Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation Author(s): Dieter Weiss Reviewed work(s): Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies,

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 27 (1995), 29-37. Printed in the United States of America

Dieter Weiss

IBN KHALDUN

ON ECONOMIC

TRANSFORMATION

A number of Arab countries have been exposed to structuraladjustmentprograms. Under the guidance of the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund, these programs are aimed at making various kinds of Arab socialist and mixed-economy a policy that startedin the 1950s and 1960s in counregimes more "market-friendly," tries like Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, and Egypt.1 Considering the mounting social tension that results from continuing population growth, urban agglomeration, and unemployment, it would be naive to expect-with Fukuyama-an "end of history" as most countries try to adopt market regimes and to strengthen civil society and parliamentarydemocracy. As Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) well knew, economic and social change is a never-ending process. In the search for viable and sustainable strategies it may be stimulating to consider the insights of this great scholar of the Arab world who wrote 600 years ago.
IBN KHALDUN'S SOCIAL SYSTEMS THEORY

Ibn Khaldunwas born in Tunis into an influential clan of South Arabian origin with substantialinfluence in Islamic Spain and, after the fall of Seville in 1248, in northwestern Africa. He was exposed to the turmoils of his time. He held his first position in 1352 at the court at Tunis at the age of 20 and then went on to high political, administrative, diplomatic, and judicial posts in the service of various rulers in the Maghrib, Spain, and Egypt. From 1375 to 1378, tired of politics and the hazards of public life, he wrote his "History of the World" (Kitab al-'ibar); its famous introduction (Muqaddima) was completed in 1377. Ibn Khaldun's career supplies the background for his attempt to condense historical experience into a system of scientific rules determining the rise and decline of social systems2 and to explain the patterns of historical change (1:11, 71).3 He aims at a new science of the genesis and decline of cultures (Cilmal-'umran). This science, according to Ibn Khaldun, should have its own subject matter-human society-and its own problems-social transformations(1:7, 77). In modern terms he deals with processes that recur cyclically during relatively normal phases, but from time to time undergo sharprupturesleading to fundamentalchanges of the systems.
Dieter Weiss teaches in the Departmentof Economics, Freie Universitit Berlin, Boltzmannstr.20, 14195 Berlin, Germany. ? 1995 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/95 $7.50 + .10

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Dieter Weiss

He himself had witnessed these in the form of the Black Death (which hit Tunis in 1348-49), the Mongol invasion, and the political and economic rise of Europe. The core concept of Ibn Khaldun's social theory is 'asabiyya (group feeling, social cohesion),4 which, according to him, is the decisive force behind the rise of a civilization. Today Casabiyyacan be applied to economic development: that is, it can be construed as combining the commitment by leaders to development with a people's strong motivation to achieve. The success or failure of development strategies during the last four decades has in fact been determined by these two factors ratherthan by conventional economic categories such as capital, naturalresources, and (unskilled) labor. For Ibn Khaldun, Casabiyyaemerges spontaneously among relatives and tribes. It is a relationship between persons who support each other. 'Asabiyya can also extend to clients and allies when mutual interest is involved (1:264, 270). Social cohesion, group feeling, and solidarity create the basis for cooperation. A political leader supported by a sufficiently effective casabiyya can succeed in founding a new dynasty. Cooperation is essential for building efficient social organization, and therefore it becomes more and more important as the state develops. The difference in the quality of Casabiyyadetermines the difference in size and quality of the civilization. After having reached its height, Casabiyyanecessarily grows weaker as a result of a web of psychological, social, economic, and political factors. It is a process of degradation5 and corruption in which luxury plays a prominent role. The decline of the old civilization allows for the rise of a competing new one. Ibn Khaldun's insights are strikingly modern: four decades of economic development in some 150 countries have made it clear that social cohesion based on a reliable sociocultural consensus and the satisfaction of basic needs of the population is in fact the decisive factor of success. Other elements are the commitment of the ruling elites to development and a framework of suitable macroeconomic conditions-both subject to a numberof contemporarystructuraladjustmentprogramsand the cultural disposition and qualification of the human factor linked with educational traditions, practice-oriented curricula, and achievement-oriented values.
IBN KHALDUN'S OBSERVATIONS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In 1776, Adam Smith published his Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the

Wealth of Nations. Its first chapter explains why division of labor enables workers to specialize and to increase their productivity. Ibn Khaldun presented almost exactly the same argument 400 years earlier: The individual humanbeing cannotby himselfobtainall the necessitiesof life. All human beings must co-operateto that end in their civilization.But what is obtainedby the cothan of a groupof human manytimesgreater operation beingssatisfiesthe needof a number themselves.Forinstance,no one, by himself,can obtainthe shareof the wheathe needsfor to makethe tools, and food. But whensix or ten persons,includinga smithanda carpenter of the ripe otherswho are in chargeof the oxen, the ploughingof the soil, the harvesting to obtaintheirfood andworktoward activities,undertake grain,andall the otheragricultural

Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation

31

that purpose either separately or collectively and thus obtain through their labor a certain amount of food, that amount will be food for a number of people many times their own. The combined labor produces more than the needs and necessities of the workers. (2:271-72) The increasingly complicated network requires cooperation, hence Casabiyya. Cooperation becomes ever more important in development at higher stages of organization and growing markets. With rising wealth there is an increasing demand for more sophisticated products in differentiating markets which in turn offer new opportunities for further productive specialization. Development consists of a mutual stimulation of supply and demand (2:277, 351) linked with the encouragement of science and technology (2:434-35). Ibn Khaldun is aware that prices and values are determined by supply and demand (2:276-78). He emphasizes the links between the market forces: demand offers chances for profit and stimulates supply; purchasing power turns into demand, thus stimulating a cumulative development process. When civilization [population] increases, the available labor again increases. In turn, luxury again increases in correspondence with the increasing profit, and the customs and needs of luxury increase. Crafts are created to obtain luxury products. The value realized from them increases, and, as a result, profits are again multiplied in the town. Productionthere is thriving even more than before. And so it goes with the second and third increase. All the additional labor serves luxury and wealth, in contrast to the original labor that served the necessity of life. (2:272-73) Ibn Khaldun stresses the role of labor as a source of added value: "Profit is the value realized from human labor" (2:311). He is aware that education and a high level of science and technology increase productivity. Once technical capacity is available, it attracts talent which in turn strengthens the technological potential. That is why technology is located in the cities where demand and incomes are high and buyers sophisticated (2:348). Ibn Khaldun declared that economic development needs a stable political framework, again a finding clearly verified in recent times. The structure of administration should be simple and should concentrate on a few essential functions like defense, diplomacy, and public finance (2:6-7). The supervision of markets, the enforcement of regular financial transactions, and the inspection of buildings for the protection of inhabitants should be part of its basic duties (1:292, 462-63). Ibn Khaldun describes the qualifications of a good ruler: An eager desire for goodness and good qualities such as generosity, the forgiveness of error, tolerance toward the weak, hospitality toward guests, the support of dependents, maintenance of the indigent, patience in adverse circumstances, faithful fulfillment of obligations, liberality with money for the preservation of honor, respect for the religious law and for the scholars . . ., belief in and veneration for men of religion . . ., great respect for old men and teachers, acceptance of the truth in response to those who call to it, fairness to and care for those who are too weak to take care for themselves, humility towards the poor, attentiveness to the complaints of supplicants, fulfillment of the duties of the religious law and divine worship in all details, avoidance of fraud, cunning, deceit, and of not fulfilling obligations, and similar things. Thus, we know that these are the qualities of leadership. (1:292-93)

32 Dieter Weiss A workable system, according to Ibn Khaldun, must be balanced. Public control and wise leadership should be matched by economic freedom for individuals, unhampered by an overwhelming public sector or a trade system monopolized by the ruler, or overburdened with heavy taxation that destroys economic incentives for productive work. The markets should be free from arbitraryinterventions of the state. Ibn Khaldun is also aware that the enforcement of low purchase prices for agricultural products through trade monopolies of the ruler regularly subject to correction in structural adjustment programs destroys the incentives for the farmers: "The trouble and financial difficulties and the loss of profit which it causes the subjects takes away from them all incentives to effort, thus ruining the fiscal structure. The trading of the ruler may cause the destruction of civilization" (2:95). During the last decade this phenomenon has also had a substantial impact on food security in Arab countries. The mint is a religious institution. Its offices have to guard gold and silver currency against debasement.6The ruler's mark upon the coins guarantees their quality and purity. The people want stability in the value of money. Once the inhabitants of a particularpart or region have decided upon a standardof purity, they hold to it and call it the "guide" (imam) or "standard"(Ciydr) (1:464). Ibn Khaldun says that gold and silver have a fixed value, not recognizing that the value of these metals is also subject to supply and demand ("all other things are subject to market fluctuations, from which gold and silver are exempt. They are the basis of profit, property, and treasure"; 2:313). Ibn Khaldun recognizes the three functions of money as a standardof value, a medium of exchange, and preservation of value. For Ibn Khaldun it is essential to design a tax system suitable for economic development. The state should only levy taxes according to religious law, that is, for charity, on land, and the poll tax; "they have fixed limits and cannot be overstepped" (2:89). However, Ibn Khaldun is aware that virtues such as kindness, reverence, humility, and respect for the property of other people tend to get lost as a dynasty grows rich and powerful. It imposes new and higher taxes which weigh heavily upon its subjects, and discourages economic activities (2:90-92). A prosperous economy offers a stronger tax base and leads to higher public receipts; high taxes discourage these effects and shrink the economy: "Business declines, and the subjects lose their livelihood, which, generally, comes from trading. Therefore, if no trading is being done in the markets, they have no livelihood, and the tax revenue of the ruler decreases or deteriorates, since ... most of the tax revenue comes from customs duties on commerce" (2:110). This leads to a deterioration of the state, to famine, and to rebellion. "At the beginning of the dynasty, taxation yields a large revenue from small assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation yields a small revenue from large assessments" (2:89). Ibn Khaldun is in favor of keeping the price of food low to meet the basic needs of the people (2:341-42). However, low price should not be achieved by the government fixing prices because this would destroy incentives for production (2:95, 136), as can be seen in contemporaryArab development policies now subject to revision within the current structuraladjustment programs.

Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation 33

Ibn Khaldun describes the socioeconomic and political mechanisms of urban agglomeration: growing population and migration to cities, rising urban purchasing power, differentiating markets and opportunities for specialization, growth in labor productivity and wealth. In the capital, the government accelerates this process through public spending. Being close to the ruler means participation in the additional flow of income. "Their wealth, therefore, increases and their riches grow. The customs and ways of luxury multiply, and all the various kinds of crafts are firmly established among them. This then is sedentary culture" (2:287). Ibn Khaldun offers the rudiments of a central place theory: Leading cities have highly specialized crafts which do not exist in the countryside. Sophisticated facilities such as public baths depend on the demand that arises only in a large, densely populated city. In smaller towns such establishments cannot be supported; if they are, they are neglected and fall into ruin because there is insufficient demand for them (2:302). Last, Ibn Khaldun stresses the danger of neglecting the sanitary aspects of town planning. With increasing population density putrefaction grows and multiplies ... resulting in many fevers that affect the tempers, and the bodies become sick and perish. The reason for the growth of putrefaction and evil moistures is invariably a dense and abundantcivilization.... It has been clarified by science in the proper place that it is necessary to have empty spaces and waste regions interspersedbetween civilized areas. This makes circulation of the air possible. It removes the corruption and putrefaction affecting the air after contact with living beings, and brings healthy air. This also is the reason why pestilences occur much more frequently in densely settled cities than elsewhere. (2:137)7 Ibn Khaldun has a somewhat mechanical conception that population growth is the consequence of rising wealth. A kind and benevolent rule serves as an incentive to the subjects and gives them energy for cultural activities. Civilization will be abundant, and procreation will be vigorous. All this takes place gradually. The effects will become noticeable after one or two generations at best. At the end of two generations, the dynasty approachesthe limit of its naturallife. At that time, civilization has reached the limit of its abundance and growth. (2:135) The deterioration of sanitary conditions and the emergence of diseases and epidemics are accompanied by famine. An ever larger number of peasants leave agriculture as a result of heavy taxation, expropriation, and social and political unrest and revolt provoked by the decline of the dynasty. Prices for food go up, and famines occur (2:136). Hence, the urban agglomeration carries the germ of its own destruction. Deterioration is linked to public finance because in its late phases the dynasty tries to exploit the tax base to meet the rising demand for funds, including the financing of mercenaries to secure its power. Ibn Khaldun also remarks that the economy declines as the government is under financial pressure to reduce the public demand for goods and services of the urban economy (2:103). Ibn Khaldun's cyclical development model is marked by parallel movements of population, urbanization, and public finance interwoven with sociopsychological,

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Dieter Weiss

cultural, and political components. The mutual interaction of these elements determines the rise and fall of civilizations.8 His empirical background was the Muslim world of Spain and North Africa, where he noticed cyclical fluctuations within relatively stable lower and upper limits.9
THE RELEVANCE POLICIES OF THE MUQADDIMA TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

Ibn Khaldun rightly identified the relevant components of the process of economic development: creation of added value, the working mechanism of supply and demand, consumption and production, the role of money, capital formation and public finance, population growth, the effects of urbanagglomeration,the crucial role of agriculture, the importance of political stability, and the conditions of the macroeconomic regulatorysystem as echoed in contemporarystructuraladjustmentprograms. He advocates economic incentives, warns against interventionism and confiscatory policies, and perceives social cohesion and commitmentas essential sociopolitical ingredients of development. All this is still vital to contemporaryeconomic policies. The Arab world has gone a long way since the end of colonialism. A number of countriestried socialist ideas in the early decades; others startedwith market-oriented strategies and turnedto state-guided capitalism and welfare state policies. None has been able to match the newly industrializingcountries in the Far East.10 A number of arguments presented by Ibn Khaldun still deserve attention; among them are the role of Casabiyya,supply and demand, labor qualification, science and technology, political stability, efficient government administration, monetary stability, sound public finance, food prices and subsidies, urbanization, population pressure, and environmental control. A number of Arab countries in the process of structuraladjustmentare faced with rising unemployment, reduced output and income, social tension, and Islamic revivalism.11Countries that have long relied on a strong public sector are confronted with the problems of financing the displacement of up to 50 percent of the industrial labor force. Substantial investments in infrastructureand industrial plants are necessary to arrive at the standardsof technology and competitiveness set by countries in the Far East. Ecological constraints and water shortages are acute problems, for example, Jordan's water resources will be exhausted by the year 2000. A general overhaul of managementtechniques is called for in countries like Algeria or Egypt.12 So far, no general consensus has emerged as to the best path to take to overall reform. Conflicting advice is presented by professional economists, and reform policies are becoming an art. The conversion of planned or mixed economies in the Arab world requires new methods of intervention focused on the macroeconomic level and on indirect incentives.13Everyone agrees that changes are needed, but views as to the extent, pace, and sequencing of the changes diverge. Three major subjects of debate are: (1) Can partial reforms succeed while other macroeconomic distortions persist? (2) Will political consensus in favor of reforms be sustained as social tension and unemployment rise? (3) Can the lack of expertise in the legal and institutional arrangementsof a market economy be overcome?

Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation 35 Priority can be given to the reintroductionof private ownership before addressing problems of macroeconomic stability and market development,14an approach that diminishes the political risk that the economy might remain under the control of the old public-sector elites. Or one can start with macroeconomic, in particularmonetary, reforms and the establishment of functioning markets for goods, services, and factors of production since a private sector cannot function effectively without a sound monetary system and financial market, and then deal at a later stage with the privatization of the large state-owned enterprises. No single sequence can claim to be optimal for all economies. But experience gained so far in the Arab world and in Eastern Europe indicates that a workable approach should begin with macroeconomic stabilization, that is, monetary and budget reform and balance of payments adjustment. Then prices should be deregulated and domestic and foreign trade liberalized. Many of these issues were addressed by Ibn Khaldun in the language of his time. No reform can avoid painful social adjustments. Both inflation and unemployment tend to rise as prices are decontrolled and the real losses of a previously distorted industrial structurebecome visible. In a number of Arab countries, political opposition is on the rise. Income disparities are bound to grow and will challenge concepts of social equity established in the past. Therefore, Casabiyyaconstitutes a core concept of political sustainability of the structuraladjustment process. The implementation of comprehensive reform packages will take at least a decade. Several years are necessary to put into effect the most important measures of macroeconomic stabilization: a deregulation of the prices of the majority of goods and services, a liberalization of trade and of the labor markets, privatization of small and medium-sized firms, and building a modified welfare net, which in some countries (e.g., Egypt) is supportedby a social fund financed by the World Bank.15 In a subsequent phase of several years, further measures toward liberalization and privatization must be implemented, and basic issues of the legal, administrative, and institutional framework are to be tackled.16 Time is essential, but time is running out in many overpopulatedArab countries with unrestrictedpopulation growth and declining migration outlets. Change is not at issue, but implementation is being delayed by the social cost of the transition, which cannot be borne by many Arab countries alone. With shrinking incomes, a furtherdecline in consumption is reaching its limits. The sustainable political consensus and manageable social cohesion explored by Ibn Khaldun may become major problems. Everywhere attempts at reform suffer from the fact that the social costs of adjustment are not being financed, with the result that reform measures lack determination. Governments are understandablyapprehensive of political unrest. Both Western and oil-rich Arab donor countries may be facing the common necessity of developing an enlarged and far-sighted concept of regional economic and social security in the Maghrib and Mashreq states. This could become a major issue for the European Community in spite of its preoccupation with the turmoil in Eastern Europe. The trans-Mediterranean perspective was partof Ibn Khaldun'spolitical when he moved from North Africa to the court of King MuhammadV experience

36 Dieter Weiss of Granada and was put in charge of a peace mission to Pedro the Cruel, King of Castile in 1364. In our times, from the European perspective mutual security is threatenedby growing poverty and social frustrationin the Arab countries bordering the Mediterranean.Similar apprehensions may be shared by the oil-rich members of the Arab League. Both in parts of the Arab world and in Eastern Europe the ideological vacuum that the end of communism has left is being filled by a revival of ethnic, nationalist, and religious passions. We have to live with this search for identity in a turbulent world. The "new world order,"the "peace dividend," and "the end of history" have already been replaced by uncertainties, the end of the reliable political coordinates of the cold war, and many open questions calling for the sobriety and analytical clarity so aptly demonstratedby Ibn Khaldun, in designing a viable coexistence on both sides of the Mediterranean. The Arab countries in the process of structuraladjustmentcannot evade the old lessons of development:to allocate scarce resources to meaningful goals within a framework of suitable incentives embedded into a broad social consensus. These were alreadythe early insights of Ibn Khaldun.His general observations are still timely for contemporaryeconomic reformersboth within the Arab world and outside it.
NOTES Author's note: This paper was presented at the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, on 24 March 1994, while the author was John Foster Dulles Visiting Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and InternationalAffairs. 1Dieter Weiss, Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsplanung in der Vereinigten Arabischen Republik (Cologne-Opladen, 1964), 238 f. 2WalterJ. Fischel, Ibn Khaldun in Egypt: His Public Functions and His Historical Research (13821406). A Study in Islamic Historiography (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), 15-19; idem, Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane (Berkeley, Calif., 1952), 30 f.; Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (London, 1949), 567-68; Cl. Huart, Geschichte der Araber (Leipzig, 1915), 2:205. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London, 1967) (hereafter cited as Ibn Khaldun/F. Rosenthal), 1:xxxiii f.; Charles Issawi, An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332-1406) (London, 1950), 14 f.; 0. G. von Wesendonck, "Ibn Chaldun: Ein arabischer Kulturhistorikerdes 14. Deutsche Rundschau 194 (1929): 46 f. See also Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of OurAge: Jahrhunderts," The Social and Cultural Outlook (New York, 1946), 301; Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Application (New York, 1968), 11. 3Here and following, the numbers in parenthesis refer to the volume and the page in Rosenthal's translation of the Muqaddimahcited in n. 2. 4Erwin Rosenthal, "Ibn KhaldfinsGedanken tiber den Staat: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Staatslehre,"Historische Zeitschrift 25 (1932): 1-2; Annemarie Schimmel, Ibn Chaldun:Ausgewdhlte Abschnitte aus der Muqaddima (Ttibingen, 1951), xviii, xix, 9, 37, translates Casabiyyaas "Zusammengehorigkeitsgeftihl";Ibn Khaldun/Rosenthal,lxi, lxxviii f., translates it as "group feeling"; Vincent Monteil, Ibn Khaldun, Discours sur l'histoire universelle. Al-Muqaddima. Tradition nouvelle (pr6face et notes) (Paris: Commission internationale pour la traduction des chefs d'oeuvre 1967-1968), 1:255, writes: "Ce terme, dont Ibn Khaldfin a assur6 la fortune, peut etre traduit, selon le contexte, par "esprit tribal, ou de clan; esprit de corps; tribalisme; consanguinit6; liens du sang." Ulrich Schoen, Determination und Freiheit im arabischen Denken heute (Gottingen, 1976), 91, translates it as "Bewul3tsein, zu einer Gemeinschaft zu geh6ren ... Clangeist." Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History (London, 1957), 196, translates it as "communal ethos, community of sentiment, or social solidarity."See also Salim Alafenish, "Die Bedouinen in Ibn KhaldunsWissenschaft," in Nomadismus-Ein Entwicklungsproblem?ed. Fred Scholz and J6rg Janzen (Berlin, 1982), 122-23; Heinrich Simon, Ibn

Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation

37

Khalduns Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Kultur (Leipzig, 1959), 48 f. Bassam Tibi, Vom Gottesreich zum Nationalstaat: Islam und panarabischer Nationalismus (Frankfurt, 1987), 128; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London, 1962), 41, 52, 78; Aziz Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldun in Modern Scholarship (London, 1991), 168-73; GerhardHipp, "Ibn Haldun und die arabische Linke," in Ibn Haldun und seine Zeit, ed. Dieter Sturm (Halle, 1983), 54. 5See also Hellmut Ritter, "IrrationalSolidarity Groups: A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldun," Oriens 1 (1948): 4. 6See, on monetary crises during Ibn Khaldun's times, Subhi Y. Labib, "Handelsgeschichte Agyptens im Spatmittelalter (1171-1517)," Vierteljahresschriftfiir Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 46 (1965): 266 f. 7These recommendations contrast with those given by Thomas Robert Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population, 6th ed. (1798), suggesting public health standardsbe deliberately lowered to fight population growth:
To act consistently, therefore, we should facilitate, instead of foolishly and vainly endeavouring to impede, the operations of nature in producing this mortality; and if we dread the too frequent visitation of the horrid form of famine, we should sedulously encourage the other forms of destruction, which we compel nature to use. Instead of recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage contraryhabits. In our towns we should make the streets narrower, crowd more people into the houses, and court the returnof the plague. In the country, we should build our villages near stagnant pools, and particularly encourage settlements in all marshy and unwholesome situations. But above all, we should reprobate specific remedies for ravaging diseases.

Cf. Jacob Oser and William C. Blanchfield,The Evolutionof Economic Thought(New York, 1975), 107-8. See on the history of pests and famine in the Middle East, Alfred von Kremer,Kulturgeschichte des Orients unterden Chalifen(Aalen, 1966), 2:490 f; Michael W. Dols, TheBlack Death in the MiddleEast (Princeton, N.J., 1977), 13 f. 8Jean David C. Boulakia, "Ibn Khaldun: A Fourteenth-CenturyEconomist," Journal of Political Economy 79 (1971): 1117. Fuat M. Andic and Suphan Andic, "An Exploration into Fiscal Sociology: Ibn Khaldun, Schumpeter, and Public Choice," Finanzarchiv 3 (1985): 456-59. 9Joseph J. Spengler, "Economic Thought of Islam: Ibn Khaldun," Comparative Studies in Society and History 6 (1963-64): 289 f. l?Cf. Abdulaziz I. Daghistani, "The Race of Development: Egypt vs. Others," L'Egypte Contemporaine 401 (1985): 6 f. " Dieter Weiss, "The Struggle for a Viable Islamic Economy," Muslim World 79 (1989): 46-58. 12Alex Mbller, Klaus Billerbeck, Christian Heimpel, Wolfgang Hillebrand, Hans-Herbert Taake, Dieter Weiss, Proposals for the Solution of the Most Important Structural, Economic and Financial Problems of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Report to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Anwar El Sadat (Berlin, 1980), 4-8. Dieter Weiss, "Institutional Obstacles to Reform Policies: A Case Study of Egypt," Economics 47 (1993): 66 f. 13DieterWeiss, "IntroducingMarket Elements into a Socialist Economy: The Experience of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China," L'Egypte Contemporaine 415-16 (1989): 42-44. 14Cf.World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington, D.C., 1991), 145 f. 15Weiss, "Institutional Obstacles", 72-75. 16Cf.World Bank, 145-46; Dieter Weiss, Structural AdjustmentPrograms in the Middle East: The Impact of Value Patterns and Social Norms (Berlin, 1992), 12 f.