WATEROUS DRUG VS. NLRC [280 SCRA 735 ; G.R.NO.

113271; 16 OCT 1997]

Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was illmotivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and

suspension

illegal

but

disallowed

reinstatement.

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her coemployee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded: With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal. The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.

Issue:

Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under the Bill of Rights.

Held:

As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy. In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence. Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter

and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the

separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.

G.R. No. L-19052

December 29, 1962

MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents. Francisco Carreon for petitioner. Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for respondent City of Manila. CONCEPCION, J.: This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, and to set aside an order of said respondent, as well as the whole proceedings in said criminal case. . On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct

unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his as sets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". On September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of five (5) members, consisting of former Justice Marceliana R. Montemayor, as Chairman, former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and Generals Basilio J. Valdez and Guillermo B. Francisco, to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation, on September 15, 1961, the Committee, upon request of complainant Col. Maristela, or considered petitioner herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon, petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela and to the aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand. Hence, in a communication dated September 18, 1961, the Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. On September 28, 1961, the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" reading as follows: The undersigned hereby charges Manuel F. Cabal with contempt under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code in relation to sections I and 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, committed as follows: That on or about September 15, 1961, in the investigation conducted at the U.P. Little Theater:, Padre Faura, Manila, by the Presidential Committee, which was created by the President of the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with law to investigate the charges of alleged acquisition by respondent of unexplained wealth and composed of Justice Marceliano Montemayor, as Chairman, and Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug and Generals Basilio Valdez and Guillermo Francisco, as members, with the power, among others, to compel the attendance of witnesses and take their testimony under oath, respondent who was personally present at the time before the Committee in compliance with a subpoena duly issued to him, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and contumaciously, without any justifiable cause or reason refusal and fail and still refuses and fails to obey the lawful order of the Committee to take the witness stand, be sworn and testify as witness in said investigation, in utter disregard of the lawful authority of the Committee and thereby obstructing and degrading the proceedings before said body. Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the Presidential Committee and accordingly disciplined as in contempt of court imprisonment until such time as he shall obey the subject order of said committee. This charge, docketed as Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, was assigned to Branch XVIII thereof, presided over by respondent Judge. On October 2, 1961, the latter issued an order requiring petitioner to show cause and/or answer the charge filed against him within ten (10)

days. Soon thereafter, or on October 4, 1961, petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the charge and/or order to show cause, upon the ground: (1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to file said char and the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the charge has been filed without a preliminary investigation, and, civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of civil cases being limited to representing the City of Manila; (2) that the facts charged constitute no offense for section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is based, violates due process, in that it is vague and uncertain as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable therefor and that it fail to specify whether said offense shall be treated also contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court (3) that more than one offense is charged, for the contempt imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of an inferior court, as contempt of a superior court an as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4) that the Committee had no power to order an require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-incrimination. By resolution dated October 14, 1961. respondent Judge denied said motion to quash. Thereupon, or on October 20, 1961, petitioner began the present action for the purpose adverted to above, alleging that, unless restrained by this court, respondent Judge may summarily punish him for contempt, and that such action would not be appealable. In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary investigations (Section '08-C, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201) is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. contempt against an administrative officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that petitioner herein is charged with only one offense; and that, tinder the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory questions. At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand (3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character. In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.

In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture property without compensation, in consequence of a default an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such a offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power (23 Am. Jur. 599) (Emphasis ours.) In Black's Law Dictionary a "forfeiture" is defined to be "the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law." It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of duty. (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.) As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto. Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several count in an information is upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers. ... (23 Am. Jur. 612; emphasis ours.) Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the late decisions are to the effect that suits for forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are so far of quasi-criminal nature as to be within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .... It has frequently been held upon constitutional grounds under the various State Constitution, that a witness or party called as witness cannot be made to testify against himself as to matters which would subject his property to forfeiture. At early common law no person could be compelled to testify against himself or to answer any question which would have had a tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture or to form a link in a chain of evidence for that purpose, as well as to incriminate him. Under this common-law doctrine of protection against compulsory disclosures which would tend to subject the witness to forfeiture, such protection was claimed and availed of in some early American cases without placing the basis of the protection upon constitutional grounds. (23 Am. Jur., 616; emphasis ours.)

Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited. (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368; emphasis ours.)lawphil.net The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would tend to expose him to a ... forfeiture .... (58 Am. Jur., See. 43, p. 48; emphasis ours.) As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applied only to criminal, quasicriminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature, .... (58 Am. Jur., Sec. 44, p. 49: emphasis ours.) The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper. The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. (C.J.S., p. 252; emphasis ours.) A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer any question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or forfeiture is imposed as a vindication of the public justice of the state. In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against compulsory self-incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or testify in action against him for a penalty.

The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of the public justice the state as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure applicable to ordinary civil remedy. (98 C. J. S., pp. 275-6.) Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that the information, in a proceeding to declaration a forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though technically a civil proceeding is in substance and effect a criminal one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecution is not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is a action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction the criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case ...". This view was, in effect confirmed in Lees vs. U.S. (37 L. ed. 1150-1151). Hence, the Lawyer Reports Annotated (Vol. 29, p. 8), after an extensive examination of pertinent cases, concludes that said constitutional provision applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely remedial", or intended "as a redress for a private grievance", but primarily to punish "a violation of duty or a public wrong and to deter others from offending in likewise manner. ...". We are unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962) in which the theory that, after the filing of respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding in civil in nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing the substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.

PASCUAL VS. BME [28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for

prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against selfincrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the

first witness Incrimination of the complainants violates the SelfClause.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that in an administrative

hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

LORNA DISING PUNZAL v. ETSI TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al. 518 SCRA 66 (2007) FACTS: Petitioner Lorna Dising Punzal (Punzal) had been working for respondent ETSI Technologies, Inc. (ETSI) as Department Secretary. Punzal sent an e-mail message to her officemates announcing the holding of a Halloween Party that was to be held in the office. Her immediate superior, respondent Carmelo Remudaro advised her to first secure the approval of the SVP, respondent Werner Geisert. When Geisert did not approve of the plan, Punzal then sent a second e-mail to her officemates that states Geisert was so unfair . . . para bang palagi siyang iniisahan sa trabaho. . . Anyway, solohin na lang niya bukas ang office." Punzals superiors required her to explain her actions which found such as unacceptable. She was then dismissed from employment due to improper conduct or act of discourtesy or disrespect and making malicious statements concerning company officer. Punzal filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against ETSI, Geisert, and Remudaro. The complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NLRC found that while she was indeed guilty of misconduct, the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to her infraction. The Court of Appeals held that Punzals dismissal was in order. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid cause to dismiss Punzal HELD: A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to ones superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being the "proverbial hen that lays the golden egg," so to speak. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how much the employee dislikes the employer professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a bileful pen. Punzal sent the e-mail message in reaction to Geiserts decision which he had all the right to make. That it has been a tradition in ETSI to celebrate occasions such as Christmas, birthdays, Halloween, and others does not remove Geiserts prerogative to approve or disapprove plans to hold such celebrations in office premises and during company time. Given the reasonableness of Geiserts decision that provoked Punzal to send the second e-mail message, the observations of the Court of Appeals that "the message x x x resounds of subversion and undermines the authority and credibility of

management" and that petitioner "displayed a tendency to act without managements approval, and even against managements will" are well taken.