MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT G.R. No.

L-2746 December 6, 1906 FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government. ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time. HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose. While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner. J. H. ANKRON vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. No. L-14213 August 23, 1919 FACTS: Action was commenced in the Court of First Instance, its purpose was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel of land situated, bounded and particularly described in the plan and technical description attached to the complaint. The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector] alleged that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control and administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands. The lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and conditions mentioned in said decision. ISSUE: WON the portions of land cannot be registered in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law. RULING: No, in the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action. Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for registration must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for registration must be denied. We think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act

No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. Hence, judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the condition that before the final certificate is issued, an accurate survey be made of the lands to be occupied by the road above mentioned and that a plan of the same be attached to the original plan upon which the petition herein is based. VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL. vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL, G.R. No. L-20875 December 13, 1923 FACTS: A number of "Bagos" or Igorots or non-Christians were invited by the gobernadorcillo and principalia, in order that they might cultivate the same and increase the population of the said municipality, were allowed to enter on said land, took possession of it and have continued to live upon the same and have cultivated it since that date. The appellants herein are some of the original thirty who entered upon the land, and the others are their legitimate descendants. The Bagos presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan to have said parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. Various oppositions were presented to the registration of said parcel of land. The oppositors presented a motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground that the petitioners had not presented proof sufficient to show that they are entitled to the registration of the land in question, which motion, after extensive argument pro and con, was granted, and the petition was dismissed without any pronouncement as to costs. In addition to the facts, the record also shows that at the time of the delivery of said parcel of land to the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that since their entry upon the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and their ancestors have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same, believing in good faith that they were the owners; that the petitioners had cleared, improved, and cultivated the land and have constructed and maintained their homes thereon, exercising every requisite act of ownership, for a period of more than thirty-nine years, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation, without any interruption whatsoever; that the land in question was never partitioned among the petitioners because it was the custom of the Bagos, Igorots, or non-Christians to occupy and possess their land in common; that the petitioners believed, and had a right to believe, from the fact that the land was given by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the municipality, that they thereby became the owners, to the exclusion of all others, and are now justified in their petition to have the said land registered under the Torrens system in their names, as the owners in fee simple, pro indiviso. ISSUE: WON the land shall be registered in favor of the petitioner RULING: No suggestion is made that the gobernadorcillo and the principalia of the town of Alava, now municipality of Sison, were not authorized in 1884, as representatives of the then existing Government, to give and to deliver the land in question to the petitioners and their ancestors for the purposes for which the land was so given. Neither was it denied that the land in question is agricultural land. No pretension is made that the land in question might not be registered under the Torrens system had the petitioners invoked the benefits of the public land law. No contention is made on the part of the petitioners that they were ever given a paper title to the land. Their contention is simply that they were given the land; that they accepted the same; that they lived upon the land, and cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it to the exclusion of all others for a period of about thirty-nine years, and that therefore they are entitled to have the same registration under the Torrens system; that they have occupied and cultivated the same for a period sufficient to give them title and to have the same registered under the Torrens system.

We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native, who had not a paper title, a trespasser and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. Whatever the law upon these points may be, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in the case like the present. We are forced to the conclusion that the lower court committed the errors complained of by the appellants in dismissing the petition. As was said by this court in the case of Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands (31 Phil., 272, 279): ". . . only under exceptional circumstances should an application for registry in the court of land registration be dismissed over the objection of the applicant, and without giving him an opportunity by the grant of new trial, or otherwise . . . to submit additional evidence in support of his claim of title, when there are strong or reasonable grounds to believe that he is the owner of all or any part of the land described in his application. This is specially true when the only ground for the dismissal of the application is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial proof as to the chain to title upon which applicant relies, etc." Without a further detailed discussion of the assignments of error of the appellants, we are of the opinion, and so decide that the judgment entered in the court below, dismissing the petition of the applicants, should be reversed and the record remanded to the court a quo, with permission on the part of the petitioners to make such amendment to their petition as they may deem wise and necessary and to present such additional evidence as they may desire; and that the oppositors be permitted to present whatever evidence they may have in opposition, with the understanding that the evidence which has heretofore been adduced shall stand as a part of the evidence of the main trial. ANDRES MANARPAAC, ET AL. vs. ROSALINO CABANATAN, G.R. No. L-23300 October 31, 1967 FACTS: The plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners of two parcels of land, based on tax declarations; that such possession has been public, uninterrupted and in the concept of owner; that they have their houses built on the land. The defendant Rosalino Cabanatan filed an application for free patent of a parcel of agricultural public land situated at Barrio Suyo, Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said defendant "taking advantage of the ignorance and lack of education of the plaintiffs, wilfully, fraudulently, maliciously, and surreptitiously without previous notice to the plaintiffs whatsoever, included petitioners parcels of land" in his application for free patent; that a free patent was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the Director of Lands, certificate of title No. V-105031 was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the register of deeds; that said certificate of title which included the land of the plaintiffs, is null and void, because the patent was obtained thru "fraudulent misrepresentation"; and that the proceedings leading to the investigation and survey of the land were without notice and without compliance with the requirements of the law. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the free patent and the certificate of title be declared null and void, and the same should be cancelled. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has no sufficient cause of action since one year has elapsed upon issuance of the free patent. RULING: From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that the plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land , but that through fraud and irregularity, defendant Rosalino Cabanatan succeeded in securing for himself, the certificate of title in question. The foregoing recital of facts in the complaint are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or, that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. In the case at bar, predicated upon the allegations in the complaint, together with the admission of defendant Cabanatan in his answer that the amended complaint is an action for reconveyance, which are deemed admitted on a motion to dismiss, there can hardly be any debate that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action for recovery of possession of the land for, settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to

bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. (Casilan v. Espartero, 95 Phil. 799). E. W. McDANIEL vs. Honorable GALICANO APACIBLE, G.R. No. L-17597 February 7, 1922 FACTS: This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court for the writ of prohibition. Its purpose is to prohibit the respondent Honorable Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, from granting a lease of a parcel of petroleum land located in the municipality of San Narciso, of the Province of Tayabas. The petitioner entered upon and located, in accordance with the provisions of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as well as the provisions of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, three petroleum placer mineral claims on an unoccupied public land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands. That the plaintiff has remained in open and continuous possession of said three mineral placer claims. Respondent Juan Cuisia made application to the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, under the provisions of Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature, for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three said mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," which said three mineral placer claims had therefore been located. Upon the filing of the said application for lease by Juan Cuisia, the petitioner herein protested in writing to the respondent Galicano. Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources deny petitioner's said protest ISSUE: WON the petitioner has vested right over the three mineral claims. RULING: There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims in question, or that the claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him. The respondents may claim, however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been issued to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims. But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co. vs. Smith (249 U.S., 337), and St. Louis Mining and Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co. (171 U.S., 650), held that even without a patent, the possessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the United States. There is no conflict in the rulings of the Court upon that question. With one voice they affirm that when the right to a patent exists, the full equitable title has passed to the purchaser or to the locator with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no third party can acquire from the Government any interest as against him. Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery, is not essential to the preservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by nonperformance of the annual labor required. The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location not only against third person, but also against the Government. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent, and is not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government. The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The

reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.) From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude that, inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands in question, and had actually discovered petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims; that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him of such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. GOLD CREEK MINING CORPORATION vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ; G.R. No. 45859 September 28, 1938 FACTS: This petition seeks to compel the respondents, as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as Director of the Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve petitioner's application for patent for a certain mining claim and prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, and to forward and submit said papers for the signature of the President of the Philippines. The petition alleges that petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim, situated in the barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon, sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. Petitioner by itself and its predecessors in interest, has been in continuous and exclusive possession of said claim. Petitioner filed in the office of the Director of Lands an application for an order of patent survey of said claim, which survey was duly authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and performed by a mineral land surveyor in the former divisions of mines, Bureau of Science at the expense of petitioner. Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to the patent applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for the issuance of such patent. Respondents allege that "petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to the 'Nob Fraction' claim because the Constitution provides that 'natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated'; and that the respondents are, not only under no obligation to approve petitioner's application for a patent to said claim and to prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, but, also, in duty bound to proven the issuance of said patent and the preparation of the aforesaid papers, because they have sworn to support and defend the Constitution." ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to the patent RULING: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural resources," as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provisions itself. It first declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other natural resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that "their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands which at the time the constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come within the prohibition.

The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues." Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a patent on its merits as due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional and statutory provisions a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. OPOSA vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 FACTS: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the ri ght to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

HELD: The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially. Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall pr otect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 FACTS : Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude jointventure, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. ISSUE: Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

RULING: Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 48327 August 21, 1991 FACTS: Private respondents are applicants for registration of a parcel of land situated in Beckel La Trinidad, Benguet. The Office of the Solicitor General filed on behalf of the Director of Lands an Opposition 2contending that: (1) private respondents have no registrable title; (2) the parcel of land sought to be registered is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines; and (3) the application for registration was filed after expiration of the period provided for in R.A. No. 2061, hence the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss based solely on the ground that the application made by private respondents was filed beyond 31 December 1968, the extended period for filing of applications for registration provided for by R.A. No. 2061. The land registration court finding the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest to have been in open, continuous and notorious possession of the aforesaid land as bonafide owner[s] thereof for more than 30 years, their title hereto (sic) is hereby confirmed. The Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal contending that the Decision of the land registration court had attained finality and was no longer open to review.

ISSUE: WON the land applied for is forest land located within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and hence not subject to registration RULING: The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the land here involved had been officially released from the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We consider and so hold that once a parcel of land is shown to have been included within a Forest Reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the parcel of land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent withdrawal therefrom or declassification is shown. A simple, unsworn statement of a minor functionary of the Bureau of Forest Development is not, by itself, such evidence. Under the view we take of this case, however, the definite resolution of this question becomes unnecessary. The applicants in the instant case are natives of Benguet and members of the Ibaloi tribe. 20 They are members of a cultural minority whose application for registration of land should be considered as falling under Section 48(c) of C.A. No. 141. It is clear to the Court that the addition of subsection (c) was intended to create a distinction between applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles by members of national cultural minorities and applications by other qualified persons in general. 21 Members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of the public domain, whether disposable or not; they may therefore apply for public lands even though such lands are legally forest lands or mineral lands of the public domain, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture. The rest of the community, however, "Christians" or members of mainstream society may apply only in respect of "agricultural lands of the public domain," that is, "disposable lands of the public domain" which would of course exclude lands embraced within forest reservations or mineral land reservations.