RCPI v CA, G.R. No. 79528, March 1991........................................................

20

Table of Contents
Pp v Bayotas. G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994 ....................................... 2 Elcano v Hill July 17, 2011 77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977 ............................... 3 DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001 ................................................................................................................ 4 PRBL INC v Pp G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456 ....................... 5 Manliclic v. Calaunan G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007 512 SCRA 642........ 6 SPS. Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 .............................. 7 Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007 ...... 8 Air France v. Carascoso and CA G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 ....... 10 LRTA v Navidad GR 145804, 6 February 2003............................................... 11 Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995 241 SCRA 671 ....................................................................................................... 12 Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990 ........................................ 13 Castro v Pp G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008 .................................................. 14 Picart vs. Smith March 15, 1918 37 Phil 809................................................. 14 Guillang v Bedania 588 SCRA 73 ................................................................... 15 ANECO v Balen et al., 11/25/09 .................................................................... 16 Mckee v IAC, G.R. No. L-68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA 517 ...................... 17 Addenbrook v Pp, G.R. No. L-22995 June 29, 1967 ...................................... 17 Manila Electric Co. v Remoquillo, 99 Phil 117............................................... 18 PLDT vs. CA G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989 178 SCRA 94 ................. 19 Corliss v Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-21291.................................. 19 Negros Navigation v CA, G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997...................... 20

Chan Jr. v Iglesia ni Cristo G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005 ..................... 21 Taylor v Manila Electric, G.R. No. L-4977 March 22,1910| 16 Phil.8 ............ 21 Africa vs. Caltex, G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 16 SCRA 448 ............... 23 Malayan Insurance vs CA G.R. No. L-36413, September 26, 1988 165 SCRA 536 ................................................................................................................ 23 Batiquin v CA 258 SCRA 334 .......................................................................... 24 RAMOS vs. CA 321 SCRA 584 ........................................................................ 25 Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan v Pp Gr No. 158996 ............................................... 26 Flores vs. Pineda............................................................................................ 27 Professional Services Inc. v. Agana, Gr No 126279 ....................................... 28 Manila Doctors Hospital v Chua G.R. No. 150355 July 31, 2006 ................... 29 Mercury Drug v De Leon G.R. No. 165622 .................................................... 30 Del Mar v CA and Del Mar G.R. No. 139008 March 13, 2002 ....................... 31 BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G. R. No. 149454 & 149507, May 28, ....................................................................................................................... 32 Philippine School of Business Administration vs. CA 205 SCRA 729 GR No. 84698. February 4, 1942 ............................................................................... 32 Child Learning Center v Tagario G.R. No. 150920 November 25, 2005 ........ 33 PNB vs Pike Sept. 20, 2005 ............................................................................ 34 Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 .................................... 35 Lamis v Ong G.R. No. 148923. August 11, 2005 ........................................... 37 Ong v Metropolitan Water DistrictG.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958 ........... 38 Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto G.R. No. 87584, June 16, 1992 210 SCRA 18 .................................................................................................. 39 NPC v. Heirs of Casionan ............................................................................... 40 1

Sing and Ngo v Giap and Sons Inc G.R. No. 170596 ...................................... 42

Held: Affirmative. ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totallyextinguished:1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:"When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter. In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the 2

Pp v Bayotas. G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994

Facts: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. Issue: Whether death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30.Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article30.Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:"Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable."In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

Elcano v Hill July 17, 2011 77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes Facts: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage. Issue: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180. Held: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not 3

been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

court issued an order dismissing the case. However upon respondents motion for reconsideration, the order of dismissal was recalled On Feb. 21 1997 Issue: Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for Estafa without the necessary reservation exercised by the party Held: Yes. As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from thecommission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted. Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that: "(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action 4

DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001
Facts: An information for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46.Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the ground that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, Trial

unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that "After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action ." However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed. Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation. The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil

action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.

PRBL INC v Pp G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456
Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by, filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused. Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. Held: Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction 5

meted out to the employee. What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasicontracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may subject to the control of the prosecutor still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about togo to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to respondent. Issue: What is the effect of Manliclics acquittal to the civil case? Held: Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclics Acquittal Does not affect the case. Manliclic and PRBLI are still liable for damages A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the 6

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Manliclic v. Calaunan G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007 512 SCRA 642
Facts: Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan. Because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI. According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At

basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict Is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under thePenal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC. By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition. Issue: Was Morales negligent? Held: Yes. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of 7

SPS. Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010

Facts: Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store. On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store

enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded

weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007
Facts:

Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied.- Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of thecriminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Parks appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however,the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition. Issue: Whether the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of his demurer. Held: Yes. n case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of

evidence in suchaspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.- On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue. Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.- As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records the nature of Chois alleged oral objections to Parks motion for reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the 9

right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon; hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it. Dispositive Petition is DENIED.

Air France v. Carascoso and CA G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
Facts: On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. Issue: Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages? Held:

Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a firstclass-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They 10

have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, ordering Prudent Security and Escartin to jointly and severally pay Navidad (a) (1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; (2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; (3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; (b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; (c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; and (d) Costs of suit. The court also dismissed the complaint against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit, and the compulsory counter claimof LRTA and Roman. Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court modified the judgment ordering Roman and the LRTA solidarily liable to pay Navidad (a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;(b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d)P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and (e) P20,000.00 a sand for attorneys fees. The appellate court denied LRTAs and Romans motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. Issue: Whether LRTA liable for tort arising from contract. Held: YES. The premise for employers liability for tort (under the provisions of Article2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code) is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juristantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can onlybe negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of theemployee. Herein, such a factual matter that has not been shown. 11

LRTA v Navidad GR 145804, 6 February 2003

Facts: On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past 7:00 p.m., Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near theLRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the twoapparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. On 8 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counter claim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the election and supervision of its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

His card was dishonored in the restaurant and he was forced to pay in cash, amounting to almost P600.00. He felt embarrassed by this incident. He then complained to Far East Bank and he found out that his account has been cancelled without informing him. Bank security policy is to tag the card as hostile when it is reported lost, however, the bank failed to inform him and an overzealous employee failed to consider that it was the cardholder himself presenting the credit card. The bank sent an apology letter to Mr. Luna and to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure that Mr Luna was a very valuable client. Spouses Luna still felt aggrieved and thus filed this case for damages against Far East Bank. Far East Bank was adjudged to pay the following: (a) P300,000.00 moral damages;(b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. Issue: Whether Far East Bank is liable for damages to the Spouses Luna amounting the above-mentioned figures? Held: Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal damages but not moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are awarded if the defendant is to be shown to have acted in bad faith. Article 2219 states that, Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; It is true that the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of the Bank to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could the banks negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or 12

Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995 241 SCRA 671
Facts: In October 1986 Luis Luna applied for a FAREASTCARD with Fart East Bank. A supplemental card was also issued to his wife, Clarita. On August 1988, Clarita lost her card and promptly informed the bank of its loss for which she submitted an Affidavit of Loss. The bank recorded this loss and gave the credit card account a status of Hot Card and/or Cancelled Card. Such record holds also for the principal card holder until such time that the lost card was replaced. On October 1988, Luis Luna used his card to purchase a despidida lunch for his friend in the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant.

ill will. Nominal damages were awarded because of the simple fact that the bank failed to notify Mr. Luna, thus entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: "Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him."

Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Facts: Spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, water paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioner sand their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners filed a criminal and a separate civil action for damages against the respondent. Issue: Whether he IAC erred in affirming the trial courts order dismissing the civil case as the criminal case was still unresolved. Held: Yes. A careful examination of the afore quoted complaint shows that the civil actionis one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,

or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these water paths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

13

Castro v Pp G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008

Facts: Justin Albert was the son of Mr. Tan. Justin was a Grade 12 student of Reedley International School (RIS). He was dismissed for violating the rules of his probation. Tan requested for a reconsideration and RIS imposed non-appealable conditions such as not allowing Albert to participate in the graduation ceremonies. Tan filed a complaint in the DepEd, claiming malice and bad faith. DepEd nullified RIS sanctions as unreasonable and a denial of due process. DepEd orders readmission of Albert without any conditions. Albert finally participated in the graduation ceremonies. After the graduation ceremonies, Tan talked to a fellow parent Ching, intimating his contemplating suit against officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including Asst. Headmaster Castro. Ching relayed the information to Castro. At the end of the conversation, Castro said be careful talking to Tan, thats dangerous Ching then relayed the information to Tan, and Tan filed a grave oral defamation suit against Castro. Issue: Whether petitioner can still be held liable, or has double jeopardy set in? Held: No. Petitioner cannot be held liable as double jeopardy has set in. Double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3)after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can

assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. He rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

Picart vs. Smith March 15, 1918 37 Phil 809

Facts: Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php31,100 as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by Smith. The incident happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union. Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12miles per hour. Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his course and made two more blasts. Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the right side of the railing. As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he continued without diminution of speed. When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other side, Smith drove his car to the right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close proximity to the horse that it became frightened and turned its belly across the bridge with its head towards the railing. The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. It showed that the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing was probably less than one half meters. The horse died and Picart 14

received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. Issue: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done to Picart and his pony. Held: Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the amount of P200. The sum is computed to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel. In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred while the automobile was still some distance away. From this moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a place for greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision. There was an appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would react that way. The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence. The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Courts opinion would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with

risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course.

Guillang v Bedania 588 SCRA 73

Facts: One afternoon of October 1994, Guillang was driving his Corolla along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite when it was hit by a turning 10-wheeler truck driven by Rodolfo Bedania and owned by Rodolfo de Silva. The passengers of the car were rushed to the Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero, one of the passengers, was later transferred to the Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3 November1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage. On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de Silva. On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the civil case for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed a MR but to no avail. Hence, this case. Issue: Who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners? Held: 15

The trial court held Bedania and de Silva, as Bedanias employer, liable because the proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn executed by Bedania without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the collision was Genaros failure to stop the car despite seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith, we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.

Petitioner Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO) is a duly organized and registered consumers cooperative, engaged in supplying electricity in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City. In 1981, ANECO installed an electric post in Purok 4, Ata-atahon, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, with its main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing Angelita Balens (Balens) residence. Balens father, Miguel, protested the installation with the District Engineers Office and with ANECO, but his protest just fell on deaf ears. On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa (Lariosa) and Celestino Exclamado (Exclamado) were electrocuted while removing the television antenna (TV antenna) from Balens residence. The antenna pole touched ANECOs main distribution line which resulted in their electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive third degree burns. Issue: Whether there was negligence involved. Held: Yes. The taking down by [respondents] of the antenna in MIGUEL BALENs house would not have caused their electrocution were it not for the negligence of ANECO in installing live wires over the roof of the said house. Clearly, ANECOs act of leaving unprotected and uninsulated the main distribution line over Balens residence was the proximate cause of the incident which claimed Exclamados life and injured respondents Balen and Lariosa. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.

ANECO v Balen et al., 11/25/09

Facts:

16

Mckee v IAC, G.R. No. L-68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA 517
Facts: A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of thecar. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. Issue: Whether the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision. Held: Yes. The Proximate cause of the collision was the over speeding of the truck showing its negligence. The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming

car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence" Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which they failed to do.

Addenbrook v Pp, G.R. No. L-22995 June 29, 1967

Facts: At about 3:15 in the afternoon of 9 January 1960, the front bumper of the Stanvac Service Truck with Plate No. 2740, Manila, 960, while travelling southward along Marquez de Comillas being driven then by accused William Addenbrook, and in front of House No. 1010, came into contact with the body of a pedestrian Wenceslao Risaldo with the result that the latter fell and was taken to the Philippine General Hospital by accused and his helper in the truck named Amando Valeriano, but was dead on arrival, it having been found that he had received abrasions on the left 17

forehead, and contusions with lacerations on the face, left arm, right thigh, knee joints, and right buttocks and waist and fracture of the skull, Exh. B, so that the Fiscal filed the present criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence against accused resulting in his conviction. Upon impact of the van against the victim, the latter fell and rolled to a distance of 15 paces, as shown by 2 sets of bloodstains observed by patrolman Emilio Guzman in his ocular investigation immediately after the occurrence of the incident. From these facts, the appellate court found it difficult to believe that the van was travelling at a slow and reasonable speed. Considering further that as postulated by the accused himself, his view of the street was partly blocked by a parked car in front of house No. 1010, Marquez de Comillas, from behind which the deceased tried to cross the street; and with the added fact that the appellant did not blow his horn despite the visual obstruction by the parked car, the Court of Appeals concluded that he failed to observe that reasonable care required of a driver of a motor vehicle. Issue: Whether Addenbrook was negligent. Held: Yes. The objection to patrolman Guzman's competency because he was not presented as an expert witness, nor did he see the incident actually happen, is untenable. What Guzman testified to are what he saw in his ocular investigation, such as the 2 sets of bloodstains and the 15 paces distance between them, that were facts derived from his own perception. At any rate, that the accident could not be avoided because the victim was so close to the truck when he, as alleged by appellant, suddenly darted across the street, does not exculpate the accused, since the latter was driving at excessive speed. The fact that a pedestrian came into the path of the car suddenly and so close that the driver could not stop and avoid striking him will not excuse the driver, where the car was being driven at an

unreasonable rate of speed under the circumstances. While the general rule is that a driver is not held accountable just because he failed to take the wisest choice in a sudden emergency, the rule does not apply where the emergency is of the driver's own creation or devising.

Manila Electric Co. v Remoquillo, 99 Phil 117

Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-law. While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence. Held: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.

18

PLDT vs. CA G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989 178 SCRA 94
Facts: The Estebans jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduitsystem. Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The Estebans allegedly sustained injuries. PLDT, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, Barte an independent contractor which undertook the construction. Issue: Whether PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by the Estebans. Held: The accident which befell the Estebans was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. Furthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his

cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

Corliss v Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. L-21291

Facts: Plaintiffs husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendants train was passing by and blew its siren. Plaintiffs husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiffs husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband. Issue: Whether the plaintiff can recover damages. Held: Complaint was dismissed. A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and injury results. The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiffs husband and she was not allowed to recover.

19

Negros Navigation v CA, G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997

Facts: In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents' families were never found. Issue:

RCPI v CA, G.R. No. 79528, March 1991

Facts: On the 24th of January 1983 private respondent spouses sent a telegram of condolence to their cousins through the herein petioner RCPI. The telegram was in perfect resemblance as to what was intended by the spouses however, it was written on a birthday card and was sealed in on a Christmasgram envelope. The spouses contended there was a breach of contract on the part of the RCPI, they in turn filed complaint on the trial court where it rendered its decision in favor of the spouses whereas, it was appealed in the CA where also the judgment in the lower court was affirmed in toto. Thus, the RCPI came to this Court for relief contending issues that the CA erred in rendering such judgment. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner committed a breach of contract? Whether or not the RCPI are held liable for damages? Held:

Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and unwarranted. Held: Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under petitioner's formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses should receive P97,714.28. Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the personal circumstances of the victims.

The Court agrees with the appellate court in its decision and per endorsement of the trial courts findings that the RCPI as a corporation dealing with telecommunication are engaged in public interest and therefore rests in their shoulders an obligation to serve the public with care and without negligence. The reason of shortage in their production of the appropriate envelope is of no value to merit for it is their duty to have produced such. The negligence committed is evidentially sufficient to recover damages because the spouses suffered from ridicule amongst the people who have come to have knowledge of such activity.

20

Chan Jr. v Iglesia ni Cristo G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005
Facts: The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent. The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro Ely Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent. Issue: Whether there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Held: No. All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondents premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,

encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioners property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.

Taylor v Manila Electric, G.R. No. L-4977 March 22,1910| 16 Phil.8

Facts: The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy. They walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of 21

the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may bed is charged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. Issue: Whether Manila Electric is Liable for damages to petitioners. Held: No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of

15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him.

22

Africa vs. Caltex, G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 16 SCRA 448
Facts: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation). Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite, and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption inappropriate cases, in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such docrtrine. Issue: Whether without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees. Held: The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor applies and contends that Caltex is liable. Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care. The report

by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.

Malayan Insurance vs CA G.R. No. L-36413, September 26, 1988 165 SCRA 536
Facts: Petitioner, Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., issued in favor of private respondent Sio Choy Private Car Comprehensive Policy covering a Willys jeep. The insurance coverage was for "own damage" not to exceed P600.00 and "third-party liability" in the amount of P20,000.00. During the effectivity of said insurance policy. The insured jeep, while being driven by one Juan P. Campollo an employee of the respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc., collided with a passenger bus belonging to the respondent Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. (PANTRANCO, for short) causing damage to the insured vehicle and injuries to the driver, Juan P. Campollo, and the respondent Martin C. Vallejos, who was riding in the ill-fated jeep. As a result, Martin C. Vallejos filed an action for damages against Sio Choy, Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. and the PANTRANCO. He prayed therein that the defendants be ordered to pay him, jointly and severally, the amount of P15,000.00, as reimbursement for medical and hospital expenses;P6,000.00, 23

for lost income; P51,000.00 as actual, moral and compensatory damages; and P5,000.00, for attorney's fees. PANTRANCO claimed that the jeep of Sio Choy was then operated at an excessive speed and bumped the PANTRANCO bus which had moved to, and stopped at, the shoulder of the highway in order to avoid the jeep; and that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, especially in the selection and supervision of its employees. Defendant Sio Choy and the petitioner insurance company, in their answer, also denied liability to the plaintiff, claiming that the fault in the accident was solely imputable to the PANTRANCO. Sio Choy, however, later filed a separate answer with a crossclaim against the herein petitioner wherein he alleged that he had actually paid the plaintiff, Martin C. Vallejos, the amount of P5,000.00 for hospitalization and other expenses, and, in his cross-claim against the herein petitioner, he alleged that the petitioner had issued in his favor a private car comprehensive policy wherein the insurance company obligated itself to indemnify Sio Choy, as insured, for the damage to his motor vehicle, as well as for any liability to third persons arising out of any accident. Also later, the herein petitioner sought, and was granted, leave to file a thirdparty complaint against the San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. for the reason that the person driving the jeep of Sio Choy, at the time of the accident, was an employee of the San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. performing his duties within the scope of his assigned task, and not an employee of Sio Choy; More so, San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. is the employer of the deceased driver, Juan P.Campollo, it should be liable for the acts of its employee, pursuant to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. The herein petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered against the San Leon Rice Mill, Inc., making it liable for the amounts claimed by the plaintiff and/or ordering said San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. to reimburse and indemnify the petitioner for any sum that it may be ordered to pay the plaintiff. Issue:

Whether petitioner is entitled to be reimbursed by respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. for whatever amount petitioner has been adjudged to pay respondent Vallejos on its insurance policy. Held: The appellate court overlooked the principle of subrogation in insurance contracts. Subrogation is a normal incident of indemnity insurance Upon payment of the loss, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. Moreover, that right is not dependent upon , nor does it grow out of any privity of contract. It follows, therefore, that petitioner, upon paying respondent Vallejos the amount of riot exceeding P20,000.00, shall become the subrogee of the insured, the respondent Sio Choy; as such, it is subrogated to whatever rights the latter has against respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. Article 1217 of the Civil Code gives to a solidary debtor who has paid the entire obligation the right to be reimbursed by hisco-debtors for the share which corresponds to each. In accordance with Article 1217, petitioner, upon payment to respondent Vallejo sand thereby becoming the subrogee of solidary debtor Sio Choy, is entitled to reimbursement from respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc.

Batiquin v CA 258 SCRA 334

Facts: Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21,1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latters baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to 24

suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, soshe consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery.- When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record ,and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared the mare deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein statedThere was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Khos testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision. Issue: Whether respondent is negligent. Held:

Yes. While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari , there are exceptions, among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts. The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Khos testimony. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony, which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Khos testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr. Khos testimony. Also, the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than firsthand knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court.

RAMOS vs. CA 321 SCRA 584

Facts: Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of her stone in the gall bladder. She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to do the operation. The operation was scheduled on June 17, 1985 in the De los Santos Medical Center. Erlinda was admitted to the medical center the day before the operation. On the following day, she was ready for operation as early as 7:30 am. Around 9:30, Dr. Hosaka has not yet arrived. By 10 am, Rogelio wanted to pull out his wife from the operating room. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at 12:10 pm more than 3 hours of the scheduled operation.

25

Dr. Guiterres tried to intubate Erlinda. The nail beds of Erlinda were bluish discoloration in her left hand. At 3 pm, Erlinda was being wheeled to the Intensive care Unit and stayed there for a month. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died. The family of Ramos sued them for damages. Issue: Whether there was an employee-employer relationship that existed between the medical center and Drs. Hosaka and Guiterrez. Held: Private Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not technically employees, the control exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate consultants fulfill the hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship with the exception of payment of wages. The control test is determining.

and other things that will ensure that the doctors orders are carried out. The court finds that there is no employer-employee relationship between the doctors and the hospital.

Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan v Pp Gr No. 158996

Facts: In this case, the circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.s injury and the series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of theManila Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the emergency room. While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seem doubtless to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the petitioners, this conclusion is still best achieved, not through the scholarly assumptions of a layman like the patients mother, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witness/es. As to whether the petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in treating patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of expert opinion. Issue: Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies. Held:

In applying the four fold test, DLSMC cannot be considered an employer of the respondent doctors. It has been consistently held that in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the following elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only the end to be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an end.

The hospital does not hire consultants but it accredits and grants him the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients. It is the patient who pays the consultants. The hospital cannot dismiss the consultant but he may lose his privileges granted by the hospital. The hospitals obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation

Yes. This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the 26

accident arose from want of care." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facieevidence thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturare: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

Teresita did not return the next week as advised. However, when her condition persisted, she went to further consult Dr. Flores at his UDMC clinic in Quezon City. Dr. Fredelicto did a routine check-up and ordered Teresita's admission to the hospital. In the admission slip, he directed the hospital staff to prepare the patient for an "on call" D&C operation to be performed by his wife, Dr. Felicisima Flores, despite his suspicion that Teresita was suffering from diabetis. Teresita was taken to the operating room. It was only then that she met Dr. Felicisima, an obstetrician and gynecologist. The two doctors - Dr. Felicisima and Dr. Fredelicto, conferred on the patient's medical condition, while the resident physician and the medical intern gave Dr. Felicisima their own briefings. She also interviewed and conducted an internal vaginal examination of the patient which lasted for about 15 minutes. Dr. Felicisima thereafter called up the laboratory for the results of the tests. At that time, only the results for the blood sugar (BS), uric acid determination, cholesterol determination, and complete blood count (CBC) were available. The preliminary laboratory results indicated that the blood sugar of the victim was high. After the operation, Teresita's condition had worsened. She experienced difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the intensive care unit. Further tests confirmed that she was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus Type II. Insulin was administered on the patient, but the medication might have arrived too late. Due to complications induced by diabetes, Teresita died in. Believing that it was negligence of petitioners that caused the death of Teresita, respondents filed a medical negligence case. The trial court and the CA rule in their favor. Issue: Whether petitioners were negligent. Held: 27

Flores vs. Pineda

Facts: Teresita Pineda consulted Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her medical condition. She complained of general body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked for the history of her monthly period to analyze the probable cause of the vaginal bleeding and subsequently advised her to return the following week or to go to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for a general checkup.

Yes, however it is proper that a discussion of the meaning and elements of medical negligence must be made before proceeding to the ruling on to the issue.

remarks on the Record of Operation: "sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue for closure" (two pieces of gauze were missing). A "diligent search" was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery. Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad's body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes. Issue: Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil's negligence Held: Yes.PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried 28

A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient. There are four elements involved in a medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation. However, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, thus he must prove that: (1) the physician either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and (2) the failure or action caused injury to the patient. Expert testimony is therefore essential since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is generally a matter of expert opinion.

Professional Services Inc. v. Agana, Gr No 126279

Facts: Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some

on with the assistance of various hospital staff. PSI also liable under NCC 2180. It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil.

hospital gown and bed sheets, and (iii) barring the private nurses or midwives from assisting the patient. Respondents thus prayed for the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Issue:

Manila Doctors Hospital v Chua G.R. No. 150355 July 31, 2006
Facts: On December 13, 1993, respondents filed a Complaint averring that on October 30, 1990, respondent Chua, the mother of respondent Vicky Ty, was admitted in petitioner's hospital for hypertension and diabetes; that while respondent Chua was confined, Judith Chua, the sister of respondent Ty, had been likewise confined for injuries suffered in a vehicular accident; that partial payments of the hospital bills were made, totaling P435,800.00; that after the discharge of Judith Chua, respondent Chua remained in confinement and the hospital bills for both patients accumulated; that respondent Chua was pressured by the petitioner, through its Credit and Collection Department, to settle the unpaid bills; that respondent Ty represented that she will settle the bills as soon as the funds become available; that respondent Ty pleaded to the management that in view of the physical condition of her mother, respondent Chua, the correspondences relating to the settlement of the unpaid hospital bills should be relayed to the former; that these pleas were unheeded by the petitioner; that petitioner threatened to implement unpleasant measures unless respondent Ty undertakes her mother's obligation as well as the obligation of her sister, Judith Chua, to pay the hospitalization expenses; that petitioner made good its threat and employed unethical, unpleasant and unlawful methods which allegedly worsened the condition of respondent Chua, particularly, by (i) cutting off the telephone line in her room and removing the air-conditioning unit, television set, and refrigerator, (ii) refusing to render medical attendance and to change the

Whether the respondents are liable to the petitioner to pay the hospital bills arising from the hospitalization of respondent Chua and Judith Chua; and second, whether the parties are entitled to their respective claims for damages. Held: Yes. The Court takes judicial notice of the pending Senate Bill No. 337, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Detention of Patients in Hospitals and Medical Clinics on Grounds of Non-Payment of Hospital Bills or Medical Expenses," which declares, among others, that it shall be unlawful for any hospital or medical clinic to cause directly or indirectly the detention of patients for non-payment, in part or in full, of their hospital bills, and, furthermore, requires patients who have fully recovered and are financially incapable to settle the hospitalization expenses to execute a promissory note, co-signed by another individual, to the extent of the unpaid obligation before leaving the hospital. While this Court may have touched upon these matters in the adjudication of the instant case, it must be stated that this decision should in no way preempt any constitutional challenge to the provisions of Senate Bill No. 337 if passed into law, bearing in mind the standards for the exercise of the power of judicial review as well as the recognition that the tenor of the bill may adjust with the times, or that the bill itself may fail to pass, according to the dynamism of the legislative process, especially in light of the objections interposed by interest groups to date.

29

Mercury Drug v De Leon G.R. No. 165622

Facts: Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter prescribed the drugs CortisporinOpthalmic and Ceftin to relieve his eye problems. Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the Betterliving, Paraaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondents left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, CortisporinOtic Solution. De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription and it was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the days incident. Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. Issue: Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable. Held:

Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human health. In the United States case of Tombari v. Conners, it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines. In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of ones employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption. Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon. As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning. 30

Del Mar v CA and Del Mar G.R. No. 139008 March 13, 2002
Facts: The private respondent, Norma Ebersole Del Mar, and her sister, Florence Ebersole Finch, inherited three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-58397, T-58398 and T-58402, situated in Mabini, Santiago City, with a total area of 29,736 square meters, more or less. On December 6, 1974, Florence Ebersole Finch, a resident of New York, USA, executed a general power of attorney naming and constituting private respondent as her attorney-in-fact with regard to the subject property.On January 29, 1975, private respondent, acting for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Florence Ebersole Finch, executed Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner covering the three aforementioned parcels of land. The private respondent is the mother of herein petitioner.On March 25, 1976, Florence Ebersole Finch executed a Deed of Confirmation in New York, USA, confirming and ratifying all the acts and deeds executed by Norma Ebersole del Mar, in conveying properties to Robert E. del Mar, as appearing in Document Nos. 1780, Page 57, Book No. 14, Series of 1975; 1781, Page 58, Book No. 14, Series of 1975; and 1782, Page 58, Book No. 14, Series of 1975, of the Notarial Registry of Paulo Pascua, a notary public for and in the Province of Isabela, Philippines. This document was authenticated by Wenceslao J.O. Quirolgico, Vice-Consul of the Philippine Consulate Office in New York, USA. After the peaceful and continuous possession by petitioner of the subject properties for more than twenty-two (22) years, a complaint for reconveyance was filed by x x x private respondent against x x x petitioner on May 15, 1997, alleging, inter-alia, that x x x petitioner obtained the aforementioned Certificates of Title through fraud and deceit. Private respondent claimed that x x x said properties were left by her under the administration of petitioner, who allegedly transferred the ownership of x x

x said realty in his name by causing the issuance of Certificates of Title in his name without her knowledge and consent. However, records show that before she left for the United States, private respondent executed the corresponding Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner. This case, entitled Norma Ebersole del Mar represented by Gerald del Mar vs. Roberto del Mar and the Register of Deeds, Province of Isabela was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Branch 35 and docketed as Civil Case No. 2373 Issue: Whether the accused acted in negligence. Held: Yes. The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these exceptions. His negligence in this case was his inexcusable failure to file the required appellants Brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of petitioner. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of Atty. Abuans failure to appear at the pretrial conference, a failure that had placed him in default. Because petitioner was in default, private respondents evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No wonder, the trial court decided against him. Yet, he retained Atty. Abuans services for the appeal. One is bound by the decisions of ones counsel regarding the conduct of the case, especially where the former does not complain against the manner in which the latter handled the case. In effect, petitioner consented to the shabby and negligent treatment of his case by his counsel. Hence, he should not complain now of the negligence or fraud done to him by his lawyer. A partys counsel cannot be blamed for negligence, if the party was likewise guilty of the same. Clients should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves hired, and whom they had full authority to fire at any time and replace with another.

31

BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G. R. No. 149454 & 149507, May 28,
Facts: CASA Montessori International opened an account with BPI, with CASAs President as one of its authorized signatories. It discovered that 9 of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos whose name turned out to be fictitious, and was used by a certain Yabut, CASAs external auditor. He voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature and encashed the checks. RTC granted the Complaint for Collection with Damages against BPI ordering to reinstate the amount in the account, with interest. CA took account of CASAs contributory negligence and apportioned the loss between CASA and BPI, and ordred Yabut to reimburse both. BPI contends that the monthly statements it issues to its clients contain a notice worded as follows: If no error is reported in 10 days, account will be correct and as such, it should be considered a waiver. Issue: Whether or not waiver or estoppel results from failure to report the error in the bank statement Held: Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if CASA failed to report the error. Neither is it estopped from questioning the mistake after the lapse of the ten-day period. This notice is a simple confirmation or "circularization" -- in accounting parlance -- that requests client-depositors to affirm the accuracy of items recorded by the banks. Its purpose is to obtain from the depositors a direct corroboration of the correctness of their account balances with their respective banks. Every right has subjects -active and passive. While the active subject is entitled to demand its enforcement, the passive one is duty-bound to suffer such enforcement. On the one hand, BPI could not have been an active subject, because it could

not have demanded from CASA a response to its notice. CASA, on the other hand, could not have been a passive subject, either, because it had no obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to respond. Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their own deed or representation, anything contrary to that established as the truth, in legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence even make a juris et de jure presumption that whenever one has, by ones own act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief, one cannot -- in any litigation arising from such act or omission -- be permitted to falsify that supposed truth. In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or representation that misled BPI. The formers omission, if any, may only be deemed an innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences of periodic audits. Since its conduct was due to such ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. A person who has no knowledge of or consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it. "Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference x x x." CASA is not barred from questioning BPIs error even after the lapse of the period given in the notice.

Philippine School of Business Administration vs. CA 205 SCRA 729 GR No. 84698. February 4, 1942
Facts: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of the schools by assailants who were not members of the schools academic community. This prompted the parents of the deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit dismissed on the 32

ground of no cause of action and not within the scope of the provision of Art 2180 since it is an academic institution. The trial court overruled the petitioners contention and its decision was later affirmed by the appellate court. Issue: Whether the decision of the appellate court primarily anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is valid. Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny the petition of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree to the premises of the appellate courts ruling. Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes the rule of in loco parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts of Calitos assailants which were not students of the PSBA and because of the contractual relationship. The school and the students, upon registration established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The institution of learning must provide their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge, and maintain peace and order within its premises. The SC dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the trail court to determine if the school neglected its obligation to perform based on the contractual relation of them and the students.

Child Learning Center v Tagario G.R. No. 150920 November 25, 2005
Facts: This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati by Timothy Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R. Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-1389. The complaint1 alleged that during the school year 1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao. In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. Issue: Whether the Institution of Child Learning Center, Inc is negligent. Held: 33

Yes. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another while negligence consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to another. The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door. Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothys own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLCs own negligence.

PNB vs Pike Sept. 20, 2005

Facts: Norman Pike often traveled to and from Japan as a gay entertainer in said country. Sometime in 1991, he opened U.S. Dollar Savings Account with PNB Buendia branch for which he was issued a passbook. The complain talleged that before Pike left for Japan on 18 March 1993, he kept the passbook inside a cabinet under lock and key, in his home. A few hours after he arrived from Japan, he discovered that some of his valuables were missing including the passbook; that he immediately reported the incident to the police which led to the arrest and prosecution of a certain Mr. Joy Manuel Davasol. Pike also discovered that Davasol made 2 unauthorized withdrawals from his U.S. Dollar Savings Account. Pike went to PNBs Buendia branch and verbally protested the unauthorized withdrawals and likewise demanded the return of the total withdrawn amount of U.S. $7,500.00, on the ground that he never authorized anybody to withdraw from his account as the signatures appearing on the subject withdrawal slips were clearly forgeries. PNB refused to credit said amount back to Pikes U.S. Dollar Savings Account , and instead, the bank wrote him that it exercised due diligence in the handling of said account. Pike filed a case against PNB. PNB, on the other hand, claimed that before Pike went to Japan, he and Davasol went to see PNB AVP Mr. Lorenzo Val and instructed the latter to honor all withdrawals to be made by Davasol. After the loss of Pikes passbook, he allegedly withdraw the balance from his passbook and executed an affidavit promising not to hold responsible the bank and its officers for the withdrawal made. The trial court ruled that the bank is liable for the unauthorized withdrawals. The bank was negligent in the performance of its duties such that unauthorized withdrawals were made in the deposit of Pike. The CAaffirmed the findings of the RTC that indeed defendant-appellant PNB was negligent in exercising the diligence required of a business imbued with public interest such as that of the banking industry, however, it modified the rate of interest and award for damages. 34

Issue: Whether the award of damages was proper Held: Yes. The award of moral and exemplary damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, and if such discretion is well exercised, as in this case, it will not be disturbed on appeal. An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Specifically, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith,[38]or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious, or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. There is no reason to disturb the trial courts finding of the banks employees negligence in their treatment of Pikes account. In the case on hand, the Court of Appeals sustained, and rightly so, that an award of moral damages is warranted. For, as found by said appellate court, citing the case of Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, the banks negligence is a result of lack of due care and caution required of managers and employees of a firm engaged in so sensitive and demanding business, as banking, hence, the award of P20,000.00 as moral damages, is proper. The award of exemplary damages is also proper as a warning to petitioner PNB and all concerned not to recklessly disregard their obligation to exercise the highest and strictest diligence in serving their depositors .Finally, the grant of exemplary damages entitles respondent Pike the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and the award of P10,000.00 for litigation expenses.

Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010

Facts: Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store. On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC. By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition. Issue: 35

Was Morales negligent? Held: Yes. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their Claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous

in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

36

Lamis v Ong G.R. No. 148923. August 11, 2005

Facts: Sandigan Protective and Investigation Agency, Inc. (Sandigan), petitioner, was the security agency providing security services at the Manila Chinese Cemetery. The visiting hours were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Sandigan instructed the security guards not to allow any one to enter the cemetery from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also a petitioner, was the guard assigned at the south gate of the cemetery for the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. slot. Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer, with a PSM 679 plate, driven by David Y. Ong, herein respondent, arrived at the south gate of the cemetery. He beeped his car and continued doing so, but Lamis did not open the gate. Eventually, he went outside the gate and informed respondent that being beyond visiting hours, he cannot enter the cemetery. Suddenly, respondent accelerated the speed of his car, trying to enter the cemetery. This irked Lamis. He closed the gate and took a shot gun entrusted to him by one of the roving guards. About thirty minutes thereafter, respondents car returned at full speed toward the closed gate where Lamis was standing. He fired a warning shot but respondent did not stop his car. Lamis fired another warning shot. Respondent then alighted from his car. Seeing it was closed, he got inside the car, but before he could do so, Lamis shot him, hitting his right arm, left hip, and right waist. He managed to drive to the Chinese General Hospital where he was examined and treated. Thereafter, the hospital guard reported the incident to the police who immediately conducted an investigation. Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own investigation but did not turn over to the police the firearm used by Lamis. Subsequently, Sandigan paid Lamis mother the amount spent for his medical expenses. Meanwhile, he was given another job but he absented from work without leave. Thus, he was suspended and eventually dismissed from the service.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct in awarding damages in favor of the respondent. Held: As earlier stated, the trial court found that Lamis act of shooting the respondent was deliberate and intentional, hence, both petitioners are jointly and solidarily liable to respondent for damages. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that Whoever by an act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x. The obligation imposed by this Article is demandable not only for ones own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, petitioner Sandigan, being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is likewise liable for damages caused by the latter. As stated earlier, petitioner Sandigan already paid the medical expenses (or actual damages) incurred by respondent. We find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding to respondent moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P300,000.00 and attorneys fee in the amount of P50,000.00. These amounts are quite excessive. We have held that although the trial court is given the discretion to determine the amount of such damages, the appellate court may modify or change the amount awarded when it is inordinate, as in this case. It bears stressing that the award of moral damages is meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused by the defendants wrongful acts. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must 37

somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. We hold that an award to respondent of P30,000.00, instead of P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable. Likewise, we are convinced that the award of exemplary damages should be reduced from P300,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such damages are imposed not to enrich the claimant and impoverish the defendant but to serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions. Finally, an award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fee is deemed sufficient considering that the suit involved is merely for damages. Attorneys fee may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party, as in the present case.

Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs son was drowned in one of its swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances. After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

Issue: Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages. Held: We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. 38

Ong v Metropolitan Water DistrictG.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958

Facts: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee is charged . 14 year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of those pools.

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we find supported by the evidence: There is (also) a strong suggestion coming from the expert evidence presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and which to his drowning.

minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of the balcony collapsed and pandemonium ensued. The Chattos managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling and walk to the nearby FEU hospital where they were confined and treated for a day. Later, they had to transfer to UST hospital, and because of continuing pain in the neck, headache, and dizziness, had to even go to Illinois, USA for treatment. Gotesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse was due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. The trial court awarded actual/compensatory and moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the Chattos. The CA also found Gotescos appeal to be without merit. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether the cause of the collapse of the balcony ceiling was force majeure. Held: Collapse of the balcony ceiling not due to force majeure. Gotesco is Thereby Liable. Gotescos claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Ong, admittedthat he could not give any reason for the collapse. Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. Spanish and American authorities on the meaning of force majeure: Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning, tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, 39

Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto G.R. No. 87584, June 16, 1992 210 SCRA 18
Facts: Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter Lina went to see the movie Mother Dear at Superama I theater, owned by Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly 10

or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. [Blackstone] The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as, for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; [Esriche] Any accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively, without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains, and care reasonably to have been expected. Gotesco could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause is because either he did not actually conduct an investigation or because he is incompetent (notan engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the governments examination). The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident. It was not shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been discovered if only Gotesco exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But, as disclosed by Mr. Ong, no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. And even assuming arguendo that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, Gotesco would still be liable because the trial court declared it to be guilty of gross negligence. As gleaned from Bouviers definition, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.

In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby reducing their distance from the ground to only about 8-10 ft. This posed as a threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect trail users from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr. Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9 additional poles, and they identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground. 19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2 bamboo poles, and they carried one pole horizontally on their shoulder, with Noble carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead as they passed through the trail underneath the NPC high-tension lines on their way to their work place. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole that he was carrying touched one of the dangling high-tension wires. Melchor narrated that he heard a buzzing sound for only about a second or two, then he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him, but Noble was already dead. A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer determined the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation, secondary to electrocution. There was a small burned area in the middle right finger of Noble. Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of the wires above the trail hung very low. They noted that people usually used the trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and that the trail was the only viable way since the other side was a precipice. They did not see any danger warning signs installed. After the GM of NPC was informed of the incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put up warning signs around the area. 40

NPC v. Heirs of Casionan

Facts:

Noble's parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that signs were installed but they were stolen by children, and that excavations were made to increase the clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to pocket mining in the area. NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution since Noble did not suffer extensive burns. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence. RTC decided in favor of Noble's parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses were biased because all but one were employees of NPC, and they were not actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since the company has not acted upon the requests and demands made by the community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC with modification--award of moral damages was reduced from 100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees was disallowed since the reason for the award was not expressly stated in the decision. Issue: Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of Noble. NO; hence, NPC is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability. Held: Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the

person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate causeof the injury. The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the injured party's contributory negligence. Precedents + [non-]application to the case at hand In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body. In this case, there were no warning signs, and the trail was regularly used by people since it was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by DENR in the area. In Aonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. The fact that pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for NPC to leave their transmission lines dangling. Damages awarded Noble's unearned income of 720k [loss of earning capacity formula: Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)] Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is gross negligence] Moral damages of 50k 41

Sing and Ngo v Giap and Sons Inc G.R. No. 170596
Facts: Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot at 745 Caballero St., Binondo. In 1978, they decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this project, they contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent, through its general manager, John T. Lee, received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart. An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. As a gesture of goodwill to their neighbors, the petitioners assured the respondent that repairs would be undertaken by their contractor. In December 1979, Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the LSG Building. Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors, cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the building. In 1981, the respondent was constrained to consult engineers, E.S. de Castro Ph.D. and Associates, through Control Builders Corporation, to investigate the cause of the damages in the LSG Building and to determine its present structural integrity. It was immediately noticed that the LSG Building underwent differential settlement. Based on their ocular inspection on the building measurement of the actual differential settlement,

structural analysis of the building and determination of the sub-surface soil conditions, the consultants concluded that the structural failure of the LSG Building resulted from the differential settlement caused by the excavation during the construction of the NSS Building. Since the building had undergone large differential settlements beyond safe tolerable limits, the consultants recommended the complete demolition of the LSG Building. The demolition and reconstruction of the building was estimated to cost the respondents about P8,021,687.00. The respondents demanded that the petitioners rebuild the LSG Building or pay the cost of the same, which the petitioners refused. Issue: Whether or not the building is a new edifice or built on the old ashes is really of no moment. Held: This only goes to show that the additional two floors put up on the LSG Building could have overburdened the foundations load-bearing capacity and contributed to the sagging of the building. The possibility of settlement due to weak foundation cannot, therefore, be discounted. As the trial court correctly ruled: adding more floors without touching or reinforcing the buildings bottom line or foundation are already manifestive of some negligence or ignorance on the part of said building owner. Had plaintiff stuck to his original building 2-storey with its kind of foundation, the excavation by its adjacent neighbor would not matter much or affect the building in question at the outset. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. In this case, considering that respondents negligence must have necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is warranted. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that respondent should likewise share in the cost of the 42

restructuring of its building. This is more in keeping with justice and equity. As the trial court ratiocinated: After going over the records of the case, the Court believes and so holds that plaintiff is equally negligent in not providing the necessary foundation and reinforcement to accommodate/support the additional floors and this finding is supported by plaintiffs evidence more particularly the declaration of John Lee that the 3rd and 4th floors were built on the skeleton of the ground and 2nd floor which was burned (tsn pp. 8-9, July 9, 1985). To be adding additional floors to the original 2-storey of plaintiffs building and depending merely on the skeleton of the ground and second floors for its third and fourth floors without touching or reinforcing that buildings bottom line or foundation are already manifestive of some negligence or ignorance on the part of said building owner (plaintiff). To put all the blame and responsibility for the defects, cracks and tilting or sagging of the building in question on the shoulders of the defendants is not proper. Plaintiff must realize his share of the faults and defects of his property in the situation. In the case at bench, the negligence of Contech caused the damages sustained by the building, which did not discharge its duty of excavating eight (8) inches away from the boundary line from the lot of plaintiff with insufficient lateral and subjacent support Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The requisites of quasi-delict are the following: (a) There must be an act or omission;

(b) Such act or omission causes damage to another; (c) Such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and (d) There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. These requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation done without observing the proper safeguards. Although the trial court stated that petitioner as land owner had every right to excavate on his own land, such right is not absolute as to deprive the adjacent owner sufficient lateral support pursuant to Article 684, New Civil Code, which states that: No proprietor shall make such excavation upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. For the damage caused to the respondent, petitioners and Contech are jointly liable as they are joint tort-feasors. Conformably with Article 2194, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.

*MEA Builders,Inc v. CA Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty Corporation

Facts: On or about 10:40 oclock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and 43

driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"), with Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment. (C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from. Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In the meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, and subsequently raffled to Branch 42. As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection. (Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel. Issue:

Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages suffered in a vehicular collision. It declared the following doctrines on proximate cause and contributory negligence Held: 1. Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz: Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. 2. If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. 3. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident. 4. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, 44

produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 5. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. 6. Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not

eliminate respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.

St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002

Facts: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Issue: Whether petitioner should be held liable for the damages. Held: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless 45

driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof on his house which he never did. Instead he changed the materials of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is contended that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company, and for that reason the company is not liable. Issue: Whether Rodrigueza is guilty of contributory negligence. Held: It is to be inferred that the house of Rodriguez already stood upon before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course and there is no proof that Rodrigueza had unlawfully intruded upon the railroads property in the act of building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company upon making its extension had acquired the land only leaving the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the defendant company and so long as his house remained in its exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendans locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any ldamage that might result from the unlawful acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinarily prudent man. In the situation under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing the fire. The circumstance that Rodriguezas house was partly on theproperty of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous 46

Rodriqueza v. Manila Railroad Company

Facts: Defendant Manila Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of Albay, that on January 29, 1918, one of its trains passed over said line and a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive and fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively and the same were entirely consumed. It is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said fire in failing to exercise proper supervision over employees in charge of the locomotive, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks and in using a fuel of inferior quality. On the other hand, the sole ground which the defense is rested is that the house of Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant company. It further appears that after the railroad

proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but the circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action because, first, the condition was not created by himself, secondly, because his house remained on the area by toleration and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near the house of Rodrigueza, had requested him to remove it, did not convert his occupancy into trespass or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company could at any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of eminent domain but it elected not to do so. Therefore, a railroad company, admittedly guilty of negligence in allowing sparks to escape from a locomotive engine, by means whereof fire destroys houses near its track, is liable for the damage and the owner of a house thus consumed by the fire cannot be said to be guilty of contributory negligence, in relation to such fire merely because his house is built partly on the land of the railroad company especially where the house on the same spot prior to the laying of the railroad track.

Far Eastern Shipping Company v. CA

Facts: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about

7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lift edanchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.- When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of thevessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25. 47

PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master. Issue: Whether both the pilot and the master were negligent Held:

Yes. The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. PILOT A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. MASTER In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk.- Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing.- The masters negligence translates tounsea worthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC.

48

Bernardo vs. Legaspi

Facts: Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of plaintiff's automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a crosscomplaint against the plaintiff claiming that the collission was due to plaintiff's negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence. Issue: Whether the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile. Held: Complaint Dismissed. Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the damages suffered.

*U.S. v. Ortega

49