy fifth of total vulnerable hosts compared with the three.3 days taken by a PRS worm5. Hence, the C-Worm might probably modify its propagation speed such it's still effective in inflicting wide-spreading propagation, whereas avoiding being detected by the worm detection schemes. We mentioned the Atak worm in Section I and mentioned that it's kind of like the C-Worm since it tries to avoid being detected, once it suspects that it's being detected by anti-worm package. However, it differs from the C-Worm in its behavior. The Atak worm tries to cover solely throughout times it suspects its propagation are going to be detected by anti-worm
Fig. 3. Discovered infected instance variety for back-ground scanning reported by ISCsoftware. Whereas, the C-Worm proactively camouflages itself in the least times. additionally, the Self-stopping worm tries to cover by co-ordinating
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with its members to halt propagation activity solely once the vulnerable population is subverted [16]. This behavior leaves enough proof for worm detection systems to acknowledge its propagation. The C-Worm, on the opposite hand, hides itself even throughout its propagation and therefore keeps the worm detection schemes utterly unaware of its propagation. The C-Worm conjointly has some similarity in spirit with polymorphic worms that manipulate the computer memory unit stream of worm payload so as to avoid the detection of signature (payload)-based detection theme [33], [34]. The manipulation of worm payload is achieved by varied mechanisms: (a) interleaving significant directions with NOP (no operation), (b) victimization completely different directions to realize identical results, (c) shuffling the register set in every worm propagation program code copy, and (d) victimization cryptography mechanisms to vary worm payload signature with each infection try [33], [34]. In distinction, the C-Worm tries to control the scan route to avoid detection. 3.4 Discussion In this paper, we tend to target a replacement category of worms, cited because the camouflaging worm (C-Worm). The C-Worm adapts their propagation traffic patterns so as to cut back the chance of detection, and to eventually infect a lot of computers. The C-Worm is completely different from polymorphic worms that deliberately amendment their payload signatures throughout propagation [34], [52]. for instance, Meta PHOR [53] and Zmist [54] worms intensively metamorphose their payload signature to cover themselves from detection schemes that deem big-ticket packet payload analysis. Bettencourt et al. [55] studied the worm that employs personal info retrieval techniques to search out and retrieve specific items of sensitive info from compromised computers whereas concealment its search criteria. Sharif et al. [56] bestowed associate obfuscation-based technique that mechanically conceals specific condition dependent malicious behavior from virus detectors that haven't any previous information of program inputs. Popov et al. [57] investigated a method that enables the worm programs to be obfuscated by ever-changing several control transfers into signals (traps) and inserting dummy management transfers and junk directions once the signals. The ensuing code will considerably cut back the prospect to be detected. Recent studies conjointly showed that existing business anti-worm noticeion systems fail to detect current worms and may even be simply circumvented by worms that use straightforward mutation techniques to control their payload [58]. Although during this paper we tend to solely demonstrate effectiveness of the C-Worm against existing traffic volumebased detection schemes, the planning principle of the C-Worm is extended to defeat different freshly developed detection schemes, like destination distribution-based detection [39], [40]. within the following, we tend to discuss this preliminary construct. Recall that the attack target distribution based mostly schemes analyze the distribution of attack targets (the scanned destination information processing addresses) as basic detection knowledge to capture the elemental options of worm propagation, i.e., they unendingly scan completely different targets, that isn't the expected behavior of non-worm scan traffic. However, our initial investigation shows that the worm aggressor remains able to defeat such a step via manipulating the attack target distribution. for instance, the aggressor could launch some of scan traffic certain for a few information processing addresses monitored by ITM system. Recall that those dedicated information processing addresses monitored by ITM system is obtained via inquisitory attacks or different suggests that [59], [60], [61].
Using port one hundred thirty five reported by SANs ISC as associate example, we tend to nalyze the traces and procure the traffic target distribution in an exceedingly window lasting ten minutes. Following existing work [39], [40], we tend to use entropy because the metric to live the attack target distribution. Fig. four shows the chance Density perform (PDF) of background traffics entropy values. we tend to conjointly simulate the worm propagation traffic, that allocates some of scan traffic certain for information processing addresses monitored by the ITM system. Following this, we tend to get the PDF of the entropy price for combined traffic as well as each worm propagation and background traffic. From Fig. 4, we all know that once the aggressor uses some of attack traffic to control the target distribution, the entropy-based detection theme will degrade considerably. for instance, once the aggressor uses 100% traffic to control the traffics entropy price, the false positive rate of entropy-based detection theme is Bastille Day. once the aggressor uses half-hour traffic to control the traffics entropy price, the false positive rate becomes four-hundredth. Hence, so as to preserve the performance, entropy-based detection theme must evolve correspondingly and integrate with different detection schemes. we'll perform a a lot of elaborated study of this facet in our future work.
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Volume 1, Issue 1, June 2013 4. DETECTIVE WORK THE C-WORM
4.1 style explanation In this section, we tend to develop a completely unique spectrum-based detection theme. Recall that the C-Worm goes undiscovered by detection schemes that try and verify the worm propagation solely within the time domain. Our detection theme captures the distinct pattern of the C-Worm within the frequency domain, and thereby has the potential of effectively detective work the C-Worm propagation. In order to spot the C-Worm propagation within the frequency domain, we tend to use the distribution of Power Spectral Den-sity (PSD) and its corresponding Spectral Flatness live (SFM) of the scan traffic. notably, PSD describes however the facility of a statistic is distributed within the frequency domain. Mathematically, it's outlined because the Fourier remodel of the auto-correlation of a statistic. In our case, the statistic corresponds to the changes within the variety of worm instances that actively conduct scans over time. The SFM of PSD is outlined because the magnitude relation of mean to first moment of the coefficients of PSD. The vary of SFM values is [0, 1] and a bigger SFM price implies blandish PSD distribution and contrariwise. To illustrate SFM values of each the C-Worm and traditional non-worm scan traffic, we tend to plot the chance Density perform (PDF) of SFM for each C-Worm and traditional non-worm scan traffic as shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, severally. the traditional non-worm scan traffic knowledge shown in Fig. half dozen relies on real-world traces collected by the ISC half dozen. Note that we tend to solely show the information for port 8080 as associate example, and different ports show similar observations. From this figure, we all know that the SFM price for traditional nonworm traffic is extremely tiny (e.g., SFM (0.02, 0.04) has abundant higher density compared with different magnitudes). The C-Worm knowledge shown in Fig. five relies on 800 C-Worms attacks generated by variable attack parameters outlined in Section three like P (t) and Mc(t). From this figure, we all know that the SFM price of the CWorm attacks is high (e.g., SFM 0.5, 0.6 has high density). From the on top of 2 figures, we are able to observe that there's a transparent demarcation vary of SFM (0.3, 0.38) between the C-Worm and traditional non-worm scan traffic. As such, the SFM is accustomed sensitively notice the C-Worm scan traffic. The large SFM values of traditional non-worm scan traffic is explained as follows. the traditional non-worm scan traffic doesn't tend to concentrate at any explicit frequency since its random dynamics isn't caused by any revenant development. the little price of SFM is reasoned by the actual fact that the facility of C-Worm scan traffic is inside a narrow-band frequency vary. Such concentration within a slender vary of frequencies is ineluctable since the C-Worm adapts to the dynamics of the web in an exceedingly revenant manner for manipulating the general scan traffic volume. In reality, the on top of revenant manipulations involve steady increase followed by a decrease within the scan traffic volume. Notice that the frequency domain analysis would require a lot of samples compared with the time domain analysis, since the frequency domain analysis technique like the Fourier remodel, must derive power spectrum amplitude for various frequencies. so as to come up with the correct spectrum amplitude for comparatively high frequencies, a high graininess of information sampling are going to be needed. In our case, we tend to deem web threat observation (ITM) systems to gather traffic traces from monitors (motion sensors) in an exceedingly timely manner. As a matter of reality, different existing detection schemes supported the scan traffic rate [20], variance [21] or trend [19] also will demand a high oftenness for ITM systems so as to accurately notice worm attacks. sanctioning the ITM system with timely knowledge assortment can profit worm detection in period of time. 4.2 Spectrum-based Detection theme We currently gift the small print of our spectrum-based detection theme. kind of like different detection schemes [19], [21], we tend to use a destination count because the variety of the distinctive destination information processing addresses targeted by launched scans throughout worm propaga-tion. to grasp however the destination count knowledge is obtained, we tend to recall that associate ITM system collects logs from distributed monitors across the web. On a aspect note, web Threat observation (ITM) systems area unit a wide deployed facility to notice, analyze, and characterize dangerous web threats like worms. In general, associate ITM system consists of 1 centralized knowledge center and variety of monitors distributed across the web. every monitor records traffic that addressed to a spread of information processing addresses (which aren't unremarkably used information processing address conjointly known as the dark information processing addresses) and sporadically sends the traffic logs to the information center. the information center then analyzes the collected traffic LOGS and publishes reports (e.g., statistics of monitored traffic) to ITM system users. Therefore the baseline traffic in our study is scan traffic. With reports in an exceedingly sampling
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window Ws, the supply count X(t) is obtained by numeration the distinctive supply information processing addresses in received logs. To conduct spectrographic analysis, we tend to contemplate a detection window Wd within the worm detection system. Wd consists of alphabetic character (> 1) continuous detection sampling windows and every sampling window lasts Ws. The detection sampling window is that the unit quantity to sample the detection knowledge (e.g., the destination count). Hence, at time i, inside a window Wd, there area unit alphabetic character samples denoted by (X(i alphabetic character 1), X(i alphabetic character 2), . . . , X(i)), wherever X(i j 1) (j (1, q)) is that the j-th destination count from time i j one to i j. In our spectrum-based detection theme, the distribution of PSD and its corresponding SFM area unit accustomed distinguish the C-Worm scan traffic from the non-worm scan traffic. Recall that the definition of PSD distribution and its corresponding SFM area unit introduced in Section four.1. In our worm detection theme, the detection knowledge (e.g., destination counter), is additional processed so as to get its PSD and SFM. within the following, we tend to detail however the PSD and SFM area unit determined throughout the process of the detection knowledge. To obtain the PSD distribution for worm detection knowledge, we'd like to remodel knowledge from the time domain into the frequency domain. To do so, we tend to use a random method X(t), t [0, n] to model the worm detection knowledge. forward X(t) is that the supply count in period [t one, t] (t [1, n]), we tend to outline the autocorrelation of X(t) by RX (L) = E[X(t)X(t + L)]. (5)In Formula (5), RX (L) is that the correlation of worm detection knowledge in associate interval L. If a revenant behavior exists, a Fourier remodel of the auto-correlation perform of RX (L) will reveal such behavior. Thus, the PSD perform (also drawn by SX (f ); wherever f refers to frequency) of the scan traffic knowledge is decided victimization the distinct Fourier remodel (DFT) of its auto-correlation perform as follows, N1 (RX [L], K) = (RX [L]) ej2Kn/N , (6) n=0 where K = zero, 1, . . . , N 1. As the PSD inherently captures any revenant pattern within the frequency domain, the PSD perform shows a relatively even distribution across a large spectrum vary for the traditional non-worm scan traffic. The PSD of C-Worm scan traffic shows spikes or perceptibly higher concentrations at a definite vary of the spectrum. 4.2.2 Spectral Flatness live (SFM) We live the flatness of P American state to tell apart the scan traffic of the C-Worm from the traditional non-worm scan traffic. For this, we tend to introduce the Spectral Flatness live (SFM), which may capture anomaly behavior in sure vary of frequencies. The SFM is outlined because the magnitude relation of the mean to the first moment of the PSD coefficients [62], [63]. It is expressed as, where S(fk) is associate PSD constant for the PSD obtained from the leads to Formula (6). SFM may be a wide existing live for discriminating frequencies in varied applications like voiced frame detection in speech recognition [63], [64]. In general, tiny values of SFM imply the concentration of information at slender frequency spectrum ranges. Note that the C-Worm has unpreventable revenant behavior in its scan traffic; consequently its SFM values area unit relatively smaller than the SFM values of traditional non-worm scan traffic. To be helpful in detective work C-Worms, we tend to introduce a window to capture perceptibly higher concentrations at alittle vary of spectrum. once such perceptibly concentration is recognized, we tend to derive the SFM inside a wider frequency vary. From Fig. 5, we are able to observe that the SFM price for the C-Worm is extremely tiny (e.g., with a average of roughly zero.075). a proper analysis of SFM for the C-Worm is bestowed within the Appendix B. We currently describe the tactic of applying associate acceptable noticeion rule to detect C-Worm propagation. because the SFM price is accustomed sensitively distinguish the C-Worm and traditional non-worm scan traffic, the worm detection is performed by examination the SFM with a predefined threshold Tr. If the SFM price is smaller than a predefined threshold Tr, then a C-Worm propagation alert is generated. the worth of the edge Tr utilized by the CWorm detection is suitably set supported the information of organization (e.g., PDF) of SFM values that correspond to
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the non-worm scan traffic. Notice that the Tr price for the non-worm traffic is derived by analyzing the historical knowledge provided by SANs web Storm Center (ISC). within the worm detection systems, monitors collect port-scan traffic to sure space of dark information processing addresses and sporadically reports scan traffic log to the information center. Then the information center aggregates the information from completely different monitors on identical port and publishes the information. supported the historical knowledge for various ports, we are able to build the applied math profiles of port-scan traffic on completely different ports so derive the Tr price for the non-worm traffic. supported the continual reported knowledge, the worth of Tr are going to be tuned and adaptively accustomed do worm detection. If we are able to obtain the PDF of SFM values for the C-Worm through comprehensive simulations and even realworld profiled knowledge within the future, the optimum threshold is obtained by applying the Thomas Bayes classification [65]. If the PDF of SFM values for the C-Worm isn't on the market, supported the PDF of SFM values of the traditional non-worm scan traffic, we are able to set associate acceptable Tr price. for instance, the Tr price is determined by the Chebyshev difference [65] so as to get an inexpensive false positive rate for worm detection. thence in Section five, we tend to appraise our spectrum-based detection theme against the C-Worm on 2 cases: (a) the PDF of SFM values area unit glorious for each the traditional non-worm scan traffic and also the C-Worm scan traffic, (b) the PDF of SFM values is merely glorious for the traditional non-worm scan traffic.
In addition, our spectrum-based theme is additionally generic for detective work the PRS worms. this can be because of the actual fact that propagation traffic of PRS worms has associate exponentially increasing pattern. Thus, within the propagation traffic of PRS worms, the PSD values within the low frequency vary area unit abundant higher compared with different frequency ranges. a proper analysis of SFM for the PRS worm is bestowed in Appendix C. Notice that even though the C-Worm monitors the port-scan traffic report, it'll be onerous for the C-Worm to form the SFM kind of like the background traffic. this may be reasoned by 2 factors. First, the low price of SFM is principally caused by the closed-loop management nature of C-worm. The concentration within a slender vary of frequencies is ineluctable since the C-Worm adapts to the dynamics of the web in an exceedingly revenant manner for manipulating the general scan traffic volume. supported our analysis, the non-worm traffic on a port is quite random and its SFM incorporates a flat pattern. which means that the non-worm traffic on the port distributes similar power across completely different frequencies. Second, as we tend to indicated in different responses, with-out introducing the closed-loop management, it'll be tough for the aggressor to cover the irregularity of worm propagation traffic within the time domain. once the worm attacks incorporate the closed-loop management mechanism to camouflage their traffic, it'll expose a relative tiny price of SFM. Hence, desegregation our spectrum-based detection with existing traffic ratebased anomaly detection within the time domain, we are able to force the worm aggressor into a dilemma: if the worm attacker doesn't use the closed-loop management, the present traffic rate-based noticeion theme are going to be able to detect the worm; if the worm aggressor adopt the closed-loop management, it'll cause the comparatively tiny SFM because of the method of closed-loop management. This makes the worm attack to be detected by our spectrum-based theme in conjunction with different existing traffic-rate based mostly detection schemes.
5. RESULT ANALYSIS
In this section, we tend to report our analysis results that illustrate the effectiveness of our spectrum-based detection theme against each the C-Worm and also the PRS worm compared with existing representative detection schemes for detective work wide-spreading worms. additionally, we tend to conjointly take into thought destination distribution based mostly detection schemes and appraise their performance against the C-Worm. 5.1 Analyses Methodology 5.1.1 Analysis Metrics In order to judge the performance of any given detection theme against the C-Worm, we tend to use the subsequent 3 metrics listed in Table II. the primary metric is that the worm Infection magnitude relation (IR), that is outlined because the magnitude relation of {the variety|the amount|the quantity} of infected computers to the whole number of vulnerable computers, forward there's no worm detection/defense system in situ. the opposite 2 metrics area unit the
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Detection Time (DT ) and also the maximal Infection magnitude relation (MIR). DT is outlined because the time taken to with success notice a wide-spreading worm from the instant the worm propagation starts. It quantifies the detection speed of a detection theme. MIR defines the magnitude relation of associate infected pc variety over the whole variety of vulnerable computers up to the instant once the worm spreading is detected. It quantifies the harm caused by a worm before being detected. the target of any detection theme is to reduce the harm caused by a speedy worm propagation. Hence, MIR and DT is accustomed quantify the effectiveness of any worm detection theme. the upper the values, the simpler the worm attack and also the less effective the detection. additionally, we tend to use 2 a lot of metrics Detection Rate (PD) and False Positive Rate (PF ). The atomic number 46 is outlined because the chance that a detection theme will properly establish a worm attack. The PF is outlined because the chance that a detection theme erroneously identifies a non-existent worm attack. 5.1.2 Simulation Setup In our analysis we tend to thought-about each experiments with real-world non-worm traffic and simulated c-worm traffic. to form our experiments replicate real-world observe, some key parameters that we tend to accustomed generate C-worm traffic in our simulation were supported previous results from a real-worm incidence - Code-Red worm in 2001 [1]. Specifically, we tend to set the whole variety of vulnerable computers on the web as 360,000, that is that the most variety of computers that may well be infected by Code-Red worm. in addition, we tend to set the scan rate S (number of scans per minute) to be variable inside a spread, this enables U.S.A. to emulate the infected computers in several network environments. In our analysis, the scan rates area unit planned and follow a normal distribution S = N (Sm, S2), wherever Sm and S2 area unit in [(20, 70], kind of like those utilized in [19]. In our analysis, we tend to incorporate the simulated C-worm attack traffic into replayed non-worm traffic traces and dispensed analysis study.
We simulate the C-Worm attacks by variable the attack parameters, like attack chance (P (t)) and also the variety of worm instances collaborating within the scan ( C ) outlined in M Section three. The C follows the normal distribution N (m, )M and area unit modified dynamically by the C-Worm throughout its propagation. notably, for N (m, ), m is indiscriminately designated in (12000, 75000) and is indiscriminately designated in (0.2, 100). we tend to simulate completely different C-Worm attacks by variable the values of m and . The detection sampling window Ws is about to five minutes and also the detection window Wd is about to be progressive from eighty min to 800 min. The progressive choice of Ws from a relatively tiny window to an oversized window will adaptively replicate the worm scan traffic dynamics caused by the C-Worm propagation at varied speeds. we elect the setting of the detection sampling window to be short enough so as to supply enough sampling accuracy as prescribed by Nyquists sampling theory. Also, we elect the detection window to be long enough to capture adequate info for spectrum-based analysis [63]. We appraise the detection performance of various detection schemes for ancient PRS worm attacks. The detection performance results are averaged over five hundred PRS worm at-tacks. we tend to observe that each our specification and SPEC(W) schemes win 100% detection rate (PD) whereas detective work ancient PRS worms compared with the present worm detection schemes that are specifically designed for detective work the standard PRS worms.
6. CONCLUSION
In view of accenting the relative performance of our specification and SPEC(W) schemes with the present worm detection schemes, we tend to plot the MIR and DT leads to Figs. seven and eight for various scan rates S. {we can|we will|we area unit able to} observe from these figures that the MIR and DT results of our spectrum-based theme (shown just for SPEC(W)) are comparable or higher than the present worm detection schemes. For a mean scan rate of 70/min, our SPEC(W) theme achieves a detection time of 1024 minutes, that is quicker than that of power unit and MEAN schemes, whose values area unit 1239 min and 1161 min, severally. For identical mean scan rate of 70/min, SPEC(W) achieves a maximal infection magnitude relation of zero.03, that is reminiscent of TRENDs MIR price and is a
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smaller amount than five hundredth of the MIR price for the power unit and MEAN detection schemes. The effectiveness of our spectrum-based theme relies on the actual fact that ancient PRS worm scanning traffic shows a perpetually speedy increase. Thus, SFM values area unit comparatively tiny because of PSD concentration at the low frequency bands within the case of the standard PRS worm scanning.
REFERENCE
[1] Clip2, The Gnutella Protocol Specification v0.4, http://www.clip2.com/ GnutellaProtocol04.pdf, Mar. 2001. [2] E. Damiani, D. di Vimercati, S. Paraboschi, P. Samarati, and F. Violante, A Reputation-Based Approach for Choosing Reliable Resources in Peer-to-Peer Networks, Proc. ACM Conf. Computer and Comm. Security (CCS), pp. 207-216, Nov. 2002. [3] X. Yang and G. de Veciana, Service Capacity in Peer-to-Peer Networks, Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 04, pp. 1-11, Mar. 2004. [4] D. Qiu and R. Srikant, Modeling and Performance Analysis of BitTorrent-Like Peer-to-Peer Networks, Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2004. [5] J. Mundinger, R. Weber, and G.Weiss, Optimal Scheduling of Peer-to-Peer File Dissemination, J. Scheduling, vol. 11, pp. 105-120, 2007. [6] D. Moore, C. Shannon, and J. Brown, Code-red: a case study on the spread and victims of an internet worm, in Proceedings of the 2-th Internet Measurement Workshop (IMW), Marseille, France, November 2002. [7] D. Moore, V. Paxson, and S. Savage, Inside the slammer worm, in IEEE Magazine of Security and Privacy, July 2003. [8] CERT, CERT/CC advisories, http://www.cert.org/advisories/. [9] P. R. Roberts, Zotob Arrest Breaks Credit Card Fraud Ring, http: //www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1854162,00.asp. [10] W32/MyDoom.B Virus, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/ TA04-028A.html. [11] W32.Sircam.Worm@mm, http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/ w32.sircam.worm@mm.html. [12] Worm.ExploreZip, http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/worm. explore.zip.html. [13] R. Naraine, Botnet Hunters Search for Command and Control Servers, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1829347,00.asp. [14] Y. Wang, D. Chakrabarti, C. Wang, and C. Faloutsos, Epidemic Spreading in Real Networks: An Eigenvalue Viewpoint, Proc. IEEE Intl Symp. Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS), 2003. [15] M. Newman, S. Strogatz, and D. Watts, Random Graphs with Arbitrary Degree Distribution and Their Applications, Physical Rev. E, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 026118(1-17), July 2001. [16] D. Stutzbach and R. Rejaie, Characterizing the Two-Tier Gnutella Topology, Proc. ACM Intl Conf. Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS), pp. 402-403, June 2005. [17] R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, Epidemic Dynamics in Scale-Free Networks, Physical Rev. E, vol. 65, no. 3, p. 035108(1-4), Mar. 2002. [18] O. Diekmann and J. Heesterbeek, Mathematical Epidemiology of Infectious Diseases: Model Building, Analysis and Interpretation. Wiley, 1999. [19] P. van den Driessche and J. Watmough, Reproduction Numbers and Sub-Threshold Endemic Equilibria for Compartmental Models of Disease Transmission, Math. Biosciences, vol. 180, pp. 29-48, 2002. [20] J. Arnio, J. Davis, D. Hartley, R. Jordan, J. Miller, and P. van den Driessche, A Multi-Species Epidemic Model with Spatial Dynamics, Math. Medicine and Biology, vol. 22, pp. 129-142, Mar. 2005.
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A Prevention Technique For Worm Attack Detection in The Security System

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Volume 1, Issue 1, June 2013

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