Journal of Moral Education Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2005, pp.

7387

A social psychological view of morality: why knowledge of situational influences on behaviour can improve character development practices
Steven M. Samuels* and William D. Casebeer
United States Air Force Academy, USA

Results from research in social psychology, such as findings about the fundamental attribution error and other situational influences on behaviour, are often used to justify attacking the existence of character traits. From this perspective, character development is an illusion, an impossibility, or both. We offer a different interpretation of how these issues interact with character development concerns. Rather than undermining the very idea of character traits, social psychology actually sheds light on the manner in which character development can occur. It reaffirms Spinozistic and Aristotelian points about character, namely that: (1) knowledge of the fundamental attribution error can help us minimize the influence environment and situation have on our behaviour, and (2) proper habituation only takes place in appropriately structured environments. Acknowledging these important results from social psychology helps us improve some of our character education practices rather than destroying their basis.

Social psychologists have long studied human behaviour trying to understand the mechanisms and motivations that cause people to act. Additionally, much of what they study speaks to moral issues: stereotyping and discrimination, conformity, obedience, interpersonal relations, judgement and decision-making, and so on. Yet the field often seems to back off when it comes to actually investigating and understanding moral and ethical behaviour (with the notable exception of altruistic and helping behaviour). This may be due to psychologists basic identity as scientists. After all, it is the job of the philosopher to explain the normative components of morality, while the social scientist is supposed to be primarily descriptive. Social psychological involvement in ethical behaviour primarily has taken two slightly different paths. The first is the study of how people define moral rules,
*Corresponding author. HQ USAFA/DFBL, Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy, 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 6L101, USAF Academy, CO, 80840, USA. Email: Steven.Samuels@usafa.af.mil ISSN 0305-7240 (print)/ISSN 1465-3877 (online)/05/010073-15 # 2005 Journal of Moral Education Ltd DOI: 10.1080/03057240500049349

74 S. M. Samuels and W. D. Casebeer especially in issues like fairness and justice (e.g., Cohen & Greenberg, 1982; Darley & Schultz, 1990; Blader & Tyler, 2003). This set of researches is often used as a launching point for the second path where the mechanisms that cause people to act unethically are uncovered (e.g., Messick & Sentis, 1979; Batson et al., 1995; Diekmann et al., 1997). This second path finesses the issue by studying immoral rather than moral behaviour, as there seems to be more common agreement on what is evil than what is good (e.g., Staub, 1989; Darley, 1992; Baumeister, 1996). Of course, this does not mean immoral behaviour is the norm. As Berkowitz (1993) elucidates, excessively immoral behaviour, such as wanton cruelty, is unusual: Any truly comprehensive account of human aggression has to recognize peoples good qualities and especially the relatively civil way we usually behave. By and large and to a greater or lesser extent, most of us are reluctant to hurt others (pp. 108 109). This history of pointing out unusual unethical behaviour due to situational pressure has created many of the fields classic studies. For example, early studies by Hartshorne and May (1928) found that the unethical behaviour of school children was not consistent across a variety of situations (e.g., stealing money, lying to avoid getting another child in trouble, and cheating on a test), and the average correlation between any one type of behaviour was just over .2. Other studies continued to demonstrate surprising behaviour. Milgrams (1963) obedience experiments showed that subjects would shock a fellow subject perhaps to death because the experimenter told them they must continue. Darley and Latane s (1968) bystander effect showed that subjects were less likely to intervene in an emergency if there was another subject present than if they were alone. In fact, even seminary students on their way to give a sermon on the Good Samaritan would not help if they were in a hurry (Darley & Batson, 1973). In studying these types of behaviours, social psychologists have come under less criticism than their brethren in other fields, perhaps because society seems to be more comfortable labelling what is unethical than labelling what is ethical. Given this background, social psychologists can, and in fact should contribute to the ethical dialogue by studying human moral behaviour in an empirical manner. This is not to say they should decide what is moral and immoral, as social science is not designed to be normative moral theory, and psychologists are not ethicists. Nor should psychologists be manipulating human behaviour to their own desired ends in violation of human freedom (Kelman, 1990). Instead they should examine why people act in ethical manners. That is, psychologists should not advocate what actions people should commit, but they should highlight the influences on and impediments to moral action. Philosophers have long realized since to know the good is not necessarily to do the good (to paraphrase Aristotle, 384322 BC/1999, pp. 100101), it is important to discover the non-cognitive determinants of moral action. In short, psychologists should adhere to the fields definition and study behaviour, but that should include ethical behaviour. The pleasant upshot of this will be that rather than undermining the ability to develop character, social psychology can give philosophersindeed, all those involved in character

A social psychological view of morality 75 developmentneeded tools to enable people to take responsibility for their own development. The difficult truth of social psychology Social psychologists often face an uphill battle when their results run contrary to folk wisdom. Convincing people that a major cause of their behaviour is not their personalities but the situation in which they find themselves can be truly challenging. Yet the power of the situation is perhaps the foundation of much of social psychological theory and the classic studies of the field (see Ross & Nisbett, 1991 for an in-depth examination). When people look for causes of behaviour, they tend to ignore the situation and blame (or credit) that which they do notice: the person. This is especially the case in individualistic cultures, such as those of the United States or Western Europe: members of these cultures typically overestimate the impact and predictive power of observed or assumed individual differences in traits they are apt to rely heavily on overly broad and simplistic notions of good or bad character, both in their attempts to understand past behavior and in their efforts to predict future behavior (Ross & Shestowky, 2003, p. 1093). This bias, attributing causes of behaviour to actors (i.e., to internal, dispositional factors) rather than the situation (i.e., to external, environmental factors) is the fundamental attribution error. Additionally, when searching for the causes of immoral behaviour, Wegner and Vallacher (1977) suggest that people become even more motivated as they need a stable concept of moral responsibility for evil acts; attributions of moral responsibility require that we posit the existence of a free moral agent uncoerced by purportedly trivial environmental stimuli. This perspective leads to an intriguing question. If the situation is a major cause of our actions then how can people be held responsible for their own ethical behaviour? In fact, this reasoning may lead one to expect that moral behaviour is dominated by external not internal factors, that ethical behaviour is entirely dependent upon the situation. It is a position most ethicists shun, as it threatens to undermine the assumptions of agency that make moral talk possible at all. If situations are the primary, or only, determinant of action, and are not the result of an agents character traits or free choices, it becomes more difficult to hold persons responsible for their behaviour. Following this line of thought, Ross and Shestowsky (2003) argue that when such theory is applied to law, consideration of mitigation in determining appropriate punishment and treatment should be based on a full appreciation of the power of the relevant situational forces such that leniency might be considered for Nazi prison guards, Hutu perpetrators of genocide, and terrorists (pp. 11021103). If true, not only are our conceptions of agency undermined, but also some philosophers, such as Gilbert Harman, contend the very idea of stable character traits that can be developed is eradicated. This radical situationist position is interpreted by Harman as demonstrating that there is no such thing as a character trait; there simply are no stable internal regularities that contribute to behaviour. He argues this has two entailments. First, it

76 S. M. Samuels and W. D. Casebeer is more difficult (in his view, it would be well nigh impossible!) to hold people responsible when things go awry: When things go wrong, we typically blame the agent, attributing the bad results to the agents bad character a greater understanding of the agents situation and how it contributed to the action can lead to a greater tolerance and understanding of others (2000, p. 177). Secondly, moral education becomes impossible. He bluntly states, in a one sentence paragraph titled Moral Education: If there is no such thing as character, then there is no such thing as character building (2000, p. 177.) Harman argues that we would do well to dispense with the idea of character, at least as traditionally construed. If we must be virtue ethicists, he insists, we should be the kind of virtue ethicists that do not make judgements about character traits. The problems with this line of reasoning are two-fold. First, Harman appears to have overemphasized one side of this discussion. By only citing social psychology and not evaluating the field of personality psychology, he handicaps himself by not gathering all the evidence before reaching a conclusion. Social psychology often demonstrates the power of the situation by finding those circumstances that surprise intuition and overwhelm personality. Personality psychology describes areas of personal consistency and provides a wealth of information about them. One example of research supporting the trait approach to personality has revealed a large portion of personality can be summarized by five unique traits: extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, negative emotionality, and openness. Referred to as The Big Five, research in this area has given overwhelming support for some level of personality consistency (McCrae & Costa, 1987; Goldberg 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1995; etc.). Another example demonstrating personality consistency over time showed that willingness to delay gratification at ages 4 and 5 correlated with parental ratings of adolescents over 10 years later on coping, academic, and social competency. Even taking into account school-related competencies (using standardized test scores), those who were able to delay gratification longer were rated as better able to cope with a number of personal and social problems (Shoda et al., 1990). Harmans second error is his misreading of the psychology literature he does cite. Using studies similar to those discussed above (Hartshorne & May, 1928; Milgram, 1963; Darley & Batson, 1973; Ross & Nisbett, 1991), Harman ignores the fact that some people do behave consistently and as expected. Again, the richness of social psychology (and the fundamental attribution error) is that people underestimate the power of the situation. None of these sources state personality does not exist, only that it is overestimated. No social psychologist would deny that personal consistency can reach correlational levels of .3 across situations (explaining almost 10% of the variance). The discussion revolves around what that means in terms of predicting behaviour in future situations. In fact, it would be apropos to point out that those people in the Milgram study who chose to stop administering the shocks and those in Darley and his colleagues studies who stopped and helped are displaying the consistent behaviour we do expect. Perhaps a critical component enabling us to be free moral agents involves a capacity to be sensitive to how environmental variables may influence our action. Perhaps part of good character is defined by having the

A social psychological view of morality 77 wherewithal to avoid peers who will likely get you into trouble and to seek out environments that are conducive to ethical behaviour. Following this line of reasoning, we maintain that the existence of the fundamental attribution error does not undermine the very idea of character traits. Instead, it places more focus on the purely cognitive character traits common to both Aristotle and Plato: the responsible use of reason as a tool to regulate our behaviour (indeed, this ability is the practical wherewithal emphasized by both these virtue theorists, especially Aristotle). Careful study of the fundamental attribution error can actually increase our ability to lessen the influence that the environment has on our action, cause us to avoid environments where we know our behaviour will become less desirable or unpredictable, and actively work to cultivate the kind of environments where virtuous behaviour is both encouraged and made possible by appropriate stimuli regularity (for more discussion, see Doris, 2002, especially Chapter 57; Doris (p. 146) argues that reflection on situationism actually enhances normative competence, because it facilitates effective deliberation). We agree with Doris that effective deliberation is enhanced by knowing both how human beings tend to react in certain environments and what stimuli reliably activate those dispositions. The moral advantages of being aware of social psychology Awareness of the relative impact of the person and the situation may be able to give people the necessary impetus to overcome powerful situations. That is, now that the illusion of personality as the sole cause of behaviour has been uncovered, people might be more likely to detect, and thus affect the different influences of behaviour. Once they are able to see what environmental factors have the potential to influence, they may be better prepared to make a decision based on their true beliefs and feelings. The fundamental attribution error does not undermine attributions of responsibility, the existence of character traits, and the idea of character development; rather, it increases our capability to make all three of these things possible. This is a familiar theme from the work of the classic virtue theorist Aristotle. In order to develop virtue, one must be given a chance to practice being virtuous. This means cultivating a milieu where the environmental factors that influence human behaviour make virtuous behaviour the norm rather than the exception. Attention to how you react in these environments is important. People should be aware of the personality/environment interaction, for only then can they modulate their behaviour accordingly so as to boost the likelihood that they will take virtuous action. As Aristotle states in his Nichomachean ethics (in a passage that makes reference to his doctrine of The Golden Mean): We must also examine what we ourselves drift into easily. For different people have different natural tendencies toward different goals, and we shall come to know our own tendencies from the pleasure or pain that arises in us. We must drag ourselves off in the contrary direction; for if we pull far away from error, as they do in straightening bent wood, we shall reach the intermediate condition (384322 BC/1999, p. 29).

78 S. M. Samuels and W. D. Casebeer All we have done so far is assert that knowledge of the fundamental attribution error will enable character growth: is it in fact easier for someone who understands the limitations of personality to make their personality matter? Again, only people who recognize and understand the subtle power of the situation can truly take control of their ethical choices. Truly understanding the situation may allow people to overcome biases. For example, Ross and his colleagues (1975) found that beliefs fraudulently created in an experiment persevere despite normal debriefing. It is only under process debriefing, where subjects are made to understand the processes behind the creation and perseverance of the false beliefs, that the effect is eliminated. In a similar sense, a process understanding of the fundamental attribution error may help to decrease the very power of the situation when ethical decisions (or any decisions for that matter) are involved. If this is true, then students of social psychology increase their chances of becoming ethical actors. Two US Air Force Academy students also appeared to apply social psychology in this manner as they used the idea to investigate their values. They both choose to write on ethical behaviour for a short, three-page Insight Paper where they were graded pass/fail on whether they had taken any topic in the course and thought more deeply about it. The first was troubled by the deindividuation that occurs in this military setting, and how it could affect her. In her paper, she wrote, I realize that circumstances will influence me, and I need to be aware of them and how they can affect my behaviour. ... To accomplish this I must have my values set clearly in my mind so that they are the first things I encounter when processing information, and thus will I base my decisions on them. The second student looked at situational spirituality as he examined his attitudes after a fundamentalist Christian gathering and retreat. He discussed his turmoil after experiencing a speaker at the Christian mens group Promise Keepers using behaviour modification techniques (either intentionally or unintentionally) previously discussed in class. When the speaker asked everyone who would dedicate their lives to Jesus to stand up, the student noted that everyone rose. He realized it would have been almost impossible not to stand, and noticed the similarity between the request and Kurt Lewins (1952) use of group pressure and behavioural commitment. Lewin, one of the fathers of social psychology, had asked groups of housewives during World War II to make a public commitment by raising their hands to serve organ meats to their families, which significantly increased their behaviour to do so. This student finished his paper with this enlightened thought: I think in many cases that a person can be lulled into thinking that he has found the truth simply because he fits into the group, follows the norms, and does what he thinks he should do. So perhaps in this case, God to this person is nothing more than a series of social influences. ... It is so critical to evaluate ones own personal spiritual journey and see if it is merely a result of social forces, or if it is truly a walk with God. A prescription for ethical training While these examples are obviously anecdotal, it seems clear that these two students know they need to take responsibility for their own behaviour. They both

A social psychological view of morality 79 commented that they came to this realization by recognizing how their own previous behaviour was influenced by the situation. In fact, past the simple liberation from constraining situational influences, consummate students of social psychology concerned with boosting their chances to act morally would be able to fashion additional countervailing forces that push them toward more positive behaviours or away from negative ones. Rather than undermining attributions of agency, such an attitude actually supports attributions of responsibility. I take moral responsibility for the structure of my environment, and I take care not to expose myself to environments where I know my chances of exhibiting character irregularities increase. For example, if I am a member of Alcoholics Anonymous, I admit I have a drinking problem (analogously, recognize the power of the situation) and then I avoid environments, such as bars, past drinking buddies, and so on, where my problem manifests itself. That is, I have changed my own environment so I am able to exhibit the regularities in behaviour I desire, and avoid environments that will disenable my control. Thus, the fundamental attribution error undermines neither agency nor the existence of character traits. Knowledge of it is powerpower to take responsibility for your own behaviour by shaping the environment accordingly. Spinoza articulated this point in his Ethics when he noted, In so far as a man is determined to action from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, to that extent he is passive; that is, he does something that cannot be perceived solely in terms of his own essence, that is, something that does not follow from this own virtue. But in so far as he is determined to an action from the fact that he understands [that action] follows adequately from his own virtue (1677/1992, p. 166). Spinoza asserts correctly that knowledge is power over the self; only by knowing the causes of our actions (be they internal or external) can we be held responsible for the power those causes have over our behaviour. To become full moral agents, therefore, we must endeavour to understand the causes of our behaviour, and this will involve taking seriously the results of social psychological research. As Spinoza scholar Seymour Feldman explains, Thus, on Spinozas view, what makes a person an agent is self-knowledge; lacking such knowledge, an individual is merely a passive recipient of external and internal stimuli to which he responds either blindly or inadequately. Self-knowledge, however, means realizing that we are elements within a complicated and diverse system of modes. Again, psychology is part of natural science; and ethics must be grounded in these sciences (Spinoza, 1677/1992, p. 16). Becoming a full moral agent thus requires knowledge about the influences that the environment or situation has on ones own action. Knowing the truth can set one free. In an ethical example of this Spinozistic insight in action, the US Navy initiated the Naval Aviation Anonymous Safety Reporting Program (NAASREP), where someone can anonymously report a potential mishap they may have either witnessed or of which they may have been a part. Similar American programs at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also have been very successful. The Navy recognizes that

80 S. M. Samuels and W. D. Casebeer having core values of Honor, Courage and Commitment are not always sufficient to overcome situational pressures all the time. The Navy might point to what Kurt Lewin called channel factors: small but important situational characteristics that help bridge the gap from attitude to behaviour. Some examples of channel factors are selfaddressed stamped envelopes for returning magazine subscriptions (especially if you check the Bill Me Later box); a television remote control increases channel switching since viewers no longer have to get up from the comfort of their chairs; or having a mobile phone makes it more likely youll call 911 when you see an accident. NAASREP created a channel factor that insures the safety of Naval personnel when circumstances might overwhelm reporting by even honourable people. If recognizing this power can indeed help people to overcome it, what can be done to help others reach this realization? How can others take more control over their behaviour? The first step, once again, is to become aware of the power of the situation. Training can, in fact, be effective, especially if it involves understanding the process and mechanisms underlying the information (Ross et al., 1975). Beaman and colleagues using social psychological lectures were successful in increasing rates of shoplifting reporting (Klentz & Beaman, 1981) and increasing helping behaviours (Beaman et al., 1978). When one of the authors Social Psychology class specifically focused on the fundamental attribution error and why people do not help, students report that they were able to overcome both of these biases in specific situations up to two years after they took the class. Eighty-six students who had taken the course over a period of three semesters were emailed by the professor and asked two questions; 86% responded (n574). The first question was: Did learning about helping behaviour lead you to help in any situation in which you believe you would not have otherwise helped? If you can, please briefly describe the situation and why/how the class helped. Some 72% of the respondents (n553) answered in the affirmative, with nearly 85% of those (n545) being able to specifically state the situation. Some examples of helping they relayed were helping stranded motorists, removing refuse from the road rather than just driving around it, volunteering to do various jobs because they knew nobody else would, and so on. The second was, Did learning about the fundamental attribution error lead to you overcome it in any situation in which you believe you would not have otherwise overcome it? Again, they were asked to elaborate. Some 64% of the respondents (n555) answered in the affirmative, with over 69% of those (n538) being able to specifically state the situation. Some examples of overcoming the fundamental attribution error they relayed were not making an unreflective moral judgement about a friend who had an abortion, dealing with people from other cultures (and not assuming they would have the same values and styles as Americans), working with subordinates (and supervisors!) in the military and trying to understand their situation, and so on. Perhaps a more parsimonious solution than making social psychology a required course at all universities would be to incorporate the concept of the power of the situation into ethical training. Ethical training is now becoming more prevalent in a

A social psychological view of morality 81 number of different industries, both public and private. Social psychologists should volunteer to be on committees where ethics are discussed. They should help create parts of training regimens that focus on the situation in addition to those that attempt to develop the inherent goodness of the person. Most people have no problem acting ethically in clear cases, but what about in extreme situations? The question becomes much more complex in such a setting, and the desired ethical behaviour so much more difficult to achieve. In some ethical situations, knowledge of the power of the situation is already being put to use. The Stanford University Judicial Affairs office gives situational tips on how to prevent cheating: pick an exam room big enough for alternate seating; consider allowing students to bring one index card to an exam with anything they like on it ( McCormick, 2003, p. 69). Social psychological research already has many tools that can support ethical training that all educators can use. For example, attitude inoculation techniques have been used to prevent smoking, by using the power of peer groups and role play (McAlister et al., 1980; Hirschman & Leventhal, 1989, respectively). The added advantages when working with ethics is people do not need to change attitudes as most already believe themselves to be ethical. Such programs reinforce peoples need for consistency between their attitudes and their future behaviour. To highlight this lack of consistency, techniques involving hypocrisy could be used to keep peoples behaviours in line with their beliefs. This has been previously shown to increase condom use to prevent disease (Stone et al., 1994). Additionally, the power of modelling can be used to promote socially desired behaviours (e.g., Aronson & OLeary, 1983; Cialdini et al., 1990). Social psychologists also can work with others to include situationism in studying ethical behaviour. Cialdini and Kenrick (1976), for example, have built a social development scale of pro-social behaviour. Beaman and colleagues revisited behaviourism to identify proper reinforcement schedules to maximize altruistic behaviours (Beaman et al., 1983). Personality psychologists are also becoming more sophisticated as they examine personsituation interactions. A growing body of research from Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda has discovered that while personalities are not necessarily consistent across situations, they have consistent idiographic patterns in overall levels of situationbehaviour relationships (i.e., if this situation occurs, then this person will act this way). For example, while someone does not act compassionately all the time, they may always act very compassionately at home, somewhat compassionately at school, and never compassionately during sports. Thus, each person has a stable intra-individual behaviour pattern that takes into account changes in situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). In addition to suggesting possible research programs for psychologists and enhancing their interactions with character development professionals, careful study of the intersections of psychology and ethics can be profitable for teachers, leaders, administrators, and anyone otherwise involved in addressing moral development and institutional cultures and climates. For example, teachers of ethics could benefit from a richer understanding of how their non-verbal behaviour in the classroom influences student cognitive development, or of how institutional situational

82 S. M. Samuels and W. D. Casebeer pressures affect the likelihood of praiseworthy moral action; indeed, making this an explicit part of classroom discussion may provide students with the cognitive tools they need to avoid moral pathology. Leaders and administrators could use these findings to enhance deliberation regarding culture and climate. For example, viewed from one angle, a certain policy change may make perfect sense; viewed from the angle of ethical deliberation, however, some policy changes may create incentives to cheat or steal. Ideally, our environments would afford maximum opportunity for freely chosen moral action and would not set up those living and working in them for moral failure. This is not to say that situational influences are exculpatory, but rather that we can not hope to intelligently engineer moral environments if we have a pre-scientific understanding of these influences. Ultimately, policy-makers of all sorts could benefit by careful consideration of these developments. Grand strategy for managing, controlling and influencing environments ranging from the corporate workplace to the university lecture hall would best be served by a scientifically robust understanding of the determinants of human behaviour. If we do not understand and control our environments, they will stand over and control us. Some specific suggestions While this paper has endeavoured to highlight the importance of situational awareness when considering ethical behaviour, we would be remiss if we did not suggest actions that can be taken to improve ethical behaviour. The theme of this paper is obviously the first step: moral education should include an explicit discussion of phenomena like the fundamental attribution error. We do students an injustice if we ignore their environment of action during discussions about moral deliberation. Libertarianism about moral deliberation is not a live optionthe way we think is canalized by the environments we inhabit. Severity also should be discussed, perhaps in a non-obvious way. Many systems take into account the severity of the unethical behaviour when meting out punishment. However, a closer inspection of situational pressure might suggest an orthogonal approach, depending on the facts of the case. That is, someone who cheats on a major test or a final exam might be desperate and therefore might have an abundance of situational factors affecting them (e.g., fear of failing out of school, fear of disappointing parents, etc.). If truly contrite, they may benefit from guidance and mentorship. On the other hand, someone who cheats on a small quiz early in the semester has little situational pressure affecting them; they appear to have cheated simply because the opportunity presented itself. The issue of severity has other interesting aspects. Low severity cases are less likely to be reported. Curphy and his colleagues (1998) found US Air Force Academy cadets were less likely to turn in another cadet for low severity cases. Additionally, Beers (2002) reported that at the US Military Academy (West Point), cadets on Honor Boards might vote not guilty if the cadet on trials violation was not serious enough to warrant expulsion. Also, we must be cognizant of the unintended consequences of policy changes. These are often more important than the intended consequences. One classic

A social psychological view of morality 83 example is the lengths systems go to be fair to students accused of cheating. While it is important to protect individuals rights, when systems become too bureaucratic and too unbalanced towards potential violators, people may become reluctant to report violations. Both Beers (2002) and Curphy et al. (1998) pointed out that there are costs for reporting other cadets, costs that are worth absorbing only if it is perceived the violator will be punished. If it becomes unclear that punishment will result, that cognitive equation may become unbalanced and other students may be less likely to report. In the same vein, professors may be unwilling to go through the sacrifice and effort (both in terms of time and mental energy) of reporting violations if they believe nothing will come of the report. (For example, when one of the authors told a colleague about reporting an offence, the response was, Good luck with your likely dead end walk.). A University of Florida professor admitted, My faculty [colleagues] generally do not take cases to the university system. In cases where my colleagues have demonstrated cheating, we have not been able to get a conviction from the student honors court. (Selingo, 2004, p. 30). Perhaps this is why Murray (1996) reported 20% of psychology professors surveyed, had ignored strong evidence of academic dishonesty on at least one occasion (p. 42). Ethics researcher Donald McCabe found even higher numbers in a 2000 survey: one-third of professors who said they were aware of a cheating incident in their classroom in the last two years did nothing about it (Selingo, 2004, p. 26). Based on the above difficulties, it is crucial educators understand the importance of reporting dishonest behaviour. We have already mentioned the importance of modelling, and thus we must model the behaviour we desire. Part of that is obviously acting in moral ways. McCabe stated that next to academic pressure, the most common response as to why students cheat is that the adult world sets such poor examples (Slobogin, 2002). In fact, focus groups of high school students believed cheating was a normal part of life and many felt that fundamental changes must take place at the societal level before cheating can be stopped (McCabe, 1999, p. 685). The other important aspect of modelling is it demonstrates that an ethical person does not tolerate cheating. McCabe et al. (2001) stated: When more than a few faculty behave this way [fail to report cheating], it is hard to convince students that an ethic of integrity exists (p. 226). They highlighted an additional advantage of reporting: Word seems to travel among students as to who these faculty are [who do not report cheating or punish it harshly] and student comments suggest their courses become particular targets for cheating (p. 226). In this light, leaders should be aware of how their presence day in and day out affects moral operating environments. One way to change a problematic organizational culture is by changing the social environment. In this case, leaders can verbally support those who actively report unethical behaviour. A simple youre doing the right thing can have a powerful effect on someone with doubts (and also serves as a potent model to others in the organization). Beyond verbal support, leaders can create other more tangible supports. (For example, again, when one author reported an offence, his department head downloaded him from several

84 S. M. Samuels and W. D. Casebeer additional departmental duties due to the amount of time taken up by the investigation. His department head also offered to teach his classes when he testified at an Honor Board.) Leaders who let their people know they value ethical efforts help to create an environment of integrity. Failing to report cheating also has one last major problem: if less cheating is reported, there is less punishment. Punishment has been identified by nearly all researchers as an crucial issue. Selingo (2004) reported if instructors handle cases themselves, then habitual cheaters might never get the punishment they deserve (p. 30). McCabe and his colleagues agreed that one of the primary ways of reducing cheating is to provide harsh penalties rather than light ones to cheaters (McCabe, 1999; McCabe et al., 2001). Whether it is due to psychological reasons mentioned above, vicarious learning by watching others suffer, or simple cost-benefit analysis, severely punishing cheating deters cheating. Educators also can look beyond obvious solutions and attempt what might seem like counter-intuitive strategies. For example, as mentioned above, the US Air Force Academy has an Honor Code, but it has also realized that brand new cadets may not have fully internalized the code. Thus, there are different rules for first year students, including common examinations given at a single time instead of given to each section (the Academy has multiple sections of a single course given in 14 periods over two days). New cadets are also more likely to be given probation rather than expulsion over an Honor Offense if they admit their violation. This is a several month long period of self-reflection guided by a faculty or staff member. However, the same offence by an upper-class cadet might merit expulsion. When the US Military Academy switched from a single sanction system (i.e., everyone found guilty was expelled, even those who self-reported) to a discretionary system, the amount of Honor cases increased. Beers (2002) examined the data closely and realized the increases were in two interesting directions. First, there were more lower-level violations that were brought forward by other cadets. Second, there were a higher number of admitted violations than contested ones. Beers interpreted these data to mean that the discretionary system made it easier for cadets to report violators and made it easier for violators to take responsibility for their actions. Thus, more true moral development could occur and less examples of unethical behaviour permeated the environment. Aside from these major issues, small changes can also improve ethical behaviour. For example, creating an overt awareness can lead to reductions in cheating. Creating an Honor Code either in ones department or in the school can reduce cheating, especially when it is deeply embedded in the culture. Again, McCabe et al. (2001) reported that while cheating does occur at schools that have a code, students in such schools report one-quarter less serious cheating than students in schools without a code: honor code students apparently do not succumb to these [various situational] pressures as easily or as often as noncode students (p. 227). As stated above, support for the Honor Code must also come from faculty. Kerkvliet and Sigmund (1999) report that cheating is reduced when professors pay attention to it. They also point out other small actions professors can take to reduce cheating: using

A social psychological view of morality 85 different versions of the same test can reduce it more than 25% and even simple warnings before each test can reduce it more than 12%. In sum, not only can institutions create environments that discourage cheating, but also teachers can contribute to the reduction of the problem. Conclusion Thomas Huxley (1929) wrote, when considering what a child does and does not know, begin with the most important topic of allmorality, as the guide to conduct (p. 243). Just because the situation can have undue influence over people does not mean it must exert that influence. Social psychologists, philosophers, indeed, all those involved in moral education and development can integrate this starting point for education by using their tools and knowledge to educate their students on the paths and barriers to ethical behaviour. The power of the situation can perhaps be overcome by understanding and acknowledging its potential influence. Through this improved insight, social psychologists can help to create systems in which ethical behaviour, as well as development, is more likely to occur. Contrary to some interpretations of the impact the fundamental attribution error has on character development, a clear truth can emerge: knowledge improves the chances for ethical behaviour over ignorance. Aristotle and Spinoza were right all along, and social psychology has vindicated, rather than undermined, some of their critical insights about moral judgement and character development.

Acknowledgements Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the policy of the US Air Force Academy or any other government agency. The authors wish to thank Robert Cialdini, John Darley, Mark Snyder, Lee Ross, David Porter, Robert Berger, Ronaldo Mendoza, Kent Harber, Sonja Lyubomirsky and Andrew Ward, for their thoughtful comments, insight and support. References
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